Doctrine for Combined Airborne and Amphibious Operations

A Monograph
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First Term 90–91

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
Title of Monograph: Doctrine for Combined Airborne and Amphibious Operations

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Accepted this 9th day of April 1991
ABSTRACT

DOCTRINE FOR COMBINED AIRBORNE AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS by Major Harry M. Murdock, USMC, 57 pages.

The geo-political environment of the world today is rapidly changing creating many diverse challenges for the United States. When military force is required in response to these challenges, the most readily available forces to employ are U.S. Army airborne and U.S. Marine Corps amphibious units. However, in 1983, during Operation Urgent Fury, these forces were the primary participants and the operation, though successful, was poorly executed. This monograph examines the doctrine that is applicable to combined airborne and amphibious operations to determine if sufficient guidelines are provided for their effective integration.

The monograph initially establishes the usefulness of combined airborne and amphibious operations using the principles espoused by the classical theorists. Next, two historical operations are examined that featured combined airborne and amphibious operations. Then, current doctrine is presented. Finally, an analysis of the evidence is conducted using the command, control, and communications portion of Wass de Czege's maneuver effects model as the evaluating criteria.

Based on the analysis, amphibious doctrine provides the definitive guidelines required for successfully integrating the two operations. The elements of the doctrine that establish its primacy are the specified command relationships, the prescribed planning procedures, and the regulations associated with an amphibious objective area especially with regard to air-space control.
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The geo-political environment of the world today is rapidly changing, creating many diverse challenges for future military planners. The traditional bi-polar world that dictated our foreign policy over the last forty-five years has become a multi-polar world as the United States emerges from the Cold War as the apparent victor. Now, the potential exists for regional powers, unencumbered by the superpower struggle, to grasp the opportunity to assert themselves over their less powerful neighbors to enhance their national wealth and prestige. The United States, the world policeman by default, must be prepared to respond to these challenges as they may affect areas that are vital to our national interest.

If the response to a regional challenge necessitates military force, the forces that are the most responsive and combat ready are the forward deployed Marine amphibious units and the U.S. Army's alert airborne brigade of the 82d Airborne Division. Both of these forces have a forcible entry capability, yet are capable of conducting operations across the operational continuum. As flexible and versatile as these forces are, deployed individually they have exploitable weaknesses. Once deployed, airborne forces lack mobility, plus they are vulnerable to mechanized infantry and armored forces. Forward deployed amphibious units can arrive on the scene quickly, but due to their small size, are limited in their ability to respond without rapid reinforcement. In order to maximize our nation's response capability, the ideal rapid response force may be a force composed of both airborne and amphibious forces.

Besides offering the ideal rapid response force, combined airborne and amphibious forces, henceforth called airborne-amphibious forces, provide a
highly mobile strike force capable of operational maneuver on a conventional battlefield. Maneuvering to attack the enemy’s reserve forces, to cut their lines of communications, or to seize an advance base for the introduction of follow-on forces are likely roles for their employment.

In view of the above, it seems reasonable that such joint operations would be commonplace, however; the converse is true. The reluctance to combine the forces appears to be associated with command relationships and doctrinal procedures.²

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the command relationships and current doctrine to determine if there is a remedy to the current dilemma. The basic research question which must be answered is as follows: When airborne and amphibious forces are combined in a single operation, does current joint doctrine provide sufficient guidelines for effective integration?

The methodology to acquire the answer to the research question will be a seven step process. First, the theoretical foundations of airborne-amphibious operations will be explored to establish the usefulness of this type of operation. Then, two historical examples that featured airborne-amphibious operations will be discussed. A discussion of current joint doctrine will follow the historical presentation. Next, the criteria, which are the command, control, and communication portion of Wass de Czege’s maneuver effects model, will be introduced. The criteria will be used as a lens through which the evidence will be filtered. Then, using the criteria as the basis for evaluation, an analysis of the two historical operations and the current joint doctrine will be conducted. The next step will be the stating of the conclusions of the analysis. Finally, the monograph will end...
with the implications of the findings on future airborne-amphibious operations.

Finding a solution to the doctrinal dilemma in executing airborne-amphibious operations will optimize the usefulness of these forces while avoiding the needless loss of lives due to ineffective procedures. The next conflict we face will certainly require a joint force response with airborne and amphibious forces probably leading the way (even if it's just a show of force as in the initial stages of Operation Desert Shield) -- they must act as a unified force.
THEORY

The classical theorists produced volumes of principles that provide the foundation for modern warfare. When these principles were written, amphibious warfare was rudimentary and airborne warfare was unknown. However, the principles they postulated can be applied to these forms of warfare today. The principles will be examined to show the usefulness of airborne and amphibious operations as a viable form of combat.

Alfred T. Mahan, the well-known United States (U.S.) naval theorist, classified the U.S. as a maritime nation by virtue of its geographic position. He believed that the wealth of a maritime nation was dependent on sea commerce with the rest of the world. In order to maintain and protect the commerce, a navy was required. As the nation's interests became global in focus because of commerce, the necessity to secure the sea lines of communications to distant trading partners became essential. The responsibility for securing these vital sea lines of communications belonged to the navy or sea forces (including embarked troops).³

The great British naval theorist Sir Julian Corbett saw sea lines of communications as obstacle-free highways that offered an unlimited number of routes to distant areas of interests. If a nation's interests were challenged in one of these distant locations, he prescribed the use of a naval task force as a means of resolution. Corbett's naval task force was composed of embarked army troops, naval transports, a covering squadron, and an escort squadron. Upon arrival on the scene, the task force had the capability to conduct a variety of operations, amphibious assault being one, to dispute the challenge and preserve the nation's interests in the area.⁴ Corbett's
assessment of the value of these types of naval operations is revealed in
the following:

Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great
issues between nations at war have always been
decided—except in the rarest cases—either by what your
army can do against your enemy's territory and national
life or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it pos-
sible for your army to do. 5

Corbett describes the close and dependent relationship between the na-
val task force and the landing force as he states that the landing force is
incomplete without the supporting fires, supplies, and protection offered by
the task force. The task force provides the landing force with its means of
retreat, as well as its base of operation. Without the support immediately
available from its naval task force, the landing force was incapable of
"striking its blow in the most effective manner." 6 These statements on the
surface seem as negative indictments on amphibious operations. However, they
also clearly indicate positive attributes of amphibious operations when the
entire naval task force is employed. The positive attributes indicated are
that amphibious operations are sustainable, flexible, and possess their own
supporting fires.

With the development of the airplane, geographically separated nations
obtained an alternate way to influence or intervene overseas via air lines
of communication. Giulio Douhet, the Italian air power theorist, stated that
air lines of communications were similar to sea lines of communications in
that they were also free of natural obstacles and offered numerous routes to
distant locations. For Douhet, the airplane, due to its speed, was the ulti-
mate offensive weapon. Being on the offensive provided the attacker with the
advantage of being able to choose the time and place for action, while the
defender was compelled to disperse his forces to all potential targets. The
aerial force also had the advantage of operating from several separate bases
and converging on the target at the prescribed time to attain mass. It was the airplane's "complete freedom of action and direction"\textsuperscript{7} that so convinced Douhet of its dominance on the battlefield. Since planes deliver airborne troops on target, Douhet's concepts are applicable to airborne operations.

