THOUGHTS ON A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

DAVID TILLOTSON III
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, USAF

1992
THOUGHTS ON A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

by

David Tillotson III
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Dr Jim Toner

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
February 1992
DISCLAIMER

This study represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government.

Loan copies of this document may be obtained through the interlibrary loan desk of Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5564 (telephone [205] 293-7223 or DSN 493-7223).
General James Toner
Commander in Chief
United States Air Forces in Europe
Ramstein Air Base, Germany

Dear General Toner,

Congratulations on your appointment as the new Chief of Staff. The assignment will prove to be something of a challenge (and I further suspect that that remark will prove to be the understatement of the last four decades). Just as my predecessor did for me, I will pass you some thoughts to consider as you embark on your assignment. You are free to use or disregard any of the thoughts I offer you (and I remind you that advice is often worth what you pay for it), and if I can clarify anything I may subsequently say, please feel free to call me. Finally, I will apologize for the length of my remarks, but the magnitude of the changes that are occurring portend both great challenges and great opportunities for the Air Force and the country.

Let me begin the discussion by summarizing my concerns. First, I am concerned that we are not developing a strategy to take advantage of an historic opportunity which has opened up for us. Changes in the international environment may allow us to take a certain amount of risk to achieve major gains both in terms of improved security and improved economic power.

Second, our failure to take advantage of these opportunities causes a perception, particularly with members of Congress, that we are continuing to justify our existence in the same Cold War terms we have used in the past. While some of the criticisms are not valid, these members of Congress are reflecting legitimate concerns of the American people. Finally, I am concerned that our present strategy, while affordable, may permit us to achieve nothing more than maintenance of present, albeit improved, capabilities. This maintenance of the status quo may make us vulnerable to a range of threats in the future that we can foresee today, but which must be addressed now because of lead time considerations.
Before I begin my discussion, let me review some basic principles. At the risk of bringing back mixed memories, you may remember the strategy model the Air War College tried to sell us while we were at Maxwell. While much has slipped away from me, the three part model which focussed on goals, resources and assets, and a plan which uses the resources to meet the goals still serves me well as I consider where we should go in the future. (1:49) The key constraint, especially during periods of economic downturn such as we presently experience, is to develop a plan which does not call for more resources than we presently have available. Even if I think I have achieved a supportable plan, I then do a self-examination by addressing some of the questions Crowl posed in his catechism for strategists. In particular, I use "the questions of the limits of military power and the alternatives to the strategy I have developed. (2:183) Finally, Crowl's warning that the today's strategy should not "overlook points of difference and exaggerate points of likeness between past and present" is particularly germane to my assessment of our future direction. (2:184) While the foregoing may seem to be elementary, it serves to organize my thoughts and show you the focus of my concerns.

Central to my concerns is the question of differences and likenesses between the current situation and the past. The primary orientation of US national security policy in the past has been the threat posed by the nuclear and conventional military power of the Soviet Union. In order to oppose the possible expansion of Soviet influence, the US adopted a general strategy which we called "containment." Key to the containment strategy was the effort to "confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world." (3:24) In order to achieve this goal, President Eisenhower set several guidelines for US military forces to include not initiating an attack, defining the mission of US forces in terms of deterrence, emphasizing the importance of keeping weapons modernized; and stressing the importance of alliance actions. The results of
these guidelines were the development of retaliatory forces; the maintenance of forward deployed forces; the development of a strong maritime force structure; and the use of reserve forces to reduce the expense of the overall force. (4:27-29) These defining guidelines and the resulting force structure and deployments remained essentially unchanged until the disintegration of the East European bloc and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Despite changes in retaliatory doctrine and the modernization of US forces, the essential pillars of military strategy in support of containment have been survivable strategic nuclear forces, heavy forward deployments in Europe and Korea, and significant follow-on forces sized and configured principally to fight in either of the two forward theaters, but available for use in any other contingency as necessary. The maintenance and upgrade of these forces has been the focus of the DoD budget.

