Standing Joint Task Forces--A Way to Enhance America's Warfighting Capabilities?

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ABSTRACT

STANDING JOINT TASK FORCES--A WAY TO ENHANCE AMERICA'S WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES? by MAJ Marc R. Hildenbrand, USA, 51 pages.

This study answers the following question: Would American warfighting capabilities be enhanced by creating standing joint task forces for all but the most unlikely contingencies?

In answering the foregoing question, the monograph first part examines the new United States (US) military strategy. The second portion reviews current procedures for allocating forces for contingency operations. The third section outlines a concept for creating standing joint task forces. The next presents a comparative analysis whose purpose is to develop a basis for determining whether current force allocation procedures or standing joint task forces better serve America's future warfighting needs. For the comparative analysis, doctrine, command and control, interoperability, and teamwork serve as analytic criteria. The monograph's final section includes appropriate conclusions and recommendations.

Overall, the monograph concludes standing joint task forces appear to offer the potential for enhancing America's warfighting capabilities vis-a-vis current force allocation procedures. Given enough time before hostilities begin, the current system does not require major changes. However, adequate future pre-hostility preparation time will probably be the exception rather than the rule. As a minimum, the US should create standing joint task forces for the most time sensitive missions--such as forcible entry operations to establish a lodgement.
Standing Joint Task Forces —
A Way to Enhance America's Warfighting Capabilities?

A Monograph
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INTRODUCTION

The world is changing in dramatic ways. The National Security Strategy of the United States conveys a sense of the enormous international changes currently taking place. As President Bush states:

A new world order is not a fact; it is an aspiration--and an opportunity. We have within our grasp an extraordinary possibility that few generations have enjoyed--to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals, as old patterns and certainties crumble around us.1

The President is also a pragmatist, and his National Security Strategy recognizes the continuing need for the United States (US) to employ military force in pursuit of vital national interests. In fact, the very conditions making the creation of a new world order possible--the disintegration of the bi-polar US-Soviet structure which dominated post-World War II (WW II) international relations--are, in many ways, precipitating a less politically stable world.

America's armed forces are currently undergoing one of their greatest reductions since WW II. Given the realities of a continuing need to employ force, an unstable international political environment, and a smaller military, maximizing the warfighting capability of whatever US armed forces remain is essential--especially in contingency areas associated with vital

American interests. One way to enhance the warfighting capability of a smaller military force might be to create standing joint task forces. This study answers one question related to the issue of standing joint task forces, to wit: Would American warfighting capabilities be enhanced by creating standing joint task forces for all but the most unlikely contingencies?

Following the introduction the study comprises five main parts. The first examines the new US military strategy. The second portion reviews current procedures for allocating forces for contingency operations. The third section outlines a concept for creating standing joint task forces. The next presents a comparative analysis whose purpose is to develop a basis for determining whether current force allocation procedures or standing joint task forces better serve America's future warfighting needs. For this portion, doctrine, command and control, interoperability, and teamwork serve as analytic criteria. The monograph's final section includes appropriate conclusions and recommendations.

Standing joint task forces are not an example of unnecessary jointness. Instead, standing JTFs appear to offer the potential for enhancing America's warfighting capabilities vis-a-vis current force allocation procedures. Given enough time before
hostilities begin, the current system does not require major changes. In the future, however, adequate pre-hostility preparation time will probably be the exception rather than the rule. As a minimum, the US should create standing joint task forces for the most time sensitive missions she may face--such as forcible entry operations to establish a lodgement.

THE NEW MILITARY STRATEGY

The President's *National Security Strategy* specifies four major interests for the United States in the 1990s. These are:

1. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

2. A healthy and growing US economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.

3. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

4. A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.2

Appendix A lists the military objectives supporting the preceding interests. As the appendix illustrates, creating the new world order President Bush envisions requires using military force.3


On August 2, 1990 in Aspen, Colorado President Bush outlined a new national defense strategy. The President's Aspen speech calls for:

[forces] in existence . . . [and] ready to act . . . . [with] speed and agility. . . . forces that give us global reach. . . . a new emphasis on flexibility and versatility. . . . readiness must be our highest priority. . . . [our forces] must be well-trained, tried, and tested--ready to perform every mission we ask of them.4

The January 1992 National Military Strategy translates the President's vision into a coherent military strategy. This document alters many of the fundamental assumptions guiding military planning since World War II. The most significantly altered assumption "is the shift from containing the spread of communism and deterring Soviet aggression to a more diverse, flexible strategy which is regionally oriented and capable of responding decisively to the challenges of this decade."5

The National Military Strategy requires commanders in chiefs (CINCs) of unified and specified commands to plan for the use of military force in four general categories:

1. Deploying and employing reconstituted forces to counter the emergence of a global threat and

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4President George Bush, "Remarks by the President at the Address to the Aspen Institute Symposium," speech delivered in Aspen, Colorado, 2 August 1990. [hereafter referred to as President Bush, "Aspen Speech"]

to defeat any such threat that arises.

2. Employing strategic nuclear forces and strategic defenses to deter and respond to a nuclear attack.

3. Employing assigned resources on a day to day basis to: build military and alliance readiness; foster stability; promote peace, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; protect lives and property; help US friends, allies, and those in need of humanitarian aid.

4. Deploying and employing forces to deter and, if necessary, rapidly and decisively resolve a regional military conflict [emphasis added].

