Power Projection—The Need For
Operational Deployment Doctrine

A Monograph
by
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School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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**POWER PROJECTION—THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT DOCTRINE**

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ABSTRACT

POWER PROJECTION-- THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
by Major Daniel V. Sulka, USA, 72 pages.

This monograph addresses doctrinal considerations for power projection in a predominately CONUS based military. It will examine the concept of deployment from the perspective of the operational level of war. There appears to be a void in deployment doctrine as assumptions for deployment of U. S. forces focus on either end of the scale of potential conditions for extra-theater movement (forced entry or strategic buildup). Contemporary deployment doctrine may not address an operational deployment in a relatively immature theater.

1965 was a seminal year for power projection for the United States. Not since the Korean 15 years earlier, and Desert Shield 15 years later, would this nation deploy large formations of its armed forces from CONUS in circumstances that potentially would require immediate synchronized and sequential combat actions. In Korea and in 1965-- the deployment of the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to Vietnam-- forces were deployed and immediately employed in campaigns designed to achieve operational objectives critical to the strategic end state. This monograph will analyze the operational design and considerations for the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division from Fort Benning, GA to Central Highlands of the Republic of Vietnam. It will use the criteria of the TRADOC Pam 11-9 Operational Operating Systems, the establishment of the lodgement, and the integration of joint and combined forces during this deployment and apply those observations in analysis of current and evolving deployment doctrine.

The monograph concludes that current and evolving deployment doctrine is beginning to embrace the experiences of the deployment to the Vietnamese Central Highlands particularly in terms of the concept of tailoring the deployment force at the Corps level. However, the doctrine focuses too much on the mechanics of moving the force and too little on the demanding planning aspects of deploying operational forces. Given a continued shortage of assets in the strategic mobility triad of sealift, airlift and prepositioning, doctrine falls short in establishing a critical imperative. This is that operational planners must consider the sequence and detailed composition of the deploying force, the role of the lodgement, and potential contributions of other services or allies in the context of the operational design. The success of a future power projection will probably not hinge significantly on hostile entry or will we be given six months to build forces in theater. Deployment and employment may be seamless. Therefore success will depend on the ability of planners to make operational deployment a fundamental building block of the campaign.
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INTRODUCTION

In the changing strategic environment brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States is adapting a new national military strategy. A fundamental assumption of the strategy is that when our vital interests or those of our allies are threatened the US military will be called upon to demonstrate commitment or assist in the resolution of the issue--perhaps by force. Fiscal constraints and the new strategy also calls for a reduction in U.S. forward deployed forces. Consequently, the nation is returning to a policy in which its military is based predominantly in the continental United States.

Strategic agility and power projection are two principles essential to the new strategy. Strategic agility is characterized by the rapid movement of forces stationed in the United States, or in a forward presence role overseas, on short notice to wherever they are needed. Power projection is the manifestation of this agility in terms of deterrence or actual participation in crisis response operations. Regardless, this new strategy presents planners with significant high risk challenges.

Concerning those risks, Helmut von Moltke once stated that: "An error in the original concentration of armies can hardly be corrected in the whole course of a campaign." With its military power now located within its borders, or concentrated in a small number of overseas bases, the essential first phase in a U.S. major regional contingency response will be the timely and strategically sound projection of power through the deployment of military forces.

The governing reality of a CONUS based military is that no matter how you figure the calculus of a deployment, or adjust the geometry of the strategic mobility triad-- sealift, airlift and prepositioning, there always will be according to General Jerome O'Malley:
more fight than ferry available."³ It is therefore absolutely crit-
icical for operational level planners to consider the sequence and de-
tailed composition of the force to be deployed in light of immediate
operational and strategic objectives. Hence, von Moltke's adage ap-
plies to power projection as errors made in the original deployment
of forces can hardly be corrected during the course of a contingency.

As A. C. P. Wavell once said: "It takes little skill or imagi-
nation to see where you would like your army to be and when: it
takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your
forces and whether you can maintain them there."⁴ Therefore, this
monograph will examine the concept of deployment from the perspective
of the operational level of war to determine if the current doctrine
for deployment of Army units will support the requirements of the
national military strategy. In doing so it will analyze the opera-
tional movement of the First Cavalry Division from Ft. Benning, GA to
the Central Highlands region of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in Au-
gust/September 1965. The deployment of this complete division, while
in itself significant, was but a part of a larger strategic-
operational design. Studying this deployment therefore serves as a
vehicle for closer examination of how a operational level commander
might structure a deployment so as to be able to quickly begin to
direct those forces toward the pursuit of strategic objectives.

This study will initially focus on the strategic situation,
operational design considerations, planning and execution for the
commitment of US forces to stabilize what was perceived as a major
regional crisis. The analysis will consider three areas: synchroni-
ization and sequence for movement of the operational operating systems
in conjunction with tactical assets: requirements and tasks neces-
sary to establishing lodgement areas: and joint and combined efforts.

Consideration of these factors in planning an operational de-
ployment are essential for rapid transition to combat operations to
achieve operational objectives. The lessons learned from the deploy-
ment of combat forces to Vietnam in 1965, in which there was very little time between the deployment and employment of forces, will then be used in evaluating emerging Army deployment doctrine and in developing a concept for operational movement by strategic means.

THE STRATEGIC SITUATION 1965

1965 was a seminal year for power projection for the United States military. Not since the Korean War 15 years prior, and not again until Desert Shield 15 years later, would America deploy its armed forces in circumstances that could immediately require the synchronized or sequential employment of large ground, air, and naval forces. For Korea, and in 1965 Vietnam, these forces were immediately committed to combat operations directed towards and significantly contributing to achieving a strategic end state.

At the beginning of 1965 the United States military was in a high state of combat readiness. Training, exercises, operations, and many innovative programs such as the Special Forces and the 11th Air Assault Division test program were well funded and in full progress. The Army alone was 970,000 strong with half of it based overseas. It had been alerted, mobilized, and honed by a series of events beginning with Berlin in 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and the Kennedy assassination a year later. It contained a wealth of experience with many veterans of WW II and Korea serving within its ranks. In fact, many soldiers had already seen advisory duty in the Republic of Vietnam. The other services enjoyed an equal state of readiness on the eve of the crisis in Southeast Asia; all would soon be tested by the demands of a war in South Vietnam.

In the mid-1950's the United States expressed the ideal of an independent, western aligned Vietnam as a vital national security
interest. This interest was threatened by the communist led insurgency in South Vietnam. In support of this interest the US strategic objectives regarding Vietnam in late 1964 were:

1. Get Hanoi and North Vietnam (DRV) support and direction removed from South Vietnam, and, to the extent possible, obtain DRV cooperation in ending Viet Cong (VC) operations in SVN.

2. Re-establish an independent and secure South Vietnam with appropriate international safeguards including the freedom to accept US and other external assistance as required.

3. Maintain the security of other non-Communist nations in Southeast Asia including specifically the maintenance and observance of Geneva Accords of 1962 in Laos.6

Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, in a staff meeting shortly after his arrival in Vietnam, touched on the consideration that:

The Sino-Soviet bloc is watching attentively the course of events in South Vietnam to see whether subversive insurgency is indeed the form the "wave of the future" will take. Failure in Southeast Asia would destroy U.S. influence throughout Asia and severely damage our standing elsewhere throughout the world. It would be the prelude to the loss or neutralization of all of Southeast Asia and the absorption of that area into the Chinese empire.

A wide range of the elements of national power had been applied to this cause. The most prominent was the increased use of military force to defeat North Vietnamese aggression and the Vietcong insurgency raging throughout the countryside. The numbers of U.S. advisors (20,000 at the beginning of 1965) and the scope of their involvement had vastly increased since the late 1950's.8 So too did the direct support of the South Vietnamese military with the limited introduction of U.S. Army aviation, signal, and logistics units. In addition combat and reconnaissance support from the Air Force and Navy were also provided.

By mid-1964 the stage was set for an ostensible shift in the nature of the American military commitment to the RVN. This shift would be from support of South Vietnamese counterinsurgency and sta-
bility operations to that of direct engagement in conventional air, ground and sea warfare. The impetus for the transition was quick in coming and it required the relatively rapid operational deployment of major US and allied combat formations.

This impetus was to some degree in response to a change in Vietcong/North Vietnamese strategy evidenced by attacks against American support elements or advisors. Three examples of this type of activity were-- the November 1964 attack on Bien Hoa airbase killing four US servicemen and resulting in the destruction or damage of 13 aircraft; the February 6, 1965 Vietcong attack on the US military advisory compound at Pleiku killing nine Americans and wounding 76 others; and the February 10th bombing of the enlisted men's barracks in the Central Highlands port city of Qui Nohn killing 23 and wounding 21 Americans. Attacks continued through the spring. The increasing number of American casualties amplified political pressure for a decisive response on behalf of the American administration.

Even more significant to US leadership than the attacks on American targets was the beginning of large scale movements of conventional forces from the north into the RVN. Not only would these movements seriously threaten U.S. forces in country but could topple the weak South Vietnamese military structure. Some intelligence reports early in 1965 estimated a total of nine North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regiments deployed in the south. Two more were positioned just inside the Cambodian border poised to strike east to cut the nation in half. Furthermore, analysts surmised that the large military air base at Da Nang was in danger of being overrun by 12 Vietcong battalions numbering over 6,000 men. In January and February firm evidence of the 32nd and 101st NVA regiments joining the VC battalions also began to emerge.

Nevertheless, with the exception of the dramatic March 31st bombing of the US Embassy in Saigon, the Vietcong were unusually inactive during the months of March and April. But on May 11th they
conducted a regimental level attack on the provincial capital of Songbe. A month later, they attacked at Dongxoai and overran an ARVN battalion at Bagia. The South Vietnamese Army had been badly mauled in each of these battles. Alarmed by these turn of events, General William C. Westmoreland, Commander U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) reported to Washington that the Vietcong were pressing their campaign and were capable of regimental size operations in all four ARVN Corps Tactical Zones (CTZs). 15 By mid summer the South Vietnamese army was losing an equivalent of one battalion and control of one district capital per week. Unless some action was taken it appeared that the Saigon government would collapse within six months.16

The scope and tempo of the attacks clearly indicated that the nature of the war was changing. It seemed that the insurgent forces in the south, with support and direct involvement of the north, had begun Mao's phase three of guerrilla war— all out conventional war.17 Westmoreland recognized this enemy shift. His assessment was correct.18

The Central Highlands region appeared to be a decisive point in the Viet Cong/Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) effort. Although the five provinces of the Central Highlands (Kontum, Pleiku, Binh Dinh, Phu Bon, and Phu Yen) were sparsely populated, they were critical for they serve as a gateway to Saigon. Control of the Central Highlands would provide the VC the opportunity to slice the country in half isolating the northern portions politically, if not militarily, from the southern part of the nation.19 Once this split was effected the Vietcong goal was to establish a national government in the Central Highlands that would challenge Saigon's legitimacy in the region.20

Operations in the Vinh Thanh Valley of the Central Highlands, a 1 1/2 to 3 mile wide and 12 mile long area, were indicative of Vietcong efforts in this critical region. This well developed, heavily populated area had long been the subject of terrorist acts of burning
churches, schools, and hamlets. In May of 1965 the Viet Cong were "in charge" and all available males had been coerced into their ranks.\textsuperscript{21} By the mid/late summer of 1965 a divisional size force of the PAVN consisting of the 32nd, 33rd, and 66th regiments was firmly located in the Cambodian border area adjacent to as well as within the western portions of the Central Highland province of Pleiku. They were well positioned in support of the country splitting strategy to push through to the coastal city of Qui Nohn.\textsuperscript{22}

THE RESPONSE--OPERATIONAL DESIGN

The announcement of the deployment of the 1st Air Cavalry Division on 28 July 1965 coincided with the movement of the NVA 33rd Infantry Regiment and 66th Infantry Division towards secret staging areas in Cambodia. These units were aimed for eventual employment in the South Vietnamese Central Highlands.\textsuperscript{23} The deployment of this major US Army combat formation served as the most symbolic element of US resolve to reverse the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. However, it was but part of the larger operational design behind the deployment and immediate employment of US military power in the region.

