THE MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND FUNCTIONS OF U.S. ARMY REAR DETACHMENTS AND THE NEED FOR DOCTRINE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DEBORAH R. GODWIN, MAJOR, USA
B.A., University of Mississippi
Oxford, Mississippi, 1977

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1992

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rear Detachments provided unprecedented support with mixed success for US Army soldiers during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Rear Detachments have no doctrine but raised an Armywide systemic issue that required real responses in terms of manpower, material, money and time. Ad hoc missions were derived from past experiences and general officer guidance. The Rear Detachments had numerous specified and implied duties. Key but undefined was how to provide family support. Rear Detachment duties and family support groups were complimentary and also conflicting. As a Rear Detachment mission and an Armywide problem, family support was the most prevalent issue raised in both primary and secondary sources. A single, cohesive doctrine would ensure success for today and tomorrow's Army. Analysis by this thesis recommends a Rear Detachment at separate brigade or post level. The Rear Detachment would handle deployment and redeployment and combat service support as required. Subordinate to the Rear Detachment at brigade and battalion level, Family Support Teams, organized similarly to the US Navy family Ombudsman Program, would provide full-time family support. The Teams would ensure continuous communications with the Army, helping reduce stress, encouraging self-sufficiency and providing assistance when necessary.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff college or any governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


Rear Detachments provided unprecedented support with mixed success for US Army soldiers during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Rear Detachments have no doctrine but raised an Armywide systemic issue that requires real responses in terms of manpower, material, money and time.

Ad hoc missions were derived from past experiences and general officer guidance. The Rear Detachments had numerous specified and implied duties. Key but undefined was how to provide family support. Rear Detachment duties and family support groups were complimentary and also conflicting. As a Rear Detachment mission and an Armywide problem, family support was the most prevalent issue raised in both primary and secondary sources.

A single, cohesive doctrine would ensure success for today and tomorrow's Army. Analysis by this thesis recommends a Rear Detachment at separate brigade or post level. The Rear Detachment would handle deployment and redeployment and combat service support as required. Subordinate to the Rear Detachment at brigade and battalion level, Family Support Teams, organized similarly to the U.S. Navy Family Ombudsman Program, would provide full-time family support. The Family Support Teams would ensure continuous communications between families and the Army, helping reduce stress, encouraging self-sufficiency and providing assistance when necessary.
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FOR MATT, CAROL, AND ESPECIALLY CHRISTOPHER,
AND TO ARMY FAMILIES EVERYWHERE,
WHO HAVE SUPPORTED
THEIR SOLDIERS, THE ARMY AND THE NATION,
IN WAR AND PEACE
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Significance of this Study

The major changes evolving in the balance of power throughout the world are resulting in significant changes in our national strategy. In particular is the role the United States' armed forces play in helping to stabilize this new world. Our army's philosophy concerning our concept of operations has taken a dramatic shift, with the result being a much smaller, yet very capable force. With the reduction of our forward presence overseas, the United States Army of the 1990's must be capable of responding more rapidly than ever before to protect our national interests.

Based on the shape and mission of the Army of the 1990's and on lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Army is revising a great deal of its current doctrine. It appears that no one, however, is looking at one of the most critical areas affecting the Army's role in the future: Army families. If we are to truly have a rapidly deployable, capable force, we must
ensure that the Army's families are provided the necessary resources to ensure self-sufficiency and sustainment on a no-notice basis as well, during their spouse's deployment.

During our Army's most recent deployment, Operation Desert Shield Desert Storm (ODS/DS), the slogan "The Army Takes Care Of Its Own" was not the rule for many units despite sometimes Herculean efforts to provide support to family members. Although the majority of deployed units had some type of Rear Detachment, many of them did not function well for a variety of reasons. These reasons included lack of leadership to lack of understanding of the mission to lack of adequate staff to perform the mission. It is assumed that quality family support positively affects soldiers' morale and unit cohesion. It is not enough to provide the myriad of family services, however, if there is no link between the family member and the unit when the soldier is deployed. The Rear Detachment provides this link. Family support is, or should be, a primary mission of Rear Detachments. But what is a Rear Detachment and what is family support?

There is no manual at any level which even requires a Rear Detachment, much less describes its mission, organization, and functions. Yet, in most unit deployment
Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) across the Army, from battalion to Corps, an annex is published on Rear Detachment operations. Some are very detailed in terms of mission but most are generally vague. These annexes state that the unit will appoint a Rear Detachment Commander who will be responsible for stay-back (non-deployable) personnel and who will provide family support. Some unit SOP's address property accountability as well as security of the soldiers' personal property. Few deal more specifically with the Rear Detachment mission or consider staffing the Rear Detachment with other than non-deployable soldiers with the possible exception of the Rear Detachment Commander.

In order to provide family support, the Rear Detachment needs to understand what is involved. Common sense requires the Rear Detachment to ensure the sustainment and self-sufficiency of Army families throughout the unit's deployment. There is no manual that defines this broad responsibility or the details of how a Rear Detachment accomplishes this mission.

This thesis answers the question: is there is a doctrinal requirement for Rear Detachments, and if so, what is the generic definition? What is the mission and how
should the Rear Detachment be organized and staffed? If a valid requirement does not exist, we shall be no worse off than we are at present; units will continue independently to form ad hoc organizations consisting primarily of non-deployable soldiers to perform whatever mission their commander deems necessary.

Background

I served as a battalion Rear Detachment commander during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm while assigned to the 3d Signal Brigade, III Corps, at Fort Hood, Texas. My experience is that few units initially conduct Rear Detachment operations well. There are no "how-to" manuals to describe the mission, organization, and functions, and not only did most units start off slowly, the process of organizing and leading this type of organization was largely trial and error with a heavy reliance on experience, maturity, and luck. Units were unaware of the complexity of their mission and not properly trained or staffed to perform that mission. Many Rear Detachments were expected to perform a variety of functions, with only fifteen to twenty dedicated, but not necessarily qualified, soldiers for the job. Common sense was my primary resource during the early weeks of operation. As I gradually derived my mission, which was very broad, and built my organization, we greatly
improved the support provided, both to the families, and to the deployed battalion.

My focus in this thesis is at battalion level because this is the lowest level at which a staff is exercised. At this level, the personnel of the Rear Detachment have a greater knowledge of the soldiers' past, personal problems, and performance, as well as the functioning of the unit in its' entirety. This knowledge of a unit is critical in making appropriate decisions and recommendations. In addition, I also include a discussion of Rear Detachment operations at brigade, division and Corps levels. As a minimum, it is best to appoint a brigade level Rear Detachment Commander (RDC) for Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) purposes as well as to serve as a single point of contact for the respective battalion RDC's to direct their major issues. This is especially pertinent for separate brigades.

It is possible to link battalion Rear Detachments directly to their counterparts at division, or to consolidate a Rear Detachment at brigade level with representatives from each of the battalions serving on the staff. Both of these options were used by units during ODS/DS. This makes the selection criteria for Rear Detachment Commander especially critical, as this thesis will discuss in future chapters.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four parts as I define the mission, organization, and functions of a battalion level Rear Detachment based on my experience at Fort Hood. In the summary I list the other questions which must be answered during my research effort.

**Mission**

Based on my experiences during ODS/DS, the mission of a Rear Detachment is as follows:

Provide Combat Service Support (CSS) to deployed force, in the area of personnel, administrative, financial and logistic support; family support to family members; command and control of Rear Detachment personnel; physical security and accountability of non-deployed equipment and property to include soldiers' personal property; support installation mobilization as directed; conduct redeployment operations.

This is a very broad, all encompassing mission statement; nevertheless, this was the reality I encountered at Fort Hood. The requirements were derived as weeks passed and the mission continued to grow. However, to truly understand the complexity of the Rear Detachment's mission, let me focus on each part of the mission statement in more detail.
The first part is "provide combat service support to deployed force, to include personnel, administrative, financial, and logistic support." This was an important mission for the Rear Detachment in ODS/DS because the forces deployed into an immature theater. The initial deploying forces did not have a Theater Army Personnel Command or Finance Center, Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) or Theater Army Material Management Center (TAMMC) to support them. As more support forces deployed to the Middle East, a larger burden of the logistical support could be provided from within the theater. The Rear Detachment remained, in many instances, the liaison with the CONUS Sustaining Base and the preponderance of personnel, administrative, and financial support remained the mission of the Rear Detachment. One aspect of providing personnel support involved personnel replacement operations. Since few units deployed at 100% strength, many Rear Detachments, mine included, provided reception, training, equipping, and administrative preparation of incoming soldiers for overseas movement. This requirement lasted until January 1991, when the Conus Replacement Centers became fully operational.

"Providing family support," the second part of my mission statement, requires an understanding of family support and the scope of the Rear Detachment's responsibilities towards family members. First, Rear Detachments can expect
some assistance from families in helping other families cope with the stress of family separation through family support groups (FSGs). Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 608-47 defines a family support group as

a company or battalion affiliated organization of officer and enlisted soldiers and family members that uses volunteers to provide social and emotional support, outreach services and information to family members prior to, during and in the immediate aftermath of family separations (deployments, extended tours of temporary duty, and field training exercises).  

The main objective of the FSG is to help reduce the strain and alleviate stress associated with military separation for both family and soldier. The pamphlet further states that the purpose of an FSG is to enhance the military mission via the family as well as to benefit family members. Of significance, however, is the statement that "an FSG would be hard pressed to perform this function on either the active or sustaining level without adequate links to its associated military unit." The link is the Rear Detachment but additional definitions and amplifications are needed. The following questions illustrate a few of the problems in providing family support, questions that will be answered in future chapters.

How involved does the Rear Detachment get in family matters? What type of resources, to include transportation, does a Rear Detachment have and what are the restrictions? What is the role of the family support group,
how reliable is it, and what is the interface between that organization and the Rear Detachment? How does one determine if there is a valid complaint with the performance of the Rear Detachment, and what type of issues should be raised to the Rear Detachment? Since there were no definitions regarding roles, missions, and areas of responsibility, common sense ruled in my unit. If these questions had been answered prior to the deployment (had we in fact, been smart enough to ask them) a great deal of stress for the families as well as the soldiers of the Rear Detachment would have been avoided.

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was essentially the first war or conflict to focus on the issue of family support in any real detail, and on so large a scale. The point here is that it was an intensely complex mission and there was no ready reference guide to define the scope of a Rear Detachment's responsibilities regarding the critical mission area "provide family support."

The third part of my mission statement, "provide command and control of the stay-behind element," had many implied tasks during ODS/DS: determining UCMJ authority; processing and escorting soldiers receiving administrative discharges; attempting to develop some type of meaningful training program; coordinating duty rosters, to include security details of personal property storage areas as well
as staff duty rosters; and ensuring rating schemes, policy letters, bulletin boards, and other internal administrative actions were accomplished. This mission area also required providing Special Duty (SD) personnel to fulfill the installation's remaining requirements. Although deployment of most of the soldiers from the post resulted in reduced hours or even closure of some facilities, we were still required by the Corps headquarters to provide eight able bodied soldiers (without physical profiles) for SD throughout the deployment period. This may not sound too difficult, but because of the requirement for eight "able bodies" and because the majority of Rear Detachment soldiers had some type of limiting physical profile, this requirement significantly impacted on our ability to perform our mission.

The fourth part of the mission statement for my unit was the responsibility to "provide physical security and accountability of all non-deployed equipment as well as the soldiers' personal property." The challenge in providing disposition of stay-behind equipment was the inherent difficulty of having the Rear Detachment Commander do a 100% inventory of that property with five or six deploying company commanders, all while attempting to organize a Rear Detachment and assisting in the overall unit deployment. Due to limitations of available vehicles and
shipping container space, a lot of property was left back with instructions to ship it to the deployed battalion as soon as possible. Among these items were tentage, stoves, cots, and other bulky items. (One item that particularly comes to mind are the company maintenance tents: a "must" in a desert environment but monsters to crate and ship!) Few units have 100% lift capability for personnel, much less Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) authorized equipment.

In addition to the MTOE equipment, my Rear Detachment assumed accountability of all real property (Buildings, motor pools), installation property (desks, office furniture, etc.), and barracks furnishings (beds, wall lockers, chests of drawers). It involved inventorying and signing for all buildings, motor pools, washracks, and keys, as well as the installation and barracks property, to include linen. Also implied here is the requirement for some individual to manage the documentation involved in accounting for a battalion's worth of this type of property. If Fort Hood was comparable to other installations, after the units deployed, "war" on excess was declared and the Rear Detachments turned in truckload after truckload of excess property. (The III Corps and Fort Hood Commander directed that Rear Detachments inventory and properly dispose of property no longer authorized to be
retained by the deployed unit.) This "war" was further complicated by communications difficulties as the Rear Detachment often had to coordinate with the deployed unit to ensure that only actual excess was turned in, and that document numbers were appropriately assigned and managed.

The second part of the "provide physical security and accountability" mission concerned the deployed soldiers personal property, including privately owned vehicles (POVs). Finding locations to store both the cars and the other property and how to ensure adequate security was very challenging. There was also an initial requirement to physically guard the POV's.

The fifth part of the mission statement, "support installation mobilization," required us to relocate the soldiers' personal property, excluding POVs, in order for us to sign over our barracks and orderly rooms to several Reserve units being mobilized at Fort Hood.

The sixth and final part of our mission statement was to "conduct redeployment operations." The III Corps and installation staff assumed responsibility for the actual reception and transportation of the redeploying forces. The Rear Detachment's part in redeployment operations included: coordinating the "Welcome Home" rally, preparing leaves and/or passes for the redeploying unit, and conducting transition operations from the Rear Detachment to the actual
unit. This can be extremely complex and is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four of this thesis.

As an aside to the actual mission, but nonetheless, an important factor, is the issue of transportation. Fortunately, I was left with two, two-and-a-half-ton cargo trucks when my battalion deployed which allowed me to perform most of the mission. Some assistance from the installation transportation motor pool (TMP) was available, but there were restrictions on the use of TMP vehicles which impacted on the Rear Detachment's ability to provide family support.

**Organization**

This section is devoted to defining the Rear Detachment organization. What does it take in terms of personnel and job descriptions to accomplish the very broad, diverse mission outlined earlier? Initially I began with a small force of five company-level Rear Detachment Commanders (sergeants and one sergeant first class), a Rear Detachment First Sergeant, an S-1 clerk (who incidentally received a medical discharge one week after the battalion deployed), and a sergeant who conducted some "on-the-job" training as the S-1 clerk. Shown on the next page is my battalion's Rear Detachment organization for accomplishing all the above listed missions - once we became smart enough in the
business to figure out what we needed. (Fortunately, I had a very soldier/family oriented Brigade commander who, once I identified the requirement, made sure I was assigned a competent individual for each job. All Rear Detachments were not so fortunate.)
FIGURE 1. Rear Detachment Organization - 57th Signal Battalion
The average size of the organization was sixty soldiers. Following are the functional descriptions of each of these sections.

**Functions**

(1) **Rear Detachment Commander.** I was the Rear Detachment commander for my unit. I am confident, however, that ability would have been the driving factor for the selection, had circumstances not resulted in my availability. (I had just been informed that I was pregnant one week prior to my unit’s alert for deployment). The soldier and family-oriented climate of command in my unit was solid. A battalion level Rear Detachment Commander should be an experienced, mature, senior captain (or major) with command experience. This is absolutely critical to ensure adequate resolution of the depth and breadth of problems which arise in both the family support arena and in supporting the deployed unit. The impact of the selection of Rear Detachment Commanders is addressed in future chapters.

(2) **The Rear Detachment First Sergeant.** My Rear Detachment First Sergeant was a Master Sergeant, fully deployable, but deleted from orders to Germany to fill what the command group viewed as a critical job. This position is indeed key to the success of the Rear Detachment’s mission and should
be filled by an experienced, mature Sergeant First Class at the very least. Few battalions have an extra Master sergeant or even a Sergeant First Class to spare but possible solutions for this and other manning concerns in the Rear Detachment are discussed in future chapters.

