CHALLENGES TO EASTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE NINETIES

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The authors of this study present a sobering assessment of the difficulties faced by Eastern European countries. They argue that the principal problem is that of economic reform during a period of severe recession at home and unwelcome export markets abroad. While such a problem does not lend itself to a "military" solution, the authors argue that unless these countries are able to reform and restructure their economies, the reemergence of internal and external policies based on ethnicity, religion, nationalism, and ideology is very likely. When one considers the historical propensity for European-wide conflicts to begin in this region, the need for economic reforms and stability has never been more important.
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FOREWORD

One of the most vexatious issues faced by Washington in post-cold war Europe is coming to terms with the security challenges faced by its former adversaries in Eastern Europe. As Professor Curt Gasteyger writes in the March/April 1991 edition of Survival, “The demise of the cold war has left several orphans.” Exactly what Washington intends to do about these “orphans” has proven to be both difficult and, at times, disruptive in its relations with its Western European allies.

The authors of this study present a sobering assessment of the difficulties faced by these countries. The principal problem universally faced by them is that of economic reform, during a period of severe recession at home and unwelcome export markets abroad. While obviously not a “security” problem in itself, the authors argue that unless these countries are able to effect fundamental economic reform, the likelihood is very high that we will see the reemergence of policies based upon ethnicity, religion, nationalism, and ideology. The experience of the 1930s, where these types of policies were the norm, should be evidence enough that Washington and its allies ought to work against their renaissance. And, the immediacy of the need to create stable conditions in these countries should not be underestimated. As the authors state in their introduction, since 1815 practically every European crisis has had its genesis in Eastern Europe.

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The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this report as a contribution to the debate on the evolution of European security.

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CHALLENGES TO EASTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE NINETIES

Introduction.

Almost every European crisis since 1815 has begun in Eastern Europe. Often they have led to war or to the brink of war. Since Bismarck, Western inability or unwillingness to intervene has determined the course and/or outcome of these crises. U.S. support for Yugoslavia in 1948-50 to counter Stalinist invasion threats is a glaring exception to this principle that otherwise has been the case. Today, the new states in this volatile region collectively desire political, economic, and security integration with the West. To overcome the long legacy of failure, enormous efforts on both sides are needed.

Economic and political reconstruction within the context of democratic institutions in these vulnerable states is threatened by forces whose salience is growing while the remedies currently available to Eastern Europe are insufficient. These threats are:

- failure to introduce market forces more quickly, particularly in privatizing the economy and reorienting trade westward,
- unresolved ethnic disputes within and between states, and
- the existing security vacuum in the area.

The West, to date, has either been unresponsive or unable to overcome this vacuum by providing needed political attention and sufficient economic support in a timely manner. It will be argued that local failures to reform national economies will stimulate internal and inter-state ethnic problems, which could present a major security challenge in Eastern Europe that antidemocratic forces could exploit. An economic crash which would likely undermine fragile political structures in one or more states could touch off a regional or international
economic crisis like that of 1929-41. Economic crisis, like that of 1929, is the more immediate security threat to these states and could open the way to authoritarian and belligerent governments, such as occurred to Weimar Germany. A united, timely, and coherent Western policy conceivably could avert such crises.

A second consideration is that reinforcing local democratic forces by invigorating their economies will strengthen reforms in the former Soviet Union and provide a stronger basis for its integration with the West. Because the ex-Soviet and East European economies were so deeply connected economically and will remain closely associated, wise policies enhancing reform and development in one could influence trends in the other.

What needs to be understood, however, is that these problems are long-standing and simply do not lend themselves to resolution, especially by military means. That said, the potential for some form of military activity remains high in this region and it is important that U.S. and NATO military planners understand the root causes of these conflicts in order to be prepared to help resolve confrontation and contribute to greater stability.

The Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe.

To date, former Warsaw Pact members have more or less successfully liberalized prices, converted currencies, and begun to dismantle the old planning bureaucracies.\(^1\) However, privatization and successful commercial integration with the West rather than dependence on the backward former Soviet market have been more elusive and wrenching than expected. The Polish and Czech privatization plans illustrate the difficulties involved. Western observers currently contend that the results in both countries will be meager, and state control will last for years. The same holds true for Bulgaria and Romania which are even further behind in this process.\(^2\)

The state factories and plants to be privatized are the region's most backward economic and ecological "assets." Their value is rapidly falling and they are uncompetitive on the
world market. In many cases, their managers and bureaucratic allies have done their best to sabotage or counter economic reforms. In Poland, for instance, management has formed "perverse triads," with unions and local works councils, to block reforms, rational responses to market stimuli, and hard decisions about unemployment. The unions' and workers councils' power and prestige have made management a willing hostage of its labor force as it focuses on maximizing wages, not profits. Moreover, the triads' efforts have materially contributed to instances of political stalemate as seen in Poland's inconclusive 1991 election.

The ensuing domestic stagflation and recessions directly affect these states' foreign economic sectors which cannot then generate exports, service foreign and domestic debts, and meet spiraling social expenses, all at a time when their currency continues to be devalued. Hence, their domestic and foreign crises are inexorably intertwined. Western pressures for austerity programs and demands for debt repayment reduce the margin that East European governments have for acting to overcome their crises at home and restrict their capability to perform as responsive democratic political parties.

The outcomes of such programs and policies are pronounced and visible across the region. Bulgaria's Deputy Chairman of the Agency for Economic Projections and Development characterized 1991 as the year of great depression. Romania's inflation rate in 1991 was between 170-200 percent. Though Hungary has done much better than most, difficult problems remain. Indeed, Hungary's foreign debt position and burden resembles that of many Latin America countries, and it must keep borrowing abroad. It is estimated that debt service will consume 11-12 percent of GDP through 1996, substantially retarding growth, capital formation, and industrial modernization. The Vienna Institute for International Economic Cooperation concluded that, in 1991, this region had its greatest crisis since 1929-33. Czechoslovak officials confirmed that their economy was, or is, close to collapse.
The first country to implement reform, Poland, has yet to see an upswing in its economy. Poland’s current recession has been longer and deeper than past ones. Expectations and realities for the future are not good due to the continued presence of Western trade barriers, the collapse of the previously important Soviet market, stagflation, and depressed domestic demand. Rising hidden unemployment indicates that firms and managers are acting as they did under communism and that the “perverse triads” are not slackening. Yet at the same time, a decline in real wages is expected. These findings display a general inability to adapt to the rules of a free market. All these factors lie at the bottom of spiraling political unrest there.