Of the four preceding planning categories, the last serves as "the primary determinant of the size and structure of our future forces."7

The Base Force is the centerpiece of the new regionally focused military strategy. The Base Force's most important elements are "trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and the leadership to make the force work in joint and combined operations."8 As Appendix B (Proposed Base Force Composition) highlights, the Base Force will be much smaller than America's current military arsenal. Four conceptual force packages and four supporting capabilities comprise the Base Force. "This is a force sizing tool

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7National Security Strategy, p. 28.
8General Colin L. Powell, Military Strategy, Preface.
and not a blueprint for a new command structure"
[emphasis added].9 The four conceptual force packages consist of Strategic Forces, Atlantic Forces, Pacific Forces, and Contingency Forces; the four supporting capabilities are Transportation, Space, Reconstitution, and Research and Development.10 Strategic Forces exist to deter nuclear aggression. Atlantic Forces display a continuing commitment to US interests in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Africa, and Southwest Asia. Pacific Forces stand ready to respond in the Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. Contingency Forces will respond on a short notice, "come-as-you-are" basis to spontaneous, often unpredictable crises. Virtually all contingency forces will be based in the United States.11 The purposes of the supporting capabilities are as follows:
Transportation—sealift, airlift, and prepositioning;
Space—communications, navigation, and intelligence;
Reconstitution—industrial capability, mobilization and force regeneration (including reserves); Research and

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Development—to support and improve all forces and capabilities.12

In the National Military Strategy forward presence replaces, for all practical purposes, forward deployment. Excluding nuclear forces (which are beyond this study's scope), America's forward presence forces will consist of approximately: three Army divisions, three carrier battle groups, two Marine amphibious ready groups, and seven Air Force fighter wing equivalents (see Appendix C--Forces Designated for Forward Presence). The National Military Strategy "is built upon the four foundations of Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution."13 However, the overwhelming majority of America's military forces will be contingency forces positioned in the United States—including Hawaii and Alaska—awaiting employment in a crisis response mode.

A number of realities emerge from the preceding discussion. Overall "the distinguishing feature of this new strategy is that it focuses more on regional threats and less on global confrontation."14 The Base Force available for fighting regional conflicts is

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smaller, forward presence replaces forward deployment, and America's primary military efforts will focus on executing contingency related, crisis response missions. These realities underscore the importance of four key issues.

First, before "committing US forces to combat it must be determined that US vital interests [emphasis added] are at risk and that political, diplomatic, and economic measures have failed to correct the situation or have been ruled out for some other reason."\(^{15}\) Thus, if America commits military forces into combat, she cannot afford to lose.

Second, America's armed forces must be strategically agile. The forces needed to win a regional conflict linked to a vital US interest must be capable of moving "from wherever they are to wherever they are needed. US forces stationed in CONUS [the norm] and overseas [the exception] will be fully capable of worldwide employment on short notice."\(^{16}\)

Third, the US must be able to fight and win unilaterally. "While we emphasize multinational operations under the auspices of international bodies such as the United Nations, we must retain the

\(^{15}\)Military Strategy, p. 16.

\(^{16}\)Military Strategy, p. 9.
capability to act unilaterally when and where US interests dictate."17

**Finally, American armed forces must be capable of applying decisive force to overwhelm our adversaries and thereby terminate conflicts swiftly with a minimum loss of life.**"18 Decisive force is especially important in a world in which our adversaries "may possess cruise missiles, modern air defenses, chemical weapons, ballistic missiles and even large armor formations"19

Overall, the "new strategy is, in many ways, more complex than the containment strategy of the Cold War era."20 Confronted with the new strategy's realities and the key issues arising from these realities, one can hardly question this complexity. How then does the current system for providing military forces to America's combatant commanders work? The next section answers this question.

**CURRENT CONTINGENCY OPERATION FORCE ALLOCATION PROCEDURES**

Current American military planning falls into one of two broad categories: force planning or operational planning. Force planning involves creating and

maintaining military capabilities. The primary responsibility for force planning rests with each of the military services. In contrast, operational planning focuses on employing military forces within the context of a military strategy to attain specified objectives. Operational planning for most contingencies requires using forces of more than one service. Therefore, joint operational planning will be the norm in future contingencies. The chain of command running from the National Command Authority (NCA) to the combatant commanders conducts joint operational planning. This section examines force allocation procedures for contingency operations within the context of joint operational planning.

Combatant commanders have the primary responsibility for preparing and implementing joint operation plans. In peacetime, they develop theater military strategies and appropriate operation plans to achieve such strategies. During a crisis, combatant commanders recommend courses of action (COAs) to the National Command Authority to deal with the situation at hand. When directed by the NCA, combatant commanders

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22 Planning Joint Ops, p. I-1.

commanders--also referred to as CINCs--conduct joint operations.24

In peacetime, crisis, or war the basic joint planning process consists of five steps: mission identification, estimate of the situation, plan development, plan review and approval, and implementation.25 Identification of a real or potential need for military action initiates the joint planning process. Mission identification is also the basis for conducting an estimate of the situation.26 The first step in the estimate of the situation is to conduct a mission analysis. Mission analysis results in a clear, concise mission statement. Next, the combatant commander issues planning guidance. Planning guidance facilitates the preparation of staff estimates concerning alternative ways to accomplish a mission. The various alternatives are evaluated and compared, and the preferred COA is identified.27 Finally, having identified the preferred COA the CINC's strategic concept is prepared. The CINC's strategic concept guides all subsequent planning by clarifying the commander's intent and expanding "the selected COA


