U.S. ARMY GUARD AND RESERVES: BEYOND DESERT STORM AND INTO THE FUTURE

by

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December 1992

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The United States Army, unlike the other services, relies heavily on its reserve components for reinforcing forces and for augmentation in the support areas. There are currently two heated debates taking place over the Guard and Reserves. One debate is taking place within the Army. The other debate is being heard on Capitol Hill as the Department of Defense continues to request for reductions in the politically well-connected Guard and Reserves. As the Army continues to draw down its forces and faces demands for further reductions, the number of Army reservists, as well as their roles and missions, will become even more controversial. This thesis begins with an examination of the intended role of the reserves as established in the Total Force Policy adopted in 1973. The discussion continues with the performance of the reserves during the Persian Gulf War, followed by an assessment of the role of the reserves in the New National Security Strategy. The congressional attitude towards the reserves is addressed, including a discussion of how the Army might meet the conditions of a hypothetical Base Force II proposal and its impact on the reserves. Prior to the conclusion, recommendations are offered for altering the roles, missions, and structure of the reserves to improve the effectiveness of the Total Army.
U.S. Army Guard and Reserves:
Beyond Desert Storm and into the Future

by

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ABSTRACT

The United States Army, unlike the other services, relies heavily on its reserve components for reinforcing forces and for augmentation in the support areas. There are currently two heated debates taking place over the Guard and Reserves. One debate is taking place within the Army. The other debate is being heard on Capitol Hill as the Department of Defense continues to request for reductions in the politically well-connected Guard and Reserves. As the Army continues to draw down its forces and faces demands for further reductions, the number of Army reservists, as well as their roles and missions, will become even more controversial. This thesis begins with an examination of the intended role of the reserves as established in the Total Force Policy adopted in 1973. The discussion continues with the performance of the reserves during the Persian Gulf War, followed by an assessment of the role of the reserves in the New National Security Strategy. The congressional attitude towards the reserves is addressed, including a discussion of how the Army might meet the conditions of a hypothetical Base Force II proposal and its impact on the reserves. Prior to the conclusion, recommendations are offered for altering the roles, missions, and structure of the reserves to improve the effectiveness of the Total Army.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On 2 August 1990, President Bush announced a major shift in the structures and missions of the U.S. military in a speech delivered at the Aspen Institute. The new national security strategy, as it became known, was proposed in response to dramatic changes throughout the world. As a result of the end of the Cold War and diminished Soviet (Russian/CIS) threat, the President's new national security strategy calls for a shift in emphasis away from the Cold War European conflict scenario and focuses on presence and worldwide contingency operations.

Under the administration's proposal, the new strategy calls for a 25 percent reduction in defense spending over fiscal years 1991 to 1995. As part of the strategy, a Base Force was proposed as the minimum force structure necessary to meet U.S. national security needs. The Base Force called for significant reductions in the active components (AC) and the reserve components (RC). The Base Force calls for a reduction in Army divisions from 18 active and ten reserve to 12 active, six reserve, and two cadre divisions.

When the United States finally arrives at the Base Force, the RC will make up a significant portion of the Army's force structure. As a result of the proposed reductions in the RC, there has been much discussion about the role of the reserves in the new national security strategy. The number of
reserves has been a controversial topic between the Department of Defense and the Congress. Additionally, the performance of reservists during Operations Desert Shield and Storm, in particular ground combat units, has added to this controversy.

Some leaders in Congress and military analysts argue that, given the end of the Cold War and diminished threats throughout the world, the United States can once again rely on a smaller regular force backed up by a large reserve force. They support their argument by noting that reserves provide an economical alternative to the high costs of maintaining large active-duty forces. Some reserve supporters have even made proposals to expand the role and the missions of the reserves. On the other hand, the administration appears to be rethinking how the reserves fit into the Total Force Policy and the roles they will perform in the new strategy.

Since the Army relies more heavily on its reserve forces than the other services, this paper will focus primarily on the Army's reserve forces and their role in the nation's national security posture.1 Table 1 shows Selected Reserve contributions to the Total Force, by service.

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1Since the Army relies more heavily on its reserve forces than the other services, this paper will focus primarily on Army reserve forces, in particular the selected reserves. Selected reserve units are manned by drilling members of the Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve and supported by Full-Time support personnel. Hereafter the term "reserves" will be used to refer to both the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve.
This paper will begin with an overview of the intended role of the reserves as established in the Total Force Policy adopted in 1973. The discussion will continue with the performance of the reserves during the Persian Gulf War followed by an examination of the new national military strategy and how it affects the Army's RC. The congressional attitude toward reserve forces will be addressed, followed by an assessment of how the Army will meet the conditions of a hypothetical Base Force II proposal and its impact on the reserves. Prior to the conclusion, recommendations are offered for altering the roles, missions, and structures of the RC to improve the effectiveness of the total Army.
II. THE RESERVES AND THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

Following the end of the Vietnam War and the abandonment of the draft, the Army underwent a major transformation in the composition of its forces. As the United States transitioned from conscription to the All-Volunteer Force, the reserves became the primary source for additional manpower in time of military crisis or national emergency. In 1973, the Department of Defense (DOD) adopted the "Total Force Policy," which reflected a heavy reliance on the RC. In a radical shift, the policy sought to integrate all resources including civilian, host nation and the RC with the AC. Under the policy, active and reserve forces were viewed as a single fighting force. This integration sought to achieve "The One Army Concept," in which the active forces and RC were interwoven in all aspects of military training and employment. This chapter examines the factors which led to the formation of the Total Force Policy and how the Army implemented the policy, including a brief discussion of the controversial Capstone and Roundout programs.


There were several factors which led to the development of the Total Force Policy. First, Americans have traditionally been wary of a large standing Army and strongly believe that the citizen-soldier, in a democracy, would bear the major responsibility for providing defense in wartime. The fear of a large standing Army and the establishment of a militia were codified in the militia-related clauses of the United States Constitution. As is the case throughout the Constitution, an effort was made "...to prevent the accumulation of overwhelming power in any person or agency." Congress has the "...authority to organize, arm, and discipline the militia; the states, the power to appoint officers and to train the citizen soldiers." Congress was also given the authority to "...summon the state militias into federal service, for three specific tasks only: to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections, and to repel invasion." The president was designated as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy and the militia when called into federal service. Finally, the second amendment called for "...a well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." Military historian Russell F. Weigley remarked, "...the Constitution...retained the dual military system bequeathed to the United States by its history: a citizen soldiery enrolled in the state militias.

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plus a professional Army" modelled after the British Army "or more roughly, the Continental Army."  

Second, as the United States began to draw down its forces in the aftermath of Vietnam, the RC became a cost effective alternative to maintaining a large and costly active Army. As in the past, following a major war, the United States has traditionally reverted back to a small active Army bolstered by significant numbers of reservists. Additionally, the low opinion of the military held by the American public, following the Vietnam War, increased the pressure on Congress to further reduce active forces.

Third, Congress remained committed to manning and equipping the reserves. Congress strongly supported the policy that the reserves should be trained and led by reserve officers and noncommissioned officers. Fourth, the Total Force Policy received the support of many senior Army officers, including then Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams.

Finally, many leaders in the Congress and throughout the government, cited the fact throughout American history, when reserve forces were mobilized and committed to battle, the citizen-soldier performed admirably and with distinction. As one military analyst stated, "It was the "citizen

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*These five factors have been summarized from Philbin and Gould, p.46.
soldier"— the National Guard and the Army Reserve not the regular who fought America's wars and who was the traditional "Savior of his Country."

One of the chief architects of the Total Force Policy was General Abrams. Abrams, who served as the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, experienced the negative impacts of the Johnson administration's refusal to mobilize the reserves. Abrams "...was determined to ensure that the mistake would not be repeated." Abrams decided to create a force structure in which the reserves were an integral part. Abrams set out to "...intertwine the three components [active, guard, and reserve] so completely that to fight any war a President would have to obtain congressional support and, in turn as Clausewitz states, the will of the people."

Given a reliance on the reserves, the Army placed some military capabilities needed only in wartime exclusively in the RC such as water purification units, railroad units, and heavy helicopter units. Additionally, a large proportion of many capabilities in the areas of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) were placed in the reserve structure. By the end of the 1980s, the size of the Army's

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RC surpassed the active force. Today, the Army National Guard (ARNG) is responsible for a significant portion of the Army's combat and CS capability, while the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) maintains much of the Army's CSS missions. These two reserve components provide almost half of the Army's combat structure and two-thirds of the Army's support structure (See Table 2).10

**TABLE 2**

**TOTAL ARMY STRUCTURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat</th>
<th>Combat Support</th>
<th>Combat Service Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>Supply and Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer (LBT)</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>Ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation (CBT)</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Judge Advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
<td>Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>Petroleum/Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Railroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Pie charts showing ARNG, AC, ARNG, AC, and USAR percentages for Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support.](chart.png)

Source: Department of the Army
Data as of September 30, 1990

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This restructuring changed the traditional role of the RC from one of being "held in reserve" and providing augmentees for active forces, to being an essential element in any future conflict. General Abrams best reflected his intent for fully integrating the reserves into the Total Force Policy when he asserted, "They're not taking us to war again without calling up the reserves."1

A. CAPSTONE

In attempt to integrate the reserves with the active forces, the Army implemented the Affiliation Program in 1973. The intent of the Affiliation Program was "...to improve the training and readiness of the RC combat arms units by associating them with AC units." Affiliation was comprised of two elements: Roundout and augmentation. Roundout brought understructured active-duty divisions to standard configurations. Augmentation "...assigned Guard and Reserve combat arms battalions to fully structured AC divisions to increase combat power." Affiliation was expanded in the late 1970s to include further integration of RC units into war plans. This new program became known as the Capstone Program.12

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1 General Creighton Abrams as quoted by Lewis Sorley in "National Guard and Reserve Forces," p.187.

The Affiliation Program, other readiness programs, RC modernization, and wartime requirements were consolidated under the Capstone Program. Capstone sought to define every unit's wartime mission, both active and reserve. It attempted to foster a closer working relationship between the RC and the AC by having reserve units work with "...their wartime AC headquarters on a regular basis to integrate planning, training, and force modernization." Since its inception, the Capstone Program has received much praise for improving the readiness of the Total Army. However, the failure to activate some reserve units during Operation Desert Shield, with Capstone missions for the Persian Gulf, generated serious discussion about the Army's commitment to the Capstone Program.

