LIBERATION, OCCUPATION, AND RESCUE: WAR TERMINATION AND DESERT STORM

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LIBERATION, OCCUPATION, AND RESCUE:  
WAR TERMINATION AND DESERT STORM

John T. Fishel

August 31, 1992

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FOREWORD

This study of post-conflict activity associated with the termination of the Gulf War is a companion to the author's recently published, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing The Restoration of Panama*. It is consciously comparative on two separate levels. First, it addresses similar questions in similar ways using essentially the same methodology. The interview schedule devised for *Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue* deliberately parallels that designed for *The Fog of Peace*.

The study also follows much the same conceptual order as its predecessor flowing from context to planning to warfighting execution as a transition to the implementation of the planned and unplanned civil-military operations. Finally, the study addresses the strategic implications for war termination.

On the second level, this study makes direct and explicit comparisons with similar events, organizations, and activities in the earlier operation. The result is to highlight a number of mutually reinforcing lessons. The most critical lesson is the centrality of a full blown strategy of ends, ways, and means which translates national policy into campaigns and operations which are not completed until the desired political end-state is achieved. A second important lesson is that our doctrine has developed many of the ways needed to achieve our objectives. However, much of the relevant doctrine is not found where it is needed to address effectively the problems under consideration. Thus, the organizational model that served as the base for a civil-military operations task force is found neither in civil affairs doctrine nor any particular combat, support, or service support doctrine, but rather in the doctrine for low intensity conflict. Yet, even this model as it has evolved is not adequate, for, as the author points out, civil-military operations require the integration of civilian and military agencies of the U.S. Government.

A third key point is that civil-military operations encompass far more than civil affairs. While civil affairs units represent a unique and essential asset for the conduct of civil-military operations, they are only a part of the equation. Their essential importance lies in the skills and capabilities their members bring from civilian life coupled with the multiplier effects of military organization and planning capabilities.

The author has much more to say than can be touched on in a brief foreword. His work is essential to several different audiences. First, he addresses the leadership, both military and civilian, demanding that the means be found to achieve a real unity of effort in the planning and execution of operations designed to achieve the desired political end-state as a war or conflict terminates. Second, he addresses the planners and executors, the faceless action officers who must make these things happen. Here he tells a story of the successes and pitfalls of this process in the combined, interagency, and joint arena where we will be operating in the future to greater and greater degrees.

This study represents the breaking of new ground which, together with its companion piece, forces us to consider that part of our most recent military operations which largely has escaped our attention.

KARL W. ROBINSON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
SUMMARY

This study examines post-conflict activities in the liberation of Kuwait, the occupation of southern Iraq, and the rescue of the Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq in the wake of Operation DESERT STORM. In the process, the study focuses attention on the planning and execution of the operations required to terminate war by achieving its political objectives.

KEY FINDINGS

A Strategic Concept for Post-Conflict Operations.

- International Law requires the victor in war to undertake specific responsibilities toward the people of a defeated nation. The role of “liberator” carries most of the same responsibilities as an occupier. This is especially true if the government of the nation being “liberated” is unable to provide basic functions or services to its people.

- The experiences of post-World War II occupations provide a basis for lessons learned in planning and executing occupation and liberation and also in the structuring of U.S. military organizations that conduct “civil administration” functions.

- Strategic concepts for post-conflict operations are determined by the military and political objectives for which a war has been fought. Not only must we know what our objectives are, but we should also be able to fully describe the desired end-state—at least in general terms.

- Our post-conflict strategy needs to develop the proper organizations to achieve the requisite unity of effort in the interagency, combined and joint environments.

- Adequately resourcing our strategy will require new legislation coupled with streamlined bureaucratic procedures to get resources where they are needed in a timely fashion.

Planning for Civil-Military Operations.

- Planning for the restoration of Kuwait largely was conducted by the Kuwait Task Force (KTF).

- The birth of the KTF was pure serendipity. It was the result of one man who occupied two key positions in two separate organizations—the State Department and the 352d Civil Affairs Command, U.S. Army Reserve.

- Colonel Randall Elliott, working with the State Department and with colleagues in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict developed a concept of action that resulted in the Emir of Kuwait requesting civil affairs support from the President of the United States in a letter dated October 9, 1990.
The KTF was activated on December 1, 1990, under the control of an interagency Steering Committee Group, working in conjunction with a Kuwaiti Government planning team. It was not under the command or control of CENTCOM and had no access to CENTCOM plans. The KTF solved the issues of interagency planning coordination which had plagued the Panama civil-military operations planners the previous year. The resolution of interagency issues, however, raised another issue supposedly settled by the Goldwater-Nichols Act: Is the CINC in command of all military forces operating in his theater? While the Kuwait Task Force did eventually come under the command and control of CINCCENT when it deployed to theater, its initial efforts while in Washington were not coordinated with those of CENTCOM, and were from time to time at cross purposes.

CENTCOM delegated Executive Agency for civil affairs to its Army component, ARCENT, in accordance with its standing procedures. This, however, failed to settle the issue since CINCCENT never created a Land Component Commander and therefore retained that command. This meant that there were issues of civil-military operations that simply could not be dealt with by the appointed executive agency.

ARCENT simplified its planning by reducing it to identifying civil affairs forces and allocating them to the two committed corps and their divisions. How they were to be used was left to the corps commanders.

Planning for the occupation of southern Iraq was stymied by a series of misunderstandings between CENTCOM and ARCENT and within the ARCENT staff over both the guidance and the responsibilities of the occupying power. Generally, ARCENT G-5 perceived that its guidance from CENTCOM was to not set up any camps for displaced civilians. CENTCOM believed that its guidance was much less restrictive. CENTCOM, however, had reserved the right to approve any such camps. The ARCENT staff argued that the issue of occupation responsibilities was unimportant since coalition forces had no intention of staying in southern Iraq, which was nearly devoid of any significant population anyway. Although the issue was resolved satisfactorily in the end, it could have involved U.S. and allied forces in unintended human rights violations. The clear lesson is that commanders must be extremely alert to their obligations toward civilian populations under international law. This requires the G-5 and the Judge Advocate working together. Failure to plan and execute successfully in this area is a culminating political point that can destroy the most effective military operation.

Planning for humanitarian relief operations among the Kurds of northern Iraq was done entirely "on the fly." The requirement was simply not anticipated despite Presidential rhetoric which suggested that the United States would come to the aid of a Kurdish rebellion aimed at the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

Liberation of Kuwait and Occupation of Southern Iraq.

ARCENT G-5 briefed the commander on a plan to establish a civil-military operations organization under the commander of the 352d Civil Affairs Command. Commander,
ARCENT rejected the plan and, instead, established Task Force Freedom under the command of his Deputy Commanding General. Task Force Freedom repeated the experience of creating an organization to execute civil-military operations in Panama the year before. Thus the similarities between Task Force Freedom and the U.S. Military Support Group-Panama are remarkable. Both organizations contained civil affairs task forces, combat support, and combat service support. While the Military Support Group drew its inspiration from the doctrinal Security Assistance Force, Task Force Freedom was developed independently. Yet both organizations integrated Active and Reserve Component forces and civil affairs and other types of forces in ways that were similar because the “form followed the function.”

- Task Force Freedom integrated the Kuwait Task Force within the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force as a staff element. The KTF, however, was able to maintain a separate identity to a great extent because its functions remained sufficiently unique. The KTF was needed to continue its liaison and advising mission to the Kuwaiti Ministries and its augmentation to the American Embassy. Again, these functions repeated functions performed in Panama.

- One innovation that the KTF introduced was a subordinate element from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) supplemented by contractor support. The OFDA/contractor team was incorporated into the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force. The result was the creation of an embryonic interagency organization for the conduct of civil-military operations at the tactical and operational levels. Even in its embryonic state, this organization resolved one of the continuing problems that had plagued the Military Support Group in Panama—interagency coordination.

- The existence of the OFDA/contractor team within the Kuwait Task Force resulted from the combination of the KTF’s serendipitous birth and from Colonel Elliott’s conscious choice to recruit as his Executive Officer a USAR major who, as a civilian, was a member of the Senior Executive Service (general officer equivalent) and Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

- In Kuwait, Task Force Freedom executed the immediate restoration plan coordinated by ARCENT with input from the KTF and rolled those actions over into the implementation of the long-term recovery planned by the KTF. Despite the earlier command and control difficulties experienced by the KTF in terms of who it worked for, the results were quite effective as its plans were implemented to include a transition to Army Corps of Engineers’ support for the Kuwaiti government.

- While most of Task Force Freedom and its Combined Civil Affairs Task Force was committed in Kuwait, the flexibility created by having Task Force Freedom was critical to the effective execution of the displaced civilian mission in southern Iraq. Once the misunderstandings between CENTCOM and ARCENT were cleared up, Task Force Freedom was able to coordinate the civil affairs activities of the civil affairs units attached to the two corps and their divisions. In addition, Task Force Freedom was able to make
available essential elements of the OFDA/contractor team so that their expertise on refugee matters could be used effectively. Finally, Task Force Freedom controlled support assets that were needed by the civil affairs units in the corps to accomplish the displaced civilian mission.

- The final critical lesson from the Kuwait operation is that executive agency is an inappropriate command and control mechanism in the Goldwater-Nichols era. Early in 1991, the Secretary of Defense determined that there was a need for an executive agent for DOD assistance in Kuwaiti reconstruction and designated the Secretary of the Army as Executive Agency. He then established the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office (DRAO) to control DOD elements involved in the effort. DRAO was activated on March 3, 1991, and Army oversight was exercised through the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment. On March 7, the Secretary of Defense named engineer Major General Patrick Kelly as Secretary of Defense Representative (SECDEFREP) in Kuwait in charge of DRAO. It was not clear that DRAO fully recognized that it was subordinate at all times to the American Ambassador in Kuwait, something that was very quickly clarified. CENTCOM also resolved a potential conflict with the Secretary of Defense Representative by appointing him as CENTCOM Representative for military coordination matters. These complicated arrangements would hardly have been required had executive agency not been used and the principles of Goldwater-Nichols been followed.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

- This operation demonstrated again that civil-military operations is much more than civil affairs. In the case of PROVIDE COMFORT, unlike DESSERT STORM, security was a dominant feature. As an intrusive humanitarian relief mission in a hostile environment partly controlled by a defeated, but not destroyed enemy, it required a much more significant security component than similar operations in more permissive environments.

- Despite this difference, the organization of the operation under a combined task force for the conduct of civil-military operations followed much the same structure as did Task Force Freedom and the Military Support Group in Panama. PROVIDE COMFORT confirmed the utility of the basic structure as well as the need for a major civilian component such as the OFDA contractor team established by the Kuwait Task Force in Task Force Freedom and again in PROVIDE COMFORT. The OFDA/contractor team’s assignment to the combined task force was the result of the successful experience in Operation DESSERT STORM.

Strategic Implications for War Termination.

- The civil-military operations considered here demonstrate the transcendental importance of strategic vision. Strategic vision means that the political and military leadership has a relatively clear picture of its desired end-state, one that represents a range of acceptable political/military outcomes.
The fact that Presidential rhetoric is, in fact, a statement of policy complicated the development of civil military operations in Kuwait, and southern and northern Iraq. The fact that the U.S. Government civil and military bureaucracy was slow in responding to the implications of the President's statement that Iraq's aggression against Kuwait would not stand caused significant delay in beginning to plan for the recovery of Kuwait. Other Presidential statements, in the ears of listeners wishing to believe what they wanted to hear, resulted in the revolts of the Shiites and the Kurds which, in turn, had to be dealt with by civil-military, displaced civilian/refugee relief operations.

Organization for the conduct of civil-military operations and the required command and control has a useful conceptual model in the doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict. That model, however, is best when it is modified in a number of significant ways. It should not be tied to security assistance or foreign internal defense alone. It should not be built around any particular combat organization but rather from the kinds of units (combat, combat support, and combat service support) needed to execute the specific mission in that particular political/military context. Its commander should not be selected for his technical specialization but for his broad background, command experience, regional familiarity, and political/military sensitivity.

Civil-military operations organizations require a hefty civil affairs component built around standard Civil Affairs unit structures. They also require a civilian government component analogous to the OFDA/contractor team found in Task Force Freedom and Combined Task Force-Provide Comfort.

War termination is a phase of military operations that must be planned in full coordination with warfighting. When the political-military and the exclusively military end-states are not fully synchronized, then strategic victory is that much harder to achieve. To effectively terminate a war requires that unity of effort be achieved within the entire U.S. Government. This demands interagency coordination from the highest levels down through the theater. Interagency planning took place only because of the KTF and because it was operating under interagency auspices.

American military doctrine must change across the board to recognize the interagency imperative. War and peace are too complicated for either military or civilian agencies to address without the participation of each as full partners.
CHAPTER 1

WAR’S END:
A STRATEGIC CONCEPT
FOR POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

Introduction.

International law in general, and the law of land warfare in particular, provide that the victorious nation in war has specific responsibilities toward the people of the vanquished nation. Some of these are the maintenance of law and order, the provision of food and shelter, the care of displaced civilians, the provision of health care and services, and the reestablishment of public education. It takes very little extension of this concept to conclude that a "liberating" power has most of the same responsibilities as does an "occupying" power. This conclusion is even more valid if the government of the nation being "liberated" is totally unorganized.

Two recent cases point this out clearly. In Grenada in 1983, the United States was de facto responsible for all government services until a new government could be organized. At the time of the “rescue mission” Grenada was governed by one man, Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor General. Eighteen months later U.S. forces left the island with a new government fully responsible for its own affairs. Similarly, in 1989, Panama demonstrated that three elected officials do not make a government, and the slogan “liberation not occupation” did not relieve the United States and its military forces of the responsibility for the welfare of the people of the nation. Thus, U.S. efforts did address assisting the new government to establish itself and provide the required services.

The American and allied experiences in the Gulf War represent a third example of the varying degrees of responsibility that the victor must assume for the inhabitants of conquered or liberated territory. In Kuwait, with a government in exile but with numerous financial resources and coalition partners, the responsibility of the United States, while less, still remained. In southern Iraq, U.S. and allied forces were responsible for the welfare of inhabitants and refugees until those forces were withdrawn. Finally, among the Kurds of northern Iraq, the United States and its allies accepted the moral, if not the legal, responsibility for the welfare and survival of these people by initiating Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

In practice, immediate responsibility for conquered and liberated territory devolves upon the military commander on the ground. It remains there until other agencies of the government, international organizations (UN, etc.), and the host government assume that responsibility. Again, in practice, this often means that the military commander, as the person controlling the key resources, will have to continue exercising the responsibility long after the State Department and other agencies have arrived and begun to function.
Occupation History.

If, as shown above, liberation and occupation are related and not antithetical concepts, then it is important that one consider the major historical experiences of Americans as occupation forces. Modern American occupation history is that of being the occupying power after World War II. That experience provides not only a basis for lessons learned in planning and executing both occupation and liberation, but also in the structuring of the U.S. military organizations that conducted what Army Field Manual 41-10 calls "civil administration" functions, the Civil Affairs units of the U.S. Army.5

While the World War II occupation experience is not likely to be repeated, contingencies similar to Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989-90), Kuwait (1991), southern Iraq (1991), and/or northern Iraq (1991) are highly probable in the near future. As the leading nation in President Bush's vision of the "new world order," the United States will most assuredly have the major role in any crisis where American interests are at stake. Equally important is that only the United States has military forces specifically designed, configured, and trained to conduct the wide array of relevant civil-military operations. Future contingencies could arise from scenarios as diverse as peacekeeping in Yugoslavia, peacemaking in Haiti, to major operations of various kinds in the Philippines.


The effective conduct of civil-military operations (CMO) in the aftermath of conflict, whether as liberation, occupation, something in between, or something else entirely, depends on the existence of strategy at both the national and the theater level. If there is any lesson common to all our recent experiences it is that the lack of a full blown strategy raised grave doubts about the long-term success of the enterprise. Strategic success thus depends on the three pillars of strategy: ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources).

**Ends.** The first issue is defining the ends or goals to be achieved. This is often where the strategic process breaks down because the national strategic objectives (political-military) generally are obscure at the beginning of an operation. Indeed, while national policy goals often are reasonably well articulated, rarely are these translated into strategic political-military objectives expressed as end-states and attainable supporting objectives.6

Perhaps the key to resolving this problem is the concept of the strategic objective as an end-state. An end-state is a description of what we want the battlefield to look like when the campaign is over. In the political-military realm, however, that description will include a range of acceptable outcomes—hence the picture of the terrain will be fuzzy around the edges. If the national policy in Panama was the restoration of democratic government as a result of Operation JUST CAUSE, then what were the specific political-military objectives that, if achieved, would together describe the desired end-state? If the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait was the policy goal, and if that included some liberalization of that government, then what were the specific political-military objectives that together would constitute the desired end-state? In
neither case was the end-state adequately described, so in neither case was there a clear national strategic objective.

World War II provides yet another set of examples of a lack of clarity of objective. We obviously wanted the absolute defeat of Germany and Japan and their unconditional surrender. However, even though much effort was devoted to planning for the post-war in both countries, we remained unclear as to the policy goals we desired in each. While we described Germany in end-state terms in the Morgenthau Plan, we really never committed our nation to achieving that particular end-state. With changed circumstances the policy goals changed as did the acceptable outcomes. An agrarian, disarmed Germany gave way to an industrialized, rearmed Germany, federal, democratic, and firmly committed to the West as a member of NATO and the European Communities. While the extreme end-state envisioned for Germany was abandoned, the core of a democratic nation bound to the Western Allies was the central objective achieved.

The case of Japan was somewhat different. While there was no Morganthau Plan to be rewritten and, therefore, the envisioned end-state was hazier, the vision that General Douglas MacArthur, as proconsul, had of a democratic, prosperous Japan that had renounced war as an instrument of national policy clearly set the tone of the occupation. In both cases, however, a great deal of planning had gone into how to administer conquered territory as well as the appropriate ways to provide what has come to be called civil administration assistance to liberated governments. So, too, did effort go into accessing and training appropriate civil affairs personnel, detachments, and larger units to provide military government and civil administration.

At the time, what we now call the interagency environment was hardly conducive to a smooth transition from military to civilian operational control. General George C. Marshall and the War Department wanted as little to do with military government as possible. The State Department, however, asserted that it did not have the capability to plan and execute an occupation. That left the military as the only organization able to carry it out.

Given the predispositions of the Army, civil affairs and military government units were designed around a concept of self-sufficiency and the ability to interface with remaining civilian infrastructure rather than with military combat support and combat service support units. The underlying idea was that these civil affairs/military government soldiers should be prepared and able to remove their uniforms on very short notice and function, intact, as subordinate organizations of the State Department. While this never came to pass, post-World War II civil affairs unit organization continued to reflect this organizational concept through the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) used during Operation DESERT STORM.

The above digression into means will be addressed in greater detail below. However, what is clear from a reflection on the end of World War II is that the appropriate end-state represented a range of alternatives around some core objectives. If we consider several post-war contingency operations in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama, we find as common core policy goals democratic, stable, and friendly nations. The details and supporting objectives were unclear and often unstated which left room for significant amounts of conflict not only about ways and means but also about appropriate ends.
This pattern suggests that there may well be an important lack of connectivity between national policy, national strategy, theater strategy, and operations. While the linkage among these levels may be broken, it is not at all clear at what point the break occurred. In Panama, there were breaks all the way down the chain of command.\textsuperscript{14}

The linkage is first and foremost one of policy goals, national strategic objectives, theater strategic objectives, and operational objectives. All should be analyzed as end states. The question that should be asked at the policy level is what kind of world do we want to see when this policy has been implemented and its goals achieved. At the national strategic level we wish to know what the landscape will look like with the achievement of the national strategic objectives. In Panama, for example, we should have been prepared to state with a great degree of specificity what a democratic government would look like, how its institutions would be organized, and what they would be capable of accomplishing at any given time.

At the theater strategic level we should have been able to state as objectives those actions which would yield the kind of institutions we wished to see in Panama while at the operational level we should have conducted an analysis of the probable consequences of our actions. In no case was this, or anything like it, done adequately.\textsuperscript{15}

A similar analysis of goals and objectives as end states would appear to have been required in the wake of the Gulf War. While an end-state analysis was conducted at CENTCOM it never was carried to the point of establishing the full range of essential links from policy through operations. Moreover, it never went directly beyond the CENTCOM Staff.\textsuperscript{16}

Ways. Even with goals and objectives defined as end states and linked from the policy through the operational levels, what exists is only a partial strategy. There are two other components of strategy—ways and means.\textsuperscript{17} Critical among the ways to achieve an objective on any level of the equation is unity of effort. Yet achieving unity of effort for post-conflict operations is extraordinarily elusive because at least three separate games are being played at the same time, each one under different rules.

The Interagency Game.