The commitment of US ground troops to combat in South Vietnam is one of the most controversial decisions in American military history. The much debated 1965 and 1966 deployments are commonly referred to as a "build-up" of forces implying that it occurred without a fixed design or end state. Typically this view follows that of author Douglas Kinnard:

Approval of deployment programs themselves, which are the benchmarks of decision making in war are related to the size of forces alone; missions were not ruled on. Moreover, there is no independent set of documents which deals with the question precisely what the forces were for or how they were to be used. The original commitment of large scale ground forces was an emergency measure, and subsequent increases were responses to a changing situation.\textsuperscript{24}
However, it is important to move beyond arguments over the appropriateness of the response to the impending fall of South Vietnam in 1965, to examine the operational decisions made to address the crisis. These decisions offer the perspective that rather than a pointless build-up, the deployment of US forces to Vietnam can be considered a structured operational deployment designed to achieve specific objectives in support of national policy. The response to the changing strategic situation of early 1965 began to take shape the summer before.

The 2-4 August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incidents, and the subsequent Congressional resolution of 10 August, demonstrated at least politically that the U.S. was determined to take all measures to prevent further aggression in South Vietnam and that it regarded the region as vital to its security interests. Limited retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam and a program of aerial interdiction of LOCs in Laos began that fall. General Westmoreland also suggested US military posture be improved by deploying a quick reaction Marine force for security of the vital air base in Da Nang and an Army brigade to secure Bien Hoa. Ambassador Taylor did not consider this necessary at the moment and with the U.S. election coming up in November-- little interest was paid to the suggestion.25

After the election, high level policy working groups grappled with the problem. Ambassador Taylor returned to Washington to apprise these groups of the bleak situation that was made even worse by another coup d'etat that fall. The military options discussed ranged from a continuation of the military actions currently underway to a program of systematic and sustained military pressures against the North designed to force them to the negotiating table. The pressures were to be in the form of a bombing campaign aimed at interdicting infiltration routes and applying progressive pressure on the North to bring them to the negotiating table. This bombing was also tied to a serious attempt on the part of the South to achieve political stabil-
ity.26 One option included the introduction of limited ground forces into the northern area of South Vietnam concurrently with the first air attacks into the DRV. It would have morale stiffening effect on Saigon and send a strong signal of U.S. commitment to Hanoi.27

The final recommendation of the group, accepted by President Johnson in principle on 1 December 65, was termed a controlled escalation. Along with the air campaign, there could take place the deployment of just enough troops to avoid the disaster of the fall of the South but without posing a threat to the North.28 The national command authority reserved the initial decision making authority to determine volume and targets of the bombing campaign and approve the employment of ground forces. Though this strategic guidance was frustratingly vague—lacking specific objectives and parameters for types, quantities, and missions of US forces—it was enough to allow planners in Washington, Honolulu, and Saigon to begin to prepare operational deployment courses of action. During this process there were still a number of significant factors that influenced the operational design governing the deployment.

One of these factors would be the results of the air campaign. In February 1965, CINCPAC expanded the force demonstrating U.S. resolve by positioning three carriers, the Hancock, Coral Sea, and Ranger off the coast of Vietnam. Their planes were to participate in reprisal strikes (Flaming Dart I and II) for the 10 and 11 February attacks on Pleiku and Qui Nohn.29 However, it became clear that air attacks conducted in retribution for attacks in the South were not having the intended effect of deterring Vietcong activities. On the 2nd of March, the air campaign Rolling Thunder was launched beginning the pressure concept decided upon in December. At first the bombing strikes correlated directly to aggressive acts on the part of VC/NVA units. Later the objective shifted to that of forcing the government of North Vietnam to cease its support and direction of the insurgency or face the destruction of its capacity to do so.30
Another factor was an effort by General Westmoreland to design the ways and obtain the means to support policy decisions in a constantly fluctuating situation. He had made up his mind that the current concept of limited commitment of Special Forces, helicopter, logistical and air support to reverse the deteriorating situation was inadequate. It would become necessary to conduct U.S. combat operations to attrit the enemy main force units hand in hand with the other efforts aimed at eliminating the guerrilla infrastructure and addressing the conditions that allowed it to exist. In January 1965 Westmoreland brought BG Ellis W. Williamson, commander of the Okinawa based 173rd Separate Infantry Brigade (Airborne), to Saigon for discussions on employing the 173rd (the CINCPAC theater reserve) as a force to secure the arrival of other combat units.

On the 24th of February, General Westmoreland asked for two Marine Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs) to be deployed to the northern Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) I to address the threat to the airbase at Danang. The request was passed through CINCPAC to Washington where it was approved reluctantly. Portions of the 9th MEB conducted an administrative landing just north of Danang with the balance airlifted from Okinawa. They joined the South Vietnamese forces in assuming the mission referred to as: "Improved Security Measures in the Republic of Vietnam." 

Growing impatient with the lack of results of the bombing campaign during the period, President Johnson directed the Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson go to Vietnam to determine what was needed to improve the situation. General Johnson envisioned a corridor of three US and two Free World Military Forces divisions across the DMZ. This force would act as a blocking force to destroy any North Vietnamese invasion. General Westmoreland's views were considerably less grandiose. His Commander's Estimate of the Situation called for American forces to secure coastal enclaves and installations and defeat the Vietcong efforts to dominate Kontum, Pleiku and
Binh Dinh provinces. In this 26 March document, three courses of action, including General Johnson's, were evaluated against likely enemy courses of action. Detailed deployment sequences for tactical units, lodgement considerations and logistics estimates were also calculated. General Westmoreland concluded that he would require a US Infantry division in the Central Highlands provinces, a separate brigade for security and mobile reserve in the south, and the entire 9th MEB, plus one BLT in CTZ I. This force would include all necessary combat support and combat service support units. His intent, as described in the paragraph discussing military objectives was to:

1) Improve the security of major air bases and coastal port areas from which combat operations may be supported.

2) Augment and reinforce existing force capabilities vis-a-vis the Vietcong to improve the overall security situation in the country.

3) Reverse the military trend in I and II Corps zones while maintaining momentum in Hop Tac and Tien Giang areas and status quo in the area south of the Mekong River.

The end state would be a strengthened negotiating position for the government of South Vietnam. This document appears now to have provided the basis for the eventual operational design governing the deployment of U.S. forces to Vietnam in the summer and fall of 1965.

Except for numbers of troops, it was consistent with the guidance contained in the 6 April 65 National Security Action Memorandum 328. That document authorized, among other actions, 1) the 18-20,000 man increase in military support forces to fill out existing units and logistics personnel, 2) the deployment of two additional Marine BLTs with one Marine Air Squadron to Danang with an expanded mission permitting their more active use, and 3) continuation of the slowly ascending tempo of ROLLING THUNDER operations. By mid-April General Westmoreland won the long fought battle to have the 173rd Airborne Brigade deployed for security of Bien Hoa. Their role would later be expanded to include participation in counterinsurgency combat opera-
In April the "ways and means" to be given General Westmoreland were once again expanded. During a series of meetings in Honolulu, SECDEF McNamara, CJCS Wheeler, CINCPAC Sharp, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor as well as Generals Westmoreland and Johnson agreed upon a new military strategy. This strategy was designed to swiftly break the will of the DRV/VC forces by denying them victory and avoiding a spectacular defeat of GVN or U.S. forces. Among the means to support this strategy would be an increase in the number of US combat battalions from 4 to 13. Troops from Australia and South Korea would bring the total to 17 battalions. These increased force recommendations were forwarded to President Johnson mentioning the possible need for deployment of 11 additional US and 6 Korean battalions (including the soon to be organized Airmobile Division). The JCS began preparing a detailed program for the deployment of the 13 battalions and their support package. In terms of the "ways" that these "means" were to be applied, the intent of the deployment was to:

...bolster GVN forces during their continued build up, secure bases and installations, conduct counter-insurgency combat operations in coordination with RVNAF, and prepare for the later introduction of an airmobile division to the central plateau, the remainder of the Third MEF to the Danang area, and the remainder of the ROK division to Quang Ngai. By mid-May the original enclave strategy was physically in place. The balance of decisions laid out in NSAM 328 and the Honolulu conference were implemented in accordance with President Johnson's directives. These employments were kept as close hold for the administration still hoped for political settlement based on an offer of an aid package to the north as incentive to negotiate.

The beginning of the enemy summer offensive, however, would soon escalate the crisis and be the final factor in the design of what now would become an expanded deployment. On June 7th with the
military situation further deteriorating, particularly in the Central Highlands, General Westmoreland asked for a total of 44 battalions immediately with the requirement for additional forces in 1966.

Westmoreland envisioned a three phase extended campaign. This campaign would be conducted in conjunction with a vigorous air war and continued counter-insurgency operations. Phase I would use the 44 battalions of U.S. and other Free World Military Assistance forces to seize the initiative to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965. Phase II would be the resumption of offensive actions through the first half of 1966 to destroy enemy forces and reinstitute rural construction activities. Phase III would continue for up to another year and a half to complete defeat and destruction of enemy forces and bases. Then, as the Saigon government began to maintain internal order and assume responsibility for the defense of its borders, the US/FWMA forces would redeploy. The immediate operational goal was to, by deploying the airmobile division to the Central Highlands in a spoiling attack, deny the enemy's long sought objective of splitting the country.

This request caused a tremendous reaction at the Pentagon as the JCS and services were working hard to complete the 13 battalion requirement decided upon earlier in Honolulu. Policy makers challenged the requirement but Admiral Sharp and Ambassador Taylor backed up General Westmoreland. On the 26th of June, COMUSMACV was given authority to commit US forces as he saw fit to strengthen the relative position of South Vietnamese forces. This essentially addressed the question of "ways" to implement his plan. The remaining question was whether he would receive the proper "means". This was answered on the 16th of July during SECDEF McNamara's inspection visit when he informed General Westmoreland that the President had decided to back his request for an additional 34 battalions.

With both a new strategic perspective on the nature of the US role in Vietnam and an operational plan designed to implement it.
President Johnson publicly announced on 28 July that the newly formed 1st Air Cavalry Division would deploy to Vietnam. The division would be ordered to An Khe, a base that had not figured earlier in the planning but would allow the unit to exploit the new technology and doctrine of organic air mobility. An Khe was strategically essential, however, because the division was given the offensive mission in the Central Highlands to intercept and defeat Viet Cong and regular North Vietnamese regiments in zone. Calling in advance of the speech to advise him of the Presidential decision, General Johnson told MG Harry Kinnard, the commander of the 1st Air Calvary Division what would be in essence the operational concept behind the deployment of the unit:

Your job, Harry, is to keep them from cutting the country in half. You've got to go in there and stop them, because if they can do that they've got it won.