Changes in the International and Domestic Environments

The containment strategy was predicated on a certain set of conditions in both the international and domestic environments. These conditions have changed, and it is in this transformed environment that a new national security strategy must be developed. The most significant factors in the new international environment are the dissolution of the Soviet Union (and its replacement with the Commonwealth of Independent States [referred to as the Commonwealth]) and the breakup of the East European bloc. Although the new Commonwealth continues to possess nuclear weapons, the key question in formulating a new national security strategy is how the threat to the US, and to a lesser extent, our allies may be changed as a result. My own opinion is that the threat to the US is at the worst no greater than in the past, and is probably less. Certainly the standdown of Russian bomber forces and SSBNs reduces the overall threat to us. Further, the apparent efforts by the Russians to reduce, if possible, the Strategic Rocket Forces in the other Republics adds credence to Russian claims that controls are in place.
to prevent accidental launches. All these changes add up to a much lesser central strategic threat to our survival. Indeed, one of the principal contentions of Representative Aspin is that the formation of the Commonwealth, whatever else it may portend, represents an irreversible change in the character of the former Soviet Union. (5:1-3) Having said that, it is clear that the Commonwealth, in whatever guise, still represents a power (the current National Security Strategy says the only country) capable of destroying the US in a "single, cataclysmic attack." (6:1)

On the conventional side, the threat from the Commonwealth and the other former Soviet republics is diminished. On paper, these forces remain formidably equipped. However, continuing debates among the Commonwealth countries regarding control of these forces, along with uncertainties among the upper command structure of these forces, will inhibit their ability to act, especially in other than "internal" security matters. Compounding the problem for Commonwealth conventional forces is the breakup of the East European bloc and the unleashing of the national military establishments of those countries. The result has been a redeployment of these forces, and a clear likelihood that in the event of a Commonwealth attempt to attack Europe, the forces of the former Warsaw Pact would form a part of the defense.

The resurgence of nationalism and ethnic splits is another characteristic of the post-Cold War era. This trend is particularly evident in those areas either previously under direct superpower control (e.g., within the former Soviet Union itself and in Eastern Europe) or in areas formerly deemed essential to support superpower strategy (e.g., the Philippines and Central America). The outbreak of suppressed ethnic differences in Georgia, Armenia, and Yugoslavia, among others, shows the extremes to which these differences can be taken. While these problems represent a threat to countries in the region, they actually tend to reduce the threat to the US and to Europe as a whole since resources and attention must be focused inward.
In some cases, growth of national pride and initiative can be of benefit to the US even if it is not immediately perceived as such at the time. For example, Costa Rican President Arias' peace initiative led to the end of Contra-Sandinista fighting in Nicaragua and ultimately resulted in the establishment of a democratic regime in that country. (7:233-241) Although not appreciated at the time, these outcomes, especially the restoration of democracy in Nicaragua, were precisely those desired by the US. Resurgent nationalism in the Philippines, combined with less interest in forward basing on our part, resulted in a decision to withdraw our forces from that country for the first time in almost a century. The bottom line is that countries will be operating in their own interests and we will be more willing to see these individual motives. The old unifying external threats will no longer act to moderate disputes where those individual interests conflict. Representative Aspin again characterized the situation accurately as "multipolar," with national and religious extremes, resulting in more complex and uncertain international environment. (5:12) The key question is whether this poses any more significant threat to us?

Certainly there is considerable evidence to suggest that proliferation of new weapons capabilities is occurring in several regions. Among the more significant trends are the increasing numbers of countries which are acquiring or developing ballistic missiles. Some sources suggest that within the next several years, up to 16 more countries will have ballistic missiles in their inventories. When coupled with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological, and most especially chemical weapons, the possibility of an increased threat certainly appears to exist. (8:151)

On the other hand, this threat again appears to have limits. First, the acquisition of these weapons appears to be confined to regions of significant unrest and turmoil, in particular in the Middle East. The orientation of these systems tends to be against other powers within the
region in which they are deployed, not against the US directly. Even if these nations were so inclined, with the exceptions of the Commonwealth and the People's Republic of China, none yet possess systems which are capable of reaching the US. Finally, the costs of ballistic missiles (as well as other advanced military capabilities) are so high that unless a country perceives a threat, or alternatively has a goal such as regional hegemony, which would drive the need for their acquisition, other needs will drive the use of their budgets.

