CRITERIA TO MOBILIZE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ROUNDOUT BRIGADES
WITH ITS ACTIVE COMPONENT DIVISION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirement for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

THOMAS J. O'DONNELL, MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1979

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1992

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
The thesis examines historical examples of the mobilization of Reserve and National Guard forces. The intent of this study is to evaluate past reasons for mobilization efforts in order to synthesize valuable lessons which may be applicable to the Total Army in the 21st century. The mobilization of the National Guard's 29th Infantry Brigade for the Vietnam War and the 48th Infantry Brigade for the Persian Gulf War are analyzed to highlight and validate conditions under which such activation decisions were successful. In each case appropriate detail is presented to create an accurate picture of the conditions, techniques, and procedures employed in making the decision to mobilize a roundout brigade. The analysis reveals the importance of establishing clear criteria against which each mobilization decision should be evaluated at the National, Departmental, and Unit levels. Findings, lessons learned, shared characteristics, and implications are presented to assist future decision makers as they make mobilization decisions in the uncertain strategic environment of the decades to come. Implications for the protection of American national interest in the future show that as the active Army shrinks, valid criteria for mobilization decisions will grow in importance.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (Reference to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Guard stands naked before the American public portrayed as having failed, after millions of dollars and uncountable hours of our soldiers' time have not produced combat ready units.\(^1\)

LTG Herbert R. Temple (Ret.)
Former Chief of the
National Guard Bureau
February 1991

Introduction

As the Army responds to the new roles it must perform to support the new National Military Strategy (NMS), two trends emerge quite clearly. First, despite the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the accompanying failure of world communism, the world will remain a volatile and unpredictable place. U.S. global interests will continue to be challenged, and as recent events in Panama and the Persian Gulf illustrate, U.S. military forces must be able to mobilize and deploy rapidly to conduct combat or

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humanitarian operations with little or no preparation. Second, the virtual disappearance of the Soviet threat, coupled with changing domestic and international priorities, will result in a dramatically smaller force structure.

The implication from these developments is clear: to execute its part of the NMS, with the enduring primary aim of deterrence, the Army will depend more heavily on its Reserve Component (RC) and the National Guard than ever before. As former Chief of Staff, General (Retired) Carl E. Vuono, noted in 1991:

If the U.S. were to attempt an operation like DESERT STORM with the forces contemplated for the mid-1990s, the President might have to declare partial mobilization immediately and activate reserve forces on a far greater scale. The rapidly mobilized reserves would not only be required to train, deploy, and fight ... they would be mobilized early ... to assume the strategic functions that a smaller active force could no longer cover.

This thesis seeks to determine the conditions which must be considered in determining whether to mobilize an Army National Guard (ARNG) roundout\(^2\) brigade for combat service with its Active Component (AC) parent division. Not since the Weinberger Doctrine was proposed in 1984 has there been an attempt to address (in a criteria based model) the use of US forces for crisis. This study expands on the basic concept of former Defense Secretary

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\(^2\)The Army defines "roundout" units as a "Department of the Army managed program which brings units up to a designated structure by filling organizational voids with units from a different component." Typically, units from the Reserve Component "roundout" Active Component units to bring the AC unit up to wartime strength. As stated in FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, Glossary I, 1 August 1988.
Weinberger's proposal to address the mobilization of combat National Guard roundout brigades with their active component parent divisions.

The principal theme that emerges from the American history of mobilizations is that decision-makers at the political (National) level, as well as leaders at the Department of Defense (Departmental) level, and Army commanders (Unit) level have not considered the most pertinent factors in every instance. Rather they routinely reached their decision primarily to meet manpower requirements or political needs; criteria which are strictly national level considerations, and which only address one aspect of the mobilization decision. While in isolated cases decision-makers have considered relevant national, departmental and unit level factors, they have not systematically considered these factors in a thorough and comprehensive fashion. As a result, U.S. decision-making in this regard has often achieved less than optimal results. We have either mobilized the Guard too late or not at all, in various degrees of preparedness, and in some cases, for the wrong reasons. In the situations where we did not mobilize the Guard (as in Vietnam), the President isolated the Army from the Congress and the American people. Consequently, the Army carried the brunt of American dissatisfaction for the outcome of the war. The implications of an inadequate mobilization decision process for the future--a future in which ARNG roundout brigades must play an increasingly significant role--will be critical for the achievement of US national security objectives.
Background

The Army National Guard has received much attention in the media during and after Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1990-1991. Unfortunately, the reports only focused on the negative aspect of the Army's reluctance to deploy the ARNG roundout brigades into combat with its parent AC division. The Philadelphia Inquirer, for example, reported that "the Guard, while eager and willing, has not proven it is ready and can fight a real war." In the same tone, the Los Angeles Times struck the same doubtful tone when it posed the bottom line question: "are the Guard units up to the job (to fight in combat)?" In an answer to their own question, the Times went on to cite "recent studies by the Defense of Department (DOD) indicated the answer may be 'no.'" Numerous examples of similar articles flashed across the nation, leading the American public to conclusions without access to the entire story.

Yet, what are the criteria the President should use to determine the deployability of an ARNG roundout brigade with its parent AC division at the start of hostilities?

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3 William V. Kennedy, "The National Guard isn't ready for war," Philadelphia Inquirer, 4 November 1990, 7E.


5 Ibid.
The Secretary of Defense determined that the ARNG roundout units--Georgia's 48th Infantry Brigade, Mississippi's 155th Armored Brigade and Louisiana's 256th Infantry Brigade--were simply not available due to the 180 day mobilization restriction under section 673(b) of Title 10 of the United States Code. 180 days was too short a period to permit mobilization, post-mobilization training, deployment and redeployment. In reality, by the time a roundout brigade executed its post-mobilization training and deployment, it would only have at best a few months in the Persian Gulf before the unit would be sent home to demobilize. As Desert Shield gave way to Desert Storm in January 1991, stories emerged that the roundout units were simply not ready for the rigors of combat. The Army held the ARNG roundout units at training centers until they validated realistic training standards under simulated battlefield conditions.

Congress, which appropriated an average of over 6 billion dollars a year for the National Guard, grew skeptical of the Total Force policy. The sense of Congress in the House Armed Service Committee and the Army Caucus in early September 1990 was that the roundout program had doubtful utility. If the roundout units were recently validated as trained to the level organized (brigade level), and there were no extraordinary reasons why they could not satisfactorily complete post-mobilization training, then the units

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should be mobilized immediately at the start of hostilities.\textsuperscript{7} The Chairman of the Armed Service committee, Les Aspin (along with Sonny Montgomery, Beverly Byron, and Dave McCurdy) wrote the Secretary of Defense on the 6th of September 1990 to express their displeasure in the "decision not to call up any reserve component combat forces."\textsuperscript{8} The Representatives truly believed that the Guard was trained and ready from the recent DOD reports they had received. They also believed that the future state of the Total Force concept was at risk, and that potential morale problems would arise if the Guard was not mobilized. They stated that "if we truly have a Total Force, then we need to rely on all the elements of that Total Force when the chips are down."\textsuperscript{9}

The Department of Defense responded to the Armed Service Committee by stating two reasons for not deploying Army combat National Guard roundout units to the Persian Gulf. First, Secretary Cheney's top advisors had not advised him that the call-up of such units was necessary at that point in time. Second, the statutory time limits for combat ARNG units placed artificial constraints on

\textsuperscript{7}Information obtained from the House Armed Services Committee while the author served as a 1990-1991 Congressional Fellow for Congressman Dave McCurdy (D-OK).

\textsuperscript{8}Letter from Congressman Les Aspin (D-WI) to the Secretary of Defense dated September 6, 1990 regarding mobilization of the ARNG roundout brigades.

\textsuperscript{9}Ibid.
their employment.10 This was not satisfactory to Congress, who countered that section 673(b) of Title 10 could have been expanded to 360 days, (180 days with the possibility of a 180 day extension), if only the President had requested such action. Since the Secretary of Defense opted not to make such a request, the search continued for a more plausible answer to the mystery. When Desert Storm ended, even the Secretary of Defense seemed to abandon the roundout concept in mid-March 1991 by saying that the "state of the 'weekend warrior' forces convinced him and others that the concept of mixing a brigade of combat reserves with active-duty combat forces is 'not a good one.'"11 A dark cloud formed over the future of the Total Force program.

The Army had repeatedly told the ARNG roundout units that they had met the appropriate readiness standards and were deployable.12 Yet, it seemed that when the "chips were down, senior Army leaders showed they had little faith in the combat soldiers of the Guard."13 It also appeared that there may have been some perceived institutional bias against the ARNG. The ARNG program had progressed tremendously during the 1980s since the arrival of the

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12 The author’s discussion with LTG LaVern Weber (Retired), President of the National Guard Association, on April 21, 1991.

13 Trainer, C-1.
CAPSTONE program--a Department of the Army program designed to improve readiness through integrated AC/RC training. Due to the CAPSTONE policy of "first to fight, first to equip", the roundout units received the latest combat vehicles at the same time as their parent AC division. Equally important was the inclusion of the ARNG roundout units in training rotations at the National Training Center (NTC) with their parent units (in the eyes of Guardsmen). Training at the NTC was a major step that would not only enhance their readiness posture, but also build an important creditability bond with their AC counterparts.\textsuperscript{14} Yet the perception lingered that these recent changes did little to improve the credibility of the National Guard. The President decided to pass up the initial opportunity to call upon the ARNG roundout units for the ultimate test on the battlefield. When he eventually did mobilize them, it was too late to be deployed for combat in Operation Desert Storm.

The Army, which plays a major role in the readiness reporting of ARNG roundout units, questioned which criteria to use to decide the deployability status of roundout units. Normally, DOD requires the ARNG combat units to maintain the second highest readiness category to be deployable. When the three roundout brigades--48th, 155th, 256th--arrived at their respective mobilization stations, the "combat-readiness rules they believed they understood over the years with their parent units had changed. Although the parent organizations rated the roundout units as combat ready prior to

\textsuperscript{14}Weber, April 21, 1991.
August 2, none was deemed combat ready when it reached mobilization station."¹⁵ In defense of the Army's actions, General Edwin H. Burba, Jr., Commander in Chief, Forces Command (FORSCOM) stated before the House Armed Service Committee on 8 March 1991 that "it was a 'come as you are war' and the roundout units were simply not the right units to initially send for valid reasons."¹⁶ The Army was partially responsible for the Guard's preparedness since it is tasked with the training responsibility of the ARNG roundout units. FORSCOM reported that the roundout units were not as ready as the ARNG units reported when they arrived at the National Training Center (NTC) to be trained under realistic and stressful conditions.¹⁷ The National Guard stated that the Army subjected the roundout units to intense oversight and unneeded supervision by Active Component (AC) personnel while at the NTC.¹⁸ But the question remained, what are the criteria and the process that the Army should use to determine the deployability of roundout units?

Moreover, the Army had seemingly changed the rules by which units were deemed qualified for deployment. First, the Army did not notify the roundout units to mobilize side-by-side with their parent


AC division as previously planned under the CAPSTONE concept. Then, the Army required a higher readiness rating for the roundout units than previously published in the FORSCOM mobilization plan. This higher readiness requirement alone caused intensive post-mobilization training that Army planners had not factored into the mobilization equation. These problems, combined with new computer equipment requirements, additional individual soldier schooling needs, officer leader development training, and additional medical screening requirements, added to the confusion and stress of the post-mobilization process.¹⁹

Exactly what is the expected standard to mobilize the roundout brigades? Are the conditions clear and known by the Administration, Congress, National Guard Bureau, and AC/RC units? If the Army had clearly established the standard well before the Persian Gulf War, the Congress, the public, and the units involved may have better understood the mobilization decision--regardless of the outcome. However, the President made his initial decision not to mobilize the roundout units under unclear and unknown conditions. This fact draws into the question the validity of current mobilization procedures and criteria for American leaders faced with similar critical questions in the future.

Purpose of the Research

The purpose of this research is to determine the criteria for the President to mobilize a ARNG roundout brigade. I will present these criteria in the form of a model that will describe the necessary conditions at the various levels of authority in the government and military. The model will be helpful as a conceptual framework which will assist senior leaders in their decision whether roundout mobilization is the best course of action to protect American national interest in a crisis that requires military forces.

Objectives

This research has four objectives:
(1) Discover through historical research the principal criteria for past mobilization decisions.
(2) Present the criteria in a matrix that graphically portray the main reason for mobilization during a particular crisis.
(3) Develop a criteria based model which represents a series of tests that must be satisfied prior to the decision to mobilize roundout units.
(4) Evaluate the criteria for their validity and reliability in analyzing the necessary issues for a sound roundout mobilization decision.
Scope

This study of the conditions for the ARNG roundout has taken place during a time of rapid and historic change, both around the world and in the United States. When I first conceived the need for this study, the United States and a United Nations coalition of 28 nations were at war with Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces. As my research progressed and formalized, the Army delayed major policy decisions until after the emotion of the Gulf War had settled and the fundamental lessons learned had surfaced.

This thesis will not answer with finality the myriad of complex issues which relate to the deployment of roundout units in the time of hostilities, but will concentrate strictly on the decision to mobilize ARNG roundout units. The proposed criteria will serve as a starting point for further discussion and research in this area--a vital issue our nation must address for the uncertain future.

Definition of Terms

(1) Reserve Component (RC) Forces: Refers collectively to the various elements of the reserve force which include the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. This thesis will concentrate on the Army Reserve with particular attention on the Army National Guard (ARNG).
(2) Army CAPSTONE Program: This program created an organizational structure intended to improve readiness, mobilization, deployability, and mission capability. It provided the means for unit commanders in the RC to work with their designated wartime AC counterparts to form a cohesive bond in planning and training. The Chief of Staff of the Army initiated the program on December 6, 1979, and the Army officially established the program in the Spring of 1983 by aligning CAPSTONE units into three wartime scenarios—Europe, Pacific, and Southwest Asia.

(3) Roundout Program: A HQDA managed program that brings a unit from one component into the structure of a larger unit from another component. The roundout program with respect to this thesis applies to an AC division with only two brigades, (normally a division has three brigades), which is brought up to full strength by adding an RC brigade.

(4) Parent Unit: Normally associated with the AC division that incorporates into its structure a roundout unit for peacetime association and upon mobilization.

(5) Mobilization: A constitutional act by the President to call to active duty the part-time Reserve and National Guard forces.

(6) Post-mobilization Training: Upon mobilization, the prescribed training that designated units must undergo prior to deployment. The amount of training is normally based on pre-mobilization readiness reports.

(7) Deployment: The movement of forces to an overseas theater of operation. For the purposes of this thesis, I will use this term in
relation to RC forces movement overseas after mobilization and certification.


Assumptions

Given the current world situation and the recognized need for a viable national defense posture, I have made specific assumptions that should remain valid in order to accept my recommendations. These assumptions are valid based on current projections of national needs and will.

(1) The roundout concept will be a required part of the Total Force Structure in the future.

(2) The CAPSTONE program is functioning with AC divisions and ARNG roundout brigades at the critical point of the decision process to decide whether to mobilize.

(3) Forces Command (FORSCOM) will have highly visible involvement in the development of mission ready National Guard roundout units.
(4) The commitment of the Reserves in future conflicts will continue to demonstrate national will.