(3) **S-1 Section.** The S-1 mission, personnel administration and management, is one of the largest for the Rear Detachment from start to finish. Initially, my Rear Detachment operated with virtually no S-1 section. After a few weeks, I was assigned a captain whom I immediately designated as the Rear Detachment S-1. There was no time for any type of formal training so she learned on the job. She was absolutely key to the Rear Detachment's support for the deployed force and assisting the family members with errors in Leave and Earning Statements (LES) and numerous other pay and allowance problems.

The Rear Detachment S-1 does not have to be a captain, but I do recommend at least a senior first lieutenant since the complexities of the job and the requirement to interface with family members and division, corps and installation support activities requires some experience and maturity. In addition to the S-1 officer, two or three clerks should be assigned, preferably of the correct military occupational specialty (MOS), to provide technical expertise.
If the division or brigade does not convert to a consolidated mail room, a trained and certified mail clerk and alternate are required. This job required augmentation due to the requirement to forward almost every piece of incoming mail. The number of zip code changes for each unit throughout the deployment made the job of mail clerk exceptionally challenging.

Towards the end of Desert Storm, I was fortunate enough to acquire one school-trained administrative specialist as a result of the inactivation of the 2d Armored Division and had another redeploy from Southwest Asia (SWA) due to family emergencies. They were a welcome addition to the Rear Detachment.

All of the deployed soldiers' Personnel (201) files were intentionally left at the installation. As a result, the Rear Detachment performed most of the personnel service support for the deployed battalion. It was my experience that the only financial support the deployed forces received was to obtain casual pay and to start and stop allotments. The Rear Detachment submitted all entitlements authorized by ODS/DS for a battalion of more than 850 soldiers. The S-1 section also provided administrative support to the soldiers of the Rear Detachment, to include processing numerous administrative discharges.
(4) The Operations and Logistics Section. This section was led by a first lieutenant and consisted of a maintenance noncommissioned officer (NCO), an S-4 (logistics) NCO, a training NCO, and a physical security NCO. Only the maintenance NCO was MOS qualified; the other three conducted on the job training (OJT). The mission of this section included the maintenance of the two 2-1/2 ton trucks we were responsible for (and very dependent upon), and tracking the job orders of fifteen vehicles and trailers turned into the Directorate of Logistics (DOL) by the deployed unit (for technical inspection prior to turning them back into the supply system). In addition, they were responsible for the accountability and disposition of all property, as well as shipping required equipment and supplies to Southwest Asia; training and equipping replacements; publishing weekly training schedules for the Rear Detachment; the physical security of all property to include personal property, including POV's; and establishing and maintaining key control.

(5) Family Support Section. This section was absolutely critical for the success of the Rear Detachment. I filled the job of family support coordinator with a sergeant first class who had the necessary "people skills" to respond to
the needs of the family members with concern, diplomacy and, above all, patience. He was assisted by a staff sergeant and a sergeant. Their mission was to resolve as many problems as possible at the lowest level, elevating them to me or the first sergeant as required, or to the Rear Detachment S-1 if that type of assistance was needed. The family support section set up and attended all family support meetings conducted at company and battalion level. Company level meetings were coordinated with the company chain of concern, (the informal organization of volunteer spouses whose assistance was absolutely invaluable — more about this in a future chapter), and the Rear Detachment company level commanders. They also attended all installation level bimonthly family support/command information briefings and weekly family support meetings.

(6) Rear Detachment Company-level Commanders. Although they were noncommissioned officers, I called them commanders because of their level of responsibility. Their mission included accountability for all non-deployed MTOE equipment, real property, installation property, and barracks furnishings previously signed for by their company commanders.
One of the Rear Detachment Company Commanders was a supply sergeant by MOS, and was actually deployable. The others were bright, motivated, and exceptionally dedicated noncommissioned officers who were nondeployable for various reasons. In addition to property accountability, which included turning in excess property, they assisted the spouse chain of concern and the family support coordinator, performed Rear Detachment Staff Duty every five to seven days.

Two of these NCO's were dual-hatted -- one was the assistant S-4 and the other was the physical security NCO. The Rear Detachment Company Commanders were key to the support provided by the Rear Detachment because of their familiarity with their individual company's personnel, equipment, storage locations, barracks and motorpools.

(7) The Platoon Sergeants. The platoon sergeants were designated for command and control of the Rear Detachment personnel. (The Rear Detachment Company-level commanders were not rated by the platoon sergeants due to the complexities of their jobs - see organization chart, page 16). As there were so many soldiers who were non-deployable due to lack of family care plans, physical profiles, or administrative issues, the platoon sergeants did what platoon sergeants normally do: track medical appointments.
and administrative discharges, help resolve the Rear Detachment soldiers' personal problems, provide professional counseling, some training, and assure the general health and welfare of the command.

Summary

I have defined the mission, organization, and general functions of a battalion level Rear Detachment based on my experience during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. This is the starting point. To develop my thesis, I must determine if the available research material supports my definition or if there are better definitions.

One area I shall not address in depth is the Rear Detachment in the Reserve Component. While their organizations are by no means problem free, a thorough analysis of the Reserve Component family problems and deployment problems is beyond the scope of this study. However, I briefly discuss the Reserve Component findings in the area of family support, as reported in their ODS/DS After Action Report in Chapter Two of this thesis.

To focus my research, these are some of the questions that I attempt to answer in this thesis. Should Rear Detachments be organized at battalion level or should they be the responsibility of division, corps, or installation? Should some of the functions performed by
Rear Detachments be performed by installations, freeing the Rear Detachment to focus on its primary mission of family support? If Rear Detachments can be defined generically, where will the resources come from for staffing them? How will they be trained? What have units done about Rear Detachments since ODS/DS? Is the issue still relevant? Was there a significant time lag between organization and efficiency? Can some elements of the Rear Detachment be staffed with soldiers from the Reserve Component? Does one of the Army's sister services have a better family support program?

I believe the resources available will help to answer these questions and help to determine the need for and the scope of a doctrinal manual for the United States Army on Rear Detachment operations.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE


2 Ibid., p. 4.
CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Current State of Literature

Presently, the Army does not have any doctrinal publications specifically addressing Rear Detachments. This is rather disconcerting in view of the concept of the army of the future. The Army's smaller size, reliance on Reserve Component (RC) forces, and the requirement for rapid deployment were subjects of a recent briefing by General Edwin H. Burba, Jr., the Commander in Chief of Forces Command (FORSCOM). The briefing was entitled "Mobilization and Deployment, A CINCFOR Perspective," and was given at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas during the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Senior Leadership Warfighters Conference, 21 November 1991. General Burba discussed in detail the strategic uncertainties and resource constraints. As a result, there is no longer a dedicated threat-based force structure, making the requirement for rapid deployment and a strong Reserve Component more critical than ever before.¹

The most logical consequence of CONUS-based (Continental
United States) deploying forces is the need for Rear Detachment operations for both active and reserve forces. The requirement was not addressed in General Burba's presentation.

There is a Department of the Army Pamphlet concerning Family Support, however: DA Pam 608-47, A Guide to Establishing Family Support Groups. It is an excellent source for spouse volunteers and Rear Detachment commanders on how to organize and run a family support group (FSG) and also contains numerous lessons learned from other unit deployments. I was unaware of this resource during ODS/DS but would have found it invaluable. Interestingly, the spouses of my unit organized an FSG along very similar lines. Common sense was the driving force for them, as it appears to have been for the authors of this manual.

A review of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Airland Operations, A Concept for the Evolution of Airland Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond, is a concept paper published jointly by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command. Its purpose is to "set the general azimuth for evolution of doctrine, organization, training, material, and leader development for both services."
While it discusses the threat and our counter strategy of rapid force projection, it does not address the importance of Rear Detachments in accomplishing and sustaining rapid force projection.

The material I reviewed for this thesis is predominantly a result of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (ODS/DS). It included after action reports from a Europe-based Corps, and a CONUS-based separate brigade; interviews with a former Rear Detachment Commander from 11th Signal Brigade, Fort Huachuca, Arizona and the Garrison Commander of Fort Riley, Kansas, (1st Infantry Division); interviews with spouses involved in family support group activities; and publications from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I also include a review of the Program of Instruction for the Pre-Command Course (PCC) which, in recent months, has focused more on family support issues. I reviewed Deployment Readiness Workbooks from a Ranger battalion and a light infantry brigade: these units deploy frequently on a no-notice basis and address family support issues in some detail. A secondary source is the United States Army Research Institute's survey on Rear Detachments and Family Support. To examine another services' family support program, I researched the U.S. Navy Ombudsman Program, which included reviewing the manual on the subject as well as
conducting interviews. The rest of this chapter is organized with references relating to ODS/DS addressed first and then other references in the general area of family support or Rear Detachments.

Resources Pertaining to
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Part I - Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Reports

I consider these After Action Reports (AARs) as secondary sources. They were sent from the respective unit headquarters to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for compilation and filing by MG Thomas H. Tait's Desert Storm Special Study Group. (MG Tait was formerly the commander of The United States Army Armor School and Fort Knox, Fort Knox, Kentucky. He was selected by the Chief of Staff of the Army to head this group due to his experience and impartiality - he did not deploy for ODS/DS.) All unit submissions are located in the basement of Funston Hall at Fort Leavenworth and can be read in their original form, or referenced via computer by the assigned Joint Uniform Lessons Learned Numbers (JULLS) or by "key word" searches through the data base.
These AARs are compiled into the U.S. Army's After Action Report on ODS/DS which is awaiting release by the TRADOC Commander. In the meantime, I compiled the reports from two units: VII Corps, deployed from Germany; and the 11th Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Brigade, deployed from Fort Bliss, Texas. I selected these two units based on their differences in size, geographic location, (CONUS-based versus OCONUS-based), and command structure (Corps versus Separate Brigade) on the premise that they are representative of the majority of like units that deployed. This premise is supported with the information derived from the interviews with the two Rear Detachment commanders.

VII Corps: Background

The background information is extracted from VII Corps executive summary. VII Corps was alerted for deployment to Southwest Asia (SWA) on 8 November 1990. The commander of VII Corps established the Desert Shield Family Support Directorate (DSFSD) within the Corps headquarters on 20 November 1990 and VII Corps Base, VII Corps' Rear Detachment, became effective 13 December 1990. The DSFSD Director visited every community involved in the deployment during the last week of November 1990 to ensure Family Assistance Centers (FACs) met the Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Europe (CINCUSAREUR) and Corps Commander's intent. That intent was to:
- Continue the link between deployed soldiers and Germany, where their families are;
- Reinforce and legitimize existing chain of concern and family support groups;
- Create separate and visible organizations totally dedicated to family support [Family Assistance Centers];
- Resource the concept.

When communities or units did not meet this intent, the Director of Desert Shield Family Support gave specific guidance on what to improve.

The DSFSD organized its action officers into four teams. These teams maintained contact with Rear Detachment commanders, FAC leaders, FSG leaders, and members of the respective Military Community (MILCOM) staffs. The mission of VII Corps Base was to continue the current level of training and mission readiness, ensure continuity of quality of life operations, provide support for family members of deployed soldiers, and prepare for redeployment.

Family support in the VII Corps area of responsibility consisted of four major components: Family Assistance Centers, established at community level and consisting of community support agencies such as Army Community Service
(ACS), Red Cross, Transportation, Housing and Housing Referral, Legal Assistance, Army Emergency Relief (AER), Chaplain, and Social Work Services; Rear Detachments; Family Support Groups (FSG - consisting of volunteer spouses of the deployed unit); and Mayors. (In Europe, the distances between housing areas and facilities require housing area mayors who play an active role in solving community problems. They are also used in stateside units but not to the same extent). Although not directly responsible for any of these programs, the DSFSD assisted the communities in establishing the programs, resolving issues that impeded support of family members (that were beyond the capability of the community to resolve), and provided information flow between the communities, Corps Base Staff, and USAREUR.

Every battalion or separate company that deployed from VII Corps established a Rear Detachment. Corps' guidance was that battalion detachments be commanded by mature capable captains with sufficient staff to accomplish the mission. This guidance was not always followed, as many of the rear detachment commanders were junior officers or NCOs.3

The VII Corps Rear Detachments had the dual mission of providing both tactical and family support. Below are the responsibilities of the Rear Detachment as defined by VII Corps:4
- Welfare of families
- Focal point for the FSG and Chain of Concern within the unit (The Chain of Concern is a telephonic roster of spouses, organized into a telephone tree. The purpose of the chain of concern is to keep the family members informed. Normally a senior NCO spouse or senior officers' spouse headed the chain.)
- Military Community (MILCOM) interface
- Communication link between the deployed unit personnel and families
- Roster maintenance of all family members of deployed soldiers and civilians within the unit.
- Interface with Department of Defense Dependent Schools (DoDSS) and medical facilities
- Command and control of rear detachment personnel and transients
- Casualty assistance and notification
- Replacement personnel processing, when required
- Mail redirection

Because units deployed throughout late November and December 1990, unit Rear Detachments were in various phases of establishment until January 1991. However, by mid-January, Rear Detachments were in place. They matured
as organizations throughout the deployment. Some Rear Detachment staffs were augmented by soldiers who returned early from SWA due to pregnancy or illness. Most Rear Detachments were effective in supporting family members and worked well with the other organizations that were responsible for supporting families. Some were hampered by lack of sufficient personnel to perform both the tactical and family support missions.

The advantages and disadvantages of FACs and Mayors are beyond the scope of this thesis but I will examine VII Corps FSGs. The importance of this volunteer organization, as well as its interface with the Rear Detachment cannot be overstated. Initially, for VII Corps, FSGs ranged from "just starting" to "well established." Although the command was concerned that they function effectively, commanders did not place much emphasis on them during deployment. Spouses had enough to cope with in helping their soldiers deploy, and many put other activities on hold until the unit departed. After deployment, FSGs became active. They worked closely with both the unit Rear Detachment and the FACs; using their telephone chain of concern, FSGs ensured that family members were contacted regularly, usually every other week, and rapidly disseminated important information. Some wrote newsletters for family members, which proved to be an important source of information for both local
families and those that lived in other military communities of the United States.\textsuperscript{5}

The diagram on the next page depicts the organization VII Corps implemented to ensure accomplishment of its rear mission.\textsuperscript{6}
FIGURE 2. VII Corps Base Structure
The establishment of the DSFSD was unique and appeared to contribute significantly to resolving problems of Rear Detachments, Family Support Groups, and Family Assistance Centers. Nonetheless, VII Corps surfaced a host of Rear Detachment and Family Support issues in the After Action Report itself which need resolution prior to the United States Army's next major deployment. I will list Rear Detachment issues first, then FSG issues.

The standard format for AARs is JULLS Number, Keywords, Title, Observation, Discussion, Lesson Learned, Recommended Action, and Comments. In order to expedite this process, I will list only VII Corps' observations, an abbreviated, discussion, and their recommendations. (The wording of these AAR comments is that of VII Corps staff officers who compiled the After Action Report).

VII Corps AARs: Rear Detachment Issues

(1) Observation: There was a lot of confusion over division of duties between Rear Detachment Commands (RDCs) and Family Assistance Centers.

Discussion: Guidelines given to FACS and RDCs were very similar. Confusion over whom to call for what was the source of a great deal of confusion and frustration for staff members of both organizations and family members.
Recommendation: Document RDC functions and organization; include clear-cut division of responsibilities or overlapping responsibilities in both RDC and FAC "how to" books. Have official documentation available for immediate implementation of functions when needed.

(2) Observation: Having senior NCOs (E-7 and above) in Rear Detachments added a sense of maturity and stability to the RD.

