THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN FUTURE CRISSES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

ROBERT A.C. BERTHOLEE, MAJ, FA
ROYAL NETHERLANDS ARMY

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1992

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
The role of European security institutions in future crises

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Today, four security institutions are in existence in Europe: NATO, the EC, the WEU, and CSCE. Analysis of their histories and their current plans reveals that neither of those institutions in its present form meets the requirements for the future.

In its conclusion the study presents a possible security structure, build around the EC with NATO providing the military component. As the EC evolves into a true European Union though, the WEU will gradually replace NATO. CSCE will not only provide a platform for fundamental discussions on security, but it will also link the USA and Europe.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN FUTURE CRISIS

by MAJ ROBERT A.C. BERTHOLEE, RNLA, 138 pages.

This study examines the possible role of European security institutions in future crises, in relation to the ongoing changes in Europe. The study outlines the security environment, explaining typical European interests and the need to defend these through a European oriented security structure. Based on the main concern, i.e., the unstable situation in Central and Eastern Europe, the study identifies crisis management as a critical capability. Therefore, the study discusses some basic rules for effective crisis management.

Today, four security institutions are in existence in Europe: NATO, the EC, the WEU, and CSCE. Analysis of their histories and their current plans reveals that neither of those institutions in its present form meets the requirements for the future.

In its conclusion the study presents a possible security structure, build around the EC with NATO providing the military component. As the EC evolves into a true European Union though, the WEU will gradually replace NATO. CSCE will not only provide a platform for fundamental discussions on security, but it will also link the USA and Europe.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

As the European Community heads toward the new milestone of a single market by the end of 1992, we enter a revolution of relations in the West, perhaps ultimately as important strategically as the revolution taking place in the East. It is no accident that Europeans are contemplating greater West European cohesion in the security field, even while preserving the vital transatlantic framework.¹

A changing world...

Until some two years ago, Western-European security thinking focused almost exclusively on a possible East-West confrontation: the United States and the other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the one side, the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) on the other. Ironically, this situation, in which NATO dominated European thoughts on security, has been reassuring for several reasons. The potential enemy and its capabilities were known and so was the approximate location of the battlefield; thus the future battlefield could be, and actually was shaped and prepared extensively. Since the available intelligence-gathering
assets enabled NATO to keep a close tab on the enemy, the European countries could ascertain that their weapons systems, equipment and organizations matched those of their opponents. To make up for the WTO’s superiority in numbers and eventually to counter Soviet nuclear capabilities, NATO also provided Western Europe’s formal link with the nuclear arsenal of the USA. Because of the relative security and stability in this two-power-block system, the chances of an attack by the Soviet Union alone or with the WTO countries, were considered very remote.

The changes in Eastern Europe were at first exemplified in the accomplishment of the INF-treaty in December 1987 and in the unilateral force reductions announced by the Soviet Union. Later these changes, accelerated by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, finally wrecked the stable system that NATO and the WTO, nolens volens, had been providing. The Berlin Wall seems to have been the catalyst for a sequence of events that led, among other things, to the disintegration and the formal disbandment of the WTO, to the break-up of the Soviet Union and to the outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia. In the wake of these developments several European countries, nations and organizations are trying to establish or reestablish their position. Outside Europe, the shift in the global balance of power has set off struggles for local and regional power. It is arguable, for instance, that Iraq’s attempt to seize regional power in
Southwest Asia would not have occurred, had it not been for the events in Europe. Events in Yugoslavia and Southwest Asia illustrate graphically the fact that the developments in Europe have had severe consequences already, both regionally and worldwide. Conceivably, they will have even more effect in the future. Such processes of change and development will almost certainly endanger the vital national interests of one or more European states. Prior to and parallel with these events, the United States has emphasized repeatedly that Europe should be more committed to its own security, both politically and financially. Although Europe does not really exist as a political entity, the point is well taken. Indeed, the combined and focused efforts of the different countries could enable Europe to deal with crises both local and afar. Europe should be able to handle its own security without relying too heavily on support by the United States of America. However, there are as yet no provisions that can turn Europe's economic, political and military potential into a truly effective instrument for crisis management.

This study, therefore, will try to determine whether Europe can develop an effective security-structure and exploit its potential for crisis management. Since a simple "yes" or "no" to this primary question would satisfy neither the author nor the reader, it also will indicate the requirements, the possibilities and the limitations of such a
structure. The study will try to identify the problems that will arise if a European security-structure can be established. Finally, some possible practical applications of the findings will be considered.

... another approach?

In search of an answer to this complicated problem, the first thing to ask is, whether an overarching security structure in Europe really is necessary. After all, Europe is no more and no less than a number of sovereign nations that have their own security-policies, each with its own interests and objectives. The nations have their own distinct languages, their own currencies and their own specific cultures. They just happen to be on the same continent. As it was in the past, this "living apart together" could still be reason for dispute or even armed conflict. Although not explored in extenso, the study will briefly show that, at a closer look, the nations have many things in common. Their national interests currently are interdependent to the extent that endangering the vital interests of one nation automatically threatens the vital interests of other nations. Thus, by concluding that a common European security-policy and the provisions to implement that policy are necessary, it will prove the primary question to be appropriate. Now the subordinate questions that are essential to answer the primary question, can be addressed.
A basic question is what the requirements are for a structure (or an organization) to be effective in crisis management. The answer to this question is probably more complicated than it seems at first sight. First, the study will present a set of general rules and principles that apply to all crises, no matter where they occur or what their level of intensity. Then it will determine what could be considered a crisis in the European context. To do so, it will identify (in a generic way) both vital interests and possible threats to those interests. Next the study will show what means are required to deal with the identified crises, given the set of general rules and principles. By identifying the relation between the elements of a crisis, the threat and the means to respond to the crisis, a rough outline of the required structure will be established. Examples will tie this rather theoretical approach to the real world, preferably in Europe. The Yugoslavian civil war and the way it has been dealt with by the European Community (EC), will play an important part in this.

To refine the outlined structure and adapt it to the specific European environment, one needs to take a closer look at the "living apart together" aspect. In doing this, however, a distinction should be made between the western and eastern parts of Europe. Since 1945, the Western European countries have mutually respected their national sovereignty, and have maintained stable political relationships,
despite their various differences. These differences are still present though, and influence even today the courses of action that these nations choose. They comprise cultural, ethnic or religious matters, as well as other idiosyncrasies. Some of those might have their roots in history as far back as the Middle Ages. Yet, one also can recognize a trend that in some areas the differences are now less reason for dispute than they formerly were. For obvious reasons, the official or unofficial postures of the various governments in Europe will be incorporated as far as possible. Almost by default, the larger nations, i.e., Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy, will be the main actors in this particular part of the study. Germany, which could well be developing as the most important economic power in Europe, will get special attention, although the smaller countries will be examined too. The way the European Community, chaired by the Netherlands and Portugal, handles the civil war in Yugoslavia, should indicate how, and to what extent the various countries can influence the process.

Most of the Eastern European countries are in search for their positions in the international political and economic arena. In the meanwhile they have to deal with severe domestic problems caused by cultural, ethnic or religious conflicts due to artificial national boundaries, as well as the problems caused by their collapsing economies. As said before, this can pose a severe threat to the
vital interests of other countries. On the other hand, those Eastern European countries might want to participate in a European security structure; this might even prove desirable or essential from other nations' points of view. One could even question the feasibility of a European security structure, if not every European country is involved.

The study will not be able to present complete solutions to all the problems it identifies. However, the problems will serve to define the possible weak points in a future European security structure. Each of the existing security organizations in Europe will match only partly with the required security structure. The organizations will be reviewed one by one to see to what extent they match.

The first one to be examined is NATO. Although NATO will match neither de jure nor de facto the desired structure, it can provide elements of security that otherwise cannot be provided. The most obvious, of course, seems to be the link with the nuclear capability of the United States. Even though Great Britain and France possess nuclear weapons, their arsenals could be too limited to be of practical use. A more intangible, but no less important aspect of NATO is the support it renders to the historical bond between Europe and the United States.

The next organization to be discussed, will be the Western European Union (WEU). Initially, this organization does not match the desired structure either. Although the
WEU has both a political and military structure, it lacks an effective command, control and communications structure; only nine European countries participate in the WEU. However, it might be possible to modify the organization along the lines of the desired structure.

The third organization, will be the European Community. This is basically an economic organization. Due to the interrelationship between politics in general and economy, the organization is more and more evolving as a truly political organization. An advantage could be the lack of military history; it might make the EC acceptable to more nations. Although the effectiveness of the EC might show in its handling the Yugoslavian conflict, it is not expected to fit the desired structure completely.

The last organization to look at, is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE has established several confidence and security building measures (CSBM) and has thereby played an important part in Europe's security regime. The strong point of this Conference is the participation of 48 countries, including the neutral and non-aligned ones. The weak point, however, is the lack of consolidated power to enforce the agreements that were negotiated.
**Definitions.**

An *international crisis* is a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe disagreement, involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of escalation to armed conflict.\(^6\)

*Crisis management* includes crisis prevention, the actions taken during a crisis, and conflict management in the early stage of armed conflict. Crisis management can be applied both to internal (national) and to international crises. Nations can manage crises unilaterally, or multilaterally in cooperation with other nations. Crisis management will be discussed more elaborately in chapters III and IV.

For the purpose of this study a *security structure* is the complex of organization, means and procedures that is meant to protect the security and the integrity of its members.

**Limitations.**

The study will use only non-classified sources. By that it will be easier to get access to sources, which is important in relation to the limited timeframe; simultaneously more readers can have access to this study.
Delimitations.

Although the incorporation of Eastern European countries will be considered, the study will concentrate on a security-structure that is primarily sponsored by Western Europe. The purpose is to limit the already broad scope of this study.

Although the Yugoslavian civil war will be an important reference throughout the study, a true case study will not be conducted. Cause and effect of action (or lack of action) in this particular conflict cannot be measured or assessed unequivocally, because the conflict has not ended yet.
Notes


2 On 7 December 1988, in his address to the United Nations, President Gorbachev, announced that the Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce 500,000 troops and 10,000 tanks worldwide, (including the withdrawal of half of the Soviet Union's tanks in Europe), and that it would withdraw from the ATTU-area (Atlantic to the Ural) some 800 combat aircraft and 8,500 artillery systems. Those numbers reflected 10 to 25% of the systems involved.

3 The interests of a nation are considered to be vital when they refer to elements which are essential for the continuation of that nation, or when they involve unique representatives of the standards and values of that nation.


5 Since its conception, the CSCE membership comprised 35 nations. After the unification of Germany the CSCE counted 34 members. In the second half of 1991 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania applied for and obtained membership. Some other newborn nations have applied for and obtained membership also. It can be expected that even more will apply in the near future.

6 This definition is a modified version of the one found in Glenn Snyder, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decisionmaking and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 6.
CHAPTER II

RESEARCH DESIGN

General

This presentation of the research design serves two purposes. On the one hand, it will provide the reader with a map of this study. On the other hand it will direct the thought processes and should prevent diversions.

The previous chapter introduced the primary research question: Can Europe develop an effective security-structure to use its potential in crisis management? This introduction already gave away much of the research questions and the research design. Therefore, the present chapter will only briefly restate the subordinate questions that must be answered. Furthermore, it will present the method and instruments to be used.

Questions...

The subordinate questions are supportive to the primary research questions. Some are divided in subordinate questions themselves. The questions are:

Is an overarching European security-structure at all necessary?
What are the requirements for a structure to be effective in crisis management?
- what are the general principles?
- what is a crisis in a European context?
- what means are required to respond to the crisis?

How does the current European environment influence a future security-structure?
- what is the role of cultural, ethnic, religious and other differences?
- what are the official or unofficial national postures?

Can any of the existing organizations in Europe be modified to fit the ideal security-structure? If so, how?

... and answers!

By the nature of the questions it will be clear that a mainly qualitative approach is required, as opposed to a quantitative. The research method will consist of three elements.

The first element will be the review of literature. Since this study deals with a subject that is still very much in the process of developing, it is to be expected that little literature is available that addresses the primary question as a whole. There is, however, an abundant supply of literature that deals with the subordinate questions.
separately or, at least with parts of them. This literature comprises mainly books and reports; it will be reviewed in chapter III.

The second element is observation. The situation in Europe keeps on changing with tremendous speed. That does not only affect international relations inside and outside Europe, but it also might change the validity, and thereby the useability of reviewed literature. This observation is based upon the author’s personal experience, daily newspapers, television, national up-dates, etc. From an academic point of view, the weakness of this particular element is that not all observations can be acknowledged properly.

The third element will be analysis and synthesis of the data provided by the literature and the observations. This is the decisive element to answer the research questions. For this one chapter will be dedicated to describe the security environment, i.e. the specific European situation, the need for a security structure, the principles of
crisis management in general, and the application of those in the European situation. Then, separate chapters will be dedicated for each of the four organizations that were identified in the introduction: NATO, WEU, EC, and CSCE.

These chapters will first present a historical overview of the organization. Then its current situation will be considered, as well as its plans for the near future. This provides the input for the analysis of how the organization fits the principles of crisis management in a European context. Based upon this, the weak points and the strong points of the organization can be identified.

In the final chapter the conclusions of each of the preceding chapters will serve to conduct a final analysis. This should answer the primary question: can Europe develop an effective security structure to use its potential in crisis management?
CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Before addressing the research questions in the next chapters, it should be helpful to review what has been written so far on the thesis' subject. The literature review serves as a reference of sources for this study, but at the same time, it enables the reader to check the opinions expressed in this study against the opinions of other authors.

Still, the nature of this particular study severely confines a review due to a limited amount of literature available. As mentioned in chapter I, the events in Europe have accelerated tremendously since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. Even today the developments have not lost much of their momentum. The consequences of this are twofold.

Limited research and limited value

Firstly, the literature on the most recent events regarding the subject mainly consists of articles in daily newspapers and magazines. The research for those articles
presumably has not been as thorough as is usual for publications that were prepared over a longer period. In an absolute sense therefore, these articles are of only limited value.

Regardless, these articles contribute to the study in a valuable way, because they often express the opinion of people who have an immense amount of experience in the matters they write on. If nothing else, they stimulate the thought process and frequently offer a fresh view on a particular event or situation.

**Extensive research and limited value**

Secondly, literature which is based on sound research and which addresses the subject of this thesis integrally, is hard to find. Even the literature that can be found, has only limited value. This needs some further explanation, because at first glance some authors appear to cover the subject thoroughly and extensively.

