THE INDO-PAKISTANI NUCLEAR ISSUE: A U.S POLICY PERSPECTIVE

by

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June 1992

Thesis Advisor: David B. Winterford

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This thesis examines U.S. nonproliferation policy and the problem of nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan. Its central hypothesis is that the end of the Cold War has created an opportunity to advance U.S. nonproliferation interests and work with both India and Pakistan to reduce the threat of a nuclear confrontation on the Indian Subcontinent. The thesis assesses both the motives for and the current status of the nuclear weapons programs in India and Pakistan. It also presents some plausible scenarios concerning future courses those programs could take. Finally, it presents a set of policy recommendations directed toward reducing Indo-Pakistani nuclear tensions and laying the foundations to make a future South Asian nuclear nonproliferation regime possible. Ultimately, this approach would create safer, more stable security arrangements for India and Pakistan and further reduce the threat from nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world.
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The Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Issue:
A U.S. Policy Perspective

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1992

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines U.S. nonproliferation policy and the problem of nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan. Its central hypothesis is that the end of the Cold War has created an opportunity to advance U.S. nonproliferation interests and work with both India and Pakistan to reduce the threat of a nuclear confrontation on the Indian Subcontinent. The thesis assesses both the motives for and the current status of the nuclear weapons programs in India and Pakistan. It also presents some plausible scenarios concerning future courses those programs could take. Finally, it presents a set of policy recommendations directed toward reducing Indo-Pakistani nuclear tensions and laying the foundation to make a future South Asian nuclear nonproliferation regime possible. Ultimately, this approach would create safer, more stable security arrangements for India and Pakistan and further reduce the threat from nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world.
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I. U.S. INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA

American domestic political and economic difficulties as well as the end of the Cold War have spawned demands for a "Peace Dividend" and a shift in emphasis from foreign policy issues to greater attention to problems at home. However, it seems highly unlikely that the United States would become totally disengaged from foreign policy. In fact, instantaneous communications, rapid world travel, an increasingly interdependent world economy, and new immigration patterns will facilitate and even demand that the U.S. maintain an active foreign policy effort.

The challenge comes in identifying the important national interests, and developing a foreign policy strategy that represents those interests in relations with other nations and regions of the world. This chapter establishes the significant U.S. interests in the context of relations with South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan. The discussion of interests and priorities lays the foundation and establishes the framework for the development of a revised U.S.-South Asian policy.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For over 40 years U.S. government officials under nine different presidential administrations have struggled to
determine how much consideration South Asia should be given in American policy-making decisions. In 1989 Paul Kreisberg assessed the situation, "The essential problem throughout this period has been that the region was never, in itself, of serious concern to American policy-makers other than in the context of East-West relations." Considered by itself, South Asia lies largely out of the view of American citizens and their leaders.

However, the South Asian region lies at a strategic crossroads. The Indian Subcontinent has common borders on the north with China and the former Soviet Union and in the west with Iran and the Middle East. It also extends to the south to sit astride the vital sea lanes through the Indian Ocean. As a result, presidents from Harry Truman to George Bush have struggled to come to terms with South Asian issues and place them in the proper context with U.S. interests.

"The central dilemma of U.S. policy in South Asia since 1947 has been to deal with the competing claims of the two central states of this region, India and Pakistan." On one hand, India is the home of one-fifth of the world's population (approximately 860 million people) and the largest democratic country in the world. Its natural resources, growing middle class and sound industrial and technological base make it a potentially appealing ally. But its strong desire to avoid "entangling alliances", and maintain its ability to act
independently have been an impediment to closer U.S.-Indian relations.⁵

U.S. relations with India have been constrained by the effects of divergent strategic interests and fundamentally different perceptions of communism. "Given differing Indian and American strategic perceptions, it was inevitable that India would turn elsewhere."⁶

Pakistan, on the other hand, demonstrated early on that it was willing and eager to become a member of the U.S.-led anti-communist coalition in exchange for military and economic assistance.

Pakistani leaders --- from Jinnah to Zia --- have sought help from the USA, which has 'used' Pakistan for purposes related to its own global objectives and concerns. In consequence Pakistan has joined numerous American sponsored defence pacts and agreements and become the recipient of large doses of economic and military aid.⁷

This combination of Pakistani availability and Indian intransigence established the conditions under which U.S. containment strategy operated in the South Asian Environment during the Cold War.

The Cold War has ended and altered the significance of the South Asian crossroad in American interests. It is essential that the U.S. reassess its interests in the region and shape its foreign policy to support those interests. Some scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington have already suggested that American involvement in many Third World situations will disappear. Without the Cold War it is hard to see how much interest the United States will have in ... whether
India or Pakistan controls Kashmir. South Asia is simply not an American strategic priority.\textsuperscript{8} This view assumes that the United States' only interests in the Third World and South Asia are (or were) related to the Cold War. This is simply not true. It is true that "containment strategy and interlinking security alliances ... guided American thinking toward South Asia."\textsuperscript{9} However, other interests have always existed and periodically gathered enough momentum to command attention.

B. CURRENT INTERESTS

The Bush Administration has identified 21 national security interests and objectives for the 1990s.\textsuperscript{10} Included in this list are three that have a special significance with regard to South Asia.

1. Improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable nuclear arms control agreements.
2. Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.
3. Promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes.

These interests are directly applicable in the South Asian context. India and Pakistan have the only advanced nuclear programs in the region. They possess the two most powerful armed forces and are the primary regional rivals. The \textit{National Security Strategy of the United States} addresses only
one paragraph to specific U.S. concerns in South Asia.

However, the concerns are compelling:

In South Asia, as elsewhere, we strongly believe that security is best served by resolving disputes through negotiations rather than military pressure. The dangers of intermediate-range missile deployments and nuclear proliferation in the sub-continent persist, however, and this year we were unable to certify Pakistan's nuclear program under the Pressler Amendment. We will continue to encourage Indo-Pakistani rapprochement and the adoption of confidence-building measures and other concrete steps to moderate their military competition.11

The number of direct U.S. interests in South Asia may be minimal when compared to Europe or the Middle East. However, they are of such importance that they can be ignored only at great peril.12

1. Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation

First of all, for the sake of clarity, definitions of the terms nonproliferation and arms control should be established. There are two types of nuclear nonproliferation. The first, horizontal nonproliferation, refers to efforts to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons and technology by countries which have not previously possessed them.

Examples of horizontal nonproliferation efforts are:

The provisions of Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 13 which prohibit the transfer to or manufacture of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices by the Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) and The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.14
The second type, vertical nonproliferation, directly affects nuclear weapons states (NWS). It limits the increase in quantity, quality or sophistication of nuclear weapons arsenals and technology by states which already possess them. Examples of this type include The Strategic Arms Limitations Treaties (SALT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiated between the United States and Soviet Union and Article VI of the NPT. 

Arms control is directed toward vertical nonproliferation. Arms control is the reduction, control or limitation of existing nuclear weapons capabilities. Throughout the remainder of this paper nonproliferation will refer to specifically to horizontal nonproliferation and arms control will be associated with vertical nonproliferation.

It is irrelevant to consider the South Asian nuclear issue solely in terms of either arms control or nonproliferation measures because both India and Pakistan have advanced their nuclear weapons programs to such a point that they are now weapons-capable states. Both countries are categorized as "de facto nuclear states", even though they both maintain officially that they do not possess or intend to build nuclear weapons. 

In this context it is appropriate to try to prevent further escalation and expansion of these capabilities through arms control measures. However, it is also important to realize that neither state has declared itself to be an NWS.
India tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974. However, since that time, it has not conducted any further tests. Pakistan has never conducted an actual test of an explosive device. But on February 7, 1992 it publicly issued its "first formal acknowledgement that it has the capacity to make an atomic bomb." Both countries continue to maintain that in spite of their capabilities they have refrained from actually constructing nuclear weapons.

Even though India and Pakistan have expressed reservations concerning nonproliferation regimes, this situation presents a possibility that some nonproliferation measures could be effective.

The combination of existing nuclear capabilities, regional animosity and ambiguity presents a complicated situation. The South Asian nuclear issue does not fall exclusively within the ambit of either nonproliferation or arms control scenarios. Flexibility, compromise and creative thinking which combine aspects of both approaches may lead to solutions which can satisfy U.S. interests.

2. Stable Military Balance

The U.S. must consider the military balance in South Asia because of its relationship to the nuclear weapons issue. Both India and Pakistan see their nuclear weapons programs as the force multiplier and equalizing factor in the regional strategic military balance.
The decision to advance India's nuclear weapons program was made in the aftermath of its humiliating defeat by China in 1962 and China's detonation of a nuclear device in 1964.\(^\text{19}\) Former Chief of the Indian Army Staff, General K. Sundarji has written,

China exploded its first nuclear device in 1964. India, which already had a peaceful nuclear programme underway, decided to master the technology of nuclear explosions.\(^\text{20}\)

India has continued to emphasize the Chinese threat as its primary concern. Government officials justify India's refusal to sign the NPT and reluctance to engage in South Asian nuclear arms talks by pointing out that these efforts do not take into consideration the Chinese threat.\(^\text{21}\)

India's accelerated efforts triggered a response in kind from Pakistan. From 1971 to 1974 India and Pakistan had maintained an uneasy peace along their border. Three wars in 1948, 1965, and 1971 had ended in military defeats for Pakistan, but with mixed political results.\(^\text{22}\) However, upon learning that India had conducted a nuclear test, Pakistan's prime minister, Z.A. Bhutto reportedly said "that Pakistan would develop a weapon of its own even if Pakistanis had to 'eat grass' to meet the cost."\(^\text{23}\) In his memoirs Bhutto also wrote,

The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have this capability [nuclear weapons]. The communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that was about to change.\(^\text{24}\)
Pakistan cannot afford to compete with India in a conventional arms race. Pakistan already spends an estimated 6.9 percent of its GNP to maintain its armed forces at 484 thousand, while India’s 1.3 million man armed forces consume only 3.5 percent GNP. It sees nuclear weapons development as a cost effective way to deter India and maintain a balance of power in the region. Pakistan’s Minister for Defense Production stated recently that, "Our aim is to create and develop a military capability which is visible and correctly perceived by our enemies so that they dare not consider aggression against us.""26

Thomas W. Graham points out that it is extremely expensive to develop and deploy a nuclear arsenal as part of a country’s strategic forces. However, it may not be necessary to actually deploy weapons to achieve a deterrent effect. This has been the rationale behind Pakistan’s ambiguous "bomb in the basement" strategy.28

The nuclear issue is, therefore, inextricably linked to the issue of the strategic military balance in South Asia. U.S. policy makers must consider efforts to help stabilize the military balance as a vital element of any nuclear arms control policy in the region.

