Alternative missions which the U.S. Army may assume in the post-Cold War era are examined. The authors document the decaying social and physical infrastructure of the United States and propose that the Army has resources and experience to assist in remediating many of the domestic problems plaguing the nation. They present evidence that historically the Army has been more involved in domestic activities of the nation than in warfighting. The authors conclude that it is now time for the Army to return to its historical roots and resume domestic missions. They offer proposals as to how this might be accomplished, noting that in times of reduced defense budgets, the Army must make itself domestically significant.
Two individuals influenced our approach to this study. First and foremost was Colonel David E. Shaver, a colleague at the Strategic Studies Institute. His *Justifying the Army* was an original and thoughtful assessment of where the Army should be headed as it prepares for the 21st century. We have incorporated many of his thoughts in this study. Second is Mr. Carl H. Builder from the Rand Corporation. His paper, *The Role of the Army in the American Society*, presented at the Army Worldwide Long-Range Planners’ Conference (April 30-May 2, 1990) argues that the Army must have visible domestic significance if it is to successfully compete for resources in the future. Any errors of fact or judgment are, of course, the responsibility of the authors.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the authors by calling commercial (717) 245-3001 or DSN 242-3001.
FOREWORD

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the absence of a global military threat to American national security, the American public and the Congress is questioning the need for retention of a large military force structure. Many believe that domestic problems are now more important than international issues. They believe that our decaying social and physical infrastructure may constitute a greater threat to the stability of the nation than any foreign army.

This study was initiated several months prior to the Los Angeles riots and the recent proposal by Senator Sam Nunn for civil-military cooperation in "community regeneration." The authors present many proposals that parallel Senator Nunn's recommendations. However, they go further by suggesting that it does make sense to use domestic missions to justify force structure. Particularly significant is their assessment that some of the combat missions of the National Guard and the Army Reserve be reduced in favor of assigning those components additional support-oriented missions that could also have domestic application in peacetime.

They argue that the Army, particularly its Reserve Components, has both the resources and expertise to assist in remedying many of the domestic problems plaguing the nation. They present evidence, despite many perceptions to the contrary, that the Army historically has been more involved in the domestic activities of the nation than in warfighting. In fact, it has been only within the last 45 years that the Army has been viewed as primarily a warfighting force. The authors conclude that it is now time for the Army to return to its historical roots and resume domestic missions. They offer concrete proposals as to how this might be accomplished, noting that for the Army to compete successfully in times of reduced defense budgets, it must make itself domestically significant.

KARL W. ROBINSON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES
OF THE AUTHORS

COLONEL PHILIP A. BREHM is the Army National Guard Advisor to the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He is a 1986 graduate of the Army War College and holds a master's degree in public administration from Shippensburg University. A Signal Corps Officer, he has served tours of duty in Germany (2), Panama, and at the National Guard Bureau, and commanded a Combat Support Battalion for a Separate Infantry Brigade. His most recent assignments were as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army South and as Senior National Guard Advisor for U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Army South, Republic of Panama. He is coauthor of Expansibility of the Army and U.S. Army South After Withdrawal From Panama (USARSO 2000), and author of Restructuring the Army: The Road To A Total Force.

MAJOR WILBUR E. GRAY is a Virginia National Guardsman serving with the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, as a Strategic Research Analyst. A graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Major Gray holds bachelor's degrees in history and political science from Clemson University and a master's degree in international relations from the University of Southern California. A military intelligence officer in the Active/Guard Reserve program, he has had numerous active duty assignments, to include a tour with the 1st Armored Division in Germany. He has also served with the 29th Infantry Division(L), VA ARNG. His most recent assignment was as Associate Professor of Military Science, University of Virginia.
SUMMARY

This study examines alternative missions which the U.S. Army may assume in the post-cold war era. It documents the decaying social and physical infrastructure of the United States and proposes that the Army has both the resources and the experience to assist in remedying the problem. The authors make the case for Army acceptance of these missions because, if the Army is to compete successfully in the budget process, it must have domestic significance in the eyes of the American public. To accomplish this, a restructuring of its three components that will draw on the demonstrated strengths of each will be required. Domestic significance means acceptance of peacetime missions as a justification for force structure. Peacetime missions mean tasking the Army to use its many assets to repair or maintain much of the physical and social infrastructure of the United States. Executing these missions applies most directly to the Reserve Components (RC), which are already located in over 5,000 communities throughout the nation. The window of opportunity for the Army to aggressively determine its own future will not remain open indefinitely. Action is required now.

Key Findings.

- The United States Armed Forces, particularly the Army, are among the few agencies with the resources and required expertise to repair a decaying national infrastructure. Contrary to popular belief, the Army has a long tradition of domestic involvement.

- The Army has many assets that are exactly of the type required by government to fix or maintain its infrastructure. Especially available are assets residing in the Reserve Components that are, for the most part, underutilized for much of the year.
- The social and physical infrastructure of the United States is rapidly deteriorating. As such, the deterioration constitutes the most significant threat to the security of the country.

- The Army National Guard (ARNG) also has a high number of combat forces that have little likelihood of being used for their primary mission.

- The Army should structure its three components to do what they have demonstrated they do best: Combat structure for the Active Component; Combat Support and Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) structure for the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units.

- Areas where the Army could be helpful in assisting Federal, State and local governments include drug and immigration control, engineering and construction, health care, transportation, and law enforcement.

- Because they are already located in over 5,000 communities throughout the nation, the Reserve Components are the most logical to be assigned domestic missions. This will also free the Active Component to focus on what it does best, prepare for and conduct contingency and combat operations.

- To accomplish the new missions, restructuring of the Reserve Components, especially the Army National Guard, will be necessary. Particularly important will be restructuring selected National Guard combat units into CS or CSS units while retaining those already in the Army Reserve. This robust CS/CSS structure also will provide the Army with a better capability to expand rapidly, if necessary, to meet a future threat that is beyond the capacity of the existing combat forces.
- There are no insurmountable legal roadblocks to the Army becoming more involved in domestic nation assistance.

- The primary obstacle for the Army to overcome before assuming these missions is the reluctance to break old paradigms.

- Given the evidence presented, the Army should eagerly assume domestic assistance missions. The RC are ideally situated to be the lead element in executing these missions.
Introduction.