On balance, the reemergence of national desires, ethnic differences, and the regional proliferation of weapons does make the world, at least in some areas, a more dangerous place in that moderating influences may have been removed. However, the focus of this emerging threat also tends to be regional, and direct threats to the US and its survival are not apparent for the near term (within the next decade). Even postulating that a regional actor should gain an overnight increase in capability to attack the US directly, the near term threat to the US itself would certainly be far less than the threat the Soviet Union has posed for the last forty years. Threats may exist to US overseas interests, or even to US forces if they are or will be deployed to these unsettled regions, but this again does not necessarily translate to a threat to the survival of the US. We must carefully examine our interests throughout the world before we decide to commit or to maintain forces at risk, since the justification that our survival is at stake (due to the expanding hegemony of the "Evil Empire" which did have the capability to destroy us) will no longer "play in Peoria." Again, Representative Aspin seems to represent this view and sees a diverse, non-deterrable, regional threat which while ill-defined, does not pose the risk of conflict escalation beyond the involved region. (5:10)

Military threats are not the only challenges facing us. The public, and by extension, the members of Congress are expressing increasing concern about the economic problems facing the country. In the absence of a direct threat to the US, the public has more concern for rising
unemployment rates and increasing trade restrictions by other countries. Their concerns are
aggravated by their perception that the structure of threats facing the country does not justify
the continued emphasis on defense, especially when in their eyes the justifications for that force
structure reflect much the same rationale as during the Cold War. The public perception is
expressed by Representative Aspin when he states in his White Paper that the Base Force we
currently endorse is not a new concept in response to a new world order, but is instead “less of
the same.” (5:1) I will defer my discussion of the validity of the proposed force structure
until later and will instead address the question of whether the economic concerns being raised
are justified.

Saui Barr, an economist at the Air War College, suggests that while the industrialized
trading nations are increasingly reliant on one another for goods and services, several countries
among this group have in fact implemented increased trade restrictions. (9:276) However, he
asserts that the US adherence to free trade principles has generally benefitted the country and
that overall our economic posture is better than we sometimes think. In fact, he suggests that
the US export sector has been undergoing growth and that unemployment on average over the
last ten years has generally been low. (10:275) Professor Barr states that the growing deficit
must be addressed because in the long term continued deficit will result in the loss of foreign
reserves. In turn, the loss of foreign reserves would result in a corresponding loss in our
ability to purchase needed goods and services overseas. The industrial system must, and is,
going through restructuring in response to efforts to redress previous imbalances. This
restructuring will cause some “dislocations” in current industry as noncompetitive industries
fail and new ones develop. (9:280,287) While Professor Barr's assessments that some
turbulence to be expected are reassuring for the long term, his analysis does reinforce the
notion that the concerns being expressed by the public and the Congress are legitimate.
Unfortunately, if the long term solution for addressing trade problems is related to reducing the national deficit, this means that we must continue to expect pressure to reduce the defense budget. Once we eliminate all the “must pay” bills in our national budget, such as interest on the debt, social security, and so on, the largest piece of discretionary spending left is defense.

Reductions in defense spending are going to exacerbate the turbulence already being caused by adjustments in the international trade environment. Dr. Blair, also of the Air War College faculty, has suggested that reductions in defense spending will not have a major effect on the economy because the economy will adjust to alternative production and consumption patterns over time. Like Professor Barr, he suggests that some “local displacement” will occur in the near term as local economies adjust. (11:36-39) The problem as I see it is that all these adjustments are occurring simultaneously, and I wonder if the cumulative effect is larger than we might otherwise anticipate. Certainly the members of Congress are showing sensitivity to the problems of the “local dislocations,” to the point where even traditional opponents of increased defense spending, such as Representative Patricia Schroeder, are actively lobbying against base closures (at least where they affect their home districts). (12:95) Given the pressures to reduce the defense budget, there may be little we can do but we should be aware of the concerns.

Underlying all of this economic discussion is my concern about the affordability of our approach to a revised national security strategy. Authors have referred to this concept as “solvency,” and it fundamentally comes down to being able to pay for the strategy we undertake, not only in terms of the budget costs, but in terms of all the costs to the society. (13:43) The most strident critics of our failure to consider the costs (in its broadest sense) of our strategy suggest that we avoid dealing with the issues of risk assessment and cost (in its monetary sense) altogether. (14:18) While I do not agree with all the conclusions suggested by the critics who
declare that the time has come to withdraw from the international scene, it would do us well to remember that we essentially outspent the Soviet Union to the point that they went bankrupt. While our system does not seem to be as vulnerable, I believe we are beginning to see some limits.

