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FROM SOUTHERN FLANK TO SOUTHERN FRONT

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This study examines the nature of the threats to Western interests in the Mediterranean region and recommends responses of a political and military nature that can be developed to create stability in this volatile region.

The emphasis in this final product is on the underlying causes of instability in the region and the political and conventional military responses that can be used by the West to stabilize this part of the world. Maritime and unconventional forces have long been a reality in the Mediterranean region for the West, and although they are of vital importance to Western policy are not addressed in this study.

This paper is intended to compile and interpret what has been written in recent years in order to create the necessary stability to promote economic cooperation and political stability within the region. The end state proposed in this paper may take even longer than the forty-five years it took to develop a unified Western Europe, but the West must begin to influence this process.
EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION IS DEAD

The Warsaw Pact is dead as a military organization. Soviet troops are leaving Eastern Europe. Nuclear weapons are being thought of in political rather than military terms. Reduction of conventional arms between the Soviets and NATO members is moving at an incredible pace. Both sides of the Iron Curtain are considering 'Peace Dividends' as politically acceptable, and a natural process with the ending of the conflict. Security Cooperation is the replacement for the Calgary Squadrons that faced each other just a short time ago along closed borders. The result of these almost inconceivable events has been the disappearance of the no warning, large-scale attack in Central Europe that has dominated the Western security establishments for more than forty years. The Central European plain is no longer the center of gravity of Western security. Accompanying the retreat of the Soviet Army has been the dislocation of Communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Democracy is spreading, market economies are replacing Socialist systems, human rights issues are increasing in importance and free elections are occurring. Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe has disappeared. The result has been initial euphoria followed more recently by the realization of an increase in uncertainty and disorder. The transition period, it now seems, will be just as dangerous an endeavor as the Cold War.

Compounding this situation is the apparent lack of a strategic approach by the industrialized nations to tackle the underlying political and economic problems that threaten the stability of the developing countries both in Eastern Europe and around the
Mediterranean. The overriding condition then becomes one of a changing security scene for the Western nations from the traditional Central European plains to the stabilization of those regions in which turmoil will adversely affect Western social and economic well-being. Nowhere are these threats any more predominate than around the perimeter of the Mediterranean sea.

MEDITERRANEAN REGION'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

President Bush in his 1990 National Security Strategy of the United States referred to an "open and expanding international economic system" as a security objective. This translates to mean that four regions of the globe must remain stable if economic growth is to occur- North America, Western Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. "A hegemonic power or instability in these regions would threaten the growth of the world economic system and carry serious consequences for international security."(1) It is no surprise then that the world reacted in unison when Iraq invaded Kuwait.

U.S. Historical view of the Mediterranean

The United States has long had the view that the Mediterranean region was of strategic importance. It has taken the view that the Mediterranean straddles worlds-European and non-European in nature. It has been seen by the U.S. as the meeting point of three continents, Europe, Africa, and Asia. Therefore, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia are a continuum of vital interest to the U.S. As a result of this thinking, since World War II the U.S. has had a formidable naval presence in the region. Its purpose is to do the following; "stabilize the oil-bearing regions of the Middle East, protect access to vital adjacent areas, maintain balance of
peace between Greece and Turkey, keep trade routes open, provide NATO organizational structure on the Southern flank, and support Israel's continued existence." (2) For the purpose of this paper the Mediterranean region is defined at Annex 9.

The United States has also taken into account the Mediterranean Sea's role as an avenue of access to the Persian Gulf. It can be argued that the Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea form a single geopolitical unit. (3) It should be noted, however, that the U.S. National Command Authority has the region divided between two commands; CENTCOM and EUCOM.

**Europeans historical view of the Mediterranean**

European views on the region have varied considerably, with the difference being mainly how well insulated the country felt it was from threats in the region. Those countries in the North taking a much more detached view of events than have Spain, France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey (4), the only exception being Great Britain.

The Northern European NATO members have viewed crises in the Mediterranean region on a case by case basis. They have been extremely reluctant to get involved in 'out of area' problems. The feelings run so deep in several countries that involvement and military assistance to NATO member Turkey's Eastern borders are often referred to as a 'Gray Area', and during the Gulf War when a clear threat existed to Turkey several countries reacted as if their NATO obligations did not exist (5). "The perceived tardiness of the German response in contributing to the Allied Mobile Force deployments to Turkey during the Gulf crisis has left a negative impression.... the problem was [seen not as] the German government's difficulty in
committing forces outside the Central Region, but the reluctance to
commit German forces in defense of Turkey."(6)

Southern European NATO members have a different view. They know
that any instability in the region has a direct and often profound
economic and political impact on them. The acquisition by Libya of
Russian fighter bombers, the formation of large modern tank armies in
Syria and Iraq, the proliferation of tactical ballistic missiles, and
the rise and exportation of Islamic fundamentalism and its
accompanying terrorism in the late 1970's and 1980's, was not
regarded with casual interest in the Southern Mediterranean
countries. These were real threats to their security, and in the case
of terrorism the Southern Mediterranean countries remain on the Front
lines.

The result of these threats in the region lead the Southern NATO
member countries to expand their commitments within NATO in order to
be members in good standing, and thus insure allied presence in case
of a serious security threat. Italy accepted Cruise missiles, agreed
to the redeployment of F-16 fighters, and sent mine-hunting vessels
into the Persian Gulf. Turkey extended basing rights to allied
nations for both NATO and non-NATO activities. Spain and Portugal
both increased their interest and activities in the alliance during
the same period.

It is no surprise then that the nations most interested in the
development and modernization of Rapid Reaction Forces for the
purposes of protecting their interests outside the NATO sphere of
influence include France, Italy, and Spain, along with Great
Britain(7). And that Turkey has recognized the need to modernize its forces, and is in the process of doing so with U.S. assistance.

**CURRENT MEDITERRANEAN SITUATION**

The Mediterranean region is presently characterized by the two most dramatic events in the region, and for that matter the world, in the past three years. The dislocation of Communist regimes and the Gulf War have had a profound impact on the region. The Gulf War showed regional, NATO, and world leaders that a conflict of regional proportions can now have an impact on the entire industrialized world in economic and environmental terms. It also has shown that with the decline of East-West antagonism, the United Nations is capable of building a strong and effective coalition with U.S. and Russian cooperation.

It clearly showed the shift in the Soviet Mid-East policy from one of an 'Arab policy' in which the objective was to influence the Arab-Israeli conflict by aligning themselves with Iraq, Syria, and the PLO, to a 'Muslim policy' in which the objective is to influence its own Muslim Republics through Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia(8).

The war in the Gulf made Europeans painfully aware of the region's vital importance to their economies, and political well-being. The differing views of the nations regarding how to resolve the crises exacerbated existing ties and led to paralyses by the Europeans as a whole(9).

Turkey's role as an alliance member and its strategic importance was reemphasized, but not as NATO'S Southern flank, rather as Europe's bridge to the Middle East. Europe's view of Turkey as a bridge is seen in a very limited sense of "Turkey's role as a model
for political and economic development in the Middle East", not in the wider role "as an agent for dialogue,"(10) a role the U.S. sees as important.

In addition to the Gulf War, the other event that is currently influencing the Mediterranean region is the dislocation of the former Communist regimes in the Balkans and Southern Russian Republics. The result is that disorder is becoming the rule as directed economies are replaced by free markets, and communist regimes are voted out of power. With the withdrawal of the two superpowers, the friction that they created and the restraint that they required from their client states goes as well. Regional powers now have more leeway to conduct their own security agendas be it peacekeeping, hegemony, or benign neglect. The result to this point is a rise of long standing feuds which have laid dormant for years, and nationalist movements fueled by the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of Soviet influence and hegemony. Compounding the situation is the real possibility that with the advent of Naval arms control initiatives, and the execution of the already agreed upon CFE accords in Central Europe, the Mediterranean region may well become the most heavily armed region in the world.

As in turbulent periods of world history in the past, the present is characterized by opportunity and peril. The creation of market economies is providing the Southern European countries a unique opportunity to become intermediate trading partners and trusted advisors, a role that Turkey and Italy, in particular, have eagerly accepted. The fledgling governments of the Balkans and the Southern Russian republics see them as a valuable source of expertise.
and also as a direct or indirect link into the European Economic community(11).

The past one hundred years has proven to be a volatile one for the region, and thus characterized as perilous. If an "open and expanding international economic system" is to come into being, it stands to reason that it must operate in an environment in which it can flourish. Put another way, the relationship between economic growth and security is reciprocal; "stability--the absence of crisis and war--is obviously necessary if effective economic activity is to go on"(12).

This fact has lead the Northern and Southern European NATO members, as well as Japan, to the realization that the countries around the Mediterranean and those that can effect the security of the countries surrounding the Mediterranean are of vital importance to our economic welfare. With today's integrated world economy the chances of instability in Eastern Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East adversely affecting the economic well-being of the most industrialized nations are greater than at any other time in modern history(13).

If the region is gaining in strategic importance in the eyes of Western leaders and it is recognized as a volatile region, it stands to reason that a through understanding of the root causes of the instability and violence in the region is necessary.

WHAT ARE THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN?