The cold war is over, the U.S. military establishment is shrinking, the United States is losing what many call an economic war, and corporations and state and local governments are struggling to meet payrolls while continuing to provide the basic benefits and services that most Americans have come to expect. To successfully compete for resources in this environment, the U.S. military, in general, and the Army specifically, must make itself domestically significant. This study will examine how that may be accomplished.

With the end of the cold war, many Americans believe it is time to target the country's energies and resources toward solving domestic problems. The military services, particularly the Army, stand uniquely qualified to help win these "wars without combat" through peaceful use of their equipment, personnel, and experience in meeting difficult challenges. Further, the Army's command and control apparatus, with its ability to mobilize and shift personnel and equipment, enables the Army to provide its resources with efficiency. During FY90, for example, National Guard units responded to 292 state missions, assisting their local communities in a variety of emergency actions.1

While use of the Army for noncombatant, domestic missions may be viewed as a radical departure from tradition, a closer examination of American history provides many positive examples of its participating in domestic actions. The Army has served the domestic needs of the Republic since its formation, quietly and efficiently, often because it was the only agency available with the expertise and resources to accomplish the mission.

1
Historical Overview.

An early example of domestic use of the military occurred in 1804 with President Jefferson dispatching Captain Meriwether Lewis and Lieutenant William Clark to survey the extent of the recently completed Louisiana Purchase, which had doubled the size of the United States. The expedition paved the way for American expansion westward to the Pacific.

Brigadier General James Wilkinson, governor of the Louisiana Territory, sent Captain Zebulon M. Pike to explore the headwaters of the Mississippi River later the same year. These and other expeditions were the vanguard of American expansion with the Army continually ahead of the settlers; surveying, fortifying and building roads. Captain Benjamin L.E. Bonneville of the 7th U.S. Infantry took a 4-year leave of absence to explore the Pacific coast in the 1830s. In 1842, Lieutenant John C. Fremont of the Corps of Topographic Engineers led an expedition to map the Platte River in support of pioneers moving along the Oregon Trail.

The Corps of Engineers completed construction of the Cumberland Road (the National Road) in 1818 and 7 years later was called upon to conduct repair operations on it. Later in the century, in Alaska, the Army actually administered all affairs within the region except customs, commerce and navigation, which fell under the jurisdiction of the Treasury Department. The Army did this from 1867, when the United States purchased the territory from Russia, to June 1877, when it turned over full control of the territory to the Treasury Department.

Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers has participated in many other essential, but noncombat missions, domestically and throughout the world. It performed various railway surveys, effectively building the nation’s first railroad, and also developed the country’s water resources through building or improving harbors, rivers and flood control. The Corps also supervised the construction of many public buildings in the District of Columbia, including the Washington Monument, the State Department building, the War Department building, the
Navy Department building, and the main building of the Library of Congress. Outside the Continental United States, the Corps administered the construction of the Panama Canal from 1907 to its completion in 1914. In the aftermath of World War II, the Corps constructed or rehabilitated more than 7,500 miles of road in Europe, and 10,000 miles in the Southwest Pacific. It also was instrumental in building the Alcan Highway.4

The Corps of Engineers had responsibility for two of the four great geological surveys mounted before the establishment of the U.S. Geological Survey of the Interior Department in 1879. The King Survey (1867-72), explored the 40th parallel with a decidedly military focus. The Wheeler Survey of the 100th meridian (1871-79), had a more civilian outlook and collected specimens of interest to the fields of botany, zoology and paleontology.

Other Army departments made significant contributions to civilian life as well. Brigadier General Albert J. Meyer of the Army Signal Corps gained international fame as the head of the nation's first modern weather service from 1870 to 1891. The Signal Corps ran the service using both leased and owned telegraph lines to permit reporting of simultaneous observations to Washington, DC. The service became the U.S. Weather Bureau in 1891, upon its transfer to the Department of Agriculture. One of the Signal Corps' descendent agencies, the Army Air Corps, carried the mail for the Post Office during several months in 1934.

Assistant Surgeon General John Shaw Billings revamped the Surgeon General's library, in 1868, into one of the world's great medical research institutions. In a medical triumph, Colonel William C. Gorgas' supervision of sanitation efforts during the building of the Panama Canal demonstrated how to control malaria and effectively wiped out yellow fever.

One of the Army's most visible civilian projects occurred in 1933. With the consent of Congress, President Franklin D. Roosevelt directed establishment of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) to employ jobless young men in reforestation and other reclamation projects. Roosevelt ordered the Army to supervise the effort, and within 7 weeks 310,000 men had been
organized into 1,315 work camps. While the Army successfully executed the mission, its senior leadership objected vigorously to the task. To meet the long-term challenge of supervising the camps, the Army turned to the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) to replace the Regulars. By August 1935, over 9,300 Reserve officers were serving the CCC with most remaining in this service until 1941. An unanticipated benefit of the program was the valuable leadership and organizational experience the reservists gained. Historian Maurice Matloff noted, "It furnished many thousands of Reserve officers with valuable training, and it gave nonmilitary but disciplined training to many hundreds of thousands of young men who were to become soldiers and sailors in World War II."

These examples illustrate that the Army has a tradition in "civilian" affairs that many tend to forget. Only since World War II has the Army been perceived as essentially a combat force, required only to defeat and destroy our enemies in armed conflict. In fact, the Army has a long legacy, both at home and abroad, of peacetime missions.

Nontraditional Missions and Emerging Doctrine.

It is significant to note that there seems to be a developing appreciation of noncombatant missions for the Army. "Peacetime engagement," the term used by the President, recognizes that attention to civil needs in peace can prevent or lessen the chance for future unrest. The import is that peaceful utilization of military forces is as much in defense of our vital interests and values as is their use in armed conflict. The final draft of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, *Airland Operations*, incorporates the same theme as part of the Army’s emerging doctrine for the 1990s, terming it "Nation Assistance." The pamphlet states:

Nation Assistance is a relatively new term that describes the type of support provided to assist nations in promoting their own sustainable development and growth of responsive organizations. The goal of Nation Assistance is long term regional stability—pluralistic governments, sound democratic institutions, viable economies, and processes for orderly change. Nation
Assistance activities seek to address the causes of instability to obviate the need for US military intervention to counter acts of violence. Emphasis is on helping the host nation to be the builders/rebuilders which enhances the host government legitimacy.