Constraints and Opportunities

Before I turn to the substance of the discussion regarding our proposed strategy, and some possible alternatives, let me address some constraints and opportunities which might affect how we approach the future. First economic: I do not believe that we in the Air Force can successfully address the economic issues outlined above, nor is it in our charter to do so. However, we will be foolish indeed if in the formulation of our strategy for the future we do not consider the limits imposed and seek opportunities to contribute to the economy where we can. If for no other reason, we must do so to ensure that we can convince the American public that there are tangible benefits to defense investment. We must recognize that in the absence of a more tangible threat to the survival of the US, we can expect to see no increases in the budget, and if recent history is an indicator (i.e., reductions from $324.4B in FY89 to $278.3B in FY92 [in FY92 dollars]), we may continue to see some decline. (15:325)

Second, we face a number of political constraints. The first of these is the continuing influence of the War Powers Act on operations. While no President has acknowledged the legality of the requirements imposed by the act, any decision regarding the use of military forces must account for the attitude of the Congress and the public toward the action. (16:77) When contemplating the commitment of forces in light of this act, we must consider either short actions; or actions which have the full support of the public; or prolonged actions if they involve only a limited number of troops, especially if those troops come only from active duty forces. Representative Aspin again summarizes this concern for generating public support in
his White Paper when he states, "Thus it is critical to identify threats to US interests that are sufficiently important that Americans would consider the use of force to secure them [emphasis in original]." (5:6)

Dr Hammond of the Air War College faculty suggests another political constraint which may be of more significance than the War Powers Act. He suggests that the growing reliance on reserve forces will act as a brake in the execution of large scale military operations. (17:204) Since the mobilization of the reserves requires, at a minimum, action by the Secretary of Defense, any large scale deployment of forces carries with it a political decision of great significance, especially in light of the public concerns about economic and social issues at home, and in the absence of clearly definable (to the public) national interests. The figures showing the extent of Air Force capabilities residing in the Reserve components bears out this thesis. Just as a sample, as of 30 September 1990, 64% of tactical airlift, 25% of the tankers, and 17% of the strategic airlift resided with Guard or Reserve forces. (18:18) This constraint affects any military action.

A final constraint we face in the political arena is one which I have alluded to throughout the discussion to this point, but it is one which should be addressed explicitly. This constraint is the growing public perception of that the need for the military is reduced. Recently, CNN carried a report of the President being challenged during a news conference by one of the governors at the National Governors Conference who explicitly stated that the military's budget should be further reduced to free funds ("the peace dividend" -- he even used the term) to address pressing domestic concerns. These concerns are exacerbated by the lack of a direct threat and the resulting need to define an interest important enough to justify American lives. Some of the concerns expressed by the governors, Congress, and the public in general are beyond the capability of the Air Force, or even the DoD to address. We must be sensitive to these
concerns, and where we can use our forces to assist in addressing these problems, we should do so. This strategy alone may allow us to justify the retention of forces we may need for worldwide contingencies. I will say more about this later.

The picture is not all gloomy, and we do have a couple of significant, and related, opportunities which may allow us to develop and field forces capable of addressing threats into the foreseeable future. The first of these opportunities is time. I have already discussed my perceptions of the changes in the threat, and I have taken care to emphasize the lack of direct threat to the US (or in the case of the Commonwealth and China, the fact that the threat has not grown and may even be diminished). This window of opportunity may be limited, but in light of the significant internal problems in and among the members of the Commonwealth and in the countries of Eastern Europe, I believe that the focus of these countries will be internal for some time to come. The remainder of the international actors, as I discussed, cannot presently threaten the survival of the US, and even if they obtained some increased capability, could not hope to develop forces to defeat us in the near term. How much time do we have? There are some in senior positions who have suggested that the reconstitution portion of the National Security Strategy imposes a requirement to rebuild disbanded forces over a period of six to ten years. (19) I would estimate that we could count on a period of at least a decade. We can either take advantage of this time or squander it.