One of the key reasons for the lag in response to economic reform in large part has been due to the reforms themselves. The “big bang” or shock therapy treatment sponsored by the first generation of post-Communist reformers has led to much greater economic costs (particularly longer recessions) than predicted. In retrospect, shock therapy was oversold, unrealistic, and, in the end, ideologically dogmatic. Today, economic officials ruefully admit that they failed to anticipate the consequences of the transition from planned economics. Yet surprisingly, reformers’ answer to this dilemma is more of the same: accelerated privatization, continuing price liberalization, limited price regulation, and more integration with the West. While perhaps economically sound advice in theory, application of these reforms at a time of political fragility has produced instances of severe instability.

The Need for Export Markets and Foreign Capital.

Indeed, it could be argued that Eastern Europe’s desperate economic conditions will militate against continued support for economic liberalization policies in some countries. Romania’s miners’ strike of September 1991 forced Prime Minister Roman to resign. Poland’s parliamentary stalemate and unrest and Czechoslovakia’s political disintegration demonstrate similar processes at work. Ethnic unrest and deep economic distress are intensifying demands for social and economic protection that are already being met though protectionist
policies. The adoption of such policies make clear the failure of domestic reforms to date, a failure compounded by the West’s slowness and hesitance to open its markets to Eastern Europe. Because Eastern Europe can only generate very modest growth due to depressed domestic demand and constrained monetary and fiscal policies, its only alternative then becomes an export-driven growth strategy. Failure to stimulate growth will encourage “perverse triads” to preserve a closed, slow-growth economy in the name of nationalism, egalitarianism, anti-Semitism, and anti-intellectualism: classic antidemocratic nostrums of the past.

Without foreign trade and massive foreign financial assistance these states cannot obtain needed capital for badly needed reconstruction. Failure to win markets abroad forces more sectors of their economy to close and adopt protectionist policies, and in turn encourages the revival of traditional protectionist and antidemocratic interest groups that could command domestic political support. Ominously, economic stagnation also reinforces ethnic inequality in these states, thereby encouraging a growing sense of ethnic discrimination and conflict. Therefore, greater access to external markets must be assessed as essential. Unfortunately, neither the European Community (EC) nor Russia appears ready, able, or willing, to accommodate the large amount of materials and goods these countries need to export if they are to import Western goods to stimulate their own industries. Restrictive Western trade policies and the chaos in the fiscal, monetary and trade policies of the newly independent republics of the Soviet Union only stimulate regional uncertainty and the domestic tensions mentioned above.

Political Ramifications: Hungary and Poland.

Consequently, the victors of 1989-90 are now under domestic political siege on account of both economic failure and growing nationalist dissension. The results of regional elections can be taken as a sign of growing popular frustration with liberalism. Poland’s and Hungary’s elections of 1991 illustrate the trend toward either apathy or authoritarian solutions due to economic failure. Hungary’s March-April 1991
by-elections signaled an increasing apathy toward politics and readiness to vote for the former Communist party.\textsuperscript{20}

In Poland, only 40 percent of the voters participated in the 1991 elections and the leading party, which inherited Solidarity’s coalition, received only 12 percent of the vote, producing parliamentary stalemate which has extended well into 1992. Voters were clearly angry and cynical, and issues were not discussed other than to attack the government’s program categorically. The plethora of parties has continued the tendency of political deadlock and obstruction that the largely Communist Parliament had shown.\textsuperscript{21}

Such frustrations have led President Walesa to seek to enlarge presidential powers, arousing fears about his proclivities toward dictatorship. They also have led to backtracking on economic reform.\textsuperscript{22} Hungarian commentators also fear that society’s undemocratic upbringing under communism leads it to reject the notion of checking the government by forceful opposition, because it believes that such action would be tantamount to preventing the state from exerting its activities in the public interest. As for Poland, the refusal to give power to the opposition stems from this fear that it will be no better than its predecessor. Former Polish Politburo member Andrzej Werblan likewise comments that, “People still believe the government can be pushed into bailing out the large factories and they are right.”\textsuperscript{23}

**Problems in Western Europe’s Response.**

If one assumes, therefore, that Western Europe must play a key role in helping its Eastern European neighbors adopt viable market economies, then trade discrimination weakens the very objective the West is attempting to achieve. What is at stake is more than simply allowing Eastern Europe access to foreign markets. Within the EC a bitter struggle has been taking place over the future course of European integration. German political and security interests are increasingly directed to problems in Central and Eastern Europe. Germany regards the end of the cold war as presenting it with an opportunity to establish a broad security regime encompassing
all of the East. Former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's 1991 and 1992 speeches indicate Germany's determination to take the lead in creating stable, prosperous, and democratic states to its east and forestall nationality unrest, mass migrations or worse. Pressing the EC in recognizing Croatian and Sloven independence are prime examples of that policy. Genscher has even called for a Pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) force to police violations of human rights and intervene in those countries.24

Conversely, many of Born's EC colleagues have been less effusive about a new influx of cheap agricultural and industrial products and an unproven collective security arrangement. German advocacy and pressure for some form of Eastern European access to EC markets finally wore down principally French objections over the course of 1991 but created much tension within the EC. The new timetable for EC entry for these states and open markets by the year 2000 is extremely significant. EC regulations and standards would impel these governments to comply with world standards and competitiveness and signify Western Europe's constant concern for Eastern Europe's security. Nevertheless, Western Europe's trade barriers remain high.25

Not surprisingly, President Walesa's interviews and speeches display the great bitterness and betrayal he and Polish elites feel at the EC's earlier refusal to lower its barriers to the East.26 Associate membership, with an agreed schedule for later entry into the EC would allow these states to reorient their trade away from Russia whose collapse has helped to devastate their economies.27 A strong and durable relationship with the West would also permit implementation of schemes to lend the former Soviet Union (or its successor states) freely convertible foreign currencies on preferential terms to buy consumer goods from Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (and presumably Romania and Bulgaria as well) as proposed by Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Dienstbier.28

Finally, East Europe's statesmen know well that economic failure is feeding their domestic crises. Moldovan Prime Minister Muravschi recently stated:
My opinion is that if we succeed in undertaking concrete steps toward a market economy, many of the political problems and even the problem of interrepublic relations, would lose their intensity and could be solved more easily. Economics would also become more important because the majority of the republic’s population is concerned with material well-being, maybe even more than with a restoration of the national identity, even though that still remains our primary goal.29

These remarks apply equally to all countries in Eastern Europe. Conversely, failure to resolve economic issues encourages a retreat from democratic politics towards apathy or national conflict or both.