The first is the interagency game. In every contingency the game will clearly encompass multiple agencies of the U.S. Government. Always among the players will be the Department of Defense, Department of State, the military forces on the ground, the Agency for International Development (AID), the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In addition, one often finds players from the Departments of Justice, Commerce, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), to name but a few. Normally, the control of this interagency hodge-podge lies with the U.S. Ambassador to the host nation by virtue of his letter of instruction and appointment as the President's personal representative. This normal control is invalidated only in time of war when the President clearly directs that the military commander in theater is the senior U.S. representative, when the U.S. Embassy in a country is not operational (as in Kuwait during the first week following liberation), or when activities take place across the boundaries of
several nations. The latter two conditions obtained in the Gulf War; the former did not. Thus there were times when clarity of control was obscured at the working levels of the interagency players.\textsuperscript{18}

A second aspect of the interagency game is that no player except the military has the means to carry out those activities required to achieve post-conflict objectives. As a result, the military—especially its civil affairs units and other combat support and combat service support units such as MPs, Engineers, Medics, Transportation, and Logistics organizations, among others—will provide the bulk of the assets to achieve objectives at all levels. To these military organizations must be added the other U.S. Government agencies involved including AID, its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the U.S. Ambassador and his Country Team, and such agencies as the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program of the Department of Justice. Achieving unity of effort in the interagency game means developing effective command, control, and coordination mechanisms that are adaptable to a wide variety of circumstances.

A third aspect of the interagency game is that involving nongovernmental and private, voluntary organizations (NGO/PVOs) that render humanitarian service. These can be as varied as the Red Cross and the American Friends Services Committee. Invariably, issues involving NGO/PVOs spill over into the second, or "combined," game.

The Combined Game.

The combined game refers to coalition military activity involving the armed forces of two or more nations. This narrow, technical, military definition must be expanded in post-conflict operations to include the activities of the civilian agencies of those governments. As alluded to above, this often involves the activities of NGO/PVOs. If one adds the involvement of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the combined game becomes very complex, indeed.

In most of our recent operations the combined game has been relatively simple. In Panama, for instance, it was generally bilateral with only limited IGO/NGO/PVO involvement.\textsuperscript{19} By contrast, the Gulf War produced an extremely complicated combined game. At its most complex the game was played in northern Iraq as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

The issue of the combined game is one that compounds the interagency game of who is in charge. In the combined game the answer depends on the circumstances in which the question is asked and whether one expects the answer to be \textit{de jure} or \textit{de facto}. This is not to argue that it cannot be both, but rather that it may well be different. For example, in Panama the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), General Thurman, resolved his problem by placing the Commander of his Civil Military Operations Task Force under the operational control of the U.S. Embassy in support of the Panamanian Government.\textsuperscript{20} While the \textit{de jure} arrangement was coordination between the two governments and control of all U.S. activities by the Chargé d'Affaires, the \textit{de facto} arrangement was that the U.S. military controlled everything that was done in Panama by either government. This was a result of having all the resources required, whereas the Embassy
was severely understrength and the Panamanian Government consisted only of the elected President and two Vice Presidents.21

By contrast, the de jure situation in Operation DESERT STORM had all U.S. effort unified at the level of the CINC and coordinated with the coalition forces. Generally, this was the de facto situation as well. However, there appear to have been moments when members of the U.S. Country Team in Kuwait had questions as to whether the CINC was usurping the authority of the Ambassador.22 Like the Panama experience, there did not seem to be conflict among the principals but such conflict did arise at the action level.23 Operation PROVIDE COMFORT gives the best example of congruence between the de jure and de facto organization for unity of effort. In Turkey and northern Iraq all coalition forces, civilian and military, were under the "tactical control" of the task force commander, U.S. Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili.24 Coordination with the UN and other IGOs and NGO/PVOs was effected to prepare for a hand-off to the UN but there never was any question of who was in charge.

The Joint Game.

The third game is what we will call the joint game. This is that game which is most controlled by doctrine—a purely military game where such terms as attachment, operational control, and direct support rule. All the U.S. military players understand the terminology and what it means but this makes it no less difficult to establish unity of effort where the players are unclear over ends, ways, and means.

One example of the kind of confusion that was possible came during DESERT STORM where the Army Component (ARCENT) of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) perceived that CENTCOM had ordered it not to establish any refugee camps and, therefore, it was doing next to nothing to assist refugees.25 Meanwhile, CENTCOM was insisting that the refugees be cared for in accordance with international law.26 The net result was confusion both over who was, in fact, in charge and what was expected.

In spite of these difficulties it seems clear that achieving unity of effort among the various U.S. military organizations is a much easier process than achieving it between agencies and governments. However, because the joint game has been far more institutionalized than any of the other games, it is far more subtle. The joint game has been played in the U.S. military for years and even such major rule changes as the Goldwater-Nichols legislation have only changed the game at the margin, although in some very profound ways.

As a result, few would ever question the fact that the CINC commands all military forces in his theater. Even such situations as took place during DESERT STORM, where EUCOM forces provided combat search and rescue over northern Iraq, were covered by agreement and doctrine that made EUCOM the supporting command to CENTCOM. This, in turn, put EUCOM forces under the operational control of CENTCOM.27
Considering all three games, a central question is where unity of effort—or stated as the military principle of war, unity of command—is to be achieved. Critical to the response is which game is dominant as well as the circumstances in which the games are being played. If the joint game dominates, then the Joint Force commander (usually the CINC) commands. If, however, the interagency game is dominant then command and control generally will be exercised by the Chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission (Ambassador). One exception to this generalization is that when the game crosses international boundaries it is not nearly so clear as to who should be in charge. In the case of the combined game, command and control of U.S. elements usually will rest with the U.S. military commander (again, the CINC).

If the United States is the leader of a coalition, then its military leadership should exercise command and control over coalition forces. This, however, may not always be the case. It is perfectly possible to envision a Combined Game under UN auspices where the coalition force commander will be from some other nation. Another possible approach to command and control in both the combined and interagency games is that of appointing a civilian as the person in charge. This raises many questions about the capability of civilian leadership to command and control large military forces and civilian organizations but it should in no way be impossible.

Means. This discussion should lead to the third leg of the strategy stool—means or resources. These are best considered in terms of the principles of war of mass and economy of force.

The evidence of our recent contingency operations and wars is that the forces required to fight only have a partial overlap with the forces required to terminate a conflict. The latter forces are primarily combat support and combat service support as opposed to combat. The most important of the forces required for war termination are military police, engineers, medical, and transportation types including air, and most critical of all, civil affairs (CA). Ninety-seven percent of the latter are in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).

Getting these military forces into theater and properly organized to accomplish the war termination mission effectively has been a major problem in both Panama and DESERT STORM/PROVIDE COMFORT. In neither case was civil affairs doctrine adhered to. Rather, in Panama, Kuwait and northern Iraq, task forces were created that followed more closely special operations doctrine than anything else closely resembling the Security Assistance Force (SAF). In each case the task force had, at least, two major components, one of which was a civil affairs task force.

The common thread in these three operations with respect to doctrine is that civil affairs doctrine does not account for how CA forces will interact with the rest of the army. Rather, CA doctrine addresses how CA forces interact with host country civilians and civil government. The gap that existed in these operations was that what needed to be done could only be accomplished by military forces—mostly other combat support and combat service support units. As a result, commanders on the ground chose to organize composite task forces which contained what they perceived as the correct mix of forces to carry out their assigned and implied missions during war termination.
Obviously, not all or even most of the resources required for war termination are military units and civilian organizations. Many resources can be accounted for in terms of the dollars required and authorized to procure them. Each of the three operations considered here suggests different problems and solutions in acquiring resources.

Operations JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama were defined as liberation. Only a month into the operation, this resulted in a prohibition being placed on U.S. forces from spending any further operational (O&M) funds on restoring the Panamanian infrastructure. The further result of this ruling was to thrust necessary funding activities into peacetime systems that were ill suited to the task. Only the fact that some very skilled professionals were in positions to make things happen permitted the degree of efficacy in acquiring and disbursing of funds that prevailed. Finally, two emergency appropriations by Congress resulted in some new funding finally becoming available three and a half months after it was required.

DESERT STORM illustrates two different situations. First with respect to operations in southern Iraq, the United States and its coalition partners constituted an occupying power under international law. As such, U.S. forces were required to provide for the well-being of the local population. This included any refugees, of which there were ultimately some 30,000. Since this was a legal obligation, operational funds could be used; indeed, any order cutting off their use without compensating funds being immediately available would have been patently illegal.

A second situation existed in Kuwait. There the coalition forces entered as liberating armies. This situation was analogous to Panama with one overriding difference. Kuwait had the wealth to pay for any services it received and agreements to this effect had been made with the government in exile. As a result, all actions taken by U.S. and coalition forces to restore the Kuwaiti infrastructure were paid for by Kuwait.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq illustrates a third example of obtaining resources. In this case the operation fell under a different rubric, disaster assistance. It was a humanitarian relief mission. As such it was funded by the various donor nations and agencies which, for the United States, were DOD and AID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

Economy of force only applies in these instances of war termination operations to the Panama case. During Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, especially after the DOD cut-off of operational funds for restoration on January 20, 1990, U.S. forces were used quite effectively to carry light engineering projects and medical civic action to many rural villages in the Panamanian interior—all under the auspices of JCS and SOUTHCOM exercises. These “exercises” served to carry the message that the U.S. Government and the Panamanian Government cared about the people of Panama while the normal peacetime funding was winding its way through legislation and bureaucratic disbursement.
Conclusion.

This chapter has focused on developing the background for a strategic concept of post-conflict operations. It rests on the three components of strategy—ends, ways, and means. More than ever in future operations we need to determine what our political-military objectives will be when war is finally terminated. Not only must we know what our objectives are, we should be able to describe the desired landscape—at least in general terms.

Our strategy must develop the ways we intend to achieve our objectives. We need to develop the proper organizations to achieve the requisite unity of effort in the environments of the interagency, combined, and joint games. Such organizations will of necessity be task forces built around the CA forces of the U.S. Army (mostly found in the Reserves) and other combat support and combat service support units. To these will be added a variety of other government agencies, IGOs, NGO/PVOs, as well as military and civilian organizations from other nations. Command and control, to be effective, will require innovative thinking and flexibility coupled with more knowledge of the underlying political-military reality among military and civilian leaders than presently exists.

Adequately resourcing these efforts will require new legislation and streamlined bureaucratic procedures to get resources where they are needed in a timely fashion. As with organization, open minds and flexibility associated with strong planning capabilities will be essential.

The concept outlined here is not yet national policy. The failure to make it so almost certainly will condemn us to live with significantly less than optimal ways to address the challenges of conflict termination. So there is a requirement for national policy to produce a strategic concept for war termination but there is also a requirement to institutionalize that concept. The Army and JCS need to do this as well as develop implementation doctrine. Although the term, doctrine, may carry negative connotations for civilian agencies, it is not dogma. Rather, military doctrine represents general rules for how operations are conducted. Doctrine is modified to fit the circumstances in which one finds oneself.

Civilian agencies also operate within a doctrinal framework. The difference is that they do not call their procedures doctrine. Whatever it is called, a doctrine for post-conflict operations that embraces this strategic concept is essential. Such doctrine will be best produced with the joint doctrine system and further developed by the individual services. Finally, there will be a need to disseminate it beyond the military for adoption by other government agencies. In the end, if useful, the concept will provide the means by which the community of IGOs and NGO/PVOs will be able to most effectively coordinate their activities with those of the U.S. Government, should that be the mutually desired goal.
CHAPTER 2
THE KUWAIT CRISIS

Background.

The events surrounding the invasion of Kuwait are far too well-known to require a detailed retelling here. Rather, this chapter will attempt to focus on those events which are salient to developing the concepts introduced in Chapter 1.

Kuwait, was not anybody's model of a democratic nation in the summer of 1990. However, without even the trappings of democracy at the time—those having been shorn with the closing of the legislative assembly by the ruling Sabah family only a few years earlier—it did have an indigenous democratic tradition centered on that assembly. In accordance with that tradition it had a lively politics focused mainly through the institution of the diwaniyyah or informal gathering.

Less admirable than its indigenous "democratic" tradition was Kuwait's welfare syndrome which "kept the Kuwaitis dependent on the government and scorned by their neighbors." Some of that scorn was enhanced by the perception of the Kuwaitis as extremely arrogant, lazy, and thoroughly incompetent.

Kuwait's role in OPEC and its decisions not to hold to production and pricing quotas put it into conflict with its partners, especially Iraq. In addition, Kuwait was in conflict with Iraq over production from the shared Rumaila oil field as well as old border disputes. The latter focused, in part, on Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the very existence of an independent Kuwait was disputed by its Iraqi neighbor. Iraq had never fully reconciled itself to its 1963 recognition of Kuwait's independence.

By contrast Iraq was an extremely harsh but modernizing secular dictatorship in the midst of a sea of Islamic fundamentalism and semi-feudal oil rich sheikdoms. It had just fought a long, devastating but victorious war with Iran where it defended the sheiks, the Saudi kingdom, and the secular Arab world from Iran's unique brand of Shiite fundamentalism. Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, believed that the Gulf states, in particular, and the Arab world, in general, owed him and his country both the funds to continue his modernization—including that of his armed forces—and their fealty. Failing to achieve these goals by the willing acquiescence of the regional states, Saddam was prepared to achieve them by force. In addition, he had no scruples about lying to his brother Arabs.

In the summer of 1990 the conflict between Saddam and Kuwait escalated seriously. Talks in late July failed to defuse it and while many observers and participants concluded that Saddam might well use his military might to achieve his stated goals, few, if any, believed that he would go so far as to swallow Kuwait whole. Yet, on the second of August that is precisely what Saddam did.
The U.S. Response.

Perhaps the only organization that realized before the fact that Saddam intended to invade Kuwait was the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. As Saddam began his build-up, the CIA watched and interpreted the events with increasing alarm, finally coming to the correct conclusion that Saddam was, indeed, going to swallow Kuwait just before he pounced. The immediate American response seemed to be one of stunned disbelief. This reaction rapidly gave way to anger when President George Bush declared, "This will not stand .... This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait."

How the situation came to such an impasse is well summarized by Elaine Sciolino in her book, The Outlaw State. Describing American policy toward Iraq in the year or so prior to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait she states,

The American approach was both concrete and practical. Washington would try to moderate the behavior of Iraq by rewarding it with a series of economic and political incentives. But the policy was also characterized by poor intelligence, interagency feuds, an unwillingness to chart a course contrary to Washington's Arab allies, and just plain neglect....in 1988, the United States missed an opportunity to craft a balanced, nuanced policy that reflected the fact that Iraq had become a military threat to the region. It ignored signs that Iraq was spending extraordinary amounts of money it did not have on building a military arsenal, including a nuclear weapon, and did not make clear to Baghdad that it would not tolerate new foreign adventures.

On August 8, 1990 President George Bush spoke to the nation. He said,

A puppet regime imposed from outside is unacceptable. The acquisition of territory by force is unacceptable .... simple principles guide our policy. First, we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime.

The immediate approach of the Administration was to attempt to use the mechanisms of the United Nations as the founders had intended. With the end of the cold war this had become possible; a potential for agreement on action existed among the five permanent members of the Security Council without whose concurrence action was impossible. On the very day of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait the UN Security Council passed Resolution 660 which demanded Iraq's unconditional and immediate withdrawal by 14 to 0 vote. It also called on both sides to begin negotiations. Follow-on resolutions imposed sanctions on Iraq, declared its annexation of Kuwait to be null and void (662—August 9, 1990), authorized UN members to use naval forces to enforce sanctions (665—August 25, 1990), and, in Resolution 678 on November 29, 1990, demanded Iraq's complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait by January 15, 1991 and authorized members "to use all necessary means" to force the Iraqis to withdraw after the deadline.

What the Bush Administration had done was to build a coalition within the UN. Through effective diplomacy it turned a political coalition into a military one of some 30 nations. On September 16 President Bush spoke to the people of Iraq in a speech that was televised unedited to Iraq. In it he said.
... our only objective is to oppose the invasion ordered by Saddam Hussein. Twenty seven states have sent forces to the Gulf region to defend against Iraq. Now, once again, Iraq finds itself on the brink of war. Once again, the same Iraqi leadership has miscalculated. Once again, the Iraqi people face tragedy. No one—not the American people, not this president—wants war. But there are times when a country, when all countries who value the principles of sovereignty and independence, must stand against aggression. As Americans, we're slow to raise our hand in anger and eager to explore every peaceful means of settling our disputes; but when we have exhausted every alternative, when conflict is thrust upon us, there is no nation on Earth with greater resolve or stronger steadiness of purpose.

Thus, by mid-September, not only had President Bush built a political and military coalition but he had stated his objectives, had them sanctioned by the UN Security Council, and warned Iraq publicly and privately of the consequences of its actions. Those consequences were modern war at its most sudden with a violence that had rarely been imagined. Its objective was clearly the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty.

The international coalition was not the only coalition that was required. Rather, there was also a need to build a consensus within the United States that war against Iraq to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait was vital to the national interest. Such a consensus also had to be reflected in a legislative coalition in each of the two houses of Congress. The requirement for a legislative coalition was not immediately obvious as members of the Administration argued among themselves about the impact of the War Powers Act and the need to go to Congress for an authorization to use force or a declaration of war.

One factor that strongly influenced the developing consensus was the Administration's decision to exercise its authority to call up the Reserves. This decision gave nearly every community in the United States a personal stake in the outcome and resulted in a consolidation of support for the President and his policy. On November 8, immediately after the mid-term elections, President Bush announced that he planned to double the size of the force in the Gulf so as to give the coalition an offensive option. This decision also resulted in additional Reserve call-ups with their attendant policy support effect. As discussed above, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678 on November 29 authorizing the use of force to effect an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait after January 15, 1991. This vote set the stage for the debate and vote in the U.S. Congress.

On January 4, 1991 the final pass in an intricate diplomatic dance began with an agreement for a meeting between Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, and U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, to be held in Geneva on the 9th.

On January 8, President Bush sent identical letters to the Speaker of the House and the Senate majority leader requesting a congressional resolution authorizing "the use of all necessary means to implement UN Security Council Resolution 678." On the 9th, Baker met with Aziz in Geneva and delivered the clearest possible message to the Iraqis as to the consequences of not complying fully with the several UN resolutions by the January 15th deadline. The meeting was fruitless and the apparent Iraqi intransigence epitomized by Aziz's refusal to accept President Bush's letter to Saddam Hussein helped to further consolidate American support for what rapidly was becoming inevitable.
The congressional debate focused largely on the issue of whether to give sanctions more time to work or to use military force immediately upon the expiration of the January 15th deadline. When the votes were taken on January 12th, the House passed the Resolution by 250 to 183 while the Senate passed it 53 to 47. With passage of the "Joint Resolution Authorizing Use of Military Force Against Iraq," President Bush had a functional equivalent of a declaration of war.

**Issues and Questions.**

The discussion in the preceding paragraphs suggests that from the very beginning of the diplomatic/military dance that began on August 2, 1990, the principal objective of the UN Security Council and the United States was the eviction of Saddam Hussein and Iraq from Kuwait—peacefully if possible, by force if necessary. This conclusion clearly made it incumbent on the military forces and other government agencies to undertake prudent contingency planning from the very beginning for offensive action to drive the Iraqis from Kuwait and to plan for the restoration of the legitimate government and its services as soon as Kuwait was liberated. The question is when this planning was begun. In addition, we need to know why it was begun when it was and not sooner or later. Moreover, we must know what organizations were both within and outside the coordination loop as well as why some organizations were excluded.

Although it appears that contingency planning for offensive operations did begin immediately, it was held extremely close within a carefully selected planning cell of the CENTCOM staff until well after President Bush announced that he was doubling the size of the force to give the coalition an offensive option. This resulted in very little attention to the issue that offensive operations raised were being focused at the component planning level. This was especially important for ARCENT which had executive agency for civil affairs.

Planning for the restoration of Kuwait took a different course, much of which will be detailed in Chapter 3, but which must be addressed here briefly. Action officer level recognition that such a course would be required took place as early as August in both the State Department and DOD. Nothing, however, happened to facilitate planning until the Emir of Kuwait sent President Bush a letter requesting planning assistance from DOD assets. The letter was received in October. After receipt it floundered within the bureaucracies of State and Defense for about 6 weeks until the Kuwait Task Force (KTF) was finally activated as a planning cell for Kuwaiti restoration on December 1, 1990. Of particular interest for our purposes is that the KTF was not under the command of USCENTCOM nor was it in the chain of coordination for CENTCOM planning for the actual liberation of Kuwait. The fact that the KTF was not in the coordination scheme for planning would cause a series of repercussions downstream. Clearly, it did not result in failure but it did make things more difficult than they needed to be.

A third issue focuses on U.S.—in particular, President Bush's—calls for the ouster of Saddam Hussein by the Iraqis themselves, or any faction among them. These calls began to be reported as of early August 1990. Indeed. The Washington Post on August 6 reported that Bush had ordered planning for covert action to achieve that end. The issue here is how far in front of the rest of the UN Security Council this put the United States; or did we, in fact, begin to take a
divergent path? The critical questions address the implications of the overthrow of Saddam for Iraq, the region, the UN, and the United States. In particular, what role would the United States have to play in Iraq if this policy were to succeed in conjunction with the use of military force to expel Saddam from Kuwait? While both CENTCOM and JCS recognized the desirability of the overthrow of Saddam, both continually advised the political decisionmakers of the negative consequences of civil war in Iraq. The result, however, was that presidential rhetoric did not change while at the same time operational planners did not address the consequences of civil war in these lands. Thus, the source of refugees in southern Iraq came as something of a surprise while the entire Kurdish problem was not anticipated.

Many would argue that the kinds of questions and issues raised here are not the subject for military planners. This study, however, posits as fact that the political and military are so intimately interwoven that military strategists and planners must address both aspects in carrying out their duties. Moreover, the same applies at least equally to civilian government agencies.

Overview.