26 Planning Joint Ops, pp. 1-16 to 1-17.

27 Planning Joint Ops, pp. 1-17 to 1-18.
through a narrative visualization of how the operation will be conducted."

During plan development the staff translates the CINC's strategic concept into an executable operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) reviews the OPLAN or OPORD; he may direct the combatant commander to make changes to the document or approve it as written. Following CJCS approval, the OPLAN or OPORD remains in effect unless revised, canceled, or superseded.\(^{29}\)

Implementation is the final step in the joint operational planning process. Upon National Command Authority direction, combatant commanders initiate military actions to accomplish assigned missions.\(^{30}\)

Regardless of the time available, joint operational planning uses the same five step procedure. However, time-sensitive situations necessitate truncating and compressing the process.\(^{31}\)

Operational planning uses a uniform categorization system to define the forces available to combatant commanders for planning and conducting joint operations. Under this system forces are either

\(^{28}\)Planning Joint Ops, p. 1-18.

\(^{29}\)Planning Joint Ops, p. 1-18.

\(^{30}\)Planning Joint Ops, pp. 1-18 to 1-19.

assigned, apportioned, or allocated. Assigned forces:

are those in being that have been placed under the COCOM or OPCON of a commander. With the advice and assistance of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President prescribes the force structure of the combatant commands. ... Forces and resources so assigned are available for peacetime operations and other joint operation planning activities of that command.32

Apportioned forces:

are those made available for deliberate planning. They may include those assigned and those expected through mobilization. They are apportioned by the JSCP [Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan] for use in developing joint OPLANs and may be more or less than those allocated for execution planning [emphasis added].33

Finally, allocated forces:

are those provided for execution planning or actual implementation. ... In actual implementation, allocated, reinforcing forces become assigned or attached forces when they come under the COCOM or OPCON of the receiving Combatant Commander.34

Comparing the preceding definitions to the basic five step joint planning process raises several issues regarding America's ability to rapidly project military power in the way the President and the new National Military Strategy envision. Since apportioned forces "may be more or less than those allocated for execution planning [emphasis added]",35 combatant commanders will

32 Planning Joint Ops, p. 1-12. See Appendix D for the definitions of COCOM and OPCON.
33 Planning Joint Ops, p. 1-12.
34 Planning Joint Ops, p. 1-12.
probably not know until the last minute which forces are actually available for executing a given mission. Equally important is this: only when forces are actually allocated do such forces come under the COCOM or OPCON of the receiving combatant commander. As a result, the forces allocated to respond to a given situation may never have worked with one another or with the CINC they will serve under. In many ways this was exactly the situation confronting General Schwarzkopf during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Central Command had very few assigned forces. Following the Iraqi invasion the United States assembled the largest joint force since World War II. In light of the success enjoyed by General Schwarzkopf’s forces--built around a joint American nucleus of soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen--the current joint planning and force allocation system may appear totally sound. However, as the President's National Security Strategy states:

The 100-hour success of our ground forces in the war to liberate Kuwait was stunning, but we should not allow it to obscure the fact that we required six months to deploy these forces.36

We should also not forget that coalition forces had the luxury of training for six months before launching Operation Desert Storm. Also recall the President's

vision for the forces America requires to execute his new regionally oriented defense strategy:

[forces] in existence . . . [and] ready to act . . . . [with] speed and agility. . . . forces that give us global reach. . . . a new emphasis on flexibility and versatility. . . . readiness must be our highest priority. . . . [our forces] must be well-trained, tried, and tested--ready to perform every mission we ask of them. 37

The joint planning and force allocation system have admirably met the challenges of the past. Unfortunately success often stifles an unbiased evaluation of new ideas and the potential positive evolution arising from such ideas. However, as Moltke warns: "Only humility leads to victory; arrogance and self-conceit to defeat." 38 Given the imposing force projection requirements the President and the new National Military Strategy levy on America's armed forces, alternatives for providing forces to combatant commanders are worth examining. One alternative is the creation of CONUS-based standing joint task forces for all but the most unlikely contingencies. The following section outlines a concept for creating such standing joint task forces.

37President Bush, "Aspen Speech".

STANDING JOINT TASK FORCES--A CONCEPT

Joint task forces are not a new idea to the American military. Within six months of the Declaration of Independence the United States established a joint task force to capture British weapons needed by the fledgling Continental Army.39 The evolution of United States joint task forces continues today. For example, US Atlantic Command's Joint Task Force Four and US Pacific Command's Joint Task Force Five conduct daily counterdrug operations.40 However, peacetime standing joint task forces are the exception rather than the rule, and the joint task forces which do exist generally do not focus on warfighting.

Current force allocation procedures organize military forces for contingency operations on a mission basis. America's armed services go to great lengths in preparing to execute such mission based contingency operations. For example, joint training exercises such as Bright Star and Team Spirit bring together forces from each service to practice executing various OPLANs. Additionally, intra-service initiatives such as the

39 For an extended discussion of this topic see Cushman, Future Force Projection Ops, pp. 27 to 54.

Battle Command Training Program prepare Army corps and divisions for accomplishing their wartime missions. These efforts help to make today's armed forces the finest peacetime force in American history. The success of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrates the current mission based approach to preparing for war has great merit.