(5) Short of a major conflict for a protracted period or minor crisis, the roundout brigades with their parent AC divisions will not be called to service.

(6) Combat forces of the National Guard will continue to be an attractive option to augment active component units in part because of their effective cost savings.

(7) The higher level of pre-mobilization readiness desired for the roundout units, the higher the cost in terms of funding. The trade-off is the higher risk the nation must accept due to the increased time to achieve the desired post-mobilization readiness level.

(8) Readiness is not only a function of resources and training level, but also of some intangible factors such as leadership, motivation, cohesion, and experience.

Limitations and Delimitations

I will limit my research to the reasons why the US has mobilized in the past and to the Affiliation portion of the CAPSTONE program within the Total Force structure. I will further confine my selected criteria to apply only to the mobilization of ARNG roundout units with their parent AC divisions.

The study will not determine whether the decision regarding mobilization of Reserve forces in past conflicts was correct.
Further, it will not determine if the ARNG combat roundout policy is a realistic concept in today's Total Force structure. Also, my research will not determine the proper mix, size and composition of an AC/RC roundout organization.
CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Knowledge is of two kinds. We know a subject ourselves or we know where we can find information about it.

Samuel Johnson

Review of the Literature

The literature about this topic falls into four general categories. The first category reviews books I used to gain an understanding of the history of the National Guard and the Reserves. The second category is regulations outlining the current procedures for the implementation of the roundout concept within the Total Force structure. The third category includes periodicals, magazines, and newspaper articles that relate to current realities and perceptions of how the roundout concept is playing out in peace and war. The fourth category is Congressional documents of hearings, Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, and the Total Force Study Group meeting notes that reveal the Congress' concern over the Total Force structure.
Books

This section deals with the primary books I reviewed as I began my research on this topic so that I would understand the background and the issues. I found that the *Military Mobilization in the U.S. Army 1775-1945* by Marvin A. Kreiberg and Merton G. Henry to be the most consistent and thorough in presenting the facts regarding mobilization. This novel has a convenient and extensive table of contents that delivers the reader to the exact page of the information he is seeking. It also includes an extensive bibliography listing which aided in further research.

Two other books, *The Guard and the Reserve in the Total Force* edited by Bennie J. Wilson and *Twice the Citizen* by Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie were essential to fill the gap of information between 1945 and 1983. Wilson's book contains a collection of scholarly articles by various authorities in the field. The most important for my research was the section on Mobilization Readiness. Here the articles deal directly with mobilization planning principles and the mobilization process. Crossland and Curry's book deal mainly with the history of the Reserves. Their book is deep with the insights on how and why the Reserve forces developed to be true citizen-soldiers and is rich with examples.
Regulations and Official Documents

This category deals with published guidelines that govern the roundout program. Army Regulation 11-30, Capstone Program and FORSCOM Regulation 11-30, The Army Capstone Program: Program Guidance are the regulations that establish the direction and scope for the program. These set the training policy, training relationships, and frequency of prescribed training events.

Additionally, the Department of the Army Circular 350-88-XX (Draft) Reserve Component Training Strategy, is a comprehensive plan developed by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to train reserve forces to fight and win on the next battlefield. It specifically directs both the AC and RC units to adopt quality training measures that will enhance each others' unit effectiveness. To help in determining the administrative conditions that currently exist for deployment, I will use the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS), Vol. III and the FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3 FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) Post Mobilization Training and Support Requirements (PTSR) that contain essential deployment items.

Other official documents provide essential discussion and scope material necessary to visualize the issues regarding roundout units. The Department of Defense report to Congress in May, 1991 on Total Force Policy Report is an excellent overview of the background and scope of the issues. The report discusses the role of the reserve component in the Total Force, what capabilities they contribute, and
their role in the "quick reaction" contingencies. Another valuable reference is the unpublished notes and slides from a Department of the Army Inspector General (IG) Report to the Congressional Army Caucus. The brief covers the IG's team investigation of RC roundout units mobilization for Operation Desert Shield/Storm. It is an excellent summary of the problem areas encountered during each phase of the operation with recommended possible solutions. The report also graphically displays the chronological events of the roundout units' mobilization and post-mobilization training.

Finally, a special report from the Association of the United States Army entitled The Active and Reserve Components: Partners in the Total Army gives an overview of the entire Reserve program including the organization of the RC and their preparations for war. Also, the National Guard Bureau published the After Action Report: Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm 2 August 1990 - 28 February 1991 which is a daily account of the staff actions from mobilization to inactivation of ARNG units. The report also presents problems that arose during the operation with the recommended solution.

To understand the relationship that should exist between an AC division and a roundout unit, I found the Excel Net Concept Papers very helpful. These are three volumes of related articles of innovative perspectives on a wide range of leadership issues. In particular, "Vertical Bonding in COHORT Units: A Soldier Report" highlights essential principles for strong cohesion within units. Also, Mike Malone's collection of articles in Trailwatcher were
helpful in determining the meaning of cohesion and how it applies to roundout units. These principles described in these reports were helpful in constructing the roundout decision model.

**Periodicals, Magazines, and Newspaper Articles**

Articles in this section provided the current feeling that surrounded the roundout concept in the aftermath of Desert Storm. This is an important section because it gives the reader a sense of the social and political environment that existed in America when I undertook this study. The articles describe the mixed emotions that exist between the AC and RC concerning availability, training, competency, and readiness. Although referenced throughout the thesis, these articles are mainly used to set the stage to explain the necessity for a criteria based model.

Two articles in *Parameters* in particular stand out for their valuable information concerning the use of force in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf with respect to the 1983 Weinberger Doctrine. These were "Vietnam and the Six Criteria for the Use of Military Force" by David T. Twining and "The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait" by Thomas R. Dubois.

**Congressional Documents**

The documents used in this study provided insights into the direction that Congress is moving in regard to the roundout issue.
The most informative printed documentation for my research came
the Congressional Research Service Report to Congress.

A key document, "The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian
Gulf War" by Robert L. Goldich, presented a very comprehensive
perspective of many of peripheral issues lightly addressed in this
thesis. Goldich, through extensive research, states an unbiased
analysis of the current program and future implications. His report
was especially valuable to me in understanding the roundup issue
and the dilemma of which echelon of command (brigade, battalion, or
company) is best suited to roundout.

Other CRS documents that I used were informative, especially to
help understand the background of the issues concerning the
mobilization of the ARNG's 48th Brigade. The most helpful were
"Persian Gulf War: Defense-Policy Implications for Congress" by
Ronald O'Rourke; "Desert Shield and Desert Storm Implications for
Future U.S. Force Requirements" by John M. Collins; "Persian Gulf
War: U.S. Reserve Callup and Reliance on the Reserves" by Robert L.
Goldich

The House Armed Service Committee (HASC) held several
hearings to determine the proper capabilities and expectation for the
roundout units and to examine the issues that have clouded the record
of the Total Force roundout concept. At the initial hearing, General
Edwin H. Burba testified to the soundness of the roundout program
but recognized that improvements could be made in the future. Also,
Representative Dave McCurdy formed a Total Force Study Group with
senior leaders of the National Guard Association, the Association of
the United States Army, Government Accounting Office, and professional staff of the House Armed Service Committee to discuss the roundout issue. These discussions revealed many conditions that should be considered in determining whether a unit is fit to operate in a roundout type arena.

Summary

These four categories of sources provide a solid base of understanding and relevant background information of the history, purpose, and future of the roundout issue. This thesis seeks to build on this foundation to propose a criteria based model for future roundout mobilization decisions.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

...because research is conducted systematically, it results in knowledge that is not merely personal but also public--at its best, man's knowledge.

Frederick Schepman

Methodology

The purpose of this section is to explain to the reader my research procedure to determine and evaluate the necessary criteria to mobilize an RC roundout brigade. The primary method for my research is to conduct a historical review of past mobilizations experiences to discover the reasons why our nation mobilized the National Guard and Reserve forces. From my findings, lessons learned, shared characteristics, and observations, I will develop a simple model which incorporates the essential criteria that future Presidents should consider prior to the decision to mobilize. My methodology has four parts.

First, in Chapter 4, I will present the reader with a short review of seven separate periods in American history--Pre WWI, WWI, WWII,
Korean War, Berlin Crisis, Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War--where mobilization was a factor in the resolution of a crisis.

Next in Chapter 5, I will apply my findings to develop a model that will show the relationship, if any, within the criteria to mobilize ARNG roundout brigades. I expect to find that the criteria to mobilize can be analyzed at various levels. These are the levels within the government and the military that decisions and recommendations are made concerning troop deployments.

Then in Chapter 6, I will test the model for its validity and reliability of the selected criteria to surface the essential issues for mobilization consideration. I will do this by analyzing two past roundout mobilization experiences: (1) Hawaii's ARNG 29th Infantry Brigade in 1968 for the Vietnam War and (2) Georgia's ARNG 48th Infantry Brigade in 1990 for the Persian Gulf War. The 29th Brigade was not officially a roundout brigade per se because this Army program did not exist prior to 1973. It does represent good example, however, because the 29th is similar to modern day roundout brigades, like the 48th Brigade, in structure, mission, and political considerations. Both of their mobilization experiences will be analyzed against the proposed criteria. The test is to determine if the criteria draws out for each experience those historical mobilization consideration that are time proven.

Finally, in Chapter 7, I will present my conclusions and recommendations as to the relative value of a criteria based model for future roundout based mobilization decisions. I expect to find
that there is a wide range of criteria that must be considered prior to roundout brigade mobilization.

The figure below presents the research process of my thesis.

INTRODUCTION
(Chapter 1)

REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH
(Chapter 2)

METHODOLOGY
(Chapter 3)

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
OF THE DECISION TO MOBILIZE
(Chapter 4)

DEFINE CRITERIA LEVELS
(Chapter 5)

DISCUSS FINDINGS
(Chapter 5)

DEVELOP DECISION MODEL
(Chapter 5)

EVALUATE THE MODEL CRITERIA
USING THE ARNG IN
VIETNAM (1968)
PERSIAN GULF (1990)
(Chapter 6)

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
(Chapter 7)

Figure 1. Thesis Design
While it is a simple diagram, it clearly defines the path I followed in this thesis. The results of this analysis will provide valuable information for a scholarly discussion of the roundout deployability issue.
CHAPTER 4

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE CRITERIA TO MOBILIZE

The Active services had already gone to war, but the nation didn’t go to war until the Guard and Reserve were mobilized.\textsuperscript{20}

Arnold Punaro
Staff Director, Senate Armed Service Committee
January 1992

Purpose

The focus of this chapter is to point out the general criteria used by decision makers to employ the National Guard and Reserves in past conflicts. Based on an analysis of a particular conflict or period, I will discuss my observations and state the primary criteria decision makers used to advise the President when to mobilize.

The roundout concept as it is today is a relatively a new concept. Essentially, the AC and RC units operated separately in training and administration with very little interaction in a peacetime environment prior to 1955. The National Guard and Reserves were

\textsuperscript{20}Arnold Punaro, “Pentagon’s Plans for Reserve Cuts Across the Board Won’t Work,” \textit{The Officer}, January 1992, 28.
treated as the "second team" who were thought of as only good as individual replacements in the event of war. This practice resulted in poor training, inadequate equipment, and personnel shortages. The passage of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 was aimed at numerous shortcomings but certainly was not a cure all strategy. The legislation's main effort was "placed upon training those units that could be mobilized and deployed in the early stages of a conflict."21 Yet, progress was slow and it wasn't until the introduction of the Total Force Policy in 1973 that significant change began to form.

The Total Force Policy opened the door for greater AC and RC interaction, especially with the introduction of the roundout program that took shape in 1978. Since the roundout program did not exist before 1978, I will explore the criteria that past Presidents used to mobilize traditional National Guard and Reserve units before 1978. After 1978, I will explore the criteria the President used not only to mobilize the Reserves but also the roundout brigades in the Persian Gulf War.

This chapter provides a perspective on how the current mobilization concerns evolved. The United States in the 19th century has engaged in numerous conflicts, and considerable reliance has been placed on the reserve forces in a majority of these conflicts. This trend of extensive reserve use, however, had shifted in the 20th century to less reliance on the Reserves than in past centuries except for the Persian Gulf War. Throughout the history of

the United States we have relied on three types of soldiers: Regulars (Active Army); Citizen-Soldiers (Guard and Reserve); and Citizens (Draftees and Volunteers). Figure 2 on the next page shows the active army pre-mobilization strength in the first column and the Reserve component post-mobilization additions in the second column. The last column of the chart displays the percentage that our nation has relied on the Reserves.
### Mobilization

**For Major Crises since 1992**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Strength of Regular Army at Start of the Crisis</th>
<th>Number of ARNG and Army Reserve Mobilized</th>
<th>Total Serving in the Army During Crisis</th>
<th>Percent of Regulars to Total Serving</th>
<th>Percent of Total Serving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary War</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War of 1812</td>
<td>6,744</td>
<td>458,000</td>
<td>522,654</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>87.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican War</td>
<td>7,365</td>
<td>73,532</td>
<td>115,906</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Span-Amer War</td>
<td>28,183</td>
<td>170,954</td>
<td>274,817</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>127,588</td>
<td>208,000</td>
<td>4,058,000</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>187,893</td>
<td>377,000</td>
<td>11,260,000</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td>591,487</td>
<td>382,900</td>
<td>2,834,000</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin Crisis</td>
<td>859,000</td>
<td>119,622</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>970,000</td>
<td>22,786</td>
<td>4,386,000</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf War</td>
<td>765,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>905,000</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
<td>33.8% (9% ARNG)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Figure 2.**

### The Roots of Mobilization

Embodied in the second amendment of the Constitution of the United States is the nation’s responsibility to maintain "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the
right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." 22 From this basic premise, inherited from a European background, our Founding Fathers established America’s foundation for its military forces.

During our colonial period, military preparedness and use were solely based on the “militia” concept. This meant that "every able-bodied man, within prescribed age limits, was required to possess arms, to be carried on muster rolls, to train periodically, and be mustered into service (mobilized) for military operations whenever necessary." 23 Each colony was deeply concerned for its own security and interest but not necessarily in a collective defense arrangement. The colonies feared a “standing” army like the one they fought to gain independence. Yet they understood the value and need to mobilize quickly and unite for a common interest.

**Pre-World War I**

Prior to the twentieth century, our country had relied extensively on the Militia for its manpower needs (see figure 2). Preparedness of the Militia was important but often unrealistic given the low priority of organized drill conducted by the states and

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low probability of mobilization outside of the US border (federal legislation prevented such use).24

The Revolutionary War was fought and won by the Militia of the newly formed colonies. George Washington’s Continental Army, comprised of Militia units from the colonies, volunteers, and draftees, was high in spirit but weak in preparedness. Nonetheless, the sheer unity of soldiers in formations, coupled with pride and cohesion, would ultimately win the day. General Washington pointed out that the “only alternative to a large standing army was an effective militia.”25

The Militia Law of 1792, which left compliance with its regulations up to the states preserved the idea that the citizen-soldier, would be the basic mobilization document in the United States for the next 111 years (until the Dick Act of 1903). All males between the ages of 18 and 45 were obligated to serve and bear arms with standards and procedures left up to the states. The law also limited the length of service to three months per year with service confined within the borders of the United States. In late January, as we moved closer to the War of 1812, our nation started to mobilize the state’s Militia under the new law to fill the depleted ranks of the Regular Army.26


25Ibid., 108.