This study addresses the issues at war's end, what we are calling post-conflict operations. As indicated in Chapter 1, the study posits a strategic concept for this type of operation and concludes that there are more similarities than distinctions between "liberation" and "occupation." By extension this conclusion holds for "rescue" as well.

Chapter 2 has focused on the Kuwait crisis that produced Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT, as well as some of the critical issues and questions raised by the crisis with respect to the post-conflict period and the policies, strategies, and plans required for the effective conduct of post-conflict operations. The following chapters will address first, planning for the restoration of Kuwait, then Operation DESERT STORM itself, with emphasis on the impact of the related public diplomacy which has been foreshadowed here. This will be followed by chapters addressing the liberation/restoration operations in Kuwait and the occupation of southern Iraq and Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. The final chapter focuses on the strategic implications of these experiences for war termination in the larger sense.
CHAPTER 3

LIBERATION AND OCCUPATION: PLANNING FOR CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE KUWAIT THEATER

A central question of this study is the nature of planning for civil-military operations in the Kuwait theater. In this chapter it will be addressed in terms of context rather than chronologically. The first context will be that of the restoration of Kuwait by the Kuwait Task Force (KTF). The second context will be that of CENTCOM and its Army component, ARCENT. The third context will be that of the interface among the joint, combined and interagency worlds. The final context will be in contrast to that of the liberation of Kuwait; it will deal with the occupation of parts of southern Iraq. Finally, the several planning contexts will be analyzed from a comparative perspective.

The Kuwait Task Force (KTF).

The birth of the KTF was pure serendipity. It depended on the fact that one man occupied two key positions in two separate organizations. Randall Elliott was a senior analyst in the Near East division of State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). Elliott's desk at State was literally across the hall from that of his good friend Edward "Skip" Gnehm, the Ambassador designate of the United States to Kuwait.60

Colonel Randall Elliott, U.S. Army Reserve, was the operations officer of the 352d Civil Affairs Command.61 Although it was no accident that the 352d was located in the Washington DC area, none of the several previous Operations Officers of the Command had been in a similar critical position within the State Department as Elliott.

Shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it had become clear to Elliott that there was a high probability that the country would have to be liberated by force.62 If that came about it was equally clear that restoration of government and government services would be a major task and that planning for restoration should begin as soon as possible. In Elliott's mind there was no question as to who within the U.S. Government was qualified to conduct the required planning; the 352d CA Command (or elements thereof) was the appropriate organization. Elliott, therefore took it upon himself to inform his State colleagues as to the capabilities of the CA units of the U.S. Army (97 percent of which are found in the USAR).63

Elliott found a very receptive audience in his friend, Skip Gnehm. Others responded positively, as well, to his educational efforts. Soon, conversations began on both sides of the Potomac as CA qualified personnel in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD/SO-LIC) and the Joint Staff began to participate in developing a course of action.64

Early in September 1990, the Government of Kuwait in exile in Taif, Saudi Arabia, decided to send a team of 20 officials to Washington to develop the contracts for the massive reconstruction it believed would be necessary.65 Around mid-September the team was established in Washington as the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program (KERP) headed by Mr. Fawzi Al-Sultan, a Kuwaiti economist who was an official of the World Bank.66 Disarray in the Government in Taif and some floundering within the KERP made it clear to both Kuwait and the United States that assistance would be required.67 Informal discussions with members of the KERP by personnel from both State and Defense educated the Kuwaitis as to the capabilities of U.S. military Civil Affairs assets. "The real breakthrough came when Ambassador designate Gnehm informed the GOK that such a capability was available."68 With this advice the Kuwaitis requested through Ambassador Gnehm a briefing on DOD CA capabilities. The request was made in late September and Gnehm transmitted it to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) who transmitted it to the Joint Staff. The latter agreed to provide the briefing on October 4.69

When the briefing was completed the Kuwaitis pursued the subject of how they might go about requesting CA support. Sam Routson, the OASD/SO-LIC representative and a USMC CA Reservist who had participated in some of the planning for civil-military operations in Panama suggested that Kuwait present a formal request to President Bush.70 That request, dated October 9, from the Emir but "over the signature of the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the U.S., Mr. Saud Nasir Al-Sabah" stated,

... we call upon the friendship and assistance of the world community and particularly the United States in the present and future work which lies ahead in putting together an emergency and recovery program. More specifically, we have an immediate and pressing need for certain specialties and expertise resident, among other U.S. agencies, in the United States Department of Defense.71

The letter was drafted by OASD/SO-LIC.72

During the next 6 weeks there was a good deal of floundering within DOD and between DOD and State as the U.S. Government tried to determine just how it would respond to the Emir's request. Within DOD the opinion was expressed in written comments that CA units and personnel might not be the appropriate organizations and individuals to respond to the Kuwaiti needs.73 Given the history of CA in the U.S. Army, this was a response to be expected, as suggested by Chapter 1. In any event, OASD/SO-LIC determined that the mission was well within CA doctrine.74 Finally, after 6 weeks, the KTF was activated using personnel from the 352d CA Command and its subordinate units. This event took place on December 1, 1990.75

Initially, the KTF was to be commanded by the Commanding General (CG) of the 352d, Brigadier General Howard Mooney. After being activated for one day, however, General Mooney was deactivated and command of the KTF devolved on Colonel Randall Elliott.76
CENTCOM and ARCENT.

Planning for civil military operations at the CENTCOM level was the responsibility of the Political-Military Division of the Policy, Plans, and Strategy Directorate (CCJ5). Within that division responsibility rested with the Chief and one action officer, both Mid-East Foreign Area Officers (FAOs). The action officer, a major, had CA as an additional duty. In addition to these two officers, CENTCOM was supported by four Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) and a six-man augmentation team from the 352d CA Command. Typically, the IMAs would train as individuals during the course of the year while the augmentation team would conduct its annual training as a group.

Shortly after the crisis began the CA augmentation team from the 352d arrived at CENTCOM Headquarters in Tampa to support the planning effort. They had been called up under the Temporary Tour of Active Duty mechanism in volunteer status and at the initiative of the 352d which understood how to make the system work. Needless to say their assistance was very welcome.

When the augmentation cell from the 352d arrived at MacDill AFB (CENTCOM Headquarters) on August 21, 1990 they found that significant elements of the J-5 had already departed for the Gulf. Nevertheless, the cell did provide a CA knowledge base and planning capability that had been lacking.

The active component CA action officer, in his search for material that might assist him in one way or another, had been alerted through U.S. Special Operations Command to the existence of the Panama civil-military operations plan, BLIND LOGIC, that had been executed only a year earlier. He contacted the 361st CA Brigade which had a copy of the plan and arranged for a copy to be sent to CENTCOM. Unfortunately, this very logical approach came to naught because, by the time the plan arrived, much of the CENTCOM staff, including the CA action officer, was in the process of deploying to Saudi Arabia and the plan disappeared into the CCJ5 files as the effort was overtaken by other events.

While these actions were taking place at CENTCOM, ARCENT was also beginning to consider what its approach to civil-military operations would be. Unfortunately, ARCENT (or 3d U.S. Army) had just lost its permanent CA staff. In the words of more than one officer the ARCENT staff could not even spell CA. To assist them before any of their Reserve assets could arrive, an officer who had formerly been assigned to the Active Component 96th CA Battalion was sent from Fort Bragg.

The actions taken by the officer all served to restrict civil affairs activities in the early stages of Operation DESERT SHIELD to the 96th CA Battalion. In the later stages, when it had become obvious that Reserve Component help was required, his actions minimized the use of the Reserve CA units and were designed to hold them to the lowest level of command possible. The rationale behind this approach was the perception of the poor performance of the senior Reserve CA headquarters in Panama (an ad hoc composite headquarters) the year before. While a lesson had been absorbed from the Panama experience it appears to have been based on less than full analysis of the available data. The result was to deprive ARCENT of a robust CA and civil-military operations planning and execution capability until much later in the process than was desirable.
In the meantime, the 96th CA Battalion found itself alone in executing what civil military operations were undertaken.

The 96th did undertake, very early in Operation DESERT SHIELD, an assessment on the ground of the civil-military operations environment in Saudi Arabia. That assessment addressed primarily the question of host nation support for the Operation; it never took the offensive option into account even though CENTCOM was including an offensive phase in its compartmented planning activities.82

As part of its standard procedures, enshrined in its OPLANS, CENTCOM had designated ARCENT as its Executive Agent for Civil Affairs.8 What this meant was that CENTCOM did not retain any formal responsibility for planning civil-military operations. At the same time, ARCENT was lacking the trained staff due to both losses and the lack of a call-up and timely arrival of Reserve CA volunteers. The result was a significant delay in developing effective plans.

Interfaces and Disconnects in the Joint/Combined/Interagency Arena.

The KTF was organized under the interagency mandate of the Departments of Defense and State. Supervision was delegated to what was called the Steering Committee Group and normally consisted of senior officials from both departments. Thus, the usual representative from State was Ambassador Designate SKI; Gnehm while his normal Defense counterpart was Fred Smith from International Security Affairs, Henry Rowen's deputy. Day to day supervision was delegated to the Working Group with staff officers from State, ISA, and OJCS in charge.84 What this organization really meant was that COL Elliott had been able to establish a support group in the guise of interagency supervision.

The KTF was drawn from the 352d and its subordinate units and consisted of personnel with civilian expertise in most of the 20 CA functional specialties. Conspicuously absent among the specialties was Religious Affairs since the personnel who normally performed those duties were members of the American clergy—mostly Protestants and Catholics with a smattering of Jews, hardly an appropriate mix for a relatively conservative and fundamentalist Islamic nation.

Colonel Elliott planned to divide his work into four phases after first defining his organization clearly as a planning cell.85 Phase 1, consisting of task organization and mission orientation, would be short, several days to a week. Phase 2, an initial estimate of the civil-military operations situation inside Kuwait and a definition of the scope of work, would overlap Phase 1 and hardly last much longer. Phase 3 would consist of the original drafting of plans while Phase 4 would produce a detailed civil affairs annex to the CENTCOM/ARCENT OPLAN.86 Of course, CENTCOM's plan never was available to the KTF during its operations in Washington under interagency supervision because the KTF was not under CINCCENT's command.

In organizing the KTF, Colonel Elliott had not taken into consideration the planning process for civil-military operations in Panama the year before but he was well aware that a number of the officers of the 352d and its subordinate units had served in Operations JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE.
LIBERTY. Indeed, Elliott had specifically recruited several of these individuals who formed what he called his “Panama Brain Trust.” Of the members of the Brain Trust, however, only the most junior in rank had been involved in the Panama planning. To what extent this limited the impact of the Panama planning experience on the KTF remains subject to speculation, however Colonel Elliott has asserted that the Brain Trust was extremely useful to him in providing a “reality check” on KTF planning. Initially, planning focused on defining the nature of the problem. Since no one knew what levels of destruction might exist in Kuwait after liberation, “The KTF attempted to come up with planning matrices for varying degrees of conflict. These proved to be clumsy and ill-defined, so we simply planned for the worst.”

The essence of the KTF’s operation in Washington was that it was a combined, interagency planning effort that was engaged in a completely unclassified mode. Colonel Elliott and his team worked hand in glove with the Kuwaiti team (KERP), led initially by Fawzi Al-Sultan. Elliott’s insistence that the planning effort be combined made certain that the entire operation was unclassified. This removed from consideration a whole host of difficulties while at the same time created a number of others. These new problems were the result of the fact that the normal operating mode for DOD planners is classified and, while State tends to operate at the unclassified level somewhat more, it, too, classifies a significant number of its communications. Thus while producing a combined plan with the KERP ensured that the KTF was synchronized with the host government, it also resulted in the exacerbation of the disjunction with CENTCOM and ARCENT. Importantly, this lack of congruence never was susceptible to amelioration by the Steering Committee Group or its subordinate Working Group. Indeed, the problem may well have been an issue between the Joint Staff and the CENTCOM staff both of whom often were excluded from communications directly between Generals Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell.

The KTF, besides its major role in planning the details of restoration with the KERP, was also involved from the beginning in influencing the Kuwaitis with respect to some major U.S. foreign policy goals. The first of these goals was the implementation of U.S. human rights objectives. To accomplish this the “KTF put [U.S.] human rights legislation into written communication with the Kuwaitis....more importantly, KTF personnel hammered away at the issue and sensitized the Kuwaitis to the U.S. need for and earnest desire that there be no human rights violations.” These efforts continued through the liberation of Kuwait.

The second major foreign policy issue was the role the KTF played in convincing the Kuwaitis to support the U.S. policy of “buy American” when contracting for the restoration and reconstruction of their country. Colonel Elliott on more than one occasion directly articulated this position to his Kuwaiti counterparts.

A major part of the planning effort was devoted to drafting the Civil Affairs annex (Annex G) to the CENTCOM and ARCENT OPLANS. Work began on Christmas Day and a draft was prepared and sent to both headquarters and interested parties in the Washington community by early January. As described by one of the recipients, the Annex G was a thick and very complete document. Unfortunately, it had been drafted in a vacuum with respect to the CENTCOM and ARCENT OPLANS which resulted in some significant gaps between what the KTF had planned and what was already included in the OPLANS. The most important involved the distinction between reconstruction and the provision of immediate services to the liberated population. The
KTF had addressed its efforts to reconstruction with much less focus on immediate services which was the heart of the CENTCOM/ARCENT plans.

For wholly different reasons the development of the civil-military operations plan for Operation DESERT STORM had repeated the experience of Panama where restoration planning had been conducted in isolation from the planning for combat. In the case of the KTF the reasons revolved around operational security and the fact that the organization was not subordinate to CENTCOM. This would change when the KTF deployed to Saudi Arabia.

One aspect of the KTF that is not well understood is that it was designed to work in combination with its Kuwaiti counterpart, the KERP. Washington offices were in close proximity to each other. This resulted in constant interaction and coordination between the two organizations. Colonel Elliott, fully anticipating this requirement for interaction, had fought hard and successfully to keep all KTF actions unclassified. While this greatly facilitated working with the Kuwaitis, it limited the ability of the KTF to monitor CENTCOM and ARCENT plans, even had those been made available.

Early in the activities of the KTF, Colonel Elliott was directed by Lieutenant General Carns, the Secretary of the Joint Staff, to fully involve the rest of the U.S. Government. This resulted from a "lesson learned" from the Panama experience where the U.S. Army had been left holding the economic bag after other agencies reneged on promises to help fund emergency restoration. As a result, by the time the KTF deployed to Saudi Arabia, Elliott had involved 27 separate Federal agencies. Among these was the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of AID whose director, Andrew Natsios (a general officer equivalent in his civilian position) was a major in the Army Reserve. Elliott immediately brought Natsios into the KTF as Executive Officer and Natsios brought his civilian agency checkbook with him.

"When the KTF began to work with its Kuwaiti counterparts it became immediately clear that the Kuwaitis had little or no experience in planning a recovery...Kuwait had never experienced any major natural disaster. Iraq's invasion was the first manmade one they would have to react to." Thus the KTF organized briefings for the KERP from OFDA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Army Corps of Engineers. As a result of these briefings the Kuwaitis concluded that the Corps had much to offer and the KTF leadership insisted that it be given a major role in Kuwait's recovery.

Deploying the KTF.

Early in January 1990 Ambassador Gnehm, accompanied by Colonel Elliott, traveled to Taif, Saudi Arabia—seat of the Kuwaiti Government in Exile—to discuss with the Emir and Crown Prince the status of planning for reconstruction. Their trip coincided with a visit by Robert Kimmitt, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. After meeting with the Emir, Kimmitt told Elliott that the Kuwaiti ruler wanted both the KTF and the KERP to deploy as soon as possible to Saudi Arabia. Kimmitt also stated that the Steering Committee Group was in accord with the proposed
As a result of this guidance the KTF set a date for its move to Saudi Arabia and began preparations to deploy by the end of January.

"On January 25, the KTF ceased Washington operations and packed up." An advance party was designated and sent to Saudi Arabia. Its initial encounter with the CENTCOM staff on arrival in Saudi Arabia was rocky, to say the least. The KTF leadership was concerned that the organization would be broken up as soon as CENTCOM gained control over it, while CENTCOM was certain that it would do everything necessary to establish that the KTF no longer was an independent planning entity of the interagency Steering Committee Group, but rather now was a CENTCOM asset to be used as the CINC saw fit. Paranoia on the part of at least one member of the advance party exacerbated the potentially strained relations between the KTF and the CENTCOM staff.

The conflict over the role of the KTF involved both substantive as well as "turf" issues. On the substantive side the organization had been created as a planning cell to provide the Kuwaitis with American expertise in planning for the restoration of civil society and the reconstruction of their country. It had been organized under interagency auspices to effect U.S. policy by providing expertise that no other element of the U.S. Government could muster. Although it had not been focused on emergency restoration of services and emergency reconstruction, it was not unaware of the requirement and was prepared to tackle it. However, the KTF perceived itself, and was similarly perceived by Ambassador Gnehm, as being of no use to anybody if it could not remain together as an entity. Its mass of 63 persons would quickly lose criticality if very many were detached and assigned elsewhere.

The turf issues involved not only who the KTF worked for at any given time but also who it should work for in any particular circumstance. When it was created the KTF worked to execute interagency policy with its Kuwaiti government counterpart organization, KERP. It did not work for CINCCENT and did not even have effective communications with him or his CENTCOM and ARCENT staffs. Even though the CA staffs of both organizations were made up of members of the 352d CA Command, as was the KTF, effective communication was not established. Rather, civil military operations planning was conducted in isolation by three separate and distinct organizations, largely out of touch with each other.

Thus when the KTF arrived in country ARCENT wanted most of it; CENTCOM wanted some of it; Ambassador Gnehm wanted the KTF intact; and Brigadier General Howard Mooney, finally mobilized with the rest of the 352d, wanted to reincorporate the KTF members into their respective CA units. The net result was a compromise in which the KTF generally remained as a single entity while a handful of officers were detached to perform liaison functions at CENTCOM and ARCENT. The organization as a whole continued to plan with the Kuwaitis but shifted its focus from long-term reconstruction to emergency restoration of services. It also maintained a very close working relationship with Ambassador Gnehm.

The planning for the emergency restoration and reconstruction phase took off from the Civil Affairs annex that the KTF had produced in Washington. However, it focused effort on seven essential areas: food, water, medical care, sanitation, transportation, telecommunications, and
electric power. Of these, it soon became clear that power was critical; without electric power nothing runs in a modern city.

From the CENTCOM Perspective.

Early in Operation DESERT SHIELD, CENTCOM determined that a civil affairs assessment of the situation in Saudi Arabia was required. By September, the commander of the only active component civil affairs unit, the 96th CA Battalion, had been tasked to conduct the assessment. The resulting report indicated that the required CA missions essentially were host nation support, cultural sensitization, and cultural awareness programs. Then, if combat operations were undertaken, displaced civilian and refugee support activities would become the principal mission. Finally, the possibility of some reconstruction was identified but not really addressed.

Actual CENTCOM planning for what became Operation DESERT SHIELD began well before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait with the development of OPLAN 1002-90. Exercise INTERNAL LOOK 90 (IL90) was designed to exercise a portion of the draft plan. That exercise was completed at the end of July 1990 and included the civil affairs annex in the test. The OPLAN 1002-90 CA annex provided CENTCOM the basis for its CA planning during the early stages of Operation DESERT SHIELD. The annex was subjected to review, projection with respect to combat operations, and amendment qualified by the CENTCOM understanding that its first mission was the defense of Saudi Arabia until that was formally adjusted.

In early December, Colonel Larry Blount led a seven member team from the 352d Civil Affairs Command to Saudi Arabia where it became the Civil Affairs Branch of Political-Military Division of the Plans and Policy Directorate (CCJ5) of USCENTCOM. Blount’s team was cognizant of the OPLANS for DESERT SHIELD/STORM, in particular the combat phase. Therefore, civil military operations (CMO) planning made two different assumptions about the conditions under which CMO would take place, depending on location. Planning for CMO in liberated Kuwait assumed that the United States would assist a sovereign government to restore its services until such time as assistance no longer would be required. Authority to act within Kuwait was limited to what was granted by that sovereign government. By contrast, planning for CMO in southern Iraq assumed that U.S. and allied forces would be de facto occupiers and, therefore, liable under the Geneva Convention for the health and welfare of the civil population in those areas where allied forces had displaced the Iraqi government.

CMO planning at the theater level focused on five broad areas. (1) Minimize interference with and hazards to the civilian populations in Saudi Arabia; (2) Contingency plans for temporary civil authority in occupied areas of southern Iraq; (3) Contingency plans for handling significant numbers of dislocated civilians (DCs) in Kuwait in support of the Government of Kuwait; (4) Emergency and restoration services in Kuwait City and Kuwait; and (5) Repatriating enemy prisoners of war.

Blount also concluded that there was a need to bring the KTF to Saudi Arabia as soon as possible to integrate its efforts into the CENTCOM war plans. The addition of the 63 member KTF would have greatly expanded the CENTCOM CMO planning capability.
Two other issues focused CENTCOM's CMQ planning efforts: first, the issue of executive agency for civil affairs and, second, the issue of which CA units would be called-up to support the operation. Previous planning iterations had always assumed that the executive agent for civil affairs would be the ARCENT because the vast majority of CA units, personnel, and expertise were in the Army, in general, and in the Army Reserve, in particular. As a result, CENTCOM saw no reason to make any changes and designated ARCENT as CA executive agent. The impact of that decision will be addressed in the following section of this chapter.