3. Regional Diplomacy

In spite of the relative peace which has existed between India and Pakistan for the last 20 years, tensions
remain high. The Kashmir issue remains unsolved. Ethnic violence and tensions in Pakistan's Sind Province and the Indian Punjab are exacerbated by charges of cross-border support for insurgents.

There is growing concern in the United States and throughout the world that any one of these ongoing disputes could erupt into a full-scale war and escalate quickly to include the use of nuclear weapons. In June 1990 and again in November 1991 the Bush Administration dispatched high-level officials to India and Pakistan to dissuade both sides from going to war over Kashmir. Both trips were prompted by U.S. fears that nuclear weapons might be used.

The U.S. interest in peaceful conflict resolution is more than just an altruistic goal. Diplomacy as a replacement for armed conflict represents a stabilizing solution rather than one which has a potential to destabilize both regional and domestic balances of power. A number of high-ranking Indian and Pakistani military officials have expressed the opinion that had it not been for vigorous U.S. intervention efforts in 1990, there would almost certainly have been a war.

Another war between India and Pakistan would give the military in both countries an even greater level of influence. This is especially dangerous in Pakistan, which has a historical experience with military coups to replace civilian-led constitutional governments.
In India, the Army has become a more reluctant participant in operations against Indian citizens. In February 1992, "a group of retired army officers suggested that the post of a Chief of Defence Staff be created to thoroughly weigh the consequences of the involvement of our armed forces." The group cited limiting Army involvement in internal conflicts, avoidance of war with Pakistan, resolution of the Punjab dispute, and support for government economic reforms as their agenda. This attempt to gain greater influence in the decision-making process may indicate a growing disillusionment among defence officials.

Another war on the subcontinent could further weaken support for the civilian governments and jeopardize the democratic systems currently in place. The financial burden of war on weak economic systems coupled with increased ethnic violence could strain the crisis management abilities of the coalition governments currently in power. Military organizations might be persuaded to step in to attempt to restore order. The interests of the United States would suffer if the region becomes less democratic and more unstable. American efforts to promote diplomatic solutions will support the stability of democratic regimes.

C. PRIORITIES

In the past U.S. policy makers had to balance the relative importance of all other interests in South Asia against the
Cold War containment priority. Beginning with the Carter Administration in 1977, the nuclear issue achieved a greater prominence, but still remained subordinate to the containment imperative. Now that the Cold War has ended the priorities have been reassessed.

1. Arms Control and Nonproliferation

By most standards of evaluation the nuclear issue is now the primary U.S. concern in South Asia. In global, regional and bilateral terms nuclear arms control and nuclear nonproliferation have become the most important U.S. security interests.

In South Asia, achievement of a complete nonproliferation regime may no longer be a viable U.S. policy option. Based on what is known about the nuclear programs in India and Pakistan, it is clear that nuclear weapons, to some extent, have proliferated. Now that Pakistan has declared its nuclear weapons capability, it appears to have rendered presidential certification under the Pressler Amendment impossible.  

Given India's long-standing commitment to its nuclear program and Pakistan's recent announcement of its capabilities, it is pointless to ignore the fact that the nuclear weapons genie is out of the bottle in South Asia. The logical U.S. course of action in the near term is to pursue a policy of nuclear arms control aimed at freezing the Indian
and Pakistani programs at their current levels. In the long term the U.S. should still hold nonproliferation as its ultimate goal.

2. Complementary Priorities

Priority conflicts during the Cold War created a dilemma for policy makers. Decisions made to act in favor of one interest frequently interfered with the accomplishment of another. The most obvious example is the decision to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan at the expense of nonproliferation interests.

However, the situation has now changed. The interests discussed above are linked and complementary. They do not conflict with or contradict one another. Progress toward achievement of any one of the National Security Strategy goals will contribute either directly or indirectly to the others.

Improved diplomatic relations on a general level or peaceful resolution of any particular regional issue could provide a basis for other successes. For example, improved U.S.-Indian relations could be stimulated by resolution of the intellectual property rights issue. This could, in turn, facilitate expanded joint military exercises in the Indian Ocean.

Closer cooperation between military establishments might help to allay India's concerns about U.S. hegemonic
intentions in South Asia and encourage a slowdown of their efforts to expand the military. This would also send a signal about India’s intentions to Pakistan which might be further encouraged to limit its nuclear program or seek to expand its existing agreement with India, which protects declared nuclear facilities from attack.  

Even though this is a hypothetical chain of events it illustrates the point that U.S. interests in all three areas are linked. Progress in one may pave the way for progress in another.

The United States has significant post-Cold War interests in South Asia. It would be a mistake to allow the U.S. foreign policy toward the region to continue to operate in a zero-sum, Cold War framework. It would be equally inadvisable to allow it to slip into a state of benign neglect because of increased U.S. domestic pressures now that the Cold War is over and communism has lost.

The conflict between incompatible and competing foreign policy interests has been eliminated. U.S. government officials in the Administration and Congress should capitalize on this opportunity and take steps to formulate a foreign policy toward India and Pakistan which will promote those interests.
II. INDO-PAKISTANI NUCLEAR AMBITIONS

As the possessors of some of the Third World’s most advanced nuclear technology and the antagonists in an ongoing rivalry, India and Pakistan pose a major threat of becoming involved in a nuclear conflict. This chapter examines the current status of the nuclear weapons programs in South Asia and examines the motives that have spurred nuclear development. It also presents an analysis of the potential directions these two nations may take in the future.

A. CURRENT SITUATION

1. Calculated Ambiguity

In 1974 India exploded a nuclear device in the desert of Rajasthan, thus demonstrating to the world that it was capable of constructing nuclear weapons. Pakistan also announced that it intended to be second to none in South Asia.40 Beyond this, both countries have been extremely evasive about the details of their programs. Until very recently it has been difficult to determine the exact capability or the intentions of either country. Both countries have declined to become parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or submit all their facilities to IAEA inspections and safeguards.
Most of the open source literature dealing with their capabilities is based largely upon ambiguous statements by government officials and assumptions drawn from circumstantial evidence.

This situation is referred to as calculated ambiguity or nuclear ambiguity. In spite of evidence that would indicate otherwise, both India and Pakistan have, until recently, continued to insist that their nuclear programs are peaceful in nature. They have practiced this policy of ambiguity in order to extract the most utility from the benefits of their nuclear weapons programs. At the same time, they have maintained the shield of ambiguity to minimize some of the economic and political costs.

It is important, however to be aware of the nuclear weapons capabilities that may exist.

2. Capabilities

a. India

The program in India is fairly well developed, having begun in the late 1940s. Prime Minister Jawarhalal Nehru was firmly committed to nonviolence and international disarmament. He was enthusiastic about nuclear energy, but opposed to nuclear weapons. As Minister for Atomic Energy, he kept the nuclear program and the Atomic Energy Commission under his close personal supervision. However, after his death in 1964, and in the aftermath of India's military defeat
by China, there was public debate about the possibility (and
desirability) of development of a bomb.\textsuperscript{44}

India's defeat by China in 1962 exposed the glaring
weaknesses of India's military and raised great doubts about
its ability to defend itself. However, even more important
than that was China's detonation of a nuclear device in 1964.
China's test at Lop Nor was the catalyst which propelled
Nehru's successor, Prime Minister Lal Badhur Shastri to
authorize an accelerated research program beginning in 1964
and preparations to conduct a test.\textsuperscript{45}

India has always maintained that its 1974 test was
a peaceful nuclear explosion [hereafter, PNE].\textsuperscript{46} This seems,
at first glance, to be a contradiction in terms. However, at
the time there was significant ongoing debate in many nations
concerning peaceful uses and benefits to be gained from
nuclear research and test explosions. The Atoms for Peace
program was initiated to provide assistance to nations who
wanted to develop nuclear programs for peaceful means.\textsuperscript{47}
Since that time the concept of PNEs has been discredited and
the Atoms for Peace program has been abandoned.

The Indians have proceeded slowly with their
program. In spite of fears that the PNE would lead to a rapid
build-up of nuclear weapons in South Asia, this has not yet
occurred. Political leaders have steadfastly maintained that
the government has chosen not to build any weapons and that
their program remains peaceful. They have also stated that
this is a unilateral decision and that should the situation change, the Government of India alone has the authority to determine the course of its nuclear program.