26Pistorius and Stuckey, 4-5.
The Militia, volunteers, and conscription characterized the primary sources for manpower during mobilization for the Mexican War (April 1846-March 1848), Civil War (1861-1865), and Spanish-American War (24 April 1898-12 August 1898). Still, the only criterion to mobilize the National Guard during this period was the need for additional manpower. The urgency of the crisis often left little time to adequately train the force prior to deployment. Consequently, the President had to mobilize quickly with the associated risk of mobilizing with poorly trained and equipped units. These aspects characterized the units of a non-regular force structure.

Impression:

A study of this period prior to World War I reveals an interesting facet about mobilization. The decision to mobilize was linked directly to the requirement for more soldiers to expand the force rather than a unit readiness issue. When a national emergency arose, the Guard and Reserves were mobilized and they were expected to augment the force structure and serve as directed. It appeared that little emphasis was placed on other pre-conditions for employment such as equipment, training, compatibility, or shortages. However, this should not be a startling finding since Congress and military planners designed our force structure based on a small standing army with reliance on mobilizing reserve forces to meet expanded manpower requirements of war.
When a national crisis developed that required the mobilization of a sizeable U.S. military force, it was assumed that the National Guard would be activated. The Guard’s preparedness at this time was expected to be at a low level because most Guard units lacked a "consistent program of supervision by the Regular forces, ...were poorly trained and disciplined, understrength, and inadequately equipped." These inadequacies were to be corrected after an appropriate amount of post-mobilization training. Planners primarily relied on the Guard as a manpower resource. They accepted risk in the area of training and equipment, betting on a fair amount of post-mobilization time to correct these deficiencies.

Primary Criterion to Mobilize: **Manpower**

World War I

With the sinking of the *Lusitania* in May of 1915 due to a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans, the government and people of the United States could see themselves involved in war on the European continent soon. This was a correct assessment and the United States declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917.

There were two significant pieces of legislation passed prior to the declaration of war that impacted on the mobilization for the Great War. The Dick Act of 1903, which impacted mostly on pre-

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27 *Army Historical Series*, 323.
mobilization training and standards, and the National Defense Act of 1916, impacted on training and mobilization.

The Dick Act directed the Militia be divided into “two classes - the Organized Militia, to be known as the National Guard, and the Reserve Militia - and provided that, over a five year period, the Guard’s organization and equipment be patterned after that of the Regular Army.”

The Dick Act also provided federal funds for newly prescribed drill at least twice monthly, an annual training drill, joint Regular Army and Guard maneuvers annually, adherence to disciplined standards and detailed Regular Army officers to Guard units.

More importantly, the Dick Act, as subsequently amended in 1908, gave the President the authority to deploy the Guard overseas with the consent of Congress and increase tour lengths from 3 to 9 months. Although the overseas clause was later repealed in 1912, the Dick Act represented a significant improvement which facilitated overall preparedness.

The other important piece of legislation was the National Defense Act of 1916 which would remain as the basic foundation for mobilization until 1955. The legislation required the National Guard (official name designated in this Act) as a component of national defense, and when mobilized, would become part of the Regular Army. Guard units were to have 48 drill periods per year with a 14

28Ibid., 351.
29Ibid., 351.
30Pistorius and Stuckey, 7.
day annual field exercise. Also, provisions in the National Defense Act finally gave the President the authority to deploy reservist overseas. As a part of the Regular Army upon mobilization, the President could now deploy the Army with the National Guard anywhere in the world.\textsuperscript{31}

After President Wilson’s numerous ultimatums to the Germans to stop unrestricted submarine warfare failed, his selection of a course of action was predetermined--war. The criteria to mobilize was the same as in past conflicts. There was an overriding need for additional forces for which the Militia was well suited.

The United States mobilized the National Guard and the Regular Army Reserve to expand the force structure. In all, the Guard provided 382,000 soldiers in 17 divisions which represented forty percent of the 43 divisions in the American Expeditionary Force. Contrary to past mobilizations, this expansion included the first draft under the Selective Service Act of 1917. This Act authorized the President to mobilize the entire National Guard and draftees for the duration of the war. The Selective Service Act brought in 2,801,373 men for duty during its 18 months of activity.\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31}Ibid., 8.
\item \textsuperscript{32}The Army Almanac, (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Co.,1959). as quoted in Pistorius and Stuckey, 9.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Impression:

The United States used the criterion of additional manpower needs to expand the force for its decision to mobilize for World War I. This marked the end of an old era and the beginning of a new one. The Armed Forces transition from the old and proud Militia system, primarily oriented towards state service, into an increasingly professional national force ready and constitutionally able to serve anywhere. The draft had now become a part of our history which our leaders would use to supplement the standing Army and the National Guard. Even with the Dick Act improvements, US Forces still were not prepared for service in Europe in terms of personnel, equipment and training. After the President made the decision to mobilize, preparedness, as in the past, again became an issue during the post-mobilization training. This time, however, the US had the opportunity to train its forces to an acceptable standard before deployment.

Primary Criterion to Mobilize: Manpower

World War II

Germany attacked Poland on 1 September 1939 and World War II had begun. Within days, England and France declared war on Germany. President Roosevelt declared a “limited national emergency” by Executive Order and “directed a small increase in manpower
authorization of the Regular Army and the National Guard.\textsuperscript{33} Once again the United States saw the need to expand the size of the force and the Guard would eventually play a major role in that expansion. During this time, National Guard drills were increased from "48 armory drills per year to 60, and annual field training was increased from 15 to 20 days."\textsuperscript{34}

These changes in the Regular Army, National Guard and Reserves surprised the Army mobilization planners because all plans had assumed mobilization would begin on M-Day when the entire national manpower would become available. The Army had no plans for a partial mobilization. Regardless of no plan, mobilization had begun increasing the strength of the Army and National Guard through late 1941 without a declaration of war.\textsuperscript{35}

At the outbreak of World War II in Europe, Army planners realized the monumental task that lay ahead if the United States entered the war. The when and how to mobilize was a major concern. Increased training periods for the Guard and Reserves had already begun. President Roosevelt now had the "legal authority to federalize the Guard by Executive Order without any Congressional action."\textsuperscript{36} There was little discussion, if any, as to the readiness of the Guard. The Army assumed that with an increase in training

\textsuperscript{33}Pistorius and Stuckey, 10.
\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., 11.
periods, a productive post-mobilization training program and historically good performance of the Guard were adequate preconditions of preparedness to employ the Guard again if the nation called.

Critical for success was not only the Guard’s manpower but also the Army needed its leadership and equipment. Since no Guard unit was up to its full strength, military planners slotted recruits and draftees indiscriminately throughout the Guard to fill the ranks. It was then up to the experienced Guard officers and non-commissioned officers to train the new recruits provided that the cadre themselves were not sent off to school for their training.\textsuperscript{37} The Guard’s equipment was so desperately needed that Chief of Staff George C. Marshall later admitted that the Army “woefully under-equipped, wanted the Guard’s equipment more than its personnel.”\textsuperscript{38}

Military leaders of World War II, likewise, could not avoid the politics involved in the decision to mobilize. There was concern at the time by Army Chief of Staff Marshall that mobilization should not occur until the United States declared war. Marshall believed that a mobilization decision would prematurely alarm the American people. General Marshall made his point clear to the Secretary of War and to Congress. However, they disregarded his advice. The

\textsuperscript{37}Renee Hylton-Greene and Robert K. Wright, \textit{A brief History of the Militia and the National Guard} (Washington: National Guard Bureau Public Affairs Office, 1986), 36.

\textsuperscript{38}Pistorius and Stuckey, 11.
President mobilized the National Guard and the Reserves by a Joint Resolution of Congress on 27 August 1940 for one year of training.\textsuperscript{39}

Many Americans felt that the war in Europe was no concern of the United States. Yet the President ordered the first peacetime draft to complement the Guard mobilization. Some War Department planners exclaimed that if there was a national draft, there would be little need for a Guard mobilization. However, "President Roosevelt insisted that a peacetime draft was hardly fair unless the Reserve components were called up."\textsuperscript{40} President Roosevelt knew that if war arose, he had to utilize all available assets, especially the National Guard since they were the people's Army. Politically, President Roosevelt needed the Guard because there was a strong feeling of isolationism throughout the country and "anti-war sentiment was still very strong."\textsuperscript{41} This sentiment was so strong that in September 1941, the bill to extend the draft (from one year to twenty-eight months) and mobilize the National Guard passed by one vote in the House of Representatives.\textsuperscript{42}

The leadership realized, however, that the military organization was weak in strength and equipment and were not prepared at that time to enter the war. Post-mobilization training would be essential if the United States entered the war. The War Department,

\textsuperscript{39}\textit{Ibid.}, 11.

\textsuperscript{40}\textit{Hylton-Greene and Wright}, 36.

\textsuperscript{41}\textit{Ibid.}, 37.

\textsuperscript{42}\textit{Ibid.}, 37.
however, was unaware of the extent of the readiness problems. This awareness would only become clear after the President decided to mobilize. General George C. Marshall, wrote a confidential letter on 28 July, 1941 to all National Guard division commanders that expressed his concern that their training was not progressing as he expected. General Marshall stated:

I am convinced that the next three months will be the most critical period in the development of National Guard divisions. Some of these divisions have already reached a high standard, but efficiency varies from excellent to poor, and the general average appears to be far too low. The training program so far has developed certain definite weaknesses which must be promptly corrected. Accordingly, I am writing directly to all National Guard division commanders, without reference through Army and Corps headquarters, and I would like you to consider this letter as most confidential.43

General Marshall was concerned about preparedness in National Guard divisions but the President already decided that the Guard would deploy if the United States were to enter the war. General Marshall had been aware of some pre-mobilization training shortcomings but not to the extent that the post-mobilization training phase could not correct. Again, the President and his civil-military advisors seemed to be more concerned about assembling a sizeable force quickly rather than worry about training the force. It was under this premise that the President mobilized National Guard

divisions with little regard for their overall readiness. As in past conflicts, the President felt that if he mobilized the Guard, they would again perform with admirable results as in the past.

It is important to keep in perspective the substantial size of our National Guard in 1939. At the beginning of the war in Europe in September 1939, the Regular Army had on its rolls 187,000 men. Mobilization of National Guard occurred in 22 increments from September 1940 to October 1941. The Guard added 300,034 to the Federal rolls. In all, by December 1941, the Army had grown to 1,686,403 men. When the United States entered the war, there were 36 divisions in the force structure: 16 Regular Army, 2 United States Reserve, and 18 National Guard divisions. By the end of World War II, the United States Army had formed and deployed 89 divisions.44

Impression:

Prior to America’s entrance into World War II, the President made the decision to mobilize Guard and Reservists. It is my impression that this decision was based primarily on the need for more forces and equipment to fill out the regular Army force structure sorely neglected since the conclusion of World War I. The decision to mobilize early for World War II, however, showed that the President also was concerned about the public support and unit

44Ibid., 11-12.

43
preparedness. President Roosevelt's early decisions displayed his understanding of the key criteria to mobilize. This is evident by his timing of mobilization since the decision to mobilize came more than two years before America entered the war. The decision to mobilize the Guard for World War II involved criteria other than the need for additional forces. Not only were troops essential, but also they needed to be adequately trained and their mobilization was supported by the population.

Primary Criteria to Mobilize: **Manpower, National Will, Preparedness**

**Korean War**

On 25 June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. The United Nations immediately established a UN Command led by the United States. Shortly thereafter, the President approved mobilization and ordered ill-prepared and equipped units to Korea. One of these units, Task Force Smith from the Army of Occupation Forces in Japan, was deployed to assist the South Koreans. Task Force Smith was one of the first units on the ground in Korea. The North Koreans quickly annihilated the poorly prepared unit. At this point, the United States was faced with a serious crisis.\(^{45}\)

At the start of the Korean conflict, the active army had a strength of 591,487 organized in 14 divisions: four were stationed in Japan; one in Germany; and the remainder in the United States.\textsuperscript{46} The four divisions in Japan which supplied personnel and equipment for Task Force Smith "had less than 70 percent of authorized strength, were short of supporting weapons, and had light tanks only."\textsuperscript{47} Only the 82nd Airborne Division in the United States was at full strength. All other US based units were manned at 65 to 75 percent of their authorized strength. Even the non-divisional support units were inadequate to provide support due to their personnel and equipment shortages.\textsuperscript{48}

The National Guard, however, was in a higher state of preparedness in terms of personnel but still lacked in areas of training and equipment. The National Guard was organized in 27 divisions, 20 regimental combat teams (RCT), and other units for a total of 4,863 mobilized units. The total strength was 324,761 personnel which was 93 percent of its authorized strength.\textsuperscript{49} Without regard for Guard and Reserves overall low state of preparedness, the President made the decision to mobilized the National Guard.

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., 12.


\textsuperscript{48}Joseph H. Pistorius and John D. Stuckey, \emph{Mobilization of the Army Guard and the Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War}. 12.

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., 12-13.
Seemingly, as in past conflicts, the decision to mobilize was primarily based on the need for additional forces. This time, however, there was limited time available to equip, train, and employ forces in combat as there was for World War II. President Truman began on 14 August 1950 to mobilize eight Guard divisions and three RCTs. In all, 138,600 officers and enlisted men were mobilized during the Korean War which represented 34 percent of the total Guard strength. Then, as in past conflicts, force planners destroyed their unit integrity when Guard personnel "were used as combat fillers for Korea."

The Korean War was the first limited war of the 20th century. It was limited in its objective, geographical boundaries, number of personnel and amounts of equipment. The Korean War also caused the "United States to reaffirm its historical notion that mobilization of National Guard and other Reserves was necessary in war and that the reliance on Reserve was as essential in the nuclear age as it had been in the past." DOD mobilization planners began to modify our basic mobilization principles. Following the war, there were two significant amendments: (1) a full mobilization may not be


52 Joseph H. Pistorius and John D. Stuckey, Mobilization of the Army Guard and the Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War, 15.
necessary to resolve a conflict; and (2) a hasty mobilization may be necessary with limited amount of time available to prepare forces for combat.\textsuperscript{53}

Impression:

The primary criteria to mobilize for the Korean Conflict was the immediate need for additional forces. There was little concern over public support or for military preparedness involved in the rushed decision to mobilize. North Korea's display of violent aggression was a clear violation of international law which had to be stopped. As a world leader, the US would require military forces on the ground in Korea to make a demonstrative international statement regardless of their state of preparedness. Unfortunately, it was a come as you are war and our soldiers, both active and reserves, were all in a poor state of preparedness in terms of personnel, training, and equipment. Consequently, the military spent the remainder of the 1950s to correct this deficiency.