National Conflicts.

The former Communist regimes offered little scope for pluralist institutions or political culture. The ideological ground, therefore, was, and is now, quite hospitable to movements based upon a largely nationalist frame of reference. Political discourse in Eastern Europe was laden with nationalist, ideological, and ethical-philosophical baggage, not concrete issues and interests. Politics was a rivalry between competing personalities, not a process that ought to be institutionalized beyond legal tampering. Elites were therefore susceptible to grand and often irrational, but heavily symbolic, ideological schemes.30

That nationalist identities are not tactically turned on and off in relation to economic conditions is without question. Eastern European intercommunal tensions are deeply rooted in centuries-old religious, ethnic, political, and other antagonisms that transcend current economic relationships. Therefore, lasting and unresolved economic crisis allows the movements espousing these nationalist grievances to aggravate existing rivalries, while prolonged economic success would help to moderate them and possibly shape political agendas revolving around economic interests, not nationalistic ones. Economic failure, where uneven development and ethnic stresses exist, on the other hand, leads to political struggles around questions of identity.
The Politics of Nationalism/Ethnicity.

A characteristic of Eastern Europe has been a preference for stridently nationalistic politics rather than for politics openly based on concrete economic interests. If the economic agenda prevails, thanks to successful reform, the politics of nationalist ideas will be replaced by a politics based on overtly competing economic interests. But if nationalism prevails, the domestic contest will be between politicized cultures defined by reciprocal antagonism where politics is a deadly zero-sum struggle. Nationalism, or politicized culture, exalts culture not economic interest as the preeminent and priority factor. This makes the national question one of identity; and identity is never so threatened as when under failed socioeconomic development. Under those conditions, politics often become a non-negotiable zero-sum game between embattled groups.31 As will be described and analyzed below, throughout the region numerous nationality crises of these sorts exist.

Ethnic tensions are easily at hand for poisoning inter-state and domestic relations. Every state in Eastern Europe either has substantial minorities in it or many of its people are minorities abroad who claim to experience discrimination. Countries pursuing allegedly antiminority policies face charges from abroad by members of that people that they are violating minority and civil, not to mention human, rights. These charges often serve as a pretext for the external patrons or "brothers" to register their outrage, criticism, or, as in the Baltic in 1991, and currently in Serbia's case, to justify armed intervention. In turn, the host country retorts that this criticism is unjustified intervention in its sovereignty. These charges and counter-charges duly frame the issue in terms of the zero-sum nationalist discourse.

The following is a survey of the currently most volatile nationalist/ethnic situations in Eastern Europe:

Polish/Russian Minorities in Lithuania. In the new Baltic states, Polish and Russian minorities claim to be victims of discriminatory legislation depriving them of representation in local government and citizenship. These laws, especially in Lithuania, touched off a flurry of adverse press commentary,
parliamentary outcries against Lithuania, and stiff demarches from Polish and Russian officials in 1991. Lithuania retorted that its legal system had dealt with Polish grievances and Warsaw had no real grounds for intervening. Lithuanian officials stated that Poland had difficulty understanding that Lithuania was now a sovereign state, while the Poles reiterated their concern about minority Poles' civil rights that are protected by international European accords that Vilnius was violating.32

Members of Poland's and Lithuania's foreign ministries initialed an agreement on October 4, 1991, binding them to look after minorities' interests, guarantee their linguistic and religious interests, and educate them in their native tongue. Lithuania also will evidently refrain from changing the administrative boundaries without consulting the inhabitants.33 However, in talks with Russia, the Baltic states have not fully resolved outstanding issues and border claims. In June 1991, reports stated that 40,000 Russian families had already applied for emigration from Lithuania and experts predicted that the total would reach 200-300 thousand people should Lithuania become fully independent. Clearly many of those interviewed felt that border agreements reached with Russia meant nothing more than "camouflaged deportation" for them back to an economically collapsing environment.34 Continuing recriminations regarding citizenship laws in the Baltic states still arouse resentment in Poland and Russia. At the same time, the Baltic states charge that Russia is deliberately stalling on removing its troops from their lands, troops which they rightly regard as occupying forces. Obviously the basis for conflict in this region has not been ended by the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Romania. Romania (and indeed the Balkans in general) reflect the a type of potential crisis that illuminates the complex interaction between local, inter-state, and regional security problems. Since the 1989 Revolution against the Ceausescu regime, Romanian elites have increasingly come to feel threatened by internal and foreign developments. Such fears, and continuing suspicion as to the loyalty of the 1.7-2 million ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania led Romania to trigger a
political explosion concerning an article in a little known Polish newspaper speculating on a regional cooperation scheme for Eastern Europe including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Subcarpathian Ukraine, and Transylvania. The ensuing political fall-out angered both Poland and especially Hungary because the occasion was used as a pretext for charges that it coveted Transylvania and a revision of the European map under the pretext of regional cooperation. Thus, in the wake of this affair, Romania's most extreme nationalist party threatened to invade Hungary.35

Clearly, the hysteria was deliberately whipped up to indicate the government's alarm at not being in regional organizations like the Hexagonale and the Trilateral Group (see below) set up to discuss regional issues in the wake of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Romanian officials, frustrated at their exclusion from these agencies, seem to regard them as phony creations of the West which seeks to promote an artificial differentiation among regional states.36 Finally this episode, as a reasonably objective Rumanian newspaper notes, "has cast a cruel light on the way in which information is selected and turned to account in the process of policy making in Romania."37 That verdict links this affair with the regional media's aggravation of ethnic and political conflicts. This affair also reflects the use of ethnic animosity to divert attention from economic failures and the explosion of extremism and anti-Semitism. It also raises great fears concerning the strength and prevalence of chauvinist, antidemocratic forces in Rumanian thought and politics.38

Finally, Romania has unresolved claims to Bukovina and Bessarabia/Moldova in the Ukraine growing out of the Nazi-Soviet pacts of 1939 and World War II that could strain their relationship. In the same spirit, Russia has made clear its intention to protect the rights, honor, life, and worth of citizens of Russian and other nationalities and of citizens of the Russian Republic living outside its boundaries.39 With the explosion of armed violence between Russian and Moldovan forces in March 1992, the rhetoric of intervention and conflict has escalated. Indeed, some Romanian political figures have refused to rule out the use of force in defense of Moldova.40
Bulgaria. While Sofia has been very successful in shifting its foreign policy orientation westward, there remains a potentially explosive situation regarding the status of its Turkish minority. What ought to make this of immediate importance to the West is the obvious connection between this minority and Turkey, a member of NATO. Elections held in 1991 demonstrate that political and economic stalemate is fast approaching. Over 30 parties competed in the elections which repudiated the Socialists (former Communist Party) but gave the leading Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) only 34.6 percent of the vote against the Socialists 33.1 percent. A Turkish based party, The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), won 7.3 percent of the vote and played a decisive role in sustaining the government. Few Bulgarian politicians are happy at this turn of events. Indeed, the supreme court had ruled that the MRF could not contest the election and the government bowed only to concerted foreign pressure. Even so, considerable pressure was brought to bear against MRF candidates to dissuade them from campaigning. This election also took place in an atmosphere of continuing anti-Turkish policies, e.g., banning the teaching of Turkish in the schools. This outcome can only stimulate ethnic consciousness and strife amidst continuing economic problems.