The second issue, that of which CA units to call-up for EC-SERT STORM, was clearly within the purview of CENTCOM regardless of executive agency. The issue arose when the decision was made to bring VII Corps from Germany to be the second U.S. corps in the operation. It was complicated by the fact that many of its units, including divisions, were normally Third Corps assets. Hence the question was whether to follow the unit CAPSTONE (affiliation) "trace" and call the Reserve CA units aligned to VII Corps, the units aligned to the particular divisions (such as the 1st Infantry), or to call CA units with a Middle Eastern expertise regardless of their unit of CAPSTONE alignment. No matter what the choice, traditional CAPSTONE would be violated. CCJ5 was adamant that the best, and indeed the only appropriate choice was to call those units with a regional orientation. CCJ5 reasoned that the critical knowledge was of the culture of the area rather than knowledge of commanders and unit personalities. It assumed that CA technical skills would be comparable from CA unit to CA unit. As a result all activated CA units came from the "trace" of the 352d CA Command which was CAPSTONE to CENTCOM.

From the ARCENT Perspective.

As stated above, ARCENT (Third U.S. Army), according to standing plans and procedures, had been named CENTCOM's executive agent for civil affairs. Immediately preceding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, however, ARCENT had suffered the wholesale transfer of its minuscule CA element. Thus, in August 1990 ARCENT had no CA staff. As a result, a former CA company commander with the active component 96th CA Battalion who had recently been transferred to the 4th Psychological Operations Group was detailed to assist ARCENT with its early CA planning. That planning focused on CA support for Operation DESERT SHIELD during which there was perceived to be little or no need for Reserve CA augmentation.

With the activation of some Reserve units and individual mobilization augmentees (IMA), a civilian employee of U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM), Jim Kerr, who as a Reserve Colonel was IMA to ARCENT's CA staff section (G-5), was called-up as the G-5 of ARCENT/Third Army. Colonel Kerr remained in this position for the duration of the operations.

With the exception of about four people the ARCENT G-5 was staffed by personnel from the 352d CA Command. In all the prior planning it had been assumed that the 352d would be activated as a unit and that its commander, Brigadier General Howard Mooney, would be dual hatted as the commander and the ARCENT G-5. As in the case of the KTF, Mooney was not activated and as a result Kerr remained as the G-5.
Planning guidance for civil affairs was issued to ARCENT by the CENTCOM J-5. While based on CENTCOM OPLANS it was modified over time. Moreover, the ARCENT G-5 had significant input to the CA annexes of the CENTCOM OPLANS so that, in a sense, they were providing guidance to themselves. As time went on, however, the degree of congruence between the ARCENT G-5 staff and its higher headquarters at CENTCOM diminished such that there developed several disconnects in the planning and execution.

The early civil-military operations planning was embodied in OPLAN 1002-90 which was a defense of Saudi Arabia and did not envision offensive operations other than to restore the border. As a result, DESERT SHIELD force structure did not envision anything more than staff augmentation from CA units. The Saudis would be responsible for military interaction with their own people. Anything more that was required was well within the capability of the 96th CA Battalion. This was true until planning began for the liberation of Kuwait. Offensive operations would require Reserve CA units to deploy in support of the combat forces. Although, as we have seen, there was some planning for an offensive to liberate Kuwait almost from the very first moment, it was neither well developed in the early days of DESERT SHIELD nor was it widely shared. Indeed, CENTCOM staff officers have noted that planning for the liberation of Kuwait was extremely “close hold” until early December. In any event, offensive planning guidance was not issued to ARCENT G-5 until rather late in the game. Another factor in this was the perception in the ARCENT G-5 that the guidance from the CINC and his staff never was all that clear. In addition.

There was a real desire in Riyadh to hang on to a lot of civil affairs and not pass it down. We felt there should have been more passed down to us, not only for execution but also for coordination and liaison. Strangely enough, we were one of the few elements in the ARCENT staff that had no Saudi counterparts. Our Saudi counterpart relationship was preempted by the J-5 staff of the CINC.

And their Kuwaiti counterpart relationship had been established in Washington by the KTF.

Planning the Occupation of Southern Iraq.

CENTCOM’s plan for what became Operation DESERT STORM envisioned a ground sweep through southern Iraq to expel the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and destroy their capability to threaten their neighbors. It, at no time, envisioned the occupation of southern Iraq. Yet, it was precisely that phrasing that set the stage for the problems encountered in both planning and execution. Whether or not CENTCOM fully understood that international law makes no distinction between the obligations of a de facto occupier and a de jure one or between short and lengthy occupations is less important at this stage than the fact that ARCENT did not fully understand. In the planning stage, ARCENT staff kept telling its G-5 that “...we don’t have to worry about that because we are not staying. It’s not going to be a long-term thing.”

ARCENT G-5 did, however, plan for the “occupation” of southern Iraq. The section realized the requirement to deal with fairly large numbers of displaced civilians was almost certain to exist and, therefore, planned accordingly. This planning was complicated by ARCENT’s interpretation
of its instructions from CENTCOM with respect to refugees which ARCENT believed precluded the establishment of refugee or displaced civilian (DC) camps. When this interpretation of instructions was coupled with the perception of the rest of the ARCENT staff that the U.S. and allied forces really would not be in Iraq long enough to acquire the obligations of occupiers, then it was clear that planning was seriously complicated.

The simple and logical solution to planning that ARCENT G-5 adopted was to decentralize execution of CMO through the apportionment of CA units. "We planned for a robust capability to support the two corps. In fact, more than robust, more than doctrine, ACRs (Armored Cavalry Regiments) as well as all those divisions and the COSCOMs (Corps Support Command)..." What ARCENT did was to plan the arrival of forces and their assignment and allow the Corps and Division commanders to determine how those CA units would be used.

This approach in practice resulted in extreme variability in the use of CA assets as well as in the planning for their use. Two general approaches appeared corresponding to the two deployed corps. In the case of the XVIII Airborne Corps a fairly broad approach to CMO was adopted based on the Corps' experience with contingency operations, especially in Panama. By contrast, the VII Corps tended to follow the CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation) concept of host nation support that had been common in the European environment. The individual divisions of the two corps varied at least as much in their own concepts of employment of their attached CA assets. While the XVIII Corps more often had CA units it had worked with previously than did the VII Corps, this was not always the case and often was not the deciding factor in planning and executing CMO. Rather, what appeared to be decisive was the fact that the G-5 of the XVIII Corps was very experienced while the G-5 of the VII Corps was so new to the game that he had barely received a copy of the rules much less read and understood them.

**Analysis of CMO Planning for DESERT STORM.**

Clearly CMO planning for Operation DESERT STORM varied in its capability to address the several civil military aspects of the operation. The major success story in the planning was the KTF although that success was flawed. The principal failure in planning was the inability to achieve a real unity of planning effort until very late in the process. Even then unity was achieved only with "chewing gum and bailing wire."

As suggested above, the fact that the KTF came into existence at all was purely serendipitous. Structurally, the fact that the 352d CA Command was located in the Washington, DC area provided many critical CA functional capabilities from within government along with a knowledge of the American political process including its bureaucratic politics. That structure, however, was not nearly enough to guarantee that something like the KTF would be created. Rather, it was the fact that one individual, Randall Elliott, occupied two key positions at the same time that permitted the KTF to happen. As Colonel Elliott pointed out, his predecessor as operations officer in the 352d worked as a civilian in another government agency on the scientific and technical side.
Consider then what would have happened (or not happened) if this individual had occupied the position in August 1990. Consider as well the possibility of the operations position being held by a different State Department civil service employee from a different region such as Latin America. The likelihood of a KTF emerging, while greater than in the case of the person from the other civilian agency, still would have been relatively small. What is certain is that luck played a major part in establishing the conditions for the KTF. How it was established, how it worked, what it accomplished, and what it failed to do were the result of the conscious decisions, actions, and interactions of many civilian and military (Active and Reserve) players in a complex interagency and international environment.

The establishment of the KTF under interagency auspices resolved a problem that had plagued the planners of the Panama operation the previous year. In that circumstance the planners had been prohibited from effecting interagency coordination on the grounds that the OPLANS were closely held within DOD channels only. In the case of the KTF, Colonel Elliott did not learn from the Panama planners' problems but rather did what seemed to him to be appropriate at the time, based on his analysis of the problem which faced those who would be charged with planning for the recovery of Kuwait.

Given Elliott's civilian position and his military role he was particularly sensitive to the requirement for interagency planning. Moreover, he was firmly convinced of the need to plan with the Kuwaitis which necessitated that his task force operate in an unclassified mode. Thus, Elliott independently resolved issues that had been serious problems for the Panama planners. It is only fair, at this point, to note that there were significant differences between the two situations. Panama planning was extremely sensitive while Kuwait planning was an obvious necessity and had been requested by the government in exile. However, too much can be made of the differences since, during much of Operation DESERT SHIELD, planning for offensive combat operations to liberate Kuwait was extremely close-hold within the CENTCOM staff. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that had the KTF been established under the CINC's auspices, interagency and intergovernmental coordination would have been much more limited at best and stymied at worst.

Yet, it is this same point that created nearly all the difficulties faced by the KTF—the fact that it was not subordinate to the CENTCOM CINC. Because the KTF was not a CENTCOM asset it was not included in the distribution of the war plans. As a result it did its CMO planning in the dark with respect to what other U.S. plans were articulating. Thus, the annex produced by the KTF had major discontinuities with the CA plans and annexes being produced by CENTCOM and ARCENT.

Because the KTF was not a CENTCOM asset, coordination between it and the CA staffs at ARCENT and CENTCOM grew progressively weaker, despite the players generally being members of the same Reserve unit. This phenomenon was partly due to CENTCOM's operational security requirements, but, more importantly, to the sub-unit cohesion that the three separate organizations were developing. This was especially true of the KTF.

As a result, the great fear within the KTF was that when it was deployed CENTCOM would, at worst, break the organization up while, at best, it would detach so many of its members that it would lose the critical mass it needed to be effective. CENTCOM and ARCENT, on the other
hand, saw in the KTF a valuable asset to be controlled. The best way to do that might well be to break it up. Finally, there was a developing tension between the KTF and its parent Reserve unit, the 352d CA Command, which also wanted effective control once it arrived in theater.¹³²

These tensions among the several headquarters and staffs percolated through organizations under the severe stress of preparing for combat against a foe who just might be as competent as his reputation and might employ a weapon of mass destruction, poison gas. The conflict was resolved by intervention from the top when Ambassador Gnehm and the CINC reached a compromise that retained the integrity of the KTF but did provide some liaison to the two staffs. It also brought the KTF as a whole under the senior CA headquarters in theater, the 352d (the latter in its new guise as headquarters of the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force, about which more will appear in following chapters).¹³³

Finally, the KTF had been created as a planning organization. On its arrival in theater it found that it had acquired an execution mission that it had not wholly anticipated. This shifting of gears, while producing some strains, generally was accomplished well and will be addressed in subsequent chapters. The bottom line of problems for the planning of CMO was that coordination and control were far too decentralized. CENTCOM did not insist at the very beginning that it control the KTF. Not until the KTF came into theater did it become part of CENTCOM and privy to the Command’s thinking.¹³⁴ CENTCOM, however, did not emphasize the CMO role and mission. At the same time, CENTCOM, according to established procedures, delegated executive agency for civil affairs to its Army component, ARCENT. This would have been appropriate if the CINC had designated the ARCENT commander as his land component commander. General Schwarzkopf, however, retained for himself the roles of U.S. and (in effect) combined land component commander. This decision complicated the granting of CA executive agency to ARCENT since there remained critical issues relevant to civil affairs that had to be resolved at the level of the unified command. An additional, and unforeseen, complication came in the fact that civil-military operations (CMO), while centered on civil affairs (CA), are significantly larger than CA. This confirmed the experience of Panama and other recent operations and will be addressed in greater detail throughout this study.

While ARCENT was handicapped in carrying out its CA executive agency since the CINC retained command of the land component, its difficulties were exacerbated by a number of factors. First, the very small CA cell permanently assigned to Third Army disappeared suddenly with the reassignment of its officers and the failure of the Army to fill those positions in the weeks before the start of Operation DESERT SHIELD. This left the headquarters without any CA expertise at a critical moment. The replacements from the active Army on temporary assignment failed to properly interpret the likely future requirements for civil affairs units.

When “permanent” replacements from both the Active and Reserve components came on board, CA activities became routine to some extent. However, the decision to limit CA planning largely to the allocation of units to the corps and divisions and to delegate most of the operational planning to those units resulted in the abdication of the CMO planning responsibility by ARCENT.

Lastly, the inadequate communication between CCJ5 and ARCENT G-5 resulted in the misunderstanding of CENTCOM’s guidance with respect to planning for the handling of displaced
civilians and refugees in southern Iraq following the execution of offensive operations. The outcome was the lack of an adequate CMO plan by the CA Executive Agent, ARCENT.
CHAPTER 4

ACT II: DESERT STORM

Introduction.

This chapter serves to bridge the gap between the planning and execution of civil-military operations in the Gulf War. As such it focuses on the conduct of the combat operations beginning with the air campaign, through the major ground sweep, to the liberation of Kuwait. It then addresses the negotiations for a permanent cease-fire and the cease-fire, itself. Finally, the chapter looks at the revolts of the Shiites and the Kurds in light of the U.S. public diplomacy campaign and their effects on allied post-combat operations.

Scene One: The Military Campaign.

DESERT STORM was executed primarily as two major operations—one air and one land. Beginning on January 17, 1991, the air operation subjected Iraq and its forces to 43 days of the most concentrated use of airpower in history.

Planning for an airpower response to Iraqi aggression began in early August and was conducted by elements of the Air Staff in the Pentagon. Once it was determined that an immediate response would not be executed, the basic structure was incorporated into the air portion of the plan for Operation DESERT STORM by the commander of the air component of USCENTCOM, Lieutenant General Charles Horner and his staff at CENTAF in Saudi Arabia. The operation that the Air Staff had proposed and that Horner and his people had developed articulated the following specific objectives:

- Destroy/neutralize air defense command and control.
- Destroy nuclear, biological and chemical storage and production capability.
- Render ineffective national and military command, control and communications infrastructure.
- Destroy key electrical grids and oil storage facilities.
- Deny military resupply capability.
- Eliminate long-term offensive capability.
- Disrupt and weaken Republican Guard forces.
These strategic objectives were translated into operational plans as the single Air Tasking Order (ATO) for the coalition air forces. "When the war began, we started with the ATOs for the first two days, which had been produced over the previous five months. By the third day, we were into the classic ATO process, turning out a new product every 24 hours."\(^{139}\)

The process of turning strategy into orders for execution demonstrates some of the difficulties of retaining both the strategic focus as well as key political-military inconsistencies. As an example, one should consider the targeting of the Iraqi electrical grid. Clearly, this was a military target whose destruction had numerous military pay-offs. At the same time, destruction of the Iraqi electrical system would create significant hardship for the civilian population including the potential for many deaths. Therefore, it behooved the targeters to choose the destruction method that would accomplish the military strategic purpose while causing the minimum necessary collateral damage.

This concept for attacking the electrical grid rested on the assumption of a short war. If the assumption were valid then the proper way of targeting was that which would put the system out of action but capable of being repaired in a relatively short time. This approach would cause the fewest residual civilian casualties in Iraq and, therefore, the least amount of animosity toward the United States and its allies. Instead the targeters ignored the civil-military/political-military implications of their targeting and assigned those targets which would put the system out of operation for the longest possible period.\(^{140}\)

Despite a few such discontinuities, the air operation was highly successful in achieving its designated objectives. As General Schwarzkopf stated, "One of the purposes ... of that extensive air campaign was to isolate the Kuwaiti theater of operations ...."\(^{141}\) Not only did the air campaign succeed in this objective, but it also rendered major damage to the Iraqi forces and their defensive positions. Moreover, significant numbers of tanks, other armored vehicles, and artillery were destroyed. In the areas that were hit the hardest, Iraqi morale suffered tremendously under the hammer blows of the air campaign.

The land operation, although usually believed to have begun on February 24, actually was initiated at the same time as the air operation.\(^{142}\) As General Schwarzkopf said, "When we knew that he couldn't see us anymore we did a massive movement of troops all the way out to the west...because at that time we knew that he was still fixed in this area with the vast majority of his forces, and once the air campaign started, he would be incapable of moving out to counter this move, even if he knew we made it."\(^{143}\)

The end run, or as General Schwarzkopf called it, the "Hail Mary," was a brilliant success. It began on February 24 with U.S. and French forces under the control of the XVIII Airborne Corps driving north toward the Euphrates River from the coalition's left flank. On the same day British and American forces under the control of the U.S. VII Corps drove their armor north into southern Iraq while Egyptian, Syrian, U.S. Marines, Saudi and other Arab coalition forces breached the Iraqi barriers on the Kuwait/Saudi border.\(^{144}\)

On February 25, while the French armored division screened to the west, the other divisions of the XVIII Corps, the U.S. 101st and 24th Mech, reached the Euphrates and blocked the major
Iraqi escape route. Meanwhile, on both the 25th and 26th, "allied armor wheeled east to Iraq's Republican Guards."\textsuperscript{145} In Kuwait, Marines and other coalition forces penetrated the crumbling Iraqi defenses.\textsuperscript{146} By February 27, allied armor was continuing its drive east pressing down on the Republican Guards in northern Kuwait while Arab coalition forces and the Marines took Kuwait International Airport and Kuwait City.\textsuperscript{147}

The liberation of Kuwait was facilitated by the fact that the coalition never totally closed escape routes from Kuwait City to Iraq. Although this approach of leaving a relatively safe route out of Kuwait had been discussed by the CENTCOM staff, it never had been fully accepted. That it, in fact, happened in this way was fortuitous in that it encouraged the Iraqis to "get out while the getting was good" rather than making a house-to-house fight of it and inflicting the kinds of casualties on the coalition forces, with the incidental death toll among noncombatants, that Saddam Hussein intended.\textsuperscript{148} As a result, liberated Kuwait was in significantly better shape than it might have been or than in the planned for worst case.

**Scene Two: Negotiating the Cease-Fire.**

On February 27, 1991, after consultation with his senior Defense leadership, including General Schwarzkopf, President Bush declared a unilateral cessation of offensive operations. In a television address he declared, "Kuwait is liberated....Iraq's army is defeated....Our military objectives are met."\textsuperscript{149} In addition, the President outlined the general conditions for a permanent cease-fire. Those terms were:

- Iraq must release immediately all coalition prisoners of war, third country nationals and the remains of all who have fallen. Iraq must release all Kuwaiti detainees. Iraq also must inform Kuwaiti authorities of the location and nature of all land and sea mines. Iraq must comply fully with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. This includes a rescinding of Iraq's August decision to annex Kuwait, and acceptance in principle of Iraq's responsibility to pay compensation for the loss, damage, and injury its aggression has caused.\textsuperscript{150}

Additionally, the President called for a meeting of coalition and Iraqi military commanders to arrange the military aspects of the cease-fire to be held within 48 hours. The cessation was further conditioned on Iraq's not firing on coalition forces nor launching Scud missiles against any state.\textsuperscript{151} This statement by the President was the sum of the guidance received by General Schwarzkopf and his staff for negotiating the military aspects of the cease-fire.\textsuperscript{152}

The next day, February 28, the Iraqis accepted the coalition's terms for the cease-fire. On March 3, the Iraqi military leaders met with Generals Schwarzkopf and Khalid at Safwan in southern Iraq to achieve agreement on the military aspects of the cease-fire, which had been developed by the CENTCOM staff and carried by Schwarzkopf to Safwan. Perhaps the most controversial term in retrospect was the provision that the Iraqi military could continue to fly its helicopters. U.S. and allied negotiators were convinced that this provision was not unreasonable under the circumstances since helicopters were the only effective means by which the Iraqis could reestablish administrative control over their territory, particularly in southern Iraq after the coalition forces pulled back to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. What the negotiators did not anticipate was that
the Iraqis would interpret the provision to permit flying all helicopters including gun ships for any purpose but attacking coalition forces. This discussion, of course, anticipates the next section.

Scene Three: Revolts in Iraq.

As Operation DESERT STORM drew to a close, Western observers began to sense that something of historic import was happening in Iraq. This something was the revolt of the Shiites in the south and the Kurds in the north against Saddam Hussein's despotic government. How these revolts came about and their impact on the end of the war and the burgeoning peace are the subjects of this discussion.

As Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia is reported to have said in another context, sometimes the United States must be prepared when its policies succeed. In the Gulf War that "sometimes" happened with the revolts. This analysis contends that the revolts were hardly wholly spontaneous but were, at least in part, a response to an American public diplomacy campaign which, in the context of the coalition's military victory, suggested the likelihood of success.

As early as August 6, 1990, The Washington Post reported that President Bush had ordered covert action to oust Saddam Hussein. On August 13, Reuters News Service indicated that Bush would be pleased if Saddam were overthrown. On August 30, The New York Times picked up the story reporting that the President's aides were divided over whether to try to overthrow Saddam. Although the reporting of this story died down for a period after August, the seed of rebellion and the likely U.S. attitude toward it had been planted.

The story surfaced again on November 11 in the Wall Street Journal which, in commenting on the shake-up of the Iraqi government, suggested that U.S. hopes for the overthrow of Saddam had been rekindled. From November through the start of the air campaign the public diplomacy effort to pave the way for Saddam's ouster was relatively quiescent. Then, on February 6, it was reported that President Bush had called on the Iraqi military to oust Saddam in order to avoid further heavy casualties. On February 17, The New York Times weighed in repeating Bush's call for the ouster of Saddam and discussing the thinking behind the call. On the last day of the war, February 27, the Los Angeles Times ran a story about the United States forging plans to oust Saddam. Moreover, the drumbeat continued well after the cease-fire with stories on March 16, April 8, April 29, and December 1 among many in a wide variety of media.