Discussion: Rear Detachment staffing, which varied greatly throughout VII Corps, was key to the success or failure of the RD multifaceted mission. Experienced soldiers were better able to handle the varied problems that arose during deployment.

Recommendation: Establish a standard organization for Rear Detachment Commands that includes a senior NCO (E-7 or above.)

(3) Observation: Use mature, experienced junior/senior level officers and NCOs in Rear Detachments.

Discussion: Mature, experienced junior/senior level officers and NCOs were observed to exhibit knowledgeable and creative skill in handling important family member matters.
Recommendation: Continue to use mature responsible junior/senior level officers and NCOs in Rear Detachment command and support functions in the event of future deployment.

(4) Observation: Lack of family support transportation capability presented a major challenge during deployment.

Discussion: There was a definite need for vehicles to transport people to meetings and facilities. However, there was no legitimate way to use non-tactical (NTVs) vehicles without violating the "home to workstation" rule. [NTV's are for official use only and the regulations forbid transporting even active duty military from home to work, much less family members.] Similar problems existed with NAF (Non-appropriated fund) vehicle use. It should not be left to a commander's decision to take a chance by violating the rules to get the stated mission accomplished. [Violating the regulations on use of NTV's or non-appropriated fund vehicles is an offense punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.]

Recommendation: Change the rules for use of NTVs and NAF vehicles during deployments.
(5) **Observation:** Soldiers did not get their Leave and Earning Statements (LES).

**Discussion:** Individuals had problems in obtaining LES and knowing how much they got paid. Finance Support Units (FSUs) eventually got the microfiche but had no reader or printer capability. Because there was no Theater Finance Command (TFC) [in Southwest Asia] the problem took an inordinate amount of time to get resolved.

**Recommendation:** Finance proponent work the issue.

(6) **Observation:** Personnel files not brought to SWA.

**Discussion:** Personnel actions and promotion boards that were undertaken in SWA were not totally accurate due to the lack of personnel records in country.

**Recommendation:** Personnel Service Centers (PSC's) must be directed to bring soldier records with them so that critical personnel actions can be accomplished in theater.

(7) **Observation:** Many Rear Detachment Commanders were not familiar with their role in interfacing with the various community support agencies established for the family member.
Discussion: [None provided by VII Corps for this observation.]

Recommendation: Ensure that all RDCs are thoroughly familiar with the established Army Regulations (ARs), Memorandums of Instruction (MOIs), and DA Pamphlets concerning ACS, FAC, Red Cross, and other support agencies through periodic review, training, and updates.

(8) Observation: Rear Detachments were essential to the success of the deployment.

Discussion: In the case of the HHC, 1st Infantry Division (Forward) Signal Platoon, no "rear detachment" was left behind. Actions taken to assist in the deployment included a family assistance center (set up by the military community), a chain of concern, and early return of dependents to CONUS. Some dependent spouses required extensive unit assistance.

Recommendation: That units identify the resources and procedures that are required for an efficient Rear Detachment. This should be developed into a plan that can be referenced for future situations similar to ODS/DS.

(9) Observation: Security of privately owned vehicles (POVs) and other personal property for soldiers deploying from Germany was very effective.
Discussion: POVs: Units sectioned off a portion of their motor pools with triple strand concertina wire to secure POVs. A single point of contact was established to inspect and inventory vehicles processed for storage. Keys, registration, and fuel coupons were stored in sealed envelopes with the DD 788s [forms required by regulation when storing a POV on a government installation.] Personal property: Unit Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) contained specific instructions and had been routinely practiced during deployments to Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr.

Recommendation: POV storage should be routinely practiced during major deployments. Review the personal property storage procedures annually and ensure soldiers and supervisors understand and are in compliance with appropriate regulations.

(10) Observation: Lack of support by/information from Rear Detachments.

Discussion: Community demographics presented a challenge for effective coordination of family support. RDC's were scattered throughout the European theater. Compounding this was the difficulty of obtaining accurate listings of deployed soldiers and their families.
Recommendation: Units and community-based agencies work closely together to ensure effective family support is available throughout the deployment to include redeployment.

(11) Observation: Units were instructed not to bring finance records with them to SWA. [The Department of the Army published guidance to this effect. I personally cannot offer an explanation.]

Discussion: Units did what they were told. The result was if a soldier deployed to SWA with a pay problem it still existed when he redeployed home months later. All the finance personnel could do was issue a casual pay.

Recommendation: Bring finance records with you when you deploy.

(12) Observation: Rear Detachments were activated several days after deployment of main bodies.

Discussion: Rear Detachment Commanders were involved in the movement of units and were therefore unable to concentrate on pre-deployment coordination. The late activation of the Rear Detachment Commands resulted in an uncoordinated transfer of control of the unit's facilities and conflicting objectives: joint inventories of equipment
and facilities were improperly conducted in some cases, keys to some facilities were not always properly turned over and transition of control to Rear Detachment Commanders was often disorganized.

**Recommendation:** Establish Rear Detachment Commands in advance of deployment and have a written plan on turnover of facilities and equipment. Leave capable personnel behind to assume Rear Detachment responsibilities.

(13) **Observation:** Mail clerks were deployed with units. As a result, mail was processed and shipped slowly with reduced personnel manning and skill level.

**Discussion:** Almost every mail room in the community was operated by soldiers. When units deployed, improperly trained personnel remained to handle the mail. This forced the consolidation of mail rooms, greatly slowing procedures. Delivery of mail to and from the theater of operations was extremely slow.

**Recommendation:** Develop a system to regulate and control the abundance of mail for more rapid delivery. Implement a plan to allow hiring of qualified civilians to fill the vacant mail clerk positions.  

VII Corps AARs: Family Support Issues

(1) **Observation:** Burnout of family support group
leaders resulted from too many requirements for too few people.

**Discussion:** Many FSG leaders experienced serious "burnout" due to personnel shortages. Being an effective FSG leader is a full time job, but many of these leaders also volunteered extensive hours to help the community.

**Recommendation:** Try to recruit more volunteers from the ranks of family members and units with lower family versus FSG leader ratio.

(2) **Observation:** Units which established "chains of concern" prior to the deployment experienced fewer family returns to CONUS.

**Discussion:** The families of units with family chains of concern well established prior to deployment were better prepared to sustain each other throughout the stress of deployment. Those units that established family support groups because of deployment were not prepared for the emergency and experienced a greater number of family returns to CONUS.

**Recommendation:** Deploying units should ensure that family support groups and chains of concern are in place and working before any deployment takes place.
(3) **Observation:** There is a need for established FSGs at all times, not just during deployments.

**Discussion:** Those units that had established ongoing FSGs had far less problems coping with deployment than units that had no support groups prior to deploying. There is a need for support wherever Army families are located, particularly in an overseas environment. Problems seem to be that: By tradition the FSG leader is the senior wife - who is not necessarily the most enthusiastic or talented leader. If the senior wife does not participate, there is normally no group, since other wives/spouses fear the displeasure of the senior wife. Such a group is very difficult to maintain without senior support. In addition, more and more female soldiers are assuming leadership positions. The deployed spouse may well be the wife and the remaining spouse the husband. Army tradition/procedures have not caught up with this development.

**Recommendation:** Need to reevaluate the Family Support Group concept, and rewrite the documentation to meet real world situations.

(4) **Observation:** Advertisement of extraordinary support measures resulted in total dependency of some family members.
Discussion: A small number of spouses demanded more and more. These spouses quoted promises of care from the CINC on down as reasons for having everything done for them. In a few cases, extraordinary support was not enough; result was letters to the White House. Next time, the Army needs to emphasize helping spouses to help themselves.

Recommendation: Treat people as adults by policy; tell them life cannot be the same under deployment conditions and encourage self-help and reward self-reliance.8

This concludes the consolidated issues from VII Corps concerning Rear Detachments. I also reviewed the AARs from the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade.

11th ADA Brigade: Background

The following is extracted from the 11th ADA Brigade Executive Summary to the unit's ODS/DS After Action Report.

11th ADA Brigade deployed from Fort Bliss, Texas as part of the 18th Airborne Corps. Initially, Rear Detachments were organized at each battalion. From August until early December 1990, soldier and family concerns were answered by very austere unit staffs (i.e., in some cases a
second lieutenant and two or three NCOs) and the battalion family support groups. Soldier and family problems increased dramatically over time and the in-place rear detachment organizations could not meet the mission requirements. Senior spouses were burning out as they skillfully tried to solve every known family problem.

By order of the Brigade Commander, the Brigade realigned the Rear Detachment in early December. The 11th ADA Brigade Rear Detachment organization went from decentralized to centralized operations. Experienced leaders (i.e., a field grade officer and command sergeant major) were brought in from outside the brigade to run the realigned organization.

The family support center was organized to keep unit integrity, i.e., spouses from same unit helping each other. Battalion identity was maintained. Operations went from ten hour days to a twenty-four hour operation. The best NCO leaders within the old Rear Detachment organization were put in charge. Within thirty days positive results were obtained. Over 1500 family concerns were quickly resolved. The Soldier Support Team also geared up and pushed soldiers, critical repair parts, and key leaders forward during deployment and combat. [The Soldier Support Team was part of the 11th ADA Brigade Rear Detachment. It was a combined CSS organization.] Unit mission essential tasks were now being accomplished satisfactorily.
As ODS/DS changed phases, the Rear Detachment continued to evolve to meet mission requirements. The battle focus went from supporting combat operations to supporting redeployment operations.

In summary, 11th ADA Brigade Rear Detachment operations evolved to meet a change in battle focus during each phase of ODS/DS.⁹

On the following three pages are diagrams depicting the three organizational structures used by the 11th ADA Brigade.¹⁰ The specific After Action Report comments follow the diagrams. They relate to Rear Detachment issues only. I could find no specific AARs from this unit on Family Support issues.
FSG - FAMILY SUPPORT GROUP

FIGURE 3. 11th ADA Brigade Individual Rear Detachments
FIGURE 4. 11th ADA Brigade Consolidated Rear Detachment
FIGURE 5. 11th ADA Brigade Redeployment Rear Detachment

H - HAWK
P - PATRIOT
V/S - VULCAN/STINGER
HHB - HQ & HQ BATTERY
11th ADA Bde: AARs

(1) **Observation:** Key control was established prior to deployment but was not maintained.

**Discussion:** Due to the hasty deployment of the 11th ADA BDE, key control was allowed to lapse. As a result, the engineers have had to replace door locks and locks have been ordered to replace all those that had to be cut.

**Recommendation:** Place competent personnel in charge of key control from the Rear Detachment. Regardless of the situation, units need to establish and maintain proper key control at all times.

(2) **Observation:** Personnel accountability was very poor for the Brigade Rear (Provisional).

**Discussion:** Prior to 7 December 1990, personnel accountability was very poor. The Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS) was reporting numbers in excess of one-hundred and fifty soldiers not being accounted for by the unit. Many soldiers were basically on their own and reporting for duty at different times during the day with no supervision or accountability.

**Recommendation:** Resolve this problem by having experienced soldiers working in key positions. Establish plans to obtain key personnel from non-deployable units.
to fill key positions in provisional units. Establish a consolidated Brigade (provisional) unit during the pre-deployment phase. This ensures command and control of all personnel.

(3) **Observation:** Initial misunderstandings on SIDPERS (Standard Installation Division Personnel System) codes to use in identifying Rear Detachment personnel.

**Discussion:** The Brigade (Provisional) experienced problems in this area until the post established UIC's (Unit Identification Codes) for Rear Detachments.

**Recommendation:** Establish Rear Detachment UIC's prior to deployment of the main body. This ensures continuity of operations for the Rear Detachment SIDPERS clerk.

(4) **Observation:** Brigade (Provisional) did not have an initial publications account. The accounts were transferred to the deployed element.

**Discussion:** The Brigade (Provisional) had to scrounge all over post for needed publications until the new account was set up.

**Recommendation:** A publication account must be established during the pre-deployment phase in order for the Brigade (Provisional) staff to function efficiently.
(5) **Observation:** Property Accountability lost during deployment.

**Discussion:** No uniformity was evident among the battalions in their property accountability procedures during deployment. Units failed to account for property left in the Rear Detachment by signing a lateral transfer from the Rear Detachment Property Book Officer. Much of the non-deployable property was signed for by a deployed soldier. In some cases, privates were signed for the property. [The Army normally has soldiers of the rank of at least 'specialist, E-4, sign for property as they have the necessary experience and training to be aware of what is expected of them with regard to accountability of property].

**Recommendation:** Units must include an annex in their deployment SOPs on property accountability procedures. Exercise the procedures during long-term training exercises and vigorously review in after action sessions.

(6) **Observation:** Lack of qualified administrative specialists hurt unit readiness.

**Discussion:** The Rear Detachment experienced problems in personnel management, SIDPERS transactions, publications, promotions, OERs/NCOER's (Officer Efficiency Reports/Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Reports) and
tracking emergency leaves. Inexperienced soldiers who lacked expertise in administrative procedures performed most unit personnel actions. Many PAC actions were incomplete or otherwise erroneous and had to be regenerated.

**Recommendation:** Staff Rear Detachment organizations with qualified personnel and administration soldiers. Rewrite war plans. Exercise accordingly.

(7) **Observation:** Rear Detachments did not have qualified legal clerks assigned. Maintaining good order and discipline became difficult because legal actions became backlogged.

**Discussion:** By December 1990, over 35 legal actions were pending (Chapters, Article 15's, Court Martial charges to prefer). Soldiers who performed criminal acts did not receive timely justice. [11th ADA Bde provides no comparative statistics on the number of pending legal actions when unit is not deployed. A discussion with JAGC officers on faculty at CGSC reveals that 35 actions pending is excessive and in a garrison situation, would immediately assume that there was a problem with the legal clerk. In this case, there was no s\ch\l-trained legal specialist.]

**Recommendation:** Assign qualified legal clerks to Rear Detachments during deployments, long term exercises.
(8) Observation: Family and soldier care suffered because the Rear Detachment did not have a chaplain assigned.

Discussion: Frequently complex soldier and family situations developed (e.g., attempted suicide, terminal cancer, indecent acts with minors) where the chain of concern needed direct and immediate access to a unit chaplain. At Fort Bliss, chaplain services were centralized. No chaplain was assigned to 11th ADA Brigade (Rear) (Provisional). In some cases, one chaplain was assigned to help the soldier but a different chaplain was assigned to assist the spouse. This was time consuming and ineffective.

Recommendation: Ensure a chaplain is assigned to Brigade level Rear Detachments to provide responsive support to soldiers and family members.

(9) Observation: Soldiers in 11th ADA BDE (Rear) (Prov) served three different first sergeants, three different command sergeants major, two different battery level commanders, and three different Rear Detachment Commanders. [Reasons for this situation included personnel turbulence and unit reorganization].
Discussion: Rear Detachment soldiers experienced inconsistent enforcement of Army standards. This resulted in poor soldier care, poor support to families of deployed soldiers, and poor support to the forward deployed element until an effective chain of command was installed.