One of the most important factors which limits any nation's ability to produce nuclear weapons is its access to nuclear fuels and related products. India has put considerable emphasis on the acquisition and production of fissile materials. It has accumulated significant stockpiles (both safeguarded under IAEA and unsafeguarded) of uranium and plutonium. It has the capability to reprocess several hundred kilograms of plutonium annually — more than enough to satisfy its fuel requirements.48

However, heavy water, an essential component of any nuclear weapons program, poses a more serious problem. India still relies largely on imports from Canada and Russia, under IAEA safeguards. In his essay in Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, Akhtar Ali speculated that India may have been able to import additional quantities of heavy water either illegally from Norway, which has a large production capability, or secretly from China, which is not an NPT signatory. 4

In February 1992, the Norwegian government announced that it had discovered documentary evidence that India had purchased two unauthorized shipments of Norwegian heavy water through third parties. The first, in 1983, was
diverted through a German company. The second was provided by Romania in 1986.\textsuperscript{50}

India also possesses sufficient delivery systems to reach any part of South Asia with nuclear weapons. Its MiG-23, Jaguar and Mirage-2000 aircraft have ranges extending up to 920 miles.\textsuperscript{51} This is more than adequate to strike any conceivable target in Pakistan. Reports from New Delhi also indicate that the Indian Air Force may be in line to purchase U.S. F-16C and D model aircraft as replacements for its aging MiG-21 fleet.\textsuperscript{52} In addition, India recently tested its own indigenously produced intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM).\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{b. Pakistan}

In comparison to India, Pakistan's nuclear program is relatively new. Pakistan's program began in the mid-50s with the establishment of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and with the assistance of the Atoms for Peace Program.\textsuperscript{54} During this early period Pakistani politicians and the military had very little interest in a nuclear weapons program. In 1954, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Zafrullah Khan, captured the essence of Pakistan's interest in nuclear weapons when he stated that "his country did not have a policy on the atom bomb."\textsuperscript{55}

There was not even much concern with India's nuclear activity and the potential military threat.\textsuperscript{56} The
only exception to this was within the Pakistan scientific community. Researchers in the PAEC were somewhat motivated by the spirit of nationalistic rivalry with India and wanted to demonstrate that they were capable of the same accomplishments as their Indian counterparts.⁵⁷

Several events in the 1970s provided the impetus for Pakistan's program. The first was Pakistan's defeat by India in the 1971 war which resulted in the further partition of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. Pakistanis extracted three bitter lessons from that defeat. They concluded that:

1. India was intent on either destroying Pakistan or forcing it to rejoin India.

2. Pakistan could never match India's conventional military superiority.⁵⁸

3. Pakistan could not rely on its closest allies, the United States and China, to intervene militarily on its behalf in any future conflict.⁵⁹

The second event was the election of Z.A. Bhutto in the 1972 election which ended the martial law regime. As Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1968-1970, and then as Prime Minister, Bhutto was the most vocal advocate of a nuclear Pakistan. He stated that the people of Pakistan would do whatever it took, even eat grass, in order to develop a bomb.⁶⁰

Using public anti-military sentiments, fear of the Indian threat, and his own populist movement, Bhutto made
nuclear development a national issue. He was able to elevate it to a much higher national priority than it had ever held in the past.

The next event was India's nuclear explosion in 1974. This was seen as a clear signal that India intended to develop a bomb that could be used to destroy Pakistan or bully her into submission. Tensions were still high in the aftermath of the 1971 Indo-Pak war. Pakistani leaders were still smarting from the bitter defeat and the loss of Bangladesh (East Pakistan).

The final significant event was the selection of Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan to head the PAEC. Dr. Khan is commonly referred to as "The Father of the Islamic Bomb". He served as a scientist and researcher in a number of European nations until he returned to Pakistan in 1974. He is widely suspected of having "stolen" much of the technology that has made Pakistan's weapons objective an achievable goal. "Dr. Khan has been accused of having stolen the secrets of the centrifuge uranium enrichment process during his association with the URENCO's uranium enrichment plant at Almelo in Holland."61 In addition, he is also recognized as an expert in the field of high strength metals and alloys which are also essential to nuclear weapons production. 62

A.Q. Khan provided the expertise and leadership which enabled Pakistan's program to be transformed from the
implausible dream of a underdeveloped nation to that of a realistic, obtainable reality.

Throughout the 80s and early 90s Pakistan practiced a policy of deterrence through ambiguity. It has also been Pakistan’s policy to proclaim that, like India’s, its program was peaceful, not oriented toward weapons development. On the other hand, government officials often promoted claims that the capability existed if needed. In a 1987 Time magazine interview President Zia ul-Haq stated that, "You can write today that Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it wishes." However, he also stated that "Pakistan is not indulging in a nuclear experiment for military purposes."

In August and September 1991 former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto made a number of public statements critical of Pakistan’s nuclear program. She also stated that "Pakistan has the information and the capability to build a nuclear bomb." A number of government officials voiced concern that Mrs. Bhutto’s comments constituted a breach of security based on her access to classified information and some officials called for criminal charges to be filed.

Admittedly, some of this concern may have been politically motivated in order to discredit her. However, her statements indicate two important points. First, that the official government policy is still to practice designed ambiguity. Second, that there may be a significant faction among the political elite that is prepared to challenge that
policy. The possible options for this group would be to move toward nonproliferation or openly declare Pakistan to be a nuclear weapons state.

On February 7, 1992 the Pakistani Government officially acknowledged that it does possess "the capacity for making an atomic bomb." In a surprise announcement having "essentially the same significance as India’s detonation of a nuclear explosive device in 1974." This puts Pakistan one step closer to becoming a declared nuclear weapon state. It also changes the nature of Pakistan’s nuclear ambiguity. There is no longer any question about the nature of Pakistan’s nuclear program. The only ambiguity that remains is "How far has Pakistan’s weapons program progressed?"

Pakistan’s bomb is probably the enriched uranium type, since they have had this technology operational since 1984. However, Pakistan has also experimented with plutonium reprocessing. How successful this experiment has been is still open to question. Two reprocessing facilities have been built, with a third under construction. Operating at peak capability, Leonard Spector estimates that these facilities may be able to produce up to 200 kilograms of plutonium per year. However, it is doubtful that they have been able to achieve full production.

Delivery systems capability is of great concern to Pakistan. It currently possesses 39 U.S.-manufactured F-16s and was scheduled to purchase 60 more before aid was suspended
by the U.S. government in October 1990. Its fleet of 58 Mirage-Vs is also capable of carrying a nuclear payload. However, their range of 450 miles puts a great many of the desired Indian targets well outside Pakistan's strike capability.

Pakistan has initiated a missile test program, possibly with the technical assistance of China. In June 1991 a number of reports surfaced that China had agreed to sell M-11 missiles to Pakistan. If this is true, it would give Pakistan a tested, reliable delivery system. Pakistan's emphasis on self-sufficiency in defense production may motivate it to attempt to reverse engineer this missile system. This could lead to ability to produce an indigenous delivery system without having to conduct extensive (and expensive) research and development testing.

Unlike India, most of Pakistan's nuclear development is limited by its access to foreign suppliers. The London Suppliers Agreement of 1976 places strict controls and limits on the transfer and sale of nuclear technology and related products. Pakistan has access to safeguarded resources under this agreement but technology which has a dual use or strictly military use is not available from these sources, except under IAEA safeguards.

Again, China is not bound by this agreement and is Pakistan's most likely source for items not available elsewhere. If China fulfills its promise to sign the NPT and
adhere to the constraints of the Missile Technology Control Regime, the adverse affects on Pakistan's program could be significant. However, there is some concern that China's defense industries may be able to operate autonomously in spite of decisions made by other government agencies.76

At the present time Pakistan's weak industrial base and limited capability for expansion are its greatest limiting factors. However, Pakistan has proven to be remarkably adept at overcoming its infrastructural shortcomings and making its purchases in the international gray market.77 As long as their program is not self-sufficient they will have to work within the constraints imposed by their outside sources.

B. MOTIVATION

The key to deciphering the Indo-Pakistani nuclear situation is understanding the factors that motivate the two countries' desire to acquire nuclear weapons technology. Nuclear proliferation is a process, not an event. The most important factor in understanding the nuclear weapons situation is an awareness of the events, situations and conditions which motivate India and Pakistan to participate in the nuclearization process.

1. Analytical Approaches

Much of the current literature dealing with nuclear weapons proliferation in South Asia attempts to categorize the motivations for India and Pakistan (and Third World countries,
in general) in one of two ways. The first method is based on defining motivating factors in terms of either political or military/security issues. Those who use this approach to explain weapons proliferation generally argue that "Nonproliferation specialists have not fully comprehended the dynamics of regional proliferation and the perceived value of nuclear weapons in world politics." They argue that political factors are the most important and influential in the nuclear decision-making process. Even discussions of military and security aspects of nuclear weapons include consideration of political factors.

One problem with this method for establishing categories is that it does not consider the linkage between political and military factors. Chellaney states that "the importance of nuclear weapons in the world today, however, is tied intrinsically to their political value." The security value of nuclear weapons is considered to be politically significant but not useful in a military context.

The second approach to defining and categorizing South Asian motives is geographically oriented. Proponents of this method tend to group Indian and Pakistani motives into classes such as global, regional and domestic/local in nature.

This approach seems to be a modern-day derivative of the Kautilian "Mandala Theory." These classes of motives start with the state at the center and expand to include
increasingly larger geographical areas, until finally reaching global international proportions.

Within each of these categories falls a number of motives. The motives at each level can be further characterized as either political or military in nature. In other words, no geographic category consists of purely political or purely military motives.

These two approaches suffer from the same shortcoming. They tend to be static in nature and describe the situation only at a particular point in time. This helps identify some of the motives which may be temporarily influential. However, they are of limited use in trying to identify the long-term motive which has dominated nuclear decision-making in South Asia.