An example is *Rethinking Security Arrangements in Europe* by Charles Cooper, Keith Crane, Thomas Hirschfeld and James Steinberg.¹ In a Note that was prepared for the U.S. Air Force, the authors recognize that the post-World War II security structure in Eastern Europe has rapidly unraveled. Thus, a key factor in European stability becomes the integration of Eastern Europe into a broader European community. Furthermore, the authors explain that the diminished
Soviet threat means that there will be less of a strategic counterweight to the economic and political strains in US-West European relations. At the same time, a single integrated European market from the British Isles to the borders of the USSR might not be that far-fetched at all.

This leads them to three models of a European security framework, each with the same three objectives: self-determination, stability and independence.² The first model is a modified status quo, in which both NATO and WTO survive. The second model is a one-and-a-half bloc, in which Germany is reunified in NATO, and the WTC is dissolved. In this model the Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and NATO becomes the *de facto* security guarantor of the nominally neutral East European states. The last model is a new security architecture, in which NATO disbands the integrated military command structure, but remains as a political organization and in which CSCE is institutionalized as a forum to resolve security related disputes. In their final assessment of the three models the authors favor the new security framework and emphasize that the United States would still have three missions in that framework: facilitating the return of larger U.S. forces when needed, participating in a multilateral security organization, and out-of-area contingencies from European bases.³

The limited value of Cooper's work is basically caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This
renders the first two models invalid, and simultaneously alters the preferred model for a new structure. Even NATO as the main platform for Western security cooperation becomes disputable, since the authors linked this to a continuing Soviet threat.  

Another element that diminishes the value, is the fact that the authors reasoned mainly from a United States perspective, emphasizing the Eastern European needs for a security structure. Thus, they hardly mention possible Western European interests and underestimate the role that the European Community might play in a new security structure. It might also be the reason for not linking the security structure to out-of-area contingencies, other than those contingencies taken care of by the United States.

A second example is Johan Holst's *Exploring Europe's Future* 5, although the reasons for its limited value differ somewhat because of the different approach that was taken. Holst describes five possible scenario's, which are rooted in present trends, but essentially serve heuristic purposes and do not involve prediction. 6

The first scenario portrays "a Europe of the balance of power," in which a group of principal powers set the stage for a system of shifting alliances. The next scenario depicts Europe with both NATO and WTO remaining in existence, albeit in a modified form. A third scenario shows "a Europe of regions." In this scenario existing structures are
replaced by subregional organizations and groupings that interact and compete. In the fourth scenario, "a Europe of collective security" has developed out of the CSCE, with NATO intact to counterweight the Russian military power. A final scenario depicts a "community Europe," in which the EC forms the core of a confederal Europe comprising rings of states that are connected with the community in varying degrees, with the WEU as the defense component, but with NATO intact.

Although Holst points out some of the weak points of the scenario's, he does not explain how that might influence the probability of occurrence of that scenario. He does describe a short term perspective, in which the current (1990) events and their possible short term consequences are analyzed. Toward the end of his work, Holst tries to tie short term perspective to long term scenarios. It turns out that he favors the Community Europe model, without explicitly revealing his preference or his reasons.

The limited value of Holst's work is again caused by the collapse of WTO and the Soviet Union, which changed the parameters of his analysis of the short term perspective. The analysis itself is thorough, but is necessarily based on a great number of assumptions, many of which have already been proven false. A further weak point is Holst's omission to even mention, let alone analyze the WEU as a possible player in a European security structure. Like Cooper, he
does not really consider out-of-area problems as an important driver for the new European security structure. Credit must be given though for the extensive analysis of all the other phenomena that could have influence on the security framework.

A last example of literature that deals with the question of a European security structure in a more integrated way is *Halt! Who Goes Where?* by John Leech. This work is special in the sense that it is not based on extensive research by the author, but on the results of a conference of experts on foreign policy and security matters. In June 1990 some 40 specialists, diplomats and politicians from Europe and the United States had gathered to exchange their thoughts on the future of NATO. The organizer of the meeting, John Leech, took the ideas, discussed them and tied them together in his latest book.

Leech describes the situation in Europe as it was by September 1990. He offers an interesting point of view, when he recognizes that change in Europe and the world is so speeded up that we begin to see the present only when it is already disappearing. This difficulty in perception serves as an explanation for the great uncertainties in the world today. Leech refers to Gorbachev, Walesa and the Pope's visit to Poland as causes of the 1989 revolution, but also takes history and human rights movements into consideration. Important elements that determine the immediate future are
the German unification (historical reasons), as well as the development of the European Community (role model) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (reassuring factor).

His assessments of the importance of the German unification and of the CSCE as a reassuring factor are easy to follow. His presentation of the EC as a role model, however, needs some explanation. From the Moscow point of view apparently, "... the EC has wrought a profound transformation not only in the standard of living of its members but in the potential threat of any renewed aggression. Its achievement has been to create a reluctant superpower without nationalism, without external ambitions - yet with enough economic power to offer both an example and urgent help for the USSR's problems."9 This point of view is even more interesting now that we have seen the emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Leech does not see either the EC or the CSCE as panaceas for Europe, but he does identify three characteristics of a future security structure: a productive framework for a unified Germany, an end to the bloc system and a pooling of sovereignty. This might lead to a new Concert of Europe, but Europe will still need the US "to put grip in diplomatic handshakes." NATO will remain the most important instrument for that.
Two of those three characteristics might be already in existence. The productive framework, which seems to be a diplomatic way to say that Germany still has to be checked to prevent it from undesired adventures, is provided by the EC and by NATO. The bloc system has virtually ceased to exist since both the WTO and the Soviet Union disintegrated. Leech's pooling of sovereignty, however, is harder to visualize. Leech describes this as overlapping political systems, ordered in a kind of creative instability. Membership may well be random, depending on geography and purpose. With centralism discredited, looser bonds of governance are required. Again according to Leech, it will be clear that this will interfere with what currently is seen as sovereignty.

Leech says that nuclear deterrence is not created by the warheads themselves. In his view, deterrence follows from the belief that nuclear arms might be used in given circumstances and that warlike acts on any scale may provoke a nuclear response. He thinks that this will not change in the post-1989 world. Thus, war, with its implied nuclear component, has become inviable. Thanks to changed intentions and due to limited space, battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe have become obsolete. Europe now has the task to support the democratization of the former totalitarian states and prevent increasing nationalism simultaneously. This requires security, i.e., the prevention of conflict and
protection if necessary. In turn, that requires a higher authority and higher responsibilities.

After describing what NATO is and what it is not, Leech assesses NATO as an instrument to provide that security in the future. At least in the medium term, there will be an important role for NATO. Yet he states that NATO is not homogeneous and that the US had to enforce decisions more than once. He observes that political decisions taken in NATO, often were implemented in other fora, e.g., the North Atlantic Alliance. The representatives to NATO are only responsible to their parliaments. He therefore actually questions NATO’s political importance. The EC, on the other hand, is becoming more important as a political institution. The West European Union could well become the European pillar of NATO. The WEU has its own assembly, but could be linked to the European Parliament and thus become the executive arm of the EC in matters of security and foreign policy.¹⁰

Leech thinks that the only solution to security is integration, now that the bipolar balance of power has disappeared. He claims a shift in the perception of sovereignty. In his view, sovereignty is the defense of national interests, and no country today can defend its interest by itself. He mentions both NATO and the EC as illustrations of this loss of sovereignty. For his new all-European security system, the CSCE might be an option, if only for its member-
ship that includes all European nations but one. Leech predicts a Europe of regions, where national boundaries will be less prominent than regional (e.g., ethnic or geographical defined areas) activities and interests.

The value of this work is limited just as the two previously reviewed works by Cooper and Holst are, mainly due to time related factors. On top of this, Leech' work is somewhat biased due to the objective of the meeting in London, which was to explore the future of NATO in the new Europe, as opposed to the future security of the new Europe. On the other hand, Leech provides a most comprehensive analysis of the forces at work today in Europe and in the world.

More or less explicitly, all of the abovementioned authors agree on one thing: whatever security structure might evolve, its focus will not be on preplanned contingencies, but on the management of various types of crises, which may occur in a rapidly changing world. The literature on crisis management has a more constant value, because it deals with principles in an almost generic environment. Only in hindsight does it touch upon real world situations, when examples are used to support the theory.

Crisis management: a constant value

Literature on crisis management often is about crises in corporations and organizations, which have profit
as their common denominator. Although the basics of managing a crisis will remain the same, there are some specific problems if and when crises occur in the relation between two or more countries. A good insight in crisis management within the context of international relations is given by Winham's *New Issues in International Crisis Management*.  

This work is especially valuable because nine other authors contributed their analyses in their specialty, and because Winham has chosen a staggered approach.

In the first part Winham presents an overview of theory and practice of crisis management. He adopts the definition of international crisis by Glenn Snyder. Although this definition is formally correct in its terminology, two elements in the definition make it less suitable for our study. The assumption that "... the sovereign states are in severe conflict, short of actual war ..." and the mentioning of "... a dangerously high probability of war" leaves the reader with the impression that full scale war is just the next step in a crisis. The reason for this is the connotation of the words "conflict" and "war". In this study therefore, the definition of crisis uses the words "disagreement" and "armed conflict", which can be considered more neutral, to emphasize that a crisis does not start with the use of weapons, and that escalation of a crisis does not always lead to a full scale war right away.
The next step is to define "management" in relation to crises. Again there is the problem of connotation. Winham argues that management implies "... rational, dispassionate, calculating, well considered activity, conducted with judgement...."14 He refers to other authors who introduced the term "crisis diplomacy", which includes not only decision making, as the rational part, but also communication and the art of bargaining. This line of thought focuses on the process that leads to a result. A solution for this problem is to look more at the result itself. Hans Peter Neuhold uses this approach when he says that "... a crisis can be regarded as managed, if its intensity so far has been reduced, that major armed hostilities can reasonably be ruled out."15 This study will take a similar approach to the meaning of management: it is used as a familiar term which includes all rational actions, but which does not rule out emotion, communication or bargaining, as long as it leads to the desired result.

More agreement seems to exist on a set of seven principles of crisis management, that is described after the intellectual exercise over "crises" and "management". The principles are covered one by one and each of them is clarified in the context of a crisis that has occurred in the past. Chapter IV of this study will elaborate on the set of principles.
The second part of Winham's book deals with the relation between the two superpowers. This relation has always been a special one, due to the widespread interests of both powers, the size of their conventional armies and, of course, their nuclear potential. Since the Soviet Union does not exist any more, the direct value of this part is somewhat diminished. It is not presumed that Europe, or any other power for that matter, will ever be in that same particular situation. Still, this part contains some illuminating views on national interests, the relation between the interests of participants in the crisis, and their impact on the actions of the nation involved.

The last part of Winham's work is dedicated to nuclear crisis management and crisis management in a regional context. Although these topics do relate to the study, they will not be addressed extensively.

Remaining literature

Besides the literature on crisis management, there is an abundant supply of literature on the separate topics which relate to the subordinate questions. This literature comprises mainly historically based analyses of NATO, EC, WEU, CSCE or Europe in general. Because of the historical base, the literature retains its value for a longer time. However, the amount of available literature is so extensive, that it would be virtually impossible to review everything
within a reasonable period of time, if at all. Since the history of the various organizations and Europe is not a subject of analysis in this study, and this kind of literature will only be used for background information, it will not be reviewed any further in this chapter.

Even though this literature ages slowly, the study uses only a selection of what is available. The main criterion for selection is year of publication. For instance, a book on NATO that was published before 1965, could be very useful to research a specific part of the historical background, but it would be of less direct value to get an insight into NATO's potential to deal with the present and the future in Europe. Therefore literature will be selected only if published after the arbitrarily chosen year 1985.

Conclusion

Literature for this study can be divided into four main categories: newspapers and magazines as the literature that provides up-to-date information on every related topic; literature considering the current European security integrally; literature on crisis management; and literature presenting background information on Europe and the history of Europe. Each of this categories has its own advantages and disadvantages as far as useability is concerned. The bottom line is that literature on the various subtopics in
this study is abundant, but that hardly any literature has approached the subject integrally.

Within those parameters the literature review in this chapter has not been all inclusive by any means. This notwithstanding, the references made here and further on in the text should be sufficient for the purpose of this study.
Notes


2 Ibid., 24-27.

3 Ibid., 35-36.

4 Ibid., 36.


6 Ibid., 10.


8 The meeting was sponsored by the WEST-WEST AGENDA, a small Euro-American circle that concerns itself with the Atlantic partnership. Presiding this two-day meeting were the former British Minister of Defense, Michael Heseltine, and the former American Secretary of Defense, Frank C. Carlucci.

9 Leech, 3.

10 The relations between the various institutions in Europe as described by Leech will be examined in extensively in the chapters V through VIII.

11 As mentioned in chapter I, CSCE originally comprised 35 nations: the USA, Canada, the U.S.S.R. and all the European nations except Albania.


13 Glenn Snyder, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decisionmaking and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University press, 1977), 6: An international crisis is a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war.

14 Winham, 15.
CHAPTER IV

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

It would be incorrect to think that the war arose accidentally or as the result of the fault of some of the statesmen. Although these faults did exist, the war rose in reality as the inevitable result of the development of the world economic and political forces on the basis of monopoly capitalism.

Joseph Stalin, 1946.1

Introduction

This chapter is vital for the study in the sense that it provides the yardstick against which the existing European security organizations will be measured. It is divided into four major parts. The first part reviews security in Europe. This part in itself is subdivided into: security as a phenomenon; communal interests;2 and the threats against these interests. The second part looks upon the need for a European security structure, and the perception of conflict and crisis in Europe. The third part covers the principles of crisis management in an international environment, and the Atlantic aspects of European security. The fourth and final part synthesizes the previous parts and presents the requirements for the security structure.
Security as a phenomenon.

Security can be described as the freedom from danger and risk, or the freedom from care, anxiety and doubt. Essentially, security has two sides: a physical one and a psychological one. In its physical form security means protection of interests against a tangible force aspiring to interfere with those interests. More psychological is security as the perception of a threat, i.e., what kind of force is trying to interfere with what interests and to what extent could it be successful. Nations and governments deal with both these aspects of security, although the aspects are not always recognizable as separate elements.

It is a safe assumption that nations strive to attain a certain level of prosperity and well-being. It is also reasonable to assume that the more secure a nation feels, the more prosperity and well-being will come within reach, because the perception of security enables concentration on building prosperity. Governments, therefore, want to reinforce and maintain the feelings of security among their citizens. Thus, in their national strategies, governments will name vital interests, identify to what extent those interests are threatened, and explain what actions have been or will be taken to check the threats. At the same time those governments have to make sure that they actually have all the instruments available to pursue or protect the named interests in the light of an identified threat.