How much of the impetus to revolt came as a result of the American public diplomacy campaign almost certainly will never be satisfactorily determined. What is certain, however, is that the campaign clearly suggested to those already disposed to believe it that the United States Government would look with favor on any effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein. From that point there is very little distance to the wishful thought that the United States would actually provide material support to the "freedom fighters" trying to rid their country of Saddam, the tyrant.

The first of the Iraqi revolts to become apparent was that of the Shiites in the south. By March 4, reports were reaching coalition forces that the Shiites had established control of the city of Basra and were attempting to take control of all the Shiite areas of southern Iraq. On March 16,
Saddam acknowledged that there was an internal revolt and vowed to crush it. Soon he had launched his Army against the Shiite rebels, including his armed helicopters. The latter proved to be the decisive weapon against the Shiites (and later the Kurds) when there was no formal protest against their use by the coalition. Soon, the cities of the south had fallen to Saddam. As the cities fell, displaced civilians congregated at or near Safwan where U.S. forces were located.

The Kurdish revolt began shortly after the Shiites had launched theirs. The results were similar in many ways. At first, the Kurds achieved rather astounding success capturing cities that none of their previousrevolts had taken. On March 20, the Kurdish rebels claimed to have taken the oil center city of Kirkuk while Saddam rushed armor and helicopter reinforcements north from their recent victories in Basra and the Shiite zone. Almost before the Iraqi reinforcements arrived the revolt appeared to collapse—as if by its own weight. Suddenly, Kurds of all social classes and all political stripes were running for refuge in the mountain fastnesses of the Iraqi frontiers with Iran and Turkey. Before the exodus was over there were more than half a million Kurdish refugees clinging precariously to the mountainsides, safety, and life.

**Conclusion.**

This chapter has set the stage for discussions of the civil military operations that were executed by U.S. and coalition forces as the fighting concluded and in its aftermath. Chapter 5 addresses CMO in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) which encompassed both Kuwait and southern Iraq. Chapter 6, by contrast, tells the story of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT undertaken among the Kurds on the Iraqi/Turkish frontier.
CHAPTER 5
THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT
AND THE OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN IRAQ

Introduction.

Civil-military operations (CMO) began even before the fighting in the Gulf War was over. Concurrently with the great end run, the two corps found themselves operating as the de facto occupiers of a portion of southern Iraq. This meant the execution of CMO that focused on displaced civilians. At nearly the very same time, CMO had to be started in liberated Kuwait. Before the ground operation was begun it had become apparent to the CG of ARCENT that neither ARCENT as executive agent for civil affairs, nor the corps with their attached CA units, nor the 352d CA Command was an appropriate organization to carry out CMO throughout the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO). As a result of this realization a combined task force, called Task Force (TF) Freedom, under the command of the Deputy Commanding General (DCG), ARCENT, Brigadier General Robert Frix, was formed to execute the CMO mission.

Structuring Task Force Freedom.

Creating TF Freedom repeated the experience of creating an organization to execute CMO the year before in Panama with its Military Support Group. Indeed, TF Freedom in many respects resembled the Military Support Group. In general terms the task force controlled a variety of combat support and combat service support forces in two subordinate task forces. The first of these was the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) commanded by Brigadier General Howard Mooney, commander of the 352d CA Command. The CCATF consisted of the 352d, its subordinate assigned/attached companies (431st and 432d), the 96th CA Battalion (which remained under ARCENT operational control), the Kuwait Task Force (KTF), the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (KERO) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the fledgling Saudi and Kuwaiti Civil Affairs units.

The second supporting task force was the Support Command Task Force commanded by Brigadier General Kenneth Guest. It consisted of the 301st Area Support Group; MP, signal, and medical units; an aviation and a military intelligence brigade. (See Figure 1.) This concept differed from that of the Military Support Group in Panama only in that TF Freedom did not have Special Forces assets assigned or attached. The reason for this is that the genesis of the two structures was different: the MSG found its inspiration at USSOCOM and TF Freedom was the product of Third Army/ARCENT logic. Yet, the remarkable similarity of the two organizations derives from their comparable missions of restoring civil government and services to war-torn societies. The parallel is even more striking when one notes that in both cases the U.S. organization was charged to assist and support the “existing” government of a liberated nation.
Figure 1. Task Force Freedom.
The logic that established TF Freedom and the MSG clearly showed that CMO is much more than civil affairs although the latter is a large part of these operations. CA capability provides the planning and coordination necessary to interact effectively with the host nation but not the force structure required to execute either emergency restoration or long-term reconstruction operations. The assets for the latter, to include the provision of security, must come from the combat, combat support, and combat service support units of the Army, other services, or substitutable civilian organizations. This set of facts led Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock to reject the recommendation of his CMO planning cell in the ARCENT G-5 that the Civil Affairs Task Force direct all CMO undertaken by all U.S. and allied units.¹⁷⁰

TF Freedom differed from the MSG in one other significant way. It was not solely confined to activities involving the emergency restoration of Kuwait, but was also responsible for the conduct of CMO in occupied southern Iraq. Structurally, this was visible in the “dual hatting” of General Frix as Deputy Commanding General (DCG) of ARCENT as well as Commander, TF Freedom. Likewise, Frix’ headquarters performed the second mission of ARCENT Forward.¹⁷¹ In this capacity General Frix supervised CMO conducted by the two corps.

TF Freedom in Kuwait.

On February 27, TF Freedom received orders to move into Kuwait and begin operations in the vicinity of Kuwait International Airport on the outskirts of Kuwait City. To achieve this the disparate elements of the task force needed to be brought together. This was especially the case for the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF). The main problem faced by the CCATF was the reintegration of the KTF into its parent organization, the 352d CA Command. As noted above, some tensions between the KTF and the 352d had developed over the previous several months. In its guise as the CCATF, the 352d was the proper operating agency to absorb the KTF, which it did leaving the latter organization largely intact as the Deputy Chief of Staff Reconstruction (DCSREC).¹⁷² That the KTF felt it remained a distinct entity is attested by the fact that its own history, and most others, continue to refer to the KTF rather than DCSREC.¹⁷³

CCATF made some other organizational adjustments involving the creation of a liaison element in its coalition warfare branch within the Security, Plans, and Operations directorate. The coalition warfare branch performed its liaison role with the Saudi and Kuwaiti civil affairs teams with the aid of Kuwaiti student augmentees to the U.S. Army who formed the translators’ branch of the directorate.¹⁷⁴

There were British engineers, Explosive Ordinance Detachment teams from several nations, Kuwaiti and Saudi CA teams, liaison from the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Kuwait Red Crescent, and finally a mixed team from USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and an AID contractor, Intertect, all under the operational control of the CCATF.¹⁷⁵ (See Figure 2.)

The small OFDA/contractor team was a significant innovation with respect to organizing for Civil-Military Operations in contrast to the Panama Military Support Group. Like the KTF this team
Figure 2. Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF).
was not the result of any lesson learned from Panama but rather of the circumstances involved in the formation of the KTF. Colonel Elliott had recruited as his Executive Officer, Major Andrew Natsios whose civilian job was Director of OFDA. Natsios, in turn, recruited one of his civilians and the President of Intersect who were then attached to the Kuwait Task Force and through it to the CCATF and TF Freedom.\(^\text{176}\)

Under the leadership of General Frix within TF Freedom, the CCATF provided the critical interface with the Kuwaiti government, its own attached U.S. interagency and combined elements, and the U.S. supporting forces of the Support Command Task Force. The KTF (DCSREC) provided personnel to the Kuwaiti government ministries in roles that were rapidly changing from initiators of government action to supporters and advisors. In this, the KTF assumed the same role that the civil affairs ministry support teams had carried out the previous year in Panama.\(^\text{177}\) While the analogy has never been specifically attributed to a lesson learned, it appears highly likely that it was the work of the "Panama Brain Trust," at least one of whose members had served on the Panama ministry support team.\(^\text{178}\)

In sum, the mission of TF Freedom was to provide "...short-term restoration of emergency services for Kuwait City in conjunction with the Kuwaiti (sic) Task Force at the request of the Kuwaiti government."\(^\text{179}\) TF Freedom entered Kuwait City on February 28 and for about a week was the force responsible for what governmental actions were undertaken. Essentially, it took that first week for significant elements of the Kuwaiti government under the Crown Prince to arrive; Ambassador Gnehm did not enter the country and raise the flag over the U.S. Embassy until the Crown Prince and the government were in place. This left General Frix, in effect, as the senior representative of CINCCENT in country and, in his capacity as DCG ARCENT, as the executive agent for civil affairs and the responsible allied officer.\(^\text{180}\)

One of Frix' problems was exercising control over the rather volatile situation involving members of the Kuwaiti resistance whose self-proclaimed members were prepared to provide "rough justice" toward those Palestinians and other third country nationals who were deemed to have been Iraqi collaborators. Preventing potential human rights violations and stopping those which were already occurring was the task of the members of the CCATF and especially its KTF and OFDA/contractor elements, as well as the Special Forces personnel deployed with the Kuwaitis.\(^\text{181}\) That human rights violations were as limited as they turned out to be was a credit to the foresight of the KTF leadership in assembling the appropriate team and planning to address these problems with the Kuwaitis from the time the KTF had been set up in Washington.\(^\text{182}\)

General Frix was faced with a peculiar problem of command and control during his second week in Kuwait. From the time Ambassador Gnehm reopened the Embassy he was the senior American representative in Kuwait. Frix, however, had been directed that he did not work for the Ambassador but rather that his chain of command was through General Yeosock to the CINC.\(^\text{183}\) Moreover, Frix commanded a force that included the troops of several nations so that as a combined commander he could not be responsible to the Ambassador. In addition, TF Freedom was supported by U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia which meant that its activities were constantly crossing international frontiers. This latter fact was compounded by the task force's responsibilities in southern Iraq, which will be detailed below.
The result of this complex situation was a potentially sticky problem of resolving who was in charge of U.S. activities in Kuwait. Fortunately, the resolution was achieved by reasonable people who wanted to succeed and recognized that success depended on their cooperation. The relationship between TF Freedom and the U.S. Embassy was one of coordination and support. In fact, it was much closer due to the personal relationship that existed between Colonel Elliott and Ambassador Gnehm and the one that developed between the Ambassador and General Frix. As a result, some elements of the CCATF actually served to augment the Embassy staff in the early days until the Embassy became fully staffed. This circumstance clearly parallels what had developed in Panama the previous year.

TF Freedom had a number of accomplishments to its credit in the three months of its operation in Kuwait. Many of these were the result of effective prior planning by the KTF and the ARCENT and CENTCOM CMO staff sections which were overwhelmingly drawn from the ranks of the 352d CA Command. To the great credit of Generals Frix and Mooney, they successfully adapted the plans of the several planning organizations to the reality that they found in Kuwait. Equally important was that the close relationship established with the U.S. Embassy by Colonel Elliott was developed to its full extent by General Frix. Interagency coordination in the field served to achieve most of the U.S. objectives in Kuwait with little apparent friction among U.S. agencies or among the United States, its allies, and Kuwait.

Specifically, the prior planning was successful in that there was enough food, water, and medical care brought into Kuwait early to meet the emergency created by the Iraqi occupation, flight, and the liberation. The efforts of the KTF bore fruit in that the U.S. military did not have to concentrate many resources on caring for Kuwait. Rather the Kuwaiti government contracted for and paid the bills for all support. Supplies delivered by all sources during the emergency phase included over 12.8 million liters of water, 2.8 million liters of diesel fuel, 12,500 metric tons of food, 1250 tons of medicine, more than 750 vehicles, and 245 generators. In addition, during the same period, more than 35 major convoys of over 1700 vehicles delivered miscellaneous supplies including batteries and tires to Kuwait.

By the time TF Freedom departed, the Ministry of Health had become operational and the Kuwaiti medical community was supporting 98 percent of its pre-war workload. The international airport reopened and was put under Kuwaiti civilian control by April 1991. The Kuwaiti police forces were fully operational within 30 days of liberation and had begun to control the security of Kuwait City replacing the "resistance fighters." In the first two weeks after liberation one Kuwaiti port was opened while the others were being cleared of mines, and repairs were being made. "All major roads were cleared of debris and craters; most could sustain convoy traffic." In short, TF Freedom, working with the U.S. Embassy and the Kuwaitis, had fully met the challenge of the emergency period in Kuwait and was in an excellent position to effect a transition to the long-term U.S. military organization that would play the principal military role in Kuwait's reconstruction.
TF Freedom/ARCENT Forward in Southern Iraq.

As discussed in earlier chapters, the operational plans for the war called for the very rapid sweep of U.S. and coalition forces through southern Iraq. Even though there was a recognition that a short-term de facto occupation incurred certain obligations under international law, there was a reluctance in the CENTCOM J5 CMO section to fully face the implications of that obligation. Writing after the fact, Civil Affairs Branch chief, Colonel Lawrence Biount stated:

We had made a deliberate effort to avoid populated areas...It was later on when we decided to occupy the area to try to force Iraq to agree to a permanent cease fire, that we ended up with significant numbers of dislocated civilians. Most of the DCs were generated by the internal Shia uprising...Civilians moved into or through US occupied areas, or deliberately sought refuge near or behind US lines.

We knew our obligations under international law were to provide for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population in occupied areas, including providing DC camps, if necessary. However, our guidance to the field had been to avoid creating DC camps, if possible. Our rationale in cautioning on the creation of DC camps was threefold: (1) Operating DC camps could become resource intensive and a drain on US logistical capabilities; (2) DC camps serve as magnets, and draw people who are only marginally in need... (3) Camps tend to become permanent installations, and we intended only a very temporary occupation.188

While it is clear that the guidance provided by CCJ5 to ARCENT G5 was not an absolute prohibition on establishing refugee camps, it “had the effect of discouraging the provision of emergency shelter for displaced civilians. Specifically, ARCENT was instructed not to contemplate the construction of DC camps...Authority to create any such facility was reserved to CINCCENT.”189 Thus, the ARCENT G5 could logically interpret the CENTCOM guidance as a prohibition on the establishment of any refugee camps and put that interpretation out as policy guidance to the two corps. When faced with significant numbers of refugees about March 15, VII Corps requested permission to establish a DC camp, which was denied.190 Whether that request went only as far as ARCENT or was further transmitted to CENTCOM cannot be determined but it is clear that refugees were becoming an increasing problem without a resolution. As an interim measure the ARCENT units established “emergency assembly areas” which were temporary DC camps by any other name.191 The problem was finally resolved when the CENTCOM J5, Admiral Grant Sharp, visited Safwan and was so appalled by the refugee situation that he directed ARCENT to do something.192

Overall control of the displaced civilian problem devolved on Brigadier General Frix and his ARCENT Forward/TF Freedom headquarters. While most of TF Freedom was committed to the restoration of Kuwait, more than enough civil affairs assets were attached to the corps and their subordinate divisions to meet the requirements for dealing with refugees. The supporting assets belonging to ARCENT’s 22d SUPCOM and the means to coordinate them were not so readily available. Here, ARCENT Forward proved to be invaluable through the efforts of the ARCENT Deputy G5/Forward G5 and the robust ARCENT liaison team under a full colonel. This team had an excellent communications capability and provided an effective link between VII Corps and ARCENT, ARCENT Forward, and 22d SUPCOM.193 In addition, TF Freedom sent an element of the CCATF AID/Contractor team to assist with its expertise on refugee matters.
Once the misconceptions over the nature of CENTCOM’s and ARCENT’s guidance with respect to DC camps were resolved and overall responsibility for CMO in southern Iraq devolved upon ARCENT Forward, then coordination of CMO with VII Corps as executor became quite straightforward. The problem was a standard civil affairs issue and was easily encompassed by current CA doctrine.

During the month of April 1991, DC and other humanitarian operations continued in the VII Corps area. By mid month the issue was how to extricate the corps from this mission, transfer responsibility for DCs, and withdraw from southern Iraq. On April 17 the Saudi government agreed to build a refugee camp on Saudi territory and take responsibility for those DCs who wished to accept refuge there. A temporary refugee camp inside Saudi Arabia was completed on April 27 and some 8400 refugees were flown in USAF aircraft from Safwan to the new camp by May 7. On May 8, the last VII Corps unit (3d Armored Division) ceased humanitarian operations in Iraq, crossed the buffer zone, and entered Kuwait.

The Corps of Engineers in Kuwait.

It was indicated previously in this study that the KTF in Washington had concluded that the proper agency to manage the restoration and reconstruction of Kuwait, both for the U.S. and Kuwaiti governments was the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. As a result of discussions between the KTF and its Kuwaiti counterpart, the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program (KERP) on January 4, 1991 asked the Corps to manage recovery efforts for the initial 90 day emergency phase after liberation. Ten days later the Government of Kuwait signed a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case for $46.3 million for the Corps to provide emergency repairs and damage assessments during the initial 90-day period. To manage this effort the Corps created the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (KERO) under the Middle East Africa Projects Office (which was later renamed the Transatlantic Division).

KERO soon deployed to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia where it was incorporated under the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force within TF Freedom. (See Figure 3 for the KERO organization.) KERO further deployed to Kuwait with TF Freedom where it applied its engineering and management skills as a full player within the CCATF structure sharing credit with the other subordinate TF Freedom organizations for the accomplishments of the first 30 days in restoration of power, water and other services and beginning efforts toward reconstruction.

Early in 1991 the Secretary of Defense determined that an executive agent for Department of Defense (DOD) assistance in Kuwaiti reconstruction was needed and designated the Secretary of the Army as executive agent. “He further established the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office (DRAO) to coordinate and consolidate control of DOD elements involved in the recovery and reconstitution effort.” DRAO was activated on March 3, 1991 and Army oversight was exercised through the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment. On March 7 the Secretary of Defense named engineer Major General Patrick J. Kelly as Secretary of Defense Representative (SECDEFREP) in Kuwait in charge of DRAO.
Figure 3. Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office.
This simple and linear description of events does not account for the significant amount of inter- and intra-agency negotiations that took place before DRAO under General Kelly assumed the place that the Secretary had authorized for it. (See Figures 4 and 5.) Although the terms of reference were very specific and had been coordinated before General Kelly arrived, it was not clear from the beginning that DRAO recognized that it was subordinate at all times to the American Ambassador to Kuwait. This, however, was made clear very quickly and DRAO adopted as its guiding precept that "all policy decisions required the concurrence of the United States Ambassador...From the beginning, special attention was given to ensure that this paradigm was operative."202

Another area of potential conflict was between DRAO and CENTCOM. As the theater commander, CINCCENT was in command of all U.S. military forces in theater. The SECDEFREP as chief of DRAO with derivative executive agency from the Secretaries of Defense and Army could have seen himself as independent of CENTCOM. As it was, the CINC appointed General Kelly as CENTCOM Representative for military coordination matters which, by regulation, put the CINC in Kelly's rating chain.203 None of these command arrangements would be in effect until TF Freedom carried out a transition of its functions and residual assets to DRAO. This finally took place on April 30, 1991. Even before the transition from TF Freedom occurred, General Kelly had signed a Letter of Exchange with Kuwait for the United States to provide reconstruction assistance to Kuwait, to be fully funded by Kuwait. This occurred on April 5.204

DRAO's primary mission was "... to assist the Government in managing the restoration of necessary civil infrastructure and emergency services for the U.S. Department of Defense acting through the Secretary of the Army as Executive Agent."205 Another mission was to develop, if feasible—a long-term role in Kuwait for the Corps of Engineers.206

DRAO operated under two distinct legal authorities, the same as govern all U.S. security assistance activity, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. These authorities were the same as operated in Panama the previous year after the cut-off of operational funds for restoration and reconstruction. Unlike Panama, however, the Government of Kuwait was not impoverished. On the contrary, it was prepared to pay for all the goods and services it desired. Thus, these peacetime authorities worked quite smoothly to provide a means to accomplish the purposes of the two governments. The net result was that DRAO administered nearly $400 million in contracts under the Foreign Assistance Act and another $300-$400 million in FMS cases under the Arms Export Control Act.207 Most of DRAO's work was completed by the end of 1991, with some residual activity lasting through the spring of 1992. As a result DRAO began to phase out of operations late in 1991.

Headquarters, Army Corps of Engineers acquired most of DRAO's residual responsibilities with the Transatlantic Division gaining overall program management. KERO phased down into a smaller element renamed the Kuwait Program Office which will close out the residual Foreign Assistance Act programs and administer the remaining FMS cases.208 Through this entire period DRAO and KERO were assisted with required support by the 22d SUPCOM, an ARCENT asset which has remained in theater.
Figure 4. Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office (DRAO) Organization.
Figure 5. Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office.
Conclusions.

Several interesting issues come from this discussion of CMO execution in Kuwait and southern Iraq. First, planning for the liberation of Kuwait made the actual CMO operations there significantly easier. Even though there were problems in integrating the KTF plans with those of CENTCOM and ARCENT, those problems were overcome and the actual operations never had the appearance of being ad hoc as they did in Panama.