Reserve Component Army units have pursued such missions in Central America since the early 1980s. The first such large-scale project of this nature, "Blazing Trails," used rotating National Guard Engineer units in 1982 during their 2 weeks of annual training to build roads and bridges in the Azuero Peninsula in Panama. When one engineer unit would finish its training, another would be rotated in to continue the project. Consequently, not only was an operational mission accomplished, but the engineers received solid training in the process—training directly related to their wartime mission essential task list (METL). Over the years, Army Reserve, National Guard, and Regular Army soldiers have conducted similar exercises worldwide, but primarily in Latin America and the Pacific Basin. Additionally, the Air Force and the Navy have conducted similar missions.

Though current Army doctrine implies that nation assistance will be conducted only in foreign countries, there are no valid reasons why similar activities should not occur domestically as well. We believe it makes sense for Army CS/CSS units to assist in maintaining the U.S. infrastructure. Soldiers would benefit from the training, while Federal, State, and local governments would benefit from improvements in their public services.

The Nation's Crumbling Infrastructure.

*Physical Infrastructure.* Former Commerce Secretary Peter G. Peterson, now the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, stated that a serious education, economic, and urban problem in this country "now threatens America’s long-term national security more than the traditional preoccupations of security and foreign policy such as the menace of Soviet nuclear bombs or conventional attacks on our territory or vital interests."8
A look at any large metropolitan newspaper gives firm evidence of what Peterson is talking about. On any given day one may read about a state or local government struggling with budget deficits which, to correct, will require layoffs of personnel, reduction of services, increasing taxes, or a combination of all the above. And in the same paper, perhaps even on the same page, will be news about infrastructure failures that have created or are creating major problems for the citizenry. The result is that things that must be done are not, are delayed, or are done on a reduced, patchwork basis to fix the immediate crisis. This way of doing business only ensures that the problem will return sooner, rather than later.

Other signs of a decaying infrastructure may be found in our transportation system, which seems to be a mass of deteriorating roads, unsafe bridges, and antiquated mass transit. In 1989, according to one Federal Highway Administration report, there were some 575,000 bridges in the United States, with nearly 23 percent structurally deficient. This means that they are either closed or restricted to light traffic. The national highway system, including the interstate system, is also over-age and overused. The Department of Transportation (DOT) reported in 1991 that some 40 percent of the nation's Federal roads are in only fair to poor condition. The Federal Highway Administration reported in 1989 that 65 percent of interstate highway traffic through urban areas travels at speeds less than 35 miles an hour during peak times. This equates to Americans spending some two billion hours each year tied up in urban traffic, which translates in turn to 35 billion dollars lost in interstate commerce due to traffic delays alone.

Many companies practice a technique known as "just-in-time" inventory management. The idea is to maintain on hand only enough inventory to meet short-term demands thereby reducing waste, handling costs, and storage facilities. Obviously, this depends on an adequate transportation system for timely delivery of supplies. Consequently, transportation delays may quickly have a ripple effect on business, industry and manufacturing.
Other companies report that the decaying road network directly affects their labor and maintenance costs. Overnight shipping companies complain that their delivery trucks are often held back by bumper-to-bumper traffic, forcing them to delay aircraft and the men who load them. Gary Holdsworth, district manager of Airborne Express in Norwalk, Connecticut stated, "Every 10 minutes I'm delayed, I'm paying 36 guys to sit and do nothing."\(^{14}\)

Added to the above, aviation hubs and mass transportation systems are also in need of an overhaul. The United States operates nearly 16,300 public airports, more than the rest of the world combined, yet has not had a major new airport built since 1974, when the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport was constructed.\(^{15}\) Only recently, Denver approved the building of a replacement for its overcrowded Stapleton Airport. Since 1974, however, the number of air passengers has doubled to 479 million a year.\(^{16}\)

In our mass transit systems, lack of rider confidence prompts most people to prefer driving rather than "risking" the bus or train—regardless of the congestion. This despite the fact that, as a result of Federal grants, the number of new transit vehicles is growing twice as fast as ridership.\(^{17}\)

Economist David A. Aschauer has noted all of this, asserting that half of America's productivity problem is due to ignoring the country's weak infrastructure. He states that every dollar spent on repairing bridges and roads will eventually increase the nation's gross national product (GNP) by four dollars.\(^{18}\) Former Transportation Secretary Samuel Skinner agreed, noting that fixing our transportation system "equals competitiveness abroad and growth and productivity at home. Failure to invest in infrastructure equals economic decline."\(^{19}\)

Obviously, physical infrastructure problems are not limited to just the nation's water mains and transportation systems. Waste treatment is another area where there is a real need for assistance. Only a fraction of the country's waste is properly treated.\(^{20}\) Soon we may face the basic problem of where to put it. By 1993, the half of the nation's land fills that collect 95
percent of America’s garbage will fill up and close.\textsuperscript{21}
Environmental implications are frightening.

\textit{Social Infrastructure}. Even though the picture is bleak, it gets worse. While the physical infrastructure problems are serious enough, of at least equal concern is the condition of America’s social infrastructure. Education is an area desperately needing assistance. The landmark Supreme Court case \textit{Brown versus Board of Education} was quite clear when it stated, “It is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”\textsuperscript{22} Recent studies indicate that the opportunity for an education has dropped considerably.

Richard D. Lamm, former Governor of Colorado, outlined some of the harsh facts in an address presented at the U.S. Army War College in June 1991.\textsuperscript{23} He noted, for example, that in comparison to a Japanese eighth grader, an American with a master’s degree in business administration (MBA) actually knew less math. Recent international testing ranked the typical U.S. student last in mathematics skills of all nations tested. The typical Japanese high school graduate normally has as much classroom time as an American college graduate, and an IQ 11 points higher than his U.S. counterpart. In 1985, Japan beat the United States by 20 percentage points in numbers of students graduating from high school. Governor Lamm also pointed out that, at the same time, the United States had the largest number of functional illiterates of any industrialized nation—some 23 million. He stated that 40-50 percent of all urban students were thought to have serious reading problems. Added to the academic challenges is the disturbing fact that the security of the student in many schools is problematical. Several New York City schools have installed metal detectors to control a growing problem with students carrying guns.\textsuperscript{24} The scope of the problem is illustrated by statistics for the current year—56 shootings in and around schools: six resulting in student deaths.\textsuperscript{25} Problems in all facets of our education system are indeed overwhelming.