US-based standing joint task forces would radically alter the current mission based approach for preparing to wage joint warfare. A variety of standing joint task forces would incorporate all CONUS-based forces (including reserve component elements). Such CONUS-based forces will soon represent the majority of America's military force structure (see Appendix E--Base Force Positioning). Assigning CONUS-based forces to standing JTFs requires making hard decisions regarding the allocation of scarce military assets--especially in an era of diminishing fiscal resources.

Rather than organizing standing joint task forces on a mission basis (a virtual impossibility given the range of potential contingencies and the size of the Base Force), a functional approach may serve as a reasonable basis for organizing standing JTFs. In organizing forces for all but the most unlikely contingencies, a functional approach might yield the

following JTFs:

1. Forcible entry JTF
2. Heavy JTF
3. Light JTF
4. Heavy-light JTF
5. Light-heavy JTF

The composition of each functional JTF would vary. For example, marines, Army paratroopers, and Air Force elements would probably serve as the nucleus of the forcible entry JTF. In contrast, Army heavy divisions and Air Force assets might form the core of the heavy standing JTF. Such a functional approach still allows CINCs to receive forces (in the form of one or more standing joint task forces) based on the situation, the terrain, and the enemy.

Irrespective of a joint task force's functional focus, appropriate units from each of the four services, special operations forces, and necessary support elements would be assigned together under one commander. The responsibility for preparing the JTF for combat would rest with this commander. JTFs with the highest required level of readiness—the forcible entry joint task force for example—would be composed, if possible, entirely of active duty forces.

Combatant commanders would be apportioned standing joint task forces instead of type units for warplanning purposes. In the event a crisis exceeds a combatant commander's in-theater military capability, the NCA would allocate the type and number of standing JTFs the
CINC needs. Even if the force the CINC receives is more or less than the JTF apportioned for warplanning, the CINC's forces arrive in-theater as teams which have worked, trained, and operated together in peacetime.

Functional organization of standing JTFs provides deployment flexibility to the combatant commander. For example, in a contingency requiring a forcible entry to establish a lodgement, the forcible entry JTF deploys first. Thereafter other standing JTFs to support the combatant commander's NCA approved plan follow.

Integrating CONUS-based Army and Air Force units into standing joint task forces is relatively easy. Indeed, General McPeak (the Air Force Chief of Staff) is moving the Air Force towards greater jointness by creating composite airwings comprised of "bomb droppers, fighter escort, jamming aircraft, lethal defense suppression aircraft, airborne radar platforms, tankers, airlifters, and the like," generally located "at one base and under one commander."42 The frequency of overseas deployments which Navy and Marine Corps combat forces experience might cause the maritime portion of standing JTFs to change more frequently than the Army or Air Force portions. However, blending Navy

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and Marine Corps elements into standing joint task forces is not an insurmountable challenge.

Finally, the Base Force's assets appear adequate for creating functionally organized standing JTFs. However, such adequacy is contingent upon making tough decisions concerning the military capabilities the United States truly needs in this century's closing years. From the perspective of resources, attempting to organize standing JTFs for every possible contingency will not work; organizing standing JTFs for all but the most unlikely contingencies will probably work.

This section outlined a concept for creating standing JTFs. Still unresolved is the question of whether creating standing joint task forces for all but the most unlikely contingencies will enhance America's warfighting capabilities? The following section enables the formulation of an answer to the preceding question.

**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

This section analyzes current contingency force allocation methods and standing JTF procedures using four criteria. These criteria are: doctrine, command and control, interoperability, and teamwork.

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\[^{43}\text{Cushman, Future Force Projection Ops, p. 79.}\]
Doctrine is this section's first analytic criteria. The Department of Defense defines doctrine as: "fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services of the same nation in coordinated action toward a common objective." Units fighting together must understand one another's doctrine. The previous sentence highlights two important ideas related to doctrine. First, common doctrine must exist if units are to fight together successfully. Second, a common understanding of doctrine must exist between the parties who will employ such doctrine.

The American military's outstanding success in the Persian Gulf War might lead to the conclusion that adequate joint doctrine exists. In many cases such a conclusion is correct; in many other cases, incorrect. Progress continues in the development of joint American warfighting doctrine. However, key deficiencies continue to exist in developing and implementing comprehensive joint doctrine for the armed forces of the US. For example, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm reveal a continuing lack of joint doctrine.