Primary Criterion to Mobilize: \textbf{Manpower}

\textsuperscript{53}\textit{Ibid.}. 15
Between the Korean War and the Berlin Crisis

This period between the conflicts marked the beginning of our nation's leaders realization for the need for trained and ready reserve forces able to respond rapidly. A shift had begun to occur in the reason why our nation wanted to mobilize the National Guard and Reserves. Not only would the need for additional manpower be important for mobilization but also unit combat readiness would become an important criteria to mobilize. In a report following the Korean War, Secretary of Defense Wilson stated:

...trained Reserve units must be available for deployment immediately, not 9 to 12 months later. We are not satisfied with the present capacity of our Reserve forces to meet these requirements. A greater state of readiness for our Reserve forces is essential...\(^{54}\)

The concept of immediately available Guard and Reserve forces became a new defense requirement and much later (1973) became known as the Total Force Policy. However, the lack of pre-mobilization readiness was not new to senior Army officials. Historically, there were two conditions that have prevented the Guard from achieving a higher state of pre-mobilization readiness: (1) inadequate manning levels and; (2) major equipment shortages. Both were directly related to the level of funding that was available for Guard units. Prior to the Dick Act of 1903, the colonies and

states had been solely responsible for Guard readiness. Since then, however, Congress and the Defense Department were liable for readiness levels through funding for Guard manning, equipment and training.55

Following the Korean War, the status of the Guard and Reserve improved significantly through improved funding but it was still inadequate for the task at hand. In 1953, the Reserve Forces Policy Board reported that facilities for operations, training, maintenance, and storage remained inadequate for the Guard requirements.56 Consequently, during the Eisenhower Administration, Congress passed the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. This Act forced the military to increased the reliance on the Reserves and provided measures to help increase their readiness.

Impression:

As our nation moved towards the Berlin Crisis in 1961, preparedness of the Guard and Reserves seemed to be an important criterion that might dominated this war-free era. Yet, progress was slow in implementation of the new policies. Still, pre-mobilization readiness still was not considered as the highest priority during a period that the Army was going through a force restructuring.

55Joseph H. Pistorius and John D. Stuckey, Mobilization of the Army Guard and the Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War, 16.

Berlin Crisis

In the summer of 1961, the Soviet Union forced a crisis over the status of Berlin. Again we were faced with a critical decision regarding which level of response was necessary in the era of a "massive retaliation" national strategy. President Kennedy realized that the consequences of a nuclear war or national humiliation from the Russians were limited options. The administration introduced a new concept of "flexible response" which "implicitly recognized the probability of limited wars and a wide range of threats from nuclear war to guerrilla insurrections." This change in strategy led to the October 1961 partial mobilization of the Guard and Reserve.

The historical significance of the 1961 partial mobilization was that the President for the first time used the National Guard as a political instrument rather than in a traditional military role. At that time, the Regular Army comprised 14 divisions, 11 of them combat ready, totaling 859,000 soldiers. Five of these divisions were in Europe, three were in the Pacific, the remaining six were in the United States. Clearly there were enough active duty, combat

57 Joseph H. Pistorius and John D. Stuckey, Mobilization of the Army Guard and the Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War, 18.


59 Ibid., 1-10, 1-11.
ready units to satisfy the manpower needs of the Berlin Crisis. But the issue was larger than strictly a manpower issue.

Rather than declaring a national emergency, for which the President could order up to one million Reservists to duty, President Kennedy asked Congress to enact a Joint Resolution authorizing the mobilization of up to 250,000 men. The primary purpose of the mobilization was to demonstrate to the world our national resolve in conflicts of this nature. President Kennedy described his mobilization decision for the purpose "not to win war, but to help prevent war." In addition, Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany reportedly wrote that, in his opinion, "the prime factor influencing Khrushev in his show-down on Berlin was the swift buildup of the American forces."61

Impression:

The Berlin Crisis taught our senior leaders and mobilization planners an important lesson. For an international crisis that imposes a significant threat to the United States, mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves can produce, dependent on the situation, a formidable deterrent effect. In this situation, the

60Joseph H. Pistorius and John D. Stuckey, Mobilization of the Army Guard and the Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War, 25.

criteria for mobilization did not call for additional manpower or for a superior, trained and ready force but a for statement of national will.

Primary Criterion to Mobilize: \textit{Deterrent effect}

\textbf{Vietnam}

Unlike the Korean Conflict, the Vietnam Conflict did not appear suddenly on the scene. The United States had been involved in Indochina since WW II. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United States proved its commitment to stopping the spread of communism. President Truman increased military assistance and thereafter, the United States was deeply involved in the region.\textsuperscript{62}

In the mid-1950s, the United States ratified the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a collective defensive agreement designed to protect South Vietnam. Our government began sending military advisors to support the effort. By the end of 1960, the United States had 875 military advisors in South Vietnam and that number increased to 16,236 by the end of November 1963.\textsuperscript{63} President Johnson had inherited 20 years of frustration in Southeast Asia and it was up to General William C. Westmoreland as the Commander of the US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam to fix

\textsuperscript{62}Ibid., 39.

\textsuperscript{63}Ibid., 40.
the problem. The Gulf of Tonkin incidents on the 2nd and 4th of August 1964 resulted in a Joint Resolution in Congress on 7 August authorizing President Johnson to “take all necessary measures” to safeguard US forces and to prevent further aggression.\textsuperscript{64}

When the US began to deploy combat forces in 1965, the Regular Army had a strength of about 970,000 organized in 16 divisions, 4 RCTs, 7 separate brigades, and 7 special forces groups.\textsuperscript{65} Similarly, the National Guard and Reserves were equally as strong on paper after 3 years of reorganization. In 1965, the Reserve Components of the Army had 695,000 citizen-soldiers organized in 23 divisions, 11 separate brigades, and some 8,000 units.\textsuperscript{66}

This conflict, however, in terms of mobilization, was different from every major conflict in the past. The United States “has relied extensively on its militia, National Guard, and Reserves in every major war in its history, except for the Vietnam War.”\textsuperscript{67} President Johnson debated with his principal advisors and refused to mobilize

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{65}US Department of Defense, \textit{Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense and the Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force}, FY 65, 116, 131, 194.
\end{itemize}

53
the National Guard and Reserves for more than four years. Contrary to President Johnson, mobilization "was favored by the Secretary of Defense, the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the National Security Advisor, the Secretaries of the military departments, many members of Congress, the National Guard leadership, and others."\(^6^8\)

David Halberstam analyzed President Johnson's decision not to mobilize in 1965 in his book *The Best and the Brightest*:

If there were no decisions which were crystallized and hard, then they could not leak, and if they could not leak, then the opposition could not point to them. Which was why he was not about to call the Reserves, because the use of the Reserves would blow it all. It would be self-evident that we were really going to war, and that we would in fact pay a price. Which went against all the Administration planning: this would be a war without a price, a silent, politically invisible war. The military wanted to call up the Reserves.

He was against a call-up of the Reserves for other reasons as well. It would, he thought, telegraph the wrong signals to the adversaries, particularly China and the Soviet Union (frighten into the idea that this was a real war) and Hanoi, which might decide that it was going to be a long war (he did not intend to go into a long war), and he felt if you call up the Reserves you had to be prepared to go the distance and you might force your adversary to do the same. He also felt it would frighten the country, and he had just run as a peace candidate; similarly, he felt it would be too much of a sign that the military were in charge and the civilians would turn over too much responsibility to the military. Finally, and above all, he feared

\(^6^8\)Ibid., 272.
that it would cost him the Great Society, that his enemies in Congress would seize on the war as a means of denying him his social legislation.\textsuperscript{69}

In addition, John K. Mahon wrote that there are three main reasons for President Johnson’s decision not to mobilize:

(1) to conceal America’s military commitment in Vietnam from the American people;
(2) to avoid sending a belligerent message to the North Vietnamese, China, and Soviets; and
(3) to preserve the Reserves for other contingencies.\textsuperscript{70}

The United States, under a cautious President Johnson, eventually decided in 1968 after the USS \textit{Pueblo} was seized and the Tet Offensive began in late January that mobilization was now a feasible option. Yet, the President still delayed the decision until 31 March when he addressed the nation with the increase of forces plan. Surprisingly, it took four years of deliberation and two major incidents before “President Johnson made the belated decision to mobilize a small portion of the National Guard and Reserve.”\textsuperscript{71} In all, 76 ARNG and USAR units were mobilized totalling 20,034 soldiers for the stated purpose (1) to provide troops for actual deployment to Vietnam and (2) to provide troops to build up the

\textsuperscript{69}David Halberstam, \textit{The Best and the Brightest}, 593-594, as quoted in Joseph H. Pistorius and John D. Stuckey, \textit{Mobilization of the Army Guard and the Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War}, 46-47.


\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., 283.
strategic reserves in the United States. Yet, it was far too little and far too late to make any difference in the outcome. Compared to all previous wars, this was the smallest mobilization to date.

Again, the state of training and the availability of modern equipment was not the central concern for the mobilization decision in the Vietnam War. DOD had made some progress in this area since the failure of Task Force Smith during the Korean War. However, unlike the Korean War, the unavailability of time was not a critical factor. The Reserves had time to train its units to an adequate level of preparedness prior to deployment. As always, a higher state of preparedness was desired but not required for this mobilization. Despite attempts throughout the 1950s to improve readiness, planners were faced with the "failure to obtain peacetime training objectives and the shortages of equipment proved major problems that generally prevented the mobilized units from meeting post-mobilization readiness objectives." As a direct result of several failures in the Vietnam War, major changes in force structure, Reserve training and mobilization procedures were on the horizon.

Impression:

President Johnson's decision not to mobilize the Guard and Reserves from 1965-1968 was rational from his personal

72 Ibid., 280.

perspective. He did not want to send a message to the American people that our country was really at war. President Johnson feared a message of war in Vietnam would flatly defeat any effort to rally public and Congressional support for his war. By doing so, he overlooked that special quality that only Guard and Reserve forces possess--a temperature gauge of public opinion. Handled properly, President Johnson could have rallied support rather than opposition by mobilization in the early stages of the war.

The President seemed to avoid the traditional criteria for employment of the Guard and Reserves. Initially in 1965, he did not see mobilization as an expander of the force. Instead, the President opted for national draft to fill out the force structure. Unit preparedness at that time was not considered as a criterion for mobilization. The Defense Department understood that a RC unit may not be as prepared as a AC unit but certainly an RC unit was more prepared than a unit filled with draftees. One would also like to believe that our nation would rather sent existing, trained RC units, with a greater cross-section of Americans, instead of untrained, draftees. This, however, did not occur until 1968, far too little and far too late. A hard lesson learned for future conflicts.

Primary Criterion to Mobilize in 1968: **Manpower**
Between Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War

This period would represent the most significant attempt in our history to integrate the Army's functions, training and personnel through one innovative and comprehensive program. In 1973, under General Creighton Abrams' term as Chief of Staff of the Army, the Total Force Policy was born in 1973 whose primary goal was enhancement of AC/RC preparedness prior to mobilization.

General Abrams, after forty years of distinguished military service, used to tell his audiences that the price for unpreparedness was the useless loss of young soldiers in battle. "We have paid, and paid again in blood and sacrifice for our unpreparedness...I don't want war, but I am appalled at the human cost that we have paid because we wouldn't prepare to fight."74 Abrams easily convinced James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, that his plan envisioned that "never again would a President be able to send the Army to war without the reserves maintained for such a contingency."75 He further believed that:

The vehicle for doing this was a revised force structure that integrated reserve and active elements so closely as to make the reserves virtually inextricable from the whole. That was in turn an integral part of the large package of initiatives.76


75 Sorley, 43.
Reform and restructure rapidly swept through the Army in the mid-seventies, culminating with the birth of the Army CAPSTONE program on 6 December 1979. The term CAPSTONE is not an acronym, "but represents the culmination (or Capstone) of several evolutionary programs which began in 1975 to organize the Total Army into groupings of units to support the reinforcement of Europe." CAPSTONE was the type of program General Abrams, who died while in office in 1974, would have wanted to provide:

...commanders and staff officers at all echelons with a single message - train and plan towards your wartime mission. The program organizes the Total Force into cohesive groupings of Reserve Components (RC) and Active Components (AC) units based on contingency mission requirements.

To complement General Abrams' vision for the future, the Department of Defense in the early seventies was changing from a draft based system to an All-Voluntary Force. With the absence of conscription to expand the force, the Reserve forces became the principle source for rapid augmentation of the AC units. This reliance on the Reserves was known as the "Total Force Concept."

The Total Force was born and by 1983, roughly 50 percent of the combat elements and 70 percent of its combat service support were

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76 Ibid., 43.


78 Ibid., 3.
in the National Guard and Reserves. General Abrams' desire was to "correct one of the major deficiencies of the American involvement in the Vietnam War - the commitment of the Army to sustained combat without the explicit support of the American people as expressed by their representatives in Congress." His dream, now a reality, was most visible with the introduction of the National Guard 'roundout' brigade concept integrated into an AC division with only two AC brigades. This allowed for increased AC/RC training opportunities, shared preparedness responsibilities, equipment compatibility requirements, unit cohesion and most importantly, a deployment slot if the AC division went to combat. These were valid reasons to assume the that Army was determined to correct the numerous problems inherited from Vietnam.

Impression:

Military force planners designed the Total Force Concept for three basic reasons: (1) enhance US defense posture through a higher degree of AC/RC unit preparedness; (2) increase AC/RC interaction through a bold integration plan; (3) ensure the popular support for the next major conflict through mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves. I believe that preparedness and AC/RC integration were important factors for mobilization, however, obtaining and

79 Sorley, 46.

maintaining the popular support of the people was the driving force behind major force changes during this era.

I believe that General Abrams and others founded the roots of the Total Force concept based on the principle that our nation's political leadership would have to seek and feel assured of popular support of the American people before involvement in a major conflict. When our nation mobilized the National Guard and the Reserves, the President would have to consider the impact of removing the citizen-soldiers from their jobs, families and homes. National Guard mobilization decisions would have to be weighed against the degree of political consensus expected to gain by mobilization versus the military advantage gained on the battlefield as the result of mobilization. If no such public consensus existed and a large scale mobilization was required for accomplishment of our stated objectives, then the President may avoid going to war at all.

**Persian Gulf War**

On 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein's battle-hardened Republican Guard forces (the world's fourth largest Army) invaded the tiny nation of Kuwait without provocation or warning and claimed Kuwait as a new province of Iraq. This caused an international outrage and was a perceived violation of US national security interest in the region. As such, the United States, through the United Nations, began to form an unprecedented coalition of 28 United Nations against
Iraq's clear act of aggression. On 7 August, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney received the approval from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to deploy forces to the area while Secretary of State James Baker was gaining support for our actions and future plans in the United Nations. Eventually, what resulted was a slate of twelve UN resolutions condemning Iraq's invasion and demanding it to unconditional withdrawal. The UN designed these resolutions, primarily diplomatic and economic in nature, to force Iraq out of Kuwait through peaceful means.

What followed was President Bush's decision to declare a national emergency and use US forces in the Persian Gulf. This move marked the start of Desert Shield, a contingency plan designed to halt the Iraqi forces from attacking into Saudi Arabia. President Bush had drawn "a line in the sand" that was clearly visible around the world. In order to move forces to the region and defend Saudi Arabia, a mobilization of the Reserves consisting of primarily combat support and combat service support was essential based on Total Force policy decisions made during the seventies and eighties. The President used the authority that allowed the call-up of selected Reservists but it was not as clear for the use of combat National Guard forces, specifically the ARNG roundout brigades.