A second issue was the integration into the KTF and hence the CCATF and TF Freedom of the OFDA/contractor team. This clearly was the result of judicious recruiting by Colonel Elliott which produced the disaster relief expertise of Andrew Natsios who brought into the organization both AID employees from OFDA and the contractor support from Intertect. The latter provided expertise that was simply not available in the military or the civilian U.S. Government. This team, along with the Special Forces, ultimately was responsible for the fact that human rights violations in liberated Kuwait were minimal. The ability of TF Freedom to incorporate this civilian government/contractor hybrid suggests that this kind of organizational flexibility will continue to be a critical factor for successful civil-military operations.

Not only was the OFDA/contractor team essential in Kuwait but it was also one of the keys to creating order out of the chaotic refugee situation in southern Iraq. This situation had come about because of a series of misunderstandings between CENTCOM and ARCENT over what was to be the U.S. policy toward displaced civilians. These misunderstandings resulted from the lack of integration of civil affairs planning with the operational planning from the earliest days of Operation DESERT STORM. Weak civil affairs/CMO planning, which did not anticipate the Shiite revolt, coupled with the other problems discussed here produced a very ad hoc solution to the execution of civil-military operations. Fortunately, CMO in southern Iraq was largely in one of the 20 CA functional areas and could be dealt with by the attached CA units according to doctrinal adaptations—once CENTCOM had cleared up ARCENT’s authority to act.

Another issue that is illustrated by these operations is that of the proper organization to conduct CMO. As discussed previously in this chapter, ARCENT commander, General Yeosock rejected the recommendation of his G5 staff that the 352d CA Command control all CMO in Kuwait, opting instead for the structure that became known as TF Freedom under the DCG of ARCENT. The flexibility of using the ARCENT Forward headquarters proved invaluable to executing the two wholly disparate CMO missions in Kuwait and southern Iraq. Moreover, TF Freedom clearly was a recognition of the fact that the CMO mission consists of two major parts. First is a traditional civil affairs mission involving relief, restoration of government services, and preparing for reconstruction, each of which interacts directly and extensively with host country civilians. Second is the logistical support and security mission which is largely undertaken by U.S. (and/or allied) military forces. TF Freedom, with its two supporting task forces, effectively addressed both missions.

The final issue for this chapter is that of executive agency. This concept was used twice with respect to CMO associated with Operation DESERT STORM. In the first instance ARCENT was made executive agent for civil affairs. In reality this gave ARCENT the responsibility without the authority, something that became clear when CENTCOM reserved the decision to establish DC
camps to itself. The conclusion from this discussion must be that executive agency is not the appropriate mechanism to conduct CMO when there is no overall land component commander except the CINC.

The second instance of the use of executive agency confirms its inappropriateness in wartime and post-conflict environments. When the Secretary of Defense gave CMO executive agency to the Secretary of the Army and appointed General Kelly as SECDEFREP, he undermined the authority of his unified commander and set the stage for a wholly unnecessary, if brief and minor, dispute with the Department of State. Obviously, these issues were resolved rapidly and generally amicably but they need not have even become issues if a better command and control arrangement for CMO had been chosen.
CHAPTER 6

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT

Introduction.

When Senator Sam Nunn said that we should be prepared for the fact that sometimes our policies are successful, he could have been speaking of the situation that developed in northern Iraq at the end of the Persian Gulf War. As stated previously, President George Bush's rhetoric calling for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein gave the Kurds of northern Iraq just the impetus they required to rebel. But when Iraqi forces assumed an offensive posture and the U.S. led coalition took no action to stop Saddam, the rebellion fell apart. Jubilation turned to panic as hundreds of thousands of Kurds abandoned their homes and sought refuge over the borders of neighboring Turkey and Iran.

Although it is highly probable that more refugees found their way across the Iranian than the Turkish border, it was the refugee situation in Turkey that became policy critical. Kurds of all social classes fled their cities, towns, and villages to take dubious shelter from the Iraqi army in the mountains of the Iraqi/Turkish border region. They fled to sites above the snow line on the grounds that the Iraqi forces would not follow. And, in this conclusion they were right for the Iraqis did, indeed, stop at the snow line. The Kurds, however, were hardly any better off as nearly a half a million eked out a precarious existence waiting for relief efforts, for the Iraqis to tire of keeping vigil, or for some form of rescue. In 43 separate locations the Kurds made their makeshift camps with some one thousand dying each day due to disease, malnutrition, and exposure.

By April 5, 1991, media reports of the horror story of the Kurdish refugee situation on the Iraq/Turkey border were attracting the attention of the world. Ignored in all this were the efforts of Turkey to provided relief from the suffering and safety for the refugees. Turkey's valiant efforts notwithstanding, the problem soon reached overwhelming proportions, all of which the media reported. So, on April 5, President Bush directed U.S. forces to begin humanitarian assistance operations to help the Kurds. In the opinion of at least one high ranking U.S. official, without the media the U.S. Government would have taken no action.

The initial humanitarian response to the Kurdish refugee crisis was the result of a series of interagency meetings in Washington. At those meetings of the agency deputies, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) representative recommended that the circumstances called for a normally less than optimal response—the airdrop of relief supplies. The next day, April 6, U.S. and other coalition forces began supply airdrops from fixed wing aircraft. This operation, combined with the Turkish efforts, had a minimal impact on the suffering. Then, on April 9, Secretary of State James Baker visited a refugee camp in Turkey near the Iraqi border. What he saw appalled him. Baker's intervention is widely reported as the beginning of the major change in U.S. policy toward an intrusive Kurdish relief program.
General “Shali” Gets the Call.

There were many antecedent conditions for what became Operation PROVIDE COMFORT during the Gulf War. Most important among these was the relationship between U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and USCENTCOM. EUCOM was responsible for that part of the air operation that was conducted from the U.S. bases in Turkey. Although the EUCOM air elements were included on the single Air Tasking Order (ATO) from CENTAF, most EUCOM air operations were relatively independent. In addition, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) operations were conducted from Turkey by SOCEUR under the command of Brigadier General Richard Potter, U.S. Army Special Forces.

Because of this direct EUCOM involvement in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the CINC, General John Galvin had, in the fall of 1990, augmented his staff with key subordinates from the Reserve community. Among the people Galvin insisted come to Europe was his senior civil affairs officer, Brigadier General Donald Campbell, commander of the 353d CA Command which was CAPSTONE to EUCOM.215 Campbell sent a detachment of his staff to EUCOM where they served for the duration with some follow-on augmentation. Campbell, himself, was in and out of Europe throughout the conflict until Operation PROVIDE COMFORT began—then he stayed.216

When the fighting ceased at the end of February, General Potter’s SOCEUR elements returned to their home base in Germany. With the development of the refugee crisis in early April, however, Potter was directed to return to Turkey and, working in conjunction with USAF General Jamerson, the senior U.S. commander, assisted in the initial relief mission. Indeed, Potter’s Special Forces (SF) troops were the first U.S. and allied forces on the ground—trying to coordinate relief efforts, both airdrop and ground delivered.217

About the midlle of April the DCINC of EUCOM inspected the relief operation. At this same time, the DCINC of U.S. Army, Europe, Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili (known to nearly everyone as “General Shali”) was informed by his boss that he needed to go to Turkey for a few days to sort out the issue with respect to the Army role in the refugee crisis.218 General Shalikashvili indicated that he wanted to stop at EUCOM headquarters first to get fully briefed. While at EUCOM, he spoke with General Galvin on the telephone. Galvin’s guidance was to go to Turkey prepared to stay until the problem was resolved and that he, Shali, worked for Galvin and nobody else.219

General Galvin’s priorities were “...stopping the dying and the misery up in the mountains and then find [sic] a workable scheme to relocate the refugees to places (still unknown to us at that time) where we would be able to sustain them. Then, as rapidly as we could, to transition this operation to UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) or some other similar organization.”220

On the 16th of April, General Shalikashvili arrived at the NATO airbase at Incirlik, Turkey. There, he spoke with the EUCOM DCINC who had just inspected the area. That same day, President Bush announced that the United States with Britain and France would create a security zone in northern Iraq and a multinational military force would protect the refugees and stay until the UN was operational in the area.221 General Shalikashvili was named as the commander of
Combined Task Force Provide Comfort (CTF-PC) which was charged to carry out the new Presidentialy directed mission called Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

Also on April 16 the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) from the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and headed by OFDA's Deputy Director, Dayton Maxwell, conducted its first field site inspection in conjunction with U.S. military personnel already in the area. The DART was dispatched by OFDA Director, Andrew Natsios, who had just returned to his civilian position from having spent the last four or so months as Executive Officer of the Kuwait Task Force. Thus Maxwell knew just how important it was that his operation be fully integrated with the developing military effort.

Among those who accompanied General Shalikashvili on his April 16 trip to Turkey was Major General Jay Garner, Deputy Commander of the V Corps. The reason that General Shalikashvili asked General Garner along was that he headed a rapidly deployable contingency cell. With the arrival of Generals Shalikashvili and Garner the cast of general officers and general officer equivalents that would head the various elements of CTF-PC was more or less complete. General Potter and his Special Forces were coordinating relief on the ground while General Jamerson was coordinating air operations. General Campbell had arrived in theater and was prepared to support the operation while DART leader, Maxwell (a general officer equivalent), had established his people on the ground with the military in the midst of the refugees.

Organization of CTF PROVIDE COMFORT.

What is particularly interesting about the CTF that General Shalikashvili established and commanded is not how it differed from TF Freedom in Kuwait and southern Iraq, but rather how much it resembled both TF Freedom and the Panama MSG. Figure 6 gives a simple schematic of the CTF and its subordinate units.

Central to the operation of the CTF were its two subordinate task forces. Alpha and Bravo. TF Alpha, under the command of Brigadier General Potter, had the mission of finding, caring for, and pursuing the refugees to come down from the mountains. It consisted primarily of U.S. Special Forces augmented by some allies and, later in the game, by a U.S. CA company. It was located in the Turkish mountains along the border east of Silopi. TF Bravo under Major General Garner had the mission of establishing temporary camps for the refugees inside Iraq. On the advice of the DART which included several members of the same consulting firm that had proven so useful in Kuwait, Intertect (and including its President), General Garner had chosen sites for the temporary camps as close to the Iraqi cities that were home to the refugees as possible. TF Bravo consisted of a variety of U.S. forces including a CA Brigade as the base of the organization, allied forces, and most importantly, the DART which had attached itself to Bravo. Finally, TF Bravo located its headquarters in the town of Zakhu in northern Iraq, which many of the Kurds called home.

In addition to the two task forces, the CTF was made up of an air forces element which included all helicopters, except for Marine aircraft, under Air Force Brigadier General Hobson. Called the
Figure 6. Provide Comfort Organization.
AFFOR it was collocated at Incirlik with the CTF and the Civil Affairs Command under General Campbell. The last element of the CTF was the Combined Support Command (CSC) lead by Colonel Hal Burch (who had been selected for promotion to Brigadier General). CSC headquarters were at Silopi, Turkey, relatively close to Zakhu and the two operating task forces.227

The mission of the CTF as it was finally written was:

Combined Task Force Provide Comfort conducts multinational humanitarian operations to provide immediate relief to displaced Iraqi civilians until international relief agencies and private voluntary organizations can assume overall supervision.228

Command and control of the CTF was an issue that while it could have been tricky, turned out to pose no major difficulties. U.S. forces were simply under the command and operational control of General Shalikashvili and his subordinate commanders. Allied nation forces all were placed under the tactical control of General Shalikashvili according to standard NATO practice. The only exception to formal tactical control was the German contingent but the German Defense Minister assured General Shalikashvili that German forces would behave exactly as if they were under tactical control—and indeed they did.229

A second command and control issue was that which involved the interagency operations in the field, the relationship of the DART to the CTF. The entire arrangement was ad hoc as the DART attached itself to TF Bravo. In retrospect, this turned out to be a mistake since DART’s responsibility covered the same area as the entire CTF. Mr. Maxwell, however, had attached DART to General Garner’s operation because that was where the action was and where he believed DART could be most effective. Maxwell was right on both counts but was in error about where his place in the operation was. Maxwell’s equivalent rank was higher than General Garner, the man he had subordinated himself to but neither was aware of the fact at the time. Still, Maxwell knew he needed to be able to pass information, advice and coordination issues freely with General Shalikashvili and was frustrated when occasionally things he told General Garner never reached General Shalikashvili.230

A third issue involving command and control was who the CA brigade worked for (and, incidentally, the company with TF Alpha). The 354th CA Brigade had been transferred lock, stock, and barrel from CENTCOM to EUCOM for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. It brought with it two of its subordinate CA companies and acquired elements of the active component 96th CA Battalion which were redeployed back from Fort Bragg.

The 354th, when it arrived, immediately went to work with TF Bravo along with one of its companies. For a short period it seemed to the commander of the 354th that General Campbell was trying to direct the 354th’s activities until a face to face discussion clarified the command relationships. In short, these were that CA units were under the operational control of the task force they operated with.231

A major task of CTF-PC was coordination with Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) like the UNHCR, and the various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which included the private voluntary organizations (PVOs). The U.S. Government hoped and expected that together these
organizations would take over the entire relief effort as soon as possible. Coordination with IGOs, NGOs, and PVOs was a special mission for General Campbell who was supported in this by the Deputy Commander of the 354th and a number of his staff elements.232

There was a major misconception throughout the U.S. military in the CTF about the United Nations. From General Shalikashvili down U.S. officers perceived the UN as some kind of unified organization like the U.S. Government. That the UN is merely a diverse and uncoordinated group of IGOs that must have the unanimous consent of its members to act and depends entirely on governmental member contributions for funding seems to have completely escaped U.S. military cognizance.233 Most directly, it never seems to have been clear that the UNHCR does not follow the orders of the Security Council nor of the Secretary General. Similarly, WHO (World Health Organization) is not subordinate to them or to UNHCR. Helping to correct these misperceptions was one of the major contributions of the DART in coordination with General Campbell’s civil affairs operation.234

Execution and Accomplishments.

The initial problem faced by General Shalikashvili was to stop the dying and stabilize the situation. Generals Jamerson and Potter had gotten a head start on that but Potter’s effort greatly accelerated with General Shalikashvili’s arrival and the formal change of mission signifying a full U.S. commitment. The fully established CTF included sufficient air assets both fixed and rotary wing to effectively reach any refugee site in the mountains while national level intelligence assets were brought to bear to make certain that all refugee sites had been located.235 Engineer assets from the Combined Support Command were effective in building necessary access roads as well as temporary shelters both in the mountains and in the lowlands as transition sites.236

Providing security for the refugees was a major part of the story of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Uniquely, among recent humanitarian type operations PROVIDE COMFORT was an intrusive effort which relieved the suffering of displaced civilians and placed the blame for that suffering and the long-term burden to relieve it on the regime that caused it in the first place. Thus, there resulted numerous cases of intrusion on Iraqi sovereignty and confrontations and near confrontations between coalition and Iraqi forces. While few produced any shooting there was some, as well as a number of very tense situations.237

One such situation was when General Garner entered an Iraqi town with just a few members of his staff and the Iraqi security elements who could have completely overwhelmed Garner backed off. In another northern Iraqi town which was home to many refugees who were afraid to return, CTF elements discovered some 200-300 Iraqi police sent by Saddam to establish presence and control. The refugees would not come down from the mountains for fear of these police. The solution to the problem came from the consultants on the DART who suggested that we ... go to the authorities, because we had military control. get a list of all their names and functions, get a list of where they are assigned and what they are going to be doing. make sure we have visitation rights. Then we publicize their names. so everything is transparent. With that kind of
peaceful transparent initiative, they lose their secrecy, their capability of working in a covert way to harass or intimidate the refugees as they come down.238

The result was that transparency so intimidated the Iraqi police that they did not stay and when the refugees finally did return they returned to relative security.239

Beginning May 2, 1991, General Potter began moving refugees from the mountains to the first transit center in the valley. This process indicated that there was, at minimum, a breakdown in communications between General Potter and General Garner because, as a senior member of the DART said, "We learned about his plans to bodily ship tens of thousands of refugees into northern Iraq with no participation by Garner and no preparation for receiving these refugees."240

After the confusion of the initial move the situation stabilized and the movement of refugees from the mountains to the transit camps became relatively efficient and routine. By the middle of May, efforts to resettle the refugees in the towns of Zakho and Dahuk (where most were from originally) were well under way. On May 24, coalition representatives met with UNHCR officials in Turkey to complete final arrangements for the transition to UN management of the refugee assistance program. At this time there were 21,511 military from 11 nations participating in the relief effort.241

By June 7 the operation in the mountains had been completed and all the refugees had entered the transit camps or returned to their homes. TF Alpha redeployed. By mid-July most refugees returned to their homes with only some 7000 remaining in a camp in Silopi, Turkey and another 7000 in the transit camp in Zakho. On July 15 the coalition forces withdrew from Iraq and the Combined Task Force Provide Comfort was consolidated into a Combined Battalion Task Force (CBTF) located in Turkey near the border. The UN was now managing the Kurdish refugee assistance program and its residual problems with limited support from the CBTF.242 General Shalikashvili had accomplished his mission.

Conclusions.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT tends to confirm the CMO lessons of DESERT STORM and Panama. While planning for PROVIDE COMFORT was done entirely on the fly, unlike those two cases, the operation was necessary because of the results of related U.S. policies, as they were in the other cases.

Again, PROVIDE COMFORT demonstrates that CMO is far more than civil affairs. One of the most important features of this operation, as opposed to the others we have been considering, is the centrality of the security aspect. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, as an intrusive humanitarian relief mission in a hostile environment partly controlled by a defeated but not destroyed enemy, required a much more significant security component than similar operations in more permissive environments. The issue is almost one of "liberation" versus "occupation" in northern Iraq, unlike Kuwait or Panama, or even southern Iraq, the situation was that of occupation and the need to provide humanitarian services to hundreds of thousands of refugees produced by the war. What was really different about northern Iraq, however, was that these refugees had
to be protected from the legal government of their own country while at the same time prevented from themselves exploiting the situation to further their rebellion (which had been the precipitant of their search for refuge in the first place). This made for a wholly intrusive occupation/humanitarian relief mission.

That the mission eventually would be turned over to the several international relief organizations operating under UN auspices made for yet another twist in this highly complex situation. The fact that U.S. and allied military forces knew very little about the UN/IGO/NGO community made for an incredible amount of potential misunderstanding. That there was so little was due to the sophisticated efforts of the 353d CA Command under General Campbell and his subordinates from the 354th CA Brigade and the critical knowledge of the DART.

The role of the DART throughout Operation PROVIDE COMFORT clearly demonstrates the importance of properly structuring an organization to conduct CMO in a post-conflict or similar period. Skills which are not found within the military, active or reserve, are found within the civilian government community. In the cases of DESERT STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT, they were found in OFDA and made available to the appropriate task forces. However, the fact that anyone in the military knew about them was due to the serendipitous circumstances of the establishment of the Kuwait Task Force. That the circumstances revolving around the role of the DART were derivative of the KTF resulted in a less effective integration of the DART into the overall operation. DART was extremely effective at the level of TF Bravo, less so with TF Alpha and the CTF. Had the DART been assigned to the CTF with the formal understanding that Mr. Maxwell was an immediate subordinate of General Shalikashvili, some of the few misunderstandings that developed might well have been resolved before they became problems.

In short, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT represents one more step on a continuum of post-conflict civil military operations that the United States has embarked upon in the recent past. Its lessons, combined with those from the desert and Panama, will be examined more fully in the final chapter of this study.
CHAPTER 7

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR WAR TERMINATION

Introduction.

The study of civil-military operations in the contexts of liberation, occupation, and rescue missions during the Persian Gulf War underlines the transcendental importance of the requirement for strategic vision. Here, strategic vision means that the political and military leadership has a relatively clear picture of its desired end-state. That end-state is what the leadership desires the battlefield and the surrounding political landscape to look like when the war is over, and it represents a range of acceptable political/military outcomes. Moreover, end-states suggest descriptions, in fairly great detail, of the goals of national policy.

National Policy Goals and Strategic Objectives.

In the Persian Gulf War, U.S. articulation of its policy goals was mixed in terms of its effects. The picture is one of a president rhetorically stating his goals followed by members of his administration providing interpretations which, at times, had little relationship to the words uttered by President Bush.

Two cases will serve to illustrate the point. First, when the President uttered the words, “This will not stand...” American policy became from that moment on that Iraq would be ejected from Kuwait, one way or another. This policy clearly implied that if necessary, offensive military operations would be used. It took no geniuses to make this analysis but CENTCOM and the Joint Staff gave the strongest impression that all military efforts were focused only on the defense of Saudi Arabia. While offensive planning was taking place at this time, it was so closely held within CENTCOM for reasons of operational security that much of its own Army component, especially the G-5, was in the dark. As a result, all of ARCENT’s early civil-military operations and civil affairs planning focused exclusively on defensive operations and host nation support within Saudi Arabia. This focus reinforced the predisposition of the Active component Civil Affairs personnel supporting ARCENT to minimize any role for Reserve CA units thereby depriving ARCENT of the robust civil affairs CMO planning and execution capability that it required until very late in the process. It also seemed to cause ARCENT not to look toward Washington where the KTF was planning for precisely what ARCENT would have to execute.

That presidential rhetoric was policy did not escape the key player in establishing the KTF, Colonel Randall Elliott, nor the notice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, James Locher and his assistants. Together, Elliott, Locher, and their associates in State and Defense developed the conditions where the Emir of Kuwait requested Army CA assistance and the KTF was established to provide it. That it took nearly two months from the time of the Emir’s request until the establishment of the KTF is explainable only in terms
of bureaucratic reinterpretations of presidential statements and an unwillingness to recognize the strategic and operational implications of the fact that rhetoric is policy.