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interdiction doctrine. Specifically, the joint force commander's "role in the [interdiction] targeting process is not clearly defined in joint doctrine and was often misunderstood."46 America's Gulf War experience also indicates doctrine:

for coordinating interdiction did not exist. Components viewed their responsibilities differently and from a functional perspective. These differences caused unnecessary confusion and wasted effort [emphasis added].47

An interdiction doctrinal void resulting in "unnecessary confusion and wasted effort" should certainly be a cause for concern. Other doctrinal shortcomings surfaced during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm including: firing beyond the fire support coordination line, implementing the joint force air component command concept, and providing satellite communications support in contingency operations.48

Even when doctrine exists there is no guarantee the doctrine will be similarly understood by the


members of a joint team. In this regard the issue of the doctrinal meaning of fire support coordination line (FSCL) is illustrative. During Desert Storm the Army and Marine Corps lacked a common understanding concerning the authority for firing beyond FSCLs. According to Joint Pub 1-02 "supporting elements may attack targets forward of the FSCL, without prior coordination. . . ."49 The Army and the Marine Corps each interpreted the meaning of the term "supporting elements" differently. According to the Army "a corps FSCL could be fired beyond by all subordinate corps elements, irrespective of boundaries, but could not be fired beyond by an adjacent unit not subordinate to the corps [emphasis added]."50 The Marine Corps interprets "the FSCL as an authority to fire beyond the FSCL, irrespective of boundaries, without further coordination [emphasis added]."51 Clearly joint doctrine for firing beyond the FSCL existed; clearly the Army and Marine Corps interpretation of the joint doctrinal meaning of the FSCL varied greatly.

Current contingency operation force allocation procedures exacerbate the challenge of developing joint


doctrine, and, even more importantly, developing a common understanding of joint doctrine’s meaning. This common understanding is vital if joint doctrine is to "guide the employment of forces of two or more Services of the same nation in coordinated action toward a common objective."\textsuperscript{52} However, developing meaningful and mutually understood joint doctrine is difficult. The Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy spend the majority of their time conducting intra-service training exercises. Consequently the resolution of doctrinal issues often lacks the sense of urgency which would exist if inter-service formations trained and operated together on a daily basis. Even after the extended in-theater training period preceding Operation Desert Storm, Army and Marine units were unable to reach a common understanding of the meaning of the term fire support coordination line. How much more difficult reaching a common understanding of joint doctrine will be when six months are unavailable before a war begins—the situation which the National Military Strategy envisions will be the norm rather than the exception in future contingencies.

Standing joint task forces appear to offer a higher probability of meeting the joint doctrine challenges of the future. As a minimum, standing JTFs will yield a higher degree of common intra-JTF

\textsuperscript{52}Defense Dictionary, p. 118.
doctrines. By training and working together on a day-to-day basis, the doctrine most relevant to the tasks for the JTF's functional employment will be constantly practiced, evaluated, and revised. As a result, standing JTFs will probably be better able to act with the speed and agility the President expects in future military operations. A forcible entry JTF, for example, will extensively work doctrinal issues which relate to its primary functional responsibility. From the perspective of doctrine, standing JTFs appear to offer a higher probability of being ready to fight from day one--rather than hoping American forces have the time to develop and refine required joint doctrine.

The second analytic criteria is command and control. The Defense Dictionary defines command and control as "the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of a mission." Conferring command authority upon an individual is a simple task; effectively exercising command authority is a complex task.

In his work Command and Control of Theater Forces: The Future of Force Projection Operations, Lieutenant General (Retired) John Cushman raises a series of questions concerning command and control (C2) in

53President Bush, "Aspen Speech".
54Defense Dictionary, p. 77.
contingency operations. These questions include:

Would a contingency force commander's C2 system be well tied together from top to bottom?

Would a contingency force commander's C2 system be provided by relatively independent parties who have not adequately coordinated with the commander, the commander's staff, nor with each other?

Would a contingency force commander's C2 system ever have been tested in advance under the expected conditions of war?\[5\]

The three preceding questions provide the framework for this section's analysis.

Under current force allocation procedures, a joint contingency force commander's C2 system would, at least initially, not be well tied together. At the outset of a contingency operation, joint commanders must currently pull together a diverse group of service components. Some of these forces may never have trained or operated together. Forces also might not have recent experience working together--an especially critical factor in unexpected regional contingency situations which might "arise on very short notice.\[5^6\]

Irrespective of the degree of common training experience, the initial fusing of the many subfunctions of battle (tacair, air defense, intelligence, logistics, maneuver, artillery, special operations, etc.) is a difficult task. For the joint force to be

\[5^5\]Cushman, Future Force Projection Ops, p. 17.

\[5^6\]Military Strategy, p. 7.
truly effective the contingency commander's C2 system must be well tied together from the lowest level upwards. With enough time (as Operation Desert Storm illustrates) the joint commander can create an adequate command and control system.

In contrast to current force allocation procedures, organizing standing joint task forces reduces many of the problems associated with forming an integrated command and control system from scratch. By training and operating together in peacetime, JTFs could constantly refine how the various services' link their C2 systems together. Although some command and control problems will always exist (if for no other reason than a lack of total interoperability), the JTF commander could solve a majority of his C2 problems before hostilities begin. As a minimum, each intra-JTF C2 system would be more highly integrated than under current force allocation procedures at the outset of a deployment—which might very well correspond with the initiation of hostilities.