There are two overriding conditions in the Mediterranean region that contribute to instability, these are the inequalities in the 1) social and the 2) economic well-being between the wealthy
industrialized Western European countries and the less developed ex-communist regimes of the east, and the third world countries of North Africa and the primarily authoritarian regimes of the Middle East. Social and economic development in the region is, therefore, a prerequisite for stability to become a prevalent factor(14).

The Debt Minefield

The very process of achieving this economic development is in itself destabilizing. The transition from one form of government to another is a very difficult process, that challenges the legitimacy and authority of the existing political system. The process of liberation can be severely disorganizing, therefore, every course of action taken by the fledgling government is fraught with dichotomy. Almost all the countries in the region, except several oil rich Gulf states, are somewhere in the 'debt minefield.'

In order to acquire technology for economic growth, developing countries must borrow from developed nations, or the World Bank. Debt and dependence upon an external source are the immediate results. The advanced technology that is obtained leads many times to ecological problems, and high visibility projects lead to increased expectations by the populace. Set backs in social or economic development then seem to exacerbate existing community-based grievances and social instability acquires more importance. The social instability is a significant threat in itself, but it usually leads to vulnerability from external forces as well. Conversely, resolution of domestic social problems requires a strong state structure relatively free of outside pressures. The political leadership must balance, therefore, the social and economic needs of their country and the resources that
are entailed, with the need to raise and equip a military force potent enough to deter their neighbors and credible enough to keep themselves in power. The result is often an over stated military capability and as a consequence an arms race with neighboring states (15).

Third World leaders are thus continually trying to balance often contradictory political, social, and economic factors with enough military strength to ensure their security from internal opposition and from neighboring hegemony. How well they balance these needs determines how long they remain in control. In the Mediterranean, there are several unique features to this balancing act.

Political Traditions of Mediterranean Countries

Before tackling the specific threats posed to the states in the region, it is beneficial to first examine the historical underpinnings that have been built over centuries that interact to make up the present day political traditions. These have been summarized best by Thomas Friedman: Tribe-like politics, authoritarianism, and nation-states imposed by imperial invaders.

Tribe-like politics is a pre-modern form of political interaction characterized by a harsh, survivalist quality and an adherence to certain intense primordial or kin-group forms of allegiance. These may be an actual tribe, a clan, a religious sect, a village group, neighborhood friends, an army unit, or a combination of any number of these. The individuals are bound together by a tribe-like spirit of solidarity - total obligation to one another - mutual loyalty that takes precedence over allegiances to national community or the nation-state.
Authoritarianism is the concentration of power in a single ruler or elite, not bound by a constitutional framework. This ruling elite usually assumed/inherited power by the sword and expects his subjects to submit obediently to the sword.

The modern nation-state in most of the Mediterranean region is a new concept, arbitrarily drawn by imperial invaders, not willed into existence by their own people or developed organically out of a common historical memory. (16)

This description of the political history of the region is meant to show that Western values and conduct are not necessarily an accurate yardstick in which to measure the effectiveness or intentions of Mediterranean leaders.

The West, for instance, must not only look on men like Saddam Hussein and Hafez Assad as tribal chiefs, as brutal authoritarians, but they must also be seen as men of ambition, modernizing bureaucrats, trying to solidify and develop their relatively new nation-states (17). Keeping these ideas in mind, it is essential to now examine what are the threats to the stability of the states in the Mediterranean region.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS

Instability within the region can best be examined by looking at what are the threats to the states of the region. These manifest themselves into two broad groupings, internal and external threats to the nation-state.

The underlying causes of the internal threats are political instability (caused by nationalism, arbitrarily drawn borders,
ethnic/religious minority unrest), economic underdevelopment, or recently, environmental degradation.

"Since 1945, most armed conflicts in the developing countries have taken one form or another of "internal war", with only a small number being inter-state wars."(18) Internal threats take the form of insurgencies, terrorism, or organized criminal organizations usually connected to the drug trade.

External threats come from a variety of sources; denied access to resources, over population of a neighboring state, border disputes, arms races, state sponsored terrorism, drug trafficking, or ethnic/minority unrest.(19)

**Nature of Internal Conflicts**

Internal conflicts are characterized as highly political conflicts that are usually very long in duration and very bloody. The root causes are normally economic in nature, but often are wrapped in social, religious, or political overtones. They are, therefore, highly ambiguous and frustrating affairs. They do not arise in well functioning, legitimate participatory governments as a rule. Since they are political in nature they must have political solutions that gain or regain the loyalty of the population, not necessarily defeat the "enemy". Military force by itself is not the clear answer, therefore. As a rule, the industrialized nations of the West do not become interested until the problems internal to a developing country have been under way for quite some time. The hearts and minds of the population may already have been lost. This implies it may be hopeless to enter the struggle, or it may require more
These threats usually start with little or no warning. It is often very difficult for Western leaders to quantify how much of a threat an internal conflict in a far off land is to our interests, as a result, public support is difficult to muster and is seldom unanimous. Therefore, western leadership is hesitant early on, when it is the most opportune time to intervene, to commit the resources necessary. They delay until the situation develops more clearly, usually waiting until it is too late. The corollary is that the more U.S. or Western presence, the less likelihood of success and the less leverage we can exact (21). Western presence seems to get tied to the problem and not seen as a solution.

**SOURCES OF INTERNAL CONFLICT**

**MINORITY GROUPS**

Minority groups trapped within established state boundaries may be the most frequent and troublesome of the internal threats, particularly within the countries of Eastern Europe. Heterogeneous populations are often sources of tension, especially to fledgling democracies. Government legitimacy is often perilous to begin with, and when charismatic minority leaders use nationalism as a means of securing political power it is usually in opposition to the political system in being, and it is usually focused against minority groups. The Neo-Nazi movement in Europe is an offshoot of this phenomenon. A second catalyst forms when minority groups compare their economic and
social status with the majority population, their country of origin, or the regional role model, usually resulting in their dissatisfaction. (22) (see Annex A)

The former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher writes: "The lesson of this century is that countries put together artificially will fall apart. National identities will not be suppressed."

**RELIGIOUS MINORITIES**

A close relative to the minority groups are the dissatisfied religious groups. In the Middle East and North Africa this translates to Muslims, and Muslim fundamentalism. Islamic fundamentalism results from widespread feelings of frustration with their governments performance in social and economic terms. (23) Its rise in one nation places a tremendous amount of pressure on neighboring territories, especially if that country is predominately Muslim. The resulting instability often results in Muslim against Muslim or Muslim against Jew (West Bank) or Muslim against Christian (Lebanon) conflict.

Knowledge of the historic divisions within the Muslim religion is instructive. The Shiite-Sunni conflict dates from the 7th century and the death of the Muslim prophet Mohammed. The Sunnis wanted Mohammed's successor to be determined by a process of election and consensus by the elders. The Shiites, however, thought the successor should come exclusively from Mohammed's family and their descendants. This has translated into modern Sunni Islam doctrine centered around power and achievement, while Shi'ism is a doctrine of opposition. Its appeal is, therefore, to the defeated and oppressed (24). (Iran, Iraq, Algeria, Lebanon, and Israel).
The fundamentalist movement may find its greatest momentum in the Central Asian Soviet republics. There search for sovereignty and identity may lead to fundamentalist Muslim societies. The spill over will certainly effect Iran and Turkey with their heavy Muslim populations. (Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, Azerbaijan and western Kazakhstan)(25).

Another form of religious strife, one not often mentioned, and often assumed away is the internal conflict and the widening gap between the ultra-conservative Haredim and the Zionist Jews in Israel, and between the Jews of Israel and those who do not reside there, particularly American Jews. The principle differences are all centered around the policy of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza strip. It has been suggested that if Israel takes a real and passionate look at its ideological differences it may "end up like Lebanon arguing first in parliament, then in the streets-particularly over annexation of the West Bank."(26)

THE FIT OF PEOPLES AND BORDERS

The fit between borders and peoples around the region is also a volatile situation. Several minority groups could potentially cause regional conflicts, and one group, the Palestinians, have been at the heart of several regional wars and international terrorism. Palestinian groups in one country are capable of drawing support from neighboring countries governments, thus quickly raising the stakes from an internal security problem to an external one (Jordan, Lybia, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria). Additionally, various Middle East leaders have thrown their support to the Palestinian cause as a means of cheaply undermining the government of a neighboring state (Syria
and Lebanon/Lybia and Israel) or have quietly supported them as a means to control them so that they can not become an internal threat. (Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Iran)

The Kurdish nationalist movement, if allowed to fester, will involve the reshaping of the borders of three nations (Iran, Iraq, and Turkey). The Kurds have also been used at various times through the years as a means for one of the three nations to indirectly wage war on another. (Recently Iran against Iraq) Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani was once asked why the Kurdish national movement had not won the wide spread recognition and international support that others had received. His response was simple, "Because we fought only on our land and we killed only our enemies, we never got the world attention of some other national liberation movements." (27) This lesson was not missed by Yasser Arafat and the PLO. The West can only hope that it does not get too wide an audience.

Another group with grievances that can affect the security of the region are the Macedonians in Southern Yugoslavia. If their nationalist movement takes hold it will affect the borders of Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey. It should also be remembered that the peoples of Cyprus have lived under the cloud of tension from the mainland Turkish and Greek governments.