2. Dominant Motive

In both India and Pakistan the nuclear weapons programs have been continued despite changes in political leadership that resulted in otherwise fundamentally different governments. Pakistan has gone from the democratic socialist Zulfiqar Bhutto regime in the mid-1970s, to the Islam-based military dictatorship of Muhammed Zia ul-Haq. It has since seen two more moderate democratic changes of government led by Benazir Bhutto on one hand, and Nawaz Sharif on the other.
Yet despite the radically different political philosophies of these leaders, the nuclear weapons program has been continued by each successive government.

In India, internal changes have produced a relative decline in the dominance of the Congress Party, a period of constitutional emergency under Indira Gandhi, and two short-lived minority governments. Like its neighbor, India has continued to maintain its nuclear policy in spite of these otherwise significant political changes.

The best explanation for this phenomena is found in the analysis of their motives for nuclear weapons. While many of the political motives have changed over time, the issue of survival of the nation and defense of borders has remained unchanged. Security from military threats has been, and remains, the primary reason to acquire nuclear weaponry.\(^8^5\)

As stated earlier in this chapter, the events which compelled India to launch its nuclear weapons program were the 1962 Sino-Indian War and China's nuclear test in 1964. As P.R. Chari states, "The Chinese invasion across the Himalayas in 1962, and China's first nuclear explosion in 1964 seminally influenced India's nuclear policies."\(^8^6\) The Sino-Indian situation has not changed measurably since then. In December 1991, Li Peng became the first Chinese head of state to visit India in over 30 years. While this was given great attention as a breakthrough in Sino-Indian relations, the long-standing
tensions over border issues and weapons transfers remain unsolved.  

China is still considered to be India's main source of concern from a military and strategic perspective. India's primary argument against a South Asian nuclear agreement of any kind continues to be that a regional settlement would not address its security situation with respect to China.  

As long as India's position on nuclear weapons remains unchanged, Pakistan's motives for nuclear weapons will remain in place. While announcing publicly its nuclear capability, Pakistan's foreign minister also stated that it would be "impossible for Pakistan to dismantle its program without a similar move by India."

Over the period of the last 25 years, the most constant factor in Pakistan's nuclear weapons equation has been the desire to acquire a deterrent to India's conventional and nuclear superiority.

Ashok Kapur has argued convincingly that under Z.A. Bhutto, the primary motivation for Pakistan's nuclear program was to "match Indian nuclear capability; and/or deter India's military superiority after 1971 by nuclear means." In spite of changing regional and global political circumstances throughout the 1970s and 1980s, this factor did not change.

Changes in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship (including U.S. nonproliferation sanctions), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War have had little or no effect on changing Pakistan's desire to develop nuclear
weapons capabilities. Kapur also has concluded that,

"[Under Zia] changed circumstances increased the incentive to remain on the nuclear path. (The reasoning was/is that the nuclear project is a symbol of nationhood, sovereignty and indeed national survival)."

In fact, a number of U.S. government officials have voiced the opinion that aid to Pakistan in the 1980s allowed President Zia the opportunity to advance his nuclear program.

The issue of national survival remains for Pakistan, virtually the same today as it has been since 1947. India remains its closest neighbor, the most powerful nation in the region, and its greatest rival. The fear of extermination by India, which compelled Bhutto to undertake the nuclear weapons program in 1976, is the only factor which has consistently been strong enough to keep successive governments in Pakistan committed to the development of nuclear weapons.

C. FUTURE SOUTH ASIAN SCENARIOS

India and Pakistan have reached a decisive point on the nuclear weapons path. There appears to be three possible routes which can be taken. The choices are:

- Maintain the ambiguous nuclear option (Status Quo).
- Declare possession of a nuclear arsenal (Go Nuclear).
- Dismantle nuclear program (Surrender the Option).

There are a number of benefits and drawbacks to each of these options.
1. Status Quo

India and Pakistan could both choose to maintain the position that they are nuclear capable, but not nuclear armed. In spite of Pakistan's recent admissions that its nuclear program has achieved a weapons capability, it can sustain its status of nuclear ambiguity. Pakistan's announcement that it has the capability, but has chosen not to exercise the option, has put its weapons program in the same status as India's.

A number of scholars have argued that, like the superpower rivalry, nuclear weapons proliferation in South Asia has introduced an element of stability to the Indo-Pakistani rivalry and prevented the occurrence of a major war since 1971. This possible deterrent effect is appealing to both countries because it is achieved without actually having to assemble or deploy nuclear weapons.

The current ambiguous position also offers a great deal of flexibility to Indian and Pakistani leaders. As long as the nuclear option can be maintained without actually crossing the threshold into the realm of the NWS it is also possible to back away from the threshold should future circumstances warrant.

On the other hand, the current policy of ambiguity carries with it some dangerous risks. It provides a cover under which the two nations' nuclear bureaucracies can continue to operate, free from scrutiny. This could lead to
an arms race to that both programs could grow more advanced and sophisticated and remain just shy of actual deployment.

The decision to continue an ambiguous nuclear program also carries with it a financial burden. Nuclear weapons programs demand allocation of resources that will limit implementation of other important economic policies. The economic disincentive alone is not likely to dissuade either India or Pakistan from pursuing their nuclear weapons programs, but it will influence the decision-making process."

Additionally, continued pursuit of this option offers very little hope that the situation between India and Pakistan will improve. Indo-Pakistani relations in this type of situation would continue to be controlled by the mutual fear and mistrust which one Pakistani journalist has labeled "The structure of collective paranoia.""

Indo-Pakistani relations under this option, would continue in a extended state of brinkmanship. In this type of stressful environment, many fear that the line between ambiguity and deployment could be easily crossed."8

This policy would also limit the ability of either country to develop improved relations with the United States, given current U.S. nonproliferation policy. This is, of course, only a drawback if one assumes that India and Pakistan desire improved relations with the U.S."9
At the recently concluded Indo-US Strategic Symposium in Washington, D.C., the mood was decidedly optimistic. Many of the papers presented reflected a very positive outlook on the prospects for increased Indo-US cooperation.  

Continuation of the status quo policy is the most likely near-term strategy to be followed in both India and Pakistan. It is the automatic solution if no decision is made to initiate change. It also offers the benefit of avoiding political risk. Given the current domestic situation and relatively weak ruling parties, it is unlikely that Indian or Pakistani leaders will be anxious to take big risks on an emotional issue.

2. Go Nuclear

This option would undoubtedly fuel a nuclear arms race on the Indian Subcontinent that neither country wants or can afford. Since both sides currently rely on the deterrent effects of their ambiguous parity, a decision to go nuclear by one would compel the other to do likewise. The economic and political expenses of a South Asian nuclear arms race are great.

In spite of this significant drawback, there are growing numbers of influential people on both sides of the border who favor this option.Retired Chief of The Pakistan Army Staff, General Aslam Beg, has formed a non-governmental think-tank called "The Foundation for Research on National
Defence and Security", or "FRIENDS". The majority of its members are conservatives, academic hard-liners and retired military officers, most of whom have publicly stated their preference for a declared nuclear policy. If one of the goals of FRIENDS is the advancement of the Pakistani pro-nuclear position, it could well have a great deal of influence on the government’s political leaders.

One of the leading Indian proponents of a declared nuclear policy is retired General Sundarji, former chief of the army staff. In his "Brasstacks" column in India Today, he has defended the position that it is too late for a South Asian nonproliferation regime because proliferation has already occurred. He also states his position that India should assume its rightful place along side the other NWS and "indicate our willingness to go along with the rest of the nuclear haves in preventing uncontrolled proliferation."

It is difficult to predict whether India or Pakistan will choose this option. However, the threat of an overt nuclear arms race in South Asia is too serious to be ignored.

3. **Surrender the Nuclear Option**

There are a number of variants to this option. However, all of them would produce the same effect. The threat of nuclear weapons would be virtually removed from the Indian Subcontinent.
Some of the possible ways to achieve this are through unilateral accession to the NPT by India and/or Pakistan, establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in South Asia, or through the negotiation of a series of lesser CBMs that results in an incremental step-by-step approach.

Unfortunately, even though this may be the most desirable for U.S. interests, in the eyes of the international community, and provide the greatest long-term benefits to India and Pakistan, this is also the most difficult, as well as the least likely option to be achieved. The benefits of this option are self-evident, but the risks and difficulties are many.

India's objections to this option are the greatest. A regional solution that does not include consideration of the Sino-Indian problem has been categorically rejected because of the Chinese nuclear threat to India. India is also philosophically opposed to the NPT on the grounds that it unfairly discriminates against the NNWS.

Many in Pakistan also have objections to NPT-style agreements. However, the official government policy continues to support agreements that would be uniformly binding on both countries.

Despite the difficulties associated with this option, the potential benefits to South Asia and the world make it an option worthy of serious consideration. If this approach were to be taken in a series of incremental steps over an extended
time period it might be successful. Benefits would accrue to India and Pakistan in the form of enhanced security at a much lower cost as well as greater acceptance by and integration into the international community.

D. CONCLUSION

The proliferation of nuclear weapons ranks high on the agenda of international issues. As long as India and Pakistan retain both their adversarial relationship and their nuclear weapons programs a good deal of attention and pressure will continue to be focussed there.

There is little expectation that a dramatic change will take place overnight, or even in the near future. However, both sides have shown a great deal of restraint by avoiding an all-out nuclear arms race up to this point. And recent developments indicate that there is some room for tentative negotiations.

The road to agreement between India and Pakistan on nuclear issues is a long and difficult one. But it is also a road worth exploring. As long as both sides proceed cautiously, the prospects for incremental improvements exist.
III. U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY TOWARD INDIA AND PAKISTAN

A. INTRODUCTION

Nuclear weapons have generated global concerns in two respects. First, nuclear fears focused on mutual deterrence and the avoidance of nuclear war were at the center of the superpower conflict. Second, the global spread of nuclear weapons capabilities has caused a conflict between the nuclear weapons states and those which aspire to acquire them. The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union has rendered the first issue much less salient and dramatically altered the second.