Recommendation: Brigade War Plans need to be rewritten to include annexes on Rear Detachment operations. Annex must at a minimum outline structure/functions of Rear Detachment operation during every phase of a deployment. Plans must be exercised and vigorously reviewed using Army AAR process.\textsuperscript{11}

In addition to the AARs, 11th ADA brigade provided an executive summary detailing the responsibilities of the Brigade Rear S-2 and Rear S-3. Included for the S-2, for example, were key control, physical security of 135 buildings, and inprocessing 600 incoming personnel for security clearances. Leaving back qualified personnel in those two staff sections had a very positive impact on the deployed unit as well as the Rear Detachment during the pre-deployment, deployment, and re-deployment of the 11th ADA Brigade.\textsuperscript{12}

Part II - Other ODS/DS Related References
The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) published two excellent secondary sources on ODS/DS. One was a newsletter entitled *Getting To the Desert*. This publication dealt with many deployment issues, including transportation, command and control, training, and equipment and supply. It recommended that Rear Detachment Commanders be selected for their ability, not availability, stressing the importance of ability, rank, and experience. It offered recommendations for organizing Rear Detachments, and identified the requirement to ensure guidance was available for disposition of organizational equipment. It also recommended consolidated storage of soldier's personal property at battalion level.\(^{13}\)

The other CALL publication is *The Yellow Ribbon*, a bulletin covering lessons learned from the home front. It encompasses Rear Detachment Commander selection, operations, missions, and has a separate section devoted to family support issues. I will list the major issues that pertain to Rear Detachments and then those that are related to family support using the format used by CALL: Topic, Discussion, and Lesson(s). (As many of the discussions and lessons are somewhat lengthy, I will summarize the main points.) Rear Detachment Issues
(1) **Topic:** Selection and support of Rear Detachment Commanders

**Discussion:** The RDC faces many soldier and family concerns and must be prepared to provide the necessary assistance. The Rear Detachment accomplishes unit tasks for installation support, training of replacements, and property accountability. Even more difficult are the varied problems the RDC will have to solve involving family care. This demands a commander who is mature and sensitive to family problems.

**Lesson(s):** Select the RDC early, either before or immediately after deployment notification. Selection should be based on rank, experience, and the ability to accomplish the mission of the Rear Detachment. The RDC should be no more than two ranks below the commander of the deploying unit.

(2) **Topic:** Selection of Rear Detachment Personnel

**Discussion:** Research indicates that deployment operations require emphasis on the quality of personnel selected to perform duties in the Rear Detachment. In some instances, those left behind in the Rear Detachment were personnel that the deploying commander did not want to deploy. Commanders must be cognizant of the importance of
the mission of rear detachment personnel in relation to the selection process.

Lesson(s): Rear Detachment personnel need to be knowledgeable in personnel, finance, and supply, and prepared for the many family requests and problems. Ideally, two senior NCOs should be assigned to Rear Detachments for battalion and above levels.

(3) Topic: Rear Detachment Information Requirements

Discussion: Deploying unit commanders are responsible for providing Rear Detachment Commanders with information to care for their personnel, families, and property remaining at the installation. The information on the soldiers is frequently insufficient to identify potential family problems.

Lesson(s): Rear Detachments need timely telephone/FAX/E-Mail contact with the deployed force to address personnel, family, and medical evacuee issues. Information sheets should be provided on all remaining families. During the Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) have soldiers complete information questionnaires on their families. [A sample form is included in the publication.] Gather information on all immediate family members, to include location of children's schools, spouse's work
address and phone number, spouse's ability to speak English, any family members with special needs, etc.  

Family Support Issues

(1) **Topic:** FSG Operations and Functions

**Discussion:** In many units, the operations and functions of the FSGs have been thought out in advance of unit deployments.

**Lessons(s):** Commanders of deploying units and Rear Detachments should clearly define the operational boundaries of FSG activities for FSG leaders. FSG's without boundaries may be subjected to conflicts among volunteers and loss of mutual support within the group. Primary role of the FSG is to distribute pertinent information to families and provide a mechanism for family assistance. FSGs were critical assets to Rear Detachments primarily through the number of problems they were able to resolve at their level, which lightened the burden on the Rear Detachment, and by the accuracy of their family support rosters. Some organizations, both active and reserve (perhaps the entire Army), did not appreciate the potential value of the databases which produced family support rosters. Often the FSG had more accurate information than did the Rear Detachment due to the network which kept it informed if a spouse had gone home for a visit, had returned, or had left the area altogether.
(2) **Topic:** Predeployment Planning

**Discussion:** Most family issues should be resolved during predeployment POR before they become problems. While soldiers are responsible for their own personal affairs and those of their families, unit leaders have an obligation to see that soldiers are attuned to both POM and non-POM considerations.

**Lesson(s):** Command interest is essential in identifying areas that can become problems during the soldier's deployment. Accurate rosters and family member information, (from access to bank account to state of family finances, to child care problems, etc.), must be items of command interest to ensure the Rear Detachment is able to meet the needs of the family members.15

Another resource resulting from ODS/DS is the Army National Guard After Action Report Operation Desert Shield Operation Desert Storm. This report provided some pertinent information on family support and family assistance. The emphasis was on the requirement to operate and staff the family support centers during mobilization exercises as well as during future activations.16
On 9 March 1992, I conducted a telephonic interview with LTC Norman K. Southerland, Commander of the 11th Signal Brigade (Rear) (Provisional), Fort Huachuca, Arizona, during ODS/DS. The interview questions were approved by my committee and are included at Appendix A. The purpose of the interview was to gain his views on the mission, operations, and functions of a Rear Detachment. Also his views on redeployment and transition issues were elicited. Following is a summary of the interview.

LTC Southerland was already at Fort Huachuca, assigned as the secretary of the general staff (SGS) to the Commander of Information Systems Command, when 11th Signal Brigade units began deploying for SWA. He was a command designee for 86th Signal Battalion and was notified of his assignment to command the 11th Signal Brigade (Rear) (Provisional) three days prior to assuming command.

LTC Southerland reported that he derived his mission as he went along, that his mission grew with each passing day. Following is a list of his Rear Detachment mission requirements:

- Provide 24-hour family support to over 700 families
- Provide administrative and logistics support to deployed unit (Bde HQS and two battalions)
- Provide command and control of Rear Detachment including two deployable signal line companies
- Provide physical security of POVs
- Provide physical security and property accountability for all nondeployable and installation equipment, located in 61 different buildings
- Provide personnel replacement operations including training and equipping
- Provide mobilization support to 7 company size reserve units to include billeting, messing, and Common Task Training/Testing (CTT)

The organization LTC Southerland used to accomplish his mission is shown on the following page.
* - THESE TWO COMPANIES WERE DEPLOYABLE BUT WERE NOT REQUIRED FOR ODS/DS; ATTACHED TO REAR (PROV) WHEN PARENT HQs DEPLOYED

FIGURE 6. 11th Signal Brigade (Rear) (Provisional)
LTC Southerland's experience can be divided into two areas: things that worked well and things that didn't work well within the organization.

**Things that worked well:**

(1) **Family support.** LTC Southerland stayed personally involved in this area and clearly defined the mission of the family support NCO. He had active family support groups whose help he stated he could not have done without.

(2) **Logistics Support to deployed force.** LTC Southerland admits that part of his success here depended upon his wealth of logistical experience. He was able to make things happen and get the needed supplies and equipment shipped fairly expeditiously, although this area was not without its share of frustrations.

(3) **Storage of personnel property.** The Fort Huachuca installation provided non-temporary, commercial storage of the deploying soldiers personal property at government expense. Although the installation transportation office was busy, both during the deployment and redeployment, LTC Southerland's Rear Detachment had no involvement in this area whatsoever.
(4) POV Storage. LTC Southerland did what the majority of units did: triple strands of concertina wire around the POVs after parking them in the unit motor pools, and guards.

(5) Redeployment. LTC Southerland set up a one-stop operation for soldiers to turn in weapons, sensitive items, and then sign out on leave or pass, or be escorted to the barracks. Once LTC Southerland was notified of the Brigade's redeployment, he spent the majority of his time in planning and coordinating the Welcome Home ceremony.

(6) Communications. LTC Southerland was successful in installing FAX and E-mail to the deployed Brigade headquarters and both battalion headquarters.

Things that didn't work well.

(1) The S-1 mission area. LTC Southerland reported that his S-1 shop survived but never "got well" due to the immensity of the task and the lack of any trained administrative personnel.

(2) Personnel turbulence. During ODS/DS, LTC Southerland had four different acting command sergeants major, four different S-4's, and three different property book officers. This turbulence was caused by mitigating factors outside his ability to influence but was obviously extremely disruptive to maintaining an efficient operation.
(3) S-3 mission area. The S-3 was new to the job and required personal, daily involvement by LTC Southerland.

(4) Property accountability. Not done well during initial deployment due to speed of deployment and lack of established procedures. This continues to have a major effect on transition of accountability of equipment back to the parent units, eight months after the Brigade redeployed to Fort Huachuca. (11th Signal Bde redeployed from ODS/DS in July 1991).

(5) Installation family assistance and support agencies. Neither the installation or the agencies such as Red Cross or ACS were staffed or resourced to handle the volume of families that had need of their services. The installation Director of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA) was diligent in his efforts to provide the necessary support but the families best source of support came from the Rear Detachment's family support group.

To conclude this interview summary, here are LTC Southerland's conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations:

(1) Now a battalion commander, LTC Southerland has a chain of concern active in each company which meets regularly to ensure information exchange and update of family information data base. The Brigade now has a family support handbook. He addresses the issue of
staffing a Rear Detachment in his Rear Detachment Annex to his Deployment SOP and, if deployed, will appoint his Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD) commander as Rear Detachment Commander. He will select representatives from each of the primary staff section (good people, qualified for the positions) and will designate a senior NCO as RD First Sergeant. His RD Annex also addresses the transition problems, especially with regard to equipment and property turnover and has provided expeditious procedures while still ensuring accountability.

(2) LTC Southerland stated that the biggest problem he had in commanding the 11th Signal Brigade (Rear) (Prov) could be summarized easily: he didn't have the right folks with the right experience for the job required. As far as the organization itself, LTC Southerland stated that he was greatly in need of a second in command, an XO, (preferably a major) throughout the operation but could never free himself up enough to do anything about the lack thereof. (One advantage in having another field grade officer in the RD is for UCMJ purposes.)

(3) When asked about the possibility of using soldiers from the Reserve Component to staff or "round out" Rear Detachments, LTC Southerland said it is absolutely "doable" but recommended a 50/50 split between reservists and assigned soldiers. He feels that the RD commander could
also come from the Reserve component if the concept could be trained. It is critical, in his opinion, that the RD commander have knowledge of the installation, organization and personnel in order to be effective.

(4) Concerning the need for a doctrinal publication on Rear Detachment missions and operations LTC Southerland feels that it is necessary for two reasons. One is the fact that there are certain basic functions that all Rear Detachments have to do so guidelines need to be made available. Those things that are installation specific should be included in installation and unit SOPs. Secondly, Rear Detachments need and use resources - yet they are not resourced. Had ODS/DS lasted longer, most Rear Detachments would have had no operating funds. LTC Southerland feels that once the RD mission is defined, the question, "Who pays?" needs to be answered.

(5) In the area of family support, volunteers were key to the success of that program, to include soldiers who volunteered to work in this area. Attitude is all important. LTC Southerland feels that we can continue to expect and to count on volunteer support in future deployments but believes some reimbursement should be allocated for items such as child care and mileage.
In conclusion, LTC Southerland acknowledged that commanding the 11th Signal Brigade (Rear) (Prov) was as big a challenge as he has ever had and he would not look forward to doing it again! His advice to fellow battalion commanders is that it is essential upon deployment to leave some good people back. LTC Southerland stated that he will hand pick the RD staff if he is called upon to deploy. Furthermore, in choosing personnel, minimize potential for turbulence by ensuring longevity of at least six months in the respective Rear Detachment positions.

On 20 March 1992, I conducted an interview with COL (Ret) Gary LaGrange, Garrison Commander for Fort Riley and the Installation Rear Detachment Commander for the 1st Infantry Division (Mech) during ODS/DS. (The interview questions are at Appendix B.) His operation was different from the other organizations researched. He consolidated all Rear Detachment Missions at the installation level with the exception of family support. Family support was provided at battalion, brigade, and installation level. COL LaGrange had participated in six REFORGER exercises (Return of Forces to Germany), and had always been able to rely upon the respective installation for assistance in deployment, sustainment, and redeployment.
COL LaGrange stated that they essentially pulled out their REFORGER deployment plans, modified them slightly, and went to work. He further stated that the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) was very impressed with the manner in which the Fort Riley installation staff operated, both in support of the deployed 1st Infantry Division soldiers, and their families. According to COL LaGrange, the DAIG held the Fort Riley installation up as a model "for other installations. COL LaGrange credits his success to a division commander who allowed him the latitude and flexibility to run the Rear element without interference, a talented and dedicated installation staff, and his own personal experience. COL LaGrange organized the stay-behind soldiers into provisional companies to ensure a consolidated work pool was available and provided these workers to respective directorates as needed. He had a large portion of the Division AG stay back; they were further augmented by a Reserve AG company and a Reserve finance company. He also consolidated all family support services into the post Family Assistance Center, to include finance. The organization developed and used by COL LaGrange's Rear Detachment is shown on the next page.
FIGURE 7. Fort Riley Installation Rear Detachment
The Fort Riley installation was told that its priorities were to deploy the division and set up installation level family support. All units were told that the umbilical cord to their former unit headquarters would be cut and that all requests for logistical and administrative support would come to the installation operations center. All MTOE property left behind (with few exceptions) was considered excess and would be turned back in to the supply system or otherwise disposed of by the DOL. All soldiers and families were required to process through the post family assistance center, run by the DPCA. It took approximately two weeks to process the entire division and their families but this action paid big dividends later in terms of minimizing some types of family problems, particularly financial. [I asked how they "required" the families to process through. COL LaGrange reported that the command involvement resulted in family members "wanting to go."

As units deployed, DOL signed up for all equipment and furnishings and the Director of Engineering and Housing (DEH) signed for all the buildings. The soldiers' personal property was also signed for by DOL, boxed up and secured in buildings. (POVs were handled similarly.) The remaining Military Police company, and a Reserve MP company closed roads leading to barracks and motor pools used for
personal property storage and other unused buildings and barracks and also assumed security responsibilities.

Family support was the only mission the deploying units were required to provide manning for and "unit contact teams" were formed. Each battalion had a lieutenant or captain, and a sergeant first class or master sergeant. All personnel for unit contact teams were selected on merit, not nondeployability with only a few exceptions.

Each brigade contact team had a major or senior captain assigned, along with three senior noncommissioned officers. The installation appointed a major (hand selected by COL LaGrange) and a sergeant major, and was charged with the overall responsibility of coordinating family support for the installation.

As stated earlier, the DPCA formed the FAC and staffed it primarily with personnel from the Family Support Division of the DPCA. Besides the American Red Cross, ACS, and AER, the installation placed the reserve finance company in this facility. Problems with pay and allowances were resolved efficiently, further aided by E-mail to the deployed division finance support unit. The Family Assistance Center was where problems were solved.

Within the two provisional companies that were formed, a labor pool of initially 600 and eventually 1200 soldiers were available to provide labor pool to DOL
and DEH to accomplish their objective: sign for all the equipment, personal property, and buildings.

Due to the organization structure, the Rear Detachment was able to provide training for the stay-behind element, to include Common Task Training and Testing. UCMJ actions were not a problem as the HQs Commandant was a field grade officer. The two provisional companies fell under his control.

To assist in reception of the returning division and subsequent transition period, COL LaGrange made good use of a number of lieutenant colonels who were battalion command designees and were already prepositioned at Fort Riley. He also formed a provisional battalion whose primary mission was to receive the division. He gave the provisional battalion commander a staff and company commanders. It was their responsibility to sign over respective buildings, equipment, release POVs and other personal property, and secure, transport and store weapons and other sensitive items until the unit was prepared to resume these functions. According to COL LaGrange, the reception and transition period went very smoothly.

COL LaGrange also reported that they were able to renovate every barracks except one (fifty two in all) to include upgrades in bathrooms, improved lighting, new curtains, and repainting. Resourcing for this was not a
problem: mission dollars were converted to base operations dollars.