B. ROUNDOUT

One of the major innovative elements of the Total Force Policy, which sought to further integrate the RC with the AC, was the implementation of the roundout concept. The roundout concept attempted to accomplish two major objectives. First, roundout offered the Army a cost effective solution to maintaining more active-duty divisions without increasing the number of active Army soldiers. Under the roundout concept, some divisions would have only two of their normal brigades manned with active soldiers. The third brigade would be a

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1Ibid., p.25.

2Heller, p.16.
reserve brigade. Roundout was also used at the battalion level.

The second objective that the roundout concept sought to accomplish was to upgrade the readiness and improve the image of the Army RC. By assigning roundout units to active-duty divisions, reserve proponents felt that the AC would be forced to take a greater interest in the training and equipping of the often neglected reserves.¹⁵

Eventually, the roundout concept took hold and was accepted as a crucial element in the Army implementation of the Total Force Policy. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the number of Army divisions increased, the roundout concept became a fact of life for many divisions. Prior to the Persian Gulf War seven out of 18 Army divisions were rounded out by a reserve brigade.

Since its inception, the roundout concept has probably been the most controversial aspect of the Total Force Policy. Some senior active Army officers and military analysts were skeptical of the ability of roundout units, upon mobilization, to deploy with or shortly after their active-duty divisions. They were particularly concerned about those roundout units assigned to divisions earmarked for rapid deployment. However, most Army officials publicly endorsed the roundout concept as it began to grow in the 1970s and 1980s. It was not until Operation Desert Shield that the roundout concept faced its first true challenge. Operations

¹⁵Goldich, pp.5-6.
Desert Shield and Desert Storm brought the roundup concept back into the spotlight when two active Army divisions deployed to the Persian Gulf without their roundout brigades.
III. RESERVE PERFORMANCE DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

As the United States continues to draw-down and restructure its forces there will be much discussion on the proper active/reserve structure to meet the nation's national security needs in the post-Cold War era. The presidential call-up of the reserves during the Persian Gulf War was the greatest call-up and mobilization of the reserves since World War II and marked the first real test of the Total Force Policy. Many analysts will look at the Persian Gulf to make their assessments about future structures and mixes of active and reserve forces. This chapter examines the reserve involvement in the war and argues that despite the public praise for their performance, there remains a great deal of concern amongst Army leaders about the ability of reserves to perform certain missions as envisioned by the founders of the Total Force Policy.

The first call up of reserve units took place on 22 August 1990 when the President called up 50,050 personnel to active-duty in support of Operation Desert Shield. For this initial call-up, the President exercised his authority to mobilize the reserves under Title 10 USC 673(b) which limits the number of troops mobilized to 200,000 for 90 days. A 90 day extension to this initial call-up was granted prior to the second major call-up. As Operation Desert Shield transformed
into Desert Storm, the President issued an executive order on 18 January 1991, mobilizing up to 360,000 personnel under a broader call-up authority (10 USC 673), which also permitted the Army to call up members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The call-up process culminated in the mobilization of about 213,000 reservists (includes all services) at the peak of the war.\footnote{U.S. General Accounting Office, "Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces" Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1992), p.9.}

The Army called up more reservists than the other services. The Army activated 1,033 reserve units, just short of 150,000 personnel, and deployed 69 percent (708 units) of the them to the Persian Gulf. These reserve units represented all facets of the Army: combat, combat support, and combat service support. They served in field artillery, military police, maintenance, medical, engineer, petroleum, as well as several other types of units. At one point, 25 percent of all Army personnel serving in Southwest Asia were members of the RC.\footnote{Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1992 Part 2, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., p.464.}

For the most part, the nearly 40,000 National Guardsmen and 40,000 Army reservists, who deployed to the Persian Gulf performed admirably and received high marks for their contribution to the war. The performance of reservists in the CS and CSS areas "...was often indistinguishable from
that of the active forces, in part a reflection of the frequent congruence between what they did in civil life and their military duties." General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on 3 December 1990, commented:

The success of the Guard and Reserve participation cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and balance. 1

At the end of the war, General Powell referred to the contributions of the reservists as "magnificent." The Commander of the Army's Forces Command noted that the performance of the reserves was "...one of the major success stories of the entire operation." 2

As one might expect, virtually all of the administration's and the Pentagon's comments on the participation of reservists during the war were favorable. There is little literature evidence which contradicts the claim that reservists in the CS and CSS branches of the Army successfully accomplished their missions during the Persian Gulf War. Based on this favorable impression of reserve CS and CSS units, the Total Force Policy premise of relying

1"Sorley, p.201.


heavily on the RC for support missions during wartime was validated during the Persian Gulf War.

**A. ROUNDOUT PERFORMANCE**

However, the performance of reservists, who were called up but not deployed to the Persian Gulf, raised some serious discussion about the assignment of reserve units to the front line. The ground combat forces of the reserves received a "black eye," largely due to the performance of three ARNG roundout brigades which were activated during the conflict. Two active Army divisions were sent to the Persian Gulf without their roundout brigades that were supposed to deploy with them. The three roundout brigades received unfavorable attention in the press as they spent a prolonged period of time preparing for deployment to the Gulf. The 48th Infantry Brigade of the Georgia ARNG (the roundout unit for the 24th Infantry Division) was the only roundout brigade certified as combat ready after spending a record two months at the National Training Center in Ft. Irwin, California. As a result of the post-mobilization training performance of the roundout brigades, several studies were conducted to reevaluate the roundout concept as it fits into the Total Force Policy.

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\[\text{J. Paul Scicchitano, "Total Force or Total Failure," Army Times, 15 April 1991, p.11.}\]
The General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a detailed review of the three roundout brigades from December 1990 to June 1991. The GAO concluded:

The Army has not adequately prepared its National Guard roundout brigades to be fully ready to deploy quickly. For example, many soldiers were not completely trained to do their jobs; many noncommissioned officers were not adequately trained in leadership skills; and gunnery skills were less proficient than reported.2

Several soldiers, approximately eight percent in two of the brigades, had to attend formal schooling to learn a new military occupational specialty. Despite having attended the Army's Tactical Commanders Development Course, the entire officer staffs of the three roundout brigades "...continued to display tactical and technical weaknesses when they returned to their units."3 Maintenance problems plagued the two roundout brigades at the National Training Center and adversely affected training. Many mechanics and soldiers "...did not know how to diagnose equipment problems or repair the vehicles in a timely manner."4 The GAO report also concluded that the National Guard's different administrative systems hampered the Guard's ability to transition to war. Additionally, the GAO concluded inadequate peacetime medical screening practices failed to identify a large number of soldiers who were nondeployable for medical or dental reasons.

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2"Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War," p.12.
3Ibid., p.18.
under Army regulations. The GAO provided the Secretary of the Army with recommendations for resolving these problems including several suggestions for improving peacetime training and training evaluations and combat readiness validations.25

Another study on the roundout performance was conducted by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Many of the same shortcomings that appeared in the GAO study appeared in the CRS report. The CRS concluded that despite these shortcomings, the roundout units proved capable of being declared combat ready within three to four months after being activated. The CRS added, "This is an unprecedented achievement when compared to the previous historical experience of mobilizing National Guard combat units of brigade or division size." The report noted that several factors led many to assume that roundout units were as combat ready as similar active Army units: excessive optimism, typified by a "can-do" attitude, inflated numerical readiness levels, and "...high-level inattention to the actual readiness levels of the roundout brigades." Additionally, the study notes that the active Army and National Guard "can-do" approach in public statements and in front of congressional committees left the impression that "...the roundout brigades would and could deploy with their parent

25 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
26 Goldich, p. 23.
27 Ibid., p. 1.
divisions under all circumstances, without any explicit reference to the time that might elapse between mobilization and deployment."

Reserve and National Guard supporters were infuriated by the DOD's decision not to deploy the roundout brigades to Southwest Asia. According to several analysts, the failure to send the roundout brigades undermined one of the major premises of the Total Force Policy. It was a devastating blow to those ARNG roundout units who trained extensively, developed a close relationship with their AC divisions, and truly believed that they would be called to fight side by side with active-duty soldiers in the event of war. The roundout decision also added to the traditional rivalry between the "regulars" and the "citizen-soldiers."

The ARNG was critical of the post-mobilization training program which was designed and implemented by active forces. In the ARNG's *Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report*, the Guard claimed, "The overwhelming support provided the roundout brigades by the active component personnel had a counterproductive affect on unit training." The Guard also criticized the AC for "changing the rules" concerning

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"Ibid., p.19.

"Scicchitano, p.10.

"Heller, pp.15-16.
deployability criteria and for implementing a new combat readiness evaluation process.

The DOD contends that the roundout brigades were never intended to be deployed as part of an immediate response as part of a short-notice rapid contingency mission. Instead, it was envisioned that the roundout units would undergo post-mobilization training and would enter the conflict as "...part of early reinforcing forces (forces that would depart for a crisis between 30 and 90 days after its commencement)." However, many people, including members of Congress, were led to believe that the roundout brigades "...could deploy without at least several weeks of post-mobilization training" and "...were as available for short-notice, rapid response contingencies as for any other."

Several influential Congressman were outraged and voiced their displeasure with the decision not to send the roundout brigades. Representative G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery (D-MS), a staunch advocate of reserve forces and a retired major general of the Mississippi National Guard, often recited General H. Norman Schwarzkopf's comments about roundout units while he served as the commander of the 24th Infantry Division in the mid 1980s:

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"Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War," p.10.

Goldich, p.20.
The 48th Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, is the third brigade of my division....I expect them to fight alongside us. They have demonstrated [their capability] through three demanding rotations at the National Training Center...they are, in fact, combat ready.  

During Operation Desert Shield, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, urged Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney to integrate reserve combat forces as early as possible. The DOD cited four reasons for not activating the roundout brigades until four months after their parent units were alerted for deployment to Saudi Arabia. First, with the possibility of immediate combat upon arrival, active forces were better suited to meet the primary mission of Desert Shield to deter and defend against an Iraqi attack against Saudi Arabia. Second, General Schwarzkopf requested two full-strength heavy divisions at the beginning of Desert Shield. Since there was no time for roundout post-mobilization training, two active brigades were substituted for the roundout units. Third, General Schwarzkopf's request was received 16 days prior to the initial call-up on 22 August 1990. Fourth, it was felt the initial call-up restricted the effective usage of the reserves to 180 days (90 days initially, followed by a 90 day extension based on presidential discretion).  

Whatever the rationale for not

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"General H. Norman Schwarzkopf as quoted by Sorley, p.196.

"Goldich, pp.9-10.
calling-up the roundout units, the DOD's decision sent a powerful message to Congress concerning the military's true attitude about the combat role of the reserves "...and the validity of the entire Total Force study effort."