This was the first real test of the Total Force Policy since its conception. Due to the composition of our force structure prior to the Gulf War, President Bush had virtually no other option but to

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81 "The 48th Brigade: A Chronology from Invasion to Demobilization." National Guard, May 1991, 12.
mobilize, in some form, a portion of the Reserves. My historical review of the decision to mobilize up to this point has primarily dealt with National Guard and Reserves as an entire element.

Until now, I have concentrated primarily on Reserve forces in general. I will now begin to focus my analysis on ARNG roundout brigades, a small portion (11%) of the overall Reserve force. The Gulf War represented the first major conflict in the new era of integrated Reserve combat, combat support and combat service support in the AC force structure. Some elements of the Reserves, specifically the roundout brigades, were not so tightly woven in the force structure that AC divisions must deploy with them. So, the roundout brigades were still subject to a similar type of review that their predecessor, all Reservist, experienced in times of past national crises.

This is why a study of our history of mobilizing the Reserves establishes the framework for the analysis of modern day mobilization decisions concerning roundout brigades. In essence, there is a correlation between the decision to mobilize the Reserves before 1978 and the decision to mobilize ARNG roundout brigades after 1978.

The Armed Forces of the United States at the start of the Gulf War, consisted of 4.6 million active and reserve military personnel. Of this total, the active Army only had 765,300 men in uniform arrayed in 12 divisions. The United States Army Reserves and the National Guard, on the other hand, numbered 1,061,600 soldiers of which about 300,000 were slotted in 10 Reserve divisions. DOD's
Total Force Policy had placed about 46% of the combat forces in the ARNG and 42% of its combat support and combat service support in the Reserve. Our Army must rely on the Guard and Reserves, who were woven throughout the force structure, in most of the Army's contingency plans. Why? Because that was exactly the way General Abrams envisioned the force structure for future conflicts.

Within days of 7 August, the first elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps, primarily elements of 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Assault divisions, began to arrive in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the 24th Infantry (Mechanized) and the 1st Cavalry divisions were alerted to deploy on August 13th and September 11th, respectively. However, their ARNG roundout brigades were not activated until 30 November and 7 December. To fill the vacancy in these divisions, the Army alerted an AC brigade from Fort Benning, Georgia, 197th Infantry Brigade (Separate), and the 1st Brigade, 2nd Armored Division from Fort Hood, Texas to roundout the deploying divisions. A third roundout brigade, 256th Infantry from Louisiana, of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) was also mobilized on 30 November. These roundout brigades went through a post-mobilization training period but were never deployed to the Persian Gulf.

Regardless, President Bush was gaining overwhelming public support for immediate action if Iraq did not depart from Kuwait.

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The American public was appalled by Saddam Hussein's aggressive actions and atrocities in Kuwait. Secretary James Baker had clearly spelled out our strategic objectives as: (1) immediate withdrawal from Kuwait; (2) restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait; (3) release of all hostages and; (4) preservation of peace in the region. The administration continually stated that this was not a war about oil but about naked aggression against a defenseless nation. However, Iraq controlled 20% of US oil needs and could influence up to 50%. If Iraq's aggression were to continue, they could control up to two-thirds of known oil reserves that lie in that region. This would be catastrophic to the world's economy and, equally important, Saddam Hussein's increased wealth from this venture would rapidly increase his potential to produce nuclear and chemical weapons. For these reasons, and others, the President had all the public support he needed to mobilize the Reserves in the early stages. But the roundout brigades were were not part of the initial call-up.

Congress was upset over the non-deployment of the 'roundout' brigades. Representatives from the House, namely Les Aspin (D-Wis), Chairman of the Armed Service Committee; Sonny Montgomery

84 Author notes, Secretary of State James Baker testifies before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, United States Senate, Dirkson Office Building, Washington, D.C., December 5, 1991.


By sustained level of resourcing provided the reserves, Congress has clearly demonstrated its strong commitment to the Total Force. Unfortunately, the extent of DOD's commitment is far less clear, particularly in light of some of the decisions made with respect to the reserve callup. Why, for example, when the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, was mobilized, wasn't its Army National Guard round-out brigade (the 48th Infantry Brigade) activated as well? ...In Operation Desert Shield, the Department of Defense has a unique opportunity to test the reserve system, generally, and the validity of the active component's concerns about the need for refresher training for the reserve combat units, more specifically. ...If we truly have a Total Force, then we need to rely on all the elements of that Total Force when the chips are down.87

To Congress, it seemed that the Persian Gulf situation represented the type of scenario in which DOD could logically employ roundout brigades. But DOD had some reservations about such a move initially. Secretary Cheney wrote back to Chairman Aspin on September 18 stating that he did not authorize the use of the ARNG roundout brigades for two reasons:

87Letter from Les Aspin (D-Wis), Chairman of the Armed Service Committee; Sonny Montgomery (D-Miss), Chairman of the Veteran Affairs Committee; Beverly B. Byron, Chairwoman of the Personnel Readiness Sub-Committee and Dave McCurdy, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to the Secretary of Defense on September 6, 1990.
First, my senior military advisers have not advised me that the call-up of such units is necessary at this time. Secondly, the statutory time limits on the use of Selected Reserve units imposes artificial constraints on their employment.

In the letter, Secretary Cheney further explained that:

In deciding what units to deploy to the Middle East and when, I must be guided by military needs. When Selected Reserve units are needed to meet the military requirements of the situation in and around the Arabian Peninsula, there will be no hesitation to deploy them. ...The statutory limitation upon the availability of Selected Reserve units (90 days with the possible extension of an additional 90 days) and personnel limits our ability to make the most effective use of the Selected Reserve units.88

In hindsight, the President had all the authority necessary to call-up the roundout brigades under the authority given to him by declaring a National Emergency. President Bush could have implemented a partial mobilization which permits the call-up of one million members of the National Guard and Reserve for up to two years. The President eventually used this authority, however, to mobilize the roundout units on 30 November and 7 December.

The exclusion of the ARNG roundout brigades from the initial mobilization may have suggested that President Bush wanted to avoid the "political and psychological burden that a more massive reserve callup, including the brigades, would entail, unless absolutely necessary."89 Secretary Cheney later said that he felt


89 CRS, 11.
very strongly that "we would have run the risk of getting a lot of people killed unnecessarily if we sent units (to the Gulf) before they were ready." In an interview with a Force Planner in the Joint Strategy and Concepts Office at Forces Command, he stated that FORSCOM "could not rationalize sending National Guard roundout brigades to the Gulf before we (FORSCOM) first considered the available AC separate brigades. It is our responsibility to the American public to consider AC forces first." Whatever the reasons were, DOD decided to leave the roundout brigades at home and this caused great concern about the credibility of the Total Force Policy.

The preparedness of these roundout brigades was not likely a key issue until after the decision to leave the units at home when the President sent their parent divisions to the Gulf. The Mobilization Readiness Division of the National Guard Bureau on 5 August provided readiness data on the 48th Infantry Brigade (roundout to the 24th Infantry Division). That readiness data met all of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) deployability criteria. The information available to decision makers at the NCA at the start of the crisis was that the roundout brigades (48th,


155th, and the 256th) were reported as mission capable and met AMOPS deployability criteria.\textsuperscript{93} It was assumed, based on readiness reports, that the roundout brigades were ready to be mobilized and conduct their normal post-mobilization training.

Impression:

The Army Reserves, primarily support soldiers, were mobilized along side of active forces to perform their missions as General Abrams envisioned in the early 1970s. That was to signal US National resolve and send a deterrent message to the enemy while at the same time answering the call for additional manpower and force composition needs under the Total Force Policy. The Secretary of Defense decided to leave the ARNG roundout brigades behind and replaced them with AC units with similar capability. Secretary Cheney stated that the call-up authority under Title 10, Section 673b limited the President to use the roundout units for 180 days which was clearly inadequate. Although it seemed that the President had all the authority necessary to mobilize the Guard roundout brigades under a declared national emergency on 7 August 1991 but he opted not to use this authority.

The criteria to mobilize the roundout brigades under the existing Total Force guidelines was center stage in early August. The way RC roundout units were linked to parent AC divisions, the decision

\textsuperscript{93}Ibid., 23.
should have been obvious—mobilize. However, the decision makers decided that the manpower available from using the roundouts could be easily offset by using available AC brigades. Public support was already gaining momentum partly because of early commitment of the Reserves. And even though the ARNG readiness reports stated the roundouts were ready, the Army still had available AC brigades which traditionally would be at a higher state of readiness. Consequently, it was not necessary to mobilize the ARNG roundout brigades until political pressure to exercise the Total Force policy and the eventual need for more combat power would lead the President to mobilize the ARNG roundout brigades. However, the war would end before any roundout brigades deployed to the Persian Gulf.

Primary Criteria to Mobilize the Reserves: National will, Manpower, Deterrent effect, Policy, and Force Composition

Primary Criteria to Mobilize ARNG Roundout Brigades: Policy, Force Composition, and Readiness

Summary

Through research for this chapter, I have discovered that throughout our history, the President decided to mobilize the National Guard and Reserves based on varying criteria. It is clear that six distinct criteria have dominated the decisionmaking process (see figure 3): (1) Establish a firm commitment of national will (by
committing both the Regular and the Reserve Forces to conflict); (2) Expand the force structure with the required aggregate manpower to meet the mission requirements; (3) Send a deterrent message to the enemy by demonstrating U.S. commitment and resolve; (4) Satisfy established policy decisions (regarding Active and Reserve Component affiliation); (5) Satisfy unique force composition requirements; and (6) Capitalize on the expected preparedness inherent in the Reserve Components (manned, equipped, and trained to the level organized).

These criteria were the bases for the decision makers to decide whether mobilization was necessary for a particular crisis. WW II marked the first attempt to mobilize the Reserves for more than just manpower needs. Consequently, mobilizing in 1939 before the declaration of war enabled the President to rally public support, allowed military leaders the time to solve manpower problems and start a much needed force preparedness effort. Korea represented what happens when our forces are ill-prepared for unforeseen crises. The urgency of the situation did not allow the necessary time as in WW II to develop the other criteria. As the Berlin Crisis developed, President Kennedy understood the value of mobilization to cement US national resolve and the deterrent effect of such action. The President did not need to rely on any other criteria to solve the crisis. Then, as the Vietnam War evolved, it appears that President Johnson had little regard for the very criteria to mobilize that had proven itself in WW II and Berlin. Finally, Desert Shield and Desert Storm seemed to consider all of the criteria by first.
activating the Reserves and then, ultimately, mobilizing the roundout brigades.

**MOBILIZATION CRITERIA: 1636-1991**

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*Figure 3.*

The criteria I have described in figure 3 should be considered in future crisis situations when mobilization decisions are necessary and critical as the force structure shrinks in the 1990s. I will verify the necessity of these criteria in the next chapter by analyzing two recent roundout mobilization experiences--Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War.
CHAPTER 5

MOBILIZATION DECISION MODEL

War is a national undertaking that must be coordinated from the highest level of policy making to the basic levels of execution.94

Operations
FM 100-5

Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to present a decision model that has been developed from an analysis of our past mobilization decisions. This model will be used as the vehicle to compare and contrast two recent mobilization experiences in an effort to prove its relevance to roundout brigade mobilization decisions.

What are the criteria that should exist for an active component division to integrate a National Guard roundout brigade for employment in combat? Because there are numerous criteria that one could use to analyze this type of a problem, I believe it is appropriate to focus on the broad criteria which were used to make previous mobilization decisions.

The decision to mobilize and deploy a roundout brigade with its parent division has broad implications and must not be considered as a readiness issue only. I contend that the RC unit readiness is a major factor and carries considerable weight in the decision process.\textsuperscript{95} Readiness, however, is only one part of the mobilization decision equation viewed from the unit level perspective. There are other factors to be considered beyond readiness issues. These factors are: (1) to rally the support of the American people or create a national will for the crisis; (2) the need for additional manpower to expand the force to the required size; (3) the need to establish a deterrent effect to send a message to our adversaries; (4) to satisfy policy directives of the respective services and (5) to create a force composition package to satisfy mission requirements. These issues along with unit preparedness are important criteria and should be part of the mobilization equation. Defense Department planners must visualize the depth of the roundout mobilization decision in order to make an informed decision. To do this, I contend the criteria mentioned above can be viewed on three separate levels: National (political), Departmental (Department of Defense) and Unit (readiness). The inputs from each and all levels can and do affect the outcome of the mobilization decision.

\textsuperscript{95}John D. Messer, Jr., LTC, Army National Guard Advisor, Command and General Staff College, interview by the author at Ft. Leavenworth, 4 October 1991.
Levels Defined

National: At the national level, the US national strategy seeks to protect American interest and further U.S. goals by using all elements of national power. These elements include political, economic, social, military, and technological power as a means to achieve our national ends. For the purpose of this research, I have defined the range of the players at the national level as the international community, the President, Congress, and the National Command Authority (NCA).

Departmental: Narrowing the field of view from the national level to that which includes only the military element of power brings the DOD perspective into focus. From this perspective, senior military officials coordinate the appropriate force level to support our national goals (via military objectives). A key element at the DOD level is translating strategic objectives into unit objectives. I have defined the range of the players at the departmental level as extending from the Joint Chiefs of Staff down to and including the Major Commands (MACOMs) and State Adjutants General.

Unit: This level has the most narrow perspective on the hierarchy of military. Leaders at this level concentrate fully on applying military force to achieve specific military objectives through individuals who are specialists in war-fighting. I have
defined the range of the players at the unit level as extending from the Corps down to the individual soldier.

**Development of a Model**

This chapter examines the necessary criteria which must be considered in determining whether to mobilize an ARNG roundout brigade for employment with its designated AC division for combat operations. To gain an understanding of the criteria our senior leaders must consider for an optimal solution, I have investigated why the Army mobilized during eight periods in our history: pre-World War I, World War I, Korean War, post-Korean War, Berlin Crisis, Vietnam War, post-Vietnam War, and Persian Gulf War. I have used my assessment of each of these mobilization periods to develop a model in the form of a series of tests to guide the decision-making process for mobilizing roundout units.

The principal theme which emerges from my historical review is that the President at the political (national) level, as well as military and civilian leaders at the Department of Defense (departmental) level, and unit (readiness) level have not always considered the most pertinent factors. They have usually reached their decision primarily based on political needs or force structure requirements which are criteria normally observed at the national level. In some isolated cases, however, the President and his advisors have considered relevant national, departmental and unit level factors. They have not traditionally considered these all of
these factors in a thorough and comprehensive fashion. As a result, if decision-makers do not fully consider criteria on all levels, the mobilization decision may be flawed. We have either mobilized the Guard too late or not at all, in various degrees of preparedness, and in some cases, for the wrong reasons. In the cases where the Guard was not mobilized such as in Vietnam War, the President in effect isolated the Army from the Congress and the American people. Consequently, the Army carried the brunt of American dissatisfaction. The prospect of an incomplete mobilization decision process for the future--a future in which ARNG roundout brigades can play an increasingly significant role--could be detrimental for meeting US national security objectives.