This seemingly minor turn in Bulgarian domestic politics should not be dismissed by the West, since it could directly affect two NATO states, Turkey and Greece. The head of the MRF described speculation that its election victory might lead to cooler Greco-Bulgarian relations as foreign intervention. He finds nothing disturbing in the fact that Turkey’s Foreign Ministry called the MRF, after its electoral victory, “compatriots.” Despite his denials, it appears that a rapprochement with Turkey at Greece’s expense is occurring. This rapprochement could also stem from fears of Greek efforts to take over a newly independent Macedonia/Skopje that emerges out of Yugoslavia. The Macedonian question has the potential to destabilize the entire region. Turko-Bulgarian cooperation has now reached the level of agreement on military training, borders and the rights of immigrants, not to mention economic cooperation.
The Czechoslovakian Crisis. Perhaps the most serious of all the current ethnic rivalries is that which has evidently led to the break-up of Czechoslovakia into two states, Czechlands and Slovakia. Since 1989, Slovak nationalists, whose main tactic seems to be nationalist attacks on Czech policies, have waged a continuous separatist campaign for an independent Slovakia. This unremitting offensive includes demands to slow privatization and economic reform in favor of preferential state-run policies for Slovakia's benefit, protection of Slovakia's arms industries, and demands for sovereignty up to and including separate entry into the EC. The movement's leaders admit that they are strongly motivated by fears of the inequality with Czechoslovakia resulting from market policies and current economic difficulties.\textsuperscript{46}

Slovak demands evinced a desire to bring about a Slovak state and then recombine with the Czech lands in some undefined manner.\textsuperscript{47} Negotiations on drafting an acceptable constitutional accord dissolved in a deadlock over the economic issues of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{48} Czech officials, fed up with constant Slovak demands that raise the ante but refuse to define their true goals and that advance unrealistic ideas that Slovakia alone can enter the EC by the year 2000 said that if Slovaks will not accept the federated state, then they should go.\textsuperscript{49} The constant politicization of the issue led many to accept disintegration of the state if this is what the Slovaks want since Slovak spokesmen have made governance in the current federation impossible. Even President Havel had to threaten to rule by decree in November 1991 to resolve the problems of these relations and concede much decentralization to the Slovaks. Havel has consistently stated that if the Slovaks really want to separate they should vote for it in a referendum. Otherwise the federation should be maintained on an acceptable constitutional basis.\textsuperscript{50} But Slovak politicians are decidedly lukewarm, if not hostile, to the idea of a referendum (generating suspicions that they know they would lose) and continued to obstruct the state in pursuing their nationalist aims.

The result of the June 1992 elections to Parliament confirmed this trend. In the elections' outcome in the
Czechlands, liberal reformers led by Finance Minister Vaclav Kraus won a plurality, while in Slovakia, nationalists headed by Vladimir Meciar, an ex-Communist in favor of heavy state intervention in the economy, got a plurality. Talks between Meciar and Kraus quickly bogged down and the impasse that resulted has now led both of them to conclude that the breakup into two states is inevitable and the only option. Accordingly, they have agreed to a 'velvet divorce' where a 10-member federal commission will oversee the transition and decide the division of property between the two new states. Meciar and Kraus will each seek to head the government of their individual states, not the federal government of Czechoslovakia.51

Spokesmen for the large Hungarian minority in Slovakia fear an independent Slovakia, no matter how much they themselves are divided.52 Nor are severe problems associated with the breakup of Czechoslovakia limited to that country and its Hungarian minority. Some Ukrainians have mounted a campaign to rectify their border with Czechoslovakia to include Slovak Ruthenians within the region known as Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, that is part of the Ukraine. Against this background Ukraine may field an army as large as or larger than the Bundeswehr and has engaged in loose talk about securing a nuclear capability, steps that alarm its neighbors.53

A breakup of Czechoslovakia would create a Slovak state along with Romania and the remnants of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav Federation that puts pressure on their Hungarian minorities, a prospect that could trigger a crisis in Hungarian politics and its foreign relations. Prague's prospects to enter EC and to collaborate with neighboring states would falter if not disappear, democratic forms of rule would go on the defensive, certainly in Slovakia, and ethnocentric politics in and around the new states would become the rule. The partitions in 1938-39 proved to be decisive triggers of the crisis leading to World War II and any similar move now could add greatly to existing instability.

Yugoslavia/Macedonia/Skopje. Recent developments in Yugoslavia demonstrate the strong potential that its crisis may extend beyond the borders of the now-defunct Federation and threaten the entire Balkan peninsula. Yugoslavia's as yet
unresolved civil war have heightened fears of mass migrations from there and of ethnic violence within and between states. The dangers resulting from this civil war has increased fears for domestic and external security in the Balkans. This is not merely a question of the ethnic Hungarian minority in Vojvodina which is hostage to Serbia’s officials and armed forces in the Yugoslav crisis. It also is a question of the future of Moldova (with its majority of ethnic Romanians), currently under attack by dissident Russian and Cossack military forces who seek to break up that state, or at least truncate its territory and derail its ultimate reunification with Romania. Yugoslavia’s crisis also could trigger a Balkan-wide conflict among states with regard to the possible recognition of a Macedonian state that would emerge from the former Yugoslavia.