The second command and control issue is whether warfighting commanders receive command and control systems from relatively independent parties? The answer to this question is yes. The Goldwater-Nichols act significantly increases the command authority joint

57 For an excellent discussion on this issue see: Cushman, Future Force Projection Ops, pp. 8 to 9.
commanders possess over assigned forces once these forces come under their control. However, on a day-to-day basis each service exercises virtually autonomous control over its own forces. For example the Goldwater-Nichols Act charges the Secretary of the Army with responsibility for recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining the Department of the Army.\footnote{Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Section 501, Conference Report 99-824 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 46.} The Secretaries of the other services have the same responsibilities. Although adequate C2 coordination between the joint commander, the commander's staff, and the forces which the services provide to the joint commander may occur, there is no guarantee such coordination will occur. Standing JTFs reduce the problem of having relatively independent services deliver C2 systems to the joint force commander when a crisis or war occurs. As a minimum the forces assigned to a JTF are under the operational control (OPCON) of the JTF commander. An OPCON relationship provides the JTF commander "full authority to organize commands and functions as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions."\footnote{Planning Joint Ops, pp. GL-10 to GL-11.} Such OPCON authority
permits the JTF commander to integrate multi-service C2 systems before--not after--a crisis or war occurs. This authority would not eliminate all service related obstacles to C2 integration. It would, however, be a giant step forward in producing the kind of joint, integrated force the President and the new *National Military Strategy* call for.

The need to test a contingency commander's command and control system in advance under the expected conditions of war is apparent. Within uni-service combat formations (for example the XVIII Airborne Corps), C2 problems are minimal. However, the potential for C2 problems in hastily formed joint combat formations is extensive. No amount of C2 planning can take the place of actually testing a C2 system under simulated wartime conditions. In this regard, Clausewitz's concept of friction--the concept that more or less corresponds to the factor distinguishing real war from war on paper--comes to mind.60 A joint force deploying directly from CONUS into battle with only hours or days of preparation time is an invitation for friction to occur on a huge scale. Such friction is especially harmful in the area of command and control. Previously undetected C2 deficiencies make the task of exercising direction over

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assigned forces in the accomplishment of a combat mission difficult to impossible. Operation Desert Shield underscored the fact that "the value in conducting exercises in preparation for real world contingency operation execution cannot be overemphasized."61 Current contingency operation force allocation procedures preclude the possibility of routinely exercising together the forces which will execute a particular OPLAN. In contrast, functionally based standing JTFs provide JTF commanders with the ability to test their C2 systems in preparation for the real world contingency operations they are most likely to execute. In so doing, a contingency commander's C2 systems effectiveness undoubtedly increases.

Overall, standing joint task forces offer the promise of more effective joint command and control from the outset of hostilities—especially in short to no notice contingency situations. Integrating the C2 system of a fixed number of standing JTFs also appears easier, faster, and more effective than fusing the C2 components of multi-service elements which may or may not have recent experience operating together.

The next criteria is joint interoperability. Joint interoperability is: the ability of inter-service

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systems, units, or forces to operate effectively together. For the foreseeable future, joint force interoperability will result from a combination of fully compatible systems, units, and forces (the ultimate goal) and the use of expedients. Three issues can serve as a basis for analyzing the issue of current joint operations interoperability: communications equipment interfacing, commonalty of understanding in inter-service operational language, and interoperability expedients.

"Units that intend to fight together must be able to communicate with each other" is a sound operational principle to follow. Despite recent improvements in joint communications interoperability Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm highlight continuing problems in the area of communications interoperability. Some of the many communications interoperability problems encountered by US forces in the Gulf include: insufficient multiple subscriber equipment to conduct joint Army, Air Force, and Marine operations; non-interoperable meteorological and oceanographic cryptological equipment; and insufficient antennas for establishing ground to satellite communications.


63 Mullen and Higgins, p. 49.
In these and all other UNCLASSIFIED cases from the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS), the use of expedients, cross leveling, off the shelf procurement, and the development of new products enabled joint communications interoperability problems to be corrected. In every case though, correcting communications interoperability deficiencies took time. Under current force allocation procedures, the requisite time for correcting such problems might not be available.

Commonality of understanding in inter-service operational language is a second facet of joint interoperability. American forces may speak the same national language, but they do not always speak the same operational language. The previous example of the differing interpretation between the Army and the Marine Corps during Operation Desert Storm concerning the meaning of FSCL is illustrative in this regard. Current war preparation procedures permit a commonality of understanding in inter-service operational language to occur, but developing this operational language commonality is difficult when joint forces rarely train

or operate together. In contrast, standing JTF commanders have the authority to establish common intra-JTF definitions for doctrinal terms. Ideally, these common doctrinal definitions would eventually permeate throughout America's armed forces as a whole. As a minimum, commonly understood operational language yields greater intra-JTF unity of effort and reduces the potential for intra-JTF fratricide. Operation Desert Storm indicates:

\[
\text{fraticide was the second largest killer.} \ldots \text{The most important preventative [measure] is the clear delineation and rigid compliance with doctrinal fire support coordination measures, particularly the fire support coordination line (FSCL).}\]

Clearly, fostering a common understanding of operational language--such as the meaning of FSCL--is a valuable goal. Although not a panacea, standing joint task forces afford a greater potential \textit{vis-a-vis} current force allocation procedures for achieving this goal.

Achieving joint force interoperability requires using various expedients. The previous statement is true irrespective of whether future contingency operations employ current force allocation procedures or standing JTFs. Under current procedures, however, joint interoperability expedients are rarely implemented prior to a crisis or war. There are at

least two reasons for this situation. First, current force allocation procedures often preclude identifying a required joint interoperability expedient until units are thrown together in a crisis. Second, interoperability expedients represent a "cost" of some type to some commander. For example, providing a liaison officer from an Army unit to a Marine Corps unit "costs" the Army commander a "body". Consequently, commanders will probably defer implementing identified interoperability expedients until an actual crisis occurs. Standing JTFs reduce the difficulty of implementing peacetime joint interoperability expedients. In a standing JTF, the commander has a minimum of OPCON authority to direct the institution of interoperability expedients. Further, JTF commanders can prioritize which interoperability expedients to implement on the basis of what best facilitates execution of a JTF's functional responsibilities.