THE OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT

Based generally on the March MACV Commander's Estimate of the Situation as modified by constraints and restraints placed on the quantities and employment of U. S. forces and the deterioration of the situation in South Vietnam, U. S. forces began to deploy to Vietnam. They would arrive in a manner designed to achieve Westmoreland's objectives. There was no time for a build up phase; deployment and employment were to be concurrent. Unit operations were designed to establish immediate military ascendancy as well as make possible the continual deployment of forces to conduct future operations. The key unit to the establishment of this ascendancy was the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile). This division size deployment directly into the Central Highlands of the RVN makes this movement stand out in the annals of American power projection history because of the size and the immediate nature of the employment.
This deployment was even more remarkable considering that the First Air Cavalry Division did not exist prior to 3 July 1965. On this date, the test-bed 11th Air Assault Division was deactivated. Personnel as well as equipment were aligned under the 1ST Air Cav at Fort Benning, Ga. The division was ordered to achieve REDCON 1 by the 28th of July to coincide with the Presidential announcement of its assignment to Vietnam. It accomplished this with resources taken from the 2nd Infantry Division and transfers from the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions as well as with personnel moved over from the Infantry Center.\footnote{53}

These actions were required because President Johnson had not declared a state of emergency authorizing the call-up of guard and reserve units. More critical for the 1St Cavalry, the state of emergency would have extended soldiers past their enlisted term of service (ETS). That action would have allowed the new division to keep 100\% of its current personnel.\footnote{54} Failure to establish the state resulted in the 16,000 man division loosing the ability to deploy over two thousand of the approximately 9500 assigned personnel. These included about 500 key aviation personnel. In addition, over 7500 families had to be moved to fill out the division creating a major distraction for the soldiers.\footnote{55}

Prior to the inactivation of the 11th, some staff officers and commanders had been working on highly classified plans for the deployment and subsequent employment of the unit in the Central Highlands. Five operational plans were developed and war-gamed but many members of the staff sections that had participated in this process had either changed positions or had been reassigned.\footnote{56} If this turbulence weren't enough, the question of the basic infantry weapon of the division arose. During a liaison/reconnaissance visit to Vietnam in July the Assistant Division Commander, BG Richard Knowles and the G-3, LTC Robert Shoemaker, became convinced that the M-14 rifle would not perform as well as the newly developed M-16. Knowles per-
suaded the division commander that the benefits of the M-16 would far outweigh the difficulty and risk of converting the entire division. Kinnard gave his approval. Consequently the Army shipped some of the weapons to Benning arriving just ten days prior to departure. The balance met the units at the ports prior to boarding. Most of the division's troops familiarized with the new rifle firing from ship's decks.57

By far the biggest challenge was moving this newly configured division as a single entity so that it would be able to be employed immediately upon arrival. The predecessors of U.S. Transportation Command's operating agencies (Military Airlift Command, Military Sealift Command, and Military Traffic Management Command) had to react quickly because the first of the division's three increments was scheduled to depart on 2 August. This group was the 32 man advanced liaison planning detachment led by ADC BG John S. Wright who would quickly gain fame for his efforts using the advanced party with machetes and hand tools to carve out the division's main base area. Nicknamed the 'Golf Course', this area was used for marshaling and operating the division's fleet of over 450 helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. The second group, an advanced party of 1030 personnel, 9 UH-1s and 152 tons of cargo, was moved to Robbins AFB, Georgia. It began to depart over a six day period on C-124 and C-130 Military Airlift Command Aircraft. It should be noted that the C-141 was in its very early stages of deployment and the C-5 was not yet in service.

The newly activated Military Traffic and Terminal Service, the forerunner to the Military Traffic Management Command, arranged domestic transport for the nearly 16,000 personnel, 1100 vehicles and 450 aircraft and conducted ship load operations in Charleston, New Orleans, Jacksonville, and Mobile, Alabama. The Navy's Military Sealift Transportation Service (later to become the Military Sealift Command) provided civilian crewed 3 T-AKVs (jeep carriers) and the
active duty pocket carrier Boxer for movement of the aircraft and associated aviation supplies. The aircraft were partly disassembled, cocooned, and stowed on the decks of the carriers. Most aviation personnel moved with the aircraft so that they could perform minor reassembly of the blades and fly the aircraft off the carriers. Six T-APs (Troop Transports) were withdrawn from European Service to carry the bulk of the troops. Seven conventional commercial vessels (non- roll on/roll off ships) provided by Lykes Bros. Steamship Company carried division vehicles, equipment, building materials and initial sustaining supplies. Administrative loading rather than combat loads was conducted to maximize the cargo carried. However, all agencies cooperated in maintaining unit integrity so units could be made effective rapidly upon discharge.58

As documented in the well known Vietnam memoir Chickenhawk by Robert Mason, and the lesser known diary of a 1st Air Cavalry battalion commander Colonel Kenneth Mertel, Year of the Horse- Vietnam, the one month sea voyage was long but provided leaders with important time to prepare their troops. This was of particular importance with the influx of new personnel into units. The transition to war and strategic movement was challenging but ahead lay even more serious hurdles of getting the equipment to shore in Qui Nhon and to An Khe and the 'golf course' via the infamous Highway 19.59

At the time Qui Nhon harbor was a very shallow fishing port without sufficient depth to accept the carriers, troopships or cargo ships. It did have, however, fairly flat sandy beaches bordering a well protected harbor. The Army had re-positioned LCUs and LCMs to Qui Nhon from the south while the Navy provided the larger LSTs. The planned discharge of the vessels would include both a fly-off operation of the helicopters from the carriers and a Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS) operation for the troops and the equipment. Vessel gangways and cranes were to be used to transfer cargo to the landing craft for transfer to the beach. Some helicopters were also to be
used in this operation. Assembly areas, ground and air refueling points, and three truck companies (1 Medium POL and 2 Medium Cargo) were set up to receive and facilitate forward movement.60

Even though the Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) sent to secure logistics preparation had engaged Vietcong in the area some weeks earlier, the landing would remain unopposed. The route over Highway 19 had to be secured by elements of 1st Brigade, 101ST Airborne Division, who had in August replaced the Marines as the security force in II Corps zone. Regardless, Highway 19 remained an extremely contested, dangerous passage due to mines and snipers.

By the 16th of September, the vessels that had moved from various ports over different routes converged in Qui Nhon harbor. Messages had been sent to various commanders aboard ships telling them to prepare to conduct a combat landing. This guidance created confusion and anxiety as units tried to piece together unit equipment that had been stowed in different vessels.61 Once in Qui Nhon harbor, however the situation was clarified and discharge operations went smoothly. Some 20-30 vessels lay at anchor loading cargo into the landing craft making runs to the shore. Every few minutes helicopters lifted off from the carrier decks making room for others being hoisted to the flight deck from lower holds by the aircraft elevators.62 In spite of this complex and time consuming operation, the division did not have the luxury of time for a build up. Their first missions awaited them. The 1st Cavalry Division would face combat almost immediately.

For example, on 18 September the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry participated in Operation Gibraltar with the 101st in the Vinh Tranh Valley.63 For the next two weeks, bracing sniper fire and probing attacks, men and equipment were ferried by helicopter or truck over the mountains along Highway 19 to An Khe. Meanwhile, the 101st secured the route and conducted patrols in the region surrounding the "golf course". The soldiers of the 1st Cavalry's main body joined the
advanced party for perimeter security and provided some aviation support to the 101st.64

With the division closing on An Khe in the first week in October the stage was set for the U.S. Army's first extended operation of the Vietnam War.65 The division was ready to intercept and destroy the North Vietnamese regiments moving south or laterally into the Central Highlands. As MG Kinnard noted on 28 September 1965, the day the division assumed responsibility for its tactical area of operations:

This was 104 days from the date Secretary McNamara announced the formation of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, and 90 days after General Orders activated the unit on 1 July 1965. Somewhere in the annals of military history organizations may have been activated, organized and moved 12,000 miles to combat, all within the space of 90 days, but none come to mind.66

ANALYSIS OF THE DEPLOYMENT 1965

Though the First Air Cavalry Division's deployment was the most symbolic and significant block of combat power deployed to Vietnam in 1965, it did not arrive alone. It was in many respects only a piece of a larger mosaic of forces deploying to support Westmoreland's operational plan. There are three critical elements to this operational deployment: 1) appropriate flow and sequence of operational level units, 2) establishing a lodgement, and 3) joint and combined considerations.

First, for an operational deployment, it was just as important in Vietnam to provide tactical formations with the combat support and combat service support functions not organic to the division. This enables it to operate with greater sophistication. agility and effectiveness against lethal, elusive, and skilled enemies in an operational environment with little or no existing infrastructure.
This element of an operational deployment can be examined from an analysis of the deployment of units generally based on the Operational Operating Systems (OOSs) as described in TRADOC PAM 11-9.

The two other critical elements of the deployment were the establishment of a lodgement area that would support immediate operations and the requirement to work both jointly and with the indigenous and allied forces. Let us first address the Operational Operating Systems and then consider lodgement and joint and coalition factors. In doing so it is important to look at both the operational level considerations that directly impacted on the 1st Cavalry Division's operations in the Central Highlands and those that established the theater conditions which directly or indirectly influenced those operations.

*Operational Movement and Maneuver*

The operational movement and maneuver OOS pertains to the movement and disposition of all operational forces (air, land and sea) for the purpose of achieving the military operational objectives of a campaign. For the purpose of this discussion the scale of the force is regarded as less important than their immediate contribution to the operational end state. It will focus on deployment of combat units and systems normally associated with the maneuver battlefield operating system considering them as operational level forces.

In addition to the 1st Cavalry Division, major maneuver units were deployed in 1965 to establish stability and secure critical points. The deployment of III MAF to Danang in I CTZ was carefully planned as these forces were at the outset more self sufficient and could be resupplied over the shore. This was a critical factor in their selection due to the austere port and airfield capabilities and the desire to eliminate dependence on an unacceptably long and vulnerable ground LOC. The employment of this unit was essential to
protecting critical facilities and countering enemy activity in CTZ I which in turn would help counter the country splitting strategy. In addition to the 173rd Airborne Brigade mentioned earlier, brigades from the 101st Airborne Division and the 1st Infantry Division followed in July 1965 to establish the lodgements and protect infrastructure that would make possible the further deployment of larger ground units.

To enable the First Cavalry to deploy directly into the Central Highlands, first a Marine BLT from III MAF secured Qui Nhon and the preparations for the division arrival. During late August the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne relieved the BLT and began Operation Highlands to secure the areas astride Highway 19 leading from Qui Nhon to An Khe in the Central Highlands. This sector had been selected as the lodgement for the 1st Cavalry Division. In November an infantry division from the Republic of Korea assumed counterinsurgency and security missions in the Qui Nhon area and Bihn Dinh province. The 25th Infantry division began to deploy in December with its 3rd Brigade immediately going to the Central Highlands city of Pleiku. Therefore, by the close of 1965, U.S. Army, Marine, and coalition brigades and divisions had been deployed as operational forces from forward bases and CONUS to Vietnam where they were immediately employed for combat operations. These often simultaneous and sequential operations had the cumulative effects of enabling the First Cavalry Division to secure the geographic area then most critical to the stability of South Vietnam, bolstering the South Vietnamese military, and securing critical facilities enabling further deployment of forces. This strategic-operational deployment, in retrospect, accomplished its objective.