The second opportunity relates to the first. During the recent operations in the Persian Gulf we convincingly demonstrated the advantages high technology weapons can bring to warfare. In fact, some analysts have suggested that high technology gives "overwhelming advantages" to the forces which employ it. (20:46) The Secretary of the Air Force's recent White Paper, "Global Reach-Global Power," reinforces the value of technology and states that its development is crucial to the maintenance of a quality force. (21:5) We (the Air Force) have been in the
technology business since the inception of our Service, and I suggest that while we are advocates (almost to a fault) of the value and necessity of technology, we are also acutely aware of the rapidity with which vulnerability to the force and the nation can result from changes in technology by potential enemies. Given that a significant aerospace technology base already exists, and given that time (in terms of limited threats) also exists, we have a pair of reinforcing opportunities which might permit radical changes in capability.

Assessment of Current Strategy

The previous discussions were a preamble to the central issue which is whether our current strategy does the best job of addressing the national objectives in terms which will allow the best possible use of resources. As I stated at the outset of this letter, I am not sure that it does. Before I present some alternatives, let me provide my assessment of the current national security strategy. Our interests or goals are clearly laid out in the strategy and include: (1) the survival of the US; (2) the maintenance of a healthy economy; (3) the maintenance of relations with our allies; and (4) the promotion of stability in the world. Secretary Cheney (SECDEF) has translated these political goals into several military objectives to form the basis of a national security strategy. These military objectives include: (1) maintenance of strategic deterrence forces and the development of defenses against strategic attack; (2) maintaining a capability to respond to crises worldwide, albeit on a smaller scale than we can currently; (3) maintenance of forward presence; and (4) development of an ability to reconstitute larger capabilities if the need arises. These objectives are clearly stated, and I will use the national interests defined in the National Security Strategy as the basis for my assessment of the military strategy.

The underpinning of the military strategy is a concept known as the base force. The base force represents a set of capabilities which, in the opinion of the senior defense leadership,
represents the essential capabilities that the US must maintain to ensure we can protect our national interests. The base force consists of four parts: (1) strategic forces for deterrence and defense; (2) the Atlantic force, including forces in Europe, which consist largely of heavy land forces and air; (3) the Pacific force, largely a maritime component; and (4) the contingency force, which consists of light forces and air. (6:31) This base force concept translates to force structure among the Services. To deter and defend, we will maintain some strategic nuclear forces including some Minuteman missiles, a limited B-2 force, and the SSBNs. In addition, nonstrategic nuclear forces in Europe form a part of the deterrence element. Finally, in order to provide defense against limited nuclear attacks, we intend to pursue a limited version of the Strategic Defense Initiative called Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). Forward presence translates to the maintenance of forces in both Europe and the Pacific. In Europe, a limited number of aircraft wings and an Army corps will be maintained. In the Pacific, some limited reductions will occur, but most forces will remain. In the rest of the world, forward presence will continue to be a function of training visits, exercises, and security assistance. In order to provide the capability to respond to crises, forces will be maintained in the US and will be available for deployment. These forces will be supported by a mobility structure which will be modernized both in terms of sealift and airlift forces. Finally, the reserve components will play much the same role as they do today, although they, like the active force, will be reduced in size. (6:25-29) Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) Rice, in his White Paper "Global Reach--Global Power," described the same functions for the Air Force, but included the requirement to "control the high ground" by maintaining the command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) assets necessary to allow the force to respond to crises and to detect problems and threats as they emerge. (21:5)

Having outlined the existing national strategy, how well does it measure up? First, it
meets most, but not all, of the objectives defined for our national interest. Forces are provided for the survival of the US and to support our allies, although the levels of both are reduced. Continued forward presence provides support to our allies and, so it is asserted, will contribute to the maintenance of stability in the world. The proposed force does fit within the resource constraints imposed since it fundamentally represents a reduction in existing forces. However, I suggest that the proposed force structure does little to promote a healthy economy. In order to maintain the force structure necessary to provide a smaller but still significant forward presence in Europe and the Pacific, the SECDEF has recently been forced to cancel or scale back significant acquisition programs, including the Small ICBM, the new attack submarine, the Y-22, and to limit others such as the B-2. My key concern is not that these programs were cancelled or limited (in fact I support these decisions), but that in order to maintain a force in being we must cancel acquisition of new systems. It is these system acquisitions, with the accompanying employment in defense industry, which will have the greatest impact on the economy. Further, we are foregoing the opportunities of time and technology we have been presented due to changes in the international environment. To assess where we may fall short, let's step through some of Crowl's questions which I mentioned at the outset.