As indicated by Corbett and Douhet, amphibious and airborne forces have enormous potential to influence actions on distant shores. Individually, these forces are limited to the lift capability of their respective transport. However, if both forces were directed toward the same objective, then obviously greater combat power would be generated to influence the action. Combining forces in this manner is endorsed by Carl von Clausewitz as apparent in the following:

\begin{quote}
Since in strategy casualties do not increase with the size of the force used, and may even be reduced, and since obviously greater force is more likely to lead to success, it naturally follows that we can never use too great a force, and further, that all available force must be used simultaneously.\textsuperscript{8}
\end{quote}

Clausewitz continued by stating that the simultaneous use of all available forces was most effective when their employment was concentrated on "a single action at a single moment."\textsuperscript{9}

Combining airborne and amphibious operations in a single action offers distinct advantages at the operational level of war. According to Clausewitz, the attacker has the advantage of surprise, initiative, and concentric attack.\textsuperscript{10} A combined airborne and amphibious force (forward deployed) accentuates these advantages as their movement to the objective area is multi-directional and maximizes the use of speed. By combining the two forms of warfare, the enemy is placed in a defensive dilemma with regard to where to defend. The mobility of the attacking forces provides for multiple points of attack enabling the attacker to exploit an enemy's weakness. The
cumulative effect of these actions was captured 2500 years ago by Sun Tzu in the following:

Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions.  

Sun Tzu in his writings on estimates, energy, weaknesses, and strengths in The Art of War accurately describes many other facets of airborne-amphibious warfare (Sun Tzu's concepts on basic strategy and tactical fundamentals are considered valid today by many military theorists). Sun Tzu's belief that "all war is based on deception" is effectively employed with the mobility and versatility of airborne-amphibious forces. He believed in creating situations which forced the enemy to move and conform to the attacker's scheme of maneuver - exactly the intent of airborne-amphibious operations. In addition, he stated that those skilled in attack caused the enemy confusion on where to defend, another characteristic of airborne-amphibious operations.

Implied from the above discussions is that airborne-amphibious operations conform to certain principles of warfare considered important by the classical theorist. Therefore, military theory supports the use of airborne-amphibious operations as a viable form of combat.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In this section, two historical examples of airborne-amphibious operations will be scrutinized. The two operations chosen are: (1) the recapture of Corregidor, 1945; and (2) Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, 1983. The selection of these operations is based on their similar force structure (one reinforced battalion or near equivalent conducting the amphibious assault portion and a regimental size or slightly larger force conducting the airborne assault). In addition, both operations were planned under time constraints: Corregidor was planned in eleven days with the units involved engaged in combat in the Philippines; Operation Urgent Fury was planned basically in four days.

CORREGIDOR - 1945.

On 30 January 1945, the U.S. Sixth Army assumed responsibility for the conduct of operations on the Bataan peninsula, relieving the U.S. Eighth Army. The ongoing operations were destroying the Japanese 14th Area Army; however, the major objective of reopening Manila Bay had not yet been accomplished. In order for Manila Bay to be opened, the island fortress of Corregidor had to be captured.

General Headquarters South West Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur's command, issued the order on 5 February, 1945, for the recapture of Corregidor. The order stipulated that seizure of Corregidor would occur subsequent to the seizure of the Mariveles Bay area on Southern Bataan. Therefore, on 15 February, D-Day, an amphibious assault would be conducted to secure Mariveles in preparation for the D+1 assault on Corregidor. For Corregidor, the order specified that the assault would be a combined airborne and amphibious operation (see Appendix A). On 6 February, Rear
Admiral A.D. Struble, Commander, Attack Group Nine, was designated as Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) by 7th Fleet. Colonel G.M. Jones, Commanding Officer, 503d Parachute Infantry Regimental Combat Team (RCT) was designated as Commander, Landing Force (CLF). The landing force was commonly referred to as the ROCK FORCE. The chain of command for the operation is depicted in Appendix B.

Admiral Struble's attack group consisted of nine subordinate units. The units included the assault transport craft, Landing Ship Transports (LST's), escort ships, minesweepers, beach party, salvage, and rescue units. In addition, he was supported by a Naval Support Group (cruisers and destroyers) and a PT boat unit.

Colonel Jones' ROCK FORCE consisted of his own 503d Parachute Infantry RCT, 462d FA Bn, 161st Engineer Company from the 11th Airborne Division, and the 3rd Bn, 34th Infantry from the 24th Division. All total, the ROCK FORCE was 4,560 men strong.

The participants in the operation commenced planning on 8 February on board Admiral Struble's flagship in Subic Bay. This meeting was attended by Admiral Struble, CG XI Corps, and representatives from 7th Amphibious Force, 5th Air Force, and 503d RCT. Detailed planning was accomplished at this meeting to include decisions on times, objectives, and general concept of operations. Landing beaches and drop zones were also discussed, though additional information was needed prior to reaching decisions on these items.

The basic concept for the assault on Corregidor was for the 503d to conduct two 1000 men parachute drops while the 3rd Bn, 34th Infantry conducted an amphibious assault. The first 1000 men jump would occur at H-Hour, 0830, 16 February. Upon completion of the jump, the aircraft would return to Mindoro and load the second wave of jumpers. At H+2, 1030 hrs, the 3rd Bn,
34th Infantry would land in six waves across the designated beach. At approximately H+4, 1230 hrs, the second wave of jumpers would commence parachute operations. The remaining soldiers of the 503d would parachute onto Corregidor on 17 February.

Based on the above general concept, the Army air liaison officer on Admiral Struble's staff and representatives from 5th Air Force developed the air plan. The plan provided fighter protection for naval and ground forces enroute to and returning from the objective area, provided close air support to ground and naval forces, and outlined the troop carrier aircraft plan for delivery of the 503d. In addition, two plans were published to separate surface fires and aircraft.  

To further coordinate the use of the airspace, two air control agencies were established. "Support Aircraft Controller Afloat" was designated to control the airspace from the flagship until CATF and CLF agreed that the "Support Aircraft Party Ashore" was prepared to assume control. In order for CLF to have air control assets ashore, 1st Airborne Visual Control Party jumped in with the 503d. The map of Corregidor, Appendix C, shows additional fire support control measures established for controlling air during the operation.

To ensure the CLF could control naval gunfire, the 592d Joint Assault Signal Company (JASC) also jumped in with the 503d - their first combat jump. Besides controlling naval gunfire for RCT, the JASC provided HF communications between CLF and the CATF.

Perhaps the most difficult decision made during the planning phase was the selection of the drop zones (DZ's). In order to achieve tactical surprise in seizing the primary objective of "Topside", the RCT was forced to jump onto "Topside" itself. The only DZ's available were the parade ground,
325 yards long by 250 yards wide, and the golf course, 350 yards long by 185 yards wide. The golf course DZ was bordered on the south side by steep cliffs - there was no margin for error.

CAFF published Operation Plan No. 4-45 for the Mariveles-Corregidor amphibious operation on 10 February. The document reflected the thorough planning that had transpired in preparation for the assault as exhibited by its detailed target list, comprehensive landing beach analysis, complete air support plan with associated communication appendix (obtained from 5th Air Force), and designation of fire support areas for naval gunfire ships.