Operational Fires

Operational fires are those fires furnished by assets other
than those organic to the operational maneuver elements discussed above. They are a separate but integrated component of the scheme of maneuver. Operational fires will include indirect fire Army artillery and missile units, naval gunfire and missile systems, and theater and strategic air forces that had an impact on the campaign or on major operations.69

Operational fires in support of the 1st Cavalry Division and other operations in the Central Highlands depended heavily on USAF, US Navy aviation and naval gunfire support. Though the division utilized its helicopters for fire support, the Air Force and Navy provided a greater intensity of fires on suspected concentrations of enemy forces and infiltration routes. A further discussion of the deployment of Air Force and Naval fires support is contained at Appendix D.

Fire support planning was driven by the fires concept for Vietnam which was centered on the goal of providing at least two field artillery battalions per brigade— one organic in direct support and one for augmenting fires and area protection.70 However, the wide dispersal of maneuver forces required significant changes in the employment of artillery. The size of brigade areas of operations required the breakup of field artillery units and prevented the massing of fires. Artillery fire, including some organic to the division, was relegated to an area support role tasked to give maximum coverage to population centers and government facilities. In some cases it was micro-managed to assure the greatest political consideration.71

In this political/area context and in terms of protection of the lodgement, non-division artillery assets will be considered as operational fires. The deployment of US Army units contributing to operational fires in the Central Highlands during 1965 consisted of a 105mm howitzer battalion on 12 September and eight inch howitzer battalion on 29 October to An Khe. A 175mm gun battalion, a search light battery, and a 155mm howitzer battalion closed on Qui Nhon on
29 October, 30 October and 28 November respectively.72

Operational Protection

Operational protection includes those forces securing the force from enemy ground, air, naval, terrorist actions and natural occurrences.73 As discussed in the section on operational movement and maneuver, the basis of the operational concept was to use maneuver units to secure and facilitate the arrival of other forces. It was necessary to early on deploy units from echelons above division to perform specialized missions. These were primarily air defense and military police units as well as naval forces securing the coast and harbor areas.

The 504th MP Battalion arrived in Qui Nhon 31 August 1965 to provide traffic, law enforcement, EPW, and route security support for the arriving units. On 29 September the 6th Battalion, 71st Field Artillery (Hawk) arrived in Qui Nhon to provide air defense coverage for the growing lodgement area.

During the summer of 1965 the US Navy and US Coast Guard began Operation Market Time programs in conjunction with the small South Vietnamese Navy to protect harbors and coastal areas against infiltration, sabotage and mining. The Navy under TF 115 (Coastal Surveillance Force) employed 3-4 destroyers, 6 minesweepers, 26-82 foot USCG cutters and carrier based aircraft for detection and interdiction missions.

Air superiority precluded a critical need for air defense units. However the terrorist and guerrilla capabilities of the enemy demanded the early deployment of operational level protection assets to facilitate further deployments and release combat elements from protection missions.
Operational Command and Control

Discussion of the operational command and control operating system will focus briefly on the initial arrangements for command of the forces deploying. Then the key task of establishing a communications infrastructure in theater in support of the operational design will be addressed.

During 1965 few if any units that would today be considered operational level headquarters were deployed. The jointly staffed MACV along with the III MAF, the USAF 2nd Air Division and the newly established Army 1st Logistical Command were the only elements that seemed to have operational oversight of their respective missions. The Field Force concept was still being discussed and Field Forces, Vietnam (a provisional organization responsible for II CTZ) was created in country with personnel from MACV and individual deployments.74

The air campaign was managed at CINCPAC with extraordinary input from the National Command Authority. The concentration of Marine units in I CTZ and of Army units in the Central Highlands, the coastal areas of II CTZ and III CTZ (Saigon) permitted a simplified command structure to meet immediate threats to those areas.75 The challenge was to establish communications among these dispersed activities and expand signal capability in the theater.

The US military communications system existing in the spring of 1965 was arguably the most established of the OOSs yet the most inadequate and vulnerable. From February 1962 until the decision to employ combat forces in 1965, the 39th Signal Battalion with great dependence on civilian contractors, provided both tactical and strategic communications for MACV. It operated 32 sites stretching from Quang Tri just south of the DMZ to Bac Lieu south of the Mekong River. In 1964, augmented with 177 military personnel and contractor--Page Communications Engineers Inc., it installed the "Backporch" Tro-
poscatter network providing a link between South Vietnamese Army units, SOF forces, and CIA activities. In August 1964 the Army Satellite Communications Command established two clear satellite channels linking Tan Son Nhut and Hawaii (creating the first operational satellite communications system). All of these systems were designed to form integrated operational communications links to the CTZs. Central Highlands nodes included facilities and small signal detachments at Khontum, Plienu, and a large MRC-85 installation at Qui Nhon.

The 1st Cavalry Division's support came from the 586th Signal Company who, with the 1st Cav's advanced party and engineers, set up a signal site on a hilltop overlooking the "golf course". This company, provided by the 2nd Signal Group, arrived over two weeks before the main body of the division. Other signal units supporting the lodgement and Central Highlands were the 56th Signal Co. (Forward Support Maintenance) arriving on 9 July, the 41st Signal Battalion (Combat Area) arriving 24 July, and the 578th Signal Co. (Cable Construction) arriving on 31 August. All of these units operated primarily from Qui Nhon and supported the Central Highlands including the Korean Division.

Concerned with the political implications of the deployment and the 1st Cavalry Division's campaign in the Central Highlands, the President and his advisors demanded the most minute details of operations. This flood of high precedence traffic soon drastically slowed the normal flow of administrative and logistics communications. Even with the quantity of early arriving signal assets the units proved to be less than adequate to meet these demands.

*Operational Intelligence*

The operational intelligence OOS includes those units, activities and systems that provide the operational or theater commander
the intelligence required for the planning and conduct of operations and campaigns. Though some intelligence structure and many technical capabilities were in place at the beginning of the deployments in 1965, increased demand for tactical and operational intelligence coincided with the commencement of US combat operations and the intensification of the air war. General Westmoreland's J-2, Major General McChristian, briefed SECDEF McNamara in mid-July that he would now need the assets to fight as well as advise. He requested one aviation company (aerial surveillance) and a topographic company per field force (Corps).

Late July 1965 saw the arrival of two Corps Intelligence Detachments and 218 individuals to augment the MACV J-2 staff who had done triple duty as operators, collectors and analysts. In addition to the increased work load on the intelligence system with the change in the nature of the war, General Westmoreland's area of interest expanded. Intelligence units and systems needed to be able to touch large areas of North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Therefore, key arrivals in the summer of 1965 included Counterintelligence Det 704, the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (Pholnt), and the 1st MI Bn (Air Reconnaissance Support) which, as normally part of field army, disseminated intelligence collected mainly by USAF elements to units in theater. Despite these deployments it does not appear that the MI community could keep up with the demands of the tactical users. The 219th Aviation Company (Light Surveillance) arrived in Pleiku to support the Central Highlands. However, it appears that division military intelligence units were fed information from Saigon during 1965. Other intelligence units and capabilities deploying during the summer and fall of 1965 are shown in Appendix B.
The Operational Support OOS consists of those activities that provide logistical support required to support the force, including all services located in the theater, and in this instance those of the host nation and allies. It considers those units from the theater base up to the logistics units organic to tactical units.\footnote{82} It includes engineer units not organic to maneuver forces though usually these are examined in the context of the movement and maneuver OOS for mobility and countermobility.

Support planners faced the challenges of a nearly worst case scenario in terms of length of the strategic LOC, the largely undeveloped nature of a country with no secure rear areas, and the instantaneous support required to sustain forces that would immediately conduct combat operations. The infrastructure and the logistics system needed to support over 500,000 coalition troops would have to be established while engaged in combat. Time for accumulating logistics resources was a non-existent luxury. Logistics buildup and force buildup would have to be complementary. This concurrent force buildup would have to proceed with neither element becoming a detriment to the other. All available shipping, airlift and resources would be allocated to insure retention of this balance.\footnote{83}

To offset these challenges all units were supposed to deploy with an unrealistic and rarely achieved 180 days of accompanying supplies.\footnote{84} However, the desired balance in support and combat forces soon was forgotten in favor of deploying combat forces as rapidly as they could be made available.\footnote{85} The results created short term risk and friction for forces already deployed and required a catch up pause in November and December to permit more CSS unit deployments. The CSS structure deployed was not of sufficient strength to receive the push of 180 days of supply sent to compensate for that which couldn't move with units.
Combat service support units began to deploy to the Central Highlands as early as April 1965 with the 5th Maintenance Battalion arriving in Qui Nhon. With the exception of ammunition and transportation units, the majority of the combat service support preceded or arrived concurrently with the 1st Cavalry. This was necessary under the 1st Logistics Command's Forward Support Activity concept to facilitate the deployment of combat units and support immediate combat operations. Most critical to this support was the early deployment of US Army boat units and a temporary shift to Qui Nhon of these assets to "surge" for the transfer of 1st Cavalry equipment and personnel to shore. Another critical support consideration for the 1st Cavalry was addressed by the 19 September arrival of the 540th Transportation Company (Aircraft Maintenance GS) and the 14th Transportation Battalion (Aircraft Maintenance Support) at Qui Nhon and Nha Trang. (See Appendix B for further detail on deployment of operational support units.)

Engineer construction would be absolutely critical to both the reception of units and supplies and in providing the secure facilities from which to conduct operations. The most immediate needs for engineer support were recognized to be in II CTZ. As a result, on June 11th the 84th Engineer Battalion (Construction) landed in Qui Nhon followed by the 70th (Combat) in mid-August, and the 19th (Combat) on 2 September. Construction of LST beach ramps, marshaling sites, ammo storage pads, helipads, and roads were the priority. With the protection of the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division, these engineer units also repaired sections of Highway 19 leading to An Khe and Pleiku and built a difficult 1.5 mile two way road into the "golf course" area. That stretch of road alone required 6000 dump truck loads of rock. Over 1,000,000 square yards of land were cleared to permit the 1st Cavalry to occupy the lodgement.

The early deployment of combat service support and engineers was critical to the operational deployment of the 1st Cavalry as the
undeveloped theater and magnitude of the logistical effort was beyond the capabilities of brigade and division assets.

**Establishing the Lodgement**

The complexity of establishing the lodgement for the 1st Cavalry Division, as well as all units deploying to Vietnam, was tempered by the presence of other maneuver, combat support and combat service support units. Many of their efforts to create, in the terminology of the period, enclaves, have previously been discussed. Most of the units supporting this effort themselves had recently deployed. Moreover, the difficulty of deploying these forces and as the 1st Cavalry through Qui Nohn into the Central Highlands, was infinitely increased by the remoteness, the lack of infrastructure, the presence of hostile forces and the immediate operational requirement to conduct a campaign to defeat major enemy formations. Lodgement operations required elements of each of the OOSs and were planned and executed by the operational level headquarters--MACV.

According to Jomini, the front of operations, or the space which separates two armies and upon which they may fight, is ordinarily parallel to the base of operations. In his time it was considered to be two or three marches (40-60 miles) away. In the case the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division to Vietnam, this distance ceased to be significant because once the division crossed the beach it was subject to attack. Therefore another force, the 1st Bde., 101st Airborne had to establish contact and secure the point of entry into the theater. The lodgement, which in fact stretched from Qui Nohn on the coast to the "golf course" at An Khe, was, again using Jominian terms, both a pivot of operation (being a semi-permanent base) and a pivot of maneuver (from which the army proceeds to fulfill some important task but continues to guard).

The lodgement served in two other roles. First as the point of
entry over the shore, the lodgement established interior lines of operations for strategic delivery of forces and materiel. Finally the lodgement also served as a line of defense in that:

For an army entering a country with the purpose of subjugation or of temporary occupation it would always be prudent, however brilliant may have been its earlier successes, to prepare a line of defense as refuge....