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Communal interests

All this shows that interests, threat and perception of security do not just relate, but mutually influence each other. The interests in themselves can be tangible (economic growth), or intangible (cultural values, freedom of religion). It will be clear that common interests are easier to identify in small, homogeneous communities, than in large mixed populations. By the same token, interests are easy to protect in small communities, but they will be harder to safeguard when different communities have intensified their interaction and have developed conflicting as well as mutual interests. The related system of interests, threat and security perception provides an indication of what the security structure of a community should look like. Given this, the first step to confirm the need for a European security structure should be a look at the common European interests and the possible threats against these interests.

The first specific European interest derives from the economic situation. After the Second World War, the countries in Europe have developed an economic interdependence that has gradually expanded over the years. This interdependence is mainly caused by export-import relations, concerning both goods and services, but is also increasingly the result of the merging of companies that seek diversification or enhancement of their positions. Economic relations and interdependence will be stimulated even more by a single
European currency, expected to become available by 1997.\textsuperscript{5} This economic interdependence encourages the convergence of national policies in Europe. At the same time increasing international trade and traffic which accompany closer economic relations, create more and closer cultural interaction.

Although the aforementioned is true in particular for the members of the EC, we can see a similar trend in the other West European countries. The increasing interdependence has stimulated the countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to start negotiations on how to create a European Economic Area (EEA), i.e., how to ensure the integration of EFTA countries in the domestic market post 1992 without having to be a full member of the EC.\textsuperscript{6} It also induced Austria (with 64% of its total exports in 1989-1990 to the EC\textsuperscript{7}) and Sweden to apply for EC membership.

It has already been indicated that economics and national interests are closely linked. Illustrative is the 1991 U.S. National Security Strategy that identified one of the four basic national interests as "a healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad." Elaborating on this, that same strategy document states that national security and economic strength are indivisible.\textsuperscript{8} In analogy the same will apply to what could be called the communal interests and the communal security of a group of
countries in Europe. The unique European character of economically driven interests is perhaps best illustrated by an example from the Cold War, when European countries revolted against an otherwise extremely important partner in security and international relations, the United States. In 1982 the United States Administration saw the Soviet gas pipelines into Europe as a dangerous dependence on the Soviet Union for only a modest gain to domestic economies. The European governments, however, considered the small increase in energy dependence a fair trade-off for significant domestic gains.9

Typical European interests also follow from the collapse of the Soviet system. Though the breakdown virtually annihilated the possibility of a large scale Communist attack on Western Europe, it left Europe in an explosive situation, in which national, ethnic, cultural or religious divergences fuel lingering conflicts. Since the Soviet fall has destroyed the balance of power on the European continent, the only way to create stability, i.e., to prevent the outbreak of these conflicts or at least contain them, seems concerted action by Western Europe.

Actually, the events on the European continent always have had greater significance for Europe than for third parties like the United States, no matter how closely those parties are linked to Europe. In the recent past, Europe faced the certainty of being in the front line should
an armed East-West conflict occur, whereas American (or Soviet) territory would not be involved unless strategic nuclear weapons were used. Today a similar situation exists: if and when regional conflicts escalate and spread out, Europe will be physically involved, while the effects for third parties will only be indirect in most cases. Therefore Europe will have a stronger direct interest in stabilization of the situation in the former Soviet republics or in solving the Yugoslavian situation than other countries like the USA. The contrast between the actions to support the Russian republic taken by Europe on the one hand and the United States on the other hand, is fully in line with this difference in interests.\textsuperscript{10} The European approach to the Yugoslavian conflict, as compared to others, illustrates the concept of unique European interests, but at the same time touches upon another issue, i.e., the unification of Germany.\textsuperscript{11}

The unified Germany can be considered a third example of typical European interests, because it has disturbed the existing balance of power within Western Europe. After all, the unification of Germany entailed more than just rejoining the two parts of what used to be one country. It confronted West Germany with an overnight growth of approximately 16 million (25\%) in population and the addition of roughly 42,000 square miles (44\%) to its territory. It also raised West Germany’s foreign debt from $
500 million to $ 20.6 billion. Less tangible, but no less real, was the psychological victory of a nation that had obtained its primary goal, unification, and that finally would regain full sovereignty again. In particular the latter worries many Europeans. After all, Germany already ranked number one in Europe in GDP and, although its GDP per capita decreased somewhat after 1990, it is still among the higher in Europe. Germany's proven resilience together with its economic potential will probably enable it to overcome the disadvantages of an ill developed eastern part by the end of the century. At the same time, the economic capabilities could facilitate a German political dominance over Europe.

In reality it can not be prevented that one European country dominates other European countries, albeit in a benevolent manner. Nevertheless, it is in the interest of Europe that such a dominance stays within proportions. Seen from this perspective, the European countries will want to make sure that the German dominance in Europe does not transform Germany into a hegemonic power. In this light, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's inaugural to the first all-German parliament on 30 January 1991, could be either reassuring or ominous: "Germany is our fatherland, Europe our future. The nucleus and basis for Europe's integration are to us the European Community which we aim to develop into a European union."
The economic threat

Threats against the abovementioned typical European interests cannot easily be identified as stemming from one particular country or group of countries. Moreover, threat is no longer felt as mainly politico-military, aimed directly at Western Europe, but is perceived as more nebulous, both in origin and in aim. Threats against European interests most probably would also pose threats against the national interests of other, non-European countries. Those countries might react in a different way, due to different perceptions of their interests and the threat.

A threat against European economic interests may originate from many sources. First, there is so called peacetime competition. In this the economies of different countries or groups of countries, compete with each other to produce and sell better, more, and cheaper in order to reinforce the own economic position. Up to certain limits, it is an accepted form of competition, and an economic adversary will not normally be perceived as a serious threat, unless the domestic economy is in severe depression. It has not happened yet in Western Europe, but such an economically based threat perception seems to be emerging in the United States, where Japan is being accused of taking over the American economy at the expense of the Americans.\(^{15}\) Whether the threat is real or only perceived is not important, because the government will have to react one
way or another to satisfy the people. One should keep in mind though that usually the interests of industrialized countries are not served by disturbance or disruption of their markets, be it economically or otherwise. Countering a this particular economic threat, therefore, is often not primarily viewed within the context of a security strategy.

In general, every event that aims to interfere with Europe's economy, is a threat against the economic interests of Europe. Among them, the most dangerous is a country or an organization that assails the core of the European economy in some way, i.e., cut off or vastly reduce Europe's access to resources and especially oil. This type of threat is probably easier for the public to recognize, because it clearly translates into personal costs. The threat can be aimed directly at the European economy or it can be the indirect result of other actions. Regardless, a threat against the economy will not stand alone, but will be part of more encompassing action at the politico-military level. In case of an indirect threat at Europe, it will not be easy to develop a course of action. The events in Southwest Asia are a good example. On 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. The invasion posed no direct threat for either European countries or the United States. Still, all perceived Iraq's action as an indirect threat to their respective economies, due to the possibility that Iraq might continue the attack and seize control of the larger part of the oil fields in
Southwest Asia. While the United States was able to react immediately, credibly and with increasing force by banning all trade with Iraq (2 August), offering to defend Saudi Arabia (3 August) and ordering forces to Saudi Arabia (7 August), the West European countries reacted primarily at the national level (2 and 3 August). When the EC imposed sanctions and an embargo against Iraq on the 4th of August, it was the first coordinated European action. On 14 September the United Kingdom was the first European country to announce its decision to send troops, at a time when the United States had already deployed more than 50,000 troops. As it turned out, the United Kingdom together with France would be the only European countries to send ground troops, although other European countries did contribute with naval and air force assets and personnel. Throughout the development of the Gulf conflict, however, the European contributions would basically be national actions, as opposed to European actions.

For the near future, restricted access to fossil fuel will probably be the only threat to the European economy that could force Europe to enter armed conflict outside the European continent. If this assumption is correct, it indicates where in the world European armed forces might be expected to operate. Still, access to other vital resources could cause severe disagreement between Europe and third powers.
East and Central Europe: instability as a threat

As pointed out, a second major communal interest is stability on the European continent. During more than 40 years after the Second World War, a relative stability was provided through NATO and WTO, basically by maintaining the status quo. The events which eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet system also caused the disintegration of the WTO, thereby taking out one of the elements that contributed to a relatively stable situation in Europe. Equally important is the fact that the events also changed the value of maintaining the status quo ante, i.e., the situation before the collapse. Both from an ideological point of view and for practical reasons, it is no longer desirable to preserve that situation. As the Secretary-General of the NATO expressed it: "He who clings to outdated structures and believes that he can force people into a nation against their will, does not create stability, but causes new tensions."¹⁸

It follows that stability in Europe has gained a new meaning: a certain instability is considered necessary as the inevitable companion of change, but at the same time a minimum stability is required. It is the possibility that this required minimum stability cannot be preserved, which poses a threat to Europe. For a clear understanding of this possibility, some historic background on the Central and
East European area is necessary. This will also explain some of the parameters the current conflict in Yugoslavia.

An appropriate event to start this background review is the Peace of Westphalia (1648), because this peace brought some relative rest in the western part of Europe, and especially settled the religious and political balance within the Holy Roman Empire. In the second half of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth, the Austria-Hungarian empire (on later date together with Russia) and the Ottoman empire fought four major wars in Central Europe. These wars led to numerous changes in the boundaries of Central Europe and brought the same people under different rulers at different times: both parties intervened in Transylvania (1663); Hungary was parted (1664); the Turks advanced as far as Vienna and besieged the city in 1683; and North Serbia, Transylvania and Little Wallachia belonged to either of the empires at certain times. In the nineteenth century especially Wallachia, Moldavia, Bessarabia, Bohemia, Pomerania and Silezia were the scene of armed conflicts in which Austria, Prussia, Poland, Russia and Turkey participated. Toward the beginning of the twentieth century, Cisleithania (or Austria) comprised eight nationalities among which were Poles, Ukrainians, Slovenes, Slovaks and Serbo-Croatians. The Poles had obtained some autonomy in Galicia and the Czechs gained some recognition when the Czech university in Prague was
established. In Transleithania (or Hungary) six different nationalities could be found; an autonomous Croatia also was part of Hungary.\(^{20}\)

The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Hungary in 1908 marked a break in an international accord that had preserved the *status quo* in the Balkans for a long time, despite Cretan uprisings and a Greek-Turkish war. Serbia was very disappointed, because it had always claimed Bosnia as being Serbian national lands. In this same period Bulgaria declared independence. In fact, the events meant a humiliation for both Russia and Serbia: there was nothing they could do to change the situation.

By 1912 war alliances against the Ottoman empire developed. The first agreement was one between Serbia and Bulgaria. The agreement included details on the division of parts of Macedonia. Furthermore, it was agreed that the Tsar would be asked to mediate, if no settlement could be realized to divide the rest of Macedonia. Bulgaria and Greece followed with a treaty, although they made no provisions for territorial claims. After Montenegro had reached an agreement with Serbia and Bulgaria, Bulgaria attacked the Ottoman Empire in 1912. The Ottomans were heavily defeated.\(^{21}\)

The Treaty of London, in May 1913, ended this war and established the Ottoman possessions, but left the Macedonian question unsettled. Also, the great powers, among which France and Great Britain, insisted on the formation of
an independent Albanian state, though the other Balkan states wanted to divide the Albanian lands. In June that year, Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece, but suffered complete defeat. The Treaty of Bucharest ended this war and partitioned Macedonia. Thanks to this, Serbia almost doubled in size. The same Treaty established the state of Albania.

By 1914, the Ottoman empire was almost non-existent on the European continent. Only Constantinople and some territories surrounding this city still belonged to the empire. One has to remember, though, that Ottomans had reigned for some 500 years in the Balkans and this had left its traces in the Balkan culture and the population. Many Muslims remained in the area and in regions like Bosnia they held powerful political positions. Likewise, Rumanians could be found in Transylvania, in Bukovina and in Bessarabia.

The South Slavs, i.e., Serbs, Croats and Slovenes lived within the Habsburg monarchy. This situation was less than ideal. The Croats in Serbia wanted a coalition within the monarchy, but some Croats wanted to unify Croatian lands, i.e., Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia Herzegovina. The Catholic church was meant to play a very important role. The Serbs, on the other hand, strived for annexation of the Serbian lands, i.e., Bosnia Herzegovina, Vojvodina and those sections of Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia with a Serbian population. Another option for the Serbs would be a Yugoslavian program, unifying Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes in one nation. This program was very attractive, because of the potential of such a state to become a power in the Balkans.22

The First World War disturbed the situation in the Balkans again completely. The territorial claims would be settled in a final agreement in 1920, the Treaty of Trianon. Rumania received Transylvania, Bessarabia, Crisana and Bukovina, thereby including some 1.7 million Hungarians in Rumania. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later to become Yugoslavia, was established. Bulgaria lost the province of Thrace to Greece and four military strategi, but clearly Bulgarian regions to Serbia. Since the Albanian government had totally broken down, foreign troops occupied Albania. Some of them, in particular Greece, Serbia and Montenegro wanted to keep the areas they occupied.

The two states where the national problems were most severe, were those states that had won most after the war. Yugoslavia saw major conflicts among Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Bosnian muslims. On top of that the Serbian dominated regime attempted to hold Kosovo (part of Albania), Vojdovina and Macedonia. Rumania, the second state, experienced heavy frictions in Transylvania (due to a Hungarian minority), Dobrudja (largely Bulgarian), Bessarabia and Bukovina (mainly Ukrainian).23

In the early stages of the Second World War, Germany virtually destroyed Czechoslovakia and exploited the Slovak
rejection of Czech dominance. Italy seized Albania, while
the Soviet Union took Bessarabia and the northern part of
Bukovina. In 1940 Transylvania was divided among Hungary,
Rumania, and Bulgaria. The end of the war would not lead to
radical changes. Rumania retained Transylvania, but its
losses to the Soviet Union would become permanent. Yugosl-
avia became a republic, obtained Istria, and reoccupied
Kosovo. Still, the Yugoslavs did not realize their other
goals, i.e., making Bulgaria the seventh province and
obtaining the southern part of Carinthia, which had a
Slovene population. Again, the Macedonian question was not
fully solved. From now on, the borders in the Balkans would
basically remain the same until 1991.24

Clearly, history has left the Central and East
European area with a number of problems yet to solve. The
existing national borders do not match the various ethnic
groups, and the borders of the Ottoman empire are still
visible in the locations of Christian or Muslim populations.
Various states may have claims on territory of other states,
that date back to the seventeenth century. The heritage of
history, combined with a new sense of freedom and the
possession of modern weapon systems might turn out to be a
very explosive mixture.
The unified Germany: a serious concern?