In the top tier of the model, the President, the Congress, the National Command Authority and key advisors are responsible for the final mobilization decision after consideration of the national, departmental, and unit level criteria. Prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, decision-makers usually based the decision to mobilize Reserve combat units on one or two of these criteria: (1) manpower needs to expand and fill a limited active component force structure; (2) a symbol of commitment and national will to friend and foe and (3) a message of resolve to promote deterrence achieved by mobilization. These are important criteria for the decision process at the national level.

In the middle tier of the model, the Joint Chiefs of Staff level down to and including the Major Commands (MACOMs) and State Adjutants General manage mobilization planning and execution at the
unit (AC/RC roundout unit) level as well as departmental level criteria. The departmental level planners, after an analysis of the unit and departmental level criteria, make a force structure decision based on policy and an estimate of the situation. Then, they foreword a recommendation to the national level for decision.

The mobilization decision for the Persian Gulf War in 1990 revealed the reality and understanding of an additional criteria—what Guard combat capabilities are desired and which AC/RC force package will yield the best results—normally had not been considered as a pre-mobilization condition. These new criteria are what I have called the departmental level criteria. As the US Army downsizes in the 1990s, there is an increased threat of multiple regional conflicts that the US must be prepared to respond. Contingency plans with the best AC/RC force package will be the key to success. The Department of the Army's policy decisions of the 1970s, influenced by General Creighton Abrams, now dictated the US basic force composition for future conflicts. These are decisions made primarily on the departmental level.

The final tier of the model, the Corps level down to and including the individual soldier, is responsible for forwarding a readiness recommendation to the departmental level as well as being prepared for combat at the unit (roundout brigade) level. A study of our mobilization history reveals a change in training practices after the Korea War in 1953 because defense planners recognized that unit level preparedness was a serious pre-mobilization problem. Senior Defense Department officials envisioned the need for maintaining a
highly trained and ready National Guard force before mobilization. This new concept envisioned a Guard force available for deployment prior to or shortly after the start of hostilities.\textsuperscript{96} Yet, this vision did not take shape until the introduction of the Total Force Policy in 1973—the foundation for the roundout concept. The responsibility to report the status of training and availability of the ARNG force falls upon the unit level leaders.

Future mobilization decisions for ARNG roundout units with their parent AC division must consider national, departmental and unit level criteria. The RC roundout units must be evaluated on specific criteria at each level to determine their strategic availability. This process will assist leaders in planning for mobilization and assist the President by providing him the confidence that his advisors have conducted a thorough decision process based on accepted criteria.

Currently, such a model does not exist. Given the unpredictable nature and timing of the next regional contingency crisis and the expected reliance on Reserve forces in the future, our senior leaders must make mobilization decisions based on a comprehensive assessment of the relevant facts. The decision model will not only assist senior leaders in the decision process but also aid planners and units to prepare for the next employment opportunity.

Model Assumptions

(1) There will be a need for a clearly defined tool or model--understood by the Administration, Congress, and the public--to assist the NCA, DOD, and unit officials to make timely decisions about whether a particular roundout brigade will be mobilized for a crisis requiring combat forces.

(2) In a national emergency that requires full mobilization (major war), AC divisions with ARNG roundout brigades can be expected to mobilize with little questioning.

(3) If a relative small contingency operation (minor war) that does not require mobilization, then AC divisions with ARNG roundout brigades will generally not be mobilized.

(4) In a regional contingency operation that requires a moderate force, AC divisions with ARNG roundout brigades can be expected to be considered for mobilization.

(5) The parent AC division will be at a deployable readiness status when required.

(6) The alerted units will undergo their post-mobilization administrative and training requirements according to a pre-
established plan under FORSCOM Regulation 500-33 Post Mobilization Training and Support Requirements.

(7) To be deployable, selected units should be evaluated on criteria at three decision levels: national, departmental and unit.

(8) Once the decision is made to employ a particular roundout brigade with its parent division, the post-mobilization training time line for the ARNG roundout units will be sequenced according to the deployment schedule.

Model Criteria

National Level

**Criterion I:** The President should not commit the Army National Guard roundout units unless such action is consistent with US strategic objectives outlined by the President and promotes national will.

**Criterion II:** In order to attain the national strategic objectives in a crisis, the conflict will require the manpower of a particular combat division with its National Guard roundout brigade to deploy to the theater of operation.
Criterion III: The mobilization of combat ARNG roundout units will send or reinforce a deterrent message to the adversary's leadership.

Departmental Level

Criterion IV: The Department of the Army's policies and procedures for National Guard mobilization for regional contingencies mandates, dependent on the situation, the mobilization of ARNG roundout units.

Criterion V: The capabilities and combat power offered by the selected roundout unit with its parent unit is the right force package to use in relation to the accomplishment of our strategic objectives for a particular crisis.

Unit Level

Criterion VI: The roundout units are manned, equipped and trained to the level organized--brigade level. Pre-mobilization (peace-time) has ensured AC/RC equipment interoperability, sufficient integrated training, and met the required readiness rating.

With this generalized list, I have arranged the elements in a logical sequence. Senior leaders can use this model to determine whether the mobilization of a particular roundout brigade will
achieve the desired end state. Similarly, the national, departmental and unit level leaders can use this model to assess their status during peacetime operations.
Purpose

The intent of this chapter is evaluate the roundout mobilization criteria (Appendix) for its validity, reliability, and usefulness. This can be done by applying the model criteria against past mobilization decisions in an attempt analyze the outcome. I will not attempt to prove that a particular mobilization decision was right or wrong, but will examine specific mobilization decisions as a vehicle to evaluate selected criteria. I will do this by applying the criteria to like units of similar structure and mission: (1) Hawaii’s ARNG 29th Infantry Brigade (Separate) in the Vietnam War and (2) the Georgia’s ARNG 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) in the Persian Gulf War.

Introduction

It is important to note the parallel circumstances of the 29th and 48th Brigades’ mobilization experience even though they
occurred some 23 years apart. The Army could have used the 29th Infantry Brigade (Separate) from Hawaii to roundout the 25th Infantry Division in its support mission in the Pacific Theater in 1965. However, the President did not mobilize the ARNG at that time. It wasn’t until after the USS Puabio incident and Tet Offensive in early 1968 that the President felt that the nation and the US forces needed the support of the ARNG. Consequently, the 29th Infantry Brigade was mobilized on May 13, 1968 to prepare for deployment operations in the Pacific.\(^{97}\)

At the time of mobilization, the 29th Brigade in December 1967 had completed a “brigade FTX and was rated formally as combat ready.”\(^{98}\) Regardless, the Army directed the brigade to conduct a prescribed post-mobilization training before deployment. Although hindered by severe personnel turbulence and equipment shortages which effected training after mobilization, the 29th reached a deployability rating of 85 (80 was the standard for deployment) in July 1968.\(^{99}\) Throughout the majority of their training, there was “widespread belief in the brigade that the unit would be shipped overseas, possibly to RVN (Republic of Vietnam), maintaining unit integrity. When it became known that the brigade was destined to


\(^{98}\)Ibid., 79.

\(^{99}\)Ibid., 80.
remain in Hawaii and provide individual levies...morale suffered." 100
Even though the 29th Brigade was trained and ready to deploy as a unit, the Department of the Army never deployed the 29th Infantry Brigade to Vietnam. Instead, the brigades' personnel were used as individual replacements.

President Johnson's initial decision not to deploy units like the ARNG's 29th Infantry Brigade but rather to rely on the draft to build the required manpower for the Vietnam War caused problems throughout the nation. His decision had "far reaching consequences and lasting effects not only on the Guard and Reserve Forces, but also on the active forces, the decisionmakers in Washington, society's overall view of the military establishment, and the war itself." 101 Numerous problems of poor leadership, low discipline standards, low morale, lack of public support for the war and the National Guard--viewed as a haven for draft dodgers--can all be linked to President Johnson's reliance on the draft rather than mobilizing Guard and Reserve forces.

The 29th mobilization experience is very similar to that of the Georgia ARNG 48th Infantry Brigade. The 48th Brigade was trained and available to roundout the 24th Infantry Division for missions such as the Persian Gulf War according to the guidelines established

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100 Ibid., 18.
101 Stevens, 1.
under the Total Force Policy. However, the President did not call up the ARNG maneuver brigades (roundout units) until he received pressure from congressional members of the Armed Service Committee and a change in national strategy from one of defensive in nature to one of projecting an offensive capability. President Bush's shift in strategy required additional forces, both Active and Reserve. The Secretary of Defense announced the activation of the 48th Infantry Brigade, one of three ARNG combat roundout brigades alerted, on November 8, 1990 to support Operation Desert Shield in the Persian Gulf. At the time of the actual mobilization on November 30th, the 48th Brigade had completed training at the National Training Center in July 1990 and was rated as combat ready by their parent organization—the 24th Infantry Division. As specified under the Total Force Policy, FORSCOM Regulation 500-33 Post Mobilization Training and Support Requirements (PTSR), the Army directed the brigade to conduct post-mobilization training before deployment to the Persian Gulf.

As with the 29th Brigade 23 years earlier, the 48th Brigade experienced numerous personnel and equipment shortcomings which


103 Ibid., 148.

104 Ibid., 148.

impacted on training that were recognized after mobilization. Personnel problems arose due to crew turbulence, critical MOS shortages in repairmen and crewmen, and shortage of school trained officer and sergeant leaders. Logistic problems occurred with shortages in radios, night vision goggles, trucks and communication security equipment. Both areas lacked the computer hardware to interface properly with the AC systems.\textsuperscript{106}

Since there was no deadline for the 48th to be in the Gulf, the Army decided to increase the readiness standard and sent the 48th Brigade to the NTC for additional training before the Army deployed the brigade.\textsuperscript{107} After intensive training, LTG James Crysel, commander of the Second US Army certified that the 48th Brigade was combat ready and prepared for deployment on 28 February 1991.\textsuperscript{108} However, that very day, the President called a cease-fire and the ground war was over. Like in the case with the 29th during the Vietnam War, the 48th Infantry Brigade was activated and mobilized but was never deployed.

President Bush's initial decision not to mobilize the ARNG roundout brigades brought the utility of the roundout portion of the Total Force Policy into question. Moreover, the same ill feeling

\textsuperscript{106}"Special Assessment of the National Guard Brigades' Mobilization and Deployment," author's notes and slides from a briefing by a Department of the Army Inspector General Briefing Team to a meeting of the Congressional Army Caucus, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C., April 25, 1991.

\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., 14.

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., 15.
between the AC and RC that existed during the Vietnam era were surfacing again.

**Vietnam Mobilization Study**

President Johnson apparently did not consider all the mobilization criteria as described in the Appendix of this thesis. These criteria, in concept, may have influenced his decision making process in July 1965, but there is little evidence to support this idea. Had he developed his decision considering all factors that affect the rationale to mobilize rather than primarily a political decision (national level), President Johnson may have decided to mobilize National Guard forces much earlier than 1968. Instead, he took three years and the occurrence of two significant events--the *USS Pueblo* incident and the Tet Offensive in early 1968--to force him to mobilize primarily for the immediate need for additional forces.

**National Level**

**Criterion 1**: The President should not commit the Army National Guard roundout units unless such action is consistent with US strategic objectives outlined by the President and promotes national will.

The key issue here is that the United States was committed to a protracted war in Vietnam with minimal public debate.
Increasingly, the American public felt isolated as they spoke out against the war—a war the public gradually saw as not vital to US national security interest. President Johnson’s decision not to submit to at least a partial mobilization in 1965—an example was the mobilization of the Hawaiian ARNG 29th Infantry Brigade which could have been used as a replacement brigade or, in today’s terms, the roundout brigade to the 25th Infantry Division—he was taking a calculated risk as to the response of the public and Congress. Traditionally, mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves for war, among other things, had served as the litmus test for the direction of public reaction. There were “individual calls for reserve mobilization by military leaders, members of Congress and the press [but they] went unheeded by the Department of Defense and the President.”109 Yet, President Johnson viewed this conflict as his “secret war” that he tried to hide from the American public. A conflict “without a price, a silent, politically invisible war.”110

The second point is the President Johnson did not clearly articulate to the American public the US strategic objectives in Vietnam. Why were we there and what were our objectives. The 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution simply stated that “peace and


110David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 593-594, as quoted in Joseph H. Pistorius and John D. Stuckey, Mobilization of the Army Guard and the Army Reserve: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War, 46-47.
security of Southeast Asia were 'vital' to US national interest."\textsuperscript{111} The Cold War induced the fear of communism throughout the our countries' leadership in the 1960s and our military's involvement in Vietnam represented a tangible step to stop the spread of communism. Over the course of the Vietnam War, there were many references to US interest and objectives which led into long rhetoric which confused policymakers and the public as to what truly was at stake and their priority.\textsuperscript{112}

President Johnson failed to gain the support from the American public throughout the course of the Vietnam War. Would mobilization of the National Guard and Reserve in 1965 have gained the President the support of the American people for his "secret" war? It is difficult to determine for sure, but one can say that a mobilization decision would have perhaps provided an opportunity for debate of this issue in Congress. The American public, through their representatives, could have sent a message to the President as to where they stood. Hence, in order to satisfy the first criteria, a President will have to first clearly define our objectives and the end state to the American people. Then, he will have to subject his mobilization decision to the scrutiny of the people through Congress. These steps are crucial to help secure the popular support of the nation as the military seeks to achieve its war aims. It can be


concluded that mobilization of the Reserves as a political indication of the US strength and determination, in an international setting, is a powerful tool in the hands of the President.\textsuperscript{113}

**Criterion II**: In order to attain the nation's strategic objectives in a crisis, the conflict will require the manpower of a particular combat division with its National Guard roundout brigade to deploy to the theater of operation.

Unlike most earlier conflicts, Vietnam was a protracted war in which our forces were slowly incrementally employed into the theater of operation. Our direct involvement in South Vietnam began shortly after the United States signed the Geneva Accords on July 21, 1954. President Eisenhower offered direct economic assistance to the Ngo Dinh Diem government with economic assistance which was followed immediately by US military advisors on February 12, 1955. The number of military advisors had risen up to 3,200 advisors by 1962 and to 33,000 by 1965.\textsuperscript{114} A snapshot of US deployment of troops can be summed up by saying that:


\textsuperscript{114}Odegard, 1-31.
The gradual build-up of US forces in Vietnam was accompanied by a gradual evolution in the use of US forces as advisors only, to base security, to their more active use as patrols near the bases, to combat support of Vietnamese units in trouble, to combat support to Vietnamese units, and finally to direct combat.\footnote{Ibid., 11.}

The first US ground combat unit, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, was deployed to Vietnam by June 30, 1965. The number of US combat battalions quickly grew to 44 battalions, but General Westmoreland knew that this was no force for victory. He stated in his book \textit{A Soldier Reports} that the US "would require some form of national mobilization and the public airing by Washington of a frank, objective, complete analysis of the problems and what we had to do about it...."\footnote{William C. Westmoreland, \textit{A Soldier Reports} (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1976), 140, as quoted in Odegard, 12.} A piecemeal approach to the troop build-up was not the answer. Clark Clifford, Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, advised President Johnson in 1965 that:

\begin{quote}
I don’t believe we can win in Vietnam. If we send in 100,000 more men, the North Vietnamese will meet us. If the North Vietnamese runs out men, the Chinese will send in volunteers. Russia and China don’t intend for us to win the war. I can’t see anything but catastrophe for my country.\footnote{Lyndon Baines Johnson, \textit{The Vantage Point} (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971), 148, as quoted in Odegard, 17.}
\end{quote}

Clark Clifford was right--Vietnam was a catastrophe for the United States, but if the military element of the government was not
the answer, what was? In view of Criterion II, what could have been done differently? President Johnson still believed a "secret war" was the solution supported by massive troop involvement. Right or wrong, I believe the President's method for the troop build-up was fundamentally flawed. Massive combat power was needed immediately in order to protect our own soldiers and ultimately proceed towards victory. National Guard units were trained and ready to deploy as opposed to a draftee who had to be trained and organized into units before deployment. A National Guard and Reserve mobilization could have been supplemented by a national draft rather than replaced by it. The mobilization of the ARNG's 29th Infantry Brigade as a part of the 25th Infantry Division, for example, not only would have opened a national debate but, if approved, would have delivered to the theater a portion of the necessary combat power.