CLF published the landing force operation order on 13 February. Again, thorough planning was illustrated throughout the order as it clearly identified subordinate unit missions, provided the air and naval support plan, and stated the communication procedures. The CLF also tasked his regimental supply section (3 officers/50 soldiers) to go ashore with 3d Bn, 34th Infantry to function as the ROCK FORCE logistical support section and establish a beach evacuation station for all casualties.24

Both operation orders were based on an intelligence estimate that stated the island was defended by 850 Japanese. The island defense was oriented towards preventing an amphibious assault as exemplified by the extensive off-shore and coastal minefields. As the ROCK FORCE was soon to discover, the Japanese strength was significantly greater than expected - totaling an estimated 5847.25

On 16 February, at 0833 hrs, the lead elements of the 503d were landing on "Topside". Colonel Jones landed at 0940 hrs and within the hour had communications established with CATF.26 Japanese resistance was light, but the small treacherous DZ's were taking their toll as 175 men were injured and three killed during the jump. At 1028 hrs, the first wave of the 3rd Bn,
34th Infantry came ashore. Again, resistance was light and the lead elements arrived on Malinta Hill, their objective, within 30 minutes. The operation was proceeding as planned; the extensive preassault naval and air bombardment had forced the defenders to stay inside their tunnel hideouts. At 1250, the second wave jumped onto "Topside". By 1515 hrs, the initial airhead and beachhead had been secured so Colonel Jones reported to Admiral Struble that he was assuming control of the operation ashore.\textsuperscript{27} By parachuting onto "Topside", the ROCK FORCE achieved tactical surprise, while the amphibious landing successfully divided the defending force denying it the ability to move for a counterattack. By nightfall on D-Day, ROCK FORCE was firmly established ashore, but the two 1000 man jumps had been costly as a total of 267 men were injured or wounded and 12 more killed.

The costly jumps on D-Day caused Colonel Jones to change the insertion technique for the rest of his force, so on 17 February, the remainder of the 503d arrived via landing craft and linked up with the 3rd Bn, 34th Infantry. With all the ROCK FORCE now on the island, Colonel Jones began to methodically clear the island. By 23 February, "Topside" was secured enabling the force to commence operations east of Malinta Hill. The east end of the island was reached on 26 February and the island was declared clear of enemy forces on 28 February. On 2 March, the operation was officially concluded as General MacArthur returned to raise the U.S. flag over "Fortress Corregidor".

The detailed planning and coordination conducted between the participants prior to the operation resulted in the ROCK FORCE being able to capture the island despite being outnumbered. During the operation, 64 naval gunfire missions were fired. Between 16–25 February, 30 close air support missions were conducted, expending 34,900 gallons of napalm and 286 five
hundred pound bombs. This extensive use of fire support illustrates the excellent planning and coordination accomplished by the operating forces. Planned and executed as an amphibious operation, the recapture of Corregidor was a smoothly executed military operation.

**GRENADA - 1983**

In March, 1979, the New Jewel Movement, a communist inspired organization seeking governmental reform, staged a coup on the island of Grenada installing a government called the "People's Revolutionary Government". The new government kept Grenada within the British Commonwealth allowing the Governor-Generalship of Sir Paul Scoon to continue. However, they fostered a growing relationship with Cuba. For the new government, their ties with Cuba were critical as they were dependent for the training and equipping of the newly created People's Revolutionary Army (PRA). On 19 October 1983, internal party dissension resulted in the killing of Prime Minister Bishop and the declaration of a "shoot on sight" curfew by the ruling regime.

This unstable situation forced the U.S. to respond, so later that same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a warning order to the U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) to prepare for a non-permissive noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). Two days later, the JCS informed LANTCOM that the mission would be expanded beyond the scope of a NEO and would include full scale combat operations. Finally on 22 October, the JCS published the execute order for Operation Urgent Fury with LANTCOM's mission being as follows:

conduct military operations to protect and evacuate U.S. and designated foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralize Grenadian forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace. In conjunction with OECS (Organization of Eastern Caribbean States)/friendly government participants assist in the restoration of a democratic government in Grenada.
The execute order stipulated the participating forces to be those listed in Appendix D.

Based on the advanced warning received on 21 October, Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, CINCLANT, arranged a meeting for 22 October with the participating commands. Selected members of the LANTCOM staff, a JSOC representative, and four 82d Airborne representatives attended the meeting. Unfortunately, the Military Airlift Command (MAC) representative arrived late (after the JSOC and Airborne personnel had left) and there was no Marine present from the participating unit since they had sailed from Morehead City, N.C. on 18 October.31 Hampered by not having a map or any details on the enemy forces, the meeting concluded with a general concept of operations for the forces involved. However, specific details concerning identification of objectives, coordination procedures between the three ground forces, and other pertinent planning requirements went unanswered. From the general concept of operations discussed, CINCLANT proposed an operation plan to JCS. The LANTCOM plan, modified by JCS, was subsequently published by LANTCOM as their operation order on 23 October. D-Day was set for 25 October and H-Hour was set for C200.32

Prior to the publication of the LANTCOM operation order, roles and missions for the ground forces assigned were extremely vague. This is exemplified by the fact that as late as the night of the 23rd, all three ground forces (Ranger, 82d Airborne, and Marines) were planning to seize the same objectives — Salines and Pearls airports.33

LANTCOM's operation order established JTF-120 as the operational staff to command the operation. On paper, JTF-120 is always in a "ready for action" status as personnel are designated from all services to man the 88 staff positions. In this case, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, Commander 2d
Fleet, was named Commander, JTF-120, and he elected not to activate the entire staff. Instead, he decided to man the staff with selected officers from his 2d Fleet staff and a few augmentees (figure 1). This decision would later prove to be detrimental to the efficient execution of the operation as there were not sufficient Army personnel on the staff to man key control agencies such as the Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC). At the time of his official selection as CJTF-120, VADM Metcalf had 39 hours to organize his forces before H-Hour.

![Figure 1](image)

The concept of operations for Operation Urgent Fury, which VADM Metcalf inherited from LANTCOM, was complex. The Rangers and the other JSOC forces
under MG Richard A. Scholtes (CTF-123) were to secure the below listed objectives:

- Salines Airport (1/75 and 2/75 Rangers at H-Hour on D-Day)
- True Blue Medical Facility (1/75 Rangers on D-Day)
- Calivigny Barracks (2/75 Rangers on D-Day)
- Radio Free Grenada transmitting station (SEALS at H-Hour on D-Day)
- Sir Paul Scoon at Government House (SEALS at H-Hour on D-Day)
- Richmond Hill Prison (Delta at H-Hour on D-Day)
- Recon Salines Airport and install aircraft beacon (SEALS and USAF Combat Control Team (CCT) prior to H-Hour on D-Day)

The 82d Airborne units under MG Edward Trobaugh (CTF 121) were to land on the afternoon of D-Day; their mission was to relieve the Ranger units and then conduct mop-up operations to restore law and order on the island. The amphibious task force under Captain Carl Eric (CTF 121) was to secure Pearls airport at H-Hour on D-Day, then the town of Grenville on the northern end of the island. Appendix E is a map of Grenada with the D-Day boundaries and subsequent boundary changes that would occur later in the operation.