Joint and Combined Considerations

In addition to the deployment of units from the four U.S. armed services and the Coast Guard troops already addressed under the Operational Operating Systems, troops from coalition partners also deployed to Vietnam in 1965. The largest allied unit directly involved with the 1st Cavalry was the Republic of Korea Capital Division. This 21,000 man infantry division arrived in Qui Nhon in November assuming base security duty, security for Highway 19 to An Khe, and conducted aggressive counter-insurgency operations in the coastal Binh Dinh province. Its efforts were critical to maintain the ground LOC and the logistics base at Qui Nhon. Due to the impending collapse of South Vietnam, and the potential for immediate NVA and Vietcong attack, joint and coalition relationships were critical issues requiring quick and effective solutions during the fall of 1965.

An international security force concept had been considered both in March under the DMZ cordon course of action and again in April and May with US brigades serving as a nucleus for combat formations. Ideally, all allied forces would fall under the operational control of USMACV. The United States would provide the necessary combat support and logistics for these brigades. This concept was never fully implemented. However, the potential for a multinational formation clearly existed for the 1st Cavalry.92

An even more pressing concern, however, was not relationships among deploying allied forces but the relationship to the South Viet-
namese military. MACV was, with few exceptions, in an advisory and support role. This effort was continued but balanced against a new operational reality. Now that US units would overtly assume defense of the nation, operations would have to be fully coordinated to achieve the maximum benefit from joint and cooperative endeavors. Once again, a Corps Field Force concept and a Combined Command was considered-- but the political sensitivity to US command of RVNAF forces was more than the issue could bear. President Johnson had even gone as far as suggesting mixed cadre units. General Westmoreland in 1965 also played down any sharp delineation between the roles and missions of American and South Vietnamese troops. Nevertheless, there appeared to be no concrete solutions agreeable to either side. COMUSMACV could only urge participation of South Vietnamese troops in operations. The assist and support mission of MACV remained. Regardless, the need for cooperation and coordination at all echelons was stressed to newly arriving units.

During initial operations, the First Cavalry worked with national police forces, 22nd ARVN division in the 10 October SHINEY BAYONET Operation and the ARVN II Corps for the relief of Plei Mei and the Plicku campaign beginning 19 October.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR EMERGING DEPLOYMENT DOCTRINE**

The operational deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division and other operational level units to Vietnam in 1965 provides a good example of power projection against which to test emerging deployment doctrine. Several factors are critical for developing links to future power projection operations. These are the building and sequencing of forces for deployment and immediate operational employment, the function of the lodgement, and joint and combined operations.
The 1st Cavalry Division was first deployed and then rapidly employed to fulfill a critical operational mission during a crisis. The conditions in the objective area remained constant from alert to arrival in the lodgement. Separate phases for the division's strategic movement and operational maneuver were compressed and for the most part became indistinguishable. There was neither forced entry nor a force buildup subsequent to the deployment. Deployment and employment were almost seamless. This was accomplished through a synergistically balanced deployment of tactical units, operational systems and to a lesser degree sustainment and infrastructure assets. It fulfilled the two critical requirements of providing for essential combat capabilities and for facilitating continued deployment of forces ready to achieve operational objectives. The balance was not just achieved in the 1st Cavalry's area but throughout the theater with Naval, Air Force, Marine, and other Army forces directly and indirectly contributing to the effort to establish conditions for success in the Central Highlands.

The Qui Nhon-An Khe lodgement served a number of functions. It was first a point of entry to the theater and provided an area in which units were "reconstituted" from strategic movement configuration to a combat ready status. As such it supported onward movement of forces and materiel to the Central Highlands and other sectors of Vietnam. It was both an terminal point on the strategic LOC and a trans-shipment point for intratheater movement. It was an enclave, as well as a base, offering protection and logistics support. Finally, because it was a strategic decisive point, it functioned as a pivot of maneuver for forces in the Central Highlands.

Joint and combined operations were critical considerations in setting conditions for the operational deployment. Coordination and cooperation with the host government achieved only the minimum necessary conditions to allow units to deploy into a combat environment. As a result, the potential combat capability gained by integrating US
and RVNAF operations was not realized due to the political considerations governing command and control. Nevertheless, other coalition forces were integrated into the overall operational scheme. But more considerable was the impact on the deployment by other US services on Central Highlands operations and in the synergistic effects achieved throughout the theater supporting both deployment and immediate combat operations.

In light of these three factors the operational design was well executed in support of the immediate objective of resolving the crisis in the Central Highlands. With this in mind, how emerging Army deployment doctrine addresses these considerations must be examined.

Building and Sequencing a Deploying Force

The recent deployment of US Forces to Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Shield, and their subsequent employment in Operation Desert Storm, focused attention on the strategic deployment of forces. From the strategic level, force projection and deployment issues involve the mechanics of moving the force to the region. Doctrinal literature and professional writings on deployment emphasize themes concerning modes and quantities of lift, prepositioning, unit level preparations and computerized systems managing movements. There is relatively little consideration given to the intellectually most demanding aspect of deployment planning—constructing the appropriate force and sequencing it properly to enable it to pursue immediate operational missions. This void seems to have occurred because deployment doctrine has been based on one of two broad sets of assumptions about the objective of the deployment. These two assumptions partly obscure the nature of the mission driving the planner toward one of these sets of assumptions. This in turn dictates the way the force deploys to the theater.

The first set of assumptions is that a short or medium notice
strategic deployment will take place into a benign lodgement area. US forces may already be in a forward presence role or friendly host nation with resources that permits a buildup phase with subsequent operational employment of forces. At the other end of the spectrum is the set of assumptions for situations that involve a tactical deployment or forced entry to achieve an immediate strategic end. FM 100-5 (Draft) categorizes these as requiring a tactical deployment utilizing combat loading or an administrative move making most efficient use of strategic lift. Between these sets of assumptions lies the role of the operational deployment of the 1st Cavalry to Vietnam.

FM 100-17-- Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, and Demobilization (Draft) calls for developing forces that are ready to move from the continental United States (like the 1st Cavalry in 1965) or forward deployed locations (like the 173rd Abn Bde) to the scene of a crisis with the ability to mass overwhelming force to terminate the crisis swiftly and decisively. It recognizes only that the Army must be prepared to deploy a mix of forces (heavy, light and special operations) as part of a joint or as an Army only force against a sophisticated adversary in regions that will span the extremes of infrastructure and support available to U.S. forces.

During a crisis, the emerging doctrine visualizes four general responses to major regional contingencies: Flexible Deterrent and Major Flexible Deterrent options as well as Deploy-to-Fight and Counterattack Responses. The latter two are particularly relevant to the concept of operational deployment. These two responses, as illustrated by the deployment of the 1st Cavalry to Vietnam, may require immediate initiation of a campaign or combat operations designed to achieve a strategic end state. As part of these responses, doctrine describes deployment in terms of five phases: predeployment activities, movement to ports of embarkation, strategic lift, theater reception and theater onward movement. Concurrent with the deploy-
ment of forces and logistics, the combatant commander conducts lodge-
ment, stabilization and restoration of conditions amicable to US in-
terests. Based on the experience of Vietnam 1965, the doctrine
does not attempt to make the necessary connection between deployment
and employment of the forces and provide a basic conceptual framework
from which deployment planners can construct an appropriate for force
for power projection to meet the operational, campaign and eventual
strategic objectives.

While apparently trying to provide a conceptual basis for plan-
ers to build a structure for the deploying force, the emerging doc-
trine recognizes the need for operational consideration when it calls
for forces to be configured in a way that facilitates the rapid ex-
pansibility across the operational continuum. In doing so it defines
the basic Army force projection unit as comprised of active component
Corps elements. However, while trying to establish a top down per-
spective on deployment, the doctrine writers slip back to the bottom
up building block approach for theater force generation. The writers
focus on deploying divisional units with some Corps support config-
ured into brigade task forces capable of independent deployment.
These units would also be capable of rapid reassembly into a division
size force.

The Army force generation model is a system for designating
units as forward presence, crisis response, initial reinforcement,
follow-on reinforcing, and reconstitution units based on geographic
location, readiness, arrival time in theater, and mobilization pos-
ture. The primary focus is on brigade and divisional building
blocks rather than on function. It disregards the contribution to
"the mosaic of the battlefield" of operational systems necessary to
conduct operational art. Furthermore, the doctrine leads the planner
by setting movement goals and establishes the order for Army units
flowing into a theater. It does this without giving consideration to
the operational design of the campaign. Though FM 100-17 (Coordinat-
ing Draft) does call for rapid deployment of task organized, eche- loned, and tailored forces. It falls back into the realm of the me- chanics of movement by setting transportation goals that in turn drive the deployment sequence of a hypothetical five division contingency force. 103

This slip back into tactical level thinking fails to address the critical operational level unit contributions to achieving campaign objectives. The focus should be on the deploying unit capabilities to achieve a force sequenced with the appropriate mix of battlefield, but most importantly, operational operating systems necessary to immediately begin efforts to seize the initiative, leverage our relative combat strengths and exploit enemy weaknesses. This operational operating system approach is the top down approach to design of the deployment force that offers the deployment/campaign planner the coherence, focus and harmonization that the tactical planner achieves from a tactical synchronization matrix.

The doctrine does provide one tool that assists the operational planner. This is found in the tenets of power projection—rapid deployment, tailorability, armed force early, phased, timely CS/CSS, sustainability, and forced entry capability. 104 In applying these tenets, the Army at the tactical level prepares its units for power projection through task organizing and echeloning. Task organizing is the process of forming the combined arms task forces with limited sustainment capability at the brigade task force level. This is done prior to deployment. Echeloning is done as the units are prepared for movement and establishes priority of movement within that task force by creating advanced parties, combat forces, follow-on forces and closure forces. Tailoring occurs after the initial METT-T, strategic lift, pre-positioning, and host-nation or contract assets have been evaluated. Tailoring is the situationally dependent adjustment of the size, capabilities, and equipment of the deploying force. 105
Of the three actions pertaining to force composition—task organizing, echeloning, and tailoring—tailoring is the most applicable to the operational level of war. It would be most effectively performed by the Corps headquarters which is expected to be the principle organization that will command and control Army forces provided to a combatant commander. The Corps must have the appropriate mix and sequence of forces to conduct operations in support of the combatant commander's intent. The scope of the contingency will dictate the requirement for Army component and echelon above corps units to both perform Army as well as common service missions. Additionally, Army forces will most likely become part of an appropriately structured joint task force or coalition organization. Proper sequencing of forces/capabilities into the area of operations must be included in the concept of tailoring. This consideration will significantly contribute to the stabilization or resolution of the situation as it will allow the planner to assess the most effective arrival of capabilities. Correctly done it will permit the combatant commander to seize the initiative and engage in decisive operations as early as possible.

The doctrine recognizes that the simultaneous deployment of tactical and operational level headquarters early in the operation is essential for the conduct of immediate operations, planning future operations, coordination with host nation or allied forces, and facilitating the employment of follow on reinforcing units. It anticipates the deployment of CS/CSS headquarters with the initial force.

Finally emerging doctrine asserts that all elements of the deploying force must be flexible enough to reconfigure and adjust deployment sequences allowing the joint force commander to maintain an operational focus, to seize the initiative, and create offensive capabilities. In terms of maximizing the efficiency of lift, the needs of the joint force commander, and the requirement for rapid
deployment, will initially take priority over maximizing lift efficiency. However, when looking at deployment from an operational perspective, the most efficient use of lift is that which will permit the closure of greater operational capabilities. Utilization of lift therefore must be viewed as much as a matter of effectiveness as it is a trade-off of speed for efficiency.