**Criterion III:** The mobilization of combat National Guard roundout units will send or reinforce a deterrent message to the adversary's leadership.

It appears that President Johnson underestimated the power of a National Guard mobilization in terms of deterrence. A major lesson learned from the Berlin Crisis in 1965 was the power of deterrence in mobilization to assist in resolving a conflict peacefully. However, I do not suggest that during the Vietnam War if President Johnson had declared a national emergency and mobilized the Guard and Reserves, we may not have been involved in a long and protracted
war. However, mobilization as a deterrent is a factor that should be considered during crisis action planning.

I believe that President Johnson was probably aware of the deterrent effect of a mobilization in 1965. However, he thought that mobilization would send the wrong message. As a matter of fact, President Johnson, after reviewing what options were available at a meeting at the National Security Council on July 27, 1965, believed that the US might “make threatening noises to the Chinese or the Russians by calling up the reserves in large numbers.”\(^\text{1}\) David Halberstam in his book *The Best and the Brightest* expressed a similar concern that mobilizing the Guard and Reserves would:

...telegraph the wrong signals to the adversaries, particularly China and the Soviet Union (frighten into the idea that this was a real war (he did not intend to go into a long war), and he felt if you call up the Reserves you had to be prepared to go the distance and you might force your adversary to do the same.\(^\text{1}\)

In 1965, President Johnson was concerned about an adverse adversary reaction to a US mobilization. Consequently, mobilization of a Guard combat unit like the 29th Infantry Brigade would not have achieved the appropriate deterrent message and would have been counterproductive to quick and decisive results in Vietnam. Again, right or wrong, this was the President’s and his advisor’s

\(^{1}\)Ibid., 17.

assessment of the international situation in view of Criterion III.
To satisfy Criterion III, the issue of deterrence must be
intelligently evaluated in concert with the US strategic objectives.
Mobilization, Johnson apparently believed, would agitate rather than
deter North Vietnam and her allies. This is a conclusion that
historians will continue to debate.

Departmental Level

Criterion IV: The Department of the Army's policies and procedures
for Army National Guard mobilization for regional contingencies
mandates, dependent on the situation, the mobilization of ARNG
roundout units.

In 1965, there was no specific Department of the Army policy
that directed the mobilization and deploy the any National Guard
units. Consequently, the President was not under policy or
congressional pressure to mobilize the ARNG's 29th Infantry
Brigade. Although the Army's primary source of additional
manpower needs was to come from the Reserve forces, the Army
considered the mobilization of the Reserves in 1965 as a strategic
option rather than a policy directive. This course of action appeared
to be rational and consistent with past US involvement in crisis
situations. President Johnson elected not to mobilize the Reserves

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but rather he placed the burden of meeting the Army’s manpower needs upon the Selective Service System.\textsuperscript{121}

Since a particular mobilization policy did not appear to be an issue in the Vietnam War, do departmental level officials need to consider this criteria for future conflicts? The Vietnam War opened the door for discussion on this issue and ultimately proved the need for the President to seriously consider such criteria. Creighton Abrams, Chief of Staff of the Army, recognized that our nation should never commit our Army to war again without its Reserves and he had the vision to lay the foundation for the Total Force Policy.\textsuperscript{122}

It is clear that defense departmental officials must consider all mobilization policies before making a recommendation to the President. As the crisis in Vietnam developed, there were no policies or congressional directives to urge the President to mobilize and then deploy the 29th Infantry Brigade. In future conflicts, the departmental level officials can not afford to overlook this criterion.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[121]Ibid., 616.
\end{footnotes}
Criterion V: The capabilities and combat power offered by the selected roundout unit with its parent unit is the right force package to use in relation to the accomplishment of our strategic objectives for a particular crisis.

By 1965, the political and military situation in Vietnam had eroded to a point where President Johnson felt compelled to respond to the crisis. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara presented the President on July 20, 1965 three primary recommendations: (1) cut our loses and withdraw; (2) hold at the present troop level at 75,000; or (3) expand militarily and launch a vigorous political effort to open communication lines and clarify our objectives. Secretary McNamara recommended the the third course of action.¹²³

Instead of mobilizing the National Guard and the Reserves, the President decided to rely on Selective Service System rather than available Reserve and National guard units. The 29th Infantry Brigade was one of these units which could have been mobilized and deployed in 1965. Even though their readiness rating was below 80 percent,¹²⁴ which a rigorous post-mobilization could have improved, the 29th was an existing unit with personnel, equipment and cohesion capabilities to deliver combat power to roundout the 25th Infantry Division.


¹²⁴ The 29th Infantry Brigade (Separate). 78.
Our policies should be flexible enough to allow the departmental level officials to adapt the force package to satisfy the requirements of the military operation. If the decision to mobilize is being considered, the selection of which force package to adapt to accomplish strategic objectives--the size, nature, capabilities and availability--must be evaluated. When the decision is reached, the departmental level must continually monitor the military situation and pass on critical information to the national level. The national level will monitor the political situation to ensure the military's selected force package achieves the desired effects. As with the 29th Brigade, the Army decided after it was mobilized that the unit could be better used as a replacement fillers rather than a combat unit.

Unit Level

Criterion VI: The roundout units are manned, equipped and trained to the level organized--brigade level. Pre-mobilization (peace-time) has ensured AC/RC equipment interoperability, sufficient integrated training, and the required readiness rating.

The 29th Infantry Brigade, a potential roundout to the 25th Infantry Division, was available for mobilization and deployment in both 1965 and 1968. However, it would not see combat as a unit. Politics rather than readiness appears to have determined the fate of the 29th Brigade in 1965. But in 1968, unit readiness, in specific areas, seemed to play a role in the rational for not deploying the
29th Brigade. Readiness and After Action reports showed that the 29th Brigade was rated as deployable prior to its 1968 mobilization and for 13 of the 19 months on active duty was rated as deployable. But why wasn't the brigade selected for deployment in 1968?

Clearly it was political decision at the national level when the 29th was not deployed in 1965. But in 1968, it is not as easy to define the factors that led to non-deployment after the President decided to mobilize the 29th Brigade. Problems in personnel turbulence may have contributed to the decision not to deploy. There were major problems in stabilizing unit personnel that plagued the unit. The 29th experienced "strength and MOS imbalances, personnel overages and shortages, discontinuity in leadership, training problems, supply difficulties, and impaired unit readiness status--all of these arose from personnel turbulence."

Problems also arose with mission essential equipment that prevented attainment of the 29th Infantry Brigade's readiness objectives. Just prior to mobilization, the brigade, for example, was short the following items of equipment: all track vehicles, 174 wheeled vehicles, 249 weapons of all types, 241 various types of communication equipment, and 4 aircraft. These equipment

\[^{125}\text{Ibid., 80.}\]
\[^{126}\text{Ibid., 78.}\]
\[^{127}\text{Ibid., 50.}\]
\[^{128}\text{Ibid., 50.}\]
shortages were typical of Reserve units during the Vietnam War because good equipment was normally shifted to deploying AC units. So when it became known in early January 1968 that the President was mobilizing the Guard, the National Guard, across the board, had been already seriously depleted of some of its mission essential equipment.

The brigade, however, was trained to the level organized (brigade level) despite the problems in personnel turbulence and equipment shortages. The evaluators at a brigade level FTX in December 1967 determined that the 29th was combat ready and ready for deployment.\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^9\)

Further analysis of the units’ readiness to be mobilized when compared against Criterion VI reveals that equipment interoperability and integrated training with the 25th Infantry Division, its probable parent division, were not an issue prior to mobilization. This was due to the fact that both units were light infantry with their primary weapon being the M1 or the M14 rifle. AC units in the 1960s normally did not have any equipment that was not common to the Guard or the Reserves. There was no cross-leveling or cross-training of equipment accomplished after the President mobilized the 29th Brigade. In addition, integrated training normally was not a common practice between AC and ARNG units during the sixties. The AC units normally supported the ARNG

\(^{129}\)Ibid., 78.
with technical assistance and training facilities during their training but that was about all.\textsuperscript{130}

As for the validity of Criterion VI in relation to the Hawaii's ARNG 29th Infantry Brigade, one can conclude some important observations. First, even though the 29th Brigade was rated as combat ready before it was mobilized, the true preparedness of the unit was in question simple because it was a Guard unit. The US Army Reserve Pacific (USARPAC) commander understood the reasons for the shortcomings in personnel and equipment, but in good faith he could not recommend deployment for the unit immediately upon mobilization. This was a judgement call at the unit level by commanders who recommended to the departmental level not to deploy the 29th Brigade. Criteria VI allows for this type of judgement and analysis to take place \textit{before} and \textit{after} the President makes a mobilization and deployment decision.

\textbf{Persian Gulf (Desert Shield/Storm) Mobilization Study}

Unlike the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf erupted overnight when Saddam Hussein's forces from Iraq invaded the tiny neighbor nation of Kuwait on August 2, 1991. The US quickly responded by deploying a deterrent force to the region. By August 8, only six days later, the US force had established a foothold in the sand. This emergency response was followed by the most rapid mobilization in history.

\textsuperscript{130}John D. Messer, Jr., LTC, interview December 20, 1991.
National Level

**Criterion 1:** The President should not commit the Army National Guard roundout units unless such action is consistent with US strategic objectives outlined by the President and promotes national will.

The key issue to validate this criterion was President George Bush's ability to recognize and understand the need for clearly defined strategic objectives and use these as the legitimacy for our actions to muster public support. In the case of Desert Shield/Storm, this was done with mixed results. President Bush, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and Secretary of State James Baker appeared in the media circuit almost daily and the congressional hearings frequently to educate our country on the political and military objectives in the Gulf. Still, even with a well orchestrated public information campaign on going "confusion and disagreement (over our strategic objectives) persisted." But the administration's forcefulness and conviction about our goals--deter Iraqi aggression and defend Saudi Arabia; secure unconditional removal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and permit the legitimate government of Kuwait to return to authority--influenced the tide of popular support in favor of the President's actions.

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132 Ibid., 29.
In this case, President Bush expressed a clear vision of what US national interest and objectives were and how we intend to achieve them. From the Administration’s point of view, the accomplishment of strategic objectives could be achieved without the use of the ARNG’s roundout 48th Brigade. The President’s plan in view of the Criterion I was directly in line with Clausewitz’s principal to gain public support:

No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so, without being first clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.  

Initially, due to force structure decisions of the 1970s, the Army’s combat support and combat service support from the Reserves were deployed with the first units on the ground. This action pulled citizen-soldiers from their homes, jobs, and community to perform their military duties. They went willingly and with a sense of pride which confirmed their dedication to the Reserves and their country. Communities all over the country overwhelming supported the cause as they sent their part-time soldiers off to war. The nation’s political leadership believed “that any large callup of the reserves would require a political consensus that would in turn allow the military flexibility to prosecute a

conflict to military victory."\(^{134}\) It was clear that public and Congressional support existed throughout the Gulf war.

In relation to rallying national will in Criterion I, the Administration had to make a judgement call on whether to commit the ARNG roundout units. The 48th Brigade was one of these units considered, of the three designated roundout brigades, to be combat ready and available.\(^{135}\) First, however, the President and the administration spelled out our objectives and how the US intended to achieve them both politically and militarily with the help of international support. Then, as the first elements of the US force departed, the President ordered the Reserves to duty and they trailed on the heels of the AC units. These actions, according to Clausewitz, were the correct steps to establish national will. Thus the stage was set in accordance with Criterion I to mobilize the roundout units. But in early August 1991, this would not be the case.

**Criterion II:** *In order to attain the national strategic objectives in a crisis, the conflict will require the manpower of a particular combat division with its National Guard roundout brigade to deploy to the theater of operation.*

Iraq's aggressive actions in the Persian Gulf appeared on the world scene like a rolling thunder with unpredictable consequences that could not go unchecked. As the sole remaining super power, the

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\(^{135}\)Ibid., 36.
United States was expected to act in the eyes of the world community. There were numerous options available which included a wide range of diplomatic, economic and military courses of action. The President first decided to put Saddam Hussein’s forces in check by deploying a sizable US force to Saudi Arabia while taking strategically planned diplomatic steps through the United Nations.

In order to put a large force structure in the Persian Gulf, the President had to rely on the US Reserve forces for support and sustainment from day one of the operation. Mobilization of our combat support and combat service support Reserve forces began immediately. Initially, Secretary of Defense Cheney advised President Bush that the 180 day maximum call-up authority of the ARNG roundout brigades would constrain the operation and there were ready and available AC separate brigades to replace the ARNG units. The ARNG 48th Infantry Brigade was one of the three units that, according to guidelines established under the Total Force policy, the Army had designated to be mobilized with their AC parent division.

The Army believed that rushing ARNG combat units to war would be irresponsible. Secretary Cheney said: “I feel very strongly we would have run the risk of getting allot of people killed unnecessarily if we sent units [to the Gulf] before they were ready.”136 Obviously concerned about Guard preparedness, Secretary


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Cheney wanted the most prepared roundout unit, be it an AC unit or an RC unit, to fight with the 24th Division in the Gulf.

In the Secretary's opinion, the crisis called for the combat power of the 24th Infantry Division. In order for the division to function properly, it needed a "third" brigade to fill out its divisional structure. After assessing the situation, Secretary Cheney recommend to President Bush not to mobilize the Georgia's ARNG 48th Brigade but substitute a AC separate brigade, the 197th Infantry Brigade. This action was in contrast to what was assumed as fact under the Total Force Policy. If the Secretary of Defense alerted the 24th Division to deploy, its roundout brigade, the 48th Brigade, would be mobilized, conduct post-mobilization training, and deploy either with the 24th or follow on later.

In view of Criterion II, the situation requiring military power should be assessed as to the availability combat divisions required in relationship to the need for combat divisions with ARNG roundout brigades. Criteria II requires the Secretary of Defense, after a thorough analysis of a crisis, to determine what assets are needed. If a particular division is required to satisfy our strategic objectives and that particular division has a ARNG roundout brigade, then its associated roundout brigade will be mobilized as its parent division is alerted. The roundout brigade will join the division after successful completion of its prescribed post-mobilization training.