Planning for the operation was difficult due to the geographic separation of units, late notification of participating units (caused by operational security considerations), lack of information about the enemy, the non-availability of maps, and lack of hard-copy message traffic to guide operational planning (most orders were issued verbally). These shortcomings were particularly critical with regard to fire support planning and coordination between units. For example, the 2d Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (AGLC) and 21st Tactical Airlift Squadron (TAS) teams that were to support the 82d Airborne arrived at Ft. Bragg after their units had already deployed. Without these fire support control teams, the 82d Airborne had an extremely difficult time obtaining naval air and naval gunfire. In fact,
Despite having two destroyers on station, the Rangers and the 82d Airborne units did not receive a single round of naval gunfire in support of their actions. An additional example of this lack of coordination is typified by the following comment concerning the employment of aircraft from the aircraft carrier USS Independence on 25 October (D-Day):

> [the Navy pilots] went into combat the first day with absolutely no knowledge of, or coordination with, the Ranger and the Special Forces' operation. Due to this reason, all aircraft were initially prohibited from flying south of the northern sector without permission until midday of day one.

As D-Day arrived, the optimism of the planners soon faded as the events unfolded. The attempt by the SEALs/USAF Combat Control Team to recon Salines Airport was aborted. The SEALs designated to secure the radio station did so; however, lacking firepower they were forced off the objective by PRA mechanized forces and had to withdraw to the sea. Delta (1st Special Forces Operational Detachment - Delta) was repulsed by heavy anti-air fire and was therefore unable to assault Richmond Hill prison. The SEAL team that was tasked to secure Government House and Sir Paul Scoon made it to their objective, but were unable to extract due to enemy activity in the area. The Rangers encountered in-flight communications problems that prolonged their parachute operations, but were still able to secure Salines Airport and True Blue medical facility by 1000 hrs. Meanwhile, the Marines were meeting light resistance in the north and had rapidly secured Pearls Airport and Grenville. Overall, the task force was making progress, but the resistance had been much greater than expected causing several D-Day objectives to be left unsecured.

On the afternoon of D-Day, VADM Metcalf's greatest concern was the safe evacuation of Sir Paul Scoon. Government House was being pressured by the
PRA and the SEALS were running low on ammunition. A relief force had to be
sent to extract the force. VADM Metcalf tasked TF-124 with the mission, so
an amphibious assault on Grand Mal beach was planned. The surface assault
forces landed at 1901 hrs, on 25 October, and accomplished the link-up with
the SEALS at Government House at 0730 hrs, 26 October.38

With Sir Paul Scoon now safe, the JTF proceeded to secure the remaining
D-Day objectives. The Rangers, using Marine helicopters, evacuated 233
medical students from the Grand Anse campus in a near perfect raid that
lasted a total of 26 minutes.

On D+2, the last D-Day objective was secured as the Rangers of the
2d/75th captured Calivigny barracks in a vertical assault. Meanwhile, the
82d Airborne was progressing north towards Ross Point with the Marines mov-
ing south. To facilitate the planned link-up, CJTF-120 announced two bound-
ary shifts and designated a link-up frequency. However, no call signs were
exchanged and knowledge of the boundary changes never made it below brigade
commander in the 82d Airborne. With the location of friendly units uncer-
tain, the scheduled link-up did not occur until morning on D+3.39

The Marines were relieved in place by elements of the 82d Airborne on 2
November. Mopping-up operations were continued until 3 November when JTF-120
was disestablished and the operational control of the forces on Grenada was
passed to MG Troubaugh as Commander, US Forces Grenada.

During Operation Urgent Fury many mistakes were made, yet the mission
was accomplished and many Americans who were in "harm's way" were evacuated
to safety. The errors made were primarily caused by uncoordinated planning,
poor communication interoperability, and faulty fire support
planning/execution. Conducted as a joint operation combining several op-
erational doctrines, Operation Urgent Fury solved the immediate crisis but
surfaced many doubts about the U.S.'s ability to execute complex joint operations in the future.
CURRENT DOCTRINE

Airborne-amphibious operations are conducted using forces from all four services. In the search for the appropriate doctrine to govern these operations, a detailed examination of applicable doctrine must be conducted. Therefore, in this section the current doctrine for joint, amphibious, airborne, and naval warfare operations will be discussed. The focus of the discussion will be the aspects of doctrine that affect the commander's command and control capability.

JOINT OPERATIONS

An operation is considered a joint operation when two or more services are involved. Joint operations are executed to accomplish all or part of a strategic or operational objective in a Commander of Combatant Command's (CINC's) campaign plan. The CINC is responsible for the planning and execution of all military operations within his area of responsibility.

In executing war plans, the CINC will organize his forces on an area basis, a functional basis, or a combination. An area command arrangement is based on a geographic area and assigns the area to an area commander subordinate to the CINC. The service components assigned are tasked and supported through the area commander. In some cases, the CINC will be the area commander, so the service components report directly to him.

A functionally organized command is aligned based on the military functions to be performed during the operation. These functions determine the services involved. The functional component commander is usually the service with the majority of forces or the service with the best command and control capability. Unit integrity of service components is maintained to maximize
cohesion and capabilities. Commands are organized on a functional basis when one of the below items are a major concern:

- A need for centralized control and direction of certain military functions and types of operations that are not restricted to or limited by a specific geographic area.
- A need to fix responsibility for certain normal, continuing inter-area or intra-area functions.
- A need to establish the responsibility of a commander.
- A need to ensure coordination of specialized logistic support required for a particular type of operation.
- A need to support a particular operation plan.

Once the CINC has decided on the organization of his forces, command relationships are then established. CINC's have the option to authorize one of several levels of authority to subordinate commanders. The greater the need for decentralization, the higher the level of authority delegated. The levels of authority, listed highest to lowest, are Combatant Command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, and support. See Appendix F for definitions of these levels of authority.

CINC's are the only commanders that are authorized to exercise Combat Command (command authority). They exercise this authority through the commanders listed below:

- Service component commanders.
- Functional component commanders (designated as Joint Force Air Component Commander, Joint Force Land Component Commander, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, and Joint Force Special Operations Commander).
- Commander of subordinate unified command.
- Designated single service force commander.
- Commander Joint Task Force.
- Commander specific operational force.

Exercising Combatant Command (command authority) provides these commanders the authorization to assign tasks, designate objectives, and direct all aspects of military operations and logistics necessary to accomplish a mission. Commanders of subordinate unified commands and JTF's are authorized to
organize their forces functionally if that will enhance the ability of the force to accomplish its mission.\textsuperscript{45}

The preceding explanation on the CINC's assignment options illustrates the doctrinal dilemma for airborne-amphibious operations. Using the above procedures, the Marine units are normally assigned to the naval or maritime component, while the Army units are normally assigned to the Army or land component. These types of assignments necessitate that the operation as a whole be coordinated through the common superior - the CINC, the subordinate unified commander, or the JFC.

**AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE**

Doctrine for amphibious operations is espoused in Joint Publication 3-02. This publication defines an amphibious operation as:

> an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore.\textsuperscript{46}

As a forcible entry technique, amphibious operations begin with zero combat power ashore and rapidly increase to enable the force to conduct full scale combined arms operations against their final objectives.