Overall, standing JTFs probably enhance overall joint force interoperability. The preceding statement is especially true for forces which deploy with little to no warning directly into combat.

Teamwork is this monograph's final analytic criteria. Joint teamwork is the cooperative effort by the members of a joint team to achieve a common goal.66

66This definition is derived from the term "teamwork" in The American Heritage Dictionary. "Teamwork," in The
Prior to Operation Desert Storm General Schwarzkopf had almost six months to transform his forces into an effective team. Future commanders may only have hours or days to form joint teams. Whatever amount of time is available for preparing for combat, "US Armed Forces must always be ready to operate in smoothly functioning joint teams."67

Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces repeatedly emphasizes teamwork's importance. The cover to Joint Pub 1 bears the inscription "Joint Warfare is Team Warfare." When a strong sense of teamwork permeates a joint force the results such a force attains can be superb. Such was the case in Operation Desert Storm. Joint Pub 1 goes so far as to say "perhaps the most striking feature of this campaign was the high degree of teamwork [emphasis in original]. . . achieved by UNCINCENT and his component commanders."68

A prerequisite for teamwork to flourish is a shared sense of trust among a team's members. As Lieutenant General (LTG) Horner (Commander, Central

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67 Joint Warfare, p. iv.

68 Joint Warfare, p. 68.
Command Air Force) states in regard to Operation Desert Storm:

We had an unusually strong team, and trust was the key factor [emphasis added]. . . . You need people schooled in their own type of warfare, and then you need trust in each other.69

LTG Boomer (Commander, Central Command Marine forces) is even more forceful in underscoring the importance of trust in developing teamwork:

The notion of trust may convey even more than teamwork. It's critically important that you have trust [emphasis added], especially at the commander level.70

Developing the trust LTG Horner and LTG Boomer describe does not occur spontaneously; the development of trust takes time. In the Persian Gulf adequate time--almost six months--was available for developing the mutual trust so vital to achieving teamwork. On tomorrow's battlefields America may not, and probably will not, enjoy the same luxury.

The current force allocation system for contingency operations provides little certainty that even service component commanders will know each other well enough to truly trust each other. Recall LTG Boomer's comment that "It's critically important that you have trust, especially at the commander level."71

Under current procedures component commanders might

69 Joint Warfare, p. 69.
70 Joint Warfare, p. 69.
71 Joint Warfare, p. 69.
know each other and might previously have worked together. However, such past associations seem inadequate for achieving the trust LTG Boomer describes. For a case such as a short notice forcible entry operation, developing genuine trust at even the service component commander level would be difficult at best and impossible at worst. In contrast, forces deploying into battle as part of a standing JTF will be familiar with each other, and service component commanders will know their counterparts. A basis for trust—a prerequisite to teamwork—would exist. In a standing JTF, resolving joint warfare's inevitable frictions is easier because as LTG Boomer states "you're certain your fellow component commander wouldn't do or say that."72

Trust—a vital prerequisite in developing teamwork—takes time to develop. Developing trust and teamwork before hostilities begin is preferable to attempting to develop trust and teamwork in the midst of a war. Consequently, standing JTFs appear to be a better way to achieve joint teamwork compared to current force allocation procedures.

The preceding analysis leads to a number of interim conclusions. If an extended period of time will always exist between the identification of a crisis and the initiation of hostilities—along the

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72 Joint Warfare, p. 69.
lines of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm--no revision should be made to the way America prepares its forces for war. Under current force allocation procedures the ground portion of Operation Desert Storm was completed in four days--a superb accomplishment by any standard. Completely revising how the services prepare for war in an effort to win a contingency operation like Desert Storm in less than four days is not worth the effort.

However, a much different picture emerges when little to no time exists between the National Command Authority decision to deploy American combat forces and the initiation of hostilities. In this case, the analytic lenses of doctrine, command and control, interoperability, and teamwork indicate standing JTFs may be preferable to current force allocation procedures in preparing for future contingencies. Assuming the United States fights anything other than a totally inept or minuscule opponent, standing joint task forces might make the difference between victory at an acceptable cost in American lives and defeat.

If America will always have the time to position decisive in-theater combat power prior to combat beginning, no changes to current force allocation procedures need to be made. As Operation Desert Storm demonstrates, the current system works superbly under the right conditions. However, if the US will not
invariably have the time she needs to deploy forces before hostilities erupt, consideration should be given to creating standing JTFs. The next section identifies the minimum type of standing JTF the US appears to need, and offers appropriate conclusions and recommendations.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In many ways America's armed forces may be victims of their own success. Not only is our nation's brilliant victory in Operation Desert Storm fueling calls for ever greater force reductions, but our potential enemies now know their best chance for winning is in the initial stages of an American deployment. In the future, the time joint force commanders have between deployment and the onset of hostilities will probably be minimal to non-existent.