COL LaGrange concluded that serving as Rear Detachment commander for the 1st Infantry Division was one of the most stressful things he has ever done. Coupled with the stress of helping families with problems and running the installation, was guilt [shared by the majority of stay-behind personnel] about not being in SWA. One of the biggest problems surfaced by COL LaGrange was the stress level of battalion and brigade commanders' wives. They wanted to "do it all." COL LaGrange affirms that they are not responsible - the Army is. Yet, self-sufficiency certainly needs to be encouraged. Among the senior wives there was a great deal of dependency on the Army to solve problems and at the same time the senior wives felt "too responsible." Although a very stressful job, COL LaGrange thrived on the challenge and takes a great deal of pride today in the quality support provided by the 1st Infantry Division Rear Detachment during ODS/DS.\textsuperscript{18}

The United States Army Research Institute (ARI) conducted a survey during ODS/DS concerning Rear Detachments and Family Support. The survey was conducted at major CONUS installations. The purpose of the research was to compare and contrast the stresses of ODS/DS with the institute's
prior research on long separations and deployments. The study reported that the prior research conclusions were valid and the report offered some conclusions and recommendations on assisting families to cope with wartime deployments. Pertinent to this thesis are the following conclusions from their study:

The ARI defines Rear Detachments as consisting of soldiers who are left behind at an installation to manage the affairs of a unit that has been deployed. Their main functions are to take care of the personnel and equipment that do not travel with the deploying units and to maintain a liaison with the families. Prior research has concluded that Rear Detachments are helpful in resolving pay and other administrative problems. According to spouses, the Rear Detachments did a good job by helping them feel comfortable, providing information, controlling rumors, and helping the FSG. FSG leaders and other volunteers found it much easier to assist families if the post retained Read Detachments at the battalion level or lower. Research findings prior to ODS/DS rated the Rear Detachments as the spouses "greatest source of support."

Family Support Groups were perceived as successful because knowledge of and attendance at FSG meetings was up from previous research findings, activities of FSGs were similar across the Army, and most spouses rated it as 'the most supportive service' during ODS/DS.
In the area of family support, Department of the Army Headquarters, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs has released a publication entitled *Outside the Storm*. It contains a relevant article, "Taking Care of Army Families," in which the author advocates the role of family support groups, that they are in fact, vital to Army readiness and are here to stay.20

Along similar lines is an article in the November/December edition of *Defense 91*. Entitled, "Quality-of-Life Programs Integral to Force Readiness," it is written by Millicent W. Woods, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel Support, Families and Education. She is a strong advocate of family support centers and services and lauds the family support groups formulated during the Gulf crisis. She also notes that the Navy's institutionalized ombudsman program "... paid great dividends in organizing families and providing support."21 She emphasizes that never has there been "... such a heightened awareness of the importance of morale and mental health during time of war. The mental well-being of the troops and their families is an integral part of readiness."22
Other Resources

1. I reviewed the Readiness Workbook produced by 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized). This workbook had an excellent checklist for soldiers and family members to ensure successful deployments.

2. The 2d Ranger Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment also has a Deployment Readiness Workbook. It serves the same purpose as the other unit's, although it is not as comprehensive.

3. I reviewed a Program of Instruction entitled Command Team Seminar Course (CTS) from the School of Command Preparation (SCP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The cadre there are responsible for teaching the Precommand Course for officers selected for battalion, brigade, assistant division, and division command, and also offer a course which includes the spouses of the selectees. The course is called the "Command Team Seminar" and covers group development, group dynamics, family support groups, role of the commander's wife, legal issues, and leadership issues. As a result of ODS/DS, the school cadre also include a seminar and resource material on reunion, to teach commanders and spouses to deal with the particular stresses
that result during a reunion between returning soldier and waiting spouse.  

4. The SCP cadre also gave me the names of several former battalion commander's wives, two of whom I interviewed on the role of the family support group and its interaction with the Rear Detachment. (The interview questions are included at Appendix C).

The following are the conclusions from the interviews. These interviews constitute additional original sources to validate the after action reports from ODS/DS.

(a) The first spouse I interviewed has been an Army wife for 22 years. She has experienced 30 major deployments (in excess of three week separations from her spouse). During recent years, while her husband was assigned as battalion executive officer (XO) and as a battalion commander, she instituted full time family support groups for her husband's units and believes these organizations should be institutionalized by the Department of the Army. Her experience was that having full time family support ensures preparedness no matter how "short-notice" a deployment may be. Because of the continued perception and expectation that XO and battalion commanders wives will volunteer, the Army "gets two for the
price of one" but may not be getting the best in terms of family support. Besides strictly volunteer work, many officers' wives are neither qualified for or willing to assume the responsibilities of family support. When asked if family support groups would work without the involvement of the senior officer's spouse she responded that, "right or wrong, the senior lady drives the train."

I further asked if current installation agencies (Red Cross, Army Community Service, Army Emergency Relief, etc.) could take the place of Rear Detachments. She said they can not for two reasons: first, they are not as committed to the unit and its family members and secondly, they are not resourced sufficiently to allow them to do any more than they are already doing. A full time family support program, however, would certainly allow the Rear Detachment to be smaller in size and have less direct involvement in providing family support.

This spouse is very interested in the Navy Ombudsman Program in which family support is full family support is full time and is command directed by the Department of the Navy. She sees a lot of applicability for that type of program for the Army but only if endorsed by the Department of the Army. Too many commanders will only provide family support if they are required to; they don't understand that taking care of families is something the
Army officially endorses but doesn't really require it. Full time family support should also incorporate responsibility for "waiting spouses." The spouse and children are "waiting" at the last assigned duty station, and have reported numerous problems in obtaining support from the Army because they are not part of a command.

One other important issue to this FSG leader is the lack of training for NCO wives. If the Army is planning to continue to rely on volunteers to provide family support, these wives need training. This could be accomplished in conjunction with their spouse's attendance at the First Sergeants' Course, or the Sergeant Major Academy.

This spouse, who volunteers out of loyalty to her husband, (not the Army) reports that the stress level for volunteers during deployments can be extremely high. She found that she had absolutely no time to herself and came very close to exhaustion due to feeling overwhelmed by the needs of others.24

(b) The second spouse I interviewed has been an Army wife for almost twenty years, and is also a veteran of deployments too numerous to count but does include ODS/DS. She is most definite on the fact that the family support program in the Army is broken. She agrees that the current system expects the commander's wife to head up the FSG but that in fact, the commander should drive the train on family
support. Her husband had instituted a full time family support program in his battalion before the battalion was alerted for deployment to SWA and this paid off tremendously.

The Rear Detachment at battalion level consisted of only two senior NCOs who had long been active in the battalion's family support program. The Rear Detachment at brigade level had some Captains and a CSM but this spouse reports that she interfaced at that level only occasionally; the battalion Rear Detachment and FSG were capable of handling most problems.

She also states that her loyalty is to her husband, not to the unit, and that family support programs must receive direction from and be a priority of the commander if they are to succeed. She thinks the focus of the Pre-Command Course is on the importance of family support groups but it doesn't really teach the commander's (or their spouses) the "how." The course needs to go beyond DA Pam 608-47 and provide more specifics, and especially to encourage self-sufficiency. Family support groups should be focused on encouraging self-sufficiency in families, rather than leading families to believe that the Army (or translate that: a volunteer spouse) will take care of their every need whenever their soldier is deployed.
When discussing the Navy Ombudsman Program, she believes that a similar program would be an improvement over the present system if endorsed by the Department of the Army; however the "real movers and shakers, the spouses who are promoters of improvements and changes" would not be appointed as ombudsmen because the Army doesn't want "people who rock the boat."

This spouse reports that her biggest source of stress during ODS/DS, were "outside requirements," i.e. being "expected" to attend the Christmas Formal, other social functions, and numerous battalion changes of command by other senior officer spouses, in order to "keep up appearances." Her bottom line is that family support will only get better when the Army makes it a priority.25

5. Finally, there are some other areas I would like to address in Chapter Five. I would like to offer some alternatives to the Army's family support program. I have done some preliminary research into the U.S. Navy ombudsman program and reviewed the Navy Family Ombudsman Manual, NAVPERS #15571. The program was established in 1970. It consists of a volunteer who is officially appointed by the commander, whose role is defined and supported by the commander, and who serves as the link between the command
and its families. Common duties of an ombudsman are listed below.

- keep the CO informed about the command families
- monitor the morale of the command and provide feedback to the CO
- identify all potential problems within the command so that the command can be apprised and take preventive measures
- identify, report and squash rumors.
- provide an outlet for problems to surface early, before they become severe.
- keep families informed of what is available to them and how to access those resources
- identify families who need professional help to the appropriate organizations
- use knowledge of the system to access the appropriate level of the chain of command for intervention
- participate in planning and presenting pre-deployment briefings
- provide a welcome program for families and single soldiers reporting to the command
- participate in the area Ombudsman Council or Assembly^{26}
The role of the commander in this program is to use the ombudsman as a single point of contact to disseminate official information concerning the Command to the families, pass on the "Big Picture" to help families appreciate how the well-being of the Command is impacting on them, and stay in regular contact with the ombudsman to let the families know the command is concerned and cares about their well-being.27

According to one current and one former Navy ombudsman, this institutionalized family support system is run very efficiently and provides the full spectrum of family support services. To get the full details on the ombudsman program I telephonically interviewed a squadron ombudsman with HSL-37, (HSL - Helicopter Anti-submarine Light), NAS (Naval Air Station) Barbers Point, Hawaii.28 According to this ombudsman, even when an entire Navy squadron or fleet deploys, no Rear Detachment is left back. No military liaison is needed because ombudsmen are the link; the ombudsman can contact the commanding officer for assistance or to pass critical information. All other assistance required is provided by the installation.
The job description in the manual is exactly what this spouse says that she does. She is the information center for all members of the command, military and civilian. She has been an ombudsman for two years and spends approximately fifty hours per week either fulfilling her responsibilities or attending training. Larger units, such as this squadron, normally have two ombudsmen; one is normally an officer's spouse and one is an enlisted spouse. There is no "rank" between ombudsmen. Whichever one has been there longer or has more experience will normally take the lead. Essentially, they work together, help each other, and help reduce the stress by dividing up the responsibilities. Having two also allows one to take time off with no degradation of service to the families and service members of the unit. Training for ombudsmen is a monthly mandatory event and includes classes on how the ombudsmen can cope with the stress of doing this important job. Although no salary is offered, there is reimbursement for volunteer expenses in the form of child care, mileage, parking and tolls, and telephone toll calls not covered by command telephone credit cards.29

I also telephonically interviewed the spouse of a Navy enlisted soldier who is currently assigned as a cadre member of the Command and General Staff College. She was an ombudsman during ODS/DS while assigned to COMDESRON-21,
(Command Destroyer Squadron) in San Diego, California. Although there were only 17 spouses in the command headquarters, the ombudsmen for 10 ships (with approximately 300 personnel assigned) reported to her for guidance and assistance. She confirmed the other ombudsman's information on the program and asserted that if her husband is reassigned to a detachment, squadron, or fleet, she would volunteer to be the ombudsman again. She feels that everyone benefits from the program: it has command involvement, helps ensure sailors take care of their families and encourages family members to be self-sufficient.  

To gain the perspective of unit commanders on the Ombudsman program, I also interviewed a Navy lieutenant commander who has over 25 years active service to the Navy, is a Gulf War veteran, and a classmate at Command and General Staff College. He insists that he could not have survived without the ombudsman. He believes in the program because it encourages self-sufficiency by the families. The Navy actively supports the ombudsman program and takes disciplinary action against sailors who do not take active measures to provide for their families. The ombudsman is not everybody's "mom." She's the information clearing house and a facilitator: she directs people with problems to the appropriate agencies or resources. She keeps the families
informed and keeps the command informed. He also stated that he had fired one ombudsman because she was not sincere about the job but more of a "busybody," and that commanders, in his experience, are careful and thorough in the selection of an ombudsman.31

A Navy commander with over 24 years of service, and also cadre at CGSC, agreed with the lieutenant commander's summary and added that as executive officer on board two ships, he or the commander remained in constant contact with the ombudsman even while the ship was at sea. Through her, the spouses were kept up to date on the daily happenings on board, and the sailors were assured that all was well at the home port. Her job performance was critical to the morale and welfare of the entire command.32

6. An alternative to the staffing problem experienced by Rear Detachments, and an important area for future study, is to examine the modular approach concept. The modular approach involves having a portion of each staff section always designated the "Rear element." This ensures that properly trained personnel and resources are always ready to assume the mission in the event of any deployment of the unit, training or otherwise. The AG Concepts Branch at the Soldier SupportCenter, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, is examining this approach with regard to the way Personnel
Service Companies currently operate. The intent is to provide better support to the numerous units for which they are responsible.\textsuperscript{33} A thorough analysis of this proposal as an alternative is beyond the scope of this study but will be addressed briefly in Chapter Five to provide background for anyone wishing to examine the concept in more detail.

**Summary**

This chapter has provided a comprehensive review of the available literature on the research question and three areas for future study. The literature review included information from interviews with former Rear Detachment commanders, leaders of family support groups and sources knowledgeable of the Navy's Ombudsman Program. As evidenced by the wealth of documents and opinions on the subject of Rear Detachments in general and family support in particular, the issues raised are of utmost concern and warrant further analysis.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO


4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.


8 Ibid.

9 11th ADA Brigade, "Executive Summary, Rear Detachment Operations, Family Support," DSTA74, Desert Storm Special Study Group, June 1991, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

10 Ibid.


12 U.S. Army, 11th ADA Brigade, " Executive Summary, BDE (Rear) (Prov) S-2/S-3 Responsibilities, DSTA74, Desert Storm Special Study Group, June 1991, Fort Leavenworth, KS.


14 U.S. Army, The Yellow Ribbon, No. 91-2, Center for Army Lessons Learned, (CALL), June 1991, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 1-3.
Ibid., 4-9.


17LTC Norman K. Southerland of Fort Huachuca, AZ., interview by author, 9 March 1992, transcript, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

18COL (Ret) Gary LaGrange of Manhattan, KS., interview by author, 17 March 1992, transcript, Fort Leavenworth, KS.


20Department of the Army, Outside the Storm, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Command Information Division, 1 April 1991, Washington, D.C., 14-16.


22Ibid., 35.

23U.S. Army, "Command Team Seminar Course Program of Instruction," School for Command Preparation, Command and General Staff College, 9 September 1991, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

24Christine Allin of Fort Leavenworth, KS., interview by author, 9 March 1992, transcript, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

25Valerie Tystad of Leavenworth, KS., interview by author, 10 March 1992, transcript, Fort Leavenworth, KS.


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28Tammy Karns of Barbers Point, Hawaii, interview by author, 5 March 1992, transcript, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

30 Sharon Ewing of Leavenworth, KS., interview by author, 6 March 1992, transcript, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

31 Lieutenant Commander James Clark of Fort Leavenworth, KS., interview by author, 10 March 1992, transcript, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

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CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

The methodology for this thesis was to first conduct a search for appropriate and current doctrine concerning the functions of the Rear Detachment by any nomenclature. Secondly, I will determine if the issue is systemic or problematic. A systemic issue is defined as an Army-wide concern that required real responses in the form of manpower, material, and time. Finally, a subjective analysis by comparison of the various sources will provide a framework for the what, why, how, when, and where of the operational concept of a Rear Detachment doctrine.

Doctrine is identified and modified through prescribed regulations: TRADOC Regs 25-31, and AR 11-40. Anyone can initiate an operational concept. The new doctrine requirements can be identified by many means, such as findings by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), studies, after action reports, and general officer guidance. The initiation of new or revised doctrine is in response to a major deficiency. A major deficiency, although not specifically articulated by the regulations, is
described as a major trend affecting the U.S. Army. The
Concepts and Doctrine Development Directorate of the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College informally view a
major deficiency and trend as an Army-wide concern that is a
systemic, not a problematic issue.

A search for doctrine was conducted and none was
found. Therefore, it was necessary to research actual
operations of units during Operations Desert Shield/Desert
Storm to determine if in fact a need for doctrine actually
existed. Data for the comparative analysis is from primary
and secondary sources. The primary sources are from two
U.S. Army Rear Detachment commanders and two family support
group leaders. The secondary sources are the U.S. Army
Research Institute Survey and two major units' after action
reports. An initial comparison of the primary and secondary
sources will determine if valid conclusions can be drawn
from both.