As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the unified Germany is more than just two parts brought together. Due to its industrial potential, its resources and its geographic position, Germany has the potential to dominate Europe. A review of the German GDP, or the strength of the German Mark, makes clear that a German economic dominance is already in existence now. Germany’s economic strength certainly enhances its overall position in international relations. It cannot be coincidence that Germany itself organized and supervised the unification, whereas one could have expected some supervision by the United Nations or the EC. The move to recognize Croatia, thus forcing the EC to do so too, is just another sign of Germany’s growing self-confidence and its willingness to act unilaterally. In international politics Germany already seems to be considered the emerging leader of Europe. An indication of this is President Bush’s visit with Chancellor Kohl in March 1992, to prepare for the GATT talks and possibly develop a compromise for European agricultural protectionism. Because this protectionism is the result of EC policy, it would have been more appropriate for President Bush to talk to the European Commission on this matter. He might even have talked to the French instead, who are the most profound protectionists.

Today, none of the West European nations seriously suspects Germany to start military adventures in Europe.

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Yet, as explained earlier in this chapter, security has both a physical and a psychological side. With regard to Germany, due to its recent history, the psychological factor, i.e., the perception of a threat is very important. Some countries perceive Germany's growing importance in Europe as much a threat against their national interests as if Germany had started to build up its armed forces. This perception of a threat could become a driver for the posture and actions of the various European Governments. This, in turn, could endanger the cohesion in Europe and by that the communal interests of Europe.

Even for Germany itself it is perfectly clear that feelings of resentment can easily emerge again in both West and East European countries. As Helmut Schmidt, the former German Chancellor, expressed it: "... that in the view of most of our close and not so close neighbors the enlarged Germany must be encapsulated in both the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance."\textsuperscript{26} Schmidt also realized that for this reason Germany should not emphasize its current position in Europe too clearly: "... With regard to these problem areas, we must not think that we are supposed to play an independent German role, or that we can even afford to do so."\textsuperscript{27} It puts Germany in a difficult situation. The German geographic position and its economic prosperity could make the country the gateway to Central and Eastern Europe, and, in the long term, the catalyst for a unified Europe. By
the same token, Germany could be the cause of European renationalization, even if such was not intended.

**The need for a European security structure**

So far, this chapter has identified that there is such a thing as specific European interest, which has been called communal interest. It has also indicated that the European character of those interests calls for measures with a particular European character to safeguard and protect those interests if threatened. Subsequently, the present chapter showed that these interests are threatened to an extent already, or can be threatened in the near future. In other words, European security has its own identity.

This is not to say, that European security can be isolated or that it can be separated from a broader Atlantic or even global security. It does say, though, that an integrated European approach is required to safeguard and protect communal security. It follows that Europe needs the instruments to realize this approach: diplomacy, economy and armed forces, all integrated in one European strategy. This answers one of the secondary questions in the study: yes, Europe does need a specific European security structure. Yet, it does not answer the question what this structure should look like or how it should fit into a broader frame-
work. These questions can only be answered after looking into how the identified threats might become manifest.

Conflict and crises

The Gulf War of 1990 was of course a unique situation. Yet, it could be exemplary for the development of threats outside the European continent starting with diplomatic action or physical force by a third party that threatens to interfere with communal interests in one way or another. From then on Europe should be able to use a broad array of means to protect its interests. Although initially protection will be pursued at the lowest level possible on the range of increasing pressure or force, the Gulf war showed that full use of armed forces still cannot be ruled out. The bottom line is that armed conflict between Europe and a party outside Europe can occur, but it will be the result of escalation rather than coming "out of the blue."

The same is valid for a threat on the European continent. As emphasized again in the Atlantic Alliance's new strategic concept, "the threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed ... ."28 Mutatis mutandis, this will be the case for the whole of Europe: large scale armed conflict on the European continent will not occur suddenly, but cannot be ruled out as the result of (inadvertent) escalation. At the same time, though, there might be a number of smaller
crises, which might even appear simultaneously, and which need to be dealt with adequately to prevent escalation.

An example of the potential for horizontal escalation of a relatively contained crisis, is the Yugoslavian province Macedonia. This particular part of Yugoslavia apparently aims at independence under the name Macedonia. This has upset the Greek government, because of the ramifications it might have for the Greek province Macedonia. It seemed to be reason enough to send a Greek brigade up north, to the Yugoslavian border.

An important factor in crises in the Central and East European area is that most of the potential participants have relatively modern military forces. Although these forces might lose some of their effectiveness due to internal fragmentation, the remainder will be enough to pose a serious problem. The military structures in several countries can easily fall apart under the present circumstances. The breakdown, in turn, can push former military elements into acts of terrorism, which can easily escalate to further violence. One should also realize that the armed forces are virtually the only means these countries have left to pursue national goals or protect national interests.

The third identified threat, the position of Germany and the consequences of that position, is what could be called a "soft threat". It can indeed interfere with the
interests of Europe, but there is little chance that this threat would lead to armed conflict.

As has been pointed out, a larger scale armed conflict in which Europe is involved, cannot be ruled out entirely. The review of the threats, however, can lead but to one conclusion: if Europe wants to safeguard its interests, then its security structure should be focused on the management of crises, first of all on the European continent, but also outside. Though NATO has always had to deal with some aspects of crisis management, the rules for that were set by the context of a very specific East-West confrontation. Outside NATO, and outside the classical East-West context, Europe has no contemporary experience with crisis management. Therefore a closer look is necessary at the principles that govern the management of crisis.

Crisis management: the principles.

The meaning of crisis management already has been explained in chapters I and III: the combination of the rational actions, emotions, communications and bargaining, which aim to limit the adverse effects of a threatening situation. The fact that emotions and bargaining are part of crisis management, already indicates that crisis management cannot and will not follow stringent rules. On the contrary, it is very much dependent of the personalities of those who
are in charge. Still, there are seven principles of crisis management which seem generally accepted.  

The first principle is that of multiple advocacy in the decision making process. It points out the need to look at situations from different points of view, by different persons or different departments. This principle is essential for developing alternative options and assessing the consequences of each option. It should be noted, though, that multiple advocacy can backfire and result in endless talking without decisions if the process is not controlled. In the decision making process that is used by military organizations all over the world, the principle of multiple advocacy is realized through the input by the various staff officers. The process is usually controlled by a chief-of-staff.  

The second principle is that of close political Control in the implementation of policy. This principle refers more specifically to the use of military force in a crisis. It emphasizes that military operations must serve a well-defined political goal, and that military contingency plans cannot dictate responses in a crisis. It implies at the same time that a military advisor or group of advisor should be part of the team that deals with the crisis. The principle of close political control is built into the U.S. Armed Forces' system of "deliberate planning" and "crisis action planning." In the deliberate planning cycle, the
Commander-in-Chief (CINC), responsible for a certain area of operations, develops contingency plans for his area. The plan includes decisions on the courses of action to take. The CINC’s contingency plans usually will be just a basis for further planning. After all, if a crisis develops in the CINC’s area of responsibility, the National Command Authority (NCA), being the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense, will decide what course of action should be taken, and when, based on options developed in the crisis action planning cycle.31

The third principle is that of limitation of objectives. There are two sides to this principle. First there is the need to define clear-cut objectives. By doing so, the reasoning in the crisis management process will not be troubled by uncertainty about the desired endstate. Simultaneously clear-cut objectives will focus the execution of any action that is decided on. Second there is the need to limit the number of objectives. As explained in the definition, crisis management aims at limiting the adverse effects of a crisis. It follows that no gain should be sought beyond that. This will not only provide a larger range of options, but it will also enable the adversary to give in without losing too much face.

Fourth is the principle of maintaining flexible options. This principle points identifies with what is often referred to as a flexible (or graduated) response. Decision
makers should decide on that action that is most appropriate to the particular phase of the crisis, thereby preventing unintended escalation, but creating room for deliberate escalation. Maintaining flexible options does not only create freedom of action for the decision makers, it also helps to create opportunities for the adversary to give in without loss of face.

The fifth principle is that of time pressure. Time pressure is something that is often associated with crisis, as being automatically part of it. Time pressure is part of crisis management as a limiting factor for the decision making process. It will limit the time for deliberation and reflection on possible courses of action, and it will determine the method of decision making. As such time pressure can also be used as an instrument to create freedom of action by influencing the adversary’s decision making process.

The sixth principle pertains to the perception of the adversary. First of all, this principle indicates that decision makers should go through every trouble to see the situation at hand, and the effects of each course of action through the eyes of the adversary. Only this can guarantee efficiency in crisis management, i.e., the maximum result through actions at the lowest level of interference with the adversary. The second element of this principle follows from the first. If actions occur at the lowest possible level of
interference with the adversary, it enables him to withdraw or to give in without loss of face. According to Richardson this second element in particular is often emphasized in the literature on crisis management. \(^3\) \(^2\) Seen from the perspective of limiting the adverse effects of a crisis, one could argue that this principle is the driving principle in crisis management. After all, it enables the decision makers to set clear-cut objectives and validate any course of action before execution.

The seventh and last principle is that of communication. This principle refers to the need to maintain communication with the adversary. Given the fact that bargaining is considered part of crisis management, this requirement is not surprising. But the principle of communications also points at the risk of "filtering" communication with adversaries, i.e., the intentions of messages are misperceived. Filtering can be the result of cultural or religious differences, but also of the idiosyncrasies of mediators. Especially when crisis management is conducted in an environment with more or less equal parties at one or both sides, filtering of communications can also be the result of different or hidden agendas.

The seven principles of crisis management presented in this chapter are certainly not all inclusive. Yet they provide a sufficient basis for analysis. This basis will be used to examine whether the four mentioned security
organizations in Europe are able to perform in the new security environment or not. Before doing so, there is one element of the security environment that has not been explored yet: how does European security fit in a larger framework?

The Atlantic link

Up to this point the study has more or less isolated European security. In reality the Europe's security and that of countries outside Europe are closely related. It would be too much to review every possible relationship between Europe and other countries. The relationship between Europe and the United States, however, has always been a special one. It justifies a short review of this so called Atlantic link.

Earlier on, this chapter made a case for a typical European interest being different from other countries' interests. The example of the Gulf War on the other hand, made clear that European interests can well be parallel to the interests of the United States. The reason is, of course, that interdependence is not the prerogative of Europe, but that it is a global phenomenon. The Gulf War also showed that the United States is currently the only power which can operate worldwide and which can mobilize significant resources to counterbalance security threats throughout the world on short notice. If only for this
reason, Europe and the United States should continue the formal linking of their security.

Professor Karl Kaiser gives two more reasons for maintaining the Atlantic link.\textsuperscript{33} The first reason refers to nuclear deterrence. Although nuclear weapons no longer serve to deter a conventional war initiated by the Soviet Union, the U.S. nuclear potential is an insurance policy in case of a fall-back, or in case of massive conventional aggression by one or more of the Soviet successor states. At the same time Kaiser recognizes that this scenario loses credibility every day.

His second reason is also related to nuclear weapons, but in a different way. One of the most important tasks for the near future is the control over some 30,000 nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union. In relation with this are Presidents Bush's radical proposals for nuclear disarmament. Yet the Soviet Union lacks the industrial potential to neutralize those large numbers of nuclear warheads. Only the United States has both the expertise and the capabilities to solve this problem. Because Kaiser focuses on the technical expertise to control the huge amount of warheads, he takes another possible reason for the Atlantic link simply for granted. Due to its own nuclear arsenal and its historic link with West Europe, the United States is the only nuclear power in a position to negotiate nuclear weapons with the Soviet successor states.
A final reason for the Atlantic link is the German position in Europe. It was already mentioned that Germany should remain encapsulated in both the EC and the Atlantic Alliance. In particular through the Alliance, the United States can provide a counterbalance for German dominance.

In short, a number of reasons indicate that the Atlantic link should be maintained. The United States should remain an integral part of any European security structure that might develop. For the foreseeable future, only this firm relationship can create and maintain the right environment for Europe to further develop to a truly united Europe.

Conclusion

This chapter has looked into what can be called Europe’s security environment: the facts and circumstances which might determine the shape and the limits of a security structure. In the process of this review the study introduced the communal interests, unique European security interests. The chapter also identified a number of threats against these communal interests, among which the shifting situation in Central and East Europe is the most salient, and concluded that any security structure in Europe should focus on crisis management, but that at the same time a larger armed conflict cannot be ruled out yet. In line with the required emphasis on crisis management the chapter presented seven crisis management principles, which may seem
very obvious, but which provide a solid basis for analysis of any of the existing security structures. A short review of the Atlantic link, and the preliminary conclusion that the United States should remain an integrated part of a European security system, ended the chapter.

The next step in this study will be a review of the existing security organizations in Europe, to see what their role can be, given the described security environment. The next chapter will look into NATO; the chapters thereafter subsequently will review the EC, the WEU and the CSCE.
Notes


2 The word "communal" is used on purpose. Communal interests are not merely the common national interests of a group of states within the EC. Communal interests indicate those interests which are unique for that Community as a whole and follow from the goals of the EC.


4 An interesting parallel is drawn by John Leech. He recognizes a point in history where our ancestors had to abandon private armies or posses in favor of a neutral and permanent police force. The familiarity of the village or neighborhood, formerly capable of applying its own justice, became absorbed in the anonymity of larger units. As populations grew more dense and less bonded, the rule of law needed a longer arm to enforce its writ. John Leech, Halt! Who goes where? : the Future of NATO in the New Europe (London (UK): Brassey's, 1991), 23.

5 Since 1979 the European Monetary System (EMS) and the European Currency Unit (ECU) have worked extremely well and have provided monetary stability within the EC. The ECU, however, has never been a common currency to be used by the inhabitants of the EC for their daily transactions.


7 Schwok, 331.


10 To mitigate the situation in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the EC has already raised approx. 2.7bn U.S. dollar; Germany alone has contributed 28% of this. The USA has made far fewer funds available.
Germany moved to recognize Croatia as a separate nation before the EC had decided to do so. This did not comply with the European Political Cooperation and was certainly not in line with the consolidated approach the EC previously had taken. Even if there were valid reasons for Germany's course of action, it made people concerned about the future role of Germany.


Overall GDP for Germany (East and West) in 1990 measured $1,157 billion. Per capita GDP (West Germany) before unification was $16,300, ranking third in Europe; after unification $14,600, ranking seventh. Source: The World Fact Book 1991


At the end of 1991, a mission headed by president Bush was supposed to straighten American-Japanese economic relations, but did not have the desired results. In February and March 1992 events led Japanese officials to call American laborers lazy and illiterate. One U.S. Senator reacted by making rude references to the atomic bombs on Japan. Japanese communities in the United States were threatened and even the killing of a prominent Japanese businessman is suspected to be the result of anti-Asian resentment.

On 2 August, Great Britain, France and Switzerland froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets; on 3 August West Germany, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg did the same.

"Tracking the storm" in Military review Volume LXXI (September 91), 65-78.


See: Jelavich, 95-99.
22 For this part of the history of the Balkans see: Jelavich, 104-109.