In light of the roundout performance, several military officials including General Schwarzkopf agreed with Secretary Cheney's and General Powell's claim that ARNG ground combat units would require several months of training following mobilization before being sent into combat. In testimony before congressional committees in June 1991, General Schwarzkopf, recommended that roundout brigades should not be assigned to those Army divisions designated for short-notice contingency operations.

B. APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED

In September 1991, the Army applied some of the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War and announced some controversial changes in the roundout concept and the way reserve units train. The Army acknowledged the shortcomings of the roundout concept when it altered the mission of two ARNG mechanized infantry brigades, earmarked for quick response contingency operations, from roundout to roundup.

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In two Active divisions, the Army substituted the ARNG units with an active-duty brigade and made the Guard units the fourth ground maneuver brigade (hence the name roundup) for their associated division. Although the Army's Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan, has repeatedly acknowledged that "roundout brigades are here to stay," the roundup proposal came as a shock to reserve proponents and generated more discussion on the utility of the roundup concept.

In another major overhaul of the reserve system, the Army initiated a new approach to the way reserves train. In a speech before the National Guard Association of the United States, General Sullivan outlined that reserve units would focus their training in peacetime on basic soldier skills at the crew, squad, and platoon levels as opposed to larger maneuver units. General Sullivan added that, "Full-scale company, battalion, and brigade operations will be the focus during post-mobilization training." The new approach, dubbed "Operation Bold Shift", certainly added to reserve supporters fears that the RC:

...under the new national strategy is still shy of the original intent of Total Force Policy planners...The missions [for the reserves] are in keeping with the roles the Total Force Policy sought to change.

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5Heller, p.21.
On 12 March 1992, General Sullivan announced another controversial shift for the reserves. Referring to the amount of time it would take to prepare reserve combat units for war, Sullivan commented, "As a result of our experience in Desert Storm, in my view it will take 90 days to do a brigade...and about a year to train a division." This is a radical departure from the approximate 45 days of training (for a brigade) previously envisioned by Army planners. This announcement drew a great deal of criticism from National Guard supporters who claim that ARNG units could be combat ready in half the time.

C. SUMMARY

During the Persian Gulf War, the Army called up over 140,000 reservists and deployed over 74,000 to the Gulf. This mobilization marked the first true test of the Total Force Policy adopted in 1973. During the initial phases of Operation Desert Shield, reserve support forces were called-up to assist in a monumental logistics effort. In the beginning, it looked as if the Army would implement the Capstone and Roundout programs of the Total Force Policy. However, the failure to call-up several Capstone units and the hesitation to activate roundout units caused many reserve supporters and congressional officials to question the DOD's
genuine adherence to the principles of the Total Force Policy.

Army reserve units performing CS and CSS missions were critical to the success of Operations Desert Shield and Storm. According to many senior Army commanders, they could not have succeeded without the reserve participation in these areas. However, despite literature evidence and public announcements which praised the performance of the reserves during the war, recent Army reserve initiatives suggest otherwise. The shift from roundout to roundup, "Operation Bold Shift," and General Sullivan's 90 day announcement indicate that the Army's leadership was not totally satisfied with several aspects of the integration of the reserves during the Persian Gulf War. These recent changes to the approach for preparing reserve forces for combat, has added more controversy to the debate of the role of the reserves in the Total Force Policy and the new national security strategy.
IV. THE RESERVES AND THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

President Bush's new national security strategy contains a Base Force consisting of 20 Army divisions. By 1995, the Army's contribution to Pacific Forces will be two active divisions, one light division in Hawaii and one heavy division in Korea that will have a roundout brigade. The Atlantic Force will contain two active heavy divisions in Germany. The Contingency Force, located in the United States, will be made up of five active divisions, three light and two heavy. Finally there will be 11 divisions in the continental U.S.-based reinforcement forces. The breakdown for these divisions is as follows: three active heavy divisions with reserve roundout brigades, five heavy reserve divisions, one light reserve division, and two cadre divisions (See Table 3). The Army groups these 20 divisions under three of the four pillars of the new national security strategy: forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.43

According to the Pentagon's Base Force proposal, in that portion constituting forward deployed divisions, the ratio of active to reserve forces will remain essentially unchanged. The four combat divisions, deployed overseas, will remain in the active component, with the exception of the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea which will have a roundout brigade. Under this structure, the reserves will make up about eight percent
of the CS and CSS roles. Given the locations and missions of the units performing the forward presence role, this AC/RC mix makes sense. Additionally, there is some discussion of reducing or scaling back the number of divisions deployed overseas, particularly in Germany.

In addition to reducing forces by 25 percent and decreasing the number of soldiers stationed overseas, the new U.S. security strategy seeks to respond quickly to a wide range of world-wide contingency operations. The Army includes the five divisions earmarked for the Contingency Force under the forward presence pillar. These CONUS based divisions are classified as rapidly deployable and are capable of being fully deployed in two to four months. The above-the-line (divisional forces) force in the rapidly deployable category will be 100 percent active-duty forces and the AC below-the-line CS and CSS drops to 78 percent and the RC to 22 percent. Pentagon officials contend that the majority of reserve forces are not suited for the quick response contingency type operation envisioned for the future.

The minimal reserve contribution in the Contingency Force has raised the most concerns amongst reserve proponents about the role of the reserves in the new strategy. The DOD's reasoning for the the minimal participation of the reserves in the Contingency Force can be found in the conclusions of

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44Ibid, p.156.
45Ibid.
Department of Defense's, "Total Force Policy Report to Congress," issued in December 1990. The report concluded that "...active duty forces should be able to deploy quickly to future trouble spots and sustain themselves for the first 30 days with virtually no support from reservists." The DOD's claim that reserves will play less of a role for quick response contingency operations has met strong opposition from reserve supporters in the military and in Congress.

One military analyst, who favors an increase in reserve involvement in the new strategy, asserts that the Army is steering away from the Total Force Policy's original claim of deploying the reserves early "...without qualifying the type of contingency." He also adds, "...that part of the new strategy which reduces the role in contingency operations may have little chance of being accepted by Congress or the American public."  

B. CRISIS RESPONSE

The nine divisions designated to support the crisis response pillar of the new strategy are predominantly made up of reserve divisions. The 1995 breakdown for these divisions will be three active heavy divisions with roundout brigades, five heavy reserve divisions, and one light reserve division. Additionally two roundup brigades have been placed in the

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5 Heller, p.21.
crisis response category. The Army categorizes these crisis response divisions as reinforcing and capable of being fully deployed in six to nine months. Based on the announcement made by General Sullivan, this deployability time will likely increase to one year for the reserve divisions.

The reinforcement mission for the reserve forces under the crisis response pillar appears to be a return to the traditional mission of being held in reserve. The above-the-line (divisional forces) force in the crisis response role will be 22 percent active-duty forces and 78 reserve. The three active divisions with the roundout brigades will have a below-the-line CS and CSS ratio of 50 percent active and 50 percent reserve. The remaining six reserve divisions will have only four percent active forces and 96 percent reserve forces performing the CS and CSS missions.4

The Army's shifting of reserve forces, particular the reserve combat forces, away from the forward presence mission and into the crisis response mission has generated a great deal of concern in the National Guard. The ARNG has fought long and hard to convince military and political leaders that Guard units are reliable, competent, and capable of being deployed with minimum post-mobilization training. The ARNG sees this shift as a trend toward diminishing and eliminating some of the Guard's roles and missions. While the discussion over the new strategy continues, force structures continue to be debated, and budget resources decline, the ARNG might find

4Peay and LeCuyer, p. 156.
itself under further attack by the Army's active leadership. Faced with such an assault, the ARNG will likely resort to its close political relationship with the Congress to preserve as many of its units as possible.

C. RECONSTITUTION AND CADRE DIVISIONS

Another aspect of President Bush's new strategy which has drawn much attention is reconstitution. In theory, reconstitution assumes at least a two year warning of a military resurgence of the former Soviet Union based on the old Cold War European based scenario. Reconstitution also assumes that during the two year build up, the United States will be able to generate new forces. In an effort to reduce costs, the Army proposed the establishment of two peacetime cadre divisions as part of the reconstitution portion of the new strategy.

The cadre divisions would be partially equipped and manned during peacetime then filled and trained in the event of a major war. However, the Army has yet to announce how much equipment and how many personnel will make up the cadre division. Additionally, the decision as to what Army component will be responsible for its implementation has yet to be determined. The Army's uncertainty over these issues has added further controversy to the cadre concept which has drawn considerable fire from a number of sources.

The GAO, at the request of Representative Beverly Byron, Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, House Committee on Armed Services, examined how
other countries organize and train their army reserves in an effort to assist U.S. Army planners as they restructure its components. The GAO recommended that the Army test the cadre concept at various organization levels before fully implementing the cadre divisions in the total force structure. The GAO also recommended that the Army look at other options to cadre divisions and other countries' techniques for assigning and training reserves.

The cadre concept recently "took a turn for the worse" after Representative Aspin announced his proposal for further reductions in the military force structure. In addition to eliminating an additional 200,000 active duty jobs by 1997, Aspin's proposal calls for a new Base Force without the cadre divisions. Based on Aspin's proposal and abandonment of the cadre concept, there appears to be little hope that the cadre divisions will become reality. Besides, it appears that the Army will focus its attention on saving active-duty divisions and let the proposed cadre divisions die stillborn.

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5 Ibid., p.3.

V. THE RESERVES AND CONGRESS

The final decision as to what role reserves will play in the new national security strategy rests in the Congress. Ultimately, it will be the Congress who determines how many reservists will be on the payrolls. As mentioned earlier, Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution gives Congress the authority "to raise and support armies" and "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia." In 1989 and 1990 Congress asserted this authority and refused to let the DOD eliminate any reserves.5:

During last year’s budget battle, the Bush administration proposed significant personnel cutbacks in the ARNG and the USAR. The administration argued for cutbacks in the reserves which were numerically comparable to the reduction in active-duty forces. In the absence of a detailed analysis for the proposed cuts and driven by the desire to protect the interests of constituents, Congress rejected the President's attempt to slash the reserves.

This chapter argues that congressional parochialism motivates members to vote against the proposals for large reductions in the reserves. While the administration remains committed to reducing the reserves and the Congress persists

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in maintaining a large reserve structure, it appears that this subject will continue to be a contentious issue in the future. Additionally, despite the congressional “battle cry” for a peace dividend, the reserve issue demonstrates that pork-driven activism in Congress will continue to have a significant impact on the defense budget process as well as military force levels in the future.