An amphibious operation is conceived by the issuance of an initiating directive that dictates the mission, the commanders, the amphibious objective area, target dates, instructions governing termination requirements, and other pertinent planning considerations.

Upon receipt of the initiating directive, two parallel chains of command are established; one for the naval forces and one for the landing force. The naval forces are commanded by the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF), a Navy officer, while the landing force is commanded by the Commander Landing Force (CLF), an Army or Marine officer. During the planning
phase, the two commanders are co-equal, but upon embarkation or commencement of operations, the CATF becomes the overall commander.

These parallel chains of command develop their plans using the five phases of an amphibious operation. The phases are planning, embarkation, movement, rehearsal, and assault. The plans are developed using the backward planning technique. The first step is determining the scheme of maneuver ashore during the assault. The scheme of maneuver ashore dictates how the ships are loaded during the embarkation phase. How the ships are loaded determines the movement of personnel and equipment to the port of embarkation.

To execute the plan, the CATF has a task force normally composed of the following organizations: transport group, control group, tactical air control group, fire support group, screening group, reconnaissance and underwater demolition group, naval beach group, and other support groups as required. These groups are exercised by using their commanders as special staff officers on CATF's staff or as subordinate warfare commanders.

The CLF's landing force is composed of his command element plus ground, aviation, and combat service support units. When Marine units comprise the landing force, they are organized as a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). The MAGTF's vary in size from a Marine Expeditionary Unit, based on a battalion landing team, to a Marine Expeditionary Force, based on a division landing team. When Army units are designated as the landing force, their normal combat units are augmented with whatever aviation and combat service support units are required for the mission. Normally, the landing force is transported to the amphibious objective area by naval vessels, however, portions of the landing force may enter the area by other means (such as aircraft).
In addition to the normal composition of the amphibious task force discussed above, US Air Force units may be assigned. When this occurs, they will be organized as a separate component under the command of the senior US Air Force officer. Having a similar command relationship as CATF and CLF, the Air Force component commander operates under the command authority of the CATF during operations.49

To assist the CATF and CLF in the performance of their duties, each commander has a small permanent staff that is specifically designed to conduct amphibious operations. Special staff officers are also assigned that augment shipboard personnel in the operation of key control agencies such as the Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC), Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), Joint Intelligence Center, Helicopter Direction Center, and Shipboard Signal Exploitation Space.

Amphibious doctrine provides explicit instructions on the principle issues concerning the commanders and their staffs for the planning and execution of an amphibious operation. These instructions include the eleven basic decisions (selection of amphibious task force objectives, landing areas, landing sites, landing beaches, helicopter landing zones, drop zones, landing force objectives, D-Day, beachhead, landing force concept of operations, and H-Hour) as well as procedures for coordination of supporting arms, airspace control, communications planning, and functions of shipboard control agencies.50

The coordination of supporting arms and airspace control are unique in amphibious operations. Initially, the CATF controls both through the SACC/TACC located on board the flagship. As the landing force moves ashore, the CLF establishes his control agencies. The CLF will first assume responsibility for coordination of all supporting arms by the establishment of the
Fire Support Coordination Center. As more force is moved ashore, the aviation control agencies are established. This system, the Marine Air Control System, requires the establishment of the Direct Air Support Center (for processing tactical aviation), the Tactical Air Operation Center (for air defense control), and the Tactical Air Command Center (for planning and direction of air war). Upon establishment of the Tactical Air Command Center, the CLF will assume responsibility for all operations ashore.

Amphibious doctrine also specifies that for an amphibious operation, the establishing authority will provide the CATF with an amphibious objective area (AOA). An amphibious objective area is delineated in terms of sea, land, and air space.

The size of the amphibious objective area, dictated by the requirements of a specific operation, must be sufficient to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious task force mission, as well as to provide sufficient area for conduct of necessary air, land and sea operations.

NAVAL WARFARE

Naval task forces and battle groups use a concept called Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) to fight the naval war. The concept provides for centralized direction by the overall commander while decentralizing the execution of the different types of naval warfare (i.e. strike, anti-surface, anti-air, anti-submarine, etc). Figure 2 represents the current organization of a composite warfare battle group.
The use of the concept in conjunction with amphibious forces is currently an issue between Navy Fleet and Amphibious Group Headquarters, and Marine Fleet Marine Force Headquarters. It is this discussion that is pertinent to this monograph. At issue are two items which are: (1) Who is the CATF - is it the Officer in Tactical Command or the amphibious squadron/group commander? (2) Should the CLF become a warfare commander working for the Officer in Tactical Command? The decisions will affect the traditional relationship enjoyed between CATF and CLF as explained in the previous section. The two views are graphically displayed in figures 3 and 4 below.

**Figure 3**

This is the more traditional command arrangement. CATF coordinates the defense of his Forces as the Amphibious Defense Zone Coordinator (ADZC) for the CVBG (CWC).
This arrangement makes the Senior Naval Officer present, probably the Commander of the Carrier group, the CATF and makes the CLF a warfare commander - the amphibious squadron/group commander becomes the Amphibious Warfare Commander (AWC). STWC is Strike Warfare Commander.
AIRBORNE

Doctrine for airborne operations is stated in the multi-service publication FM 100-27/AFM 2-50. This publication defines a joint airborne operation as one that involves...

two or more services in the air movement and delivery of combat forces and logistic support into an objective area to execute a tactical or strategic mission. Delivery may be accomplished by airland, by extraction, or by airdrop.57

Like amphibious operations, airborne operations have forcible entry capability where the initial combat power is zero and must be increased rapidly for force survival and mission accomplishment.

Airborne operations are created by an initiating directive issued by a unified or JFC. This directive states the mission and command structure, identifies the forces involved and supporting forces, and provides a general timeline. Information concerning delays, alterations, and termination of the operation are also furnished in the initiating directive.

Upon receipt of the directive, two parallel chains of command are established -- one for the Army and one for the Air Force. The Army commander is the land component commander under the operational command or control of the establishing authority.58 Air Force assets assigned to the mission will be under the operational control of the air component commander of the establishing authority. The air component commander will exercise his authority through the Commander of Airlift Forces (COMALF) who is designated by Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command (CINCMAC).59

The size of the airborne force will be mission dependent. Therefore, the force could range in size from a battalion to a corps. Regardless of the size, USMC Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company personnel, USAF Tactical
Air Control Party teams, and combat service support units will be attached if required.

The air component will consist primarily of transport aircraft. If required, fighter escorts and combat air patrol support will accompany the flight. In addition, an airborne command post may be established using either DC-130, the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC), or the Joint Airborne Communications Center/CP (JACC/CP). USAF Combat Control Teams and USAF special operations weather teams may be employed with the lead elements of the airborne force to provide critical airfield and weather information to the air component commander.

The two commanders will plan and execute the airborne operation in four phases. The four phases are the mounting phase, the air movement phase, the assault phase, and the subsequent operations phase. The airborne operation is terminated by the establishing authority upon accomplishment of the mission, link-up with reinforcing units, or withdrawal of the airborne force.