It must be recognized by the West that the Final Act at Helsinki supposedly established the inviolability of borders but "recent events have indirectly introduced another element of insecurity into the Third World by suggesting that borders are not immutable" (28).
DRUG TRAFFICKING

Drug trafficking and the international cartels that it breeds can also be a seriously destabilizing process in a developing nation. The export of drugs is almost always to developed nations, thus straining relations between the two. The underworld nature of the business develops and sustains a powerful criminal element within the country and undermines the political, economic, and social processes the government is trying to install. Arguably, the most devastating effect is its drain on desperately needed resources that must be taken from infrastructure to increase security measures. In environmentally devastated areas or areas ravaged by years of civil war and characterized by lawlessness, growing plants that can turn quick extremely high returns or can be grown without the fear of reprisal from police forces will be very hard to resist. In fact, drug related agriculture is already taking a hold in Lebanon. (Lebanon, Turkey, and Morocco, Eastern Europe and Central Asia?)

TERRORISM

"Terrorism is a clandestine, undeclared and unconventional form of warfare, waged without humanitarian restraints and rules. Its primary application is that by sponsorship, or proxy, it becomes an implement of foreign policy."(29) If one accepts this definition of terrorism, and this is but one of many, it can then be seen that it is in fact a form of warfare. A limited war of attrition and evasion for political, not territorial gain at a low intensity level. If properly executed, it becomes a safe, low cost method of employing
and projecting force. In fact, it is now tacitly recognized as a facet of international relations.

It is predicted the narcotics industry will expand as a tool of international terrorist organizations. There are at least two benefits to the terrorists, the first is that drugs will help finance their cause, but increasingly, and of a much greater impact to western nations, it is estimated they will use their connections into the illegal money markets that narcotics engenders to destabilize economies as a policy goal. The objective of terrorism may well become the disruption or disintegration of a country's economy. The focal point of their attacks would then become centralized communications facilities (business and government records), production facilities (electric grids, oil rigs), and distribution facilities (pipelines, ports, or international road networks).

State sponsorship of terrorism has become a method of transporting psychological warfare. State sponsorship ranges from ideological, theological, and political encouragement, through propaganda and diplomatic assistance, to overt support of activists (funding, training, and equipping).

It is estimated that Terrorism will increase as a major weapon of choice for ethnic minorities, the rise and spread of fundamentalism, internal power struggles and nationalist and independence movements (30). It seems almost assured that terrorism will be with us for a long time to come, and that the Mediterranean basin will be its spawning grounds. The West must then come to the conclusion that state sponsored terrorism is an act of war, and hold the leaders of such sponsorship responsible.
It has been suggested that terrorism and the illegal drug trades effect on the West may become a decisive factor in the formation of a United Europe. "by opening national frontiers (1989 Schengen Agreement) we see that the southern flank of Europe, incorporating Greece, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal can be viewed as a particularly vulnerable area...for a variety of reasons: extensive coastlines, close proximity across the Mediterranean sea to North Africa. Although all nations of the European Community confront, to varying degrees, a dilemma with 1992 and effective security measures against drug-trafficking, terrorism and illegal immigration, these southern countries are perceived to be the weak link in the external barrier the EC presents the rest of the world."(31)

**DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES**

The next internal threat that needs to be addressed is that of the pressures that population growth exerts upon the developing nation. The population of the world is presently 4.9 billion and increasing at a rate of 1.7% per year. Although this rate has been declining from a 1960 high of 2.1%, it is still projected that by the year 2015 there will be 7 billion people on earth(28). Of this 7 billion, 81% will be in the less developed countries. In the Mediterranean basin this translates to be two distinct populations, the Northern Mediterranean countries which are getting fewer, older, and richer, and those in the Southern part of the basin which are getting larger, younger, and poorer. This trend does not create immediate crisis, rather over-population and population distribution problems are long-term ones, which allow for long-term solutions.(32)
We also know there is a link between the environmental degradation, population growth, and migratory trends. The exact nature of this link is not well understood. Experts disagree about the extent of the effects one event has on the other, but most concur there is such a linkage. The end result, however, is the resultant pressure placed on the governments involved. This pressure usually takes the form of political unrest.

Demographic projections are assembled in Annex 2. Accurate figures are nearly impossible to obtain, and demographic projections are usually pessimistic, but viewing these figures can be informative if viewed as trends. If this is done, two distinct and important trends emerge. Both have the potential to be destabilizing and thus effecting security. These are the 1) inequities in population distribution and 2) the disparity in age of those populations.

**POPULATION DISTRIBUTION**

The population of the region is increasingly shifting to the Southern shores. The Southern countries are increasing in numbers each year, while the Northern shore countries are not growing at present and are actually projected to decline in the future. If the projections are even somewhat accurate, the populations of the four most populous countries on the Southern and Eastern shores, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey will exceed the total population of their Northern more industrialized neighbors. Each of these countries is primarily Islamic. By the year 2015 the Southern Mediterranean countries will outnumber the Northern ones for the first time in modern history. Unfortunately, several of these
countries are already having problems feeding themselves (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, as well as Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania).

Mass movement of populations is already occurring, as Hungary and unemployed rural populations migrate towards urban areas in search of employment and social services (Egypt). To what extent these unemployed working age adults and their families migrate illegally beyond borders is now only being speculated. If only one in ten of the projected number of youth moves North to an industrialized society, that in itself will double the present European work force.

The second trend is that of age disparity. The age differential from the north to the south of the basin is quite striking. As time passes, the number of working age adults will diminish in the north and those who will be retiring and living off the state will increase. Conversely, the southern countries population will become increasingly younger, if the estimates are even somewhat accurate. The implications of these population trends will be profound. The end result will certainly result in the potential for increased violence.

A clear warning sign of the potential severity of this problem has already been erected. The Palestinian uprising in Israel was initially carried out by young Palestinians who had little stake in the system in place in the West Bank. They were the young who had gone to universities and technical schools only to graduate and find jobs sweeping floors, waiting tables, or laying bricks. (33)

The most highly visible and potentially the most devastating by-product of over-population is mass migration from the under-developed to the developed countries. The growth within several of the southern countries may occur faster than some Mediterranean
country economies can react, thus giving rise to mass movement of the population. Initially the movement will be from rural to urban centers in search of work, if the urban area fails to provide the required economic subsistence, they will either resort to violence or illegally move to a near-by well-developed urban area in another country. This level of urbanization will cause at least two security dilemmas, 1) vulnerability to terrorism in such population concentrations and 2) the seeds of social unrest that accompany rapid urbanization—"crowded living conditions, the spread of contagious diseases, lack of sanitation, severe unemployment, environmental pollution, high crime rates, and heightened demands on local and national governments for services that already have been overextended by dwindling tax bases". (34)

This migration is just beginning to occur. The migration routes are from the south to the north and from the east to the west. The reasons for migration are varied, but include, economic deprivation, high fertility, unemployment and environmental degradation (push-factors) in less developed countries and family re-unification, higher wages, and increased demand for labor (pull factors) in industrialized countries (35). This migration leads to political tensions between the donor and the receiving states. The donor feels the need to protect its citizens abroad from oppressive actions. The donor is also reluctant to repatriate immigrants at a later date because it cannot feed and house its own indigenous population. The receiver nation must shoulder additional social welfare costs, labor groups oppose the immigrants as they depress wages, political groups
use their presence to fuel nationalistic feelings and thus gain political power (France, Italy, Spain and Germany).

An additional phenomenon is the concept of "guest-worker". This is common practice in the richer Gulf states (Saudi Arabia). The donor, or in this case labor exporting nations (Turkey, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria) willingly recruit immigrants to work for recipient nations. The recipient nation minimizes the potential impact politically by 1) immediately returning to the sending nation their immigrants if trouble arises, 2) allowing itself to keep its own cultural/ethnic purity, and 3) preventing the building of permanent settlements (West Bank Palestinians). The donor/exporter often finds itself months or years later defending its citizens abroad against human rights violations or finds several hundred thousand of its citizens at its borders asking for political asylum. In either case political tensions between the two nations reaches explosive stages. With the exporting nations being predominately Muslim, these tensions can build to an even higher level and the potential for crisis escalates to regional proportions.

Migration it is estimated will become one of the main issues, economically, in the nineties. "Through migration, the Eastern block and Mideastern/North African developing countries are re acquiring—perhaps surpassing, the political weight they had in the 60's and 70's." (36)

**GENERATION GAP**

The second major implication of the trends in demographics is that of a "generation gap". The northern nations are getting older with fewer entering the labor/draft pool. In the south, the opposite
is true. The state has the problem of employing, housing, feeding, and providing medical care for an increasing number of young. The result is the Northern young will be required to shoulder a heavy burden in social welfare taxes to care for its old, and a higher percentage of young, as their number decreases, will be drafted into their countries militaries—even with anticipated force reductions. The likelihood of unconventional war is increasing with the decline of the Cold par, and the Northern countries will be hard pressed to field the large conventional forces which might be necessary to combat these insurgencies(37)

The south in contrast, may find that it can not feed or employ its young population. Additionally, young views and expectations will increasingly clash with "older" folks systems, giving rise to political unrest. This has traditionally been defined as terrorism in the Mediterranean region. The state may well find that it will have to raise and arm a large conventional force to occupy its youth. This will serve to quell internal strife (assuming young will fight young), but may also cause regional instability as neighbors question the need for such a large force. This phenomenon is already a reality in Iran, Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco).(38)

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

An additional area which has potential security risk attached to it is the degradation of the environment. These problems are recent and are seldom thought of in security terms, but in the Mediterranean they may well be the fuel that ignites the flames of controversy. The destruction of the water, land and air in an under-developed country
is not often tied to instability or security, but it deserve the attention of military strategists.