**Operational Lodgement**

The critical path model to crisis response in FM 100-17 (Draft) presents five doctrinal stages for deploying a force. These are: pre-crisis, lodgement, stabilization, restoration, and redeployment. Lodgement, stabilization, and restoration occur concurrently with deployment.\(^{110}\)

As the first and most critical of these stages to deployment, the establishment of a lodgement, which is labeled initial force deployment, entails either opposed or unopposed entry. The doctrine writers feel that this stage is one in which the Army will almost invariably face high risk and will need to avoid a major engagement with the bulk of an enemy's force. The doctrine also identifies lodgement as an activity conducted by the combatant CINC. Overwhelming forces are accumulated to allow progression to the stabilization phase. This phase is described as a parity situation allowing retention of ports and airheads for reinforcing forces. The restoration phase calls for the employment of the deployed force to achieve the CINC's operational objectives.\(^{111}\)

Lodgement can either be considered as a stage or an activity but it continues throughout the course of the campaign as seen with the deployment of the 1st Cavalry to Vietnam. The theater commander is responsible for theater reception, onward movement of forces, and theater distribution infrastructure. Unless a forced entry is conducted, CS and CSS forces may precede or arrive concurrently with
combat forces. Essential elements of the lodgement will be air and sea port operation, movement control, security, communications, intelligence, and initial logistics operating and management organizations. Therefore it is critical to deploy early on sufficient capabilities/units to support the lodgement.

But it is also useful to consider the lodgement as a pivot point as illustrated by the Qui Nhon-An Khe lodgement in 1965 and 1966. It is the place from which the deploying force may prepare, pivot, launch and return for security or base functions. In the case of an opposed entry, initial operations would also focus on expansion to increase security and on defeat of those enemy elements with the potential to disrupt activities in the area. Above all else, lodgement is an operational level consideration.

Joint and Combined Considerations for Operational Deployments

Neither FM 100-5 or FM 100-17 appear to address the implications of joint or combined forces in the context of deployment. The deployment of U.S. forces to Vietnam in 1965 showed the impact of other services on operational planning. It is therefore imperative in deployment planning to consider the entire range of operational level capabilities from all services. These forces, along with an assessment of their intrinsic strategic movement capabilities or lift requirements, should be factored into the decision on how to most effectively use limited lift to achieve immediate aims.

Likewise host nation and coalition contributions should be factored into planning deployments to ameliorate US lift requirements. The planner may want to take advantage of a particular allied operational advantage and devote U.S. lift assets to moving those forces.
Army deployment doctrine is beginning to embrace the experience of the 1965 deployment to Vietnam. As power projection is a principle of the emerging National Military Strategy, the Army is adopting this as a fundamental element of its doctrine. As a window to the future, TRADOC PAM 525-5 first defined the Army's role in power projection as that of providing versatile forces deployable on short notice to a Unified Commander for major regional contingency operations. It asserts that the Army must be able to assemble forces and, based on the operational requirements of the CINC, move them great distances. These operations, will not only require a mix of armored, light and special operations forces but will be joint and preferably combined efforts. Army forces must arrive ready to control or resolve a crisis through deterrence or through the rapid application of lethal or non-lethal force to defeat an opponent with minimum casualties.

Likewise, the new FM 100-5 will identify the requirement to deploy a force configured to the operational design of the CINC and to deploy it in a ready to fight configuration. It too references the need for a heavy, light, and SOF mix. Consistent with the deployment experience of the Army in 1965, it calls for the proper sequence of forces deploying into an area operations that both contribute to the stabilization of the situation and facilitate rapid build up of capabilities so the CINC can seize the initiative and conduct decisive operations as early as possible. In that regard FM 100-5 is right on track.

Probably as a result of the magnitude of the strategic lift shortfall, doctrine still contains a void caused by failing to address the effective operational use of lift. The focus is on the mechanics of getting the force to the theater. Little has been written to give planners doctrinal guidance on what forces should be de-
ployed, the timing and sequence of those forces, the function of lodgement, and considerations for integrating host nation or coalition forces into a deployment.

Furthermore, doctrine needs to consider that in addition to the scenarios of hostile entry or long force buildup, a major regional contingency deployment may involve a situation more like Vietnam in 1965 than either Grenada or Desert Shield. The scenario would be characterized by a remote and austere lodgement area--either initially hostile or benign but threatened. There would be little or no US forward presence or prepositioned materiel in the immediate area of the lodgement and few opportunities for host nation support. The point of entry to the theater may be an operational objective or a pivot of maneuver. Finally, the objective of the deployment may require a lengthy campaign with division or larger sized forces that face immediate or near term combat operations. Given this set of conditions, doctrine must address the concept of an operational deployment (sic:movement) via strategic means.

It is essential that the deployment of forces be considered as a fundamental building block in campaign design or operational planning. Building the deployment force at the operational level is as much an art as it is a science. It is a continual juggling of capabilities, requirements, and the operational design on one hand and the speed and capacity to move the forces on the other. The best kind of deployment starts with a good sound plan; it drives strategic movement and employment, lodgement, and the considers contributions of joint and combined forces. In addition to focusing on moving the force, deployment doctrine must incorporate some measure of effectiveness of the force being deployed. Focus on the operational design with close scrutiny of the balance and sequence of tactical units, operational operating systems, lodgement operations, and potential contributions of other services and allies will offer the means to measure the effectiveness of a deployment.
In the final analysis, the effectiveness of a deployment or of deployment planning is measured by the successful execution of a plan. In 1965, the United States Army, along with the other services, accomplished a massive deployment of combat power in response to a crisis. By the end of 1965, the first phase of the operational plan had been accomplished; the situation in the Central Highlands had been stabilized and US forces were poised to begin offensive actions to destroy enemy forces and reinvigorate rural reform throughout South Vietnam. This example of a successful operational deployment should have its place among others in US military history to influence the development of future doctrine. In this way we can heed the warning of von Moltke and reduce the chance of making mistakes in the projection of US military power in a new world order.
Appendix B: OPERATIONAL GROUND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS TO VIETNAM--1965, (#= Support of Central Highlands or Qui Nhon lodgement)

OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 Mar 65</td>
<td>9th Marine Amphibious Brigade</td>
<td>Da Nang #</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May 65</td>
<td>3d Marine Division</td>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May 65</td>
<td>111 Marine Amphibious Force</td>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May 65</td>
<td>173rd Airborne Brigade</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 May 65</td>
<td>Australian Army Force, Vietnam</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Jul 65</td>
<td>2nd Bde/1st Infantry Division</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jul 65</td>
<td>New Zealand &quot;V&quot; Force</td>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Jul 65</td>
<td>1st Bde/101st Airborne Division</td>
<td>Vung Tau #</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Sep 65</td>
<td>1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile)</td>
<td>An Khe #</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Sep 65</td>
<td>Rep. of Korea Capital Division</td>
<td>Qui Nhon #</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Oct 65</td>
<td>Rep. of Korea 2d Marine Corp Bde</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 65</td>
<td>3rd Bde/25th Infantry Division</td>
<td>Pleiku</td>
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AVIATION UNITS

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Mar 65</td>
<td>197th Avn Co. Assault Helo</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Mar 65</td>
<td>74th Avn Co. Surveillance, Light</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 65</td>
<td>A Co/ 82 Avn</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Jun 65</td>
<td>219th Avn Co. Surveillance, Light</td>
<td>Plicku #</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Jul 65</td>
<td>220th Avn Co. Surveillance, Light</td>
<td>Hue/Phu Bai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jul 65</td>
<td>221st Avn Co. Surveillance, Light</td>
<td>Soc Trang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jul 65</td>
<td>11th Avn Co. GS</td>
<td>Phouc Vinh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Aug 65</td>
<td>12th Avn Grp.</td>
<td>Tan Son Nhut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Aug 65</td>
<td>54th Avn Co. Fixed Wing Transport</td>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Sep 65</td>
<td>A CO/ 5 Avn</td>
<td>An Khe #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sep 65</td>
<td>362nd Avn Co. Heavy Helo</td>
<td>Gia Le</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Oct 65</td>
<td>155th Avn Co. Assault Helo</td>
<td>Ban Me Thout</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Oct 65</td>
<td>128th Avn Co. Assault Helo</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Oct 65</td>
<td>116th Avn Co. Assault Helo</td>
<td>Cu Chi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Oct 65</td>
<td>129th Avn Co. Assault Helo</td>
<td>An Son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Oct 65</td>
<td>171st Avn Co. Airlift</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Oct 65</td>
<td>172nd Avn Co Airlift</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Oct 65</td>
<td>10th Avn Bn. (Combat)</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nov 65</td>
<td>11th Avn Bn. (Combat)</td>
<td>Phu Loi</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Nov 65</td>
<td>125th Avn Co. ATC</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
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<td>6 Nov 65</td>
<td>48th Avn Co. Assault Helo</td>
<td>Ninh Hoa</td>
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<td>28 Nov 65</td>
<td>68th Avn Co. Airmobile Light</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 Nov 65</td>
<td>147th Avn Co. Medium/Aslt Helo</td>
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<td>57th Avn Co. Fixed Wing Transport</td>
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<td>134th Avn Co. Fixed Wing Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 Dec 65</td>
<td>135th Avn Co. Fixed Wing Transport</td>
<td>Dong Ba Thin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: By Sep 1964 there were already 406 Army aircraft deployed to Vietnam. Among these were 250- UH-1s, 32- CV2 Caribou, 9- Ch-37s, and 27- U1 Otters for operational movement of units.
### OPERATIONAL FIRES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Artillery Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 65</td>
<td>Company E, 5th Special Forces Group</td>
<td>105 How, Towed</td>
<td>Gia Dinh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Sep 65</td>
<td>2d Bn/17th FA</td>
<td>105 How, Towed</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Oct 65</td>
<td>8th Bn/16th FA</td>
<td>155 Tow /8&quot; SP</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Oct 65</td>
<td>7th Psychological Ops Grp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Oct 65</td>
<td>3d Bn/18th FA</td>
<td>8&quot; How, SP</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Oct 65</td>
<td>6th Bn/14th FA</td>
<td>175 Gun, SP</td>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Oct 65</td>
<td>2d Bn/13th FA</td>
<td>105 How, Towed</td>
<td>Tan Son Nhut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Oct 65</td>
<td>Btry B/29th FA Search Light</td>
<td></td>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nov 65</td>
<td>5th Bn/27th FA</td>
<td>105 How, Towed</td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nov 65</td>
<td>6th Bn/27th FA</td>
<td>8&quot; How, SP</td>
<td>Phuoc Vinh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nov 65</td>
<td>2d Bn/32nd FA</td>
<td>175mm Gun, SP</td>
<td>Cu Chi</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Nov 65</td>
<td>XXX Corps Arty II &amp; III CTZs</td>
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<td>16 Nov 65</td>
<td>23rd Arty Grp Field Artillery</td>
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<td>Phu Loi</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 Nov 65</td>
<td>1st Bn/30th FA</td>
<td>155 How, Towed</td>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
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### OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