The backward planning technique is used for airborne operations and consists of four steps. The first step in the process is the development of the ground tactical plan. Based on the ground tactical plan, the landing plan for the delivery of the force to the DZ's or LZ's is established. The landing plan drives the air movement plan which dictates the marshaling plan.

To facilitate the integration of the two components during the planning and execution of airborne operations, the Army Air-Ground System (AAGS) has been created. The system is designed to use in-place personnel and equipment to perform specific functions that relate to both tactical airlift and air support. The AAGS interfaces with the Air Force's Tactical Air Control
System to integrate fire support, control airspace, share intelligence, and coordinate airlift requests.62

During an airborne operation, the coordination of supporting arms and airspace control is a combined Army and Air Force effort. Initially, an ABCCC is used to execute these functions.63 Once a battalion tactical command post is established, airspace control is supervised by the S-3 Air in conjunction with the USAF Tactical Air Control Party.64 Fire support coordination is conducted by the fire support element under the supervision of the fire support coordinator. When a brigade tactical command post arrives, a similar system is used. Upon arrival of the division, an Army Aviation Command and Control element is co-located with the fire support element and Tactical Air Control Party to coordinate these functions.65

The doctrine established for airborne operations provides sufficient details to properly coordinate the complex air delivery of assault forces on a distant object. Numerous agencies are identified to assist in the movement control of personnel and equipment into the objective area. Specific guidelines are established for selection of drop zones, air routes, logistical requirements, and communication and fire support planning.
ANALYSIS

In this section an analysis of the evidence presented will be conducted to determine if the current doctrine provides sufficient guidelines for the integration of airborne and amphibious operations. For the analysis, the command, control, and communications section of the maneuver effects model created by Colonel Huba Wass de Czege will be used as the evaluating criteria. The exact elements of the model have been modified from the original to allow the elements to evaluate doctrine, since doctrine is considered an element in the original model. The modifications also allow the criteria to evaluate the unique planning procedures specified by the operational doctrines, i.e. airborne and amphibious.

The command, control, and communication evaluation criteria consist of three elements, which are span of control, staff efficiency, and adequate communications. Each of these elements have sub-elements that delineate specific factors that provide objectivity to the analysis. Each of the elements will be discussed in detail to elaborate the analytical process.

The first element to be examined will be span of control. A commander's span of control is generally interpreted as the number of subordinate elements which he controls. If a commander has three or four subordinates, it is considered that he has a reasonable span of control as compared to a commander with six or seven subordinates. However, the term must also consider all the other distractions that require a commander's attention, such as responding to higher headquarters, determining the enemy situation, influencing the battle, conceptualizing the next engagement, and adjusting plans to environmental conditions. An additional subelement under span of control has been added for this analysis which is unity of effort. The commander's
ability to focus the efforts of all his subordinates towards a common objective is critical to mission accomplishment. Unity of effort relies on sound leadership, well understood doctrine, and thorough coordination of plans.\(^6\)\(^8\) A key factor in establishing unity of effort and the number of subordinates is the command's organization.

The second element of criteria is staff efficiency. Staffs are designed to assist the commander in the decision-making process and to facilitate the execution of his plans.\(^6\)^9 In that regard, the element is composed of two subelements which are staff organization and organized planning procedures. Staff organization includes the staff size and composition. Staff composition is critical in a joint operation to ensure that the appropriate service representatives are present to influence staff action and ensure efficient execution of the operation. Having an organized planning procedure, dictated by doctrine, focuses the efforts of the staff. For the analysis, the effectiveness of the staff to plan and coordinate fire support and airspace management will be the measure of this subelement.

The third element of criteria is adequate communication. This element is composed of two sub-elements, which are a comprehensive plan and compatibility. If a comprehensive communications plan exists for an operation and the units involved have compatible communications equipment, then the overall commander of the operation can rapidly exchange information and instructions with his subordinates exercising effective command and control.\(^7\)\(^0\)

**SPAN OF CONTROL**

Management of many is the same as management of few. It is a matter of organization.\(^7\)\(^1\)

For analytical purposes, the command organization of the units involved in the two historical operations will be scrutinized using today’s doctrinal terminology. Therefore, the command structure for the Corregidor operation
represents a subordinate unified commander (General Headquarters South West Pacific Area) operating through three service component commanders (See Appendix B). Since the operation was planned as an amphibious assault, the command structure was further simplified as the Navy component commander, (Commander, Attack Group Nine) became the CATF, the Army component commander (Commander ROCK FORCE) became subordinate to CATF as the CLF, and the Air Force component commander (5th Air Force) became a supporting commander. This command structure provided for one overall commander with one major subordinate component in the landing force and one major supporting component in the Air Force. The naval assets were under the CATF's control.

CATF's span of control was also enhanced by ensuring unity of effort in the operation by basing all the planning and execution on a single ground scheme of maneuver. The CATF facilitated the coordination of the landing force's plan by conducting the planning meeting on 8 February 1945, with representatives from all the participating commands. This meeting, which he hosted, enabled him to influence the overall operation and provide his commander's guidance. Unity of effort was further achieved by the use of a common doctrine for the operation. All the participants recognized and coordinated their efforts through the different control agencies established by amphibious doctrine under the CATF. Finally, the timely publication of the CATF's operation order (5 days before the initial D-Day) allowed time for the participants to coordinate their subordinate operation orders.

In contrast, the command structure for operation Urgent Fury varied greatly from that structure established for the Corregidor operation. The overall commander for Operation Urgent Fury was CINCLANT, a unified commander. However, unlike the Corregidor operation, CINCLANT established a joint task force to execute the operation instead of operating through the
service component commanders. The joint task force, JTF 120, was structured along basically functional lines with a slight modification to allow for both a maritime unit and a naval unit. Therefore, CJTF-120 had a subordinate commander for the special operations component, land component, amphibious component, naval component, and air force component. As a result, CJTF-120 had five subordinate commanders, three of which were conducting operations on the ground in close proximity of each other. The total number of subordinates in this case was not excessive; however, having three separate ground elements with three separate and uncoordinated schemes of maneuver resulted in an inefficient use of ground forces and created confusion between adjacent units. This confusion was exemplified by the uncoordinated link-up on D+3. In addition, the lack of coordination between subordinate commands extended beyond just the ground units as indicated by the fact that the aircraft off the USS Independence went into combat on D-Day with no knowledge of the Ranger and special forces operation.

The lack of coordination between subordinate commands illustrates the problems CJTF-120 (Admiral Metcalf) had in establishing unity of effort. Receiving the command only 39 hours prior to H-Hour was an obvious handicap; however, it is incumbent upon the commander to quickly focus the effort of all the forces assigned to him. Accepting a structure that lacked unity of command for the ground forces, it was imperative for Admiral Metcalf to establish unity of effort between them. Unfortunately, he was unable to have all his commanders meet together prior to H-Hour to coordinate plans or have the benefit of a common doctrine to guide their planning and execution. This lack of unity of effort was only overcome by extraordinary actions of individual unit commanders on the ground after the operation commenced.