Last but not least in considering the social infrastructure is the health of U.S. citizens, particularly those near or below the poverty line. As is being highlighted in the current presidential
campaign. Health care in America is a critical issue, especially for the poor. It is also an area where literally an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. For example, some studies estimate that every dollar spent on prenatal care saves between $3 and $20 in doctor bills during an infant's first year of life. Yet the simple truth is that health care costs are so high that even the ounce of prevention is unaffordable for many, particularly those below the poverty line. For most poor, there is no decision about health care; they simply do without. Consequently, many diseases, once thought to have been all but eradicated, are coming back. For example, in 1982, only 1700 cases of measles were reported in the United States, but by 1990 the number had risen to 27,000, primarily in poor urban areas, with 89 resulting in death. A recent Newsweek feature highlighted the alarming return of tuberculosis, primarily in urban areas. One of the causes was the increasing numbers of Americans staying in overcrowded homeless shelters. Infant mortality among black Americans, the group hardest hit by poverty, is double that of whites. The common denominator, however, is being poor, not skin color. Statistics are similar for all groups below the poverty line.

In digesting all of this it might be wise to remember the writings of British historian Arnold Toynbe, who noted that great civilizations are not destroyed; rather they commit suicide. While we don't believe the nation to be on the verge of suicide, we do see a need for domestic reconstruction. Part of that reconstruction effort could utilize Army assets. By doing so, the Army will make itself domestically significant, as it had been prior to World War II, and therefore position itself to compete successfully in the budget process. Numerous peacetime missions can serve dually to reverse the trends described here while also providing an Army trained and ready for combat.

Changing the Army.

The Army will.

Enhance its peacetime value and expand its role as a versatile national resource by engaging in a variety of noncombatant
missions at home and abroad that support U.S. domestic and foreign policy; promote American values; assist friendly nations; and enhance the nation's domestic well-being and National Security.32

The Army will continue to engage in civil-military operations to support civilian authorities in the U.S. and in foreign areas wherever Army forces are deployed. In the U.S. domestic environment, activities will include operations to assist civilian government authorities to fulfill their responsibilities.33

Peacetime domestic missions are appropriate for the Army. Those elements that have the expertise and equipment related to the tasks should be utilized domestically to maintain or rebuild the basic infrastructure of the United States. By so doing, Army support elements will gain and maintain proficiency in their technical skills so that they may better sustain combat forces when deployed and, perhaps even more importantly, they will provide the Army domestic significance in the budget process. Without that perceived significance, the Army stands increasingly at risk from those who would maximize the "peace dividend" to expand social programs. We believe America can have it both ways: We can have a strong Army befitting a superpower, and improve the nation's physical and social structure at the same time.

There is no significant reason why the Army cannot assume this domestic role, continue to conduct peacetime engagement missions throughout the world, and remain a combat ready force. Additionally, since the military as an institution is one of the most trusted organizations in America, we should capitalize on that trust.34

The Army has been engaged for many years in nation assistance activities outside the United States, particularly in Latin America. While it was executing those missions however, the basic physical and social infrastructure in the United States was crumbling at an alarming rate. The physical infrastructure: roadways, bridges, public buildings, etc.; the social infrastructure consisting of the health and education of all Americans; and the environment in which we all reside. The reason for this degradation is that state and local governments are financially ill-prepared to cope with the challenges
presented in repairing what is broken in their jurisdictions and providing all the services expected of them. Like numerous private enterprises, many governmental organizations are near bankruptcy. Utilizing the vast resources of the U.S. Army can make a difference. The Army consists of many units that are exactly the type that are required by state and local governments to fix what is broken, build what needs to be built, and provide basic services the citizens expect. At the very least, Army participation could extend the scope of projects and services that state and local governments provide through their own agencies or civilian contracts. As an example, by utilizing Army assets, a city might be able to repair five miles of roadway instead of just four or embark on a preventive maintenance program for its public buildings instead of repairing only the most obviously damaged. The Army can conduct projects that would not otherwise get done.

Engineering units are located in essentially every state of the union, as are medical, aviation, and transportation elements. Most of those assets are in the Army's Reserve Components, which have strong ties to and interests in the well-being of their communities. At the same time, RC assets are underutilized throughout the year, except perhaps for their 2-weeks annual training. We find little reason for not using the units year round, other than the mindset that to do so would not be preparing for war and warfighting. It is our view that nothing could be further from the truth.

By applying its assets to domestic missions, the Army can not only assure itself of trained and ready support forces, but also ensure that it has significance in the eyes of the American people by "enhancing the nation's well-being." Doing so may seem to be "nontraditional" to many of those in the Army today, but it is really a matter of doing the same missions we have historically done. Additionally, the Army generally and the National Guard specifically have a great deal of experience in domestic support. Active Army units have been involved for many years in counterdrug operations and have been fighting forest fires in the West and Northwest. The National Guard, of course, has the most domestic experience, which the Army
as an institution can capitalize on in the future, if it assumes significant domestic tasks.

For the Army to assume these alternative missions, a number of questions must be addressed:

- **Missions**: What kind of alternative missions?
- **Responsibility**: Should Army components be involved equally, or are some better suited than others?
- **Structure**: Is current Army structure right for the task? If not, who are the billpayers for new units?
- **Stationing**: Will our current geographic dispersion of units facilitate accomplishing these missions?
- **Readiness**: By assuming such peacetime missions, can we assure wartime preparedness?
- **Roadblocks**: What are the roadblocks?

**Missions.** Alternative missions go beyond the current operations of counternarcotics, engineers conducting isolated community projects, disaster relief, and limited health care. We see opportunity not only in continuing those activities, but also in developing an organized program consisting of the following missions:

- Assisting the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Immigration and Naturalization and state and local authorities through increased patrols and surveillance along the Southern border of the United States.
- Assisting state and local governments to maintain their public roadways and buildings.
- Assisting local school districts to maintain their physical structure, to include their playgrounds.
- Providing basic health care to local communities, including:
  - Increasing the staff assistance given to hospital trauma centers—particularly in the larger
metropolitan areas. (This program is already in place, but with only 6-7 personnel at any given time)

- Operating immunization clinics, particularly in the inner cities and remote areas of the United States.\textsuperscript{40}

- Utilizing Army aircraft to provide city, county, or regional Medevac capability.\textsuperscript{41}

- Utilizing Army transportation assets to move Army supplies from military distribution centers to their final destination, as is currently done in Europe.