Macedonian nationalists, inspired by the breakup of the Yugoslav Federation, seek to redraw the map of the Balkans at the expense of the residual Federation and Greece and with the support of Bulgaria and Turkey. Reportedly, they have announced their intention to form a greater Macedonia including parts of Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia. Thessalonika in Greece would become the capital. Turkey apparently has supported this endeavor publicly. Bulgarian nationalists and former Communists support a unified state embracing both Bulgaria and this state whose putative inhabitants Sofia calls Bulgarians. As suggested above, this has led to a Turco-Bulgarian rapprochement and the repeal of discriminatory legislation against Bulgarian Turks.54

Such maneuvers indicate that Balkan nationalist politics can still ignite international crises. Serbian violence in response to the EC’s recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia also portends a widening crisis. The fundamental cause of the breakup of the Yugoslavian Federation must be found in the failure of the federal government to adopt timely economic and political reforms in response to economic stagnation and ethnic unrest (e.g., in Kossovo) in the 1980s. These developments underscore the close tie between failed economic-political policies and the incitement of tense national rivalries, that, if allowed to flourish,
could overturn state borders and prospects for a secure and integrated Europe.

Institutional Options for Security.

The foregoing analysis demonstrates that failures to transform the domestic politics and economies of Eastern European states could lead to domestic crises, which are then exacerbated by the presence of ethnic minorities that could expand these conflicts into international ones. East European states thus face a limited number of choices in arranging for their individual, mutual, and collective security; none of which offer true guarantees. These choices are:

- A network of bilateral and multilateral accords and forms of cooperation among the threatened states themselves to manage crises and resolve conflicts before they get out of hand and to stimulate their overall economic development. An example of this is the Trilateral Group that grew out of the Polish-Czechoslovak-Hungarian summits in Vishegrad and Cracow in 1991.

- Membership and security cooperation in regional institutions that include states not physically part of Eastern Europe but neighboring it and thus having substantial interests there. Examples of this trend are the "Hexagonale." This group included Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Italy, and Yugoslavia and was an early Italian attempt to build integrative structures joining Eastern and Western Europe in 1989-90. The Nordic Council, which now includes the Baltic States as observers and is attempting to devise measures for cooperation in the Baltic Sea, is likewise an example of the drive to build integrative structures linking East and West.

- A general trend toward East European participation in the major institutions embracing all or most of Europe and the United States in order to receive as positive and as binding a guarantee as is possible. This trend encompasses Eastern European efforts to gain full
membership in the EC, Western European Union (WEU), NATO, and the CSCE and to make these organizations function positively to prevent or manage crises before they explode in open conflict.

- Bilateral treaties with individual states in Western Europe, especially Germany, that provide for mutual supervision of minority rights according to a recognized European standard and for the settlement of any outstanding mutual claims from the past. A precedent for this form of arrangement exists in the 1970 Paris Treaty between Austria and Italy over the status and rights of the German-speaking minority in the Italian provence of Südtirol/Alto Adige.55

The most serious and growing threat is that rising from the breakup of Yugoslavia which serves as an example of what might befall states who fail to resolve their own domestic crises.56 This particular crisis demonstrates that a state in Europe can be destroyed, and international borders can be violated by military force with impunity and without any resolute action by any of the existing security mechanisms in Eastern Europe. A second, related danger is that the violence in Yugoslavia could easily spread into neighboring states like Hungary. Hungarian sources who doubt a military threat concede grounds for concern over the three adjoining countries who relate badly to their Hungarian minorities.57 Therefore, they continue to stress that Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia should be more closely “associated” with CSCE, EC, and especially NATO, insofar as security threats are concerned. These pleas emanating from Budapest demonstrate that Hungary, like Poland and the other states of the area, is trying to pursue all of the options listed above including bilateral, multilateral, and pan-European affiliations that would guarantee it against a crisis spreading from Yugoslavia.

indeed, Eastern Europe’s nationality questions are becoming internationalized. This internationalization of nationality and security issues is taking place in a regional security vacuum. Despite innumerable plans offering NATO, the WEU, the EC, and the CSCE as models for a regional
security organization, in crises to date they have all been found wanting. Moreover, the general Western response to these crises, to date, have been disunited and ineffectual. As George Joffe writes,

It is clear that all the existing security structures, however defined, are quite inappropriate to satisfy a collective European security requirement. Either they exclude states with genuine security concerns in a European context, or they define objectives that extend beyond specific European interests and ignore specific aspects of Europe's security concerns. Furthermore, many of the bodies and structures currently available—such as the Trevi Group, or even NATO and the WEU—cannot respond to the types of security threat that Europe will face in the future.56

Both in Croatia and the Baltic states the intervening power claimed that it acted ostensibly in reply to appeals by members of its nationality who were suffering or about to suffer discrimination. Such pretexts harken back to the 1930s and point out the weaknesses of existing European security institutions, i.e., EC, CSCE, and NATO. None of these institutions have adapted themselves to meet an international crisis either purportedly or actually arising from irreconcilable nationality claims. Although Eastern Europe covets institutionalized association with all these organizations, their failure to act has forced regional actors to strengthen bilateral and trilateral cooperation. Nonetheless, those regional structures are fragile and untried and cannot overcome Western apathy, indifference or ignorance concerning Eastern Europe's problems.

Regional Organizations.

*Italian-led Initiatives: "Vivace ma non troppo."* In their quest for security, East European states, especially Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, also considered the option of affiliating with as many regional organizations in Europe as was possible. This aspiration gave rise to the realization of the Italian inspired "Pentagonale" (five member organization) embracing, in effect, some of the old members of the Habsburg Empire: Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. By 1991 Poland had been added and at the
end of the year Slovenia, thereby transforming it into first a "Hexagonale" and then a "Septagonal" (the inclusion of Croatia now has made that title obsolete and the organization has been renamed the Central European Initiative [CEI]).

In this organization regular ministerial meetings on topics of mutual economic, ecological, and social concern take place and efforts are made by committees set up at these meetings to work together on common solutions to mutual problems in these domains. Naturally, such associations entail an expansion of the idea of security from the traditional military sense of the term to a new understanding that embraces environmental and economic concerns as well. Secondly, such committee and ministerial conferences should, in theory and in fact, smooth the way to a broader range of regional and collective undertakings by the membership; for example, joint efforts to resolve nationality problems in these states.60

The CEI was formed at the CSCE meetings of March 1992. Its mandate clearly envisages a broader range of cooperative activities among the members in the fields of economics, transport, environmental protection, and culture. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is also considering financing major investments, e.g., a Trieste-Budapest-Kiev highway, on the condition that obvious democratic transformations take place in the countries involved and they observe minority rights as much as they do freedom of the press.60 Obviously this financial lever could become a major adjunct to lasting democratic reform and hence stability throughout the region.