Developing nations are buying older technologies from industrialized nations in order to develop an industrial base. The industrialized nation is more than happy to negotiate a sale, as it helps its own companies finance more modern technologies. These modern methods are usually more efficient and significantly less harmful to the environment.

The result is the developed world is exporting pollution to the less developed world. Water and air pollution disputes have already erupted between Bulgaria and Romania over pollution caused by the Romanian industry in Giurgiu across the Danube from Ruse, Bulgaria. It has degraded the Danube river water and the surrounding air is so polluted that the political opposition in Bulgaria has gained a serious foothold by rallying the Bulgarian youth (39). Saddam Hussein's actions in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf may not be isolated instances caused by a mad man, but may play an important role in future regional political confrontations - particularly between a have and a have not nation.
HAZARDOUS WASTES

Hazardous waste poisoning is also a reality in developing countries around the Mediterranean. Several underdeveloped countries are accepting tons of hazardous/toxic nuclear and chemical waste. They are being paid by developed northern countries. The agreement is to have access to dumps in return for much needed cash. The governments of the less developed states are in effect trading short term economic well-being for long-term political, environmental, and health problems. Their hope is to be able to develop in the interim to the point where they can prosper and thus ride out the future political problems associated with their endeavors (40). If the western countries experience is the gauge for measuring how prudent a plan this is, no one should take comfort in the long term prospects that these toxic waste dumps will become minor concerns.

ARABLE LAND

The overuse of irrigated land is also becoming a major problem in several countries. The availability of arable land, and overuse of scarce land, or the conversion of near-by rural areas into urban developments only seems to exacerbate developing nations economic woes. The decline in food production can be contributed either directly or indirectly to one of these three situations. It then begins an irreversible cycle as rural families who depend upon the land move to the city and the government is stressed even further to provide the social programs and feed even more people. The resultant discontent turns to become fertile ground for political leaders opposing the present government. The issue of land availability is
most critical in North African and Central Asian countries (Algeria, Morocco, Central Russian Republics)(41).

**WATER RIGHTS**

Disputes over water rights are presently a toughly contested issue in the Mediterranean basin, and are surely to become explosive ones in the future. The guaranteed flow to downstream users is becoming increasingly more difficult to accomplish. Severe draughts have kept the Nile river system below maximum capacity for several years now. This is coupled with the Nile delta region being reclaimed by the Mediterranean sea due to the lack of silt being carried downstream since the construction of the Aswan dam. This lack of silt has caused the fertile Nile delta to stop growing and thus reducing the regions ability to keep bread on Egypt's table(42). The Jordan river has been the source of disputes between Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Israel. The Turks have increasingly used more of the head-waters of the Euphrates river and thus irritated both the Iraqi and Syrian agricultural efforts(43). The Amu Daryu river in central Asia feeds the Aral Sea. It is an enclosed system. The much publicized overuse of the river for irrigation has been described as "a man-made disaster created by central planning"(44). It is estimated that if usage were to cease immediately, it would take at least three decades for the Aral sea to return to normal. It is only a matter of time before water disputes become a matter of life and death in the region. This coupled with the Republics of Turkmenia, Uzbekistan and Kazakstan's recent independence from Moscow makes the Central Asian region extremely volatile. The most precious natural resource in the future in the Mediterranean region may well become water, not oil.
Adding to this present situation is the perennial draughts in Saharan North Africa which claim vast tracts of cultivable land each year.

**THE NATURE OF EXTERNAL THREATS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN**

The nations of the Mediterranean are affected by threats from external forces as well. These threats are characterized by the emergence of Middle-size or larger regional actors. The conflicts will then pit one regional power against another, hegemony of a power against a weaker neighbor, or a regional power in opposition to one or more of the major world powers.

The post Cold war environment is making regional actors more active and is uncovering animosities and hegemonic tendencies that have laid dormant for forty years. A distinct pattern is emerging, the increase in military intervention by Third World states in local conflicts, partially replacing the role of the advanced industrialized powers. "(45) Today the news is full of accounts of the rekindling of old border disputes, erupting of deeply held animosities, and arguments over dwindling resources.

Complicating this situation is the well known arms proliferation in states that have often in the past tried to use such weapons to achieve their national objectives. Annex 3 is a listing in gross terms of the regional powers with sophisticated arsenals.

**THE SOURCES OF EXTERNAL CONFLICT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN**

**BORDER DISPUTES**

The most obvious irritant between nations in the region is the disputes that arise over borders. Eastern Europe and the Middle East have long been the battle grounds of Armies from western Europe, Central Asia, and locally from Turkey, and Russia. As a result, the
region is characterized by artificial borders and arbitrarily drawn boundaries. The disputes over these borders did not surface during the Cold War years, and is just now becoming an issue again in both regions of the Mediterranean. The potential for escalation into armed conflict varies greatly among these groups of nations. Annex 4 is a sample listing of the extent to which disputes exist along borders.

CENTURIES OF MISTRUST

Compounding the border disputes are deep feelings of mistrust caused by centuries of feuding. These thousands of years of conflict have left at least two legacies: "a flourishing set of national rivalries and a wariness of the close embrace of allies" (46). These states embody in their ancient cultures and identities ways of looking at neighbors with considerable skepticism, distrust or hostility. We, therefore, cannot expect long-contested borders to be suddenly accepted. Annex 5 is a sample of the countries involved.

ARMS RACES

A third factor complicating the region's stability is the inherent unbalance which exists due to the presence of a major military power, and its unsettling effect on its weaker neighbors. Security in a region is based upon the perceptions each nation has of its neighbors capabilities and intentions. Long held animosities and memories of past conflicts raise doubts about the intentions of neighbors in the Mediterranean area and are an inescapable piece of the security puzzle. Distrust and skepticism are the rule, not the exception. Therefore, a neighbor who possesses a significant military capability is immediately suspect. The nation that seems to react first is the one that is feeling threatened. The reaction manifests
itself in one of several ways. The threatened nation enters into a
never ending arms race with its neighbor(s). It ties itself through
political and economic means to an outside the region power, or it
tries to outflank its neighbor through ties to fellow regional actors
who also feel threatened. Finally, it might resort to terrorism as a
means to highlight its cause and as a means to counter and discredit
the major powers might, while disguising its involvement. " Sub-
national violence around the Mediterranean has a very long tradition
of the skillful use of terror for political ends"(47). It should be
noted however, that an arms build-up is a contributing factor, but "
not in itself a main cause of conflict" in the Mediterranean
region.(48) At Annex 10 is a listing of defense expenditures as a
percent of gross national product of select western and Mediterranean
countries.

The accumulation of military strength by one developing country
risks being either too successful or not successful enough: in the
first case, exaggerated power can lead to aggression; in the second
case an arms build-up may alarm neighbors and provoke them into a
counter-build-up, eventually threatening the first state and leaving
it less secure than it started."(49) This circle of events leaves the
initiator in a heightened state of insecurity. He awakens to find
himself weakened by the diffusion of scarce resources and unable to
achieve domestic consensus. Internal social and economic problems
then gain a security dimension (as do environmental, population
explosion, food and water availability). The end result is the
political structure is then facing security risks from both internal
and external sources. Thus it remains no wonder that the
Mediterranean region is fraught with armed conflict, the prevalence of military/authoritarian rule, and local arms races of both conventional and non-conventional weapons. (50)

A list of these regional powers would include Turkey in the Balkans and Southern Russian area, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Israel in the Middle East/Gulf, and Algeria and Libya in North Africa. If stability in these sub-regions is to exist, the security interests of these major players and their neighbors must be taken into account. Complicating this situation is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Annex 3).

WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN ABOUT MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY?

The Gulf crisis has shown the need to reorient the strategic focus of western defense establishments from the Central European plains to the Balkans, the Middle East, and to North Africa. For Europeans this means looking at the Mediterranean as the frontier between the EC and the developing world, and for the United States it means placing its prestige and commitment fully behind a grand strategy to stabilize the region.

President Bush has recognized this need and has oriented the American defense establishment in the Mediterranean's direction by establishing an "open and expanding international economic system" as a national security objective. For the international economic system to operate effectively, a stable and secure environment must exist in the Middle East. This translates to a region free of crisis.

TOUGH TO STABILIZE, NOT IMPOSSIBLE

Turmoil in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Balkans has consistently been in the headlines of the world's newspapers. This
has lead many to get the impression that establishing peace and stability in the area is virtually impossible. Nearly every account or in-depth study contains a reminder of the thousands of years of animosity and conflict that surrounds a particular news event.

The West must step in and show all the parties involved that history is not a circular process where one must never forget that ones family was harmed by another, but a linear process where love for ones children motivates all involved to build a better environment for the future. This can be done only with the help of an outsider, and the outsider best equipped with the essential economic and military strength to see the process through to a successful end is the United States.

The point, then, is that building a region free of crisis will not be an easy process, but it is not impossible either. The West must build upon the existing efforts already in place in the area.