The U.S. victory in the Cold War has as a by-product reduced the threat of a superpower nuclear conflict. In addition, the United States and the Russian Republic, heir to the majority of the Soviet Union’s arsenal of nuclear weapons, have recently engaged in a series of offers to reduce unilaterally and reciprocally their arsenals.\textsuperscript{110} Thus, reducing the risk even further.

Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War has contributed little to resolution of the issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states and in some cases intensified it. Weapons formerly controlled by the Soviet Union are now held by four separate republics. The political stability of
these republics and security of their nuclear weapons is one concern. Another is that sensitive nuclear technology may be sold in international markets as a source of hard currency. There is also concern about the potential for a "brain drain" in which a Third World nation aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons could buy the expertise of scientists and technicians who formerly served in the USSR. This change has provided the U.S. with the motivation and the opportunity to approach the issue of nonproliferation in other regions with new vigor.

This chapter examines the U.S. approach to nuclear proliferation in South Asia. The intensity of the historical confrontation between India and Pakistan, two nuclear threshold states, makes this one of the most volatile regions of the world. This chapter presents a brief overview of U.S. policy in South Asia, highlighting the key elements of its nuclear nonproliferation approach and an analysis of the effects of this policy on U.S. relations with India and Pakistan.

B. U.S. POLICY OVERVIEW

As in other regions of the world, U.S. policy in South Asia has been dominated by two concerns. Since the end of World War II containment of communism has most influenced U.S. foreign policy decisions. The superpower rivalry and the establishment of regional security alliances were the key factors which guided U.S. thinking toward South Asia. The
other critical issue, nuclear nonproliferation has only recently received emphasis in South Asia. U.S. attention was first drawn to the issue when India exploded its first nuclear device in 1974.

1. Containment

For the first two decades after Great Britain granted independence to its colonies in South Asia, U.S. policy in the region was motivated primarily by the desire to contain communism, both the Soviet and Chinese versions. Washington's policy makers saw South Asia as key terrain in the battle to prevent the southward advance of communism. Policy makers were "conditioned by the Dullesian quest for a vital link in the alliance chain that the United States engineered on the rim-land of the communist world."\textsuperscript{113}

Throughout this period the U.S. attempted to strengthen its anti-communist alliances without jeopardizing relations with India. The U.S. wanted India to be its primary South Asian ally. Unfortunately, India, under the leadership of Jawarharlal Nehru, remained firmly committed to its policy of nonalignment. During his 1949 visit to the U.S., Nehru "repeatedly stressed nonalignment and...placed Indo-U.S. relations into proper perspective."\textsuperscript{114} India's "proper perspective" resulted in its rejection of U.S.-led alliances.

India remained committed to protecting its hard-won independence. Its foreign policy rested on a foundation
framed by the Panch shila or "Five Principles." India resisted becoming entangled in alliances which might have served to limit its freedom of action.

Pakistan, on the other hand, desperately wanted to become a member of the U.S.-led alliance. Faced with enemy threats to its north and east and possessing insufficient means to defend itself, Pakistan needed to find a security patron and defender. In the post-WW II era only one country was capable of providing that assistance. As the leader of the non-communist world the U.S. had both the resources and the ideological motivation to support Pakistan and defend it from communist encroachment.

In October 1947, an emissary from Pakistan, Mr. Laik Ali, traveled to Washington with a memorandum soliciting U.S. support for Pakistan. "The memorandum offered the interesting justification that U.S. assistance to Pakistan would, in effect, be a contribution to the defence of India against Soviet encroachment." Apparently this was a Pakistani attempt to market itself as a South Asian buffer zone.

Initially, Washington was reluctant to provide direct military assistance to Pakistan. Analysts for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "did not think of Pakistan as of any usefulness in promoting U.S. security interests in West Asia." American government officials were more interested in promoting ties with Middle East countries and India than with Pakistan.
It was not until late 1949, when it became clear that India’s policy of non-alignment would prevent an Indo-U.S. security arrangement, that U.S. analysts began to consider Pakistan’s potential as a security partner. In one State Department document, a desk officer for Pakistan wrote,

We have no great assurance that India in the future will ally itself with us and we have some reason to believe that it might not. Pakistan, if given reasonable encouragement, might prove the more reliable friend.  

The shift in focus by U.S. policy-makers, as a result of growing frustration over their inability to reconcile with India, and Pakistan’s desperation to guarantee its own security, led both countries to adopt a series of measures which eventually put Pakistan in the position to be the linchpin of U.S. containment strategy in Asia. The signing of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 combined with Pakistan’s membership in SEATO to make it a firmly committed member of the U.S.-led anti-communist movement.

As the eastern flank of CENTO and the western flank of SEATO, Pakistan was the anchor against possible Soviet attempts to expand to the south into the Indian Ocean region. Even after the termination of those two agreements, Pakistan’s commitment to limiting communist influence remained strong.

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, Pakistan provided the conduit through which the United States funnelled billions of dollars of military aid and equipment to Afghan resistance efforts. It also provided
sanctuary to millions of refugees from the war as well as a base for international humanitarian relief. This prompted both the Carter and Reagan Administrations to declare that Pakistan was "a frontline state in the battle between the free world and the communist empire."\textsuperscript{120}

Throughout the Cold War period military sales and Foreign Military Assistance to Pakistan have made it one of the top five recipients of U.S. military aid in terms of total assistance received.\textsuperscript{121}

2. Nonproliferation

American interests in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons and related technology on the Subcontinent have replaced the containment of communism as the most important as well as the most divisive issue. During testimony before the U.S. Senate, CIA Director Robert Gates stated that, "In South Asia the arms race between India and Pakistan is a major concern...both countries have nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. These programs are particularly worrisome...."\textsuperscript{122}

Since the mid-70s the U.S. has emphasized nuclear nonproliferation as an important foreign policy goal. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) is the basic legislation which governs U.S. policy and provides directives relating to U.S. nuclear exports.\textsuperscript{123} A number of amendments
to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 have been enacted which link U.S. assistance with nonproliferation. (Appendix).

President Jimmy Carter used the provisions of these laws to suspend aid to Pakistan in 1979 to emphasize his administration’s commitment to its nonproliferation goals. This was largely a symbolic action, however, because Pakistan was receiving an average of less than half a million dollars per year in military assistance at the time.

Barely seven months later, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused the emphasis to shift and led, "two successive administrations to seek a way to reconcile U.S. nonproliferation concerns with a desire to bolster Pakistan’s security and independence."

C. U.S. POLICY EFFECTS

Increasing U.S. emphasis on the issue of nuclear weapons programs and nonproliferation from the mid-1970s onward made it more difficult to develop a consistent policy toward South Asia. The United States’ nonproliferation interests both complemented and conflicted with its interests in containing communism. Concerns about nuclear issues, strategic/global interests and regional interests created a paradox in U.S. policy.

The interest in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons technology in the region and U.S. desires to promote regional stability and cooperation can be compatible since progress in
one area may tend to support the goals of the other. However, when strategic or global issues such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan became a priority, conflicting goals forced U.S. policy makers to make situational choices.

During the 1980s U.S. leaders were aware that Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was progressing rapidly. In his book, The Undeclared Bomb, Leonard Spector provides an account of the evidence which was presented to the Congress and available to the Reagan Administration. Leading members of Congress favored sanctions based on this information. However, the Executive Branch chose to focus on the containment issue instead. It acted in spite of mounting evidence in order to arm the Pakistan military against the Soviet threat and channel aid for the Afghan Mujahideen through Pakistan without violating the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act limiting military aid to emerging nuclear weapon states (NWS).

The decision to place a higher priority on global strategic issues than on regional or proliferation issues sent mixed signals to both Pakistani and Indian officials. The peculiarities of the U.S. political system and the frequent course changes in foreign policy provide a source of confusion and frustration to South Asian officials who must interpret the signals and develop policies of their own. In his essay, "U.S. Policy in South Asia: The India Factor," Dr. Leo E. Rose states that U.S. nonproliferation policies have "been
counterproductive by enhancing the security apprehensions of several countries interested in developing nuclear power.  

1. Pakistan

In Pakistan, observers frequently conclude that what they see as "inconsistent" U.S. policy decisions are a sign of U.S. "ambivalence" or lack of commitment toward Pakistan. In some instances these observations have proven to be a useful means to protest against a U.S. policy with which Pakistan simply disagrees.

Government officials and the press frequently cite American decisions to suspend aid on four different occasions as proof that the U.S. places very little value on Pakistan's support and cooperation on Cold War issues. They contend that because the U.S. has not supported Pakistan on issues such as Kashmir and during its wars with India, that they are clearly more a pawn than a partner. In a leading Islamabad newspaper one recent Opinion Page contributor characterized U.S. actions as, "Deserting the most allied ally in 1965, 1971 or after the services as a front line state in the Afghan conflict."

The sense of betrayal which many Pakistanis feel has also fostered a growing mistrust toward the United States. Statements by U.S. officials and new policy decisions are subjected to close scrutiny in Pakistan. The purpose of this scrutiny is to discern the American "ulterior" motive. A
recent case in point is the November 1991 mission by Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for International Security. Mr. Bartholomew visited Islamabad and New Delhi to express U.S. support for a series of confidence-building steps, beginning with the upcoming exchange of nuclear facilities lists.