#### SIGNAL UNITS

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<th>Unit Description</th>
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<td>25 Apr 65</td>
<td>581st Signal Co. Support</td>
<td>Can Tho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Jun 65</td>
<td>2nd Signal Grp.</td>
<td>Tan Son Nhut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jul 65</td>
<td>56th Signal Co. Fwd Spt Maint</td>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jul 65</td>
<td>593rd Signal Co. Sig Com Ctr Opns</td>
<td>Tan Son Nhut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Jul 65</td>
<td>41st Signal Bn. Combat Area</td>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 65</td>
<td>578th Signal Co. Cable Constr.</td>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Sep 65</td>
<td>586th Signal Co. Support</td>
<td>An Khe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sep 65</td>
<td>972nd Signal Bn. Supply &amp; Maint</td>
<td>Saigon</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Sep 65</td>
<td>228th Signal Co. Radio Relay VHF</td>
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<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
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<td>Nha Trang</td>
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<td>54th Signal Co. Fwd Spt Maint</td>
<td>Tan Son Nhut</td>
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<td>69th Signal Bn. Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Nov 65</td>
<td>580th Signal Co. Constr/Tele Opns</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
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<td>267th Signal Co. Cable Constr.</td>
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<td>16 Dec 65</td>
<td>518th Signal Co. Tropo Radio Relay</td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
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### OPERATIONAL PROTECTION

#### AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY UNITS

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<td>6th Bn/71st FA Hawk</td>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Sep 65</td>
<td>97th Arty Grp ADA</td>
<td>Tan Son Nhut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Sep 65</td>
<td>6th Bn/56th FA Hawk</td>
<td>Tan Son Nhut</td>
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### MILITARY POLICE

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<td>716th MP Bn.</td>
<td>Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Aug 65</td>
<td>66th MP Co. Guard</td>
<td>Saigon/TSN</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Aug 65</td>
<td>630th MP Co. Escort Guard</td>
<td>Phu Thanh</td>
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<td>26 Aug 65</td>
<td>615th MP Co. Corps/Army</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 Aug 65</td>
<td>504th MP Bn. Army</td>
<td>Long Binh</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Sep 65</td>
<td>272nd MP Co. Airborne Corps</td>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
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<td>5 Sep 65</td>
<td>557th MP Co. Army Guard</td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 65</td>
<td>313th ASA Bn. Army Security Agency</td>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
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OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

25 Oct 65 519th MI Bn. Combined Intell Cntr Saigon
28 Nov 65 525th MI Grp. Command Support Tan Son Nhut
23 Dec 65 1St MI Bn. Air Recon Spt Saigon

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT UNITS

LOGISTICS COMMANDS

2 Aug 65 29th Genral Support Grp. Area Long Binh

ADJUTANT GENERAL

25 Aug 65 90th Rpl Bn. Long Binh
30 Aug 65 18th AG Co. Replacement Long Binh
6 Sep 65 178th AG Co. Replacement Tan Son Nhut

SUPPLY AND SERVICE

3 Jun 65 19th S&S Co. Direct Support Qui Nhon #
11 Jul 65 11th Sup Co. Repair Parts GS Saigon
23 Aug 65 31st Sup Co. Hvy Materiel GS Cam Ranh Bay
25 Aug 65 34th S&S Bn. Direct Support An Khe #
30 Aug 65 59th Serv Co. Fwd Field GS Cam Ranh Bay
30 Aug 65 223 S&S Co. Direct Support Saigon
2 Sep 65 625th S&S Co. Direct Support Quang Tri
2 Sep 65 629th Sup Co. Repair Parts GS Qui Nhon #
5 Sep 65 148th S&S Co. Direct Support Nha Trang
6 Sep 65 74th Sup Co. Repair Parts Fwd GS Da Nang
10 Sep 65 98th S&S Bn. General Support Qui Nhon #
18 Sep 65 88th S&S Bn. Direct Support Pleiku #
2 Nov 65 506th S&S Co. Direct Support Long Giao
14 Dec 65 526th CS Co. Coll, Class, Salv. Qui Nhon #

MAINTENANCE

28 Apr 65 5th Maint Bn. Direct Support Qui Nhon #
29 Apr 65 554th Maint Co. Lt Equip GS Qui Nhon #
29 May 65 63rd Maint Bn. Direct Support Nha Trang
11 Jul 65 2nd Maint Bn. Direct Support Vung Tau
11 Jul 65 79th Maint Bn. General Support Tan Son Nhut
11 Jul 65 19th Maint Co. Lt Equip DS Long Binh
11 Jul 65 553rd Maint Co. Hvy Equip GS Long Binh
2 Aug 65 185th Maint Bn. Direct Support Long Binh
27 Aug 65 149th Maint Co. Lt Equip DS Pleiku #
28 Aug 65 147th Maint Co. Lt Equip GS Long Binh
5 Sep 65 85th Maint Co. Lt Equip DS Da Nang
15 Sep 65 129th Maint Co. Main Support Nha Trang
15 Sep 65 178th Maint Co. Division DS Quang Tri
19 Sep 65 14th Trans Bn. Acft Maint Spt Nha Trang #
19 Sep 65 540th Trans Co. Acft Maint GS Qui Nhon #
30 Sep 65 765th Trans Bn. Acft Maint & Spt Vung Tau
29 Oct 65 136th Maint Co. Lt Equip DS Tuy Hoa
30 Oct 65 536th Manit Co. Hvy Equip GS Tan Son Nhut
2 Nov 65 94th Maint Co. Division DS Cu Chi
4 Nov 65 578th Maint Co. Lt Equip GS Phu Bai

MEDICAL
26 Apr 65 3d Field Hosp. Tan Son Nhut
29 May 65 58th Med Bn. Non-divisional Long Binh
14 Jul 65 9th Field Hosp. Nha Trang
16 Aug 65 498th Med Co. Air Ambulance An Son
23 Aug 65 3d Surg Hosp. Mobile Army Bien Hoa
23 Aug 65 561st Med Co. Ambulance Long Binh
27 Aug 65 542th Med Co. Clearing Phu Thanh
31 Aug 65 85th Evac Hosp. Semi-mobile Qui Nhon #
20 Sep 65 20th Med Grp. Nha Trang
23 Sep 65 523d Field Hosp. Phu Bai
18 Oct 65 616th Med Co. Clearing Phu Bai
31 Oct 65 51st Field Hosp. Tan Son Nhut
4 Nov 65 93d Evac Hosp. Semi-mobile Long Binh
7 Nov 65 51st Med Co. Ambulance Phu Tranh

ORDNANCE
13 Aug 65 571st Ord Co. Ammunition Long Binh
2 Sep 65 820th Ord Co. Ammunition Phu Tai #
4 Sep 65 611th Ord Co. Ammunition Cam Ranh Bay
6 Sep 65 60th Ord Grp. Maint & Supply Bien Hoa
15 Sep 65 576th Ord Co. Ammunition Long Binh
15 Sep 65 606th Ord Co. Ammunition Cam Ranh Bay
2 Nov 65 54th Ord Co. Ammunition Long Binh
4 Nov 65 3d Ord Bn. Ammunition Long Binh
4 Nov 65 148th Ord Co. Ammunition Vung Tau
5 Nov 65 630th Ord Co. Ammunition Phu Tai #
24 Nov 65 661st Ord Co. Ammunition Phu Tai #
19 Dec 65 184th Ord Bn. Ammunition Qui Nhon #
27 Dec 65 188th Ord Co. Ammunition Plieku #

QUARTERMASTER
29 Jul 65 101st QM Co. Air Equip Support Bien Hoa
31 Aug 65 134th QM Co. Petroleum Supply Phu Tai #
16 Sep 65 647th QM Co. Fld Depot & Petro An Khe #
18 Sep 65 157th QM Co. Service Qui Nhon #

TRANSPORTATION
30 May 65 123 Trans Co. Terminal Serv Cam Ranh Bay
30 May 65 347th Trans Co. Light Amphib LARC Cam Ranh Bay
30 May 65 1097th Trans Co. Mdm Boat Dong Tam
30 May 65 1098th Trans Co. Mdm Boat Qui Nhon #
31 May 65 97th Trans Co. Hvy Boat Cam Ranh Bay
2 Jun 65 344th Trans Co. Light Amphib LARC Cam Ranh Bay
4 Jun 65 155th Trans Co. Terminal Serv Cam Ranh Bay
25 Jun 65 120th Trans Co. Light Trk Can Tho
25 Jun 65 656th Trans Co. Terminal Serv Can Tho
14 Jul 65 515th Trans Co. Light Trk  Phu Bai
22 Jul 65 670th Trans Co. Mdm Trk  Cam Ranh Bay
23 Jul 65 557th Trans Co. Mdm Trk  Phu Bai
5 Aug 65 11th Trans Bn. Terminal  Saigon
7 Aug 65 394th Trans Bn. Terminal  Qui Nhon #
8 Aug 65 4th Trans Com. Terminal  Saigon
27 Aug 65 58th Trans Co. Light Trk  Phu Bai
27 Aug 65 63rd Trans Co. Light Trk  Phu Bai
27 Aug 65 71st Trans Co. Terminal Serv  Dong Ha
27 Aug 65 79th Trans Co. Aircraft DS  Qui Nhon #
31 Aug 65 61st Trans Co. Mdm Trk POL  Cam Ranh Bay
31 Aug 65 2d Trans Co. Mdm Trk  Phu Bai
31 Aug 65 119th Trans Co. Terminal Serv  Vung Ro Bay
2 Sep 65 151st Trans Co. Light Trk  Long Binh
2 Sep 65 541st Trans Co. Light Trk  Plieku #
3 Sep 65 82d Trans Co. Amphibious GS  Cam Ranh Bay
4 Sep 65 117th Trans Co. Terminal Serv  Tuy Hoa
6 Sep 65 10th Trans Co. Mdm Cgo Trk  Long Binh
12 Sep 65 163rd Trans Co. Light Trk  Chu Lai
15 Sep 65 62d Trans Co. Mdm Cgo Trk  Long Binh
19 Sep 65 10th Trans Bn. Terminal  Cam Ranh Bay
16 Oct 65 556th Trans Co. Mdm Trk POL  Long Binh
27 Oct 65 27th Trans Bn. Motor Transport  Qui Nhon #
28 Oct 65 444th Trans Co. Light Trk  Phu Bai #
1 Nov 65 335th Trans Co. Aircraft DS  Chu Lai
4 Nov 65 110th Trans Co. Depot  Tan Son Nhut
10 Nov 65 109th Trans Co. Mdn Boat  Cat Lai
29 Nov 65 124th Trans Co. Terminal Serv  Cat Lo
16 Dec 65 116th Trans Co. Terminal Serv  Cam Ranh Bay
16 Dec 65 285th Trans Co. Terminal Serv  Qui Nhon #