34
Today's current joint doctrine provides for a reasonable number of subordinates for either the CINC or JFC regardless of the organizational option chosen. The more difficult aspect of span of control achievement with our current doctrine rests in achieving unity of effort. Regardless of the technique used for organizing the command, the overall commander will end up with three subordinate commanders for ground force operations - one for special operation forces, Army forces, and Marine forces. Unity of effort in this arrangement is only achieved through detailed planning, extensive joint training, and relentless coordination. Unifying the efforts of the three elements once an operation commences remains difficult as constant attention and direction must be provided by the overall commander to focus the efforts of the ground forces.

Establishing unity of effort through unity of command over the ground forces would be a preferred technique and would be in consonance with our published principles of war. The operational doctrine which best fulfills this aim is amphibious doctrine. Under amphibious doctrine, the CLF may deploy elements of the landing force into the AOA by means other than naval vessels, ie. airlanded or para-dropped. In addition, special operation forces introduced into the AOA either prior to or during the assault are executing, in amphibious doctrine terminology, pre-assault operations. Therefore, they would also belong to the CLF. Conversely, the only command relations addressed by airborne doctrine are those concerning the airlanded or para-dropped forces.

Therefore, to optimize the commander's ability to establish unity of effort, a command structure similar to the arrangement currently used in amphibious doctrine needs to be instituted. The command structure of CATF and CLF is based on functional assignment vice service component. Functional
assignment used in this manner is authorized by current directives, since it establishes the responsibility of a commander and supports a particular operation plan (see page 20 for criteria to establish functional commands).

In view of the above, current joint doctrine does provide sufficient guidelines for the successful integration of airborne and amphibious forces with regard to the criteria of span of control. The doctrine which supports this evaluating element is amphibious doctrine.

STAFF EFFICIENCY

At Corregidor, Admiral Struble's and Colonel Jones' staffs were directly responsible for planning and executing the airborne-amphibious operation. From examining their after action reports, there were no apparent weaknesses or shortages on their staffs that impaired the operation. The evidence indicates that both staffs were extremely efficient as demonstrated by the publication of Admiral Struble's operation order on 10 February 1945, and Colonel Jones' on 13 February 1945. Both orders were detailed and provided collaborating instructions to all participants.

The staffs' planning procedures, dictated by amphibious doctrine, were extremely thorough. The thoroughness of the planning was exemplified by the fire support planning and airspace control procedures established. The fire support plan included a comprehensive target list; pre-assault, assault preparation, and post assault fires; establishment of fire support coordination measures; and the attachment of air and naval gunfire control teams to the landing force. The complex airspace control problem was solved by establishing two different techniques to deconflict air and surface fires plus the use of afloat and ashore air control agencies.

Similarly, during Operation Urgent Fury, CINCLANT's staff and CJTF-120's staff with their associated subordinate element staffs were
principally responsible for the planning and execution. CINCLANT's staff and the JTF-120 subordinate element staffs were well organized and sufficiently manned to accomplish their missions. However, CJTF-120's staff was grossly undermanned for its tasks as reflected by its normal staffing of 88 verses the actual staffing of 23 for the operation. As a result of this staffing decision, an insufficient number of Army personnel were on CJTF-120's staff to properly integrate their plans with the supporting Navy assets and to coordinate the execution with the key control agencies.

In evaluating the planning procedures used by CINCLANT and CJTF-120 and its subordinate elements, it appears that they were severely handicapped by operational security considerations. As a result, timely notification to all units participating did not occur. In addition, the tardy formulation of JTF-120 further complicated the time sensitive mission. For Operation Urgent Fury, the subordinate elements followed the doctrinal procedures established for their portion of the operation, i.e., the Army and Air Force conducted an airborne operation on their half of the island, while the Navy and Marines conducted an amphibious operation on the other end. No single doctrine was followed to coordinate the fire support planning or airspace management. Lacking a focused planning procedure based on a single doctrine resulted in uncoordinated execution of plans as exemplified by the previously mentioned difficulties the Army had in coordinating through SACC and the USS Independence's prohibition of flying in the southern sector.

Today, our current doctrine recognizes the shortcomings of CJTF-120's staff organization by stating that "staff members should be assigned in a manner that ensures that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force."75
In addition, joint doctrine has specified basic principles to guide the operations and functions of joint staffs.\textsuperscript{76}

In evaluating the current planning procedures for airborne and amphibious operations, it is found that they are amazingly similar. Both are divided into phases which in essence say that the forces are going to embark transportation means, move to an operating area, assault to seize initial objectives/landing area, and then conduct subsequent operations. Both planning processes begin with establishing the ground scheme of maneuver, then the formulation of a landing plan that drives the embarkation plan. Therefore, integrating the two procedures is a function of a common commander who provides the necessary guidance, timelines, and objectives required to complete mission planning.

Control agencies are established for fire support coordination and airspace management by each doctrinal technique. However, the multi-service manual entitled *Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone* states that aircraft that enter an AOA will be controlled in accordance with the procedures outlined in amphibious doctrine.\textsuperscript{77} Therefore, the control agencies used in amphibious doctrine must be the primary control agencies for the overall airborne-amphibious operation. Mobile command posts, such as the ABCCC that have a capability to act as a control agency, could be effectively used to extend the range of the CATF's control agencies on board ship.

Based on the above, current doctrine does provide sufficient guidelines for the integration of airborne and amphibious operations with regard to the elements of staff efficiency. The sub-element staff organization is addressed by current joint doctrine. The sub-element organized planning procedure is thoroughly covered by airborne and amphibious doctrines; however,
the procedures and control agencies outlined in amphibious doctrine must take precedence in view of the primacy of air control within the AOA. A single doctrinal planning procedure must be stipulated to focus the planning efforts of all concerned.

ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS

During Corregidor, effective command and control was achieved by the commanders establishing a comprehensive communication plan. The plan established nets for the conduct and control of supporting arms, for communications between CATF and CLF, and for coordination between subordinate units. The effectiveness of the communication plan was demonstrated by changing insertion techniques by the 503d RCT on D+1. Changing from a parachute insertion to a surface assault using naval landing craft necessitated a battalion size unit being air-transported from Mindoro to Subic Bay, then being transported to Corregidor by ship and, finally, landed via surface craft, all in less than 24 hours.78

Unlike Corregidor, Operation Urgent Fury was plagued by communication problems. From the evidence surveyed, it does not appear that a single comprehensive plan was published for all participating units. A classic example in this communication failure is illustrated by a Marine AH-1T cobra helicopter that was sent by the helicopter direction center to support the Rangers on D-Day. Given a frequency to contact the Air Force gunship supporting the Rangers, the AH-1T cobra attempted to make contact. Unable to contact either the gunship or the Rangers, the pilots scanned other frequencies and found an Army frequency. Gaining contact with a forward air controller, the AH-1T cobra was directed to the vicinity of the target, but the exact target location remained unidentified due to the forward observer having a different map than the pilots. The target was eventually pinpointed using a
signaling mirror and destroyed.\textsuperscript{79} Command and control was further exacerbated by the lack of compatibility between the participating units as shown by ANGLICO's (attached to 82d Airborne units) inability to talk with SACC due to incorrect codes, frequencies, and call signs.\textsuperscript{80}

Our current doctrine addresses the above shortcomings by stating that one of the guidelines for joint operations is to "ensure that communications equipment is interoperable, redundant, and complemented by standardized formats and procedures."\textsuperscript{81} Also, both airborne and amphibious doctrine adequately address communications planning and the necessity for compatibility between units. In summary, the current doctrine does support effective integration of airborne and amphibious operations. The critical factor that drives a comprehensive communication plan is the selection of a single doctrinal procedure that focuses the planning efforts of the participants.
CONCLUSIONS

The analysis revealed that current doctrine does support the integration of airborne and amphibious doctrine. The results of the analysis indicate a need for a common ground force commander to optimize the span of control for the overall commander. The analysis also showed that staff efficiency and adequate communications were functions of having a doctrinal procedure prescribed for planning and executing an operation.