The initial comparative analysis uses the six
domains of the TRADOC Pam 11-19. These are the standards
for functional analysis within the U.S. Army. This
comparison will determine if the issue of Rear Detachments
is systemic or problematic. Do Rear Detachments fill a real
need?

The second analysis will be more subjective and is
best described as a qualitative analysis. The purpose of
the qualitative analysis is to add understanding to the actual conduct of the Rear Detachments. For example, the diverse missions of a Rear Detachments may have detracted from the ability of the Rear Detachment to provide family support. Were there any dysfunctional tasks of the Rear Detachments? Which Rear Detachments functioned most effectively and why? If it is proven that Rear Detachments are a valid operational concept, this second analysis will provide the framework for the development of the what, why, how, when and where. If the literature supports a doctrinal requirement for Rear Detachments, does it also offer recommendations as to the staffing and resourcing of these organizations? What is the optimum level at which Rear Detachments should be organized?

Finally, and without getting beyond the scope of my thesis, I will also highlight the issue of family support as this was the most prevalent issue raised in both primary and secondary sources. I will examine the U.S. Navy Ombudsman Program to determine applicability to the U.S. Army's family support issues.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS

Premise

The premise on which I am basing my analysis is the first part of my thesis question: does the United States Army have a doctrinal requirement for Rear Detachments? The second part of the thesis question is covered in Chapter Five as it is dependent on the answer to the first part of the question. In order to answer this question, I must first ascertain if the problems faced by Rear Detachments during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm were unique, i.e. problematic, or systemic. To do this, I must answer the following questions. Were the Rear Detachments needed? Were they responding to real problems? Did location, size, or organization affect their responses to the problems? Were the problems they responded to similar and were their responses similar? If the answer to these questions is "yes," then it appears that the Army has a systemic problem which doctrine can alleviate.
Method of Analysis

To determine if Rear Detachments are necessary, i.e., are expected to respond to real problems, I will do two different analyses. First, I will use the six domains outlined in TRADOC Regulation 11-15 and do a comparison of each domain by the five representative units. This will determine what similarities and differences existed in application of the domains and determine if units derived similar or dissimilar missions. It will also determine if units subsequently responded in a similar manner to the overarching problems of leading, organizing, training, and resourcing a Rear Detachment. Second, I have selected five issues most commonly faced by the five organizations. I will compare each units's response to these issues to determine if real problems existed. The issues are: family support, support to the deployed unit, property accountability, support to the installation, and redeployment.

The five units researched cover the spectrum of size, type, and location. Included is the 57th Signal Battalion, a combat support unit which deployed from Fort Hood, Texas; VII Corps, which included all types of units: combat, combat support, and combat service support and was deployed from OCONUS (Germany); two brigades: one combat arms and one combat support, one deployed from Fort Bliss,
Texas, and the other from Fort Huachuca, Arizona; and one division, which included all types of units and was deployed from Fort Riley, Kansas.

The five domains identified in TRADOC Regulation 11-15 are:
- Doctrine ("Mission" is substituted in the absence of doctrine)
- Training
- Organization
- Materiel ("Resources" is substituted for clarity.)
- Leader development (modified to mean type, i.e., officer or NCO, and rank and quality of leadership used or recommended)

This is a comparative analysis relying on personal accounts and reports, not statistics. No one domain is weighted more than another, no pluses or minuses are required.

**Analysis by domain**

**Mission.** For the most part, units had no defined mission, but instead, a vague idea of what they would be expected to do based on experiences during other deployments
such as REFORGER or National Training Center (NTC) rotations.

57th Signal Battalion. The Rear Detachment Commander of this unit knew that her primary missions were to provide family support and provide accountability of organizational and personal property. This knowledge was based on discussions with her battalion and brigade commanders. She was not expecting to provide CSS support to the deployed unit, nor provide support to the installation for mobilizing reservists. Since no one knew how long the war was going to last, redeployment operations were not considered until the ground war was over and the word reached the Rear Detachment that the battalion would be home in three weeks. No planning at the battalion Rear Detachment level had been done prior to that announcement.

VII Corps. This unit defined the mission of Rear Detachments quite clearly and formed the Desert Shield Family Support Directorate just prior to the deployment of the Corps. (See Chapter Two). The mission was strictly family support oriented. Yet, examination of their after action report comments reveals that VII Corps Rear Detachments were involved in finance issues and personnel actions for the deployed units, property accountability and security, and personnel replacement operations as well as family support.
11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade. The After Action Reports revealed that their Rear Detachment provided family support and combat service support to the deployed brigade. They state in their executive summary that their focus evolved from supporting combat operations to supporting redeployment operations. They were also responsible for property accountability, both organizational and personal.

11th Signal Brigade. The Rear Detachment mission was defined as: provide family support, support to the deployed brigade, accountability of both organizational and personal property, personnel replacement operations, reserve mobilization support and redeployment operations.

1st Infantry Division (Mech). Although this unit did things a little differently, the overall mission was exactly the same as the other four units. The major differences were that all missions except family support were consolidated at installation level. Fort Riley, with an experienced installation staff, had a fairly complete understanding of the mission early on.

To summarize this domain, it is apparent that five different units, deploying from five different locations, all had or derived the same mission statement:
Provide family support; provide combat service support to the deployed unit to include personnel services; provide property accountability of Army and soldiers' personal property; conduct redeployment/transition operations.

**Training.** All units believed that some type of training in Rear Detachment operations was required and because of the lack of training, relied on common sense, maturity, and experience. Training of key personnel was described in After Action Reports as extremely important, especially in terms of providing family support. Training in this area was predominantly on-the-job and various support agencies assisted Rear Detachments in providing family support. The commander of 11th Signal Brigade (Rear) (Provisional), LTC Southerland, stated, in addition to training, "you need people with the right attitude to work in this area."² Another problem was identified. Since the Rear Detachment is not normally identified until a unit is alerted for deployment, there is neither time available nor a program in place to train personnel prior to expecting them to perform their mission.

The only unit which did not have a major problem with training of its Rear Detachment was the 1st Infantry
Division. They routinely deploy as a division and rely upon the Fort Riley Installation Support Plan. The installation staff are veterans in the business of deploying, sustaining, and redeploying the division. The deployment plan is exercised routinely with REFORGER. As lessons learned from ODS/DS, the plan includes the requirements for unit family support chains of concern to remain updated and on file with the installation Family Support Division at the Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities, and for battalions to have appointed a family assistance officer.\textsuperscript{3}

To summarize the domain of training, it is evident that Rear Detachment personnel need to be trained but most units did not address it prior to being alerted for deployment. Since the mission was "ad hoc" for all units researched except the 1st Infantry Division, and derived as time passed, it would have been difficult for these units to train to this mission.

**Organization.** Since the five units researched performed a similar mission, one would presume that they had similar organizations. This is true for four of the five units, and although Fort Riley organized at installation level, their overall organization was still somewhat similar to the other units. Four of the units reported that a senior captain,
preferably with command experience, should be selected as Rear Detachment Commander at battalion level.

Fort Riley often selected a senior first lieutenant as Rear Detachment commander, but had a captain or major at brigade level. The 11th ADA Bde experienced severe problems with their initial Rear Detachment organization and were forced to reorganize at brigade level. Its final organization closely resembled the organization of the 11th Signal Brigade. All five units reported that the presence of senior noncommissioned officers was critical to success, whether the Rear Detachment at battalion level had the overall mission described earlier, or merely the mission of family support.

All units provided administrative and logistical support to the deployed forces. At unit level (battalions and/or brigades), the 57th Signal Battalion, VII Corps, 11th ADA Bde, and 11th Signal Bde created an S-1 section. The same was true of an S-4 or logistics section. Fort Riley used its stay-behind Adjutant General element, which was substantial in size, augmented by a Reserve AG company and a Reserve finance company for personnel/finance support and relied on their DOL for logistics support.

All units had a family support section as part of their Rear Detachments. Three of the units (the 57th Signal Bn, the 11th ADA Bde, and the 11th Signal Bde) had an S-3 element responsible for training the stay-behind element as
well as training replacements prior to overseas deployment. Fort Riley incorporated this mission at installation level.

To summarize the domain of organization, it is apparent that although units did not organize exactly alike, there existed more similarities than differences in their organizations and in their approaches to solving the problems inherent in their broad mission statement. Even though Fort Riley organized at installation level, it was still more similar than different to the other organizations researched, again due to the similarities in mission.

**Resources.** A problem experienced by many of the Rear Detachments had to do with resourcing, both in terms of personnel, and (primarily) in terms of dollars. One of the biggest problems in personnel resourcing was not having the "right" person for the job, i.e., a trained and experienced soldier, officer, or NCO. This was a problem surfaced by four of the five units researched. Both VII Corps and 11th ADA Bde reported an overwhelming requirement for trained, experienced personnel. As LTC Southerland reported, his S-1 shop "never got well." Despite tremendous effort, the 57th Signal Bn's performance in this area is best described as "survival."

Besides personnel shortages, budgetary problems were resolved in the same "ad hoc" fashion in which the
mission was derived. Fortunately, ODS/DS deployments occurred just prior to or shortly after a new budget cycle and installations were able to convert unit "mission dollars" into "base operations" or installation dollars. (The units that deployed were funded from a different "pot" altogether.) This process was not without its problems and many units were actually without operating funds for some time. Rear Detachments are not financed in the military budgetary process; emergency funds are not earmarked. Again, common sense eventually prevails and a way is found to pay the bills. Another issue involves the lack of monies to reimburse volunteers. Volunteers devoted countless hours to family support but no provisions exist to compensate these individuals in such areas as child care expenses incurred, mileage, or toll calls to out-of-state families.

To summarize the domain of resources, it is obvious that "ad hoc" solutions were found which at least attempted to solve the problems with shortages in personnel and did solve the problems with lack of operating funds. However, had the war lasted longer, Rear Detachments would have become involved in the budgetary process, at a level much higher than installation, to obtain the funds needed to continue operating.
Leadership. This is one of the most important and most overlooked areas in past deployments. The five units researched surfaced strong opinions on the subject, as did the authors of many other publications which resulted from ODS/DS. All five units stressed that experienced, mature leaders were key to the success of their Rear Detachments. In the past, units left behind an officer or senior NCO who may or may not have been qualified to command a Rear Detachment. (It may have been difficult to determine qualifications based on the uncertainty of the mission.) All units stressed in their after action comments or in interviews that units must be prepared to leave behind qualified leaders in order to ensure that the mission is performed efficiently and effectively. LTC Southerland (now a battalion commander) has already taken steps to ensure that a qualified individual will remain behind to command his Rear Detachment; he himself will hand pick the staff to support that commander.\textsuperscript{5} Fort Riley reported that all officers and senior NCOs who were selected as unit contact teams were chosen based on merit, not nondeployability. Their installation SOP stresses that requirement for future deployments.\textsuperscript{6}

To summarize the domain of leadership, all units felt that qualified officers and senior NCO's were critical to the ability of units to effectively perform the Rear
Detachment mission. Care and attention must be applied to the selection process in future deployments.

To conclude this portion of the analysis, it is evident that all five units developed essentially the same mission; four of the five established a need for training of Rear Detachment personnel and the fifth already had trained personnel in most positions; all five formed similar organizations although at different levels; four of the five stressed the need for personnel commensurate with the task to be performed and the need for budgetary resourcing; and all five stressed the need for qualified leadership.

Analysis by Issue

The second part of this chapter will be a comparison of how the units responded to issues which directly related to their derived or stated missions. Did the Rear Detachments execute their mission in response to problematic or systemic issues? We have seen what the Rear Detachments determined their mission to be, what their organization looked like, and examined resourcing, training, and leadership of Rear Detachments. A detailed examination of how they performed that common mission is needed to determine if a doctrinal requirement exists. The five issues are selected based on commonality among the units. The issues are listed in order of priority.
provide family support. this issue will be further divided into two subsets:

- providing support to families
- the impact on volunteers of attempting to assist the army with this mission.

provide support to the deployed unit
- provide property accountability
- provide support to the installation
- conduct redeployment and transition operations

provide family support. this was the largest problem area for all rear detachments. reportedly, it was also the source of the most stress for personnel in the rear detachments as well as the volunteers who offered to help the army with this mission.

1) providing support to families. the very fact that all rear detachments expected to be heavily committed to helping families solve problems points to this being a systemic issue. no system is in place during nondeployment periods to facilitate family support, other than installationsupport agencies such as red cross and army community service. in recognition of the broad scope of the family support issue, vii corps organized a special staff directorate to aid and monitor military communities and
Before the 57th Signal Bn deployed, the Rear Detachment commander appointed a Family Support Coordinator. LTC Southerland, commander of the 11th Signal Brigade (Rear) (Prov), stated that he stayed personally involved in this area on a daily basis. The 11th ADA Bde was forced to reorganize in order to effectively cope with the family support problems. Across the nation and abroad, installations, military communities, and even civilian communities responded to the needs of family members during their spouses' deployment to Southwest Asia. Whether at battalion, division, Corps, or installation, in CONUS or overseas, people responded to a real problem.

The impact on volunteers who assist with family support. This was an additional source of stress and concern to the Rear Detachment throughout the deployment. Although providing family support is a responsibility of the uniformed members, the thousands of spouses, predominantly wives, who volunteered their services to help other family members during ODS/DS were critical to the success of Rear Detachments.

The Family Support Groups and spouse chains of concern were instrumental in ensuring problems were solved at the lowest level possible. LTC Southerland feels that we
can expect these volunteers to come forward to facilitate future deployments,¹⁰ and that is a valid expectation. However, as COL LaGrange, Rear Detachment Commander for the 1st Infantry Division, stated, "spouses do not have an official capacity; relative to their husband's rank they felt too responsible for the families in the unit, and in many cases, were perceived to be wearing their husband's rank."¹¹ As the FSG leader interviews illustrate, if senior officer's wives are not involved, the FSGs do not function at all or at least, do not function well.¹²

Many of the volunteers, however well-intentioned, promoted the belief that the Army would take care of the families and did not promote teaching families to become self-sufficient. Many of the senior officer (and NCO) volunteers experienced "burn out," which resulted in more stress on the Rear Detachments as they attempted to cope with asking volunteers "not to volunteer so much." COL LaGrange reported that this was the biggest problem he experienced.

The issue is at best confusing. Yes, the Army is responsible for providing family support but the Army does not have a program. This is complicated by the fact that family members responded better to a fellow spouse from within the unit, especially with personal problems, as confirmed by the Army Research Institute Survey. As the Survey concluded, spouses found the FSG's to be their best
source of information and support during ODS/DS. However confusing, it is nonetheless a real issue to which Rear Detachments responded to the best of their abilities.

**Provide support to the deployed unit.** This was a part of every Rear Detachment’s mission statement regardless of the level at which it was performed. What makes it important is the reasonable expectation that future deployments will also be to an immature theater requiring some level of administrative and logistics support from the Rear. At the very least, Rear Detachments can expect to provide an interface with the CONUS sustainment base until required data links are installed and operating. For the five units researched, this requirement never completely disappeared. Even after the logistics system was fully operational, the 11th Signal Brigade, 11th ADA Brigade, and Fort Riley report continued involvement in providing logistic support to some degree.

In the area of personnel and administrative support, this mission remained with the Rear Detachments through redeployment of the units. This is a complex problem because it deals not only with the mission, but with manning. It is tough to perform this mission without trained people. Four of the five units documented the difficulties. Fort Riley, organized at installation level, with
full involvement of a Rear AG and Installation Directorate of Logistics, did not experience a "pain" factor as severely as did the other units in terms of manning. Nonetheless, the Fort Riley installation still found it to be a challenging and essential mission; systemic, not problematic.