ENGINEERS
9 Jun 65 35th Eng Grp. Construction  Phan Rang
5 Jun 65 864th Eng Bn. Construction  Cam Ranh Bay
9 Jun 65 53d Eng Co. Supply Point  Cam Ranh Bay
11 Jun 65 84th Eng Bn. Construction  Qui Nhon #
11 Jun 65 513th Eng Co. Dump Truck  Qui Nhon #
11 Jun 65 584th Eng Co. Light Equip.  Plieku #
26 Jun 65 510th Eng Co. Maintenance  Plieku #
22 Aug 65 937th Eng Grp. Combat  Qui Nhon #
22 Aug 65 70th Eng Bn. Combat  An Khe #
23 Aug 65 87th Eng Bn. Construction  Cam Ranh Bay
23 Aug 65 497th Eng Co. Port Construction  Cam Ranh Bay
27 Aug 65 62d Eng Bn. Const./Land Clear.  Phan Rang
30 Aug 65 102d Eng Co. Constr. Support  Plieku #
2 Sep 65 362d Eng Co. Light Equip.  Tay Ninh
2 Sep 65 19th Eng Bn. Combat  Qui Nhon #
2 Sep 65 509th Eng Co. Panel Bridge  Plieku #
2 Sep 65 511th Eng Co. Panel Bridge  Da Nang
2 Sep 65 553rd Eng Co. Float Bridge  Phu Hiep
15 Sep 65 569th Eng Co. Corps Topographic  Bien Hoa
15 Sep 65 585th Eng Co. Dump Truck  Plieku #
18 Sep 65 46th Eng Bn. Construction  Bien Hoa
20 Sep 65 18th Eng Bde. General Support  I & II CTZ
23 Oct 65 299 Eng Bn. Combat  Tuy Hoa
23 Oct 65 630th Eng Co. Light Equip.  Plieku #
28 Oct 65 574th Eng Co. Depot  Nha Trang
30 Oct 65 159th Eng Grp. Construction  Bien Hoa
2 Nov 65 588th Eng Bn. Combat  Phu Loi
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Appendix C: Map of the II Corps Tactical Zone.
Appendix D - AIR AND NAVAL OPERATIONAL FIRES

Given the terrain, the political situation, and the dispersal of maneuver units, air power and naval gun fire support were depended upon heavily. The first Air Force unit providing CAS and BAI had been in place since 1961. The 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron flew 1940 vintage B-26's, T-28's and later AC-47 gunships. At first these missions were mainly in support of unconventional operations and later the squadron picked up ground support and in defoliation missions. After the Gulf of Tonkin incidents small groups of F-102's, F-100's and B-57's deployed to Da Nang, Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut. Units equipped with F-105's and tankers deployed to Thailand. In February 1965 two squadrons of B-52's were deployed to Guam and used for both bombing of the North and for support of ground combat operations. The Marine Air Wing organic to III MAF deployed to Da Nang and then to Chu Lai once that facility had been completed in June of 1965.

In October and November the major deployment of USAF units occurred with the arrival of the first of five Squadrons of F-100's, the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing with F-4C's and additional AC-47 gunships. From March to December of 1965 the Air Force deployed over 15,000 personnel and 350 aircraft into Vietnam.

Naval aviation played a key role in operational fires with up to three carriers operating at any one time either off Dixie Station--off North Vietnam or later at Yankee Station--off South Vietnam. These carriers had air wings comprised of 70 - 100 aircraft that provided fires for the Flaming Dart and Rolling Thunder strategic bombing and interdiction operations, coastal protection, and support of ground op-


erations. Carriers provided the most reliable and secure means of aerial operational fires as they could be deployed rapidly, easily moved and rotated, and were not subject to hostile ground actions.

Likewise, naval gunfire support provided a secure yet mobile base of fires. During 1965 cruisers and destroyers provided this support to US and South Vietnamese forces in the two most northern CTZs. The deep waters off the northern and central coast of Vietnam allowed them to range one third of the land area if I CTZ and all of the coastal provinces of II CTZ. By the end of 1965 they had fired over 90,000 large caliber rounds in support of ground actions.¹

Appendix E-- Operational Communications

The theater communication system was extremely depend-ent on contractors as the undermanned Signal Corps had per-sonnel deployed all over the world. When the MRC-85 site in Qui Nohn was attacked by the Vietcong on 10 Feb 1965 con-tractor personnel joined soldiers in defending it. Inci-dents like this combined with the deployment of Marines to Da Nang required greater tactical links. Anticipating in-creased requirements in II CTZ and the coastal regions, Gen-eral Westmoreland began to lobby Washington for more signal support. The MACV Chief of Staff believed that it would be ill advised to wait until after combat units deploy to bring these assets into country to build up theater signal capa-bilities. In June and July the 2nd Signal Group deployed with two additional signal battalions, a Communications Cen-ter Operating Company and a Forward Signal Supply and Main-tenance Company. A company from one of the battalions was sent to An Khe in September to support the 1st Cavalry Divi-sion; it also eventually supported the South Korean Divi-sion. This early deployment of operational signal units was fortuitous as in addition to the increasing requirements for arriving units, the heavy demands for service to CONUS to coordinate arrival of units and the encounters with regular North Vietnamese units generated a steady stream of urgent messages and telephone calls between Saigon and Washington.

2. Ibid. p. 129.
3. Ibid. p. 160.
SIGNAL TROOP DISPOSITION
July 1965

NORTH VIETNAM
DEMILITARIZED ZONE

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

LAOS

SOUTH

VIETNAM

THAILAND

SOUTH CHINA SEA
Appendix F: Map of Ports, Land LOCs and Logistics Commands.

PORTS, LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND MAJOR LOGISTIC COMMANDS

SCALE
Appendix G--Operational Sustainment

As in each of our modern wars, in Vietnam the services and the national industrial base could and did overload the theater's capability to absorb support.¹ The implications of failing to regulate national support and deploying an imbalance of Combat units to Combat Support and Combat Service Support early in an operational deployment are lost supplies and support lost or these materials and services being delivered to the wrong places. As a result of an overall lack of balance during the 1965 deployment to Vietnam, inventory and control problems took years to sort out and a permanent lack of faith in the logistics system resulted in the institutionalization of criminal if not life threatening work-arounds of the system. (see Appendix B for deployment detail on operational support units)

CINCPAC conducted joint logistics planning for the theater while assigning logistics workloads configured to the services needs and capabilities. The primary logistic functions in the northern most zone belonged to CINC-PACFLT because the predominance of the troops were Marines. The Army had the lead in the other three zones.² In addition to the service leads in the four corps tactical zones, the Naval Supply Support Activity Saigon and US Army Support Command Danang (one of four area commands subordinate to 1st Logistical Command), provided some common support to all forces in those areas (see Appendix F).

The deployment of large forces immediately needed for combat operations changed the previous emphasis of supporting and buildup of the South Vietnamese forces. Though this was a ongoing mission, the emphasis of logistics management at CINCPAC and MACV shifted to control of transportation assets, munitions resupply, construction materials and critical maintenance items. It


became apparent that the unified commander had to control the allocation of limited services and materiel to the multi-service needs of the highest priority.  

Theater reception of units and supplies as well as distribution presented significant difficulties due to the lack of ports and water terminals. Initially emphasis was placed on deploying over the beach using amphibious craft until hard facilities were constructed--first to support amphibious discharge and then conventional ship discharge operations. Supply distribution was mainly dependent on transshipment by intra-coastal shipping for lateral resupply and to a lesser degree on intra-theater airlift.

Engineer construction would be absolutely critical to both the reception of units and supplies and to providing the secure facilities from which to conduct operations. Concurrent deployment of Navy Seabee and Air Force Redhorse Squadrons were key to air base development and the physical protection of aircraft, ammunition and fuel storage facilities. Planning for port facilities to receive the massive movements of men and materiel was not fully developed before the deployment began. Part of this was due to the fact that General Westmoreland realized that aviation would play an essential role in the jungle warfare and the mobility of forces and supplies and would depend on the availability of airfields located strategically around the country. Next in importance were the construction and maintenance of supply routes and ports bases and supply facilities were third priority. In fact the subsequent difficulties in accomplishing all the construction requirements confirmed that there was a lack of appreciation for the amount of engineer effort necessary to support the deployments contemplated for 1965. Planners did correctly estimate that Vietnam could not support the materiel requirements for the engi-

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., pp. 257-8.

neer work.)

Initial support of the operational deployment in the Central Highlands, despite the early effort to build a support structure in the Qui Nhon–An Khe lodgement, barely meet the needs of the units engaging a tough but technically and numerically inferior force. In the future, a force, more sophisticated and possibly numerically superior to that of the North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong, will not permit US forces to assume this early risk in operational sustainment.

1. Ibid., pp. 5, 11.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 9


8. Examples of direct US military action in the period prior to 1965 range from individual advisors assuming "command" as documented in Neil Sheehan's biography of John Paul Vann to Air Force pilots, ostensibly training Vietnamese, conducting fire support or interdiction missions with their students riding as 'sand bags'.


13. Ibid.


17. Pentagon Papers, p. 447
18. Combined Intelligence Center. HQS US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Strategy Since 1954 (Saigon: 29 Jun 1967) p. 8. The Vietcong explained to their party committees and cadre that to be successful in diplomacy it is necessary to elevate their combat potential and to win decisive victories.


22. Sharp. p. 110


24. Kinnard. p. 36.


27. Ibid.. p. 342


30. Ibid.. p. 16. see also Sheehan. p. 298.

31. Kinnard. p. 34.

32. Kinnard. p. 43.


38. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Matthews. p. 87.
43. Sheehan.. p. 407.
44. Ibid.. p. 408.

45. The balance of the Marine III MAF had closed in I CTZ and the 173rd Airborne Brigade was securing Bien Hoa.
46. Sheehan.. p. 388. During a speech in April at Johns Hopkins University, the President offered a one billion dollar economic development plan for the Mekong River basin. North Vietnam would participate in this venture. As a further effort to draw the North to the bargaining table Johnson directed a mid-May bombing pause in the hope for a reciprocal de-escalation on the part of the North or pressure from Moscow or Peking to get North Vietnam to negotiate.
47. Sheenan., p. 463.
48. Westmoreland., p. 128.
49. Sheehan. p. 413.
50. Ibid.. p. 415.
51. Westmoreland, p. 88.
53. Coleman, p. 36.
54. p. 34.
55. p. 36.
57. p. 40.
59. Over a decade earlier a French formation, French Mobile Group 100 was ambushed on Highway 19 as it moved west through the Mang Yang Pass. Its defeat along this road and
the fact that it had developed fortresses in the An Khe valley and had buried many of its soldiers on Highway 19 between An Khe and Pleiku was not lost on members of the 1st Cavalry. (See Silver, p. 283.)


64. Silver, p. 294.


66. Ibid., p. 63.


68. Sharp, p. 100.

69. TRADOC Pam 11-9, p. 13.


71. Ibid., p. 45.


73. TRADOC Pam 11-9, p. 13.


75. Sharp, p. 100.


77. Ibid., p. 160.
78. TRADOC Pam 11-9, p. 14.
80. Ibid., p. 98.
81. Ibid., pp. 94-5.
82. TRADOC Pam 11-9, p. 15.
84. Ibid., p. 255.
85. Ibid., p. 99.
88. Ibid. p. 77.
90. Ibid. pp. 471-472.
91. Ibid. p. 472.
92. The most significant example of this potential command arrangement among deploying allied units was that of New Zealand and Australian forces and the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Individuals from these two nations filled staff positions on the Brigade staff and signal, artillery batteries and engineer companies also were attached. In June 1965, an Australian Regimental arrived to command Australian units whose numbers had grown to just over 1500 men. (Williamson. p. 18.)
94. Ibid., p. 90.
95. Ibid., p. 107.


100. p. 4-1.

101. p. 1-4

102. p. 1-5.

103. p. 1-8. This sequence is explicitly laid out. The lead brigade of this force is to be on the ground by C+4 (airlift), the lead division by C+12 (airlift) and two heavy divisions by C+30 (air/sealift). By C+75, the full Corps structure must be on the ground with accompanying supplies sequenced to support the force until lines of communications are opened.

104. FM 100-17 Figure 4-8.

105. p. 4-11.

106. p. 4-12.

107. p. 4-15.

108. FM 100-5 (Draft) p. 33.

109. Ibid.

110. FM 100-17 (Draft) p. 1-6.

111. Ibid.

112. p. 4-7.


114. Ibid.

115. FM 100-5 (Draft), pp. 32-33.

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