- Adding Military Police back in the force structure to do all the policing on active military installations;\textsuperscript{42} assist state and local police departments by performing many of the routine administrative duties in local police precincts.\textsuperscript{43} (This would free uniformed police personnel to return to the streets and highways for regular patrol duties.)

- Assigning coordination of Army Disaster Relief responsibilities geographically to Reserve Component Rear Area Operations Centers.

While this is not intended to be an all-inclusive list, it does illustrate the potential for productively utilizing military assets for missions other than war and for better integrating all the components of the Army. A follow-on detailed analysis should be conducted to validate these and other opportunities for noncombatant utilization of the Army. The historical precedents and the current needs are abundant. We should add that, while accomplishing these alternative missions, Army elements would continue to conduct standard training missions and overseas Nation Assistance missions.

\textit{Responsibility}. We believe that restructuring a significant portion of the RC to combat support or service support units would be in keeping with the President's Aspen speech.\textsuperscript{44} The new missions described here would provide a more mission capable Army, utilizing the \textit{demonstrated strengths} of all its components. Cost comparisons clearly illustrate that, in addition to Reserve Components being less costly than Active
Components, support units are also much less expensive to resource and train than similar size combat elements.\textsuperscript{45}

While any of these missions can be conducted by all Army components, the RC can be used most effectively (both for cost purposes and for readiness). We suggest that since RC units are already located in over 5,000 communities across the nation, they are the most logical to be the lead components for conducting alternative peacetime missions. Doing so accomplishes several objectives, all of which are positive:

* Maximizes training and utility of Reserve Components.
* Provides more American youth the opportunity to serve their country in uniform.
* Provides more Americans a direct exposure and contact with their Army.
* Provides Americans with a visible, positive example of their defense dollars at work.
* Provides for "hometown" Army units and personnel to be part of the solution to "hometown" problems.

This will leave the active component time to focus its training for, and maintain a sharp edge on, its combat proficiency. Relying on the RC will also present less of an obstacle to the Army becoming involved in community projects.

The longer peace lasts, the more pressure to reduce the Army or utilize it in different ways: to give it domestic significance. If it wishes to remain viable, the Army will be wise to accept peacetime missions as appropriate. In a recent interview in \textit{National Guard} magazine, one state Adjutant General stated:

\begin{quote}
When I cry about losing my helicopters because we can no longer support the drug program they (the Army) can't hear that because they don't know what the mission is. They haven't been there on the ground doing that mission. I definitely think that as they look for missions to do, they've got to consider that some of these state missions are extremely high priority to the people of America and they must give those missions to the Guard to be able to perform.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}
Structure and Organization.

The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. If we simply pro-rate our reductions—cut equally across the board—we could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely—and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. What we need are not merely reductions—but restructuring.47

As the Army reduces in size, the temptation will be to merely reduce structure proportionately to what we have always had—which is exactly what President Bush said we should not do. Based on the experiences and lessons learned in DESERT STORM, and language in *The Army Plan* and *TRADOC Pam 525-5* about domestic missions, this seems ill-advised, not to mention failing to comply with the President's call for restructuring.

We suggest real restructuring that would convert some of the Army's combat units to build a robust combat support and combat service support structure in the Reserve Components in peacetime, which in turn would allow the Army maximum flexibility in either peace and war. By doing so, the nation could then rely more heavily on the RC for what they have clearly demonstrated they do well—SUPPORT.48

Although the final outcome is in doubt, by the end of FY95, current Army plans call for the National Guard to have combat forces consisting of:

- Five fully manned heavy divisions.
- One fully manned light division.
- Two heavy divisions manned at cadre level.
- Two heavy separate brigades.
- One separate infantry brigade.
- Six roundout/roundup heavy brigades.
- One separate infantry battalion.
The Army Reserve will be reduced to one roundout light infantry brigade. Some believe that, considering the nature of the threat today and the controversy over the National Guard combat brigade mobilization experience during the Gulf War, those combat forces have little likelihood of ever being utilized for their stated purpose: to conduct and win combat operations. If that is so, what is their utility? What is their domestic significance?

Currently, five of ten National Guard combat divisions and two of the three Army Reserve Infantry Brigades are geographically dispersed in the old population centers (i.e., the Northeast quadrant of the United States) that also have some of the most severe infrastructure problems. Stationing large mechanized or armored formations in states such as New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Massachusetts, where limited training facilities are located, is not prudent. The units would be difficult to keep trained, even if they were all Active Component. While an obvious solution would be to restation them to different geographical areas, that may not be the answer either. Increased environmental awareness by all Americans, added to a lack of a clearly defined threat, makes any increase in training area acquisition or training activity on existing facilities increasingly problematical. Geographic dispersion is really not the problem; type of structure is.

Additionally, while serious attempts were made during the late 1980s to reduce the number of units in Compo 4 (structure required but not resourced), that list has recently grown to now total more than 1,100 units/teams and about 82,000 soldier positions. Clearly, there already is a recognized requirement for additional CS/CSS units in the Army.

Finally, a factor that seems to have been forgotten, but one of considerable importance, is the requirement to retain an ability to reconstitute or build new structure quickly in the event of any future, protracted conflict. The most difficult task, militarily, for doing that will not be building the combat force, but putting together the support structure that must accompany it.
To justify its force structure, the Army uses an accounting tool called a division force equivalent (DFE). This accounts for not only the division, but also all the additional assets required to provide warfighting and sustaining capabilities for the division within a theater of operations. The FY 92-97 Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) used a figure of 40,000 for its DFE. Otherwise, the supporting elements for each Army division require more soldiers than the division itself. These soldiers and the units they belong to provide artillery, chemical, engineer, transportation, military police, signal, public affairs, medical and other such support and services beyond what the division is capable of providing itself. Many of these units possess the capacity to utilize their skills for the peacetime domestic missions we propose. In addition to allowing the Army to conduct domestically significant missions while the nation enjoys general peace, resourcing at least a portion of that structure now, without the division, would enhance the expansion capability of the Army tremendously.