Following Mr. Bartholomew's visit to Pakistan and India, Dr. Shireen Mazari, Chairperson of the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University, published her critique of the situation. She warned that U.S. intentions should be regarded with "suspicion" because of its "hidden agenda".\textsuperscript{136}

Many in Pakistan view Washington's approach as misguided and fundamentally unfair because it punishes Pakistan, which has been a reliable ally. Pakistan's nuclear weapons program is designed to counter India's superior military capabilities. From the Pakistan perspective it is only natural that they would want to develop defenses and an ability to deter a traditional enemy. At the same time the policy allows India, which has frequently opposed the U.S., to continue its nuclear development unimpeded by sanctions.\textsuperscript{137}

The United States nonproliferation policy has not succeeded because it has failed to reduce Pakistan's desire to obtain nuclear weapons. In fact, U.S. policies may have stimulated support for the nuclear option.\textsuperscript{138} Defense of the Pakistan homeland is considered to be of the highest priority.
Most government leaders concede that Pakistan conventional forces can never compete quantitatively with India. Therefore many Pakistanis conclude that the only remaining options are to rely on the U.S. to come to its aid or to develop a nuclear deterrent. A general Pakistani lack of faith in U.S. commitment, based on their view of U.S. actions in previous Indo-Pak conflicts, makes the nuclear option appear to be the only solution. Without a ‘carrot’ to offer as a substitute, Washington’s ‘stick’ policy has met with almost no success in convincing Islamabad to abandon its nuclear weapons program.

Throughout the last decade the Government of Pakistan has made the most of the Afghan situation. In addition to receiving billions of dollars in U.S. aid to strengthen its conventional forces and support the efforts against the Soviet Union, Pakistan has worked to develop its nuclear weapons program. It has done so, safe in the knowledge that the U.S. placed a higher priority on stopping the Soviets in Afghanistan than on nonproliferation concerns. American assistance which strengthened Pakistan’s conventional forces also allowed Pakistan to concentrate a larger share of its limited resources on its nuclear program.

2. India

Washington’s relations with New Delhi have been somewhat erratic. For more than thirty years, India has very
much resented what it sees as an American search for fostering a balance of power between Islamabad and New Delhi. In spite of the vast disparity in both size and potential of India and Pakistan, U.S. policy has usually had the effect, if not the intent, of equalizing the two countries. Washington policy makers have frequently failed to give much weight to opinions emanating from New Delhi.

Rather, they have tended to, "Dismiss India as an irritant that can occasionally complicate decisions about Asian issues but can be ignored or shunted aside at little cost to the efficacy of U.S. policy decisions." This American attitude has deprived India of recognition as the dominant power in South Asia and as a major force in world affairs. India has consistently sought this recognition, which it feels it deserves.

The issue of nonproliferation, and U.S. policies in general toward emerging nuclear states, has also had an adverse impact on relations with India, even though India has supported U.S. opposition to Pakistan's nuclear program. As in the case with Pakistan, the policy of negative reinforcement through denial of support has been ineffective. There are two reasons for this failure.

First, the policy fails to address the root of the proliferation problem. What motivates India to develop a nuclear weapons program? India's biggest concern is not Pakistan. India began its nuclear weapons program and has
retained its nuclear option primarily to counter what it perceives to be the intimidating nuclear might of China.4 If the Indian fears of a Chinese threat could be removed, either physically or through some reliable form of assurance, India could defend itself with its conventional forces against any other conceivable enemy.

American policy has tended to focus on the India-Pakistan issue and either ignore or overlook the India-China issues. The failure to identify and address all the key aspects of the problem has helped to render U.S. efforts ineffective.

The other reason for the failure of U.S. policy is that India is much less dependent on U.S. assistance than Pakistan. India has a well-developed scientific and technological base on which it has built its nuclear program. It is the tenth ranked industrial nation in the world, ranks third in the number of scientists and engineers and has 40 defense research laboratories.4

India's solid domestic foundation has allowed it to overcome most of the U.S.-imposed impediments to the development of its nuclear program. One example illustrates this point. In 1978 U.S. sale of fuel to operate India's Tarapur power plant was suspended under provisions of the Glenn Amendment. By 1982 the Tarapur reactors were operating at full capacity through a combination of fuel from its own unsafeguarded facilities and sales from France.45
India has also been critical of American policy during the Afghan crisis. Indians tend to view the U.S. actions during this period as destabilizing to the region because it assisted the build-up of conventional forces in Pakistan and at the same time ignored the nuclear developments. This presents a dual threat to India’s security.\(^{146}\)

Some Indian critics have compared U.S. policy in the 80s with the military assistance program it carried out in the 60s. Under terms included in the CENTO and SEATO agreements, aid to Pakistan was intended for use only against communist threats. However, Pakistan used a large portion of the assistance to strengthen itself along its Indian border and subsequently became involved in two wars with its eastern neighbor.\(^{147}\)

D. CONCLUSION

American policy in South Asia has been the product of two strong, but conflicting interests. As a result, nonproliferation interests have been forced to take a secondary position to the containment imperative. Containment strategy contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Unfortunately, nonproliferation efforts have been less successful.

The United States has not succeeded in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia. It has only slowed the process down a bit. The end of the Cold War
provides an opportunity to rearrange the policy priorities of the last four decades and take a new look at the current situation.

Both India and Pakistan have shown signs that they may also be prepared to give the issue some fresh thought. The U.S. should take the opportunity to make the most of the changing international situation. A restructured nuclear nonproliferation strategy, unencumbered by Cold War restraints, has a real chance to succeed in South Asia.
IV. U.S. POLICY - NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND NEW OPTIONS

A. U.S. POLICY - THE FUTURE

With the end of the Cold War the time has come for Washington to reassess its nuclear policy in South Asia. This reassessment must map the strategy for the future based on a number of factors, such as: the effects of the end of the Cold War and reduced superpower competition in the region; potential restraints on U.S. resources; and, the need for U.S.-Pakistani-Indian cooperation on issues of mutual concern and interest.

This chapter discusses the future of U.S. policy and presents one possible approach to be taken. The three-stage approach includes: defining appropriate goals, establishing policy guidelines, and developing a strategy to implement those policies.

1. Goals

The first and most important factor is the objective: "What does the U.S. hope to accomplish through its nuclear policy in South Asia?" A clear answer to this question is essential for an effective policy. The current answer to this question can be found in The National Security Strategy of the United States, which lists two of its objectives as, 1) Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with
allies and friendly nations, and 2) A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.148

General goals which support these objectives are:

1. Establish a more balanced partnership with our allies and a greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities.

2. Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.

3. Promote diplomatic resolutions to regional disputes.149

In South Asia this translates more specifically into supporting the development of Indian and Pakistani conventional military forces capable of defending the geographic boundaries and national interests of their respective countries. These forces must be able to deter aggression without being inherently threatening to each other.

It also means encouraging a solution to the Kashmir issue and the various other border disputes and ethnic problems which exist. These problems serve as destabilizing factors in the Indo-Pakistani relationship and provide the potential to escalate into more dangerous situations.

Properly developed, the U.S. policy on nuclear proliferation can play an important role in contributing to the success of these goals.
2. Policies

After the goals have been clearly identified, the next step is to formulate specific guidelines and establish policies which will help achieve those goals. This is not a simple task, given the complexity of the nuclear issue in South Asia. However, there are a number of basic problems on which to focus.

The long-term goal of the United States has been and should continue to be to prevent and discourage the establishment of nuclear weapons regimes in South Asia. This is by definition a nonproliferation policy. However, the current South Asian nuclear situation described in earlier chapters indicates that U.S. policy must also have an arms control component to help prevent the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs from advancing further in the interim period.

As long as both India and Pakistan perceive a need to keep the nuclear option available as a threat deterrent there is a risk. A single act or series of events could cause one side or the other to conclude that its best option for self-defense is the assembly or use of a nuclear weapon. Assembly or deployment of a nuclear weapon by one side would invoke a response by the other. This scenario would probably degenerate into a nuclear arms race and bring the region one step closer to a nuclear war. The best way to reduce this risk is to reduce the threat.
The U.S.-USSR nuclear arms race provides a good illustration of this point. As long as there was the perception that the countries posed a threat to each other it proved nearly impossible to achieve significant reductions in nuclear weapons in spite of SALT, START and the NPT. Not until the Soviet Union showed signs of its impending collapse in 1991, reducing the threat to the U.S., did either side become willing to make significant concessions in its nuclear program.150

While there are many differences between the superpower nuclear situation and the Indo-Pakistani confrontation, the perception of the threat contains enough parallels to make the analysis valid.151 Unless both Pakistan and India are assured that the threat of attack is greatly decreased their desire to retain the nuclear weapons option will remain.

As stated in the National Security Strategy, one of the fundamental challenges associated with the control of nuclear weapons is that, "A successful non-proliferation strategy must address the underlying security concerns that drive the quest to obtain advanced weapons..."152 Unfortunately, U.S. policies to date have failed to address those concerns in South Asia. Since 1976, three successive administrations have attempted to accomplish their nonproliferation goals through the use of high pressure tactics and punitive measures. These measures have been designed to
coerce the threshold nuclear weapon states into abandoning their programs. Unless policy makers also begin to address South Asian security concerns U.S. nonproliferation goals will continue to be unattainable.

3. Implementation

After developing a clear, coherent policy U.S. officials must consider one final factor. They must be able to implement specific actions to carry out the policy and achieve the goals. These actions must address the security concerns in India and Pakistan and thereby reduce their motivation to continue to develop nuclear weapons. These actions can be divided into three categories:

1. Host a series of discussions which address the security issues within the South Asian region.

2. Encourage India and Pakistan to agree to a series of CBMs designed to improve cooperation reduce the tensions between them.