First, have we overlooked differences or overemphasized similarities between the present situation and the past? The current National Security Strategy clearly maintains its emphasis on the need for continuing, significant US force presence in Europe and commitments to NATO. (6:6-7) In addition, the President in his speech at Aspen on “peacetime engagement” stressed that we would continue to keep forces in Europe “as long as the allies want and need us there [emphasis added].” (23:433) Underlying this commitment is a continuing belief that the Europeans are fundamentally incapable of conducting their affairs without conflict, and that their conflicts will inevitably involve our interests. This set of assumptions is, in my opinion,
a clear case of carrying over lessons from the past without considering present differences. First, it assumes that our interests will unequivocally be affected if a conflict breaks out in Europe. I would suggest that the historical example is largely the opposite. Up until the 20th Century, conflicts in Europe had very little impact on the US. In fact, they did not even really interfere with trade in that we always continued trading with one side or another. US entry on the side of the Allies in World War I seems to represent the result of effective Allied and inept German diplomacy rather than intervention as a result of US interests. US losses to the U-boats were minor at best. The case of World War II, that is intervention to prevent the rise of a power with ambitions of global conquest, represents the only case of intervention in response to a legitimate threat to US interests. The formation of NATO and continued US presence to oppose the Soviet Union is in the same tradition. However, the situation has changed and the differences are being overlooked. As I discussed earlier, the Eastern European countries and the Commonwealth are going to be too busy with internal problems to pose a threat to Europe as a whole, the only real threat of concern to the US. Additionally, the countries of Western Europe have developed far more interdependence economically, and through participation in NATO, have established a tradition of cooperation and compromise among themselves. Finally, the fundamental shift in German orientation from military power to economic, enforced by years of prohibitions and the growth of a new generation of Germans imbued with mercantilism, not militarism, suggests that concerns about the rise of a new military threat may also be misplaced. Despite its similarities, this is not the Europe of the early 1900's, and the Europeans themselves are far more capable of handling their own problems, especially in light of the reduced threat from the former Soviet Union.

Crowl also suggests that we should consider the limits of military power. The advocates of maintaining significant forward presence argue that such presence gives the US access and
influence, and serves a base for forward deploying US forces to other regions. I would suggest that presence, in the absence of a significant outside threat, is no guarantee of influence. The US had a significant presence in the Philippines during the recent base negotiations, and the economic influence of those forces was recognized by the Philippine government. Despite this basis for influence, the government of the Philippines decided to end the US presence. Military power may also be limited by the total force available. Depending on where the next crisis occurs, location in Europe may not be an advantage. Further, if they are tied to an alliance structure, there may be difficulty in freeing these forces for employment elsewhere. How likely is it that a major regional crisis anywhere will require forces from Europe? During Operation Desert Storm, 24% of the forces stationed overseas were sent to the AOR.

It seems to me that given force reductions underway, any major contingency will require the bulk of US forces, and their location in Europe tied down with NATO commitments may not be to our advantage.

An Alternate Strategy

Is there an alternate strategy to meet the objectives? I suggest there is. To be more effective than the existing national security strategy, it must more completely address the national interests established by the President, but it may require adjustment to the military objectives established by the SECDEF. A revised strategy must take advantage of opportunities posed by changes in the international environment, and to the extent that is feasible, it must address some of the challenges posed by the domestic environment. Where possible, we should be able to show the public that their investment in continued defense capabilities gives them a real return, even in the absence of conflict. Finally, where possible, we should pursue our objectives with minimal force, or even use nonlethal applications of airpower, options which would be more acceptable to the public in view of the fact that national interests in question may
not include threats to our own survival. Several of these alternatives will require revisions to existing doctrine.