Provide property accountability. All five units were involved in this area to some degree, and with the exception of Fort Riley, reported numerous problems with both record keeping and security. It is safe to say that the Army has "written off" (i.e., dropped responsibility of and accountability for) millions of dollars worth of property due to lack of property accountability during the deployment phase of ODS/DS. (This is not considering the property written off as combat losses.) Would unit SOPs fix this issue, thereby placing it in the problematic category? Yes, they could. However, in the absence of doctrine or Department of the Army policy mandating that stay-behind property and personal property be an installation, rather than a unit, responsibility, a recurrence of the ODS/DS losses are most likely.

If the next deployment is as rapid as ODS/DS, or a prolonged deployment resulting in turnover of RearDetachment commanders or logistics personnel (experienced by LTC Sutherland's unit^1^5^), the property losses will again be in the
millions of dollars. Fort Riley has determined that this is a systemic issue and has resolved it at the installation level: even for short term deployments such as REFORGER, the installation has the mission of ensuring property accountability.\textsuperscript{16}

Provide support to the installation. This mission was performed only by stateside (CONUS) units in terms of supporting mobilization of Reserve Component forces. Although challenging due to unpreparedness of both the 57th Signal Bn and the 11th Signal Bde, i.e., this was an unforeseen requirement, it can be categorized initially as a problematic issue. Due to the ongoing force realignment and the increased role of the Reserve Component\textsuperscript{17}, the issue is, or will become, systemic in nature. In the absence of doctrine defining active component or installation level responsibilities for this issue, units will continue to be unprepared to assist the installation in this mission.

Conduct redeployment and transition operations. All Rear Detachments, regardless of level, performed this mission. Installations shared in both aspects of the mission at Fort Riley, and in redeployment operations only for 11th ADA Bde, 11th Signal Bde, and the 57th Signal Bn. Redeployment operations are largely a problematic issue and
should be handled at the installation level through SOPs. The issue of transition, however, is closely linked to the problem of who is accountable for property: organizational, personal, and real (buildings and other facilities).

If the installation had the property accountability mission, as at Fort Riley, the transition should be smooth and efficient. As LTC Southerland reported, units which retained property accountability at unit level are still experiencing the repercussions of the rapid deployment and subsequent rapid turnover of property. Well-written and rehearsed SOPs could solve this problem but it could still be aggravated by the length of the deployment or Rear Detachment personnel turbulence. This would then place this issue in the systemic category.

Conclusion of Analysis

Simply restated, it is evident that a series of "ad hoc" missions were identified by various Rear Detachment organizations during the course of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. These missions appear to respond to "real problems." The five units, operating from different locations, with different parent headquarters, organized themselves similarly and experienced similar difficulties. In the absence of Army doctrine or policy, they responded in an "ad hoc" fashion in a determined effort to accomplish the mission.
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR

1LTC Norman K. Southerland of Fort Huachuca, AZ., interview by author, 9 March 1992, transcript, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

2Ibid.


4Interview, Southerland.

5Ibid.

6Fort Riley Installation Deployment Support Plan.


8Interview, Southerland.

9U.S. Army, 11th ADA Brigade, "Executive Summary, Rear Detachment Operations, Family Support" DSTA74, Desert Storm Special Study Group, June 1991, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

10Interview, Southerland.

11COL (Ret) Gary LaGrange of Manhattan, KS., interview by author, 17 March 1992, transcript, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

12Christine Allin and Valerie Tystad of Leavenworth, KS., interview by author, 9 and 10 March 1992, transcript, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

13Interview, LaGrange.


15Interview, Southerland.

16Fort Riley Installation Deployment SOP.

18 Interview, Southerland.
Conclusions

A doctrinal search was conducted throughout the process of preparing this thesis. No doctrine currently exists on the subject of Rear Detachments. The preponderance of literature reviewed related to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm because that deployment sets a precedent we can logically expect future deployments to resemble. This assumption is based on the current restructuring and realignment being conducted throughout the Army and the strategy for the Army of the 1990s: a small but rapidly deployable, ready, CONUS-based force. If the Army deploys without a Rear Detachment doctrine, it will repeat the problems of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. By addressing this critical issue, today's smaller, contingency-oriented force will be totally ready to face the challenges it must be prepared for in the future.

During the course of my research, I examined five different unit Rear Detachments, as well as a variety of publications which resulted from ODS/DS. In the absence of
doctrine, the units evolved into similar missions, organizations, and functions. The available literature examined on the subject of Rear Detachments further substantiates the commonality of experience shared by the five units. Each unit had the same goal, similar ways and means of obtaining that goal, and the same endstate. The fact that so many different units responded to the "ad hoc" but nonetheless real mission in the same way proves that the problems Rear Detachments were created to solve were systemic. Only Fort Riley had a significantly different organization which is addressed in more detail later. A viable need for doctrine has been established.

The same evidence that identifies a doctrinal requirement for Rear Detachments, based on their common mission and response, also describes the organization and functions which should be included in a doctrinal publication. All Rear Detachments, regardless of the level at which they were organized, prioritized their mission requirements in this order: provide family support, provide support to the deployed force in terms of personnel administration and logistics, provide security and accountability of Army as well as personal property, and conduct redeployment/transition operations. CONUS units also responded to the requirement to assist in mobilization of Reserve Component forces.
Guidance exists, in the form of technical manuals and Army regulations, for all of the mission areas except family support. However, there is no cohesive doctrine for Rear Detachments that incorporates the various pieces of guidance into one reference manual. The most difficult portion of the Rear Detachment mission, yet the one with the least guidance, is the mission of providing family support.

The primary focus of battalion and brigade Rear Detachments should be the Family Support mission. The Army has historically based the requirement to establish a Rear Detachment on that mission. Furthermore, the research has established that units who established Rear Detachments at battalion level provided the best family support. Why? As stated in the introduction to this thesis, the Rear Detachment is the link between the families and the deployed unit, as well as to the various support agencies available. The family members will go to the unit for assistance because of that link and because they want to seek help at the level where they feel most comfortable. It was particularly illuminating to see that the Army Research Institute's findings were that family members, in fact, reported that their best support came from the Family Support Groups, followed closely by the support they received from Rear Detachments. That fact confirms that the family members must feel comfortable with the organization in order to seek and obtain assistance. Family Support Groups were also
established at the lowest level possible. Many units had company and even platoon support groups and chains of concern.

The Army has committed itself to taking care of families. This commitment is never more important than when the service members are deployed. Generally, service members have demonstrated that they are responsible for and capable of taking care of their own families while in garrison. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm demonstrated that it was family member volunteers who were instrumental to the Army's capability of providing family support.

The role of Family Support Groups, and specifically, the contribution of the thousands of volunteer spouses to the family support mission can not be overestimated or even, perhaps, fully appreciated. It is more than probable that volunteers will come forward again in future deployments to provide valuable assistance in this area. This belief does not obviate the fact however, that it is the U.S. Army who is primarily responsible for family support.

Too much reliance by Rear Detachments or even installations on family member volunteers can cause as many problems as it solves. Volunteers are not trained or provided resources. Many of the Rear Detachments' problems were complicated by overzealous volunteers who "burned out." Many wives were resentful of the fact that they are
"expected" to volunteer to the utmost of their capabilities due to their husband's duty position within the unit, especially senior officer and NCO wives. Although the Army trains its leaders over many years, spouses of commanders receive only one week at the Pre-Command Course at Fort Leavenworth where they are told what is "expected" with regard to assisting with family support but are not really trained in the required skills. Training for NCO wives is also lacking. The wives of Command Sergeants Major are invited to Fort Leavenworth for the one week course also and that is the extent of their "training." XO, S-3, and company commanders wives receive no training at all - they learn on the job only.

The family support program within a unit is, predominantly, a program created just prior or immediately after a unit deploys, and then disbanded upon the unit's redeployment. This process is essentially too little, too late. Units paid a heavy price in the family support area because they were not prepared in advance to deal with the variety and complexity of problems that arose during ODS/DS. Units were purely reactionary. Family support programs in general are mainly dependent on the participation of the commander or executive officer's wife as well as on her personality. There is no stability from command to command. The conclusion from the literature
review is that a structured Department of the Army directed, command supported program is needed. The role of volunteers, while still encouraged, should be better defined and less critical to the success of Rear Detachments.

One other predominant theme in the literature reviewed is the Rear Detachment personnel selection criteria. The recommendation is unanimous that the Rear Detachment commander, at whatever level, must be selected based on maturity and experience, not nondeployability. Additionally, senior NCOs were felt to be key to the successful accomplishment of the Rear Detachment mission. Also, personnel who work in the Family Support arena must be dedicated to and sensitive to the needs of Army families. To ensure Rear Detachments will be capable of performing the other elements of the mission, manning with personnel of the right grade, specialty, aptitude, and attitude must be given priority.

The remaining elements of the overall mission statement compete with the ability of a battalion or brigade Rear Detachment to provide quality family support. In addition, Rear Detachments at battalion and brigade are not provided resources for the remaining elements of their mission statement. Yet, Rear Detachments will inevitably be expected to perform these additional functions in future deployments.
There is a doctrinal requirement for Rear Detachments. Battalions and brigades should have the stand-alone mission of Family Support, performed by three or four person "Family Support Teams." Rear Detachments should be organized at separate brigade or installation level. They have the resources and can ensure appropriate manning to ensure accomplishment of the remaining Rear Detachment functions through centralization. The separate brigade or installation should also provide the overall umbrella for the Family Support Teams.

Special care and attention must be dedicated to the process of Family Support Team personnel selection. The extremely high stress nature of the Family Support Team duty demands that maturity and experience be key factors in the selection criteria. In addition, a Family Support training program must be established at installation level. Normal military training will prepare officers and NCOs for duty with the Rear Detachment.

Finally, the Army, like society, is extremely dependent on the participation of volunteers. Problems arise, however with regard to roles, training, and resourcing of volunteers in the area of Family Support when a formal program acknowledging the relationship does not exist.
Recommendations

This portion of Chapter Five consists of two parts. Recommendations for a doctrinal publication on the Rear Detachment mission, organization and functions is the first part. Included are suggestions for manning and training a Rear Detachment and are, essentially, areas for future study. The second part will consist of recommendations on how to improve the Army’s Family Support Program.

Part One

Mission. The doctrinal mission of a Rear Detachment, whether organized at installation or separate brigade level should be:

Provide family support; provide combat service support to deployed forces to include personnel services; provide property accountability of Army and soldiers' personal property; provide support to the installation, to include mobilization support; provide redeployment and transition operations.

This mission statement serves to focus on the families while not neglecting the many other
responsibilities expected of Rear Detachments. The question is, how can a Rear Detachment best organize to accomplish this mission?

**Organization.** Based on the research and my subsequent conclusions, the optimal Rear Detachment should be organized using the Fort Riley Installation Deployment Support Plan as the model. This serves to remove soldier support, installation support, and property responsibilities from the battalions and leaves the mission of family support primarily to the battalion "Family Contact Teams," with the installation providing backup as needed. By pooling all stay-behind personnel and consolidating them into provisional companies, the Fort Riley Rear Detachment was assured of having sufficient assets in terms of personnel to centralize all other Rear Detachment missions.

As LTC Southerland's experience illustrates, consolidating resources is also possible with a separate brigade. He had sufficient personnel and ensured command and control by consolidating them into one provisional company. Had LTC Southerland received the installation support that Fort Riley provided, he would not have experienced the difficulties he reported in the S-1 (personnel administration) and S-3 (training) areas. When
installations are not able to assume the mission of Rear Detachment, a doctrinal publication should task separate brigades for performance of the Rear Detachment mission, ensuring that appropriate resources are therefore allocated and left behind. Shown on the next pages are the Rear Detachment organization charts recommended.
FIGURE 8. Installation Rear Detachment
FIGURE 9. Separate Brigade Rear Detachment Organization
By organizing in this fashion and at the installation level whenever possible and prudent, the time lag between organization and efficiency should be reduced to days, rather than the weeks, or even months as was experienced by the remaining four units. The time lag impact can not be measured in quantifiable terms, but using 11th ADA Brigade for an example, they had been in operation three months when they were forced to reorganize due to the tremendous backlog of family support problems. One can imagine the stress experienced by some of the families as well as the well-intentioned Rear Detachment organizations which had tried to assist them.

All five Rear Detachments were effective, i.e. they accomplished the mission they were either assigned or they derived. It is evident that of the five units, however, Fort Riley was by far the most efficient organization. They had the resources in terms of both budget and manpower, they had the right technical experts, to include the AG, DOL, and DEH; and they had the leadership: from the installation commander who was already in place, down through the headquarters commandant and the provisional company commanders, to the brigade and battalion unit contact teams. It is strongly recommended that the Fort Riley Installation Deployment Support Plan be adopted as the guide for a doctrinal publication on Rear Detachments.
Functions. The functions of the staff within a Rear Detachment are broad in scope. In other words, the Rear Detachment staff must be prepared to support the deployed force as well as the Rear Detachment soldiers, continue base operations and sustainment programs, and plan and conduct mobilization operations. As was stated in Chapter Four, various doctrinal and reference manuals exist on each of these functions in general, although some modifications are being made due to other after action reports from ODS/DS. What is needed is an overall manual for Rear Detachments which consolidates these "pieces" and adds the manner in which the installation and MTOE units should accomplish the family support mission.

Manning. There are two potential areas for future study which relate to manning the Rear Detachments. One concerns the use of Reserve Component officers and soldiers and the second is the modular concept, currently in use by U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) and being examined by the U.S. Army Adjutant General Corps.

Using selected personnel from the Reserve Components to fill critical positions in Rear Detachments or Family Contact Teams is a strong candidate for further study. Not all units can leave back the personnel needed to perform the various missions, whether at installation level or at separate Brigade level. There are already Reserve and
National Guard units who are designated to deploy to CONUS installations to assume the duties of deployed Personnel Service, Finance, Maintenance, and Military Police Companies, to name a few. That selected officers, NCOs and soldiers with required specialties or MOS's could fill in other "holes" left by a deployed force is an area worthy of further analysis.

LTC Southerland felt that the Rear Detachment Commander should come from the unit. Logic also dictates that Family Contact Team personnel should also come from the unit wherever possible. However, not all units can leave behind the headquarters company commander, or the assistant S-3, for example, without a serious degradation of the deployed unit's ability to do its mission. If Reserve Component personnel could be available and therefore, trained, unit and installation familiarity would be assured. There is a great deal of potential in the overall concept.

The modular concept is currently under study by the AG School with regard to splitting the assets and/or the functions of the Personnel Service Company to ensure support for the deployed force as well as the CONUS-Rear or Theater Rear. This concept is a candidate for future study regarding manning a separate brigade Rear Detachment. It is generally true that "everyone wants to deploy" and no one willingly stays behind" with the women and children." One
of the greatest stress factors on those who stayed behind was guilt from not being deployed to Southwest Asia. We are all professionals and we wanted to go do the job we had been trained to do. If nothing else, ODS/DS has proven that the personnel who supported ODS/DS from garrison were just as critical to the overall success of the operation. But the problem remains. How do you staff a Rear Detachment when you must do it with internal organization assets, and how do you train this concept?

My recommendation for staffing a Rear Detachment is to use the modular approach. Once the separate brigade commander has determined who the Rear Detachment Commander will be, each brigade and battalion must examine their staff sections to determine who will remain with the Rear Detachment, and who will be designated as the Family Contact Team. Non-deployability should not be the only factor in designation. As has previously been mentioned, MOS is important, but so is attitude.

A Deployment Support Plan must be drafted with responsibilities under a consolidated Brigade Rear Detachment clearly defined. Likewise the mission of the Family Contact Teams at battalion level must be so defined. Then, the unit must train under this concept every time the unit deploys, to include National Training Center rotations and local training exercises. Inclusion of this concept in a
doctrinal manual would contribute to unit cohesion, i.e., this is the way all separate brigades will prepare for combat. It would somewhat alleviate the "guilt" from the soldiers who are chosen for the Rear Detachment mission and the resentment from those who will deploy.