3. Send a clear signal to both sides that the U.S. intends to pursue its nonproliferation objective.

4. Discussions

Attempts should be made to initiate a series of discussions on regional and international levels. These talks would allow the participating countries to air their security concerns, discuss the issues and provide a forum for the discussion of possible resolutions. These talks would open up channels of communications in a sort of nuclear glasnost that would permit regular discussions between government officials.
at various levels, to include heads of state. The number of variations in the types of talks to be held and the composition of participants is virtually unlimited. A number of examples come to mind which illustrate the concept.

In June 1991, The Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, publicly proposed a meeting between five countries; United States, Soviet Union, Peoples' Republic of China (PRC), India and Pakistan, to discuss creation of a nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia. While this may be too specific a topic for an initial discussion, it is not unreasonable to think that government officials from the five nations (with Russia replacing the USSR) could meet to discuss general topics concerning nuclear issues.

One important aspect which must be addressed is China's role in the South Asian nuclear picture. Since India cites China as a security threat, any discussion or long term solution will also have to deal with the China factor. China's promise to sign the NPT and abide by the Nuclear Suppliers agreements provides hope that this obstacle can be overcome. The U.S. should also encourage ongoing bilateral efforts such as attempts by India and China to discuss and resolve issues of mutual concern.

This type of discussion and communication should not be limited to government leaders and policy makers. Conferences which bring together members of the scientific, academic and military communities will also promote better
understanding and cooperation. This could also include ship visits, joint military exercises, and personnel exchange programs.

Continuing efforts to engage in constructive dialogues can help solve the problems of national security by reducing tensions. They can also provide a pressure release valve during periods of increased tensions and provide a non-military avenue for conflict resolution.155

5. Tension Reduction

Indo-Pakistani relations are characterized by distrust, fear and mutual animosity. Because they are the two most powerful countries in the region it follows that relations between the two will set the tone for the entire region. As Paul Kreisberg states, "A reduction of Indo-Pakistani tensions is essential to assure regional stability."156

If the United States expects to realize its goal of regional stability it will have to take steps to reduce the friction between the South Asian powers. India and Pakistan have from time to time made tentative gestures indicating that both countries understand the necessity for improved relations. Unfortunately, most of these efforts have been short-lived and inconsequential.157

Washington policy makers should make a concerted effort to encourage a series of bilateral confidence building
measures between India and Pakistan. Because the differences between them are so great, a comprehensive resolution in the near future is probably not realistic. However, even relatively small gains now will serve as the foundation for future relations.

The 1988 Zia-Gandhi agreement sets a precedent and provides a possible starting point for new CBM proposals and discussions. Some of the potential issues which could be considered are:

1. "No first assembly or first deployment" agreement. This would assure that neither side would be the first to completely assemble a nuclear weapon or take up a threatening deployment posture.

2. "No attack on urban centers" agreement.

3. Mutual inspection of nuclear facilities.

4. Exchanges of experts and technical personnel.

5. Agreement to ban the development, production and use of chemical and biological weapons.

6. Declarations opposing use of nuclear weapons.

This is by no means a comprehensive list of CBMs. Each of these may also be subject to objections on various grounds that they are ineffective or cannot be verified. However, the objective is to make small gains initially.

The United States can best facilitate this process by offering its services as a moderator and honest broker during bilateral negotiations or as an intermediary in a shuttle diplomacy setting. This would put the U.S. in a position to
influence or advise both parties but would put the decision-making responsibility on the affected parties.

The Kashmir impasse could provide an opportunity for this type of U.S. intervention. The situation in Kashmir is both a reason for and an outcome of historical Indo-Pakistan tensions. The problem has gone unsolved since 1948 and has become more complex. It seems that neither side is capable of some type of agreement on a solution without outside assistance. The U.S. could play the role of a non-partisan moderator in Indo-Pak negotiations.

This approach would have the corollary benefit of removing any remaining Cold War associations from U.S. involvement in South Asia. The U.S. would be able to demonstrate that it supports regional stability and that it does not view its South Asian foreign policy as a zero-sum game. It would also be able to reinforce that improved bilateral relations with one country do not have to correlate to declining relations with the other.

6. Signal Intentions

The United States has not always clearly demonstrated that it is serious about nonproliferation. There are two actions that can be taken to correct this misperception: 1) Send a clear signal to both India and Pakistan that clandestine nuclear programs are not acceptable, and, 2) Lead by example in the arms control arena.
a. Send a Signal

When President Bush refused to certify Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment in October 1990, he sent part of the message. Throughout the 1980s Pakistan had advanced its nuclear weapons program until it violated the clearly stated limits for U.S. assistance. By suspending military assistance, the president demonstrated U.S. commitment to nonproliferation and put the onus on Pakistan to decide what to do.

Since that time Pakistan claims to have met two of the three conditions needed for the resumption of aid. It has halted production of fissile material and stopped construction of non-nuclear components.\(^{161}\)

The United States must now send the same badly needed signal to India. It can do this by applying the same conditions to India that exist for Pakistan. At the present time, India holds the upper hand over Pakistan because it is possesses military superiority. However, the Indian military is also interested in closer ties with the U.S. military and defense industries.\(^{162}\) Linking military cooperation with nuclear proliferation issues will emphasize the U.S. position and encourage India to take a greater interest.

The Indian government and particularly its military, is interested in increased transfer of advanced technology and support for industrial modernization. In addition to withholding assistance because of noncompliance,
the U.S. government should also make it clear that progress on arms control and nonproliferation issues would make some assistance in these areas more readily available.

The Bush Administration opposes extension of the Pressler Amendment to include India on the grounds that it limits Executive Branch foreign policy options. However, the legislation currently in effect has a number of provisions which provide the president with options. It is more important to have the force of U.S. law behind the signal to be sent.

b. Lead by Example

The Bush Administration has already taken some actions which move the U.S. in this direction. The decisions to remove tactical nuclear weapons from the theaters, and reductions below levels mandated by START demonstrate that the United States is committed to arms control and the NPT. Another example of strong U.S. commitment is the current Congressional debates concerning the future of U.S. nuclear force structure.163

These actions contribute to dispelling the Indian and Pakistani arguments that the U.S. is hypocritical in its position because it only favors arms control and non-proliferation regimes for other countries.164 Continued U.S. efforts in this regard will reassure both India and Pakistan and make it more difficult for them to defend their arguments.
B. CONCLUSION

Successful U.S. nuclear policy in South Asia depends on two elements. It must first be based on a thorough analysis of the interests of all the concerned parties. Second, it must be executed in a consistent manner, making every effort to satisfy all those interests as much as possible.

In the current environment this requires a policy which combines elements of both arms control and nonproliferation regimes. Arms control policies address the realities of the current nuclear weapons situations in both India and Pakistan. Long-term efforts to support nonproliferation are geared toward making South Asia and the world a safer place to live.

But to be effective, this tandem approach must be synchronized to make both parts work in concert. Past U.S. experience in South Asia demonstrates that only a consistent approach has any chance for success.
V. CONCLUSION

The U.S. State Department is currently making plans to activate a new South Asia Bureau which Congress created in 1991.\textsuperscript{165} This indicates that U.S. leaders recognize not only that the Indian Subcontinent is a distinct region of the world, but also that it deserves a level of attention at least on par with others. The special set of circumstances that exist in the region especially with regard to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs make it an area of great concern in U.S. foreign policy issues.

The transformation of the international political environment calls for a fundamental reassessment of Washington's South Asia nuclear policy. This thesis has attempted to highlight several key points.

A. KEY ACTORS

The first point is that the United States is not the most important player in the Indo-Pakistani nuclear issue. If any long-term success is to be achieved either in arms control or nonproliferation, both India and Pakistan must be willing participants. No third-party participant will be able to cajole, force or buy the support of either India or Pakistan for any measures that fail to serve their own interests.
The United States can best serve as a supporting player and fill a role as honest-broker, mediator, or non-partisan advisor. It should be prepared to perform whatever functions it can to foster peaceful resolutions to conflicts and support equitable and verifiable nonproliferation and arms control regimes.

B. PROVIDE LEADERSHIP

At the same time the U.S. should not compromise its own position and national interests with regard to nuclear nonproliferation. It should continue to set the example by pursuing meaningful arms control measures and championing international nonproliferation regimes.

By demonstrating its commitment to nonproliferation and remaining actively involved in South Asia, the United States can influence the outcome to protect its own interests.

C. GLOBAL BENEFITS

American efforts to produce meaningful nonproliferation results in South Asia have the potential to produce corollary benefits on an international scale. The United States has a great deal of experience negotiating arms control agreements on a bilateral basis. However, there is potentially a great deal to be learned about negotiating with multiple parties.

The experience gained by participating in the process in South Asia may be valuable if it is applied to other regions.
of the world. Negotiations in the Central Asian Republics of the C.I.S. and in the Middle East involve a larger number of participants. Lessons learned in dealing with a limited number of participants may make it easier or less time consuming to deal with a larger group.

D. NEW APPROACHES

Finally, it is important to consider that the policies and methods that won the Cold War may not be appropriate to deal with the realities of a new global environment. New situations demand new and creative ideas. Most of the recommendations presented here have been extracted as bits and pieces from a wide variety of sources, many of which supported opposite points of view.

In the context of South Asia, arms control and nonproliferation measures need not operate in mutually exclusive regimes. Many of the CBMs discussed previously fall into the category of arms control or proliferation management tools. However, in South Asia these same tools may be able to create interim solutions that eventually lead to nonproliferation goals.