The second example of rhetoric becoming policy is found in the numerous calls by President Bush for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In this case, however, CENTCOM clearly recognized the danger at the political-military level and repeatedly advised that a definition of the policy goal of regional stability required an Iraq that while weakened not be dismembered. What CENTCOM failed to do as successfully was to examine the consequences of “rhetorical” policy with respect to its impact on CMO in the occupied areas of southern Iraq and direct aggressive CMO planning for the refugees produced by the consequences of the Shiite rebellion.

EUCOM, which was responsible for operations from Turkey in support of DESERT STORM, did anticipate that there might well be some undefined CMO mission or requirements and General Galvin asked for support from his CAPSTONE CA command including its general officer commander. Yet, there is nothing in the record that would indicate that EUCOM predicted the Kurdish revolt or did anything to specifically prepare to deal with its consequences. Like the Shiite revolt in the south the rebellion of the Kurds was eminently predictable. No matter what its outcome, the requirement for a major CMO effort should have been anticipated.

As these examples show, military leaders and staffers in a unified command, to include action officers, need to be extremely sensitive to the strategic and operational implications of policy made by presidential public declarations. Such sensitivity would allow for the early development of policy options to be carried to JCS and DOD as well as the development of theater strategies and campaign plans to address the contingencies brought on by these rhetorical flourishes which become policy whether well thought out or not.

In general, CENTCOM did well in developing its strategic objectives as end-states. Interestingly, the principal national strategic objective of ejecting the Iraqis from Kuwait was the same as the theater strategic objective. Definition of the end-state based on the policies enunciated by the White House was relatively simple and led directly to clear and specific supporting objectives. Only at the margins did the objectives become fuzzy.

Well Defined End-States—Were They Good Policy?

CENTCOM defined its objectives as end-states in terms of two fairly clear policy goals, restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait and regional stability. To achieve the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government required that the Iraqi army be forced out of Kuwait City, one way or another. CENTCOM’s preference was that Saddam would pull out peacefully in response to the UN resolutions but, failing that, if he had to be ejected by force, fighting in the city could be limited so as to minimize the number of casualties and damage. This desire to limit casualties and damage led to the discussions about leaving an open escape route from Kuwait City which, in turn, came to pass by default.
CENTCOM also recognized that it had to plan to provide emergency services to Kuwait in the immediate aftermath of liberation. This task was fulfilled in the several annexes “G” to the OPLANs of both CENTCOM and its Army component, ARCENT. It was also included in the Annex G developed in Washington by the KTF which, however, was not coordinated with either ARCENT or CENTCOM. This lack of coordination meant that a significant amount of rewriting was required when the KTF finally arrived in theater.

None of this should be construed as criticism of any of these organizations for failure to identify the supporting objectives required to achieve the identified end-state. The organizations did plan the courses of action necessary to achieve the objectives as well as the resources required. Finally, the KTF planned for the long-term reconstruction of Kuwait in coordination with the Kuwaiti government’s special planning agency, the KERP.

The U.S. Government, however, had another political objective for Kuwait that was not at all reflected in the end-state derived by the military planners. This objective was to move the Kuwaiti government, upon its restoration, to a more democratic mode. The specific objective to be achieved was the restoration of the Kuwaiti legislative assembly and the way to achieve this objective was to extract a promise from the Emir. This was the mission of Ambassador Gnehm whose means were to apply the resources he had, or could tap, through the military and AID to enhance his diplomacy.

The fact that the end-state envisioned by the military planners did not reflect this political agenda resulted in a disconnected policy and strategy between the military and civilian agencies of the U.S. Government. This is not to say that the military strategy contradicted the policy addressed by Ambassador Gnehm but rather that there was a far more insidious result. Civil military operations in Kuwait never directly supported this larger policy goal in any coordinated way. The closest they came to doing so was in their focus on preventing human rights violations.

The fact that the envisioned end-states of the civil government and the military were not in complete congruence made for less than effective policy. Had CENTCOM been directed to incorporate strengthened democratic institutions into its view of the end-state of a restored legitimate government of Kuwait, then additional objectives which supported that end-state would have been incorporated into the CMO planning at all levels. In turn, this might well have made for greater policy success than we have had to date.

While the congruence of government policy and military strategy with respect to Kuwait was not fully synchronized, there was a definite lack of congruence between the end-state of regional stability as envisioned in the military strategy and as seen in U.S. Government policy. The military strategy saw regional stability in terms of an Iraq whose military capability had been so degraded that it could not threaten its neighbors but not a dismembered Iraq consisting of a Shi'ite state in the south, a Kurdish state in the north, and a Sunni Arab Mesopotamian state in the center, all at war with each other. While government policy rejected this nightmare, it never was clear from the President's rhetoric just what it was that he wanted. Different audiences could deduce from his statements almost any outcome they desired. As a result, the CENTCOM defined end-state became just one of several competing visions of the future resulting from U.S. policy. The results, of course, were the revolts of the Shi'ites and the Kurds, the collapse of the revolts under pressure
from a Saddam who, although defeated, represented the unified Iraq of the CENTCOM end-state, and the ensuing refugee rescue operations. Lack of congruence within the U.S. Government made for confused policy and undesired (and in some cases, unanticipated) outcomes.

The Strategic Ways—Organization, Command and Control.

As demonstrated in the discussion of planning, the establishment of the KTF resolved one problem which had plagued the Panama planners. That problem was interagency coordination. The KTF, however, was a creation of the interagency process and, as such, served its interagency masters well. In fact, the KTF used its interagency status to support its mission and there was close and effective coordination through the KTF between State and Defense.

The very fact of its interagency status was also the major problem associated with the KTF. As an interagency creation it was not under any single chain of command and control. Its master was the Steering Committee Group made up of senior officials from State and Defense with day-to-day monitoring being handled by the Working Group staffed by action officers of both departments on a part-time basis. In other words, the KTF supervisors served to support the activities of the KTF as determined by its commander, Colonel Elliott. Thus, no other organization of the U.S. Government or its military was in command of or exercised control of the KTF. This situation clearly is contrary to the recent development of effective command and control under the unified command system.

To a certain extent the KTF command and control arrangement evolved from the de facto abdication by CENTCOM of its authority to command any organization that would operate within its Area of Operational Responsibility (AOR). Had CINCCENT insisted, it is highly likely that the KTF would have come under his command, if not his operational control, until it deployed to theater. This would have increased the opportunity for the KTF to have received CENTCOM guidance on planning for CMO and required the KTF to have its plans reviewed by the CENTCOM staff, early in the process. In other words, the principal command and control lesson of the KTF is that while such an organization is required to work in the interagency arena (and the combined arena, if appropriate), it must come under the command of the unified commander. During the Washington stage of its existence, the KTF was appropriately under the operational control of the interagency Steering Committee Group but should, at the same time, have been under the command of CENTCOM. The proper arrangement for CMO planning within a theater, as suggested elsewhere, is an interagency group under the command and control of the CINC.247

Within CENTCOM, planning for CMO was divided between ARCENT and the Directorate of Policy and Plans (CCJ5). ARCENT had full responsibility for CMO planning by virtue of its designation under standing procedures as executive agent for civil affairs. CCJ5, however, retained more than mere staff supervision of CMO planning since the CINC had not designated a land component commander which made him such by default. In his capacity as combined commander with General Khalid, the CINC also retained authority for CMO that he simply could not delegate. Indeed, under the Goldwater-Nichols Act which has so strengthened the role of the unified commander, it is clear that executive agency no longer is a proper command relationship.
if it ever was. If the CINC desired to delegate responsibility for CMO and/or civil affairs he should have created a Joint or Combined Civil Military Operations Task Force (J/CCMOTF) directly subordinate to himself. That General Schwarzkopf never created such a task force caused significantly more confusion with respect to CMO than was necessary. This confusion carried over from planning through execution.

Organizing to Execute CMO.

Two major organizations to execute CMO came out of Operations DESERT STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT. These were Task Force FREEDOM and Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT. The similarities between both organizations and the Military Support Group in Panama were so striking that they suggest the need to inquire into the doctrine on which they were based and to incorporate the lessons of those experiences into new doctrine for the conduct of CMO.

As discussed elsewhere, the inspiration for the MSG was found in the Security Assistance Force (SAF) which is found in the doctrine in FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (1981 edition). The SAF has been renamed in the 1990 edition as the Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Force (FIDAF) and its structure has become more generic (see Figure 7). When the FIDAF is compared with the organizations of TF FREEDOM (Figure 1) and CCTF-PC (Figure 6), the similarity is remarkable.

Yet, the inspiration for TF FREEDOM was not wholly doctrinal. Rather, its establishment was the result of General Yeosock's rejection of the ARCENT G-5's proposed organization for the conduct of CMO followed by the adaptation of the logic of the ARCENT staff. While the inspiration for the organization of the Combined Task Force-PROVIDE COMFORT (CTF-PC) is unclear, given that the initial forces on the ground which set the tone were the SOF under Special Operations Command-Europe, it is reasonable to suppose that CTF-PC was adapted from the SAF/FIDAF concept. Several adaptations of the concept were consistent in each of the three organizational structures created. First, each organization was commanded by an Army General officer (or selectee) whose career had been made in the line combat arms. That is, he was not from another service or from the special operations community. In Panama, the initial organization for CMO was under an Air Force General as it was in the first stages of PROVIDE COMFORT. In both instances this initial command was a result of the circumstances prevailing on the ground and not of any particular preference. And, in each case, one of the first changes made was to replace the Air Force commander with an Army commander. The rationale would appear to be that the vast majority of the forces required to execute this kind of operation are ground forces.

The decision not to use a Special Forces or Civil Affairs commander requires more explanation. In Panama, the original civil-military operations plan had called for a CMO task force under the command of a principal staff officer responsible to the CINC. His deputy was to be the senior civil affairs officer in theater. Under the circumstances of execution, no civil affairs personnel arrived in a timely manner and when they did, the result was to organize them as subordinate task forces as called for in the plan.
Figure 7. Type of Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Force.

When reorganization became desirable it was clear that the proper commander of the organization to carry out long-term CMO was a general officer. No such individual was represented among the civil affairs officers in the CMO task force. Moreover, analysis had shown that the mission called for an organization that was CA heavy but included far more than civil affairs. Thus the new Military Support Group was patterned after an adaptation of the SAF.

Since a Security Assistance Force is doctrinally built around a Special Forces Group, it was not illogical to conclude that the right commander for the MSG would be a Special Forces general. That, however, was not General Thurman's choice. Instead he selected a cavalry officer who had served as commander of an augmented security assistance organization in the region. While Thurman's rationale can only be supposed, it was clear from the nature of the MSG that its significant component of conventional combat support and combat service support forces played a major role in the decision.

Task Force FREEDOM represents a similar decision for similar reasons. Although the ARCENT G-5 proposed that a CMO task force be established to carry out the emergency restoration of Kuwait and that the nucleus of the task force should be the 352d CA Command under Brigadier General Howard Mooney, USAR, General Yeosock rejected the proposal. Instead he created TF FREEDOM under his DCG. Again, although General Yeosock's specific rationale can only be speculated about, it was clear that the forces required to conduct the emergency restoration mission included much more than civil affairs. In fact, there was a sufficient combat service support element to require a second subordinate task force in addition to the civil affairs task force. It should also be noted here that nowhere in civil affairs doctrine is the issue of coordination with U.S. military forces addressed. Yet, it is precisely those forces which have the necessary capabilities to carry out the kinds of activities required during both occupations and liberations. Until the occupied or liberated country has its government in place and functioning, the occupying or liberating military forces will of necessity provide the services which are normally provided by government.

The issue of command in Combined Task Force-PROVIDE COMFORT did not involve a civil affairs general but rather Special Forces. It would have been logical in following the SAF/FIDAF concept to have named the SOCEUR commander, Brigadier General Richard Potter, as commander of CTF-PC. After all, he was already on the ground and was the commander of a subunified command. Yet again the CINC, in this case, CINCEUR, decided on a conventional forces line general, John Shalikashvili, the DCINC of U.S. Army Europe. One reason may have been the perceived need for a senior general and Shalikashvili wore three stars. Another reason may have been the requirement to control a wide variety of forces that were not special operations or SOF related. These included both Army and Marine aviation, Army engineers, medical personnel, and military police in addition to Air Force, Marine and allied units.

The conclusion that one draws from an examination of the organization for CMO and its command and control is that LIC doctrine provides a useful conceptual model. However, that model is best when it is modified in a number of significant ways. First, the concept is much broader than augmentation for security assistance or foreign internal defense. Rather, it is applicable to scenarios ranging from occupations and liberations through disaster relief and other humanitarian assistance missions to foreign internal defense.
Second, the base of organization should not be tied to any particular combat organization (such as an SF group in the older SAF configuration). Instead, the organization should be built from the kinds of units needed to execute the specific mission in the particular political/military context. In this regard the FIDAF model represents a significant improvement over the SAF.

Third, the commander of a task force charged with a CMO mission should not be selected for his technical specialization as a CA, SF, engineer, medical, or artillery officer. Rather, the essential criteria for command of this type of organization include broad background, command of other fairly large military units, regional familiarity, and political/military sensitivity. Such an individual may be found in CA or SF but is equally likely to be found in one of the combat arms or combat support branches.

The Civil Affairs Component.

Another element common to each of the three organizations tasked with the conduct of CMO in these contingencies was the hefty civil affairs component. In the case of the MSG it was called the Civil Affairs Task Force (CATF); in TF FREEDOM it was the Combined CATF (CCATF). In CTF-PC the civil affairs component was the CA Command with its attached units under the control of Task Forces Alpha and Bravo. In each case, the CA elements performed the principal interface between the military and the civilian elements of the U.S Government and the military and the host government. In the case of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, one modification to this generalization was that the CA elements provided the interface between the military and the various international relief agencies (IGO/NGO/PVOs) whose role was somewhat analogous to the role of the host government in other contexts.

In both Panama and Kuwait, civil affairs elements played a major role in the reestablishment of civilian government through teams of functional specialists who worked closely with the newly named ministers. In Panama the Ministry Support Teams provided the initial staffing for the various ministries moving quickly to an advisory role. In Kuwait, the KTF served in much the same way. In both instances the last role played by some members of these teams was to augment functional sections of the U.S. Embassy which were very much under strength until some time after combat ceased.

It should be noted that ministry and embassy support are missions that are especially appropriate to civil affairs units, especially in view of their origin in World War II as civil affairs and military government units.\textsuperscript{250}

The Interagency Imperative.

One of the major lessons of the Panama experience was that CMO is interagency business. Typically, the lesson was learned in several different forums and in several different forms. Colonel Randall Elliott, the founder and chief of the KTF, did not see this as a lesson at all but rather simply as common sense. So he structured the KTF under the interagency Steering Committee Group.
with the strong and positive support of allies within State and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, among others.

Lieutenant General Carns, the Secretary of the Joint Staff, felt strongly that after Panama, DOD had been left to pay the bills despite informal commitments from other government agencies. As a result, he insisted that Elliott and the KTF so involve other government agencies in some manner that they would have to share the bill paying. Elliott responded in a number of innovative ways which did bring some 27 agencies of the government into the play. The most obvious and, in the long run, important example was AID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) whose director, a USAR Major, became Elliott's executive officer but also brought his civilian agency checkbook.

The OFDA/KTF connection became important in the field in other ways. A few OFDA personnel were attached to the KTF as were personnel from the OFDA contracted consulting firm, Intersect. These individuals made the KTF a field operating interagency organization. When the KTF was absorbed by the CCATF, it too became interagency as did its parent, TF FREEDOM. Thus the OFDA/contractor section played an important role in the restoration of Kuwait and the refugee operations in southern Iraq.

The lessons learned by OFDA during Operation DESERT STORM served the country well when it became necessary to execute Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. The OFDA director dispatched his deputy to work with CTF-PC thereby recreating the OFDA/contractor section in the CTF such that it more or less duplicated the experience of TF-FREEDOM. The organization of the CTF into two operating task forces did make the OFDA/contractor section less effective in some ways than it had been in the south but it generally served well and greatly enhanced the overall effectiveness of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

The contrast between the organizations charged with carrying out the CMO mission in Panama and the Gulf with respect to their incorporation of an interagency element clearly argues strongly in favor of this approach. The staff of the MSG recognized that the lack of interagency organization significantly hampered their efforts but were unable to do anything to change the situation. By contrast, the far sighted approach taken by Colonel Elliott to implement General Carns' guidance made the field aspect of interagency organization essentially a non-problem.

The one area where the interagency requirement was ignored was in planning at the theater and Army component level. Closely held plans that initially did not admit to anyone outside a very narrow circle that there was any intention to eject Saddam from Kuwait certainly did nothing to further interagency planning. More importantly, this approach withheld from the KTF information it required to make its plans conform to those of CENTCOM and ARCENT. Since KTF plans were developed without theater input, they were clearly less than wholly usable and so were rejected by the ARCENT and CENTCOM staffs. Not until the KTF arrived in theater and came under the CINC's control were these discrepancies reconciled.
The Means (Resources).

The conduct of CMO, both during a war and in the termination of a war, requires the application of significant organizational and material resources. Organizational resources come in two models—military and civilian. The first of the military organizations to be considered is the civil affairs community. It is made up of three USAR Civil Affairs Commands, their supporting brigades, groups, and companies, and the active component 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. In addition, there are two Civil Affairs Groups in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. The only other nations known to have attempted a formal civil affairs capability are Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

The origins and development of U.S. civil affairs are discussed in Chapter 1. Here it is sufficient to state that U.S. civil affairs units, particularly those in the USAR, provide capabilities and expertise in thousands of permutations of the 20 CA functional areas that are largely unknown in the active military. Further, these CA units are more than capable of interacting effectively with the U.S. and allied military command as well as with U.S. and other governmental civilian agencies. CA units are designed to, and do, bridge the gap between the military and the variety of civilian government and private organizations involved in the zone where military operations are taking or have taken place. CA units, however, do not have the capability to command and control other types of military units charged with executing portions of the CMO mission. Nor are CA units alone fully capable of planning the entire range of civil-military operations.

The numerous tasks involved in civil-military operations go far beyond the capabilities of CA units. Typically, there are tasks that call for engineer units, medical units, transportation units (air, ground, and sea), quartermaster units, etc. Often, an area support group is essential to the effective execution of the mission.

What has not been mentioned previously is the security mission so often associated with CMO, especially during the war termination process. This was a critical factor in Panama, Kuwait, southern Iraq, and northern Iraq. Infantry, MPs, and Special Forces were essential to CMO mission success in all of these cases. In Operation PROVIDE COMFORT armed air assets, both rotary and fixed wing, provided much of the punch that kept the Iraqis from interfering with the humanitarian assistance mission. Often overlooked in considering the CMO mission are the assets represented by civil agencies. This was a concern at the Joint Staff level during the planning for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM and resulted in significant consideration and involvement by and with U.S. civilian agencies in Kuwait. The fact that the KTF in conjunction with the KERP constituted a combined planning group brought into play the various host government agencies and institutions. Most of these were government ministries which did, as in Panama, need to be reconstituted before they could begin to exercise their functions effectively.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT brought a whole new set of organizational resources into play. These were the various IGOs, many of which were members of the UN family, NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, and PVOs like Doctors Without Borders. Each organization brought certain expertise that needed to be coordinated with the whole effort but often was best coordinated through the informal mechanisms developed in shared experiences in countless disasters. Yet, PROVIDE COMFORT was the first time that most of these organizations had ever worked with the military of any country.
Material resources, including especially finances, largely were the responsibility of the involved governments. Most of the PVOs, for example, were funded for the purchase of necessary materials such as tubing for potable water and medicines by grants from the various governments involved. In the U.S. case these grants generally were funded by OFDA at the discretion of its Disaster Assistance Relief Team chief. UN agencies are, of course, funded by their member nations' governments paying regularly assessed quotas and supplemental emergency quotas.

Only in Kuwait was the funding of operations significantly different. Kuwait, as an incredibly rich oil producing state which has invested its oil profits wisely and well for a number of years, contracted with the U.S. Government, the Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. and other private firms to provide the necessary materials and services both for emergency restoration and long-term reconstruction. One would be hard pressed to think of any probable future scenarios where the liberated or conquered nation will be able and willing to pay for the material resources required. Thus, planning for future operations will have to take a long and hard look at resourcing if they are to be successful.

The Strategic Implications.

War termination, as shown in this study, is a phase of military operations that must be planned in full coordination with war fighting. To be successful, its objectives need to be defined in end-state terms with clear supporting objectives that are both military and civil-military in nature. This, in turn, suggests that civil-military operations in the post-conflict period—post-conflict activities—may be a necessary condition for victory. Thus, when the political-military and the exclusively military end-states are not fully synchronized, then strategic victory is that much harder to achieve.

To effectively terminate a war requires that unity of effort be achieved within the entire U.S. Government. This demands interagency coordination from the beginning at the highest levels down through the theater. It further requires that the concept behind the Goldwater-Nichols legislation be adhered to throughout DOD as well as in the interagency arena. The use of executive agency within CENTCOM as well as for the reconstruction of Kuwait violated the intent of the legislation and served to further complicate relationships that already were complicated enough.

The best example of Goldwater-Nichols intent not being taken into account in the interagency arena is the case of the KTF in Washington. It was wrong that the KTF was not under the command of CINCCENT until it deployed to theater; not that the KTF should have been under CENTCOM operational control but rather that the lack of any kind of command relationship was a complication that could easily have been avoided.