Many political scientists contend that members of Congress tend to make their decisions on issues based on what will provide the most political benefits to constituents. Barry Blechman argues that members of Congress are motivated by the desire to provide “pork” for their constituents and tend to ignore the policy aspect of issues. On the other hand, James Lindsay claims that members of Congress do care about the issues surrounding nuclear and conventional weapons programs.

Concerning nuclear weapons policy, Lindsay argues, “Contrary to much of the literature on Congress, members care about the substance of policy and not just where the benefits go.” Referring to conventional weapons programs, Lindsay asserts that contrary to popular belief “...available evidence and common sense both suggest...that the parochial imperative plays at best a subsidiary role.” However, 

Lindsay contends that "...the parochial imperative clearly motivates congressional behavior on military base issues." 54

Many of the issues surrounding military bases are similar to the issues involving the reduction of reserve forces with one major exception. The reserve issue is much broader in scope. Reserve units, armories, and centers are scattered throughout the United States and have economic and political implications in a far greater number of congressional districts. The reserve issue, like the military bases dispute, are two examples of the rare instances in which Congress, as an institution, acts parochially.

This chapter will begin with an examination of the administration's 1991 proposal and its rationale behind the reduction. Following the discussion of the administration's stance, the congressional response to the proposal will be reviewed and explanations will be offered as to why Congress acted the way they did. Prior to the conclusion, the current battle being waged over the reserves in this year's budget debate is addressed.

A. THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL

As part of the Bush administration's plan to reduce the military by 25 percent during the next five years, the President recommended a reduction of 107,526 reservists in his fiscal year 1992 budget proposal. These cuts were

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54 James Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1991), p.123.
proportionately almost twice as much as the proposed reduction in the active-duty forces. However, the Pentagon argued that the AC and the RC would be reduced by equal proportions over the five year drawdown cycle. After much debate, the administration suffered a frustrating defeat as the Congress approved only about one-third of the administration's request. In the end, Congress agreed to cut the reserves by slightly more than 40,000 members.\footnote{Janet Hook, "Congress Finds Plenty to Do as War Fades Into Memory," \textit{Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report}, 10 August 1991, p.2247.}

During several appearances and testimony before Congress, Secretary Cheney and General Powell failed to convince congressional leaders of their plan to trim the reserves. The administration rationalized the reserve cuts by focusing on the costs of maintaining a "bloated" reserve structure and the diminished role of reserve forces under President Bush's new national security strategy. Additionally, the performance of the reserves during the Persian Gulf War raised some serious questions about the role of the reserves in ground combat operations.

In 1990, Congress directed the Department of Defense to study the Total Force Policy, AC/RC force mix, and military force structure. On 31 December 1990, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued the "Total Force Policy Report to the Congress." The report recommended that the RC and the AC should be reduced by about the same percentage. The Total

Force Policy Group also rejected the idea that certain AC missions and force structure could be transferred into the RC and still meet national security requirements. The administration attempted to use these recommendations and conclusions to justify their cuts in the reserve structure.  

As the Persian Gulf War ended, the Department of Defense faced an uphill fight in 1991 to rationalize its programs in an era of decreasing military expenditures. As the Soviet Union collapsed, the Pentagon found itself under further siege to reduce defense expenditures. As the year progressed, the issue of reserve reductions became even more controversial. The administration claimed that the failure of the Congress to cut the reserves threatened the combat readiness of the active-duty forces. Secretary Cheney claimed that without equitable reductions in the RC, the Army would have to assimilate approximately $11 billion dollars in unnecessary expenses over the next six years.

Echoing Secretary Cheney's remarks, General Powell told the House Appropriations Subcommittee for Defense in September 1991:

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57Rick Maze, "Reserve study called 'political brochure," p.6.


Look, I am second to no one in my love and respect and admiration of reserves. We couldn't do anything without them...I love them all, but I just don't need them all.\textsuperscript{6}

Frustrated by the congressional attitude not to reduce the reserves, General Powell pleaded, "If you force us to keep this unneeded structure in the reserves, you're just wasting the taxpayer's money."\textsuperscript{7} Throughout 1991, Secretary Cheney and General Powell criticized Congress for protecting National Guard units and armories in their districts from proposed Pentagon reductions.\textsuperscript{8}

Secretary Cheney and General Powell stressed to congressional leaders that the reserve reductions were directly related to the drawdown in the active forces. Secretary Cheney argued that since the reserve structure is there to support the active forces, if reserve units are not eliminated in proportion to active units, "I'll end up with Guard and Reserve units that don't have a mission."\textsuperscript{9} General Powell summed up his comments about keeping unnecessary reserve forces when he asserted, "They'll train. We'll keep

\textsuperscript{6}Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, as quoted by Greg Seigle in "Reserve cuts hit raw nerve in Congress," \textit{Army Times}, 6 January 1992, p.32.

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{9}Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, as quoted by William Matthews in "Cheney: Some reservists won't have a mission," \textit{Army Times}, 19 August 1991, p 6.
them busy, but they'll have no mission." Congress was not convinced by the administration's argument and agreed to eliminate only a fraction of the administration's proposal.

B. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

In 1991, Congress sent a double message to the Pentagon when it agreed to cut active-duty forces by a third while refusing to trim the reserves proportionally. Frustrated by the congressional response, Pentagon officials found it extremely difficult to explain Congress' decision. On one hand, many members of Congress demanded reduced military spending, yet on the other hand they rejected the DOD's proposal for reserve reductions.

In the book, Congress and Nuclear Weapons, James Lindsay argues that congressional decisionmaking can be explained by viewing the process through three "conceptual lenses": deferential, parochial, and policy. The deferential lens predicts that members of Congress will defer to the President on weapons acquisition issues. The parochial lens asserts that members evaluate weapons systems based on what is good for their constituents and pay little attention to what is good for the national interest. The policy lens contends that members do care about the issues surrounding

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"General Colin Powell as quoted by Greg Seigle in, "Reserve cuts hit raw nerve in Congress," p.32.

"Seigle, "Reserve cuts hit raw nerve in Congress," p.32.
weapons programs and are genuinely concerned about how weapon systems protect the national interests."

Although Lindsay's work primarily focuses on nuclear weapons programs, he does apply the "conceptual lenses" approach to conventional weapons and military bases. The debate over cutting reserves closely resembles the debate which took place over base closures in the late 1980s. Lindsay argues, "...the parochial lens appears to best explain how Congress handles DOD's requests on military bases."

The reserve issue will be examined through the parochial lens.

According to Lindsay "...while individual legislators often act parochially, Congress as an institution usually does not." The reserve issue is one of the rare instances in which Congress, as an institution acts parochially. Unlike most weapons systems and defense programs, which affect only certain areas of the country, the reserve issue affects a much broader spectrum. Reserves train in over 5,000 armories and reserve centers located across the country. Although some of these centers are colocated on large military installations, the majority of the armories

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""Lindsay, p.7.
""Ibid., p.133.
""Ibid., p.131.
and reserve centers are located in more than 3,000 separate communities throughout the United States.\textsuperscript{6}

Although most members of Congress agree that some cuts in the reserves are necessary because of the significant reductions in the active forces, many are concerned about the rapid draw-down in the reserves and the impact in their districts and states. Representative Montgomery, a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee, reminded his colleagues of the economic impact those 3,000 armories have in those communities: "...an armory in a small community of 100 guardsman, men and women, brings in about $1 million payroll a year. Certainly we should not be closing these armories."\textsuperscript{7} Representative Dean Gallo (D-NJ) noted that the administration's proposal would eliminate one in every three reservists and the closing of one in every three armories across the country.\textsuperscript{8}

One of the factors which impacted last year's congressional decision to protect the reserves was that "Congress historically has been reluctant to cut reserve strength in the face of strong lobbying from the politically


\textsuperscript{7}"Representative G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery, Congressional Record, 18 November 1991, p. H10388.

\textsuperscript{8}"Representative Dean A. Gallo, Congressional Record, 7 June 1991, p.H4149.
active National Guard members and Reservists." The ARNG and the USAR have powerful lobbying forces in Washington that wield substantial political clout.

The politically powerful National Guard Association of the United States joined the fight to oppose Defense Department reserve cuts. In April 1991, the National Guard Association sent an "Action Gram" to the Adjutants General of all the states requesting action in opposing the cuts in the Guard. The "Action Gram" urged all guardsmen "...to convince each member of Congress that the National Guard is the most cost-effective portion of our nation's defense forces." It also urged members to remind Congress of the National Guard's vital role in federal and state missions as well as "...the role the National Guard plays in generating political consensus and community support for national defense." Although it is difficult to assess the impact the National Guard Association had on last year's decision, as one Senate staffer commented, "When the state's Adjutant General calls me up, he gets my attention."

In an effort to protect constituent interests, 45 members in the House of Representatives formed the Northeast-Midwest

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Congressional coalition to protest the rapid draw-down of the reserves. The 45 members, representing 18 states, argued that the Pentagon's proposal disproportionately targeted ARNG units in their states. Under the Pentagon's plan, 64 percent of the losses would have come from the Northeastern and Midwestern states as opposed to 36.5 percent from the South and West. According to the members of the caucus, the Pentagon proposal was unfair because only 35 percent of the ARNG is located in the Northeast and Midwest compared to 65 percent in the South and West. Representative Bernard Dwyer (D-NJ), noted that the Pentagon's plan sought a 4400 ARNG personnel cut in his state, which amounted to a 31 percent reduction in the New Jersey National Guard for fiscal year 1992. Dwyer asked Pentagon officials if New Jersey was being targeted to accept an inequitable share of the cuts nationwide. DOD officials countered the claims and said the cuts were based on units that were longer needed and not on a regional basis.

In another showing of strong support for the reserves, in mid-1989 several Senators formed the Senate National Guard Caucus, a bipartisan group which focuses attention on issues of importance to the National Guard. According to Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) the primary focus of the caucus in

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1991 was to ensure that the "...National Guard should not be disadvantaged as we downsize the military." It should be noted that one of the two Army National Guard divisions nominated for deactivation last year was from New Jersey.

In addition to the caucuses formed in the House and Senate, several prominent congressional leaders voiced their support for the reserves. Representative Jamie L. Whitten (D-MS), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, stated, "If you are going to get local support, you must maintain the Guard and Reserve." In response to the President's reserve reduction proposal, Whitten countered, "If you can't have all the regulars that you would like to have, you better get somebody who contributes to the economy and practices on the weekends."