23 See: Jelavich, 125-135.

24 The post war developments in the Balkans are very well described by Jelavich, 301-335.


27 Ibid., 622.

28 The Alliance's new Strategic Concept was agreed upon by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO summit in Rome, 7-8 November 1991.


32 Richardson, 21-22.

CHAPTER V

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

The argument is not that NATO is a work of art beyond time and space that cannot be improved and is better left alone. The argument is rather ... that it must be transformed in order to accommodate a European situation that has outgrown most of its war and postwar traumas.1

Introduction

In a sense, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the only true security organization of the four that were identified. After all, NATO has not only a political body, but it also has the structure and the means to apply military power if necessary. Supporters of NATO would argue that the organization has been the most important reason for 45 years of peace in Europe. In recent years, however, NATO repeatedly has been subject to criticism, and more than once the question was asked whether NATO should survive or not. This chapter will analyze how NATO can continue contributing to security in Europe. To do so, a short overview of NATO’s history will follow. Subsequently, the chapter will give an analysis of the present situation and the projected changes.
within the organization. Checking this against the security environment should give an insight in NATO’s role in future crises.

**NATO from Washington to Paris**

Following the Second World War, after Germany had surrendered, the Western democracies began demobilization. The armed forces' strength would reflect peacetime conditions and was kept at approximately ten to forty percent of the wartime strength.² The Soviet Union, on the other hand, kept its forces on wartime strength and also maintained its war industry. Also, in the years immediately after the war, the Soviet Union did not always cooperate with the other powers as well as could be expected from a former ally. At the conference in Moscow, in 1947, the four Powers³ were not able to agree on the future status of Germany, due to the Soviet position in this matter. A new conference in London could not solve the problem either. At the same time the Soviet Union vetoed systematically the U.N. resolutions concerning Bulgaria and Albania.⁴

By 1948, all European countries at the periphery of the Soviet Union but one had communist regimes. These countries, i.e., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania, had all opposition removed or at least effectively silenced. Also, the Soviet Union had tried to intimidate Turkey, had claimed Turkish territories, had
supported communist Greek guerrillas, and was supporting separatist movements in the Iranian provinces Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. It also had become clear that the Soviets were disregarding the Treaty of Teheran, according to which the eastern border of Poland was supposed to be the so called Curzon line, as established in 1919.

It is not surprising that many European countries in this period feared that the Soviet Union might want to extend its influence further west, if necessary even with force. In March 1948 the Treaty of Brussels had been signed by France, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Although it focussed on defense against Germany, this Treaty also applied in a broader sense. After the start of the Berlin blockade, representatives of the United States and Canada attended the meetings of the Defense Ministers and those of the Chiefs-in-Staff of the Brussels Powers. It was Canada that eventually proposed a mutual defense system, including and superseding the Brussels Treaty. Participants would be the Brussels Powers, Canada and the United States. When NATO was founded in April 1949 in Washington, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal would also be among the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. Greece and Turkey were invited in 1951 and acceded the organization in 1952. West-German membership as of May 1955 marked a milestone both for Germany and for NATO. Spain became NATO’s sixteenth member in 1982.
In its almost 45 years of existence, NATO’s evolution into the current organization has been heavily influenced by various events. A first marker in NATO’s history is the 1950 communist attack into South Korea. Although NATO was not directly involved, the attack stimulated NATO’s leadership to think on a strategy that could defend Europe against similar aggression. The strategy would be to defend as far east as possible. A forward strategy like that, however, meant fighting on and for German territory. That, in turn, favored German participation in NATO, but it would take until 1955 before the German membership became fact. Another remarkable year was 1956, the year in which the Soviet Union suppressed the Hungarian revolution. In this year the Report on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO was accepted. It would give "new impetus to political consultation between member countries on all aspects of relations between East and West." 

The French withdrawal from the integrated military structure in 1966 marked the first of a number of important events that would occur in a fairly short period. In 1967 the Harmel reported was adopted. According to this Report NATO should operate on a dual track. It would maintain a defensive posture strong enough to deter a Warsaw Pact attack, but at the same time "NATO’s mandate should include effective policies directed toward greater relaxation of East-West tensions." Also in 1967, a new strategy of
Flexible Response was accepted as "a compromise between a conventional defense of Europe and U.S. extended deterrence." Even the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 could freeze the developing détente only for a short period of time and in 1969 West Germany announced its Ostpolitik, a policy aimed at restoring relations with the East. The détente led to achievements such as the quadripartite treaty on Berlin in 1971, the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT I) agreement in 1972, and the opening of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations in 1973.

In 1977 NATO found that the Soviet Union was rapidly building up its forces and was modernizing its Intermediate range Nuclear Forces (INF) with large numbers of SS-20s. This would become one of the reasons for NATO to make the 1979 dual track decision: NATO would modernize and expand its INF, but it would pursue negotiations on the subject simultaneously. The decision was a controversial one and proved somewhat of a litmus test for NATO. Various members opposed the decision completely, while others (among which the Netherlands) initially procrastinated to allow for national conferral. Before all the systems could be deployed, the INF Treaty was signed in December 1987. The Treaty that provided for the removal of all INF systems, was just as much criticized as the original decision to deploy.

By this time, things had started to change in the relationship with the Soviet Union, as Gorbachev’s policy of

NATO’s structure

The highest authority in NATO is the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The Council meets weekly at Ambassador (also called Permanent Representative) level, it meets at least twice a year at the level of Foreign Ministers, and on occasion the Heads of State or Government meet, in which case the meeting is referred to as "summit". The Council provides a platform for continuous and confidential consultation between the various governments. Since NATO is not a supranational organization, all members have equal voting rights. The NAC decides only on the basis of unanimity. Once a decision is taken, it can only be reversed by the Council itself. The position of the Council’s honorary President rotates annually, in accordance with the English alphabetical order of countries. The Secretary General is Chairman of the Council. He also chairs the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

The Defence Planning Committee deals with most defense matters. It comprises representatives of all NATO
members with exception of France. Within its area of responsibility, the DPC has the same authority as the NAC.

The Nuclear Planning Group is similar to the DPC. All NATO countries are represented except France. In the NPG, consultation takes place on all matters relating to the nuclear posture of NATO.13

The NATO Military Committee is the highest military authority. It meets weekly at the level of Permanent Military Representative and at least three times a year at the level of Chief-of-Staff. The Military Committee is responsible to the NAC and receives its directions from both the NAC and the DPC. The NAC has tasked the Military Committee to recommend those measures considered necessary for the common defense of the NATO area. The Major NATO Commanders and the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group are directly responsible to the Military Committee.14

Recent developments and future outlook

Almost immediately after the changes in Europe had started to become visible, NATO started working on adapting to the new situation. A first milestone was the London summit in July 1990. At this meeting the Heads of State and Government issued an important statement on NATO’s position in a changing Europe and provided guidelines to revise the current NATO strategy. The so called London declaration stated that NATO would field smaller and restructured
forces, that a new strategy would move away from "forward defense" toward a reduced forward presence and modify flexible response to rely less on nuclear weapons. With respect to those nuclear weapons, it was said that they would become truly weapons of the last resort. Furthermore, the NAC invited the leaders of the Soviet Union and the various WTO countries "to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO."

At the Rome summit on 7 and 8 November 1991, NATO's political leaders agreed on the Alliance's new strategic concept. The concept recognized that risks to the Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression, but rather from consequences of instabilities in Central and Eastern Europe. By no means, however, does this rule out an armed conflict, possibly spilling over into NATO countries. Therefore, the purpose of the Alliance will not change: "to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations." To achieve this purpose NATO has to perform the following tasks: provide one of the foundations for a stable security environment in Europe; serve as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations; deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member; and preserve the strategic balance within Europe.
With respect to the security of Europe, the strategic concept stated that the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever. The political component in NATO will thus become increasingly important. Still, the managing of a diversity of challenges facing NATO, requires a comprehensive security policy. NATO's policy consists of three mutual reinforcing elements, i.e., dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defense capability. A coherent approach is also required to exploit the increased opportunities for successful resolution of crises in an early stage.

The strategy of the Alliance will continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles: a purely defensive posture; an adequate military strength to deter any potential aggressor; and the ability of NATO forces to defend the Alliance frontiers if necessary. To do so the strategic concept also mentioned:

... the Alliance conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.17

The new strategic concept will be reflected in NATO's armed forces. They will include: immediate and rapid reaction elements, able to respond to a wide range of eventuities; main defense forces to ensure the Alliance's territorial integrity; and augmentation forces, which can reinforce existing forces in a certain region. Integrated
and multinational forces, as they develop in the context of an emerging European Defense Identity, will have an important role to play in enhancing the Alliance's ability to work together in the common defense. NATO will maintain adequate sub-strategic nuclear forces, consisting solely of dual capable aircraft. All nuclear artillery or ground-launched short range nuclear missiles in Europe will be eliminated.

A third milestone was the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) on 20 December 1991, another result of the Rome summit. The purpose of the NACC is to further develop the process of permanent diplomatic ties and to build a real partnership between the Atlantic Alliance and Central and Eastern European countries. The NACC seeks to strengthen European security by fostering stability in Central and Eastern Europe. The NACC will also strive to reinforce the role of CSCE, and envisions a system of interconnected institutions like CSCE, NATO, EC and WEU to complement each other. The Council will convene every two months at the Ambassador level, and will meet annually with the NAC. Other meetings can be called when the situation requires so.

The Alliance's new strategic concept does indeed reflect a shift to crisis management in a multipolar Europe, as opposed to deterrence and eventually fighting a major armed conflict in a bipolar system. Besides, the increasing
political and military cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries can certainly help prevent crises or resolve them in an early stage. That does not necessarily mean, however, that NATO is the best solution for a European security. Given the security environment as described in the Chapter IV, NATO has strong points as well as weak points.

NATO analyzed

It is assumed that the ability to use military force if necessary, will remain an important instrument in any security strategy in the foreseeable future. Thus, one of the stronger points for NATO is the existing military structure. Although by no means perfect, the structure is without precedent as far as command and control, interoperability and standardization are concerned. It can provide at least a basis to further develop and tailor a security structure.

Another truly strong point is the link with the United States. As seen in the previous chapter, the transatlantic link will remain vital to Europe's security despite the changes in the security environment. This link enables the European members to comply with at least two principles of crisis management. Involvement of the United States with its varied array of military assets, including nuclear systems, enlarges the range of options. In particular the surveillance and intelligence capabilities of the United
States can possibly help to gain insight in the adversary’s perception in crisis situations.

The military structure is controlled by a political body, the NAC. The Council provides not only political control, one of the principles in crisis management, but stimulates also multiple advocacy, another principle. The procedures for consultation among the member states are well developed and sufficiently practiced. At the same time, the Council represents a weak point, because it lacks power of decision. After all, the Alliance is characterized by "the common commitment and the mutual cooperation of sovereign states." Additionally, the interests of Europe and the North American members will not always run parallel. Taken together, the lack of decisive power and possibly diverging interests might well have an adverse effect on two more crisis management principles: the limitation of objectives, and time pressure.

A last weak point to be mentioned is NATO’s limited area of operations. As stated again in the Alliance’s new strategic concept, the Treaty applies to aggression against NATO territory. It implies that NATO cannot act if interests are threatened, but NATO territory not. It explains why so far NATO has had no commitments outside the NATO area, and why NATO cannot be involved in internal problems.
Conclusion

The analysis of the strong and weak sides shows that NATO should be part of any European security structure that might develop in the near future. After all, NATO provides elements that simply cannot be provided yet by other organizations, be it modified or newly established. Yet this does not mean that NATO will hold its current position forever. Depending on the advantages, the disadvantages and the potential of other organizations, NATO’s role in European security could diminish distinctively. The next chapter will review one of those other organizations, the European Community.
Notes


2 The United States had some 391,000 troops in 1946 as opposed to 3,100,000 in 1945; Great Britain had 488,000 in 1946 as opposed to 1,321,000 in 1945; Canada had no troops anymore in Europe in 1946. Source: The NATO, Facts and Figures (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Information Service, 1989).

3 The four Powers were France, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

4 The United Nations had looked into incidents between Greece, Albania and Bulgaria. It had established Albanian and Bulgarian responsibilities, but the Soviet Union blocked all draft resolutions which recommended action.

5 More extensive information on this particular Treaty will be presented in chapter VII.

6 The NATO, Facts and Figures, 10.


8 The NATO, Facts and Figures, 31.

9 Committee on NATO in the 1990s, "Report on NATO in the 1990s" in NATO in the 1990s, 13.

10 Stuermer, 111.

11 On 12 December 1979, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided not only to replace 108 Pershing-IA missiles in West Germany with 108 Pershing-II missiles, but also to newly deploy 464 cruise missiles. This decision would enable NATO for the first time to threaten Soviet territory with other than strategic nuclear forces.


13 A more elaborate description of NATO’s civilian structure can be found in The NATO, Facts and Figures, 321-326.
14 The military structure of NATO is depicted in *The NATO: Facts and Figures*, 337-345.


16 *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept* as agreed on the Rome summit, 8 and 9 November 1991, para 16.

17 Ibid., para. 39.

18 Currently, the NACC comprises all NATO members, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Soviet successor states.

19 *The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept*, para. 18.
CHAPTER VI

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

... for it is only in the EEC that an organization and structure exists, at least potentially, for a fifth world power.

Introduction

The European Community was never really a security structure: it focused on economical issues within its community. Thoughts on closer cooperation in politics and defense were expressed as early as the 1950s, but those thoughts did not come true. Only recently have a common European foreign policy and a common defense become topics of serious discussion again. This time those thoughts could have a better chance for survival; thus, the EC could play an more important role in international politics.

The present chapter will examine how the EC fits in a European security structure. Thereto, the chapter will look into the history of the EC first. Subsequently, it will analyze current developments and future possibilities. The strengths and weaknesses following from this analysis will not only indicate how and to what extent the EC can be part...
of a European structure, but also what problems will have be
solved before.

Cooperation, the magic word

Already in the 1930s some European countries were
striving for a closer economic cooperation. It will be
evident that especially the smaller countries like Belgium
and the Netherlands were in favor of such a close coopera-
tion. They initiated the so called Treaty of Ouchy. This
treaty was meant to realize a 50% reduction of tariffs. The
treaty provided for admission of every European country that
wanted to participate on a reciprocal basis. This initiative
however, died before it really became effective. Some of the
larger countries, especially Great Britain, argued that the
treaty did not comply with existing bilateral treaties.

Even during the Second World War, in September 1944,
these same smaller countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg) decided on a treaty that provided a customs-
union. Later on, the treaty expanded to provide an economic
union and came into force in 1948. The BENELUX was born.