With the additional support structure we recommend, the Reserve Components should also be tasked to provide much of the full-time daily support, at echelon above division (EAD), to Active Component elements based in the United States. This is not a new idea but a recommendation to expand the program currently being conducted in Europe, in which RC units are providing assistance to the 21st Theater Support Command in eliminating its maintenance backlog. To implement our proposal, we would suggest development of a command and control structure similar to that in Figure 1.

That structure would be applied on a regional basis similar to that in Figure 2. The geographic boundaries are comparable to those of the Continental U.S. Army Commands (CONUSA) and ten Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions.

Appropriate subordinate elements would be added to perform the most likely support missions for the given state or region. It is important to understand that all of the support structure mentioned is in addition to that already resourced, primarily in the Army Reserve.
Figure 1. Proposed Peacetime Mission Command and Control Structure.

By truly restructuring, the Army will not only be in a position to provide needed relief for state and local governments in maintaining their infrastructure and providing essential

Figure 2. Regional Corps Support.
services to their citizens, but will also shorten, by a substantial margin, the time required to organize, train and support new combat structure.

Stationing. Restructuring to support missions along the regional lines shown in Figure 2 would require some restationing to ensure that within each state/region of the United States were located the number and type of units deemed necessary to accomplish domestic support missions most applicable to that area. Some states/regions would require several units of the same type, whereas another region might require a totally different force structure. However, with RC units already in most communities of any size across the nation, restationing would be minimal.

The RC existing network of Maintenance and Training Equipment Sites (MATES) throughout the nation could easily facilitate implementing the full-time support mission for the Army. If most RC combat elements currently supported by these MATES were converted to CS/CSS, the sites would not only have the capacity to assume much of that full-time support mission for the Active Component, but there would also be the available manpower pool to conduct the work. Simplifying this more is the fact that MATES facilities are already located on many active installations.

Readiness. For most CS/CSS branches, peacetime missions would provide training in those technical tasks essential to accomplish their wartime missions. The only thing missing would be training in basic soldier survival skills. We submit however, that mastery and maintenance of technical skills is more difficult than the other. We do not propose any soldier be tasked to work outside his/her military occupational specialty (MOS) when conducting peacetime missions. Thus, Infantry soldiers or Armor crewmen would not be required to do engineer duty, military police duty, or any other noncombat related training. All training would be related to the individual military skill requirements. An added benefit to this proposal is that command and control elements of these organizations will also become thoroughly experienced in carrying out their military responsibilities. The staff coordination required for Army units to conduct peacetime missions is essentially the
same as that required for providing CS/CSS in a combat theater:

- Coordinate with civil authorities.
- Allocate resources.
- Prioritize requirements (work scheduling).
- Contract for necessary materials.
- Coordinate Rear Area Security.

Peacetime missions need not distract from training as some Department of the Army staff officials interviewed believe it would. On the contrary, for the forces employed, it would enhance training. The fact that RC units are already located in communities throughout the nation that would benefit the most from domestic missions only makes this idea more credible.

In return for this increased reliance on the Reserve Components to conduct such missions, the Army will get a better trained RC soldier, and will also save significant dollars by reducing the family support structure required for the Active Component soldier (housing, child care centers, etc.). Additionally, to reiterate previous assertions, by having a robust support structure in place and trained, the Army will also retain a capacity to expand quickly, should the need arise.

Roadblocks. What are the roadblocks to the Army assuming such missions? Essentially not much more than cold war mindsets. Those positing that all the Army must always be training to conduct combat operations must change their thinking if we are to be prepared for the 21st century. Combat maneuver forces must be trained for war, but the majority of support forces can conduct peaceful, noncombatant missions while also developing and maintaining skills required for combat operations. To get beyond cold war mindsets, legislative and regulatory change should be sought for the following:

- 18 U.S.C., Section 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act).
  Change or clarify regarding use of U.S. military
(Active. Army Reserve, National Guard) to assist civilian law enforcement agencies administratively.

- AR 500-4 (Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic [MAST]). Change section on policies to allow MAST program to replace a civil operation, if mutually agreed upon by local government officials and the Adjutant General of the State or Army Reserve Command.

- Utilize any RC soldier for the purpose of conducting public works projects or extending the civilian scope of those projects if practical.

- Delegate to the Secretary of Defense the authority to utilize military personnel for domestic community projects, if they would not get done otherwise due to lack of funds from the local community, State, or Federal government.

- Allow the use of military doctors in civilian hospitals for the purpose of augmenting the normal staff.

- Allow the use of military medical personnel to provide basic immunization and health care in depressed and/or remote areas of the nation.

- Provide malpractice coverage to all medical personnel performing such duties as indicated above.

- Recognize that what are now considered state missions are indeed Army missions and, therefore, make the soldiers conducting them eligible for Federal pay and benefits.

Another perceived roadblock is one concerning conflict with organized labor and/or local business interests. We found, in general discussions with officials at National AFL-CIO headquarters, a general willingness to work with the Army in such activity. While concerned with the thrust of our idea, they did not "close the door" out of hand. They did express a desire, though, to be an integral part of the planning process. To minimize the potential for conflict we propose that the Army engage only in those situations where the work would not
otherwise be done. We believe that the Army can engage in domestic projects without competing with local business or organized labor. As the example of Washington, DC, illustrates, most municipalities of any size are severely challenged to maintain infrastructure and provide services while staying within their budgets. We offer a way to extend those budgets.

The seriousness of any of these "roadblocks" could be abated if the active support of the component associations (Association of the United States Army [AUSA], National Guard Association of the United States [NAGUS], and the Reserve Officers Association [ROA]) is solicited.

We suggest, as did former Commerce Secretary Peterson, that a crumbling infrastructure of the magnitude we are facing is a threat to the nation's security. Whatever legislative and regulatory change and coordination with civilian industry and institutions are required should be aggressively pursued.

Conclusions.