Another strong supporter of the reserves is Representative John P. Murtha (D-PA), Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the Department of Defense. Murtha, a retired Marine Corps reservist, was instrumental in lessening the blow on the number of reservists cut last year. In a rather honest statement, Murtha claimed:

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Not trying to be parochial...approximately 43,000 cuts over several years would come from areas of this Subcommittee's members...Politically I don't think it will work. I don't think there is any way we could pass a bill where the cuts start to come into effect right before the next election."

When comparing cuts in the AC with reductions in the RC, Murtha added:

But Reserve and Guard, they stay in one area and they vote. Each one of them has families who vote. You lose a big Reserve unit, you are talking four or five hundred people."

Murtha was not satisfied with the administration's justification behind the reserve proposal nor its methodology for determining what reserve units were to be cut. Murtha asserted that before Congress would approve substantial reductions in the reserves, the Defense Department would have to produce a detailed plan first. The politically well-connected Reserve Officer's Association thanked Murtha for his "legislative assistance to the Guard and Reserve," when they presented him with the organization's Minuteman of the Year award for 1991."

"Ibid., p.16.


C. POLICY NOT PORK

Although several congressional members cited the negative economic impact of closing armories in their districts as rationale for restraining large reserve reductions, several influential Congressman based their support for the reserves on policy considerations rather than pork. Some members of Congress argued that reserve forces provide a cost-effective alternative to the high cost of maintaining large active forces. According to the Total Force Policy Report, reserve units cost about one fourth that of a comparable active unit.

Some members bolstered their argument by noting that historically the United States has looked to large numbers of citizen-soldiers to augment a small standing army. Other congressional leaders noted that the performance of reserve forces in the Persian Gulf demonstrated the importance of these forces in the Total Force structure. Several members claimed that the successful call up the reserves during the Persian Gulf War finally brought the nation's people into the war and proved the value of part-time soldiers. Whatever the argument, when last year's battle over the reserves ended and the smoke cleared, the Congress succeeded in passing legislation which kept the reserve forces fairly intact.

D. LAST YEAR'S PROCESS

There were several interesting twists in the congressional process during last year's battle over the reserves. Although rejecting the president's proposal, the Senate's Authorization and Appropriations Committees' proposals were
consistent. The Senate authorization bill cut reserve strengths by 33,000 while the appropriations bill cut by 35,000.\footnote{Lindsay, p.92.} The House of Representatives, on the other hand, acted more parochially, as James Lindsay would have predicted.

According to Lindsay, "House members represent smaller and more homogeneous constituencies, so they generally feel more pressure to defend the economic interests of their constituents." Since the proposed reserve reductions would have had significant economic consequences in dozens of congressional districts, it is not surprising that the House of Representatives reacted differently than the Senate. While the House authorization bill approved a reserve cut of 38,000, which was slightly higher than its Senate counterpart, the House appropriations bill mandated a radical increase in the fiscal 1991 reserve levels by 1,100. This bold proposal added more controversy to the subject of how fast, and even whether reserve forces should be reduced.

Towards the end of last year, an unusual twist on the reserve issue occurred between the authorization conference agreement and the appropriations conference agreement. On 23 November 1991, on the floor of the Senate, Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, presented the "Department of Defense

\footnote{\textit{Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report}, 7 December 1991, p3597.}
Inouye noted that the reserve issue was "one of the most difficult issues that we confronted in conference." Inouye commented that the authorization conference agreement placed a ceiling on the number of reservists but amazingly failed to establish a floor. Inouye stressed, "Nothing- I repeat nothing- is contained in the authorization conference agreement which would prevent the Department of Defense from drawing Army Guard end strength down to any figure it chooses." Inouye added that the appropriations conference agreement came to the Guard's rescue and set a floor to prevent the Defense Department from stripping the reserves. While the appropriations conference rejected the President's proposal to cut 107,526 reservists, they agreed to reduce the reserves by 40,030. However, the conference agreement did offer the Department of Defense a compromise by permitting the Secretary of Defense to further reduce reserve end strengths by no more than two percent. Senator Inouye justified the decisions of the conference based on the Defense Department's failure to present "...a coordinated plan to make these reductions."

The conference report also directed the Department of Defense to submit "...a listing of all units scheduled to be reduced, realigned or inactivated...[and] where appropriate, 


Ibid.
the lists are to include active units which these Guard and Reserve units support." Inouye concluded his remarks about the reserves by saying:

I know that there are Senators who will disagree with the position the conferees have taken on the Guard and Reserves. Nonetheless, I stand before you and the Senate, and I say without reservation- we protected the Guard. 46

Based on the outcome of last year's reserve debate, it is fair to conclude that the Department of Defense should shoulder a good portion of the blame for the defeat it suffered. The Senate Armed Services Committee criticized the Pentagon for adopting a "share-the-pain" philosophy rather than offering a detailed analysis for the cuts. The committee cited a Navy proposal to deactivate two reserve mine-sweeping squadrons as evidence of the Pentagon's lack of a detailed plan to trim the reserves. The committee stated the Navy proposal "...is completely at odds with the damaging and embarrassing problems that mines cause the Navy in the Persian Gulf War." 47 The administration underestimated the strong congressional support for the reserves and failed to put forth a convincing argument to justify the reserve cuts. There is little evidence which refutes the claim that the administration simply put forth a weak and unconvincing argument. Members of Congress skillfully used this failure

46 "Ibid.

47 "Rick Maze, "Reserve cuts postponed pending study," Army Times, 19 August 1991, p.6."
to their advantage and avoided, or at least postponed, the rather difficult decision to reduce the politically well-connected reserves.

E. THIS YEAR'S BATTLE

Although the administration was not pleased with last year's congressional decision to protect the reserves, they vowed to continue to fight. During this year's budget process, the administration once again has made an assault on the reserves. It also appears that reserve supporters remain determined "not to let the Guard down." Senator Inouye predicted that the proposed reserve reductions will be the "...most contentious and most controversial issue" during this year's budget debates.

The day following President Bush's "State of the Union Address," in a DOD Budget Briefing, Secretary Cheney was asked if he had any new argument to convince Congress to cut reserves. Cheney used the base closing process as an analogy to answer the question. Cheney commented that when he became Secretary of Defense, he was constantly reminded that it would be impossible to close bases. He added, that after much debate, and the eventual establishment of the Base Closing Commission, a compromise was reached on the controversial issue and the Department of Defense began closing bases. Cheney reflected the administration's determination to reduce the reserve structure when he stated,

"So I guess you'd have to say I'm an eternal optimist when I think we'll get the Congress to agree to further cuts in the Guard and Reserve Structure." General Powell reiterated the administration's stance when he stated:

As [active-duty] units go out of the force, reserve units must also go out of the force. It makes no sense to inactivate units and not inactivate the reserve units that support them.

During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing held on 27 February 1992, Senator John Glenn (D-OH), warned General Sullivan, "We need some information to go on as to what the mix is going to be. Or, I'm afraid what you're going to wind up with is the shallow glide slope again this year for lack of having any better information to justify bigger cuts." General Sullivan noted that in addition to the Pentagon's recommendations for reserve reductions, the RAND Corporation, as required by Section 402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1991 and 1992, has been assigned the task of assessing alternative structures and mixes of active and reserve forces. RAND submitted an interim report on 15 May 1992 and will issue its final report on 15 December 1992. The Secretary of Defense's and the


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's evaluation of the final report is not due until 15 February 1992. It is interesting to note that RAND's final report will conveniently be completed following this year's November elections.

Representative Montgomery launched his 1992 campaign in support of the reserves before the budget battle began. Prior to the President's "State of the Union Address" and the administration's budget proposal, Montgomery issued a "white paper" advocating for greater reliance on the National Guard and the reserves. In the paper, Montgomery cites the nation's historical reliance on the reserves, the non-federal roles of the Guard, the reserves' success in Desert Storm, and the economical advantage of the reserves over active-duty forces, to support his argument. Montgomery concludes by saying:

We must be careful not to eliminate units which we may need in the future. Once they are gone we will not be able to reconstitute them easily. The bottom line on the Guard and Reserve reductions is go slow.

Representative Murtha also joined Montgomery in this year's reserve debate. In a speech delivered to the Reserve Officer's Association, Murtha proposed several changes to the roles and missions of the reserves. He urged the

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implementation of a Joint Staff directorate that would address reserve affairs in hopes of giving the reserves more leverage within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Murtha also proposed using deployed reservists to replace active-duty soldiers serving overseas. For example, he favors reducing active forces in Europe even further and rotating National Guard and reserve units every two months. Murtha also predicted that, "I can foresee a smaller [active] force with a lot more missions going to the reserve."

Representative Norm Dicks (D-WA), who supported last year's administration proposal, predicted, "Congress would approve deeper Guard and reserve reductions in future years only if it can insulate the process from constituent pressure to save local jobs." Dicks also predicted, "We're going to have another commission." Representative Murtha summed up the dilemma faced by Congress over the reserves when he remarked:

"We need a practical compromise on this Reserve and Guard issue with the active forces. We can talk about it in the abstract all we want to, but we have to have something we can sell just like any other program."

"Representative John Murtha as quoted by Rick Maze in, "Expanded role envisioned," p.10.

97Representative Norm Dicks as quoted by Pat Towell in, "Defense Spending Bill Follows Authorization Measure's Lead," p.3396.

"Ibid., p.3396.

This year's debate made the front page of *The New York Times* after General Powell and Secretary Cheney spoke at a news conference on 26 March 92 and released the Pentagon's proposed list of 830 ARNG and USAR units it intends to close by the end of 1993. The DOD, "challenging one of Congress's political sacred cows," recommended eliminating 140,000 reservists over the next two years. The DOD's rationale for the reductions addressed many of the same issues as last year's debate. However, it was the first time the DOD identified the specific units directly associated with the draw-down. Secretary Cheney claimed that eighty percent of the reserve reductions were designated:

...to go to Europe in wartime and support the active force. Those active units are out. Now we've identified the reserve components that support them, and we're recommending they come out as well.

He added that the other 20 percent of the proposed reductions "...had specific missions that related to that old Cold War scenario and no longer are required."

As expected, the announcement was not well received by reserve supporters or in Congress. Several prominent members of Congress, both Republican and Democrat, expressed their dissatisfaction with the proposal and voiced their support.