BUILD UPON EXISTING COOPERATION

The degree to which each nations political system reacts to the stresses caused by existing internal and external threats will in a large measure determine how disruptive these forces will be. For example, the Nile river water issue is so vital to the growth and well being of both Egypt and Sudan that to this point they have cooperated to improve irrigation techniques and the result has not been conflict, but increased cooperation and more efficient usage of the Nile river water that has benefited them both.

Turkey, mindful of its past history of hegemony in the Balkans, has attempted, successfully, to tie itself economically to Bulgaria, Greece, and the Southern Russian Republics (Black Sea Economic
Cooperation Council), and thus make itself a lesser threat to its neighbors. The western nations must encourage this activity and, where ever possible, facilitate the process.

**FIX THE PROBLEM, NOT THE SYMPTOMS**

The list of causes of instability in the Mediterranean region, whether internal or external in nature, can all be traced back to two overriding conditions—inequalities in the social or economic well-being of the region's population. It seems imperative then, that the core of any strategy to bring stability to the region must address these fundamental conditions. The strategy that evolves must then have several complimentary parts. This presupposes a coordinated political, economic, and military strategy, ideally established by regional actors or more realistically by regional actors with western governments assistance (either acting in unison (best case) or unilaterally).

Economic aid and technological assistance from the developed nations to those in need must be a well coordinated, high priority issue for the western nations. They will find that they must either take the proactive approach of helping these nations build legitimate political systems and healthy economies, or they will find that their attention will be directed to the region in a reactive manner trying to defuse a crisis.

Quantifying the threats to the U.S. and its allies in this environment becomes a necessity. Knowledge of which threats in which countries will adversely effect western interests and also know which threats will cause disagreement among western allies as to their significance are necessary steps if an overall western strategy is to
become a reality. This process will determine whether a western strategy can be formulated, or whether unilateral and bilateral agreements will have to suffice.

Additionally, threats to western vital interests are more than likely to arise from within a nation, from an internal threat to an existing government. The western world needs to formulate a comprehensive strategy for dealing with internal unrest in order to try to maintain the desired stability. This must be done without violating national sovereignty. This type strategy is at the heart of a western response, and implies proactive intervention is desired to reaction to internal difficulties. The U.S. will have to take the leadership role in either case, and U.S. Army will surely play a part.

HOW CAN THE BEST INFLUENCE STABILITY?

Now that this paper has done what Sen. Sam Nunn has cautioned against, "looking for danger, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it inaccurately," I will attempt to "prescribe the wrong remedy."(51)

The western industrialized nations, and the United States, in particular, can play a pivotal role in the stabilization of the Mediterranean region. There influence would best be utilized by building upon three major propositions: 1) The U.S. must take the leadership role with Japan's and Europe's assistance, 2) Develop a regional economic and collective security system, and 3) Develop a multi-national force to act as the regional systems enforcement instrument. propositions two and three are long term goals, and therefore require that the nations involved in this process view
these as goals and establish intermediate steps at every opportunity, in order to attain these goals.

**AMERICA HAS AN ESSENTIAL ROLE TO PLAY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN**

The United States is uniquely qualified to be the leader of a strategy that can bring stability to this troubled region. Because of our lack of a long colonial past (in Mediterranean terms), we are seen as objective arbiters, and approach the tasks at hand with an almost naive optimism. We seem to look at situations and find a way to solve them, rather than look at them and see only the obstacles (the linear interpretation of history rather than the circular). We are also capable of showing others the truth because we are not burdened with our own interpretation of past events.

In order to bring about political cooperation we must keep in mind the political traditions of the region and do as New York Times correspondent Thomas Friedman suggests; play the following four roles simultaneously: think like an obstetrician, behave like a friend, bargain like a grocer, and fight like a real son-of-a-bitch(52).

**THINK LIKE AN OBSTETRICIAN**

Are the nations and peoples serious about getting pregnant or are they just talking about it? This implies determining who is really serious about economic, political, and social stability. Cyrus Vance is discovering in Yugoslavia that you cannot want peace forth to us.
BEHAVE LIKE A FRIEND

We must nudge the factions together, show them ways to solve their problems and not to rely on their ancient tribal and religious pessimism. We must also hold up the truth to them, make them see the world as it is, not as a tribal world with dead ancestors/martyrs.

BARGAIN LIKE A GROCER

We should never take no for an answer and put a price tag on everything that is sold. We must always go into each sale with a price to be paid if the answer is no, and a windfall if the response is affirmative.

FIGHT LIKE A SON-OF-A-BITCH

Regional powers play by different rules—kidnapping and suicide bombings are not acts of fanatics, but diplomacy. They are a cheap and effective way to push Americans out, undermine local allies, or gain bargaining chips to trade for concessions. The West must remember to always deal with the real leaders of Yugoslavia, Iran, Syria, or Lybia, read their moves and not listen to their statements, and deal in operations that directly threaten their lives or the domestic stability of these leaders. It should always be kept in mind that "Middle East diplomacy is a contact sport."

ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPRA-NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Once U.S. leadership is established it is time to reach agreements on security and economic issues with the long term objective of establishing a Regional Supra-National Organization. The starting point is an examination of which problems are so complex or far reaching in magnitude that a regional approach is needed to solve them, and which can be solved through unilateral or bilateral accords.
or cooperation. Environmental deterioration, terrorism, drose who do not want it themselves. The U.S. Marines in Lebanon found out that you cannot create peace settlements. We must listen to what the conflicting parties say to each other, not what they sayugs, hunger, and economic development are examples of problems which deserve regional/international solutions by "Supra-national" institutions(53). The assistance of America, Japan, and the western European nations is essential to the establishment of such an organization. Economic assistance, transfer of the technologies for infra-structure development, and guarantees for security are all areas in which the western nations can lend a helping hand.

Such an organization requires the nations who are members to give up some of their sovereignty and thus some constraint on national expression of diversity, but the benefit that will be derived from such a cost must be balanced. Is seems clear that this organization could prove effective and thus deserves attention. The objectives would be to encourage economic cooperation, forestall civil/cross-border tensions or to contain and terminate the conflicts quickly if they arise, and be an honest broker in the case of regional or internal disputes.

Once an agreement can be forged concerning the character and scope of the organization, the process of binding the various nations together should take place. Three over arching principles should be considered: 1) Bi-lateral and Sub-regional accords are better than the status quo, and 2) A western power should be a guarantor either by signing the accord or by being a silent partner and 3) A Multi-National force should be placed in being to ensure the political or
economic policies generated by the organization are carried to a successful conclusion.

Initially it may be helpful to find the least controversial problem with the greatest base of support in order to build as large a membership in the organization as possible. The intent would be to get the parties involved to begin trusting each other by talking to each other. Too large an organization, initially, will be counter productive as differences will naturally outweigh common agreement and doom the process. Additionally, the problem selected must not be so complex that a solution would prove impossible to develop.

It seems to be a matter of practical sense that if these developing nations are threatened from internal instability and externally from their neighbors that the establishment of collective security systems would be a sought after solution. In fact, the leaders of several East European nations have already recognized this and have asked to become part of NATO (Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland).

The prospects for collective security in the Middle East and North Africa, however, are not as good. The centuries of conflict have left these nations leery of accords and distrustful of those who propose them. The solution in this instance might be instituting security and confidence building measures either between regional actors or bilaterally with region powers.

It is still in the west's best interests to nurture and give advise to such fledgling organizations as the Arab Magreb Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council and Organization of the Islamic Conference. Although each of these
organizations has a diverse intent, they show that some form of cooperation on a regional or sub-regional level is possible, even if the region must be divided into several parts or bilateral accords are the extent of that cooperation initially.

The West must then be prepared at every possible opportunity to demonstrate the utility of developing collective security mechanisms, because "collective security begins with the premise that threats may arise from within [the collective organization], not just from without, and that avoidance of these internal threats is at least as critical as countering external ones."(54).

Before this proposition of a Supra-National Organization is rejected out of hand, it is important to recognize that the region is closer to a cooperative system than it first appears. If existing ties are utilized to begin a lateral expansion the search for regional cooperation may be closer than first recognized. Italy already enjoys close economic ties with Libya, Syria, Lebanon and Cyprus (the most volatile nations) The U.S. is tied economically to Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. The French are tied economically and through military cooperation to Romania. Greece is tied to Bulgaria. Turkey may be the solution to thawing the relationship between Iran and the West. Algeria and France are closely tied, and Spain is working hard to keep its relations with Morocco on a cordial level.

These examples show that the process of building regional ties of economic cooperation and collective security are not impossible. It is important to remember that it will be a long and sometimes frustrating process to build a stable region, not unlike the 45 year old one built by the western Europeans. Military to military contacts
will surely be a major part of any such movement towards regional accords.

DEVELOPMENT OF MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES

If a Supra-National Organization is developed and it has economic cooperation and collective security provisions in its charter, it follows that a Multi-national force of some kind would be made available in order to maintain the stable environment necessary to carry on commerce. From the organizations charter and composition would come the basic form of this force.

The political leadership of the nations involved must prescribe the circumstances under which these forces would be called upon to deploy. They would additionally have to prescribe which vital interests would be protected by their existence, which type missions are envisioned to be executed, restrictions/descriptions of the areas of operations in which they would be required to deploy, any special criteria for their use or political restrictions on their use. Lastly, and usually the most difficult problem to overcome, under whose operational control will they fall? The appropriate command and control mechanisms must be formed, and with multi-national units participating, the various functions necessary to conduct military operations must be divided into completely national, completely coalition, or a cooperative function. A list of the functional areas and how the responsibilities might fallout is at Annex 8.