European Community. Talks on “Association Agreements” setting the terms for transition to future EC membership have been plagued, right up to their conclusion in December 1991, by obstruction by the EC bureaucracy, and France in particular.61 Such bad faith is, unfortunately, not new to these talks and has aroused great indignation among East European leaders.62 They charge that the West, for all its talk, is not interested in true partnership with the East.63 In Czechoslovakia, Slovak insistence that the text of the December 1991, treaty on relations with and entry to the EC recognize Slovak sovereignty led, since the EC negotiators
refused even to discuss the point, to the threatened postponement by a year of Prague's association with the EC. That outcome could only further drag down the local economy.84

Another linkage between EC membership and the growth of trade is that German Economics Minister Moellmann maintains that U.S. investors will only invest in Eastern Europe if there is a climate of optimism there, precisely what French obstruction is hindering. But when East European officials appeal for American economic assistance they are told to continue the austerity programs imposed by the IMF and inspired by Jeffrey Sachs that have made it impossible for these states to privatize or grow out of their recessions. Thus the circle of economic stagnation in these states is very nearly closed.85 And, as for security in the military sense, it is also clear that the leading members of EC were so divided among themselves in Yugoslavia that they were more afraid of the risks of acting than they were of inaction. Hence the outcome of their initiative was foreseeable.

Western European Union. The WEU also presents a discouraging picture. It was not invoked during the Baltic crisis of early 1991 and in Yugoslavia it has done little. Just as the EC's threat of sanctions has had no effect on the Serbian-dominated Federal Army, so too is it apparent that the WEU cannot currently play an effective military role in Eastern Europe. The risks of getting bogged down in Yugoslavia's strife and the precedent that sets for other East European conflicts helped inhibit action.86 The continuing irresolution of the CSCE and WEU stimulated repeated calls for a strong force to intervene to enforce human rights in Yugoslavia or elsewhere and isolate Putschists and human rights violators.87 Thus a series of options was drafted for inserting forces into Yugoslavia. On closer examination they all turned out to be utterly foolish and impractical both logistically and politically.88 These options were futile because they allowed Serbia to continue to defy the West with impunity and the forces proposed had no means of enforcing their mandate or peace where neither side wants it. The divisions and hesitations of Britain, France, Germany, and the European security agencies
reflect their mutual discord over schemes to reconstitute or divide Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{69}

\textit{The Trilateral Group.} Faced with challenges to their security and living in a dangerous neighborhood, Eastern European states have cobbled together alternative approaches to security listed above. Eastern Europe has openly expressed its strong interest in an institutionalized association with NATO, WEU, EC, and the CSCE, e.g., at the Cracow summit in the fall of 1991. There, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia built on the prior Vishegrad summit in early 1991 to formalize plans for joint entry into these agencies.\textsuperscript{70} On October 5, 1991, their foreign ministers requested a "close and institutionalized" association with NATO. Their demarche pointedly stated that,

In Europe there is no place for different levels and types of security—security must be identical for all...There is a need to create conditions for the direct inclusion of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in the activities of the NATO alliance.\textsuperscript{71}

\textit{NATO/North Atlantic Cooperative Council.} NATO’s reluctance to extend security guarantees (positive or negative) to Eastern Europe clearly stems from a disinclination to intervene in intractable and seemingly amorphous security problems, e.g. Yugoslavia. Nor did NATO’s charter easily permit military action in the particular crisis posed by the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation. Moreover, there is a well-founded NATO fear of upsetting Russia, either because that would have inflamed the reactionaries before August or because it would appear to make Russia the enemy and aggravate lingering inter-state tensions in Europe. This policy, until recently, effectively gave Russia a veto over Eastern European security and, though these states may ultimately enter NATO, it is also clear that they will do so only if Russia is included. One can expect, therefore, that no Russian state will abandon its overriding historical security interest of having a major voice in any security regime in Eastern Europe either through inclusion in NATO or by fostering apprehension as to what it might do from outside European security structures.
NATO has accordingly carefully calibrated its actions. On October 2, 1991, former German Foreign Minister Genscher and Secretary Baker announced agreement about the latest offer of association with NATO. This announcement evidently was a reply to East European pressure for entry into NATO and to potential instability in the former Soviet Union after the failed coup of August 19-21, 1991. Baker and Genscher offered:

- regular meetings of NATO with these states, now called "liaison countries," through a North Atlantic Cooperation Council at ambassadorial, and occasionally ministerial, level;
- periodical participation by the liaison countries in NATO commissions and advisory groups, and in NATO planning sessions on civil defense and environmental affairs;
- increased civilian-military exchanges;
- opening of NATO information offices in Eastern capitals;
- planning for joint projects for disaster relief, refugee programs, and support by NATO for CSCE for coping with these and other new security requirements in Europe; and,
- priority examination of the question of NATO contribution to defense conversion in these states.72

This effort led to NATO establishing at its Rome Summit in November 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to fill a void in the East-West security dialogue. At its initial December 20, 1991, meeting, the council announced that "Security is indivisible and the security of each of our countries is inextricably linked to that of all states participating in the CSCE." On that basis the council stated its intention to continue working towards an interlocking series of European security institutions: CSCE, NATO, EC, WEU, and the council itself. The council will be the institutional liaison between NATO and former-Warsaw Pact countries.73 More recently, at the NATO/NACC meetings of April 1, 1992, further progress
towards defense collaboration between East and West took place. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, recognized as the most “Westernized” states in the region, gained more cooperation than had existed previously as a result of their concerted action. At the meeting the ministers agreed to set up a joint working group to organize panel discussions on practical defense planning, restructuring the armed forces, conversion of the arms industry to peace programs, etc. It was also agreed that NATO will send military and civilian experts to East European countries if asked to. Defense ministers will meet at least once a year.74

There has also been discussion of joint exercises and planning sessions for potential peacekeeping missions that has given rise in the United States to speculation about future joint East-West “out of area” peacekeeping missions or actual combat about threats from outside Europe or from the Commonwealth of Independent States.75

**Collective Security: CSCE.** As the Federal Republic of Germany’s reluctance to come to the immediate aid of Turkey during the Gulf War demonstrates, none of NATO’s member states can be compelled to act. By the same token the CSCE, as an organization or process, has also proven powerless to act in situations where it has competence, e.g., Yugoslavia. The ensuing demand to create a European intervention force, presumably to give Europe a viable European security pillar and safeguard minority rights, is in keeping with the liberal idealism embodied in CSCE and visions of an EC defense force, but does little or nothing to overcome what these institutions’ glaring failures highlight, namely that Eastern Europe is in a security vacuum or limbo. Talk of new security “architectures” for Europe,

Tends to obscure the fact that, since security is supposed to grow out of burgeoning interactions of an elaborate community, the crucial institutions for enhancing security are, in large part, not security oriented. The EC is expected to play the main role in providing security by containing Germany, not by acquiring an official security function but by deepening Germany’s interdependence with its neighbors.76
In the emerging European structure, the EC plays the main role in economics, CSCE in human rights, and NATO in military security, with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council being an outgrowth of NATO and its link to the other institutions, if all goes according to plan. And, as decided at Maastricht in December 1991, the WEU will be the conduit for military integration within the context of European integration. Nevertheless, these points, while they may be the best East Europe can obtain, do not fully satisfy its craving for positive security guarantees or establish reliable safeguards against what Moscow tried to do earlier in 1991, the spread of the Yugoslav crisis, or internally generated nationality conflicts. "Creative ambiguity" ultimately answers neither the visible nor the invisible problems of regional security.