Interagency planning only took place because of the KTF and because the KTF was operating under interagency auspices. CENTCOM planning was closely held and not shared in the interagency coordination forums. Had it not been for the creation of the KTF, CMO related to DESERT STORM might never have seen any interagency coordination prior to execution in the same vein as Panama. It is a very poor way to fight a war and win a peace if the only way that all
elements of power can be brought to bear on the problem is through pure serendipity. Yet, that is precisely what happened in the creation of the KTF and did not happen in Panama, with predictable consequences.

American military doctrine must change across the board to recognize the interagency imperative. Three operations in two years tell us that war and peace are much too complicated for either the military or the civilian agencies of the U.S. Government to address without the participation of the other as a full partner. OPLANS must, in the future, have appropriate civilian agency input.

The same three operations tell us that in organizing to execute CMO we are on the right track. The SAF/FIDAF provides a good model type organization to conduct CMO. The model, however, lacks a major and essential component. It fails to integrate civilian governmental agencies. The negative consequences of this failing were found in the operation of the MSG in Panama. The positive effect of such integration was shown by the operations of TF FREEDOM and the CTF-PC. Neither of the latter two organizations provide an appropriate model. In both cases the integration of the OFDA/contractor team was done ad hoc. Rather, what is required is an organizational construct that views the entire task force charged with the conduct of CMO as being fully integrated with civilian government agency personnel in the command group and on the staff and generally operating sections organized by individual agencies.

Command and control has been addressed to some extent in this chapter and elsewhere. The question remains is for whom the CMO commander should work as well as who he should be. These operations clearly suggest that the CMO commander should be under the command of the senior commander having responsibility for whatever goes on in the area of the operation. In Operation DESERT STORM this should have been the CINC rather than the ARCENT commander. In Operation PROVIDE COMFORT it was the CINC. In Panama, it was initially the CINC, then with reorganization it became the Joint Task Force commander. In neither instance did command of CMO violate the dictum laid down above.

Control, however, is sometimes different from command. In some instances, control should be exercised by the President's senior personal representative in country. Most often, this is the American Ambassador. In Panama, the Ambassador was given operational control of the CMO task force by the CINC. Later, when the MSG was established it was a de facto member of the country team and embassy suggestions were treated as orders. In Kuwait, TF FREEDOM specifically did not come under the operational control of the Ambassador for some good reasons. Potential problems were solved by effective coordination without conflict. Later, however, as the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office was being established there were some interesting if minor battles to resolve who really was in charge—it turned out to be the Ambassador to nobody's surprise. Command and control in an environment like Kuwait with a functioning embassy, an Ambassador in country, but coalition operations taking place across international borders require some doctrinal thought and clarification. Otherwise, we are bound to face some serious potential problems.

The final and most important strategic implication of this study is that it confirms the observation that civil-military operations are significantly larger than civil affairs. CMO represent the
centerpiece of the termination of war on terms that achieve the end-state identified by our national objectives.

2. Ibid.


4. Ibid.

5. *FM 41-10*.

6. Fishel.


12. Ibid.


14. Fishel.

15. Ibid.


20. Fishel.

21. Ibid.


23. Ibid.

24. Interview with LTG John S. Shalikashvili, October 31, 1991. Note that while USG civilians were under the legal jurisdiction of the U.S. Embassy, they operated under the control of General Shalikashvili (OPCON/TACON).


26. Ibid.

27. Interviews with CENTCOM and USSOCOM officers, October-December 1991.


29. Ibid.

30. *FM 41-10*.

31. Fishel.

32. Ibid

33. Ibid

34. Interviews with Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and State Department/AID officers, October-December 1991.

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35. Fishel.
38. Ibid., p. 10.
39. Interviews with U.S. Army staff officers and FAOs assigned to region and USCENTCOM during DESERT SHIELD/STORM, October-December 1991.
41. Ibid., p. 10.
42. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
46. UNSC Resolution 660 summarized in Military Review, September 1991, p. 79.
47. UNSC Resolutions 662, 665, and 678 summarized in Military Review, September 1991, p. 79.
49. Speaker consensus at Civil Affairs in the Gulf War Symposium, Fort Bragg, NC, October 25-26, 1991.
56. Ibid.
61. John R. Brinkerhoff, Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq, OCAR, Washington, DC. August 1991, p.50; see also Elliott, interviews. Interestingly, in the 352d, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations is the G-5 while the G-3 has training.
62. Elliott, interviews; and Randall T. Elliott. Kuwait Task Force: A Brief History. A CENTCOM staff officer suggests that Elliott may not have been quite so clairvoyant and is writing with the advantage of hindsight. He does note that, “What was clear is that the devastation of Kuwait would require rebuilding regardless of how Iraqi troops left.”
63. Elliott. interviews.
66. Ibid., also Elliott, interviews.
68. Ibid.
69. Mikesh.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Elliott, interviews.
73. Mikesh.
74. Ibid.
75. Elliott, Brief History.
76. Ibid.
77. Interviews with CENTCOM staff officers, MacDill AFB, November 14, 1991.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Interviews with CENTCOM, ARCENT, and 96th CA Battalion officers, October-December 1991.
83. Interviews with CENTCOM, ARCENT, and SOCOM staff officers, November 1991. According to a CENTCOM staff officer, the CCJS Pol-Mil Director attempted on numerous occasions to deploy RC CA forces for both staff augmentation and operations. Those efforts were regularly squashed by the Chief of Staff on the grounds that they threatened to break the self-imposed, in-theater personnel ceilings.
84. Interview with OJCS staff officer, November 1991; also Elliott, interviews.
85. Elliott, Brief History.
86. Ibid.
87. Elliott, interviews.
88. Interview with KTF officer, Washington, DC, December 1991; also participant observation by the author as USSOUTHCOM chief planner for CMO in Panama prior to JUST CAUSE.
89. Elliott, interviews.
90. Elliott, Brief History.
91. Elliott, interviews.
92. Interview with OJCS staff officer, November 1991.
93. Ibid.
94. Elliott, Brief History.
95. Ibid.
96. Elliott, interviews.
97. Elliott, Brief History.
98. OJCS staff officer.
100. Elliott, interviews.
101. Ibid.: OJCS staff officer.
102. Elliott, interviews.
103. Ibid.
104. Elliott, Brief History.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. CENTCOM staff officers.
The DC problem actually developed after offensive operations were suspended and resulted from the Shiite revolt. Prior planning had expected a refugee problem of similar magnitude in Kuwait but not in southern Iraq which was very sparsely populated. As a result CENTCOM, ARCENT, and VII Corps had to react to an unexpected variant of the DC problem. All were slow due, in part, to the misunderstandings.


137. *Ibid.*; also interviews with staff officers from USCENTCOM, USSOCOM, the Joint Staff, and the Air Staff, October 1991-March 1992.


145. Ibid., p. 99.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid., p. 100.
148. Interviews with staff officers.
150. Ibid.
151. Ibid.
152. Interviews with staff officers.
153. Senator Nunn reportedly made this comment with respect to the abortive Panamanian coup attempt on October 3, 1989 as criticism for the United States not doing more to make it a success.
163. Ibid., p. 78.
165. Ibid.
166. John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama.
168. Interview with TF Freedom staff officer, April 2, 1992.
169. Fishel.
173. Elliott, Brief History.
177. Fishel.
178. Elliott, interviews and Brief History.
179. TF Freedom, Briefing slide, MISSION, unclas.
180. Interviews with TF Freedom officers, and Proceedings, pp. 300-301. Lieutenant General Boomer, MARCENT Commander, was located in Kuwait but did not assume the role of CINC's representative.
182. Ibid.
183. Interviews with TF Freedom officers.
184. Ibid., and Elliott, interviews.
186. Ibid.
187. Ibid.

188. Lawrence A. Blount. Remarks in Proceedings, p. 234. Another CCJ5 officer disputes Blount’s assertion that occupation was a device to pressure Iraq to agree to a permanent cease-fire. His interpretation is far more plausible.


190. VII Corps message, Subject: Humanitarian Assistance Efforts, DTG 01XXXXZ Apr 91, unclas.

191. Interviews with ARCENT staff officers.

192. Ibid.

193. Interviews with TF Freedom officers.

194. Proceedings.

195. VII Corps message, Subject: Humanitarian Assistance, DTG P XXXXXXZ May 91. unclas.

196. Ibid. According to a senior CENTCOM staff officer, movement of DCs by air began well before the end of April.


198. Ibid.

199. Ibid., p. 4.

200. Ibid., p. ii.

201. Ibid., p. 4.

202. Ibid., p. 6, and interviews with TF Freedom officers.

203. DRAO, p.5. also interviews with CENTCOM staff officers, January-April 1992.

204. Ibid., p. 4.

205. Ibid., p. 5.

206. Ibid.

207. Ibid., p. iii.

208. Ibid., p. 29.

209. Although the reservation of certain decisions by a higher headquarters is not uncommon, it is illustrative, in this case, of the kind of responsibility without authority given by executive agency.


211. Ibid.


213. State/AID interviews.

214. Ibid.


216. Ibid.

217. Shalikashvili: State/AID interviews.

218. Shalikashvili.

219. Ibid.

220. Ibid.

221. USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Draft After Action Report, November 1991. p. 5
222. State/AID interviews.
223. Ibid.
224. Shalikashvili.
225. State/AID interviews.
226. Ibid.
229. Shalikashvili.
230. State/AID interviews.
232. Ibid.
234. State/ AID interviews; 354th interviews.
236. Shalikashvili; Proceedings; OFDA.
237. Ibid.; Hill.
238. State/AID interviews.
239. Ibid.
240. Ibid.
242. Ibid.; 354th interviews.
243. The Army War College recently has integrated the study of post-conflict activities, as a way to successfully terminate war, into its curriculum.
246. See Fishel. An example of the kind of things the military can do in CMO planning to strengthen the basis for democracy is that in establishing priorities for restoration of services the local populace can be consulted. In Kuwait, this would have meant calling together local assemblies—in the Kuwaiti tradition of its Legislative Assembly—establishing an electoral mechanism... etc., and training the Assembly. A similar concept based on Panamanian traditions was included in the strategy proposed by the MSG to the U.S. Embassy.
247. See Fishel.
249. Headquarters Departments of the Army and Air Force, FM 100-20; AF Pam 3-20, Military Operations In Low Intensity Conflict, Washington, DC, December 5, 1990.
250. Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. Washington, DC, December 17, 1985. See also Chapter 1 of this study.
251. Fishel.
252. It should be noted that plans are underway to upgrade USAR CA companies to battalions.
253. Fishel.
254. Ibid. for a full development of alternative structures.
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Headquarters, Department of the Army. *FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict*. Washington, DC, 1981.


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APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

AC: Active Component of the U.S. military, as opposed to the Reserve Component.

AFFOR: Air Force Component of a Joint or Combined Force.

AGR: Active Guard and Reserve. Full time Reservists and Guardsmen on active duty to support the National Guard and Reserve as part of the total force.


AO: Area of Operations.

ARCENT: Army Component, Central Command.

ATO: Air Tasking Order.

CA: Civil Affairs. Used to refer to Civil Affairs qualified personnel and to units which have the Civil Affairs mission.

CCJ3: USCENTCOM Directorate of Operations.

CCJ5: USCENTCOM Directorate of Policy and Plans.

CAPSTONE: The alignment between Reserve and Active units for both training and warfighting.

CATF: Civil Affairs Task Force.

CCATF: Combined Civil Affairs Task Force.

CENTAF: Air Component, CENTCOM.

CENTCOM: So 9 USCENTCOM

CG: Commanding General.

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency.

CINC: Commander-in-Chief.
CINCCENT: See USCCINCENT.

CINCSO: See USCINCSO.

CMO: Civil-military operations.

CMOTF: Civil-Military Operations Task Force. Initially, the organization planned in BLIND LOGIC to carry out CMO. During the execution of Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, CMOTF referred to the CA headquarters subordinate to COMCMOTF. See COMCMOTF.

COMCMOTF: Commander, Civil-Military Operations Task Force. Term is used to refer to General Gann personally as well as to the highest CMO headquarters during Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY.

CSAR: Combat Search and Rescue.

CSC: Combined Support Command.

CTF-PC: Combined Task Force-PROVIDE COMFORT.

DART: Disaster Assistance Response Team. Standard Operating Organization of OFDA.

DCG: Deputy Commanding General.

DCINC: Deputy Commander-in-Chief.

DCM: Deputy Chief of Mission. The number two person in a U.S. Embassy. The DCM becomes Charge d'Affaires in the absence of the Ambassador.

DCSREC: Deputy Chief of Staff Reconstruction. The official title of the KTF after it was integrated into the CCATF.

DOD: Department of Defense.

DRAO: Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office. MG Patrick Kelly's operation in Kuwait which was the successor to the KTF and CCATF.

EUCOM: See USEUCOM.

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration.
FAO: Foreign Area Officer. The product of an Army training program in the grade of Captain or higher who has had specialized training on a particular world region to include language, a Master's degree, and in-country experience.

FORSCOM: U.S. Forces Command.

G-5: Civil Affairs Staff officer or officer in an Army division or higher echelons unit.

IGO: Intergovernmental Organization.

IMA: Individual Mobilization Augmentee.

INR: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.


J-3: Director of Operations on a Joint Staff.

J-5: Director of Policy, Plans, and Strategy on a Joint Staff. On some joint staffs is responsible for civil-military operations.

JCATF: See CATF.

JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JSOTF: Joint Special Operations Task Force.

J-Staff: Joint Staff. Staff of any joint headquarters made up of personnel from several services.

JTF: Joint Task Force.

JTFPM: Joint Task Force-Panama.

JTFSO: Joint Task Force-South.

KERO: Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (Army Corps of Engineers operating program in Kuwait).

KTF: Kuwait Task Force.

MP: Military Police.
MSG: See USMSGPM.

NGO: Non-governmental Organization.

ODT: Overseas Deployment Training. A means of funding Reserve and National Guard annual training outside continental United States.

OASD-SO/LIC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

OFDA: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance of USAID.


OPORD: Operations Order. An OPLAN becomes an OPORD when the decision to execute is made.

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense.

POLAD: Political Advisor. State Department officer attached to the staff of a CINC.

PFLD: Public Force Liaison Division. Division of the USMSG-PM charged with liaison, training, and equipping of the Panama Public Force (National Police, Air Service, Maritime Service). Successor to USFLG.

PSYOP: Psychological Operations.

PVO: Private Voluntary Organization.

RC: Reserve Component (of the U.S. Army).

SAF: Security Assistance Force. Army doctrinal organization built around an augmented Special Forces Group which is capable of conducting a variety of broadly interpreted security assistance missions.

SECDEFREP: Secretary of Defense Representative. The position of MG Patrick Kelly as head of DRAO.

SF: U.S. Army Special Forces.

SJA: Staff Judge Advocate. A command's lawyer(s).

SOCEUR: Special Operations Command Europe. A subunified command of USEUCOM.

SOCOM: See USSOCOM.
SOF: Special Operations Forces (of all services).
SOUTHCOM: See USSOUTHCOM.
SUPCOM: Support Command.
TF: Task Force.
TTAD: Temporary Tour of Active Duty. Reserve Component mechanism for funding tours of duty up to 179 days using Active Component funds.
UN: United Nations.
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
USAID: See AID.
USAR: United States Army Reserve.
USCINCCENT: United States Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command.
USCINCSO: United States Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command.
USCENTCOM: United States Central Command.
USFLG: United States Forces Liaison Group. Organization created under JTFSO to establish, equip, and train the Panama Public Force. It was succeeded by the PFLD when the USMSGPM was established. Also called FLG.
USIA: United States Information Agency.
USMSGPM: United States Military Support Group - Panama. Created as the successor to COMCMOTF, this subordinate element of JTFSO (later JTFPM) coordinated all U.S. military activity in support of the Panamanian Government. Its commander was a de facto member of the Embassy Country Team.
USSOCOM: United States Special Operations Command. Supporting unified command (to USSOUTHCOM) located at MacDill AFB, Florida.
USSOUTHCOM: United States Southern Command. Located at Quarry Heights, Panama, it is responsible for all U.S. military activity in Central and South America.
### APPENDIX B

### INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amb Morton Abramowitz</td>
<td>U.S. Ambassador to Turkey</td>
<td>20 Dec 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC J. Albert</td>
<td>OJCS-J5</td>
<td>6 Dec 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Bruce Alcan</td>
<td>KTF, CTF-PC, CBTF-J5</td>
<td>18 Dec 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Fawzi Al-Sultan</td>
<td>KERP</td>
<td>18 Mar 92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Tony Auletta</td>
<td>Civil Affairs, DA</td>
<td>12 Nov 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Dennis Barlow</td>
<td>OJCS-J33</td>
<td>19 Nov 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Robert Beahm</td>
<td>Commander, 354th CA Bde</td>
<td>19 Dec 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC Walt Berk</td>
<td>Security Assistance, DA</td>
<td>20 Nov 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Lawrence Blount</td>
<td>CCJ5-PM/CA</td>
<td>5 Dec 91</td>
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<td>COL Patrick Carlton</td>
<td>OJCS-J33</td>
<td>3 Dec 91</td>
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<td>LTC Paul Christian</td>
<td>CCJ5-PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Douglas Craft</td>
<td>CCJ5-PS/PL</td>
<td>18 Oct 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(and multiple other dates)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL E. Dander</td>
<td>Dep Cdr, 354th CA Bde</td>
<td>19 Dec 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Dana Dillon</td>
<td>Dep SOCCENT</td>
<td>30 Sep 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL John Donnelly</td>
<td>SOJ9</td>
<td>13 Nov 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Randall Elliott</td>
<td>Cdr, Kuwaiti Task Force</td>
<td>11 Sep 91</td>
</tr>
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<td>6 Dec 91</td>
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<td>9 Feb 92</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Robert Frix</td>
<td>Cdr, Task Force Freedom, DCG, ARCENT</td>
<td>8 Nov 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organization/Position</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. J. E. Gettier</td>
<td>AID, OFDA</td>
<td>13 Dec 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amb Edward “Skip” Gnehm</td>
<td>U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait</td>
<td>13 Mar 92</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Gary Goff</td>
<td>CTF-PC, TF Bravo</td>
<td>30 Oct 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC Bernard Harvey</td>
<td>USAF Staff (Checkmate)</td>
<td>11 Dec 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Richard Hill</td>
<td>Intertect</td>
<td>9 Feb 92</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Byron R. Hooten</td>
<td>CTF-PC</td>
<td>13 Nov 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM David Jeremiah</td>
<td>Vice Chairman, JCS</td>
<td>20 Nov 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC Bryan Karabaich</td>
<td>SOJ9</td>
<td>12 Nov 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Jim Kerr</td>
<td>ARCENT G5</td>
<td>8 Nov 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Glen Lackey</td>
<td>ARCENT G3</td>
<td>8 Nov 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Larson</td>
<td>OJCS-J5</td>
<td>6 Dec 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Barbara Leaf</td>
<td>Dept of State</td>
<td>Nov 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR Richard McCrillis</td>
<td>OJCS-J5</td>
<td>6 Dec 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Phebe Marr</td>
<td>NDU-INSS</td>
<td>28 Aug 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Dayton Maxwell</td>
<td>Dep Dir, OFDA Chief, DART, CTF-PC</td>
<td>19 Dec 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC Paul Mikesh</td>
<td>OASD-SO/LIC</td>
<td>4 Dec 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Howard Mooney</td>
<td>Cdr, 352 CA Command, Cdr, C CATF</td>
<td>4 Dec 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL John Mooneyham</td>
<td>Cdr, USLOK</td>
<td>16 Oct 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Steve Pelletiere</td>
<td>SSI, USAWC</td>
<td>15 Oct 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL Mike Peters</td>
<td>Cdr, 96th CA Bn</td>
<td>11 Dec 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Donnell Saffold</td>
<td>ARCENT Deputy G5</td>
<td>12 Dec 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG John Shalikashvili</td>
<td>Cdr, CTF-PC</td>
<td>31 Oct 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ Chuck Trombetta</td>
<td>352 CA CMD, ARCENT Staff</td>
<td>12 July 91, 2 Apr 92</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL C. R. Ward</td>
<td>CCJ5-PM</td>
<td>14 Nov 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ H. E. Williams</td>
<td>4th POG</td>
<td>24, 28 Oct 91</td>
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<td>COL Chuck Williamson</td>
<td>SOJ9</td>
<td>18 Sep 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG Chuck Wilhelm</td>
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<td>4 Dec 91</td>
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<td>LTC Yates</td>
<td>ARCENT Staff</td>
<td>8 Nov 91</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL H. Youmans</td>
<td>SOJ9</td>
<td>12 Nov 91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DR. JOHN T. FISHEL is Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He earned his Ph.D. in Political and Administrative Development at Indiana University in 1971, taught at the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse until 1986, and served as a Visiting Professor at the American Graduate School of International Management, the U.S. Army School of International Studies, and Campbell University. In 1986 he was recalled to active duty as a lieutenant colonel where he served in the United States Southern Command in a variety of assignments. These included Chief of Research and Assessments in the Small Wars Operational Research Directorate; Chief of the Policy and Strategy Division of the Strategy, Policy, and Plans Directorate; Deputy Chief of the Public Force Liaison Division of the United States Military Support Group, Panama; and Special Assistant to the Commander, USMSGPM. He is the author of numerous articles on Latin American politics and low intensity conflict.