The central question of this monograph is whether standing joint task forces will enhance America's warfighting capabilities for all but the most unlikely contingencies? This study indicates the answer to the preceding question is yes. When viewed through the lenses of doctrine, command and control, interoperability, and teamwork, standing JTFs do not appear to be an example of unnecessary jointness. Instead, such task forces offer the potential for achieving a higher degree of warfighting capability.
compared to current force allocation procedures. The preceding conclusion is especially important in light of the enormous changes in warplanning which President Bush and the National Military Strategy envision.

As a minimum, the CONUS-based, globally oriented Base Force of the future needs functionally organized standing joint task forces for overcoming its most time sensitive military challenges. For example, a standing JTF capable of conducting a forcible entry operation to establish a lodgement seems vital. With such a capability, the US can maintain military freedom of action in a contingency operation; without such a capability, the US risks losing military freedom of action at the outset of a contingency operation.

Enormous obstacles exist to creating standing joint task forces. Chief among these is the hesitancy each service will probably exhibit in relinquishing significant peacetime control over portions of its forces. However, if the key to America's future military success lies in new ideas and fresh ways of thinking, our nation's armed forces must never be afraid to explore such ideas and engage in such thinking.
Appendix A

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN THE 1990s

The President articulates America's broad, enduring national security interests and objectives in the National Security Strategy of the United States. These interests and objectives are the basis for developing the National Military Strategy. The national interests and militarily related supporting objectives are:

* The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

- Deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies and—should deterrence fail—repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies.

- Effectively counter threats to the security of the United States and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism.

- Improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing systems capable of defending against limited ballistic missile strikes, and enhancing appropriate conventional functions.

- Foster restraint in global military spending and discourage military adventurism.

- Prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and resources to hostile countries or groups, especially the spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and associated high-technology means of delivery.

- Reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging reduction of foreign production, combatting international traffickers and reducing demand at home.

\[10^{\text{National Security Strategy, pp. 3 to 4; Military Strategy, p. 5.}}\]
* A healthy and growing US economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.

- Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space.

* Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

- Strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights.

- Strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic, and social progress.

* A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.

- Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.

- Aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.
Appendix B

PROPOSED BASE FORCE COMPOSITION

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fiscal Year 1991</th>
<th>Base Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Bombers</strong></td>
<td><strong>B-52 + B-1</strong></td>
<td><strong>B-52H + B-1 + B-2</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Missiles</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSBNs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cadre</td>
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<td>2 Divs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVBG</td>
<td>15 CVBGs</td>
<td>12 CVBGs</td>
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<td>Active</td>
<td>13 AWGs</td>
<td>11 AWGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>2 AWGs</td>
<td>2 AWGs</td>
</tr>
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<td>3 MEFs</td>
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<td>1 Div/AWG</td>
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<td>Active</td>
<td>22 FWE</td>
<td>15 FWE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>12 FWE</td>
<td>11 FWE</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SSBN: Submarines with Nuclear Missiles
Div: Division
CVBG: Carrier Battle Group
AWG: Air Wing
MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force
FWE: Fighter Wing Equivalent

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Appendix C

FORCES DESIGNATED FOR FORWARD PRESENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Base Force</th>
<th>Atlantic Forces</th>
<th>Pacific Forces</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>12 Divs</td>
<td>2 Divs</td>
<td>1 Div (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>6 Divs</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadre</td>
<td>2 Divs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVBG</td>
<td>12 CVBGs</td>
<td>2 CVBGs</td>
<td>1 CVBG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>11 AWGs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>2 AWGs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USMC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>3 MEFs</td>
<td>1 ARG</td>
<td>1 ARG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>1 Div/AWG</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>15 FWE</td>
<td>3-4 FWE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>11 FWE</td>
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</table>

Div: Division  
CVBC: Carrier Battle Group  
AWG: Air Wing  
MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force  
ARG: Amphibious Ready Group  
FWE: Fighter Wing Equivalent

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75 This information is synthesized from the discussion on the composition of the Base Force contained in the National Military Strategy. Military Strategy, pp. 19 to 24.
Appendix D

DEFINITIONS OF COCOM and OPCON

Combatant Command (COCOM). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10, United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands. Combatant Command (command authority) is the authority of a Combatant Commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant Command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through the Service component commander. Combatant Command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.76

Operational Control (OPCON). Transferable command authority which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in Combatant Command (command authority) and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and functions as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.77

76Planning Joint Ops, p. GL-4.

77Planning Joint Ops, pp. GL-10 to GL-11.
Appendix E

BASE FORCE POSITIONING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Atlantic Forces</th>
<th>Pacific Forces</th>
<th>US-based Forces</th>
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<td>2 Divs</td>
<td>1 Div(-)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve 6 Divs</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cadre 2 Divs</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Divs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 Div(+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>CVBG 12 CVBGs</td>
<td>2 CVBGs</td>
<td>1 CVBG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active 11 AWGs</td>
<td></td>
<td>11 AWGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve 2 AWGs</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 AWGs</td>
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<td>9 CVBGs</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>Active 3 MEFs</td>
<td>1 ARG</td>
<td>1 ARG</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve 1 Div/AWG</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2 Div/AWG</td>
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<td>Air</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>11 FWE</td>
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</table>

*Includes forces in Hawaii and Alaska.

Div: Division
CVBG: Carrier Battle Group
AWG: Air Wing
MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force
ARG: Amphibious Ready Group
FWE: Fighter Wing Equivalent

\footnote{Military Strategy, pp. 19 to 24.}
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