But the Second World War had virtually destroyed the
economy in Europe. For various reasons the United States
thought it important to rebuild this economy as soon as
possible and used its famous Marshall Plan to do this.2 A
condition for the implementation of this plan was that
Europe should cooperate more closely, both politically and
economically. Therefore the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was founded 16 April 1948.

Although this organization seemed very promising as an innovating institution, it did not really work that way after the first couple of years. As the Organization for European Cooperation and Development, (it was renamed in the 1960s), it is still very useful as a coordination center for the economic policies of the industrial democracies.

In the early fifties some dilemmas surfaced in Europe, mainly concerning West German heavy industry. Firstly, the general opinion was that the German coal and steel industries should be controlled by the Allied powers. On the other hand, Germany was in a very sensitive process of emancipation after the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1949. Secondly, where most European countries tended to allow West Germany to operate more freely and independently, the French policy toward Germany was relatively restrictive. This policy aimed to block German economic recovery in order to avoid a threatening resurgence of aggressive power. Thirdly, Europe needed the potential of that German heavy industry badly, but it did not want Germany to gain a dominant position. And finally, Europe wanted to play a role in global politics again.

To resolve these dilemmas, in 1950, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, proposed the creation of a
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The treaty was signed by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands on 18 April 1951, and the community was established on 25 August 1952. The ECSC was the first supranational institution in Europe. Interestingly, the Preamble to the Treaty mainly referred to European and global politics in a broad sense, and only mentioned very little about economics. In the articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty a "common market" is mentioned for the first time.

The French government saw the establishment of the ECSC only as a first step to further integration of Europe. The French envisioned eventually a European Political Community and thought the next step in that direction could be a European Defense Community. In 1954 however, the French parliament disapproved of this initiative. The next chapter will explain why almost immediately thereafter the Western European Union would be established. In December 1954 Great Britain asked for and obtained observer status in the ECSC, but still did not participate fully.

The more regionally oriented countries in Europe felt that more could be achieved. In 1955, at the Messina conference, the Belgian and Dutch Foreign Ministers proposed a customs union as the next step to integration. The conference decided to examine the proposal and installed a research committee. A year later, this committee, chaired by the Belgian Foreign Minister, recommended an economic
community and a community for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In 1957 the foundations were laid for the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in the treaty of Rome. "The Six", i.e., the countries of the ECSC, had ratified the treaty by 1 January 1958.

On 1 January 1973 Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland obtained membership to the EC; Greece became a member on 1 January 1981; and the youngest EC partners are Portugal and Spain, both since 1 January 1986.

The objectives of the EEC are best expressed in the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome:

`DETERMINED to establish the foundations of an ever closing union among the European peoples, DECIDED to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action in eliminating the barriers which divide Europe, DIRECTING their efforts to the essential purpose of constantly improving the living and the working conditions of their peoples, RECOGNISING that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in order guarantee a steady expansion, a balanced trade and fair competition, ANXIOUS to strengthen the unity of their economics and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and by mitigating the backwardness of the less-favoured, DESIRIOUS of contributing by means of a common commercial policy of the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade, INTENDING to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and overseas countries, and desiring, to ensure the developments of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, RESOLVED to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty by establishing this combination of resour-`
ces and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts, HAVE DECIDED to create a European Economic Community...

As a result of the so called Merger Act which came into force in July 1967, the Council of the European Communities came into existence. Because the three Communities, ECSC, EEC and Euratom, are managed by common institutions they are normally referred to as the European Community. The latest amendment to the treaty of Rome is the Single European Act (SEA) which is usually referred to as Europe 1992.

The leading institutions in the EC are the Council of the European Communities, the Commission of the European Communities, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice.
The Council convenes at least once a month at the foreign minister level, while the chair rotates every six months in alphabetical order. To ensure continuity there is a Troika, comprising the present, the past and the future chairmen. The Council can make decisions, which are binding; it can make recommendations, which are binding as far as the ends are concerned, but do not influence the ways to reach those ends; and it can serve as a forum for opinions. The Commission is a policy planning body and initiates all sorts of action to be taken by the EC. The Parliament is a directly elected body. It has budgetary power, it can advise and it has the power to monitor.

The way the EC operates is complicated: it is not really a inter-governmental organization, but neither is it a clear supra-national institution. Still, the institutions of the EC have legal status and legitimate power.

Figure 4: the EC decision process, step 1
The road to a European Union

The changing of Europe affected the EC, as well as it affected NATO, although not in the same way. After all, the EC is not really a security institution. Therefore it never had a security strategy that needed to be adapted to a new situation. Yet the events in Europe accelerated developments within the EC, that had started long before Gorbachev came to power.

At the time when Europe and the Soviet Union began to change, the EC was, almost routinely, in the process of
developing to closer cooperation. The reunification of Germany, however, altered the position of an important EC member tremendously. Furthermore, as the Central and Eastern European countries did away with the Soviet communist dominated political and economic system, the newborn democracies were desperately in need of food, clothing, and other support by Western Europe. Yet those countries also held the long term promise of a vast, not yet exploited market. Lastly, the shifting political situation in Europe more or less presented a window of opportunity. It was for some EC members the signal to double the efforts in pursuing a European Political Union (EPU). Still, it would take until the end of 1991, before an agreement on a political union and other important steps could be reached. On 10 December 1991, in Maastricht, the Netherlands, the Heads of Government and State agreed on the establishment of a European Monetary Union (EMU) and a European Political Union.

The EMU will be implemented in three distinct phases; in the third phase a single European currency is to be introduced. In 1996 a qualified majority in the EC is to decide whether the bulk of the EC members meet the conditions for introduction of the European currency. If so, the currency might be introduced as early as 1997. If not, the European currency will be introduced in 1999 anyway. Exceptions will be made for both the United Kingdom and Denmark.
The EPU should enable the EC eventually to address and decide on a variety of topics as a truly European body. No longer will EC standpoints be the result of compromising national standpoints until consensus has been reached, but the EC can decide by qualified majority. This important step in the development of the EC will not be done at once. In a staggered approach the power to decide by majority will apply to issues related to the environment, education, consumer protection and health. Although Maastricht was not able to include foreign and defense policy in the new decision procedure, it was agreed that the cooperation in these matters should be improved. Areas suitable for majority decisions could be the CSCE process; non-proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; arms control; and weapon export policies. The signing of the Treaties of Maastricht on 7 February 1992 led the Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers to observe that "a point of no return had been passed." The Treaty on the European Union, which should be ratified by the end of 1992, provides for every European State with a democratic government system to apply for membership. This move seems an open invitation to all East and Central European countries in particular. It certainly lends the EC the growth capacity it needs to consolidate and improve its political and economic position.
As a final landmark in Maastricht, the nine members of the West European Union (WEU) extended an invitation to the other EC members to have joined the WEU by the end of 1992, and an invitation to non-EC NATO members to become associate members of the WEU. These invitations are closely linked to the Community's proposition to make the WEU the military arm of the EC.

The Treaties of Maastricht could be the push that the EC need to become a European power. Already in 1987, Paul Kennedy wrote:

*If the European Community can really act together, it may well improve its position in the world, both militarily and economically. If it does not,..., its relative decline seems destined to continue.*

Although Kennedy's opinion should be seen in the context of the Cold War, it still carries some truth. The recent developments in the EC do certainly not indicate any decline of the Community. However, if the EC wants to improve its position in the world as a European power, it should be able to safeguard European interests. An analysis of the strong and weak points of the EC should give an indication on the Community's potential to do so.

**Strengths and weaknesses**

A particular strength of the EC is its recognition by the world as a political and economic partner. Consequently, the EC maintains close formal relations with
numerous nations. It lends the EC credibility as an actor in international relations and thus legitimizes the existence of European interests. Related to that is the Community’s ready potential to create and execute a comprehensive strategy. After all, the EC and its members have been designing economic and political policies for years, and the instruments for implementation of these policies are available too. The Community’s attempt to solve the Yugoslavian problem showed that the will to take responsibility in European matters exists.

Despite the abovementioned potential, EC involvement in Yugoslavia also showed two grave weaknesses. The first is the lack of a consolidated foreign and defense policy. This made it possible for Germany to act on its own, and to proclaim that Germany would recognize Croatia, even if the EC would not do so. It displayed a crack in an otherwise fairly united European posture in this matter. The lack of such a policy, means inter alia that economic policy toward foreign countries cannot be optimally geared to the overall policy toward those countries. The second weakness is the lack of military power as an instrument in a comprehensive strategy. Thus, the EC ran out of options when political and economic pressure did not work.

Two more weak points of the EC are its lack of consensus on the way ahead, and its decision procedures. With respect to the way ahead, in particular Great Britain
appears to have its own opinion on a possible common foreign and defense policy, whereas such a policy is essential for the EC to be a key player in European security. As mentioned, Great Britain is also excepted in the Treaty on EMU.8

As far as decisions are concerned, the Maastricht Treaty enables progress with respect to the efficiency and the legitimacy of the actions of the Community. At the same time, however, the decision process has become more complicated.9 Jacques Delors, President of the European Committee, expressed his doubts about the efficiency of the decision process in his address to the European Parliament on 12 December 1991.

A final check should be made with regard to the principles of crisis management. The EC should be able to comply with the principles of multiple advocacy and political control. Compliance with the principles of flexible options and time pressure is possible as long as military options are not involved. However, the Community cannot comply with one essential principle, being the limitation of objectives, unless a consolidated foreign and defense policy becomes reality.

Conclusion

Under present circumstances the European Community is not a fully qualified candidate to be the core of a
security structure in Europe. The EC lacks some basic capabilities to operate effectively in crisis management. On the other hand do the Maastricht Treaties express the will to create a strong European community, which in due time could become a fully qualified crisis manager. Until that time, the EC can only play a role in a European security structure, if clear-cut and common political objectives can be agreed upon, and if its functions are complemented by other institutions. One such possible institution will be reviewed in the next chapter: the Western European Union.
Notes


3 France as a political, military and economic power had ceased to exist due to the war. In order to reinforce its weakened position, France had to make sure, among others, that its traditional enemy and only rival on the European Continent would not regain its economic and military potential. However, the French hard-liner's policy toward Germany would eventually fail. By then, the formal division of Germany made it possible for France to accept West Germany as a diminished threat. See: von Schuschnigg, 56.


7 Kennedy, 488.

8 Although it is known that exceptions apply for Great Britain, the character of those exceptions is not known yet.

CHAPTER VII

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

On the one hand it is the European pillar of NATO, on the other it is the security dimension of European integration. Opinions about its evolution differ, but it could best be regarded as a transitional organization on the road toward European Union, in which ultimately the economic, foreign policy and security dimensions will converge.

Introduction

The Western European Union has been overshadowed by NATO, almost since the WEU was established in 1954. Although a review of the history will show that the WEU indeed has contributed to the European security, it will also show that the WEU has not been a very exiting organization when compared to NATO. In the seventies, the WEU was literally a dormant organization. On the other hand was WEU responsible for the more or less consolidated view that Margaret Thatcher communicated to President Reagan in her Camp David talks on the Reykjavik Summit in 1986. Also, in 1987, the WEU coordinated the naval Gulf operations, in which only Germany and Luxembourg did not dispatch any ships.
This chapter reviews the WEU, in a way similar to the previous chapters. First, the history of the organization will set the stage. Together with an overview of recent and current developments, this will provide sufficient basis for the subsequent analysis of WEU potential to play a role in a future European security structure.

History

As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the Western European Union was established in the same period of time as the ECSC and partly for the very same reasons. In the aftermath of the Second World War the European nations faced the difficult task of rebuilding their countries. In particular France experienced recurring difficulties. After de Gaulle's abdication in January 1946, governments came and went, and more than once the French Communist Party attempted to take advantage of the political chaos. At the same time, some of the European countries faced severe problems in their overseas colonies. France was fighting the Viet Minh in Vietnam, Great Britain was heavily involved in Palestine, Malaya, Burma and India, and the Netherlands had to cope with an ongoing insurgency in Indonesia. Although the Charter of the United Nations had only been signed in 1945, already it had become clear that this organization would not be a cure-all for the world's problems. Moreover, the first signs of a serious East-West confrontation had
become visible. Against this background France and Great Britain signed a treaty in 1947, by which each pledged military support to the other in case of an attack by Germany. Although initially a bilateral agreement, other states could apply for membership.

Some authors argue that the British agenda showed another interest in this treaty. Great Britain actually feared a civil war in France and possibly a communist coup. Because the British financial situation did not allow for anything more than sympathy, the treaty was the formal way to endorse the anti-communist forces in France.

In January 1948, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary for the United Kingdom, developed a number of initiatives to establish an association of European Nations. The nucleus of that association would be formed by France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. On 17 March 1948, in Brussels, the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence was signed between those five states. The preamble to the Treaty showed that a main goal still was supposed to be to check Germany: "... To take such steps as may be held necessary in the event of renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression; ...."

Given Germany's economic and political state, this supposed threat was not really imminent, and this must have been realized by the contracting parties. Furthermore, it
took the parties incredibly little time to set up and actually sign the treaty. Therefore, we can argue that the organization, also known as the Western Union, actually served a broader purpose. It was certainly very much in line with the Marshall Plan, which required Europe to cooperate more closely, both politically and economically.

As seen in the previous chapter, by 1951, the ECSC served to mobilize and integrate German economic capabilities in a European structure while at the same time checking those capabilities and the German political potential. A logical next step would have been to re-establish and integrate Germany's military capabilities under the same conditions. The need for this seemed to be underscored by the East-West confrontation that had become more serious during the Berlin Blockade (1948-1949) and the Korean War (1950-1953), but also by the change in NATO's approach to defending Western Europe against the Soviet Union. Instead of using the Rhine-Ijssel line, and thereby giving up large parts of West Germany and the Netherlands, NATO forces would actually defend along the Inner German Border. Germany would be an integral part of NATO's defense.8

So, along the lines of the Schuman Plan, France proposed a European Defence Community (EDC). The European army in this community would operate under supranational command but within the NATO framework. All German units were to be integrated at the regimental level to prevent any form of
larger separate German units. Although in 1952 the intent to establish the EDC was formally agreed upon, the French Assembly rejected the proposal in 1954.⁹

Still, the need for rearming Germany and integrating its forces into a multinational military organization could not be dismissed. A solution was found in enlarging the Western Union. On 23 October 1954 the so called Paris Agreements were signed. The Agreements amended the Brussels Treaty and established a Western European Union. The members of the WEU would be Belgium, France, West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The Agreements became effective on 6 May 1955.

From now on, the preamble expressed the wish "To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe."¹⁰ Furthermore, the amended Treaty formally established a link with NATO, both in the treaty itself and in a separate protocol, on Forces of the Western European Union.¹¹ Two more important changes concerned the nature and the responsibilities of the Council of the WEU, and the establishment of the Assembly, a representative parliamentary body.