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3. Ibid.
for the reserves. The director of the Reserve Officer's Association remarked that although he anticipated the announced reductions, his organization "...was distressed at the magnitude of the cuts." The National Guard Association dissatisfied with the Defense Department's proposal attempted "...to outflank the Pentagon's entrenched defenses by supplying ammunition—- in the form of a detailed alternative force structure— to an Army of lawmakers who will decide their future." The National Guard Association's proposal calls for a force structure of ten active divisions and ten reserve divisions compared to the administration's Base Force of 12 active, six reserve, and two cadre divisions. Senator Inouye and Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR), both members of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, claimed they favored the association's proposal. Senator Bumpers remarked, "The more I think about 10 and 10, the more it makes sense."

Undoubtedly, the Defense Department will continue to face strong congressional opposition to reducing the number of reservists or diminishing the role of the reserves in the new strategy. In an Army Times interview, General Powell expressed his optimism that Congress will eventually reduce

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the reserve structure. Powell commented that once the 535 members of Congress "come down from the rafters" following the March 26 announcement they will "...realize that the problem before the nation is to cut the defense budget in a sensible way." He also predicted that Congress would "...start to see some understanding. Something has to happen."  

F. CONCLUSION

Over the next several years the United States will continue to draw-down and restructure its forces. In an era of strict fiscal considerations and in an uncertain national security environment, congressional activism will play a major role in determining which path the United States will take concerning defense issues. The issue of the reserve forces will continue to be a controversial subject. During last year's debate, both sides presented their arguments, but in the end, the Congress rejected the administration's attempt to cut large numbers of reserves.

The administration's stance on the reserves focused on two arguments. Its major argument was that the reserve structure was too large and should be cut proportionally to active units. The second argument was that the reserves will play less of a role in the new national military strategy which envisions future conflicts requiring rapidly deployable contingency forces. Congressional leaders balked at these

arguments and mandated that the DOD produce a comprehensive list of reserve units to be cut and a justification behind them before Congress would consider large scale reserve reductions.

Driven by "pork instincts," members of Congress rejected the administration's proposal and approved only a fraction of the proposed reductions. In an effort to preserve constituent jobs and avoid the political consequences of opposing the powerful National Guard and Reserve lobbies, the Congress, as an institution acted parochially on the reserve issue.

This year's reserve debate appears to be heading toward the same conclusion as last year's. Cuts will be made in the reserve structure but not on the scale proposed by the administration. Congressional leaders are anxiously awaiting the results of the RAND study of the Active/Reserve mix "...in order to be able to make informed judgements." On the other hand, it is likely that the administration and DOD officials are hoping that the RAND study will have the same effect on the reserve issue as the Base Closing Commission had on the contentious issue of closing bases.

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"Senator Sam Nunn, Congressional Record, 14 May 1992, p.S6717."
VI. BASE FORCE II?

Since the Bush Administration proposed the new national security strategy and the Base Force, the world has witnessed some dramatic events. America's stunning victory over Iraq and the dissolution of the Soviet Union has caused numerous congressional leaders to push for substantially greater reductions in defense spending. Representative Aspin has taken the lead in this year's budget debate with his proposal to reduce the force structure by about 33 percent by 1997. Under Representative Aspin's Option C proposal (he has four different proposals), active divisions would change from 12 (under the current Base Force proposal) to nine, reserve divisions would remain at six, and the cadre divisions would be eliminated. For the purposes of this discussion, Representative Aspin's Option C proposal will be used as a basis for arriving at Base Force II.

If the administration fails in its effort to preserve the Base Force and is forced to adopt Base Force II, what recommendations will the Army make concerning further reductions in its force structure? How will these reductions affect the Army's role in the new strategy? What impacts will these reductions have on the Army's reserve components? Faced with the difficult task of determining which division...

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"Maze, "Congress whacks away at force plan," p.4."
flags to take down, the Army must look to the new national security strategy to determine the appropriate force structure to meet the nation's security needs. The answers to the questions posed above will be viewed in terms of the four major principles of the new national security strategy: deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.

A. DETERRENCE

Since deterrence is often thought in terms of nuclear weapons at the strategic level, and since the Army plays a minimal role in America's triad, the Army's contribution to the deterrent aspect of the new strategy must be viewed in terms of conventional deterrence. Additionally, as the United States and the former Soviet Union continue to dismantle their nuclear arsenals at unprecedented rates, conventional deterrence will rise in importance as a means of convincing "...a potential adversary that the cost of aggression, at any level exceeds any possibility of gain."\(^{10}\)

As the military's budget continues to shrink and the number of divisions is reduced, America's conventional deterrent potential will also shrink. According to Representative Aspin's latest proposal, the AC would be cut

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\(^{10}\) The Army will be responsible for the land based interceptors and systems of the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) program.

even more drastically, while the RC remain intact. Representative Aspin appears to be embracing the proposals of several Congressmen and reserve proponents to shift more emphasis and missions to the cost effective RC. In terms of conventional deterrence, as the United States eliminates more AC divisions or realigns them into the RC, the credibility and capability aspects of deterrence will be undermined. Unless the political leadership of the country displays the determination to call-up reservists in the initial stage of a crisis, adversaries may view this realignment as a weakening of America's ability to quickly and adequately respond to a crisis. In other words, U.S. official must prevent an adversary from being tempted to pursue a military option because they believe the gains will more than offset the costs. A country must be convinced that it cannot achieve its aims before the United States can effectively react.

In view of the potential of further undermining the conventional deterrent role of the Army, the Army's leadership will strongly oppose a Base Force II proposal which advocates decreasing active forces or realigning active units into the reserves. The Army will argue that by cutting the current Base Force even further, the nation runs the risk of "of not having decisive victory." Also, as General Sullivan recently testified, "That would require large-scale mobilization," and thus an inability to rapidly respond to a crisis situation with sufficient forces.\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\)Maze, "Congress whacks away at force plan," p.4.
If the United States expects to maintain a credible conventional deterrent, while it dismantles Army divisions, it must improve its capability and credibility to respond to no-notice future conflicts more rapidly and with sufficient combat power. This leads into a discussion of the second and third aspects of the new strategy: forward presence and crisis response.

B. FORWARD PRESENCE

At the present time, the United States Army is continuing its rapid draw-down of forces in Germany. By 1995, two full divisions will have been eliminated from Germany, jokingly referred to as DEFORGER. If the Army is forced to bring down three more active divisions by 1997, it will more than likely recommend the removal of another division from Germany. Currently, the DOD is clinging to the argument that a corps in Germany is still appropriate given the current instability and turmoil in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, most notably the crisis in the Balkans. However, if by 1995, the economic and political situation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union stabilizes and domestic political pressure in the United States demands the return of more forces, the DOD may be forced to withdraw another division and leave a small military contingent in Germany. This force would probably include a large staff, enough personnel to maintain POMCUS sites, and a combat brigade. Whatever the size, the remaining forces in Germany will merely symbolize
America's resolve to retain a foothold in European affairs as well as calming any fears of a resurgent Germany.

Another option for the Army is to pull out its division in South Korea or substantially reduce its size. However, this move will depend on several factors. Currently the Army is reducing the number of troops in Korea by 3,000. The pull out of another 6,000 soldiers is dependent upon North Korean compliance with nuclear weapons treaties and on site inspections of nuclear facilities. It is likely that the U.S. will withdraw all its forces from South Korea if the two Koreas reunify.

These cutbacks will reduce the Army's commitment to the forward presence role in the new strategy to two or three divisions: a heavy brigade or division in Germany, an infantry division (minus) in Korea, and a light infantry division in Hawaii. Since the reserve contribution to the forward deployed units in the forward presence mission is minimal, these moves will have little effect on the reserves.

In terms of quick response contingency operations, the Army will fight a long and tough battle before yielding to any reductions in the divisions assigned to the rapidly deployable category of the CONUS based contingency force. These units are the heart and soul of the Army's contribution to the forward presence element of the new strategy. Any reductions in these forces would mean a total abandonment of

the new strategy. In fact, the Army will more than likely continue to demand for more resources allocated to these divisions, including more Navy and Air Force emphasis on providing airlift and sealift assets to effectively and efficiently deploy these forces.

If the current Base Force does not draw the Army and the Marine Corps closer together, Base Force II will likely force the two services to work together. Under current plans, the Marine Corps will be reduced to 159,100 active personnel and 35,000 reservists by 1997. After the restructuring is complete, the Marine Corps will be comprised of two combat-ready divisions, each with a strength of 14,000, and a third division manned by 7,000 marines, which will be augmented by reservists following mobilization. It would be a mistake for Army planners to ignore the two combat-ready marine divisions when planning for quick response contingency operations. The Army divisions in the Contingency Force, coupled with one or two Marine divisions, provides for a lethal and versatile combination.

It appears that in the era of Goldwater-Nichols and jointness, the Congress is determined to press for more joint endeavors in an effort to reduce duplications and save money. For instance, the topic of replacing Marine Corps armor units with Army tank units was raised during the appearance of the four service chiefs before the Senate Armed Service

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Committee Hearing in February 1992. In an era of fiscal constraints and rapidly declining defense budgets, it will be in the best interests of all the services to adopt a "we can hang together or we can hang separately" mentality.

C. CRISIS RESPONSE

Given that the Army eliminates one division in Germany, refuses to cut any of the rapidly deployable contingency forces, and Congress refuses to compromise over reducing any reserve divisions, the Army will have to trim two active divisions from the reinforcing category under the crisis response pillar. These reductions will leave one heavy active division with a roundout brigade, four reserve separate infantry brigades, and six reserve divisions in the reinforcing category. As is evident, the RC will make up an overwhelming majority of the reinforcing element of the contingency force under Base Force II.

If Base Force II becomes a reality, it is probable that the suggestion of rounding out more units at the company or battalion level in the AC will be raised. Given the roundout experience from the Persian Gulf War, it is unlikely that the Army will embrace such a proposal. The National Guard intensely dislikes the proposed idea as well. The current Army's leadership is adamant about maintaining the current combat capabilities of its divisions and will fight any proposal that they perceive as leading to "a hollow Army."
D. RECONSTITUTION

The fourth aspect of the new national security strategy is reconstitution. As previously mentioned, Base Force II calls for an elimination of the cadre division concept, which in turn spells out the abandonment of part of the Army's role in reconstitution. In other words, if the United States adopts Base Force II and a major war arises, the Armed Forces will have no alternative but to resort to a large scale mobilization and conscription to reconstitute its forces.