Thus, while the recent meetings of the CSCE in Moscow and Prague have begun to outline a process for collective security intervention and crisis or conflict resolution, especially in cases involving coups against lawful authorities or violations of ethnic rights, it is not clear that the requisite authority to enforce sanctions against transgressors exists. The cumbersome four-stage process that resulted from the Moscow meeting can lead to mandatory fact-finding but not necessarily to binding mediation or even mandatory acceptance of a negotiator. The aim of this process is to make it impossible for states to hide behind the doctrine that infringing minority rights is merely an internal matter of that state. Though the requirement for unanimity is also significantly weaker than before (with regard to fact-finding missions and mediation); it is hardly clear that the CSCE members are ready to enforce the kind of sanctions that Genscher repeatedly has sought to obtain. The Yugoslav crisis shows that while this process exists on paper, implementing it to give really positive security guarantees to East European peoples and states is altogether another matter.

Collective security, though touted by many as the wave of the future, has not worked since at least 1890 when Bismarck's efforts to hold together a semblance of the Concert of Europe finally broke down. The concept's problems can be found not
only in the 1930s but in the EC’s inept handling of the Yugoslav crisis. As German analyst Uwe Nerlich states,

I fear NATO becoming an organization with means but without a role. The European Community is taking on additional roles, such as in trying to broker a peace in Yugoslavia, yet it suffers because it lacks NATO’s means.

Thus, the NACC offers only a partial and insufficient solution to regional threats. Assuming the continuing evolution toward broader European integration of the NACC, EC, WEU, and CSCE; some responses are suggested to the current and foreseeable security challenges in the area. These actions could materially enhance both the regional and individual security of the local actors and promote the further “pacification” of Eastern Europe.


The failure of these security organizations to bring about an end to Yugoslavia’s crisis led the U.N. to attempt mediation and peacekeeping in the area. Led by former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, this effort has also failed to induce Serbia or the other states of the former Yugoslavia to make peace, let alone keep it. While France, Germany, and Poland blame Serbia for the continuing violence, both Vance and Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali refuse to accept that view and ascribe some blame to all sides. That discord effectively stymies any peacekeeping or peacemaking action by the U.N. in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A second problem, apart from the discord among European states and the U.N. concerning the roots of the crisis is American unwillingness to underwrite a major new peacekeeping or peacemaking operation for reasons of financial cost. Consequently the U.N’s activity is stalemated and peace cannot be kept because it cannot first be made in the absence of any force able to coerce the belligerents into accepting peace. As Anthony Lewis of The New York Times observed, probably the only way to force Serbia to stop flouting the international community’s expressed wishes is to bomb Belgrade or undertake similar military intervention in the name
of collective security and humanitarian concerns as enshrined in the U.N. charter or the Helsinki accords. The ongoing inability to reach a consensus concerning the nature of the crisis or how to deal with it underscores the continuing unreadiness of the U.N. or any of the other institutions mentioned to enforce a real collective security regime and/or humanitarian behavior upon states.

**Enforcing Collective Decisions.**

The idea of creating an intervention force, either under the CSCE or the U.N., to safeguard human rights in countries threatened by "Putschists" or ethnic civil war has arisen. President Walesa endorsed a U.N.-controlled force precisely because he fears Eastern Europe is in danger of becoming a security "no man's land." Those forces would, along with Eastern European entry into EC, CSCE, and NATO, help defend collective security. Germany, too, has sponsored such a concept. At the Moscow CSCE conference in September 1991, Genscher called for such a force and a corresponding system to protect individual and collective legal rights and permit observer missions in troubled areas even against states' wishes.

Some German officials allegedly believe that the CSCE should develop a mechanism proscribing the use of military forces for illegitimate purposes (e.g., force not sanctioned by an international body). The idea of a CSCE high commissioner for nationality affairs is also of German origin and reflects anxieties about the use of such military forces growing from an unresolved nationality conflict. Soviet delegates to the September 1991 CSCE conference, commentators, and officials also underscored the need for such mechanisms, even up to sanctions. If a coup occurs in a country, legitimate constitutional organs must be supported. Should the coup still succeed, the other CSCE states must do all they can to see that the new government restores constitutional and prior treaty obligations. "Coup leaders must not be able to count on recognition. The enforcement of CSCE obligations does not constitute interference in internal affairs." The references in the German-Polish treaty about each state's minorities are also
intended to avert such an outcome by imposing this Pan-European standard. In this fashion, at least on paper, there is a glimmer of a means of enforcing human rights from abroad.

Conclusions.

Time is not necessarily on the side of progress in Eastern Europe. Poland's elections and their aftermath, the governmental crisis and paralysis, are leading to a visible retreat from economic liberalization. These forces coincide with the unraveling of the government's ambitious privatization scheme, its return to subsidizing bankrupt industry, corruption scandals, continuing recession, and trade obstacles. All these phenomena undermine reform and marketization. World Bank representatives have already made veiled threats that if privatization does not advance, credits may not be given. Privatization's failure means perpetuating a large state sector that inhibits reform, and sustains crisis and political stalemate due to the election results. Comparable problems exist elsewhere.

The lack of success of EC, NATO, or CSCE to meet regional problems and threats betrays a continuing ignorance about the region and encourages prominent leaders to assert that the West neither understands nor cares about Eastern Europe, a sentiment widely shared across the region. Western analysts also note that should the area feel abandoned by the West, elites will blame others for their failures, take refuge in a virulent but fantasy-ridden nationalism and autarchy, indulge a nostalgia for the "not so bad past," and squander their new opportunities.