Part Two
Recommendation for improving the Army's Family Support Program.

I have examined in some detail the U.S. Navy Family Ombudsman Program. While I am not an expert, I do feel qualified to present some recommendations to the Army leadership on changes we should make in the Army's program. I base these recommendations on the Navy's program for several reasons. First, it is a commander's program. Secondly, it is extremely responsive to the needs of families. Third, it requires training. Fourth, it is provided resources, although not as comprehensively as I feel it should be. Finally, it is a full-time program. It ensures that family concerns are dealt with routinely, eliminating the "surge" in family problems that results when Army units deploy, and the subsequent increase in stress upon families and the units and agencies set up to help them.
The Army does not have a full time Family Support Program. The Army has several agencies which certainly have done a great deal for families, such as Army Community Service, Army Emergency Relief, the Army Family Advocacy Program and the Red Cross. However, there is no overall agency responsible for family support, including the DPCA, despite its great efforts. Family Support, in order to truly succeed, must originate at the unit level, where the families feel a link to the organization. The installation is too remote, too impersonal, and lacks the loyalty which can be provided by a unit family support program. Merely providing resources to ACS or DPCA in the form of more people or dollars is not the answer.

I believe the Navy Family Ombudsman Program is an excellent concept, but I do understand that the Army is not the Navy. Its mission, organization, and functions are completely different. The Army was never expected to deploy as often or as completely as the Navy does routinely. This helps to explain why, until recently, Family Support has received little emphasis in the Army. The new strategy for the U.S. Army, however, requires all CONUS-based forces to be rapidly deployable. All active forces are essentially contingency forces. That privilege is no longer delegated to just one Corps. If the Army truly wants a rapid deployment capability, it needs to address the issue of full time Family Support. With a program similar to the Navy's
emplaced, command directed, command supported, and fully provided resources, the Army will actually be the rapid response force called for by our new strategy. As a direct result, families will be more self-sufficient.

I recommend that the Army implement an ombudsman program in the immediate future, but go one step further than the Navy. A program this important to overall Army readiness should be fully provided resources. The ombudsman should be a paid position, not just one where expenses are reimbursed. Selection criteria should be stringent but should encourage commanders to select personnel who are innovative and who will focus on making improvements.

One of the biggest problems reported during ODS/DS was the incredible dependency of some family members on the Army to take care of their every need. Some actually believed that the Army was responsible for taking the family car to the repair shop, and providing alternate transportation in the meantime! The Army Family Support Program needs a new slogan. We need to get away from implying that "the Army Takes Care of its Own" to "the Army Helps Families Care for Themselves." What really happened during ODS/DS was that the Army helped families care for one another with a lot of positive results. The volume and quality of volunteers was heartwarming. Unfortunately, a lot of stress, burnout, and resentment resulted as well.
Adopting a full-time, command directed, family support program will give families an information center at the unit level where and when it is most needed. It will keep the command informed of families with special needs and keep the families informed of unit activities, to include deployments. Consequently, the next time the unit deploys, the Rear Detachment or Family Contact Teams are not overwhelmed by the sheer volume and complexities of family problems.

When training is required, the unit is assured that a standard is being attained and maintained. The training should not be just for the personnel hired or appointed as ombudsmen. Each military unit should appoint on orders the Family Support Team which will stay back when the unit deploys. Extensive training should be required and provided by the Army for this extremely important program. Family Support is the primary responsibility of the Family Support Team and the installation/separate brigade Rear Detachment WHEN THE UNIT IS DEPLOYED. The personnel selected for this mission need the appropriate tools to ensure successful accomplishment of that mission.

To be successful, the Family Support Program must be a commander's program. Commanders need to be trained in family support, if not at the Pre-Command Course, then at
the various installations. Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy, needs to incorporate the requirement for a full time Family Support Program which finally removes the expectation that senior officers' wives must run the family support group. It should put the responsibility for the program squarely on the shoulders of the commander, not his spouse. The commander's role and responsibilities for the full time program need to be well defined and adhered to.

Summary

The Army is an organization of truly dedicated people who achieved another success story during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Unfortunately, now that the war is over, and a year has passed, it appears that many among the Army's key leaders have forgotten the importance of the lessons learned on the home front. While concentrating on rewriting doctrine in other areas and experiencing a major drawdown of forces, few of these leaders appreciate or remember the impact of the Army family on the overall readiness and morale of a soldier and his/her unit. Not only do soldiers perform better when their families are "taken care of," but Army programs which promote self-sufficiency in will foster a families with an extremely positive attitude towards the Army.
When soldiers are called upon for the next Desert Storm, we can have an Army that is a rapid response, formidable fighting force. Or we can have an Army so rife with family problems that units are combat ineffective. Family problems grew in volume and severity in direct proportion to the length of the deployment in Southwest Asia, and although exact statistics are not available, Rear Detachments ranks swelled with soldiers who returned due to family problems. (Fort Riley reported an increase in Rear Detachment personnel strength from 600 to 1200 soldiers. Included in that figure are incoming personnel who arrived in the unit too late to be deployed to SWA but the main reason reported for the increase was returnees.) We can count ourselves extremely fortunate that the war with Iraq was over so quickly. The longer the deployment, the more families fell apart or fell into crisis.

Today's Army will only be able to retain the very best soldiers. We can only do that by ensuring that the families are also the best the U.S. Army can help them to be. A full-time Family Support program at unit level is the solution.
APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR INSTALLATION REAR DETACHMENT COMMANDER

1. How was the Rear Detachment formed in your brigade, i.e. who were the players and decision makers?

2. At what point in the deployment sequence did it become active?

3. How were you selected to command the Rear Detachment?

4. With respect to the organization chart provided in the MMAS Proposal, how was your organization the same or different and why?

5. How was your mission derived and how long was your organization operating before it, in your opinion, became efficient? How often did your mission change or new mission were added?

6. If you had an individual designated for family support, what was his mission and what problems did he have in performing that mission?

7. Did you use battalion Rear Detachment Commanders and if so, what were their ranks? Were they the right ranks or did having personnel too junior increase your workload?

8. Who was your rater after the Brigade Commander deployed? Did that cause any problems for you?

9. What transportation problems did you have? Were you able to use NTV's to facilitate family support?

10. Briefly describe your mission by phase (Pre-deployment, Deployment, redeployment) to include family support, assistance to deployed unit, support to the installation, and any other related areas?

11. How much of your mission should or could have been performed by the installation staff and should be addressed in future installation mission statements?

12. What efforts are underway at Fort Huachuca in the area of Rear Detachment SOPs or installation regulations to preclude the type of problems you were presented with during your tenure?
13. How would you compare the stress of commanding a Rear Detachment with your current job as a signal battalion commander?

14. In your opinion, what should be done to prevent Rear Detachment experiences such as you had from becoming the norm? What level of the Army should solve these problems?

15. Do we need a doctrinal manual on the mission, organization and function of a Rear Detachment or is this strictly an SOP issue at installation or unit level? Why?

16. What is your position on staffing of Rear Detachments coming from the Reserve Component? Could the Rear Detachment commander be a Reserve? How would this impact on the Rear Detachment's effectiveness? (how does knowledge of the unit personnel, installation peculiarities, etc get transmitted? Is this critical or can this information be rapidly assimilated?) How many personnel should come from the actual unit? How can this concept be trained?

17. If in future conflicts, Rear Detachment personnel must come "out of hide" how would you staff the Rear Detachment and who would command it? Please discuss this at battalion and brigade level. How would we train this? Could units ever overcome the mentality that the best people are not the ones left back? What would the impact of this be on unit cohesion and self-esteem of those designated as the Rear Detachment in a peacetime environment? How much, in your opinion, would the unit's ability be degraded in combat by providing an efficient Rear Detachment organization from organic personnel?

18. How critical were the family support volunteers to your ability to provide support to family members? Please elaborate. Can we continue to count on volunteerism to this extent? Should the Army have provision for childcare/transportation reimbursement to selected volunteers?

19. What were some of the biggest problems experienced by your and/or your organization during any or all of the phase of ODS/DS?

20. Would you look forward to commanding another Rear Detachment? Why or why not? What would you do differently if you were tasked to command another Rear Detachment?
APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR INSTALLATION REAR DETACHMENT COMMANDER

1. How were the Rear Detachments formed at your installation, i.e. who were the players and decision makers? What levels were Rear Detachments formed, and why?

2. At what point in the deployment sequence did they become active?

3. Was any selection criteria established at installation/division level for command of Rear Detachments?

4. With respect to the organization chart provided in Chapter One, how were your organizations the same or different and why?

5. How was your mission, and the unit Rear Detachment missions derived and how long was your organization operating before it, in your opinion, became efficient. How often were new missions added?

6. If you had an individual designated for family support, what was the mission and what problems were experienced in performing that mission?

7. Did you use battalion Rear Detachment Commanders and if so, what were their ranks. Were they the right ranks or did having personnel too junior increase your workload, or the workload of higher headquarters Rear Detachments?

8. Who was your rater after the Division deployed? What was the chain of command for the Rear Detachments?

9. What transportation problems did you have? Were you able to use NTV's to facilitate family support?

10. Briefly describe your mission by phase (Pre-deployment, Deployment, Redeployment) to include family support, assistance to deployed unit, support to the installation, and any other related areas?

11. How much of your mission should or could have been performed by the installation staff and should be addressed in future installation mission statements?
12. What efforts are underway at Fort Riley in the area of Rear Detachment SOPs or installation regulations to preclude the type of problems you were presented with during your tenure?

13. How would you compare the stress of commanding a Division/installation Rear Detachment with your job as the garrison commander?

14. In your opinion, what should be done to prevent Rear Detachment experiences such as you had from becoming the norm. What level of the Army should solve these problems?

15. Do we need a doctrinal manual on the mission, organization and functions of a Rear Detachment or is this strictly an SOP issue at installation or unit level? Why?

16. What is your position on staffing for brigade and below Rear Detachments coming from the Reserve Component? Could the Rear Detachment Commander be a Reservist? How would this impact on the Rear Detachment's effectiveness? (How does knowledge of the unit personnel, installation peculiarities, etc. get transmitted? Is this critical or can this information be rapidly assimilated?) How many personnel should come from the actual unit? How can this concept be trained?

17. If in future conflicts, Rear Detachment personnel must come "out of hide" how would you staff the Rear Detachment and who would command it? Please discuss this at battalion and brigade level. How would we train this? Could units ever overcome the mentality that the best people are not the ones left back? What would the impact of this be on unit cohesion and self-esteem of those designated as the Rear Detachment in a peacetime environment? How much, in your opinion, would the unit's ability be degraded in combat by providing an efficient Rear Detachment organization from organic personnel?

18. How critical were the family support volunteers to your ability to provide support to family members? Please elaborate. Can we continue to count on volunteerism to this extent? Should the Army have provisions for childcare/transportation reimbursement to selected volunteers?

19. What were some of the biggest problems experienced by you and/or your organization during any or all of the phases of ODS/DS?
20. Would you look forward to commanding another Rear Detachment? Why or why not? What would you do differently if you were tasked to command another Rear Detachment?

21. Much has been written about the Army doing "too much" for family members and encouraging dependency rather than self-sufficiency. What is your opinion on this and was that your experience at Fort Riley?
APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR FAMILY SUPPORT GROUP LEADERS

Demographics

Age of spouse
Number of years as Army spouse
Number of family separations due to deployment of service member (an exercise or conflict such as Reforger, NTC, Just Cause, Desert Storm, i.e. a deployment of three weeks or more)

1. When your spouse was deployed, was there a Rear Detachment in place?

2. What was the rank of the Rear Detachment commander?

3. On the average, how many other soldiers were left back to assist the Rear Detachment commander?

4. What did the Rear Detachment "expect" of the spouses, especially the senior NCO and officers' spouses, in terms of family support assistance?

5. It has been reported in numerous after action reports from DS/DS that if the senior officer's spouse did not participate in family support groups and/or head up the chain of concern, that the family support group or chain of concern did not function effectively. What has been your experience on this?

6. Is it still prevalent among senior officers spouses (and some senior NCO spouses) that if they did not participate in family support groups/chains of concern, that it would "reflect" derogatorily on their spouses and for this reason they "volunteer" their services even though they would prefer not to? What has been your experience on this?

7. The U.S. Navy has a program called the Family Ombudsman Program whereby a volunteer spouse (rank of spouse immaterial) is designated the Ombudsman for the command, whether company, battalion or brigade level. This individual is charged with the responsibility of being the link between the command and the family members. It is a position to which she (or he!) is appointed in writing after being interviewed and accepted for the position by the commander and trained. Although not paid, she is supported by the command in terms of an office, typing assistance e, supplies, etc. She attends meetings with the command group and the installation.
ombudsman and is the advocate for family problems of all types, from spouse abuse to financial problems to receiving poor service at the hospital. She is required to keep the command group informed and to be a source of information for the families as well. When the unit deploys, she merely continues her job, only now she interfaces with the Rear Detachment commander. The officers and other spouses are "relieved" of their "responsibility" and are free to volunteer their services to assist the Ombudsman if they so desire (or not). You may, by now, be saying cynically and understandably, sure. Those spouses, especially the senior officers spouses still have to volunteer whether they want to or not. According to my Navy classmates, there is much less pressure on them to do so. Many of the spouses are "available" if the Ombudsman needs assistance but are not active in the business of family support.

What is your opinion of this program? Would it work for the Army? Would the senior offices and/or NCO spouses still be expected to volunteer as much as they have in the pass? Does the Army have the right to continue to get "two for the price of one" in their command "teams"? Would the other spouses support the Ombudsman if she were a junior enlisted spouse? Would the Ombudsman's spouse have to be in the unit in order for her to have credibility or could a retiree's spouse, for instance, do the job? (If the Ombudsman is not satisfying the needs of the command, she can be replaced at will by the commander).

8. On the subject of Rear Detachments and their role, after action reports from DS/DS revealed that there was a great deal of confusion of roles between the Rear Detachment and the Family Support Group. Can you relate any examples from your experience where this happened and a family member subsequently suffered undue stress?

9. Can the majority of problems experienced by family members during their spouses' deployments be resolved by the installation agencies such as ACS, Red Cross, AER, Family Advocacy Program, etc?

10. What is the lowest level (company, battalion, brigade, division) Rear Detachments are needed and why?

11. Generally speaking, what was your biggest source of stress during your spouses' deployment, other than worry about your spouse and loneliness? (For example, financial, communications difficulties with your deployed spouse, problems with children, transportation, etc.)
12. DS/DS was the first deployment where spouses could talk to their deployed soldiers via telephone on a fairly frequent basis every week or every other week or so. Did this help reduce your stress or add to it?

13. Did spouses in your units/family support groups worry more if they didn't receive as many or as frequent calls as other spouses in their group?

14. Should the Army continue to provide long distance commercial communications during deployments?

15. Did having this type of communications add to or reduce the number of rumors at your installation?

16. Did the majority of spouses stay in the local area or go "home" during deployments?

17. Did the spouses who returned "home" stay in touch with the family support group and have access to the same information?

18. How reliable was the Rear Detachment in providing information to the families? Was there another agency that could have or did provide better information to the families?

19. Does the Army live up to the slogan: "The Army Takes Care of Its Own." Why or why not?

20. Does the Army encourage dependency or self-sufficiency by family members during deployments? What can the Army change with regard to taking care of families or encouraging self-sufficiency?

21. Does the Army currently rely too much on volunteers to assist other spouses during deployments? Explain.

22. If the Army continues to rely on volunteers during deployments, would being recompensated in terms of transportation and child care expenses for hours of volunteers service, to include training time, make you more inclined to volunteer?
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