If these are problems too difficult to overcome politically at initiation of the organization, or it is deemed to be a possibility only in the distant future, a scaled down approach could still be attempted on a sub-regional basis or with bi-lateral accords. Again
an incremental approach is better than the status quo. The West must establish any economic, political or military foothold that seems prudent in order to begin the assembly of the long term goals described above.

WHAT CONSTITUTES THE WESTERN MILITARY RESPONSE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN?

MILITARY EXPERTS

The Italian Ambassador to Lebanon once remarked to a western journalist, "You know how people are always fighting the last war? Well, you Americans have been preparing yourselves for the confrontation on the Eastern Front. That is fine. The Eastern Front with the Soviet Union is now secured. But you are deplorably unprepared for the war in the Third World. You are like a big elephant. If you are up against another elephant, you are fine. If you are fighting a snake, you have real problems. Your whole mentality and puritanical nature hold you back."(55) The Mediterranean is full of snakes!

The nature of the threats to western interests in the Mediterranean region implies that the way we have conducted business for four decades is becoming outmoded, and if new models are not constructed the West is doomed to fail when it attempts to use military power as a foreign policy instrument.

The Israeli experience in Lebanon during their invasion is an example in point. By backing Amin Gemayl, initially not a bad call, and then remaining silent while he ran roughshod over Lebanon's Shiite and Druse Muslim populations driving them into Syria's arms, they became tied to the problem and were not seen any longer as part
of the solution. The result was Israel the most potent and professional military force in the region, found itself in the midst of a civil war and unable to bring its might to bear. If they had backed the Shiites instead of the Christians, or had insisted that the Christians form a coalition government, and made the Christians pay a heavy toll each time they tried to overstep the bounds of fairness, the end result might not have been Israel's embarrassing withdrawal. The Israeli's believed they were supporting the right of a government to extend sovereignty over its national territory—Gemayel was in reality supporting the right of Christians to dominate Muslims. (56)

This example is not given to criticize the Israeli government, but to demonstrate that in the context of this region, with the multitude of problems confronting the leaders of these developing states, western solutions and responses must be tempered with the realities of the region. This brings us back to two main themes; the Mediterranean's political history and the unique role that the U.S. must play. Both require experts seasoned in the ways of the region, there are very few black or white solutions.

The nature of these realities implies that those in the military who are giving advise on when and how military force will be appropriate must become more sophisticated in their knowledge of local customs, culture, and traditions. They must know how military force in a particular circumstance will be perceived, in local not western terms. Knowledge of the combined effects of economic development, social well-being, and environmental stability are not
issues that military planners can leave to others, if these problems have the unstable results predicted by most noted authorities.

**INTRA- AND INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION**

New and more effective methods of intra- and inter-governmental cooperation at the national, and regional level, as well as in the country of concern must be constructed. The key pieces of information needed to form a coherent response to a problem will probably be economic, political and military in nature. If this is the case, then information must come from such diverse organizations as the Treasury, Agricultural, Interior, or State Departments, or their equivalents in a regional or western government. An economist or an historian may prove to be as important a member of a crisis reaction team as a military advisor, particularly if the solutions to the developing nations problem are indeed economic, social, political, as well as military in nature. The West must remember that the region is full of snakes and we must use every asset at our disposal to charm them.

**WHAT ARE THE MISSIONS FOR MULTI-NATIONAL/ALLIANCE/U.S. FORCES IN THE FUTURE?**

**MILITARY OR CIVILIAN MISSIONS?**

The military establishments of the United States not so long ago struggled with the thought that it had a mission in deterring drugs. Many in uniform thought that the drug war was not a military, but a civilian mission. It is now only a few short years since that debate raged and the U.S. military finds itself immersed in the business of trying to stop drugs from illegally entering into the country because
it is deemed a "direct threat to national security" (57) by the
civilian leadership of the government.

If the authors who are quoted in this paper are correct in their
assessments about the future trends in demography we may find
ourselves again questioning whether stopping illegal immigration
along a border between a developed nation and an underdeveloped one
is a military mission. How will we react when a Third world dictator
openly pushes thousands of his unemployed to the border of a rich
neighbor and tries to blackmail that neighbor by means of encouraged
illegal migration? Containment of illegal migration may be a mission
thrust upon the military in the future. If not the U.S. military, our
allies along the Northern Mediterranean may well become engaged in
this type of activity.

Will the western nations come to the realization that terrorism,
kidnappings, and acts of brutal authoritarianism are all part of the
long political history of the region, and thus a part of diplomacy?
If they do, then they will respond to such acts by holding the
appropriate heads of state accountable. This implies a military
response.

The military may be asked to develop humanitarian aid packages
or plan labor intensive work projects in order to head off political
turmoil or to negate the "push" factors causing forced migration in a
friendly country. The point, then, is that whatever threatens the
political or economic stability of a nation can be determined to be a
"direct threat to national security" and thus become a military
mission.
CONVENTIONAL FORCE MISSIONS

Annex 6 describes the varied list of diverse missions that logically evolve from the threats in and around the Mediterranean. These missions require the whole spectrum of conventional organizations and weaponry as well as a nuclear and chemical deterrence capability. The use of conventional forces is a requirement in almost all of the envisioned situations. As a result, it must be recognized that the Mediterranean region is now a major area of concern for U.S. Army units, and not just a contingency theater, with a strong naval presence. The difference is one of presence verses force projection. The latter being the most powerful method of showing national will.

"There has been no stronger statement of national resolve than the deployment of the American soldier. The presence of U.S. Army units on the ground-combat elements that cannot sail away overnight-leaves little doubt that the full power and prestige of the United States are committed."(58) This does not mean to imply that these missions are Army alone, in this theater every single operation will be joint in nature and conceivably in most of them combined as well. Nor does this imply that the traditional role of presence played by the U.S. Navy in the region is obsolete.

If the region is now evolving into one where conventional ground forces will play a significant role it seems prudent to try to examine what issues need the attention of planners.

FORCE PACKAGES

The list of potential missions listed in Annex 6 leads to a formulation of Force packages that should be developed in order to
react positively and expeditiously. Examples of the types of missions and forces, by type and size, to perform the missions is at Annex 7. These force packages are designed for the entire spectrum of operations, and imply that the military headquarters overseeing their use must be very adaptive and robust.

It should be noted that the size of the force in most cases is a brigade or larger. These force packages are only meant to be a list of type units by estimated size. The factors that normally influence planning should be considered, but a list such as this should be a good departure point in order to start the planning, coordinating and training needed to accomplish these missions. It should be noted that two potential missions have been omitted, counter-insurgency operations and migration control. They are both manpower intensive, and therefore the size of the response force varies depending upon which nations are involved. Their omission from the list should not imply that they are less likely to occur, in fact they may be the threats that manifest themselves most repeatedly in the future.

From this list of possible missions, and the accompanying forces that would fall out, the next most important strategy to be worked out is that of echelons of command. These should be designated so that they cover the spectrum of possible military involvement from operations short of war to each level of command in a mature theater of conflict. These would naturally involve ARFOR headquarters, through Operational to Tactical command posts. These headquarters can either be national or multi-national in make-up. Additionally, the units in Annex 7 need not necessarily be entirely U.S. nor do they necessarily need to be all Army, the list is only a means to guide a
planner through the process of developing the proper force package for the immediate crisis at hand.

FORCE DEVELOPMENT CYCLE

The development of packages is an on going process, one which is being accomplished at most major command headquarters in Europe and around the Mediterranean at this time. The process in the different countries varies significantly. The force development packages must go through a cycle which starts with the political guidance, goes through the national command authority and various international and national commands until it gets to the major tactical units and their subordinates. This process must have the following elements if the packaging, and planning that comes from the packaging, are to be of substance.

PACKAGING FROM THE TOP DOWN

Internationally, the senior commanders must all know which forces have been ear-marked, when they will arrive in theater, when they will be prepared to perform their intended missions, any specified criteria for usage, and under whose operational control will they fall? Additionally, the appropriate command and control mechanisms must be formed, and if multi-national force structures are to be utilized the various functions must be divided into completely national, completely coalition, or of a cooperative responsibility. A list of the areas and how the responsibilities might fall out is at Annex 8.

Nationally, the responsible senior commander must lay out the rules of engagement for each contingency, he must also develop and
distribute the identification friend or foe (IFF) procedures to be used, and order of battle information.

The command and support relationships must also be well understood early on if the staffs at the various levels are going to integrate properly and plan effectively. This becomes particularly true with the building-down that is taking place and unit commanders find their outfits on several major commands contingency troop lists. Command, control, communication and intelligence/sustainment diagrams with the appropriate addresses and phone numbers will be the only way liaison officers will have to do their essential work.

Additionally, if the mission is drug or terrorist denial, then the inter-agency and intra-governmental agreements, intelligence data collection points, or field command post locations must also be a known quantity provided by the higher commander.

If the command and support relations are specified then the subordinate commanders need to be provided their requirements for liaison officers, and what joint or foreign staff officers will be accompanying them upon deployment.

A published list of exercises and who will participate also needs to be a top driven event. What training objectives are to be tested or evaluated is also of importance.