That condition cannot be allowed to come to pass. But to date, Western replies to the challenges of security have been too little too late. Preliminary reactions to NATO's Rome Summit initiatives creating the NACC deem them both "halfhearted and insufficient." East European states demand concrete guarantees of their borders against future aggression, and maintain that NATO is responsible for security across Europe, whether it wants it or not.
NATO and EC still remain paralyzed over fear of involvement in seemingly intractable and unresolvable economic and ethnic rivalries and the fear of pushing the new Russia away from democracy. Both organizations sense that East European demands for firm guarantees, which will only grow more insistent, could drag them into the region and force them to revise their charters and principles fundamentally, which they are reluctant to do.56

Thus, it is necessary to strike at the root of the crisis by offering a broader package of economic integration to these states, not ideologically derived economic advice for reforms which cannot be politically maintained and which relate poorly to local economic reality. The West must open its markets wider to Eastern Europe, and more investment, not credits, must flow there. There must be a greater positive commitment to the region's security, along with mechanisms for compulsory arbitration under neutral auspices. This means a broader role for NATO in the form of the NACC. Sanctions should be used when a crisis starts, not after long periods of paralysis and inattention as in Yugoslavia. These suggestions for immediate action sound simple but require precise coordination and multilateral negotiation with all the parties.

Moreover, they require some sacrifice of current luxury and preoccupation with other matters. Twice in this century crises in Eastern Europe have led to global wars. In each crisis Western inattention or failure to devise coherent security regimes with or for Eastern Europe led to those wars. We should have learned from this sequence of crises that this region's security is, in the final analysis, intimately bound up with our security, and that domestic structural roots of security problems must be addressed if we and local governments are to gain even a partial handle on them. While Eastern Europe has long memories of injustice, strife, occupation, and ethnic rivalry, it is also time for the West to use its memory and active intelligence so that this history becomes not a shackle upon Europe's future, but rather a springboard to a new epoch of peace, democracy, and prosperity.
Recommendations for U.S. Policy.

- Fundamental to the area is promotion of export-led growth that is then channeled into productive investment in privatized industrial and service sector firms. Therefore it is essential to open markets for East European goods and promote sales to them and investment in their countries rather than aid and credits. The latter only enhance their ultimate debt problems and do not address the real problems stated here.

- The United States, in particular, must do better in this regard. Currently 60 percent of investment in the area goes to Hungary, thereby shortchanging other states. While this reflects Hungary’s relative progress, it also reflects an unhealthy imbalance in Western and U.S. priorities.

- The direct outcome of such steps is maintaining the course to inclusion in the EC and at the same time real progress to reduce trade barriers in the GATT’s Uruguay Round.

- A positive step in this regard might well be to adopt former Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Dienstbier’s suggestion for recycling trade between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics by giving the latter cash to buy Eastern European goods and thus stimulate both sets of economies and legitimate democratic economics and politics in both regions.

- Nationality relationships might well be safeguarded by a network of treaties like those between Warsaw and Bonn that make human and civil rights a clause in the treaty and create thereby a European legal standard against which movements can measure their situation. At the same time the idea of a high commissioner in the CSCE for nationality affairs might be employed to enforce compulsory arbitration by an impartial organization, e.g., the World Court, backed by an impartial arbitration force, e.g., the U.N.
- Sooner rather than later NATO and the United States must confront the issue of granting positive security guarantees to these states or else abide by the trend toward a European force from the EC, a trend in view with the recent accord on a Franco-German corps.

  - Such arrangements will have a considerable impact upon the future of U.S. force structure requirements in Europe, let alone what the future role of U.S. forces will be in the region.

  - Although it is too early to be definitive, since senior NATO leadership must define exactly what security relationship will exist with these states, current envisaged force structure reductions should not be irreversible.

  - From the perspective of the United States, the arguable lack of U.S. vital national interests in the region needs to be tempered by the fact that our Western European allies do have vital interests there. Consequently, U.S. security policy toward the region needs to be integrated with our European allies.

- Increased access to the world market would inhibit prospects for autarchic and "praetorian" regimes like Bismarck's 1879 "marriage of iron and rye."

- Negotiated security environments undercut the plausibility of nationalist agitation and the propensity of military and chauvinist elements to exaggerate threat assessments. That process, in turn, fosters civilian control of the military and diverts it from speculating on political takeovers. Security agreements also increase opportunities for national elites to mix with foreigners and dilute nationalist enmities.

- Democratic institutional and developmental requirements for EC membership strengthen free market and democratic forces in these states. To the extent that they know they will be integrated
economically and politically with Europe, elites can move forward on reform.

- Successful economic integration into Europe is the best, if not only, way of expanding the economic pie and showing that liberal democracy works. Under conditions of economic integration and growth, inter-state borders lose much of their salience as economic conditions for all improve. And as borders decline in importance as political issues and symbols, nationalist passions would then also subside considerably. Then politics would be about expanding economic prosperity, not divisive and zero-sum issues of national identity and organized social hatreds that manifest a structured irrationalism and poison all politics.9

- Finally, Eastern Europe faces security risks from both a strong Russia/Soviet Union and from the prospect of its disintegration. There is no way around or out of this paradox. If these states are left mainly to their own devices they will be unable to cope with their particular domestic crises or those fostered by a total collapse of the economies of the states formed from the USSR. Nor would they be able to deal with threats issuing from a revived Russia anxious to recover its former role (even its Tsarist not to say Stalinist role) in Eastern Europe. As we noted above, only the West can prevent such crises from getting out of control so that they endanger Western security. But the profound interconnectedness of Eastern and Western European crises is still not fully appreciated in Western capitals or else it frightens Western states into inactivity. Until and unless this cycle of is broken, recurrent crises in Eastern Europe will disturb Western Europe's tranquility. If the West wants to achieve the domestic and regional tranquility of Eastern and Western Europe we and our allies must act vigorously to forestall disturbances before they arise. Just as Russian weakness or strength poses an unavoidable security paradox to its neighbors, we must also act
paradoxically and with vigor to restore lasting calm. Here too, there is no way around or out of this paradox.

ENDNOTES


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


22. Battiata; Bering-Jensen; and "Business in Eastern Europe."


28. Ibid.


36. Ionescu, pp. 24-27.

37. Ibid.

38. Stephen Fischer-Galati, “Rumania in Transition,” American Foreign Policy Center, Department of History, Louisiana Tech University, Current Issues, No. 1, Summer, 1991, p. 11; “FSN Deputy on Discrimination,


71. Morgan, p. 28.


79. Korey, pp. 8-11.


81. Eyal, pp. 32-35.


94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.