The Assembly was meant to balance the Council, in particular in matters of controlling armaments. As it turned out, the Assembly covered every problem that arose out of the modified Treaty. Since it was (and still is) the only official European parliamentary body with competence in
defense matters, it also recommended to the Council on means and ways to ensure European security. The Assembly had 89 representatives, being the representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. The number of representatives per country was addressed in the Statute of the Council of Europe. E.g., France could send 18 representatives, whereas Belgium only could send 7.\textsuperscript{12} As of May 1955, the Council was to be given powers of decision; it could set up any subsidiary body that was considered necessary. A Secretary-General assisted the Council. The Council met at Foreign Minister level and at the level of Permanent Representatives (being the London based ambassadors of the member states).

By 1973 the WEU had achieved three things. Firstly, it enabled West-Germany to become a member of the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. Secondly, the organization played a vital role in the settlement of the Saar problem.\textsuperscript{13} Lastly, the WEU was the only organization in which the original six members of the EC and Great Britain could meet in a European context. After 1973, when Great Britain became a member to the EC, there seemed to be no direct need for the WEU, and from then until 1984 there would be no more meetings at the ministerial level.

In the 1980s the need for more and better European cooperation re-emerged. Some reasons were the revival of the Cold War, the discussion on INF systems in Europe, the dual-
track decision concerning these systems, and the 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In particular Germany was concerned about the link between Europe and the United States. Also, Western Europe feared it would fall behind the United States and Japan, especially in technology. Thus, several initiatives emerged for European political and economic cooperation. At the same time it was clear that cooperation in these fields required cooperation in security as well. The WEU remained the only platform to discuss defense matters officially. Therefore, in 1983, France and Germany decided to revive that organization. A meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers followed in Rome, on 26-27 October 1984. At the end of that meeting a declaration was issued; it would become known as the Rome Declaration. The Declaration not only revived the WEU, but also reformed it to a certain extent. As Cahen put it: "The Rome Declaration ... does however add to WEU a new and important responsibility by making WEU the European center for the Member States' common reflection and concerted action on security matters."

In the future, the Council would meet twice a year at the ministerial level. The Foreign Ministers would be present, but so would the Defense Ministers. The Presidency would rotate in a 12 month schedule. The Permanent Council's mandate was to be enlarged, and the cooperation between the Assembly and the Council would be intensified.
The Rome Declaration emphasized again the close relationship between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. It also stressed the special position of Europe for geographical, political, psychological and military reasons. But it was also painfully clear that there was no such thing as a European security identity and there were no principles of European security. A thorough study into these matters resulted in 1987 in the Platform on European Security. The Platform describes the 1987 conditions of European security, it presents the principles on which European security should be based, and it reflects the intentions of the Member States with regard to their responsibilities.

In April 1988 the Council of Ministers of the WEU invited Portugal and Spain to join, and in November 1988 the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain was signed. This protocol showed that both the Rome Declaration of 1984 and the Platform on European Security Interests had become full parts of the modified Brussels Treaty.  

After Berlin

Just like NATO and the EC, did the WEU see a window of opportunity opening, when the situation in Europe started shifting. Only days after the Berlin Wall had come down, the WEU established the Institute for Security Studies in Paris. The institute became operational in July 1990. The tasks of the institute include independent and objective research for
the governments of the WEU member states, and to stimulate a wider debate on European security issues.¹⁹

The EC summit in Maastricht and the resulting treaties are just as important for the WEU as they are for the EC. After all, the Treaty on the European Union indicates that the WEU should be developed as the defense component of the EC. The WEU is requested to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the European Union, which have defense implications. As a restriction, however, is mentioned that the WEU cannot interfere with NATO or with bilateral treaties.

As the WEU related texts at the EC summit show, the intent is to build up WEU in stages.²⁰ The final stage of the build-up process would make the WEU the defense component of the European Union. Firstly, it is imperative that the build-up neutralizes some inherent deficiencies. To this end, the WEU will realize synchronization of the meetings of both WEU and EC, and harmonization of their working methods. Furthermore, the WEU will strive to synchronize and harmonize the rotation schedules of the Presidencies of both organizations. Also on the agenda is closer cooperation between the mutual Councils and Secretariats-General, as well as closer cooperation between the parliamentary Assembly of the WEU and the European Parliament.

Besides improving on existing procedures, the WEU foresees some measures that will further strengthen the WEU
position. Among those measures is establishing a planning cell, in order to advise the Secretary General on new fields of cooperation, such as strategic surveillance, training, transport, and logistics. Another measure will be that the Chiefs of Defense Staff of the WEU member nations will start meeting on a regular basis. The measure with the biggest impact, however, is that military units will be made answerable to the WEU.

The WEU balance

At this moment, the WEU seemingly has only two points working to its benefit. One strong point is the fact that the EC has designated the WEU as its military arm of the future. A second strength might be the lack of cold war history. As already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the WEU’s role in the East-West controversy has never been very prominent, if at all existing. This could mean a higher rate of acceptability, in particular in peacekeeping missions in former WTO countries. The third strong point is the fact that WEU is not restricted by specific geographic boundaries, as is NATO. This makes WEU more suitable for crises that occur outside the continent of Europe.

At the negative side of the balance, however, are some weaknesses that are not easy to overcome. The most salient is of course the lack of an integrated military
structure. Although the plans for the future provide for military units answering to the WEU, it will not be easy to create an adequate structure. Given the ongoing reductions in Europe, there is no financial latitude to assign units separately to WEU. It would mean "double" or "multi hatted" units, i.e., answerable to both NATO and WEU, and maybe even to other organizations such as the UN. Although not ideal, such a construction could work if carefully planned. Still, it solves only half of the problem, since the WEU would also need to establish its own command and control structure.

Another weak point is the fact that even after Maastricht, no provisions have been made to start consultations between the member states automatically if a situation demands so. The Council can put an issue on the agenda, but this procedure does no justice to the character and the objective of consultations. If security is taken seriously, such consultations should be mandatory.

Checking the WEU against the principles of crisis management, is useless. Since the organizational structure of the WEU is almost rudimentary, it will not be able to comply with any of the principles.

Conclusion

The balance of pluses and minuses does not look too well for the WEU. Although designated as the European Union's military component of the future, the WEU has little
to offer yet as far as a tangible military structure is concerned. For some this is reason to observe, that the reinforcing and modifying of the WEU is a waste of effort and of money. After all, at the very best will WEU only duplicate the organization in whose shadow it has always been, NATO. One can argue, on the other hand, that the WEU has something to offer that NATO never can: a unique European character.

It seems that WEU’s future is largely dependent on the EC’s will to create its own European forces. The litmus test for the WEU will occur once projects need to be funded. Simultaneously, WEU developments will be closely related to the developments in other security institutions. The last of the other institutions to be reviewed in this study is the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE.
Mr. Willem van Eekelen, Secretary-General of the WEU, in his address to the members of the Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap (Convention for Military History and Sciences) on 12 October 1990 in The Hague.


Some examples of this were already given in chapter V. Furthermore, in 1946, the Soviet Union did not want to withdraw its garrison (part of a tripartite military protection) from Iran, the increasing Soviet pressure on Turkey had prompted the United States to station a naval task force in the Mediterranean, and Washington had indicated to Moscow those areas and regions in the world that were not to fall into hands hostile to the United States. See also: Cahen, 1; and Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1989), 374-380.

The Treaty of Defensive Alliance, or Dunkirk Treaty, was signed on 4 March 1947 in Dunkirk.


Cahen, 76.

The Foreign Office in London considered an attack by Germany rather academic. See also Kennedy, 377.


Great Britain did not want to be part of the proposed defense community, if only because the proposal included a political union as well. Without Great Britain, and with the French armed forces heavily committed in colonial warfare, the French were afraid for German domination in the EDC. See also: Henk Houweling and Jan Geert Siccama (ed.), 176-178.

Cahen, 69.

Article IV reads: In the execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Recognizing the un-
desirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters. See: Cahen, 76.

12 See: Cahen, 31-33.

13 In this former German area one could find rich coal fields. The Saar had been given to France as compensation for the losses of the First World War. In 1935 the area was recovered by Germany, but after the Second World War it was included in the French occupation zone. France granted the Saar autonomy, within an economic union with France. The WEU convinced both France and West Germany that a peaceful solution was possible. Eventually the Saar was returned to Germany. See: Cahen, 4-5.

14 Because of West Germany’s concerns about the link between Europe and United States security matters, a closer cooperation with France made sense from the point of view that it would involve France more in the defense of Germany.

15 Cahen, 27.

16 Today, not only do the Ministers meet twice a year, but the Political Directors of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs together with their Defense counterparts meet on a regular base as well, and experts on several levels meet frequently to discuss a wide variety of matters concerning security.

17 For a more elaborate analysis of the revival (or reactivation) of the WEU see: Cahen, 4-7; and Henk Houweling and Jan Geert Siccama (ed.), 184-192.

18 To be invited a state must be a member of the Atlantic Alliance (but not necessarily of NATO’s integrated structure), the state must fully accept the modified Treaty, the Rome declaration and the Platform. It must also subscribe to the process of building Europe in accordance with the SEA. The latter could imply that the state should be a member of the EC.

19 Dr. Willem van Eekelen, Secretary-General of the WEU, in his address to the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, Great Britain, on 10 January 1992.

20 The WEU related texts adopted at the EC Summit Maastricht, 10 December 1991, were published by the Press and Information section of the WEU.
CHAPTER VII:

THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

To call the document the 'Final Act' was misleading. It represented not an end but a beginning. ... The Final Act was a set of rules, a prescription for evolutionary and peaceful change in Europe; it did not codify the European political order established after 1945, but set standards for the Europe of the future.¹

Introduction

This chapter will look upon the last of the four security organizations, i.e., the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or CSCE. One could argue that the CSCE is not really an organization. Perhaps though, it would be better to say that it is not a full grown organization. After all, in November 1990 in Paris, the 34 States decided to establish a small institutional structure for CSCE, comprising a Council of Ministers as the central forum of political consultation; a Secretariat; and a Parliamentary Assembly. The institutionalization is yet another sign of the growing role of CSCE: many European countries were already of the opinion that CSCE will be one of the more important security provisions in the near future.
To see whether this hope is justified, this chapter will first present a historical overview of CSCE. Subsequently, analysis of the present situation and the future potential, and comparison with the standards developed in chapter IV, will reveal the strong and the weak points of the CSCE.

How the East was won.

The previous chapters learned that the other three security organizations, i.e., NATO, EC and WEU, have their origins in the timeframe immediate after the Second World War. Although this is also true for CSCE, the links with post-war problems are less obvious. After all, CSCE was established only in 1975, some 30 years after the War.

The Second World War had provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity to expand its territory, in the north at the expense of Finland, in the center at the expense of Poland, and in the south at the expense of Rumania. The Baltic states were incorporated in the Soviet Union and parts of both east Prussia and Czechoslovakia were taken. Furthermore, a belt of satellite states shielded the Soviet Union in the west and southwest. The Soviet Union had enhanced its security situation enough not to fear any intrusion from the west. Western Europe and the United States on the other hand, believed that the Soviet search for control over East Europe was but the first step, and they
considered the Soviet ambitions highly dangerous for West European security. Although the Western suspicions were not necessarily true, they would guide Westerns actions for the next decades. The Soviet Union, in turn, distrusted West Europe. In fact, "Soviet and Western policies were developing reactively, one upon another." A relatively strong Western Europe linked to the United States eventually emerged from the ruins of the war. That was exactly what Joseph Stalin had feared and had tried to prevent.

After Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet Union seemed more willing to relieve some of the tensions between East and West. In January 1954, on a conference in Berlin, the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov proposed a "General European Treaty of Collective Security." This proposal was rejected by the Western powers. The idea of collective security for Europe, however, would re-appear a number of times. The concept of European collective security as an alternative for NATO was even a central slogan of the Socialistic Party Germany SPD until 1957. The 1954 Molotov proposal would be the first in a long line of suggestions, initiatives and proposals to temper the animosity between East and West.

At the conference in Vienna in 1955, a basic difference became visible between the Soviet and the Western approaches. The Soviet Union focused on non-aggression as the essence of any security arrangement, whereas Western
Europe insisted on inclusion of non-military aspects. The Soviet Union also wanted to exclude North America from any talks on European security. Later on, in 1956, it also became clear that the Soviet Union sought official recognition for the German Democratic Republic through a European Security Conference. The Soviet move into Hungary in 1956 did not do much good to the East-West dialogue on European Security, and neither did the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 or the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

In 1963, the installation of the Hot Line between Washington and Moscow and the signing of Limited Test Ban Treaty signalled a new phase in both detente and arms control. Shortly thereafter, in 1964, the Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki suggested a European Security Conference, and extended the invitation for such a conference to the United States and Canada. The conference should "examine the problem of European security in its entirety".\(^5\) Apparently, this complied with the West European wish to include other than military aspects in such a conference. Although the WTO supported the Polish suggestion, the West suspected that the Soviet Union still aimed to use any conference to drive a wedge between the United States and the European countries in NATO.

The French President Charles de Gaulle gave possible negotiations on European security another spin in 1965. De Gaulle firmly believed in the grandeur of France and
profoundly distrusted bi-polarity. He also believed in "detente, entente and cooperation" between Western and Eastern Europe. France therefore preferred a multilateral approach to European security issues, as opposed to the bloc-to-bloc method. De Gaulle also believed that enduring peace and stability in Europe could only be obtained if the German question was settled. In 1966, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) accepted "a wider international framework" as a means to improve East-West relations, but it re-iterated that there could not be "a genuine and stable settlement in Europe" as long as Germany was divided. A year later, in 1967, the so called Harmel doctrine was adopted by NATO. According to this doctrine NATO should strive for relaxation of the tensions between East and West, but NATO should maintain a firm defensive posture at the same time. The report on which the doctrine was based recognized explicitly that certain objects require by their very nature a multilateral solution.

The Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia in 1968 damaged the detente in some way, but not for long. In March 1969, in Bucharest, the WTO proposed a preliminary meeting of all European states, to determine procedures for convening a meeting on security issues and the agenda for that meeting. The NAC responded in April with a communique that proposed to explore together with the Soviet Union and other East European states which concrete issues were best suited
for negotiations and resolution. Finland was one of the Neutral and Non-Aligned countries (NNA) which responded to the Bucharest proposal. Finland suggested a meeting in Helsinki.

Also in 1969, Germany introduced its Ostpolitik. As opposed to the so called Hallstein doctrine, this policy aimed to normalize the relationship with the East and more in particular with the Soviet Union.⁹ The West German Government implemented the policy step by step, being guided by the reactions of the East, which were fairly positive. Most authors consider the German Ostpolitik as a conditio sine qua non for initiating the reorganization of the European security order through CSCE.¹⁰ After all, in line with this policy, Germany had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Chancellor Willy Brandt had proclaimed two states in one nation. Thereby, Germany had met the Soviet requirements for solving the German question.