E. SELF-DETERRENCE

The calling-up of reserves is a political statement. Since World War II, there has been a trend which indicates domestic politics have a significant impact on the decision to use reserve forces. Additionally, when reserves have been mobilized, domestic politics intervened in the selection of units to be mobilized as well as the timing of their mobilization. Before mobilizing the reserves, "[p]residents must consider not only the escalatory effects in the international community, but also the domestic political reaction, including additional pressures during unfolding crises to invoke the War Powers Act, which presidents have consistently sought to avoid." "

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"Ibid., p.109.
Under Base Force II, the president may face a crisis situation which could be intense enough to be beyond the capabilities of the small active forces. As detailed earlier, it is highly likely that large numbers of reserves will be necessary to augment active forces in a Base Force II crisis scenario. With fewer active forces and an increased reliance on reserve forces, the presidential flexibility to commit forces without congressional approval, which has been exercised so frequently in the past, will become more constrained. The possibility exists that the political mood of the country may prevent or postpone a large call up reserves. The United States might find itself in a predicament of self-deterrence. The political leadership may yield to the domestic pressures and "sit this one out."

If the President deems it necessary, he may be forced to immediately request congressional approval to activate reservists well beyond his current ability to call-up 200,000 reserves for 90 days without declaring a national emergency. This call-up, commonly referred as the "200-K call-up," seeks "...to meet operational requirements, subject to congressional reporting within 24 hours on the circumstances surrounding the call-up and anticipated use of the forces."

Following the Persian Gulf War, the GAO conducted a study on reserve mobilization and recommended that Congress examine

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the intent behind the "200-K call-up" and its restrictions and "...clarify whether this intent remains valid in light of the experiences of the Gulf War." The hesitation to call up combat reserve units during the Persian Gulf added to the already "...deep concern about the wisdom of adopting a military strategy that depends, in the final analysis, on a presidential decision to mobilize reserve forces." This topic is likely to generate a great deal of discussion between the executive branch who favors more latitude and those in the legislative branch who are concerned about excessive presidential power.

E. IMPLICATIONS

The implementation of Base Force II will have significant implications for the RC. It is likely that the Army will become more reliant on the reserves to perform even more missions. To determine the effects of Base Force II on the reserves, it is useful to address the levels of warfare and how the reserves fit into them. The three levels of warfare include tactical, operational, and strategic.

As is the case with the current Base Force, under Base Force II, the United States will probably still have the capability to "...take unilateral conventional force military actions at the tactical-level [like Grenada or Panama], but probably not at the strategic- [like World War II] or

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"Binkin and Kaufmann, p.62.
operational-levels [like Desert Storm] of air/land warfare. Under the current Base Force, it is assumed that the United States would be able to respond unilaterally to one and a half contingencies at the tactical level. Under Base Force II, the AC units in the Contingency Force can be expected to successfully perform a tactical operation similar to a Panama with minimal reserve participation. However, the U.S. may find itself unable to respond simultaneously to a half contingency mission without calling up additional reserve units including ground combat units.

At the operational level, with the current Base Force, one military analyst contends, "It should be assumed that the U.S. could not unilaterally mount an opposed contingency operation or campaign such as Desert Shield." Under Base Force II, it is even more unlikely that the U.S. would be able carry out such an operation unless significant numbers of reserves, including combat units are mobilized. Assuming that host nation support is available and the United States is part of a coalition, it will still be necessary to call up the bulk of the RC designated for the reinforcing mission.

Finally, at the strategic level of warfare, the United States will have no option but to turn to total mobilization and conscription to generate enough forces necessary for a large scale war, given a two year warning time as stated in the new strategy. Obviously, reserve units will play a major

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*Tritten, p. 35.

role at this level as they have traditionally done in the past. All elements of the reserve structure will be mobilized including individual ready reservists, inactive reservists, and retired active duty and reservists.

Faced with a scenario similar to the recent Persian Gulf conflict, the political leadership will have no alternative but to immediately call up the reserves including reserve ground combat units. It is not prudent to assume that the next conflict will afford the political leadership the luxury of watching the situation develop for several weeks before making the decision to mobilize significant numbers or reserves. Currently, the Army contends that it will take a roundout brigade at least 90 days (one year for a reserve or ARNG Division) following mobilization, to train and prepare for implementation into direct combat. Thus, the survival of those combat forces in the rapidly deployable component of the CONUS based contingency force may depend on those reserve divisions performing the reinforcing role. The failure or hesitation, on the part of the political leadership to call up reserve ground combat units, could present severe problems for those active combat forces initially deployed to a crisis area. As two senior retired military officers note, "Few realize how totally integrated the force has become and how little capability to sustain land warfare would exist were mobilization of the Reserve and National Guard not to
occur. This assertion will become even more profound if Base Force II is adopted.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Over the past three years the world has witnessed a tremendous transformation in the international system. According to one political scientist, "The world has changed more rapidly in the past three years than any other time since 1945." President Bush, as well as numerous political scientists, have often referred to the current international system as the "New World Order."

The changes in the international system began with the toppling of communist controlled governments throughout Eastern Europe. The opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the reunification of Germany marked a significant turning point in the Cold War. In just one year after the opening of the Berlin Wall, one of the icons which symbolized the Cold War, a divided Germany, disappeared.

Another critical event which has had a major impact on the international system was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. President Bush viewed the brutal Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait as the first true test of the New World Order. The multinational condemnation of Iraqi aggression, the creation of a coalition opposed to the occupation of Kuwait, and the use of armed force backed by

United Nations resolutions represented a substantial departure from the lack of international cohesiveness typical of the Cold War.

The events in Eastern Europe and Germany marked the beginning of what would eventually result in the most significant change over the past three years: the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the the closing of the final chapter of the Cold War. The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union "...caused the end of the bipolar order that had persisted for nearly half a century...." and radically transformed the entire international system.10

Today, in the context of the remarkable events over the past three years, military officials and political leaders are engaged in a contentious debate over restructuring our armed forces. This debate is not a new one. These topics have been points of contention throughout our history. In addition to budgetary limitations, topics such as the appropriate mix and structure, as well as future roles and missions of active and reserve forces will dominate discussions in military and political circles in the months ahead. This chapter will offer recommendations for altering the roles, missions, and structure of the reserves to improve the effectiveness of the Total Army.

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10 Ibid., p.84.
A. INCREASE SUPPORT ROLE AND REDUCE COMBAT ROLE

As the restructuring debate continues, it is important to consider maximizing each component's strengths and minimizing their weaknesses. One military analyst summarized the strengths and weaknesses in the following manner:

The Active Component is best suited to conduct combat operations, particularly the contingency type we expect in the future; the Reserve Components are best at providing combat support and combat service support.124

When discussing the reserves, Secretary Cheney and General Powell are quick to point out that certain skills are better suited for placement in the RC than in the AC. On numerous occasions, they commented on the impressive Persian Gulf War performance of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units who have pilots who fly airplanes on their everyday jobs. During a briefing on reserve forces downsizing, Secretary Cheney described what capabilities should be kept in the reserves:

Medical units, mortuary units, stevedore units, transportation units, ammunition hauling units, where you only need that function performed when you're in an ongoing combat operation, put that capability in the reserves. You have enough time to call it up. It doesn't require the same kind of training as a combined arms unit does, and it's a better candidate to be in the reserves.125

The Persian Gulf War highlighted the RC strength in the support role. Virtually all after action reports praised the


125Richard Cheney, "Briefing on Reserve Forces Downsizing," p.5.
performance of reserve support units. As noted in several reports, there were some reserve CS and CSS units that were better prepared and outperformed similar active units. Reserve units that have transferrable civilian skills were singled out as being particularly effective.

In light of the experiences from the Persian Gulf War, the Army should consider taking advantage of the reserve strength in the support role and realign and assign, where possible, more CS and CSS units in the RC. As recently brought out in a GAO report, the Army, during the Persian Gulf War, experienced difficulties in providing sufficient active and reserve support forces. The GAO concluded that although the Army was able to provide most of the support necessary, initially it was unable to provide some critically needed skills because personnel with those skills were members of reserve units and the call-up was not implemented yet. The report also claimed, "Over the course of the war, it [Army] sent virtually all of some types of forces, leaving few, if any, to reinforce operations had the war lasted longer or a second conflict arisen." One solution to remedy this shortcoming is to realign or restructure the combat structure in the RC divisions assigned to the continental U.S. based reinforcement forces into more support units.

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"Heller, p.23.

"Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve Support Forces," pp.4-5.
The issue of reserve ground combat forces invariably brings up the discussion of the roundout and roundup units. In the CRS Report, "The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War," the author, Robert Goldich, examines several "radical changes" to the roundout concept in addition to the Army's initiatives implemented following the war. These changes include rounding out at smaller units such as company or battalion level, rounding up at the company or battalion level, filling key command and staff positions in roundout units with active army officers and noncommissioned officers, reducing or eliminating the ARNG role in roundout, getting rid of roundout, and finally keeping roundout but fixing it. Goldich does a superb job of capturing the essence of both sides of the argument for each proposal. However, Goldich does not consider the possibility of realigning the missions of roundout and roundup units from a combat to a combat support or combat service support role.

The time has come for military and civilian leaders to make a thorough evaluation of the role combat reserve forces will play in the future. Several analysts contend that today's battlefield has become too sophisticated and warfare has become too complex an operation for soldiers who train 38 days a year plus any additional training assemblies. One of the key principles of the new national military strategy is to have the capability to rapidly respond to a wide variety of regional contingencies. Based on General

---Shaver, p.2.---
Sullivan’s claim that it will take at least 90 days to train a reserve combat brigade and one year to train a reserve combat division, the likelihood of reserve combat participation in the rapid response quick conclusion contingency operations anticipated in the future is remote. General Edwin H. Burba, Jr., Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Forces Command, in testimony before the Defense Policy Panel of the House Armed Services Committee on 8 March 1991, captured the essence of why it is more challenging to keep reserve combat forces at a high readiness posture when compared to reserve support forces:

...combat support and combat service support units generally have uncomplicated unit functions, even though many of their individual skills are complex...

On the other hand, combat units such as [armored] cavalry, infantry, and armor have maneuver skills and complex synchronization skills at the company level and higher that are difficult to train during weekend drill periods. The training of these combat units at company level and higher integrates not only maneuver skills, but those of Army aviation and Air Force lift and fire support, artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, signal, military intelligence, maintenance, supply, transportation, medical, military police, chemical, and a whole host of others.