The analysis indicated that the amphibious doctrine offered the overall commander the most effective span of control and actually took precedence over other operational doctrines with regard to airspace control within an amphibious objective area. The amphibious doctrine also accommodated the movement of forces into a single objective area by different means. In addition, special operation forces that move into an objective area early, prior to the assault, are addressed under amphibious doctrine.

Based on the above, an airborne-amphibious operation should be planned and executed in accordance with amphibious doctrine. The commander of the landing force should be the service component commander with the preponderance of forces being committed. His location during the initial stages of the operation should be on board the flagship where he can control the operations ashore while coordinating with his Navy counterparts.

In light of the Navy's composite warfare commander concept and the current debate on the command structure for amphibious operations, the commander of the landing force for an airborne-amphibious operation should be a functional component commander. This arrangement would be appropriate considering the size of the combined airborne-amphibious landing force and the probable rank of its commander (which would probably equal or surpass the
Amphibious Warfare Commander). Proposed command arrangements for an airborne-amphibious operation are provided in figures 5 and 6.

**Figure 5**

```
CINC(CATF)
  /    |
 CLF   AWC Joint Force
        Navy
        Component Commander
        Joint Force
        Air
        Component Commander
```

With this arrangement, the CINC declares that the mission will be executed as an amphibious operation and establishes his subordinates as functional commanders - Commander Landing Force, Amphibious Warfare Commander, Joint Force Navy Component Commander, and Joint Force Air Component Commander.

**Figure 6**

```
CINC
  /    |
 JFC(CATF)
  /    |
 CLF   AWC Joint Force
        Navy
        Component Commander
        Joint Force
        Air
        Component Commander
```

With this arrangement, the CINC has established a joint task force to execute the amphibious operation. The JFC designates his subordinate commanders along the same functional lines as described above.
Using the command arrangements depicted above provides the following advantages:

- The CINC (Figure 5) or JFC (Figure 6) acts as the OIC.
- The CLF has unity of command over all ground forces and designs a single ground scheme of maneuver for implementation.
- The Amphibious Warfare Commander can directly influence his ability to support the ground scheme of maneuver with his amphibious squadron/group. He acts as CWC for his task force.
- The Joint Force Navy Component Commander acts as CWC and fights the naval war isolating the amphibious objective area while allocating strike aircraft to support the ground operation.
- The Joint Force Air Component Commander can directly influence his ability to support the ground scheme of maneuver with his transport and tactical aircraft.

The command structures depicted in figure 5 and 6 are consistent with history as shown by the below stated responsibilities of the commander of the Naval Attack Force (CATF) as published in the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations dated 1934.

- The actual operation of landing on the beaches of all personnel and material pertaining to the landing force in accordance with duly prepared debarkation tables.
- The employment of naval air forces during the landing, in support of the attack, and the advance inland when air bases are not available for operation of landing force air units.
- The support of the landing by ships gunfire, and the employment of mine layers, sweepers and other naval craft.
- The maintenance of signal communications between ships and shore, both afloat and in the air; all this in addition to the normal functions involved in protecting the forces against local hostile naval attack.
Establishing a single doctrine for the execution of an airborne-amphibious operation allows these forces to fully exploit their strengths while minimizing their weaknesses. Using these forces as an integrated team provides our nation with a responsive, powerful combat force capable of intervention in a wide variety of scenarios. This increased benefit is derived without "new equipment or force structure".

In order to obtain the above benefits, several things must be accomplished. First, CINC's and JFC's must be knowledgeable of amphibious doctrine. Next, airborne and amphibious units must train together to become familiar with each other's procedures. Third, Army fire support personnel must become proficient in amphibious fire support control procedures (FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination, and FMFM 7-2 Naval Gunfire Support, describe these procedures). Fourth, Air Force air control agencies must participate in amphibious exercises to become proficient in working with the Navy's TACC afloat in transferring the airspace control responsibility ashore. Fifth, the current amphibious doctrine should be expanded to include any essential control measures, planning considerations, or procedures that are unique to airborne operations that are not sufficiently addressed. Finally, "rice bowl" concerns of special operation forces, Army units, and Marine units must be set aside for the good of the total force.

If our nation is going to maximize the use of its most combat ready units, airborne and amphibious forces must be able to function so efficiently that they appear as a single service unit. The adoption of amphibious doctrine as the prescribed procedure for planning and executing an airborne-amphibious operation is the first step, and the biggest step, in achieving that goal.
APPENDIX B

Chain Of Command
Corregidor, 1945

* GHQ PA

- Allied Air Force
  - Fifth Air Force

- US 7th Fleet
  - 7th Amphibious Force
    - Attack Group Nine
      - Rock Force

- US Sixth Army
  - XI Corps

* GHQ PA to XI Corps following assumption of command ashore.

Source: Multiple sources, chart drafted by author.
APPENDIX C

Map of Corregidor

SOURCE: COMBAT NOTES, (Assistant Chief of Staff, Sixth Army, 1945), p. 5
APPENDIX D

JTF 120 For Operation Urgent Fury

![Diagram of JTF 120 for Urgent Fury]

APPENDIX E

Map of Grenada

GRENADA
Showing 22d MAU Phase Lines

Caribbean Sea

APPENDIX F

Definitions

Combatant Command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10, United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified and specified combatant commands. Combatant Command (command authority) is the authority of a Combatant Commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant Command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commander. Combatant Command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Also called COCOM (JCS Pub 1-02)

Operational Control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Tactical Control. The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (JCS Pub 1-02)


50


5. Ibid., p. 16.

6. Ibid., p. 294.


10. Ibid., pp. 363-364.


12. Ibid., p. vii.

13. Ibid., p. 66.


21. Ibid., p. 3.

22. Ibid., p. G-5.


27. Ibid., p. 18.

28. Ibid., p. 18.


30. Ibid., p. 126.

31. Ibid., p. 119 and pp. 132-133.


33. Adkin, p. 139.

34. Metcalf, pp. 279-280.

35. Adkin, pp. 136-137.


37. Adkin, p. 186.


41. Ibid., pp. (II-1) - (II-2).


43. JCS Pub 3-0, p. II-2.

44. Ibid., p. II-4.

45. JCS Pub 2-9, p. 3-28.


47. Ibid., p. 2-5.

48. Ibid., p. 2-7 and p. 4-7.

49. Ibid., p. 2-7.

50. Ibid., pp. 2-11 thru 2-12, 4-1 thru 4-9, 9-1 thru 9-9, and 16-1 thru 16-25.

51. Ibid., p. 2-3.


55. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

56. Ibid., p. 18.


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