In October 1969, the East European Foreign Ministers met in Prague, where they suggested two items for the agenda of an all-European conference. The first item was "European security and the renunciation of the use of force or threats of force in relations between European states." The second item should cover the expansion of trade, economic, as well as scientific and technical ties, on the basis of equality, with the aim of fostering political cooperation between the European states.¹¹ The NAC reacted in December and
declared that a conference including the United States and Canada might discuss and negotiate cooperation and security in Europe. However, it made the conference subject to progress in "other conferences soon to begin." By this the NAC obviously meant the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR).

By May 1970 NATO apparently was willing to discuss the principles of governing the relations between states; the development of international relations with a view to freer movement of people, ideas and information; and the development of cooperation in the fields of culture, economy, science and the human environment. At the same time NATO realized that this broad array of topics could not be addressed in one single conference. Again the May declaration did not explicitly link a security conference to the MBFR, but the relation was obvious. That same year three more events brought a security conference a little closer.

The first was the WTO finally accepting the participation of the United States and Canada in any conference on European security. The second was the Moscow treaty, renouncing the use of force between the Soviet Union and West Germany, and recognizing the existing European borders. This recognition included recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the border with Poland, as well as recognition of the borders of East Germany. The third event was the Warsaw treaty, normalizing the relationship with Poland, renouncing the use of force.
and recognizing the Oder-Neisse line as the western border of Poland. Both the Moscow Treaty and the Warsaw Treaty were the result of Germany's Ostpolitik. The treaties served as a catalyst in the negotiations on Berlin. In 1971 the four powers reached an agreement regulating visits and the exchange of territory to solve the problems of enclaves. Soviet ratification of this quadripartite treaty and agreement on running MBFR parallel with a security conference finally cleared the way for a conference on the security of Europe. In November 1972 the preparations began in Helsinki.

**Helsinki and beyond**

Agreeing on what later was to be called the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe certainly did not mean that East and West also agreed on an agenda. It would take until 1975 for the Conference to begin. NATO identified four possible areas of discussion, each being somewhat limited in scope. The topics were more or less the same as those suggested two years before, but "cooperation to improve the human environment" had become a separate topic. The East had more ambitious ideas. It wanted to discuss fundamental principles of inviolability of borders, non-use of force and peaceful coexistence. This left the agenda drafters with a twofold problem: the broad range of the topics and the divergence between East and West. The double problem was solved by organizing the conference in so
called baskets. The first basket would deal with general principles and security; the second with economy, science, technology and the environment; the third (and last) with human contacts, exchange of information and culture, and education. One should understand, though, that all these issues, both on the agenda and later in the final statement of the conference, were equally important.

The right to participate in CSCE was based on the principle of equality of states. All states were to bring up matters from their own point of view. Therefore CSCE was officially a conference outside the existing blocs; the participating nations were all sovereign and independent. It was the reason why procedures became very important in the CSCE process and actually became part of it. All decisions would be based on consensus, while the work was to be done in committees, chaired by all states in rotation.

The Helsinki Conference ended in August 1975. The final communique became famous as the Helsinki Final Act (HFA). The HFA was not an agreement in the sense that it was subject to international law, whereas the provisions in the Act had a varying legal status. The HFA was more a political document, based on the principles of reciprocity and interdependence. It is not surprising therefore that the choice of issues settled in the HFA was guided by the bilateral agreements which preceded the conference and which reflected the lessening of tensions in Europe.
The Final Act concluded the Helsinki Conference, but it marked the beginning of the CSCE process, even though NATO in the preparatory phase had firmly opposed institutionalization or continuation of the conference. Within the framework of the CSCE process, for the first time, nations did not just accept Confidence Building Measures (CBM) as a byproduct, but sought those CBM proactively as a goal. For the first time, too, did nations emphasize the need to use increased mutual knowledge about military activities to diminish distrust. Within the framework, a Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) was issued a negotiating mandate for three years in 1984. The CDE would have its mandate renewed and, in 1989, initiated two new sets of negotiations. One would elaborate on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM), the other would focus on the reduction of conventional forces: the negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The latter, CFE, demonstrates the unprecedented speed of the events in Europe in recent years: started only in March 1989, a major agreement on conventional forces was reached in November 1990.

Helsinki again

Although the signing of the CFE-Treaty was the main attraction at the November 1990 summit, in Paris, some other results were equally important. Among those are the
decisions to establish a conflict prevention center in Vienna and an office for free elections in Warsaw. The declaration which was issued at the end of the meeting, reflected a firm intention to continue and strengthen the CSCE. First of all, the CSCE recognized the need to further enhance political consultations. Furthermore, the Conference declared it would undertake to continue the CSBM negotiations under the same mandate as before, and conclude these negotiations not later than the follow-up meeting on CSCE in 1992, in Helsinki.

Remarkable was the decision to use CSCE as a framework for environmental issues. By doing so, and by underlining that cooperation in the fields of economy, science and technology is an important pillar of the CSCE, all the elements of security seem to be covered.

As a result of Paris some changes will occur in procedures and administrative organization. It was decided that the Foreign Minister will meet at least once a year as the Council of the CSCE. These meetings will be prepared by a Committee of Senior Officials. Additional meetings, e.g., of other representatives, can be agreed upon, whenever such is deemed necessary. To support this administratively, a secretariat, was established. The Conference also decided to hold a summit every two years. Finally, the Conference called for a parliamentary assembly, but did not make any decisions.
In 1991, the CSCE saw its membership grow from 34 to 48 members. The Foreign Ministers of Croatia and Slovenia, as well as representatives of various international organizations participate as observers. The representation of almost all European countries enables the Conference to seek a broad basis of support for all the issues it addresses. Still; it does not necessarily make the CSCE suitable for operating as the core of a security system in a changing European security environment. A closer look at the advantages and disadvantages of the CSCE, should reveal more about the Conference’s suitability.

Advantages and disadvantages

The membership of all European countries, be it aligned or non-aligned, is really one of the stronger points of the CSCE. In particular, when the choice of security-related topics to discuss is not limited, the CSCE provides a unique forum for fundamental discussion. It leads to the second point, i.e., the fact that CSCE is the vehicle for implementation and verification of agreements under the CSCE umbrella, such as the agreement on CFE.

At the same time, the number of members puts CSCE at a disadvantage. After all, 48 members will bring 48 different opinions to the conference. Clearly, this will make any decision process very time consuming. At the same time, the CSCE cannot function outside Europe, because of it being
set up as a collective security system. Following from that system, however, the real Achilles heel for the Conference is its inherent lack of decisive power and means of enforcement. If the Conference decides or agrees on an issue, compliance cannot be enforced in any way, other than by political pressure.\textsuperscript{19} Not even the Conflict Prevention Center as a security mechanism, can alter that. As Dr. Ferdowsi, of the University of Munich, points out, with respect to that Center:

\textit{CSCE, like every system of collective security, suffers the basic strain between agreement and enforcement: When everybody wants peace, the mechanism need not be used, because all is quiet anyhow. Only in case of conflict is a working security mechanism required to attach [sic!] when the danger is imminent. But then it is only so effective as the will to cooperate of the parties to the conflict.}\textsuperscript{20}

It should not be surprising that CSCE does not meet the standards set by five of the seven principles of crisis management. Obviously, the Conference is in an excellent position to comply with the principle of multiple advocacy. The principle of communications creates an ambiguous situation. On the one hand communications with conflicting parties within CSCE should not pose any problems, on the other hand communications among such a large number of representatives can easily be cluttered by cultural background, languages, religion, etc. The Conference cannot comply, though, with any of the other principles.
Conclusion

The CSCE most certainly deserves to play a key role in any future security structure in Europe. Given its strengths and weaknesses however, the Conference will not be a true instrument for crisis management. It lacks the speed, as well as the decisive and executive power. It will be instrumental, though, in the process of improving relations between former adversaries in East and West. The CSCE is a forum par excellence to discuss and agree on fundamental issues regarding European security.
Notes


3 Freeman, 15.


5 Freeman, 33-34.


7 Freeman, 49.


9 The Hallstein doctrine came into force in 1955. In accordance with this doctrine, West Germany would break diplomatic relations with those countries that recognized East Germany.


11 Freeman, 49.

12 Ibid., 51-56.


14 As a result of the search for a greater flexibility of the committee structure a system of all kinds of subgroups developed: working groups, coffee groups, mini groups
and drafting groups dealt with specific topics or elements of topics.


16 The conference with the rather long name was soon referred to as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe: CDE. The CDE was tasked to negotiate CSBMs that were politically binding, militarily significant and verifiable. A significant success of the CDE would be the on-site inspections. These inspections marked the first time that the Soviet Union committed itself to accept and facilitate inspections of its military objects on challenge, i.e., without prior consultation and without preparation time.

17 See Chapter I.


19 It should be noted that the problem in this is twofold. The Helsinki Final Act for instance is not an agreement nor a treaty. According to international law, compliance with the Act cannot be enforced, even if CSCE would have the physical power, which it has not.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

From Warsaw to Tirana, and from Bratislava to Sofia, Eastern Europe has moved beyond the communist-led past and entered a new era. The present and future belong now to diverse national actors, and it is up to them to build democratic or authoritarian policies. No one can lay down guidelines for the transition. There is no error-proof blueprint to ensure the smoothness of this huge transformation.¹

Vladimír Tismaneanu, quoted above, limits his vision on transformation to the Eastern part of Europe. From his point view the logical thing to do, as he was writing on that specific part of Europe. As seen in this study, not only Eastern Europe, but Europe as a whole is in transition, and, yes, all actors are frantically looking for error-proof blueprints. Yugoslavia and some Soviet successor states already showed that error-proof is hard to come by in the world of international relations.

This study has looked into the future security situation in Europe. Necessarily it has taken a broad, but rather superficial approach, as opposed to a narrow, but more in-depth method. Both methods have pros and contras. It is the author’s firm belief, though, that a broad approach
prevails, due to the continuing rapid changes. After all, a broad perspective could easily function as a basis for adaptation or for further, in-depth study.

Yet, it has become clear that even with a broad approach, not everything could be covered. In the chapter on the European security environment for example, very little has been said on the increasing North-South gap, on specific religion oriented problems or on erratic, dangerous political players. By the same token, very little was said on the influence of nuclear weapon systems. It is questionable, however, whether these arguments, or their equivalent for the other chapters, could have changed the bottom lines of the respective parts of this study.

Before synthesizing the final conclusions, it is essential to make one more observation. As said, Europe as a whole is transitioning and looking for blueprints to guide the process. Yet Europeans are not necessarily looking for the same blueprints. Western Europe seems to focus on a higher level of integration, whereas Eastern Europe might be looking for a system of looser relationships, after so many years of forced integration. This difference in perception of a desired endstate leads to different perceptions of interests. It follows that security and eventual security systems will not be seen in a similar way by East and West.

As seen in chapter IV, Western Europe does indeed have unique interests within a European framework, the
communal interests. The communal interests, and subsequently the threats to those interests, appear in three distinct areas. The interests and threats comprise those that are economically driven and focus on vital resources outside the European continent; those that refer to the shift of power on the European continent and focus on the unstable situation in Central and Eastern Europe; and finally, those that refer to the shift of power within Western Europe and focus on the unified Germany. The bottom line in that first part of chapter IV is that a specific European security structure is justified by specific European interests and threats. Whatever threat will materialize though, the chances are that it will be an evolving crisis situation rather than a sudden full scale war. This requires a security structure able to perform crisis management according to certain stated principles. Along with that, that structure must also be capable to maintain the transatlantic link, at least for the foreseeable future.

Within those parameters, the next four chapters each reviewed one of the existing security institutions in Europe. Not surprisingly, the reviews showed that none of those institutions by itself is particularly suited for the new European security job. Although every institution has its particular strengths and weaknesses, a common weakness is the decision process. Europe consists of nations with a long history of sovereignty. This feeling of sovereignty is
particularly responsible for those problems in the decision cycle. It hampers or prohibits definition of common, clear-cut objectives, which are essential in crisis management.

Besides this lack of decision power as a specified limiting factor, some other factors were implied that could prevent Europe from efficiently and effectively managing future crises. One of those is worth emphasizing: the lack of a well developed intelligence and surveillance system. Although the United States partially can fill this gap, it will never give Europe full access to the necessary information. If Europe wants to conduct effective crisis management to safeguard communal interests, it has to realize that intelligence and surveillance are vital.

Given the security environment, and the strengths and weaknesses of the current security institutions, the possible development of a future European security structure can serve as an overall conclusion. It should be noted that no time reference is given.

The structure is built around the European Community, which eventually is to become a European Union. Until then, a military component can only be provided by NATO. As a Union however it should be able to design a comprehensive security organization by itself. If so, it should also be able to manage its own military force if necessary. By then the military emphasis should have shifted from NATO to WEU. In this shifting process, the United
States remain a crucial factor in NATO, but its dominance in the organization will diminish gradually. Eventually, the Transatlantic link will be maintained through the CSCE only. The Conference will serve three purposes. First, it will provide the forum in which the fundamentals of pan-European security are discussed and in which fundamental security provisions are designed. Second, it will serve to link European countries in a loose way to a security system, until those countries themselves decide for tighter relationships. Third and last, it will maintain the link between Europe and North America.

Obviously, the future does not come with a warranty certificate. If anything has become clear in the most recent years, it is that events can gain enormous speed and great momentum. When that happens, very few things are impossible. One thing seems certain though: Europe has passed a point of no return, and will no longer look the way we still like to think it looks.
Notes

APPENDIX A

ABBREVIATIONS

ATTU : Atlantic To The Ural
CBM : Confidence Building Measures
CDE : Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
CFE : Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CINC : Commander-in-Chief
CSBM : Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSCE : Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DPC : Defence Planning Committee
EC : European Community
ECSC : European Coal and Steel Community
EDC : European Defense Community
EDI : European Defense Identity
EEA : European Economic Area
EEC : European Economic Community
EFTA : European Free Trade Association
EPC : European Political Cooperation
EPU : European Political Union
EURATOM : European Atomic Energy Community
GDP : Gross Domestic Product
HFA : Helsinki Final Act
INF : Intermediate range Nuclear Forces
MBFR : Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
NAC : North Atlantic Council
NACC : North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA : National Command Authority
NNA : Neutral and Non-Aligned (countries)
NPG : Nuclear Planning Group
NPT : (Nuclear) Non Proliferation Treaty
OECD : Organization for European Cooperation and Development
OECEC : Organization for European Economic Cooperation
SALT : Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI : Strategic Defense Initiative
SEA : Single European Act
WEU : Western European Union
WTO : Warsaw Treaty Organization
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