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Based on a briefing given by a high ranking officer assigned to the J-5 staff. Defense planners do not expect significant roundout or roundup involvement unless the U.S. finds itself committed to two major regional contingency operations simultaneously.
They have to synchronize everything that we do on the battlefield. The tasks and standards associated with these synchronized skills change at all levels as the battlefield conditions change. Their execution is more an art than a science, and they take a considerable amount of time and effort to master.130

Before the Army places more reserve participation in the support role or restructures its reserve combat units, there are several obstacles which must be breached. First, "...the Army National Guard must be willing to relinquish its attachment to combat units."131 Also, the RC must "...confess to its ineptitude at large scale combined arms operations at brigade and higher levels."132 The ARNG will have to accept performing more support missions as is the case in the USAR. As one reserve officer commented, this proposal will likely encounter strong opposition from the National Guard. He half-jokingly remarked, "After all, when you travel throughout America and you see a statue dedicated to the citizen-soldier in some small town, he's not driving a truck, he's holding a rifle."133

Second, the AC must be genuinely committed to the Total Force principle of "First to Fight, First to be Equipped." According to this principle, priority goes to those units that are designated as early-deploying, regardless of whether

130 General Edwin H. Burba, Jr., as quoted in Goldich, p.43.

131 Brehm, p.2.

132 Shaver, p.2.

133 Summary of a statement from a telephonic conversation with a senior U.S. Army reserve officer at the U.S. Army War College.
they are in the AC or the RC. In the past, equipping combat
reserve units has worked reasonably well. However,
"...priority for equipping support forces and mobilization
forces has not received equal attention."\textsuperscript{134} For years, the
reserves have expressed their concerns about significant
equipment shortages in many of their units. Lack of
equipment and insufficient manning adversely affects
training opportunities, reduces readiness levels, and
decreases mobilization capabilities. Army leaders must
address these issues prior to any restructuring attempts.

Finally, military leaders must have enough confidence in
the capabilities of the RC to recommend to the political
leadership the call-up, without delay, of reserve CS and CSS
units. Hesitation to call-up significant numbers of reserves
in critical specialties will result in a replay of the
problems encountered by the Army during Operations Desert
Shield and Storm. The timely call-up of reserve support
forces, particularly those associated with units earmarked
for the rapidly deployable mission of the forward presence
pillar, will be critical to the success of U.S. forces in
future contingency operations.

In his essay, "Restructuring the Army: The Road to a Total
Force," Colonel Philip A. Brehm quotes an excerpt from
President Bush's Aspen Institute address in which the

\textsuperscript{134} Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1991: Report of the
President announced a new military policy for the United States. Brehm places great emphasis on the President's comment of not merely reducing current force levels but restructuring them and advocates converting the majority of reserve combat units to CS and CSS units. Brehm contends:

...the Army has failed to implement the guidance provided by its Commander in Chief at Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990. The Army's Base Force is indeed nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken down version of the force we presently have, which is exactly what the President said we must not do. Restructuring will require abandonment of some "traditional roles or missions for each component, but it will be what is best for the nation and the Army."

The shifting of emphasis away from the traditional combat role in the ARNG to a support role meets the President's intent of restructuring. It also takes advantage of one of the RC's greatest strengths: the ability to provide CS and CSS.

B. CONSOLIDATE IN THE GUARD AND THE RESERVE

On 12 December 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced a plan to merge the USAR into the ARNG, cut their combined strength by 60,000, and save approximately $150 million a year. In addition to eliminating hundreds of reserve units, McNamara's radical proposal called for the USAR to consist entirely of individuals not units. McNamara's proposal met with fierce and immediate opposition from congressional leaders and supporters of the USAR who

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Brehm, pp.1-2.
would stand to lose the most under the merger. Although McNamara's plan was soundly defeated, it is useful to examine his rationale for this radical departure from the traditional Army force structure.

Secretary McNamara had three reasons for merging the two components. First, the units designated to be inactivated were significantly short of combat manpower and equipment and would require substantial sums of money to upgrade. Second, none of the units to be eliminated were in the nation's contingency plans. Finally, McNamara asserted that the security environment had changed and "highly efficient, quick-response units" were more favorable than "large numbers of untrained men." It is interesting to note that Secretary Cheney's reasons for reducing the reserves today are quite similar to Secretary McNamara's nearly three decades ago.

While it is probably not politically realistic to assume that Congress would accept a similar McNamara-type proposal, recent motions by key congressional leaders suggest that this topic should be examined further. Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner (R-VA) are leading this year's crusade to overhaul military roles and missions. Their goal is to eliminate duplication and reshape the military in hopes of reducing costs while still meeting the threats of the post-Cold War

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1 A complete discussion of the McNamara proposal can be found in Mahon, pp.231-236.

2 Ibid., p.232.
era. The two leading members of the Senate Armed Services Committee suggest there are nine areas where streamlining is possible. One of the areas mentioned is the reserve components.138

While the details of reorganizing or consolidating the reserves are beyond the scope of this paper, there are a few factors to consider before making any decisions. First, the United States Army is one of the few armies of the world that has two reserves: the ARNG or militia and the USAR or federal reserve. By the mere existence of this dual structure, there is much redundancy and duplication. Second, any proposal should seek to maximize the strengths of each component: maneuver combat forces in the active army, CS and CSS in the USAR, and reinforcement and reconstitution in the ARNG.

National Guard supporters are likely to disagree with this breakdown. However, the dramatic changes in the international system over the past three years, which some political scientists have referred to as a "paradigm shift," dictates that military and civilian planners can no longer afford to think in terms of the "old paradigm." According to Colonel Charles Heller, U.S. Army Reserve Advisor to the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College:

In essence the militia [ARNG] is an eighteenth century creation, unwieldy in the twentieth, and an anachronism in the twenty-first century.

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The federal reserve, the USAR...is a twentieth century force more suited to the twenty-first century than the militia. The USAR not only has units, it has the right units, CS and CSS to marry up with maneuver units of the AC.\textsuperscript{139}

Any streamlining proposal must also ensure that each state has the capability to meet its state's missions, especially state disaster relief responsibilities. In the wake of the Pentagon's announcement to eliminate 830 ARNG and USAR units in all 50 states, there was an outcry by several congressional leaders who claimed that the proposed cuts could undermine their state's ability to effectively respond to civil emergencies.\textsuperscript{14} In the past, states have relied on the ARNG to respond to natural and man-made disasters such as tornadoes, floods, earthquakes, blizzards, forest fires, and civil disturbances.

Recently, significant numbers of National Guardsmen and active forces were called upon to restore peace during the Los Angeles riots in April and May of this year. Six hundred Nevada National Guard troops were also called-up to provide the same assistance in May when rioting broke out in Las Vegas. Captain Vic Dubina, spokesman for the National Guard Association, remarked that the Los Angeles riots serve as "...a stark reminder of what we've been saying all along:

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You've got to consider the state mission," before making large scale reductions in the National Guard.\(^{14}\)

Given the emphasis on reducing defense costs by avoiding duplication and consolidating where appropriate, the time is right for military and civilian leaders to reconsider streamlining the RC. Overhauling the RC and reducing redundancies throughout the services will produce more sweeping changes than the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 which placed emphasis on "jointness." Although such a proposal will likely generate stiff opposition from the ARNG supporters or USAR proponents, depending on who would stand to lose the most, it is important to recall the President's intent of restructuring within the armed forces as envisioned in his Aspen Institute address: to do what is best for the nation.

VII. CONCLUSION

Since the implementation of the Total Force Policy in the early 1970s, the roles and missions of the reserves have expanded significantly. It was the intent of the founders of the policy, "...to maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy, military strategy, and overseas permit and to integrate the capabilities of the active and reserve forces in a cost-effective manner." In implementing the Total Force Policy, the Army assigned many vital CS and CSS missions to the reserves. The Army leadership, led by General Abrams firmly believed that by intertwining the RC with the AC, the political leadership would have no choice but to call up the reserves. For almost twenty years, the Army preached about the vital role reserve units played in the "One Army" philosophy. Some reserve units, including roundout combat units were expected to mobilize within a matter of days and deploy 30 or more days later. It was envisioned that roundout units would eventual link up with their parent divisions and fight shoulder to shoulder with active units. No longer were reserves forces considered to "be held in reserve."

However, the Total Force Policy did not receive its first true test until Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

The nation witnessed the largest mobilization of the reserves since World War II. Initially, large numbers of CS and CSS units were called-up for operational support of a huge logistics effort. In the early stages of Desert Shield, it looked as if the true intent of the Total Force Policy would be carried out: reserve units would fight alongside active units.

The performance of reserve CS and CSS units during the Persian Gulf War appears to have validated the role of the reserves in the Total Force Policy. Several military leaders praised these reserve units for their contribution to the success of the war. However, it was the failure to call up the roundout brigades of two deploying divisions that sparked much controversy and raised some serious doubts about the Army's commitment to the Total Force Policy and the role of the reserves in the new national security strategy. The controversy increased following the questionable post-mobilization performance of three roundout brigades.

The worse fears of reserve supporters were confirmed after General Sullivan announced the "roundup" program, Operation Bold Shift, and increased reserve combat unit post-mobilization training to 90 days. Despite the Army's public praise for the reserves' performance during the war and announcements that the roundout concept was here to stay, the

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14. Two National Guard Field Artillery Brigades deployed to the Persian Gulf and participated in the ground campaign. Most reports conclude that these units performed favorably.
Army's reserve initiatives seem to indicate that the Army's leadership is steering away from a force structure heavily reliant on reserves. The Army appears convinced that reserve combat maneuver units are incapable of being deployed with active units unless they undergo thorough post-mobilization training.

After President Bush announced his new national security strategy in August 1990, there was much discussion about the role of the reserves in the strategy. Based on the administration's assumption that future conflicts would require relatively small but rapidly deployable forces, the Army proposed that the bulk of its units in the contingency force be made up of active forces. It was the composition of the contingency force that raised the most concerns among reserve proponents. Reserve supporters were concerned that the new strategy would mean less of a role for the reserves and an abandonment of the Total Force Policy.

At the present time, the Army is facing several challenges. It is in the process of dismantling a European structure which had been in place for over forty years. It is in the process of thinning its ranks by at least 25 percent and possibly more. It is in the process of restructuring its forces to meet the objectives of the new strategy. Finally, it is rethinking the proper mix of active and reserve forces in the new strategy.

Several congressional leaders have made convincing arguments and proposals which favor a smaller active force
coupled with a larger cost-effective reserve force. If the trends in Congress continue and budget resources become more scarce, the Army may find itself implementing Base Force II. The role of the reserves, under Base Force II, will become significantly more important. If a conflict arises, and reserve forces are mobilized, including combat arms units, they will fight side by side with active forces. If the Army is going to meet the objectives of the new strategy under the current Base Force or Base Force II, it must begin to mend the differences which currently exists between its three components: active, National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. Rather than worrying about reducing interservice rivalry, the Army must begin to eliminate its intraservice rivalry first.
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