To meet the objective of ensuring the survival of the US, I would continue with the policies and directions set out in the National Security Strategy. The maintenance of adequate strategic deterrence guards not only against those countries which might threaten the survival of the nation, such as the Commonwealth, but also will serve to deter any new entrants to the nuclear club. The development of a GPALS system is important on two points. First, it would allow the US to withstand the threat of limited nuclear attack without having to resort to retaliation in kind as the only means of defense. More importantly, this expansion of space activity is the essential difference I would pursue during this window of opportunity we have been afforded.

Now is the time to pursue expansion into space systems. The relative absence of direct threats means that we might safely divert funding to space instead of continuing to develop terrestrially-based or endoatmospheric systems. A move into space is in keeping with both the requirement to provide global reach and response, and with the SECAF’s desire to control the “high ground” in the interests of preserving command and control and intelligence capabilities. Space offers several characteristics which are particularly useful in this period of more global orientation, including the ability to provide global coverage; efficiency in performing some functions, such as communications; and an ability to provide redundancy to terrestrial systems. 

(24:5-6) In fact, the new basic doctrine for the Air Force suggests that space is a logical extension of the Air Force mission. Aerospace is defined as extending from the surface to infinity, and we assert that the "same basic military activities can be performed...with different platforms and methods." (25:5) There appear to be no legal barriers to expansion of Air Force missions into space, including the fielding of weapons on space platforms for
employment against terrestrial targets. International law prohibits the deployment of "weapons of mass destruction" in space and prohibits the establishment of armed bases on "the moon or other celestial bodies." This still leaves the possibility of employment of other weapons from space-based platforms and the right to self-defense is explicitly recognized as applying to systems in space. (24:3-4) Use of space surveillance systems would help us ensure that we are not surprised by developments in other regions since satellites have global access. The move into a space-based force will be expensive and will require a major revision in the way the Air Force operates. Why make this investment?

First, we need to prevent being surprised. Other nations are continuing to invest in space, if not for military reasons, then for economic ones. The Japanese have allocated $1.5 billion for space development this year, and have plans to sponsor a research module on space station "Freedom." (26:4) China is continuing to pursue space development and is launching satellites commercially. President Bush may authorize use of Chinese launch capacity for US satellites. (27:1) Prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, discussions of joint US-Soviet ventures took place. (28:44-48) President Yeltsin has recently expressed similar interest and commercial exploitation of his launch facilities may be one means he has of keeping high technology experts employed while bringing in hard currency. Other nations will be in space with or without us. In order to maintain our technological edge, and prevent a vulnerability from developing in an area of development we can foresee, we must pursue a logical and comprehensive space development program.

Investment in space capabilities has more than operational benefit. The investment in new technologies will also support economic development, both in industries directly related to production of space equipment, and in industries benefitting from other applications of space technology. (21:3-4) Contributions to the advancement of aerospace technology are a long-
established Air Force tradition, and one which has benefits at a time when the public perceives spending for defense to be of little utility. At such times, the investment in activities which have potential commercial, as well as military, application makes the budget more supportable by all interest groups. Finally, the high cost and risks associated with increased space activity makes government participation almost mandatory. The move to a space force directly supports the national goal of encouraging a strong and developing economy, a benefit the current military strategy does not support as well.

If we move to develop space systems, something in the current military strategy has to be reduced. I will not pretend to be fair about selecting areas for reduction because I see the improvements in conventional air capability, as well as the potential for revolutionary changes stemming from an improved space capability, justifying reductions in terrestrial forces, especially the Army. We can respond more rapidly by air to limited crises, and given a space combat force capability, could conduct attacks anywhere on the globe in very short time. I would reduce or eliminate the US forward presence in Europe and deactivate the corps stationed there to help pay for the expanded space investment. This is the calculated risk I mentioned earlier. The elimination of US military presence in Europe would not in any way jeopardize US interests for all the reasons I have already covered. There is enough ground capability remaining in the US-based Army and Marine divisions to deal with most crises for which we would envision unilateral force employment. I do not believe we will unilaterally engage in major regional crises (on the scale of Operation Desert Shield/Storm), and therefore the maintenance of ground forces to conduct such operations represents the loss of the opportunity to pursue revolutionary improvements in our defense posture. When we further consider the reconstitution timeline of 6-10 years suggested by some, there would be ample time to divert investments from space to terrestrial forces in the event of a perceived need.
I would address the requirement to remain engaged with our allies and promote stability through a combination of security assistance, nation-building, humanitarian assistance, and drug interdiction. Security assistance is a cheap way to maintain contacts with allies, expose them to US values, and to influence potential senior leaders of other countries. The FY92 security assistance budget worldwide was only $7.9 billion, of which $6.5 billion went to Greece, Turkey, and the Middle East. (29:9-10) This kind of assistance, especially training and logistic assistance, is often the most politically acceptable to other nations. In this time of re-emerging nationalism, low-key, nation-building efforts may bring us better results than lethal aid or intervention, and is more likely to be supported by the American public. (5:20)