**CLOSING THE LOOP**

At this point, the units involved can begin their planning and training. They must develop and publish Mission Essential Tasks and Training plans to train themselves on those tasks.

They must have input on recommendations on the composition of LNO's and staff officer positions on the next higher staff. They owe
the next higher commander a concise listing of their roles and functions in such multi-function operations as fire support, airspace management, intelligence collection / interpretation / dissemination, barrier operations, deployment operations, and sustainment operations.

These subordinate units must also be able to quickly list for unfamiliar staff officers their units capabilities and limitations. They also need to concisely spell out what information or resources their units need from higher, and what the higher commander can expect from their unit. In contingency operations this will speed the quick integration of the staffs and units, and lead to synchronized operations upon deployment, especially if foreign units and officers are involved.

WHAT SIZE AND TYPE HEADQUARTERS?

At present the Army is working to place propositioned equipment in the Mediterranean region for contingency operations. This is a significant step for the concept of contingency operations and one which is breaking new ground. The list at Annex 7, which outlined a proposed force package is fairly well in line with the force being constructed in Italy. The need for at least a heavy Brigade’s equipment pre-positioned in the region goes along way toward reaching the west’s security goals in the region. The issues of who controls this unit upon deployment, what composition it should have, and how the command and support relations sort out will develop over time. The point here is that they may be called into service anywhere in the Mediterranean in either EUCOM’s or CENTCOM’s areas of operational concern.
It seems to make sense then to put in place in Italy a headquarters fully capable of commanding and controlling all the contingency operations envisioned up to and including those that require a reinforced heavy Brigade. That would dictate a Division size headquarters. Why Italy? Because the basic structure is already in place, and the political climate is favorable to the stationing of U.S. forces.

It also makes sense that with the diversity of the missions, the vast area encompassing the Mediterranean region, and thus the unit/units in the region may be assigned missions from such diverse organizations as EUCOM/AFSOUTH, CENTCOM, a RAPID REACTION MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS or the more traditional AMF mission that it must have the experience, develop the expertise, and devote the resources needed to insure success the first time out.

The need to plan for, and if necessary at some point during the contingency operation, accept additional battalion size organizations or hand off the battle to a Corps staff that arrives after operations have been under way implies that the majority of those functions performed by the Corps in a mature theater must be replicated. A Brigade staff is too austere an organization to duplicate all those functions.

This proposed staff, if configured properly could revert to become the Corps tactical command post, or a better option, with round out units a tactical division capable of the full range of combat operations. It could act as the ARFOR for many of the missions envisioned, or facilitate battle hand off to a Corps Headquarters if that were to take place. The issues of who would be the ARFOR and who
would be the senior battle staff would also fall out naturally. On a
daily basis in times of garrison activity the planning staffs could
work together, thus building the familiarity and confidence needed in
time of crisis. The Southern European Task Force (SETAF) has a good
majority of the division style headquarters already in being and with
augmentation could be just the solution to the headquarters problem.

**FORCE PACKAGES**

Flexible force packages are important tools in time of crisis.
They give the decision maker the ability to pick and choose options,
and thus accelerate the decision making process. The speed of this
response may make the difference in the action being perceived by the
adversary as deterrent in nature rather than reactionary. The
response options from these packages should be keyed to specific
conditions, among them, insertion criteria, warning time, response
timing (time/distance factors) lift availability/pre-positioned
equipment status and the necessity to call up reserve units. In the
case of intervention in an internal conflict, packaging can help lay
out options early on to help in the decision on whether to intervene
or not.

Again, a Brigade size force in the Mediterranean, commanded by a
Division headquarters, capable of being quickly reinforced by a heavy
Corps seems to be the force that would best serve to be both a
deterrent in times of danger, and the potent ground component of a
western reaction force in time of crisis. This force would of course
be complimented by the necessary naval and air components to ensure
overwhelming force. The make-up of this force could evolve over time
as the formation of Multi-national forces progresses, thus helping the U.S. move from the leading actor to an assisting role.

**DEPLOYABILITY**

The issue of strategic and tactical deployment has received a lot of attention in the past year. The only points needed to be made about deployability in the context of the Mediterranean is that the areas where contingencies are likely to be executed are not necessarily near major ports and airports. The airlift and sealift assets utilized should be able to utilize austere ports of entry. There is also a need to expand the pre-positioned stocks in Italy to a Corps package. This should be on-board ships if possible to cut down the reaction time.

The deploying force must plan on the worst case, a forced entry. The ability to haul sufficient combat, combat support, and sustainment equipment must be reevaluated in light of this factor. Compounding the difficulties of executing operations under fire will be that the operation may well be Combined in nature. The implication then, is to deploy a force with sufficient transportation to gain and maintain a tactical mobility advantage. The planners should not rest until they are confident that they have the ability to transport and outfit a heavy Corps for combat in four weeks or less.

This also implies that the emphasis of these rapid reaction units should be divided equally between rapid arrival and sufficient enough force to deter, or prevail if deterrence fails, once they are on the ground. A heavy Brigade capable of the full range of combat operations normally associated with it is the minimum force necessary if the estimates in Annex 7 are used.
"Major contingencies tend to occur in places where one is least prepared to respond quickly and effectively, because it is there that hostile forces have the greatest leeway to pursue outcomes inimical to American interests."

(53) If this is taken as the truth then joint and combined exercises are essential if the idea of multi-national reaction forces are to become an operational reality and collective security in the Mediterranean is to prosper. These exercises should have at least two principal purposes, 1) deterrence and 2) hammer out solid operational concepts that can be utilized as the basis for a Combined Rapid Reaction doctrine.

The exercises should be held frequently enough to discourage potential predators from realizing their dreams and in realistic enough scenarios and environments to show that a real capability exists. They must also encompass the whole range of possible threat scenarios (NEO to counter-insurgency to conventional war) in order for the potential adversary to see that no matter what form of aggression he chooses he will be up against determined, well trained, professionals. This ability to demonstrate capability is an important deterrent. The West must keep in mind that the leaders they are trying to persuade came to power by the sword, and remain in power because of the sword.

These exercises must also validate operating procedures, doctrine, and tactical plans. They are important as dress rehearsals for those tactical operating systems that must be integrated (Annex 8). The use of computer generated exercises allow for wide dispersal and thus less expensive events. This means that the various force
headquarters can practice communications links, work out control measures, and plan common scenarios on a frequent basis. This would seem to be a very beneficial if multi-national forces are formed. This presupposes that the necessary command and support relationships are in place.

They must also be a mechanism for the various units involved to gain confidence in their role in the entire concept and for the entire organization to demonstrate its capabilities to all with misguided ambitions. These units should exercise their capability as often as the commanders deem necessary to remain trained in their key METL tasks.
CONCLUSIONS

The Mediterranean region has become a major cross-road for world commerce. Its vital sea lanes connect the four economic centers of the world— the Middle East, Northeast Asia, Europe, and North America. Over 60% of the crude oil delivered to the industrialized world travels through the region. With the emergence of the European Community and its open borders, the Mediterranean Sea will soon define Europe's southern border with the world. All these developments coupled with the integration of the economies of the industrialized world, make stability in the Mediterranean region a prerequisite for further world economic growth.

This being the case, it follows that stability in the region must be a high priority issue for the Western industrialized nations. It also follows that the causes of instability that may arise in the region must be well understood, and either eliminated or dealt with.

These threats it turns out, come in many forms, and can be either internal to the nation at risk or external to it. In both cases those who have spent years studying these issues have derived two underlying causes for this instability; economic under-development or social deprivation of the population. These basic causes manifest themselves into many forms of unrest or crisis. The most prevalent being insurgencies, regional armed conflict, terrorism, illegal drug trafficking, or illegal migration. These translate into conventional force responses by Western powers.

The western industrialized nations are slowly coming to the realization that they will become involved in the Mediterranean region either through constructive, proactive economic and collective
security arrangements or reactivity trying to tame the instability caused by the existing social and economic imbalances that exist in the region.

If the experts are correct and economic and social problems are at the heart of the instability, it only seems to make sense then that any attempts at stabilization in the region must incorporate at least these three factors: 1) establish economic growth and cooperation 2) provide for the social well-being of the populations and 3) guarantee the sovereignty of the developing nations borders from regional predators so the nations in question can focus their resources totally to the task of development.

Any western attempts at regional stability must begin with the realization that these three issues are at the heart of the solution. Additionally, any coordinated comprehensive Western response must start with the United States. The U.S. is the only country with the political, economic, and military power necessary to see the complex process through to a successful conclusion. The U.S. is not seen as a colonial power in the eyes of regional actors, and it is the only country that can forge the necessary consensus between regional players and between the European nations and Japan.

Additionally, we can show the developing world that pluralistic societies, free market economies, and collective security systems can become a reality, especially if we are willing to develop the consensus and encourage the expenditure of the necessary resources of our Western allies. In order to begin this process, the West must assist regional actors in the development of a "Supra-national organization." It would initially be of a limited scope and
membership. Sub-regional in scope, tackling common problems that need urgent solutions, with the intent of allowing the nations involved to learn to cooperate together. Ultimately, it could have a regional scope and membership, with collective security and economic cooperation as its goals.

No matter what shape this organization takes, it will not succeed without the guarantees that the Western nations can provide in terms of economic assistance, technological transfer of infrastructure, and security guarantees from external threats.