The Army must do a thorough evaluation of its total structure, determining what roles and missions are best accomplished by each component; also justifying structure based on peacetime mission requirements. It should then restructure accordingly, relying on each component to do what it has demonstrated it can do best, rather than what it may want to do. Generally, this will mean the AC will have most of the combat structure, with the RC providing essentially all support at echelons above division (EAD): and having less combat structure. Additionally, new missions must be aggressively sought which, on the surface, may appear to be nontraditional, but, in reality, are part of the Army's historical experience.

An Army liaison office should be established with appropriate governmental departments (Transportation, Justice, Labor, HEW, HUD, etc.) and with the AFL-CIO to insure that the latter's concerns are taken into account whenever domestic missions are considered with State or local government. The important point for the Army is that it become pro-active in seeking peacetime missions to give domestic
significance to its continued presence, and not “sit by” waiting for what may be unsatisfactory guidance from the civilian leadership and/or the Congress.

Army involvement in the drug war was initially met with the same skepticism as these ideas no doubt will be. Many in the Army have yet to acknowledge that counternarcotics is an appropriate military mission. But, for the Army to move forward, old patterns must be broken. We should not continue established practices just because “that’s the way we have always done it.”

By all accounts, the world has fundamentally changed in the past 2 years, beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall. During that period, and in preparation for the future, the President of the United States has provided the Army an unparalleled opportunity, in fact a directive, to implement needed “fixes” in its structure. If the Army as an institution takes full advantage of the opportunity, it may simultaneously enhance itself as an organization relevant to American society, while at the same time increasing its warfighting preparedness and capability, and its ability to expand rapidly, if need be.

The most important benefit to be realized from our proposals, however, would be expanding visibility for the Army as it assisted in rebuilding America’s infrastructure. Repeating the words of the current Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General John B. Conaway, this positive impact “adds value to America.” It is an appropriate mission for the military, particularly the Army’s Reserve Components.

As we observe ongoing debates about Army structure and end strength, we are reminded of a recent best-selling management training film entitled, “Discovering the Future—The Business of Paradigms.” The theme revolves around “paradigm paralysis,” or the fear of breaking out of old ways of doing things. It is time for the Army to break its paradigm of justifying structure only in terms of supporting in place combat forces (above the line units). Peacetime missions are an idea whose time has come and they should be used to justify the appropriate supporting structure, regardless of the number of combat units that are resourced in the force.
In this study, we have provided alternatives for consideration in breaking established paradigms. While some may prove to be unworkable, our basic thesis stands: If the Army is to be perceived as having domestic significance, it will need alternative missions. The window of opportunity will not remain open indefinitely. In lieu of any clearly defined and accepted threat, increased pressure to reduce the size of the Armed Forces will continue, with increasing probability of success. America has a national security crisis at home in its continuing infrastructure decay. The Army can be a major player in correcting that situation, or it can become a sideline player, of smaller and smaller proportion. The choice is ours.

ENDNOTES


2. Maurice Matloff, ed. American Military History. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1985, p. 119. Most of the historical material, unless noted otherwise, in this section comes from Dr. Matloff’s classic work, which in its updated version remains a standard to this day.


5. Matloff, pp. 413-414.


Wide Area Into Lake D.C.:” and Page B-1. “Kelly Considers Cutting Up To 3,500 City Jobs.” The page 1 story reported a break in an “aging” 36-inch water main that had put 20 million gallons of water in the streets in a 4-hour period, disrupting services and work schedules. The Public Works Director for the city was quoted as saying the water main in question was installed in 1912; others were 100 years old; and the city must cope with a “decaying infrastructure” that included those pipes. In the story about cutting the workforce, it was pointed out that, for the first time, some union jobs might be considered for elimination. As programs or services are cut, the article continued, they might be contracted to private industry. The proposed cuts were part of an effort by the mayor to reduce a $223 million budget deficit. We suggest that, particularly for Washington, DC, which is financed by the U.S. Congress, utilization of Army assets would be a better and less costly way to approach at least part of the problem.

10. Nancy J. Perry, “Good News About Infrastructure,” Fortune, April 10, 1989, p. 94. The thrust of Perry’s article was that better financing and management could turn the infrastructure “crisis” into just one more ordinary problem.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid. Federal officials stated in the same article that it would take up to $39 billion over the next 14 years just to maintain the roads in “tolerable” condition.

14. Ibid.

15. Perry, p. 94.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid

18. Black and Friedman, p. 55. For a more detailed look at Professor Aschauer’s analysis see his article “Infrastructure: America’s Third Deficit,” Challenge, March-April 1991. Aschauer argues that the problem with our infrastructure is the lack of public investment. Relative to GNP, the author noted a drop of public investment from 6 percent in 1950-55, to less than 4 percent by 1985.

19. Ibid.

20. Perry, p. 94.
21. Ibid.

22. President George H. W. Bush, from his Address to the Nation on National Education Strategy, April 18, 1991. The Supreme Court ruling was the decision that forbade segregation in public education systems.

23. Governor Richard D. Lamm, "The Rise and Fall of the American Civilization," from his address to the U.S. Army War College on June 3, 1991. All of the data in this paragraph, unless otherwise noted, comes from this presentation.


27. R.A. Zaldívar, "Income Falls, Poverty Ranks Rise," The Patriot, September 27, 1991, p. A1. The journalist noted that the ranks of the uninsured rose from 33.4 million in 1989, to 34.7 million in 1990. The figures are from the U.S. Census Bureau.


31. Lamm, who quoted Toynbee in the same presentation noted above.

32. The Army Plan (S). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1991, p. 4. Setting the Course (U). Additionally, in Appendix G of this document under the heading of "Overarching Principles For Managing the Army," paragraph 3, "New ways of doing business" is one of the points stressed. Continuing on, under "Guidelines for Action," one of the points is that we should seek opportunities to make money for the Army. All of these statements seem to support the President's Aspen speech when he stated that we, the military, must not just scale down but restructure, and become involved in a policy of peacetime engagement.

33. TRADOC Pam 525-5

34. The Gallup Poll Monthly, March 1991, p. 18-22. This poll showed a significantly higher approval rating (85% ) for the military, due primarily to the then just completed OPERATION DESERT STORM. However, looking back through 1985, the lowest it ever rated was 58 percent, which placed
it second to organized religion that year. In all other years during the period it ranked first, with never less than 61 percent of those polled replying they had either a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the military as an institution. In 1990, the year prior to DESERT STORM, it polled 68 percent approval.