**Criterion III:** The mobilization of combat National Guard roundout units will send or reinforce the appropriate deterrent message to the adversary's leadership.
Unlike the Berlin Crisis where the primary reason of mobilization was deterrence, mobilization of the Reserves for the Persian Gulf War was almost automatic due to our Total Force Policy decisions and commitments. Deterrence was a consideration but not likely the primary factor. The effect, however, sent a strong signal of US national resolve to Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The amount of deterrence actually felt by Saddam Hussein will never be truly be known and the answer will be left to speculation. Mobilization of the Reserves may have been a factor that contributed to deter Iraqi forces from continuing to move into Saudi Arabia when they had the chance shortly after August 2, 1990. By amassing such a potent force on the Saudi border, the US was:

...signaling unequivocally to Saddam our resolve to engage militarily should diplomacy fail. Unlike our involvement in Vietnam, this time there would be no doubt in the minds of our troops, politicians, media, populace, or the enemy that should war erupt, US armed forces were there to secure a military victory.137

In relation to Criterion III, the deterrent effect of a mobilization, if any, was probably already gained by the President’s federalization of the Reserves for the conflict. If the President mobilized the ARNG’s 48th Brigade roundout unit earlier in this case, it would have reinforced rather than sent a deterrent message to our adversaries. The importance of Criterion III, however, is for the

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137 Dubois, 28.
leaders at the national level to clearly understand the value of Guard combat roundout units can have as a builder of a deterrent factor. This is because the ARNG roundout brigades, as a part of AC combat divisions, are the "core of Army combat forces and [would] sustain the overwhelming majority of causalities in any major war." This fact alone sends a strong signal of national will which translates into a deterrent message to our adversaries.

Departmental Level

Criterion IV: The Department of the Army's policies and procedures for Army National Guard mobilization for regional contingencies mandates, dependent on the situation, the mobilization of ARNG roundout units.

Since the Army introduced of roundout brigade concept as a part of the Total Force Policy back in 1973, it was desired that if our nation ever went to war again, the Reserves would deploy along side of the Active force. General Abrams wanted the Reserves so integrated into our force structure that "it would make it very difficult, if not impossible, for the President to deploy any significant force without calling up the reserves." \(^{139}\)

In fact, the way General Abrams envisioned the force was the way the Department of Defense since 1973 developed policies and procedures to ensure the Reserves deployed along side of the active component. The Department of Defense promoted the concept by placing the majority of the combat support and combat service support missions with the Reserves. Guard combat units were integrated into the AC force through the roundout program with a similar type of understanding that these units would be mobilized when their parent divisions were alerted to deploy. At the start of the Persian gulf War, Reserve combat support and combat service support units deployed as planned. Yet, the Department of Defense's

\(^{139}\)Sorley. 45.
policies and procedures regarding roundout units were not followed as the Congress, the public, and the National Guard believed that the Departmental level policymakers had designed.

Members of the 48th Brigade expected to be mobilized when the President alerted their parent division—the 24th Division—but they were not mobilized until three months later. This was the first occasion that the roundout concept could be truly tested since its inception back in 1973. The opportunity seemed to slip by the Secretary of Defense. For if the US Army was really serious about the Total Force Policy and the Guard's portion concerning roundout brigades, early August was the window of opportunity to put our policy to the true test of battle. Yet, the Secretary of Defense cited specific legislative time limitations that would hinder the availability of the roundout units rendering them not the unit of choice. Consequently, the President deployed the AC's 197th Infantry Brigade to replace the 48th Brigade as the 24th Division's roundout brigade.

With respect to Criterion IV, President Bush made the decision from a recommendation from the departmental level, in contrast to our stated policy, not to initially deploy the roundout brigades. The US has entered in a new era where this type of consideration must be taken into account before the President reaches a decision. The Persian Gulf War brought out this fact which normally was not a consideration in past conflicts. But if the US has a mobilization policy and a procedure for ARNG roundout brigades, our military leaders should follow it. If our policy and procedure are at fault,
they should be reevaluated and changed as necessary before the next conflict.

**Criterion V:** *The capabilities and combat power offered by the selected roundout unit with its parent division is the right force package to use in relation to the accomplishment of our strategic objectives for a particular crisis.*

As the crisis began to unfold in the Persian gulf, there were numerous political, economic, and military options available to President Bush and the United Nations (UN). Secretary of State Baker masterfully worked through the UN to pressure Iraq with tough diplomatic and economic sanctions while the US was deploying forces to the region for defensive purposes. A quick response was required and units from the Central Command (CENTCOM)--US combat divisions whose mission is to begin to respond to a regional contingency crisis within 48 hours--began deployment.

The Army determined that heavy combat forces would be required immediately to display a creditable defense against the world's fourth largest army. To do this, the combat power of the 24th Infantry Division (one of the CENTCOM units) was alerted for deployment minus its roundout brigade--the 48th Infantry Brigade. The Army wanted a "full-up" heavy division with three AC brigades because the whole division could deploy immediately without a delay for its ARNG roundout's post-mobilization training. The 24th Division partially fit the mission requirement of a "full-up" division. With the substitution of the ARNG 48th with the 197th, the
division would be fully mission capable without unnecessary delays. The Army believed that this was the correct force package to fulfil the US strategic objectives.

Secretary of State Baker believed that the United Nation's diplomatic pressure would be unsuccessful and economic sanctions required more time than expected to have a telling effect. The US national interest would be better served to reconsider its means to achieve our objectives. It wasn't long before President Bush realized that the initial courses of action had little impact on removing Saddam Husseim from Kuwait and he subsequently ordered the commitment of an additional 200,000 troops. This reversal in strategy occurred in late November 1990. At this point, the 48th Brigade was mobilized and directed to commence its post-mobilization training.

Criterion V, in view of the Persian Gulf War, calls on departmental level leaders to assess what capabilities are available without destroying AC/RC unit integrity. This may not be possible under certain circumstances. The point here is that the long standing cohesion that exist between a roundout brigade and its parent division can not be taken lightly. In ordering more troops to the Gulf in late November, President Bush was acting in accordance with Criterion V's assessment of the situation and act accordingly. Initially, the Secretary of Defense did not want ARNG roundout units as a part of the force package. Yet, he wanted their parent combat

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140Dubois, 31.
Criterion V requires the Army to consider a combat division with a roundout as one interdependent unit that should not be separated.

Unit Level

Criterion VI: The preparedness of the roundout units are manned, equipped and trained to the level organized. Pre-mobilization (peace-time) has ensured AC/RC equipment interoperability, sufficient integrated training, and the required readiness rating.

The 48th Infantry Brigade, roundout brigade to the 24th Infantry Division, was trained and available for mobilization according to the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) and FORSCOM Regulation 500-33 (Post Mobilization Training and Support Requirements) deployability criteria as of August 2, 1990. Yet, the brigade would not be mobilized until November 30, 1991 and would not be deployed to the Persian Gulf. Like the experience of the 29th Infantry Brigade during the Vietnam War, I believe that it was politics rather than a readiness issue that determined the fate--the three month delay in the decision to mobilize--of the 48th Brigade.

The exclusion of the ARNG roundout brigades from the initial mobilization may have suggested that President Bush wanted to avoid the "political and psychological burden that a more massive reserve callup, including the brigades, would entail, unless

141 Army National Guard After Action Report, 116.
absolutely necessary." Secretary Cheney later said that he felt very strongly that "we would have run the risk of getting a lot of people killed unnecessarily if we sent units (to the Gulf) before they were ready." In an interview with a Force Planner in the Joint Strategy and Concepts Office at Forces Command, I was advised that FORSCOM "could not rationalize sending National Guard combat forces before we (FORSCOM) utilized all of available active combat forces." DOD's decision to leave the roundout brigades at home caused great concern about the credibility of the Total Force Policy.

The preparedness of these roundout brigades was not likely a key issue until after the decision to leave the units at home while the President sent their parent divisions to the Gulf. As stated at the beginning of this section, the Mobilization Readiness Division of the National Guard Bureau on August 5th provided readiness data that the 48th Infantry Brigade met all of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) deployability criteria. The information available to decision makers at the national level at the start of the crisis was that the 48th roundout brigade was mission capable and met the AMOPS deployability criteria. It was

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142 CRS, 11.


146 Ibid., 23.
assumed, based on readiness reports, that the roundout brigades were ready to be mobilized and conduct their normal post-mobilization training.

The value and need for the readiness issues in Criterion VI are to assist planners in assessing the roundout unit's state of preparedness, in accordance to AMOPS, prior to the decision to mobilize. Prior to August 2nd, the 48th Brigade was rated as combat ready which meant that the unit "possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the bulk of the wartime mission for which it was organized or designed." This meant that their personnel, equipment, and training were at least 80% of personnel and equipment on hand at the time the President was called to make a decision concerning mobilization. However, it would be misleading or counterproductive to frame this argument about roundout readiness in terms of only readiness. There are other factors such as morale, leadership, unit integrity, and cohesion with its parent unit that should be factors in determining the overall unit readiness rating. Unfortunately, the Army's readiness reporting system is not capable to assess such important items at this time.

There are two other areas that Criterion VI takes in consideration--equipment interoperability and sufficient integrated training prior to mobilization--that are important in the readiness equation. In relation to the 48th Brigade, there were some problems with interoperability of technical equipment, but their relationship

\[147\text{CRS. 36.}\]
with the 24th Division was a model for the other roundout units to emulate.

The long standing technical equipment problems with personnel and logistics computer software compatibility were realized well before the Gulf War started but the complications this would cause were not fully understood until after mobilization. Because the Army and the Guard had been operating with different computer systems upon mobilization, the "incompatibility of automated information systems...was a major problem." This problem was not impossible to correct but it could have been a factor, due to the delays expected to correct the problems, in the initial decision not to mobilize the 48th Brigade.

The other area that Criterion VI takes into consideration is the factor of sufficient integrated training between the roundout brigade and the parent division. It is important to note that the 48th Brigade units are physically located in the state of Georgia and close to the training facilities at Fort Stewart, Georgia--the home of the 24th Infantry Division. This enables the roundout unit to routinely train its staff, leaders, and soldiers with its parent division. This and a historic relationship between the 48th Brigade and the 24th Division made for a unique professional and social relationship that developed a cohesive unit. Unfortunately,

\[148\] "Special Assessment of the National Guard Brigades' Mobilization and Deployment," author's notes and slides from a briefing by a Department of the Army Inspector General Briefing Team to a meeting of the Congressional Army Caucus, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C., April 25, 1991.

\[149\] CRS, 34.
co-located units are not the case with the Army's five roundout brigades where hundreds of miles separation is the norm rather than the exception. The 48th Brigade had a solid working relationship with the 24th Division and was probably a positive factor in the decision to mobilize.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate changes in the charter of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after changes occur.

G. Douhet

Conclusions

1. This study has presented a historical review of the reasons why our nation has decided to mobilize for past conflicts. This research has revealed the following observations:

   a. Before the Army implemented the Total Force Policy in 1973, the President mobilized the Reserves primarily for additional manpower and units to expand the force. Generally, as a result, mobilization stimulated the national will in support of the cause and sent a deterrent message to our adversaries as to the extent of US commitment and determination.

   b. After 1973, the active Army leadership developed an integrated “total” army force structure which included both AC and RC elements. The Reserves now incorporate more than 60% of the
total combat support and combat service support forces for the Army. As a result, the decision to mobilize requires a more balanced approach at the national level--to include consideration of national will, manpower needs, and deterrent effect. It also factored in two new concepts at the departmental level--policy and force structure requirements.

These new considerations were normally not considered as a part of the mobilization equation prior to 1973. After 1973, however, Reserve mobilization was built into the total force structure so that it would be virtually impossible to go to war for a prolonged period without them.

c. The Persian Gulf War provided the first opportunity for the Army to demonstrate the roundout program in a crisis. Unlike Army Reserve units, the deployment readiness of the National Guard roundout brigades was not considered to be adequate without substantial post-mobilization training. Unit preparedness of the roundout brigades to deploy with their parent AC divisions became the most important criteria considered before the President mobilized the units. This fact caused the President to delay the three roundout brigades' mobilization until November 30th and December 7th 1990.

2. The criteria I have selected for the mobilization decision model considers the spectrum of the essential ideas, principals, and policies that the President and his advisors must assess prior to
deciding to mobilize the National Guard roundout brigades. The proposed criteria (Appendix) are not all inclusive, but offer a starting point for further research and study.

3. The basic concept of the model—that a unit must satisfy criteria at the National, Departmental, and Unit level—may have further application in other scenarios in which a unit accepts another unit into its force structure. In view of a broader context for use of this type of a model, one could evaluate the rationale for a nation’s employment of its forces in armed conflict. More specifically, one could adapt the model for the decision to employ: (1) a corps level force as part of an international coalition; (2) a brigade as part of the proposed NATO multi-national corps in Europe and (3) Active or Reserve forces in general at the start of hostilities.

4. The model criteria will promote discussion of relevant political, social, procedural and National Guard roundout issues prior to a future President’s decision to mobilize. By doing this, the issues and facts will be available to facilitate a thorough decision process. However, it is important to note that no matter what criteria are used or what weight is assigned to each criteria, the President must ultimately decide whether to mobilize the roundout units based upon the situation and after considering his options. The model assists this process by framing the essential issues in the form of criteria based conceptual framework that enables
decisionmakers to explore the realities and consequences of each criterion prior to a mobilization decision.

**Recommendations**

1. This model should be disseminated to officials involved with roundout issues at the US Army Command and General Staff College and the War Colleges for comment with respect to its utility in the ARNG mobilization decision process. I have requested an initial distribution be made to these institutions and other authorities in this field of study. A lead department at each organization should be given the opportunity to assess the utility of the model for future ARNG roundout mobilization decisions.

2. If further review and study reveals the need for a criteria model approach to the roundout brigade mobilization issue, the Commandant of the Command and General Staff College should request FORSCOM to formally study the merits of this or a revised version of the model.
APPENDIX

ARNG MOBILIZATION
DECISION MODEL

National Level

Criterion I: The President should not commit the Army National Guard roundout units unless such action is consistent with US strategic objectives outlined by the President and promotes national will.

Criterion II: In order to attain the national strategic objectives in a crisis, the conflict will require the manpower of a particular combat division with its National Guard roundout brigade to deploy to the theater of operation.

Criterion III: The mobilization of combat ARNG roundout units will send a deterrent message to the adversary's leadership.

Departmental Level

Criterion IV: The Department of the Army's policies and procedures for National Guard mobilization for regional contingencies mandates, dependent on the situation, the mobilization of ARNG roundout units.

Criterion V: The capabilities and combat power offered by the selected roundout unit with its parent unit is the right force package to use in relation to the accomplishment of our strategic objectives for a particular crisis.

Unit Level

Criterion VI: The ARNG roundout units are manned, equipped and trained to the level organized --bridege level. Pre-mobilization (peace-time) has ensured AC/RC equipment interoperability, sufficient integrated training, and met the required readiness rating.
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