Evolving from this organization will be the multi-national forces used to enforce it's charter. This force may well be a mix of Western and regional units initially, and develop into an all regional force sometime in the future. The force that emerges will be tasked to perform a wide variety of diverse missions (see Annex 6). It should be noted that the majority of these missions call for some form of conventional force. The whole spectrum of operations from NEO operations, disaster relief, nation-building, counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency to insertion of a heavy armored corps suggest that the Mediterranean is no longer a contingency theater for the U.S. Army, but a region that deserves our undivided attention.

With this in mind, it is essential to recognize what roles a conventional force will play in the region. The U.S. Army will be the primary guarantor of stability. Through their presence, U.S. soldiers on the ground, unable to fly or sail away overnight, the president communicates that the full commitment and resources of the United States are on the line. The presence of a Combat Brigade, capable of insertion into hostile areas in less than 48 hours, and the ability
to back up that brigade with a full Corps in less than a month communicates to all regional actors that deterrence of conflict is the goal, but should that fail, reversal of aggression is only a matter of time. It seems then that until the region can be taught to live and cooperate together it is necessary for the U.S. and Western nations to put in place the forces necessary to ensure stability in the region. The nature of the threats suggest that at least a heavy corps is a necessity, but it should also be recognized that there are many other missions for the military, short of this robust organization, that also deserve our attention. Because of these roles and missions, the following recommendation is proposed.
RECOMMENDATION

That the U.S. Army establish a headquarters in the Mediterranean region for the overall planning, coordination, and execution of conventional security matters in the region. Its primary function would be to facilitate the deployment of Army forces in the region, as they can theoretically be deployed anywhere in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa in order to stabilize the region. This means that they could work for EUCOM, CENTCOM, the ACE MOBILE FORCE, or as part of a RAPID REACTION CORPS.

The spectrum of conventional missions that this force must be capable of performing suggests that a stable organization with its resources devoted to the security of the region is a necessity. The sophisticated level of expertise that is envisioned in order to properly plan, recommend their use, and deploy such a diverse mixture of units and combat operations can not be replicated by an organization that is not focused on this part of the world and in tune with its unique problems. This organization must be capable of recommending precise military solutions in the context of the political, social, economic, and historical backdrop of this region. Coupled with this complex problem, is the fact that nearly all the missions envisioned will be joint, combined, or even inter- and intra-governmental in nature. If this isn't enough, add to this the fact that the majority of these missions will be carried out in very austere parts of the world with little or no existing infra-structure and it becomes clearer why a permanent headquarters, robust enough to plan and deploy a wide range of conventional forces is needed.
If this recommendation must be rejected on the basis of the force cuts that are presently being contemplated, and thus a headquarters of this type is considered superfluous, an alternative solution must be developed. One such alternative might be combining the Sixth Fleet, the Sixteenth Air Force, and U.S. Army Southern European Task Force into a Joint Task Force for use in the Mediterranean under EUCOM control.
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<th>COUNTRY</th>
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<td>Albanians</td>
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<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>Regional dispute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>Yugo-Turkish and rise of Islamic fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Greek</td>
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<td>Hungarians</td>
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<td>Romanian-German dispute</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ukranians</td>
<td>Romanian-Russian dispute</td>
</tr>
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<td>Orthodox Turks</td>
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<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>Romanian-Russian dispute</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>Bulgarian-Turkish and regional fundamentalist issue</td>
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<td>Palestinians</td>
<td>Arab-Israeli conflict</td>
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<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>Morocco-Algerian conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey/Iran/Iraq</td>
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### ANNEX 2

#### POPULATION IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN BASIN

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#### POPULATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE

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#### POPULATION OF 65 OR OLDER

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<td>2.8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source: IAI-RAND CORP. Report
Rome, Italy Sept. 16-17, 1991*
## ANNEX 3

### STATUS OF PROLIFERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>NUCLEAR</th>
<th>CHEMICAL</th>
<th>MISSILE</th>
<th>STRIKE AIRCRAFT</th>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
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## ANNEX 4

**DISPUTED BORDERS AROUND THE MEDITERRANEAN**

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<td>Kurds</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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ANNEX 5

HISTORICAL FEUDS

TURKEY & GREECE
TURKEY & ARMENIA
BALKANS & GERMANY
ISRAEL-ARABS
ALGERIA-MOROCCO

IRAN-IRAQ
IRAN-SYRIA
LIBYA-CHAD
ANNEX 6

MEDITERRANEAN CONFLICT-SCALE AND FUNCTIONS OF WESTERN RESPONSE

FULL SCALE
Nuclear deterrence must remain in region
Chemical deterrence and protection must be in region
Conventional deterrence must be able to deploy Brigade in 48 hours with Air and Naval support
Reverse aggression- Heavy Corps deployed, prepared for combat in less than 4 weeks with Air and Naval support

LIMITED SCALE
Support Nation building- U.S. presence-stability, build infrastructure, economic development measures
Counter-insurgency ops- direct intervention, indirect intervention (advice, training, and financing)
Counter-narcotics ops- detection, transport interdiction, cartel intervention
Peacekeeping/Stabilizing- election monitors, psychological operations, Crisis prevention center, human rights protection, political intervention, terrorist group exposure/infiltration, drug cartel intervention
ANNEX 6 (cont.)

Evolving Requirements

Migration control - Man power intensive, intra- and inter-governmental cooperation required

Military-to-military cooperation - Confidence/Security building measures, professional exchanges, information sharing

Arms Control Verification - Storage procedures, destruction procedures, technology transfer, acquisition control

Foreign Area Experts - linguists, feasibility experts, advisability studies, topographical classification/verification, cultural expertise, political expertise, regional historians

In-country Intelligence operations - build HUMINT/SIGINT networks, surveillance/warning systems, economic/political estimates,

Inter-agency cooperation - info sharing, LNO's, formal agreements, standardized reports, duplication avoidance, stand alone data
# ANNEX 7

<table>
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<td>NOI</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>Div</td>
<td>Bde</td>
<td>Bde</td>
<td>Bde</td>
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<td>Grp</td>
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<td>Ar</td>
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<td>NOI</td>
<td>Bn</td>
<td>Div</td>
<td>Div</td>
<td>Bde</td>
<td>Bde</td>
<td>Bde</td>
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<td>Grp</td>
<td>Grp</td>
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<td>Bn</td>
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</table>

C2- size of controlling headquarters  
COM-size of communications unit  
INT-intel links, N=national, I=in theatre, O=org.  
SOF-need for special ops forces  
INF-size of infantry force needed, type not specified  
AR-size of armored force needed, type not specified  
ENG-size of engineer force needed, type not specified  
AD-size of air force defense needed, type not specified  
AVN-aviation, C=combat unit, TN=trans unit, BDE=C+TN  
MNT-transport unit size, type not specified  
SUP-support unit size  
MED-medical unit size, type not specified  
MP-military police unit size  
NBC-unit size, implies protection and decon capability
### ANNEX 8

#### MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE RESPONSIBILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONAL</th>
<th>COOPERATIVE</th>
<th>MULTI-NATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supply, Maintenance</td>
<td>Airspace Mgmt</td>
<td>Transport, Decon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel, food service</td>
<td>Fire support corp</td>
<td>Laundry &amp; Bath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, postal</td>
<td>Barrier ops</td>
<td>Tactical Intel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>Commo Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supply Bridging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Constrn Engring</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

68
ANNEX 9

COUNTRIES CONSIDERED IN DEFINING THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

European/NATO
  Spain
  France
  Italy
  Greece
  Turkey

Eastern European
  Yugoslavia
  Albania
  Romania
  Bulgaria
  Central Asian Republics of Russia

Middle East/Persian Gulf
  Iran
  Iraq
  Syria
  Jordan
  Israel
  Saudi Arabia
  Kuwait
  Yemen
  Oman
  Arabian peninsula principalities

North African
  Egypt
  Libya
  Tunisia
  Algeria
  Morocco
**ANNEX 10**

**PERCENT OF GNP ON DEFENSE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>GNP</th>
<th>DEFENSE EXP.</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>5,423.40</td>
<td>289.76</td>
<td>5.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>2,971.20</td>
<td>28.73</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>1,187.20</td>
<td>34.79</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>1,499.54</td>
<td>35.61</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>1,090.75</td>
<td>19.58</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>278.76</td>
<td>7.82</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>986.72</td>
<td>38.52</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2.87</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>GNP</th>
<th>DEFENSE EXP.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALGERIA</td>
<td>45.43</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGYPT</td>
<td>39.45</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAN</td>
<td>59.49</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAQ</td>
<td>40.78</td>
<td>8.61</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISRAEL</td>
<td>51.22</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>12.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>LYBIA</td>
<td>28.96</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOROCCO</td>
<td>25.36</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAUDI ARABIA</td>
<td>87.97</td>
<td>13.86</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYRIA</td>
<td>17.41</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>10.1</strong></td>
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*Source: The Military Balance 1991-92*
ENDENotes


3. Hayes, p.47.


5. Ibid., p.13.


8. Guazzone, p.16.


10. Lesser, p.3.


16. Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, p.87.

17. Ibid. p.100.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p.18.


27. Ibid, p.115.


29. Lieutenant Colonel A.A.A. Beattie, "Is Terrorism Likely to Establish Itself as the Modern Form of warfare and How Can It Be Countered on an International Basis?", p.11.

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