35. *The Virginia Guard in Review*. Richmond, VA: Virginia National Guard Association, 1991. p. 27. A good example of what we propose is offered in this annual report. Referring to the 276th Engineer Battalion (Combat), the report states:

The 276th undertook a major logistical and operational mission during Annual Training, 1-15 June 1991, in mobilizing the entire battalion to Southwest Virginia for Nation Building projects in Tazewell and Russell Counties and at Southwest Virginia Community College. For this operation, code named “Virginia for Virginians,” the battalion coordinated for rations and material on the local economy, bivouacked on project sites throughout an 800 square mile area, and completed more than $4 million worth of construction and demolition projects for the region. Many of these projects would otherwise not have been completed due to lack of funding.

36. *Reserve Components Troop Basis of the Army*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1991. For the Reserve Components alone, Engineer units are listed in all states and territories except Nevada, Nebraska, and the District of Columbia. Looking at only Corps Combat and Combat Heavy Battalions, 40 of the 54 states and territories have these units, with some states having as many as five battalions. This would seem to indicate that all states could be represented if some restationing were accomplished.

37. U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee. Hearing on the FY93 Defense Budget. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, in testimony February 1, 1992, displayed the warrior attitude quite clearly when explaining Defense plans for downsizing the military. He stated, “We exist to fight. We are not a social agency. We exist to go in and kick someone’s butt, if necessary.” We would suggest the Chairman is shortsighted in his appraisal. The Army is indeed the ultimate social agency. It not only is responsible for the most basic welfare, security of the citizenry, but has often been at the forefront of social change: integration being a prime example, along with drug education.


Figures in the report show that in 1990, National Guard units were called to support 292 separate missions in 38 states utilizing 23,171 personnel. Soldiers were activated for an average of 9 days. Missions ranged from delivering hay to stranded cattle to delivering water in drought or contaminated water areas to civil disturbance control. Support for counterdrug operations accounted for another 5,155 operations and 532,899 man-days of support.


41. Shaver, p. 29.

42. As was noted during OPERATION JUST CAUSE and again in DESERT STORM, the need for military police to control refugees and tend prisoner of war or detention camps quickly outpaced the number of military police available. Additionally, interviews with Reserve Component military police personnel reflect that one of their most serious shortcomings is training in basic law enforcement activities. Most Reserve Component MPs spend their weekend drills around the armory and their 2-week annual training in a tactical field environment. While important, that is only part of their mission essential task list. Many reservists interviewed indicated that when their platoon deployed to Panama to train at U.S. Army South, it was the first time they had actually trained or performed their basic law enforcement mission.

43. Shaver, pp. 28-29.


45. As an example, the following cost comparisons illustrate the significant cost differences between the selected type units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Unit</th>
<th>Annual Operation Cost*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tank Battalion (M-60)</td>
<td>$25.401M/$5.013M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank Battalion (M-1)</td>
<td>$30.433M/$5.842M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank Battalion (M1A1)</td>
<td>$29.749M/$4.868M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalion (Mech)</td>
<td>$32.432M/$6.028M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalion (Mech w/BFVS)</td>
<td>$35.658M/$6.753M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Battalion, Corps Combat</td>
<td>$29.484M/$5.353M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Combat Support Company</td>
<td>$6.375M/$1.093M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Lt/Mdm Truck Company</td>
<td>$4.884M/$0.926M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Army Surgical Hospital</td>
<td>$11.227M/$1.803M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Company, Non-Divisional DS</td>
<td>$7.830M/$1.230M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Support Group</td>
<td>$4.311M/$1.319M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Active/Reserve Component - Operations only - Does not include personnel or facilities costs.
All examples are for Active Component and National Guard units resourced at ALO 1. The annual costs range from 16 to 31 percent of what a like Active Component unit would cost to maintain. *The Army Force Accounting.* Falls Church, VA: U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center. September 1991.

46. "The National Guard Is Still the Heart of America: Generals Discuss the Social Impact of the National Guard." *National Guard.* April 1992, p. 28-34.


48. We understand that the Army Reserve already has the bulk of the Combat Service Support mission for the Army. However, what we propose is a structure consisting of more CSS than the existing combat forces would justify. By so doing, the RC could assume more of the daily peacetime support mission for Active Army units (echelon above division), continue the many Overseas Deployment Training missions already being conducted with those type units, and provide the basis for expansion of the Army, if required for some future contingency.


50. A recent case where the Army wanted to buy or lease an additional 100,000 acres adjoining Ft. Riley, Kansas provides a good example. Local farmers and ranchers quickly united to defeat the attempt. As a consequence, the Army's 1st Infantry Division is now equipped with Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles and does not have adequate maneuver room for them to exercise in large unit training (brigade level and higher). Another example can be found with the Pennsylvania National Guard and its attempt to build a tank training table at Ft. Indiantown Gap to facilitate the 28th Infantry Division conversion to an Armored Division. Immediately, the Harrisburg, PA. *Patriot,* daily newspaper published a front page story reporting complaints from the local citizens about how such a range would upset them. In lieu of an easily identified threat warranting such combat maneuvers, average civilians do not see the need for them, certainly not if they take place in their "backyard."

51. U.S. Army Information Systems Command, *SAMAS PAAAL Report (S).* Washington, DC. December 10, 1991. While specific details of the Compo 4 listing cannot be reviewed in this unclassified report, it is safe to say that the overwhelming majority of units listed are Combat Service Support Many (about two-thirds by our count) are of the type that could be best utilized for domestic assistance projects.

52. This was identified 19 years ago by then Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams in a speech on October 4, 1973, to the Armor Officer Advanced
Course at Ft. Knox, KY. In part, he stated: "...adequate support is a necessary part of combat power, and that support is harder to mobilize in crisis than combat strength."


54. For a complete picture of this program, see Colonel (Ret) Gus A Leon. "Fix-It For Less Dollars." *National Guard*, September 1991, pp. 32-34.

55. For the sake of illustration and simplicity, we used the old CONUSA boundaries, but combined what was 4th and 5th Armies into one CONUSA and also combined what was 1st and 2d Armies into a single CONUSA. The result is similar to what the CONUSAs looked like before the five were formed in the early 1980s.