The key is not to reject any solution presented in good faith without examining it thoroughly. If possible the valuable parts should be kept and combined with the contributions of others.
American and South Asian leaders should seek to find new ways to cooperate on issues where national interests converge. The creation of stable security environments is one of those issues. The prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons will help insure that goal.
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2. South Asia consists of the countries of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Afghanistan, and the Maldives. However, throughout this paper use of the term South Asia indicates joint reference to India and Pakistan as the most important and influential nations in the region.


12. It should be noted that in the *National Security Strategy* there are a number of other interests which have some relevance in the South Asian context because they address issues of a global concern. Some of these are: promote economic reforms and U.S. access to markets, stem the flow of illicit drugs and promote environmental reforms. However, these will not be addressed here, as the focus is on nuclear related interests.


15. ACDA, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*.

16. Israel and South Africa have also been placed in this category. The de facto states are so defined because they have not openly declared themselves to possess nuclear weapons but they have the technology to produce one in a very short time if the political decision to do so is made. See Stephen Phillip Cohen, *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 1 and Spector and Smith, p. 5.


28. See President Zia’s interview, "Knocking at the Nuclear Door," Time, 30 March 1987, p. 42.


34. In January 1991, U.S. Embassy officials in New Delhi interviewed by this author stated that while the military had no interest in trying to replace the civilian government, senior defense officials were not enthusiastic about carrying out operations against Indian citizens.


36. Ibid.

37. This opinion was expressed by a number of nuclear proliferation experts at Stanford University, The U.S. Army War College and a number of U.S. government officials in Washington during interviews with the author conducted in April 1992.
38. There are some indications that India may be willing to make some concessions in this area. See "Pragmatic Compulsions," India Today, 31 December 1991, p. 9.

39. India and Pakistan signed a treaty in 1991 which calls for both countries to exchange lists of nuclear facilities. Under the terms of the treaty these facilities are then protected by a pledge that they will not be attacked. The first annual exchange of lists was conducted on 1 January 1992. See "Pakistan, India Exchange Lists of Nuclear Facilities," Washington Post, 2 January 1992, and "India and Pakistan Exchange Lists of Nuclear Facilities," Nucleonics Week, 9 January 1992.


42. Burns, p. 96-98.


44. See Kapur, "Bureaucratic Politics and Nuclear Policy," in India's Nuclear Option, p. 145-156.


46. Ibid., p. 9.

47. President Eisenhower first announced his proposal to make peaceful nuclear technology available to other nations in a speech before the U.N. General Assembly in December 1953. See, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, p. 24-30.


51. Cohen, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, p. 36.


55. Ibid., p. 34.

56. Ibid., p. 49.

57. For a discussion of the early motivations of Pakistan's nuclear program, see Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, ch.3. See also, Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Proliferation, Strategic Culture and Regional Security in South Asia" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, forthcoming).

58. Pakistan's military doctrine revolves around the concept that they must be prepared to defend against an enemy that is both qualitatively and quantitatively superior. See Israr Ahmad Ghuman, "Pakistan's Geostrategic Environment and Military System," Pakistan Army Journal 31:1 (March 1990), p.26-36.

59. This perception still exists today. During the author's assignment to the Pakistan Army Command and Staff College a significant number of Army officers expressed the opinion that based on the history of the 1971 war, it was clear that Pakistan could never count on U.S. support.

60. For a thorough, balanced analysis of Bhutto's role in Pakistan's nuclear program, see Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, p. 100-156.


64. Ibid.


69. Spector and Smith, p. 115.

70. Aid was suspended under the provisions of the Pressler Amendment when President Bush was unable to make a required annual certification to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device. See Richard P. Cronin, *Pakistan Aid Cutoff: U.S. Nonproliferation and Foreign Policy Considerations* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 13 March 1992).


75. See "POF on the road to self-reliance in defence production," The Muslim (Islamabad), special supplement, 1 December 1991, p. I.


77. For a description of some of the techniques that have been employed by Pakistani buyers, see Kathleen C. Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), p. 120.


79. Chellaney, p. 43.

80. See A.F. Mullins, Proliferation in South Asia: The Military Dimension, p. 4-5.

81. Chellaney, p. 44.


83. Kautilya was a Brahmin Indian prime minister during the 4th Century B.C. He wrote a political philosophy, The Arthashastra, in which he described the world in terms of ten concentric circles with his kingdom at the center, surrounded by the king’s enemies, the enemies’ enemies, and so forth, until residing in the outer ring was the neutral king. For a more thorough discussion of Kautilya, see D. Makenzie Brown, "The Art of Politics," Chap. in the White Umbrella (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), p. 49-63.


88. Spector and Smith, p. 75.


91. Ibid., p. 192.


93. This view was also expressed by Dr. Neil Joeck, a noted expert in South Asian nuclear proliferation, in an interview with the author at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 14 April 1992.


95. Chellaney, p. 62.


99. This would seem to be a safe assumption, considering the large numbers of high level diplomatic and military consultations being held between American, Indian and Pakistani officials in the first four months of 1992. For an account of U.S.-Indian military


101. Spector and Smith, p. 112.


104. Some of the most prominent members are: Lt. General M.K. Arif, Dr. A.Q. Khan, Dr. Shireen Mazari and Mr. Mushahid Hussain. Ibid., p. 74.


106. Spector and Smith, p. 61.


115. The "Five Principles" are: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; nonaggression; noninterference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. They were first formulated as the basis for a Sino-Indian trade treaty in 1954. These principles became the guiding factor in Indian foreign policy under Jawarharlal Nehru. See Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India, 3d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 364.


117. Ibid. p. 29.


121. This is surprising in view of the fact that during the periods 1965-1967 and 1971-1980 Pakistan received virtually no U.S. military aid (except IMET Funds) because of its wars with India and


126. Congress, House and Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Foreign Affairs, Congress and Arms Sales and Security Assistance to Pakistan, report prepared by Richard P. Cronin, Joint Committee Print, 1981, p. 103.


130. The Foreign Assistance Act places restrictions on U.S. assistance to NNWS which use their nuclear programs to attempt to develop nuclear weapons. The provisions which most often apply to Pakistan are: Section 669 (Symington Amendment), Section 670 (Glenn Amendment), and Section 620E (Pressler Amendment). Congressional Research Service, "Pakistan Aid Cutoff: U.S. Nonproliferation and Foreign Policy Considerations," CRS Issue Brief 90149, report prepared by Richard P. Cronin (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1991). Also see Gerald C. Smith and Helena Cobban, "A Blind Eye to Nuclear Proliferation," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1989), p. 53-70.


135. In a speech at Stanford University on 17 February 1992, Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States, Abida Hussein, spoke at length about the Pakistan's sense of betrayal and dissapointment over declining U.S.-Pakistan relations. She also stated that her government was anxiously awaiting the outcome of U.S. presidential elections to see which direction U.S. policy would take in the future.


137. The U.S. House of Representatives passed legislation in June 1991, which would make the provisions of the Pressler Amendment apply to India, as well. The measure is being considered by the Senate. Reactions in Pakistan have been positive.

138. Dr. Leo Rose is particularly critical of legislative efforts since the 1970s, saying that retaliatory policies are not only arrogant but ineffectual. Rose, "U.S. Policy in Asia: The India Factor," p. 47-49.

140. As stated in Chapter II, the FRIENDS organization is a veritable Who's Who of the Pakistan pro-nuclear lobby. The public debate over nuclear weapons is intensifying in Pakistan. For a balanced account which airs both sides see, Newsline, November 1991.


144. Peter P. T. Merani, "India’s Foreign Policy in the 1990’s," Asian Thought and Society, 15:45 (October 1990), p. 309.


147. India had, on a number of occasions, expressed its concern that U.S. aid to Pakistan would be used against it. See Raghunath Ram, p. 218; and S.C. Tewari, Indo-US Relations, 1947-1976 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1977), p. 63.


149. Ibid.


153. One example of such a conference was the Indo-US Strategic Symposium, held in Washington 21-23 April 1992, hosted by the IDSA-INSS.


157. A notable exception is the 1988 agreement between President Zia and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in which both sides promised to refrain from attacking the other's nuclear facilities. See Cohen, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, p. 364.

158. For a comprehensive listing of CBMs and their current status, see Cohen, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, p. 359-366.


160. This position was taken by one State Department official in an interview with the author in Washington, D.C. in April 1992. He speculated that the U.S. may become more involved in attempting to find a solution in Kashmir.


APPENDIX

Key Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is the basic law which establishes guidelines for military, economic and humanitarian assistance to other nations. Since India's nuclear test in 1974 a number of provisions have been added that link foreign assistance to nuclear nonproliferation. The most important amendments affecting U.S. aid to South Asia are:

1. The Symington Amendment (Section 669), 1976. This amendment prohibits U.S. aid to any Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) which attempts to import uranium or acquire uranium enrichment technology without submitting to International Atomic Energy safeguards. The amendment contains a provision which allows the President to waive restrictions if it seriously affects the national interest.

2. The Glenn Amendment (Section 670), 1977. This amendment prohibits U.S. aid to any country that attempts to acquire the technology to reprocess plutonium from spent reactor fuel. It further prohibits aid to any NNWS that attempts to receive or transfer a nuclear explosive device. The President cannot waive the provisions of this amendment without an act of Congress.

3. The Pressler Amendment (Section 670E), 1985. This amendment applies specifically to Pakistan. It requires the President to certify annually that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device in order for Pakistan to receive aid. Failure to certify results in suspension of all aid.

4. The Solarz Amendment [Section 670(a)(1)(B)], 1985. This amendment prohibits aid to any country which attempts to illegally export nuclear technology or materials from the U.S. This was enacted as a result of a 1984 attempt to
smuggle high speed switches, called krytons, from Houston to Pakistan. The switches are used as part of the detonating device in nuclear weapons. The President also has the authority to waive this provision if he deems it to be in the interest of national security to do so.

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