Humanitarian assistance, especially using airlift forces, is something we do often and must continue to do to maintain our influence. During 1987-1989, a sample of the kinds of Air Force participation in humanitarian efforts included providing 65 C-141 loads to Namibia, 18 C-141 loads to Armenia, and 100 C-141 loads to support the Iran-Iraq ceasefire. These efforts seem to pay off in goodwill. For example, in 1980, the Air Force airlifted relief supplies to Algeria in the aftermath of an earthquake. Later that year, the Algerians mediated the release of US hostages from Iran. (21:13-14) In addition to the benefits in other countries, the use of military airlift capability in these types of efforts helps us justify to the public the maintenance of a mobility force structure in peacetime that will be crucial to supporting our strategy of rapid global response in crisis or war.

For similar reasons, the military and the Air Force in particular should embrace the counternarcotics mission. Support for counternarcotics efforts represents support for a significant national objective. Moreover, support for these operations helps us justify the maintenance of surveillance and reconnaissance forces, such as AWACS or JSTARS, in peacetime that are crucial in time of war or crisis. Finally, the training gained in a live surveillance
environment is directly transferable to operations in war.

This revised strategy highlights some shortfalls in our doctrine. Doctrine should tell us how we are going to employ our forces to carry out the tasks required by our strategy. In the areas of nuclear deterrence and conventional warfighting, our doctrine is well-developed and clear. On the other hand, we recently rescinded our only attempt at a space doctrine. The incorporation of space into the new basic doctrine (AFM 1-1) by defining all area above the surface of the earth as "aerospace" and assuming all missions can be performed from space really only amounts to lip service. (25:5) A review of several space studies done by researchers at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, suggest that operations in space will offer novel challenges which cannot be lightly dismissed. For example, do you know why Lagrangian Points should be occupied? (30:33-36) We need to readdress this issue and develop a space doctrine.

The increased emphasis on security assistance and low intensity conflict (LIC) also reflects expansion of activities into an area the Air Force has traditionally downplayed. We have had Air Force units in counternarcotics operations, a LIC activity, since 1980. However, our doctrine manual on Foreign Internal Defense is still in coordination. We need to support security assistance operations at levels to support our national objectives, and in the course of doing provide justification for maintaining force enhancement capabilities, such as JSTARS, which can then be used for conventional war operations. To do so, we need to complete and publish LIC doctrine to provide guidance to units which are engaged in these nation building operations.

Summary

The proposed alternate strategy I have outlined is radical. I would anticipate that if you choose to pursue this course, you will meet opposition both from vested interests within the Air
Force, and from factions in other Services. On the other hand, this proposal takes advantage of
the time offered by a period of reduced threat to achieve a technological advance in our
capabilities and thereby ensure the continued security of the US. This course of action also has
the advantage of providing tangible benefits to the American people by supporting research and
development, new industry, and subsidizing commercial entree to space. I think the outcomes
justify the slight risk involved.

It is in your hands now. Regardless of the course you choose, I caution you against letting
the US become enamored of the status quo. History has several examples of countries which rose
to preeminence, and then sank into ruin because they tried to preserve the moment rather than
advancing. In this regard, I would heed the “lessons of Rome” rather than the lessons of Munich
or Sarajevo.

Sincerely

DAVID TILLOTSON III, General, USAF
Chief of Staff
LIST OF REFERENCES


19. Speaker, Air War College.


