Generating The Force: The Roundout Brigade

A Monograph by
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ABSTRACT


The purpose of this monograph is to determine if the downsized United States Army should retain the current roundout brigade concept. Under the roundout concept, a National Guard maneuver brigade, when mobilized, is assigned to a two brigade Active Component division to form a fully structured three brigade division. The non-deployment of three National Guard roundout brigades mobilized during Operation Desert Shield in 1990 generated considerable criticism and controversy, not only about the practicality of the roundout concept, but the Army's overall relationship with the National Guard.

This study examines the evolution of roundout units from Napoleon's Army of the French Republic to the proposed force structure for the U.S. Army in 1995. To determine if the Army should retain the current roundout program, this study analyzes the roundout brigade concept against six criteria: cost, force capability, training, personnel availability, political implications and roundout alternatives.

The Congress, the States, and the National Guard Bureau all advocate the continuance of roundout. From a financial, political and capabilities standpoint, it is best for the Army to continue the brigade roundout program. The roundout program provides a conventional deterrent as well as a larger foundation for active Army commanders and staff officers to develop and maintain command and staff experience at the division level. Roundout will maintain Active Army influence and control over those National Guard Brigades. The roundout relationship also increases the budgetary resources devoted to the Total Army.

Most of the roundout brigade problems revealed by the Persian Gulf War mobilization can be corrected and post-mobilization training considerably shortened, without altering the conceptual basis of roundout.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Army's Total Force Policy was implemented in 1973 following the Vietnam War, during which the use of reserve forces was limited. The Total Force Policy means the integration of planning, programming and budgeting for the manning, equipping, maintaining and training of a mix of active and reserve forces essential for meeting initial contingency demands for forces. This policy implies an increased interdependence of active and reserve forces. It also requires that the availability and readiness of reserve forces must be as certain as the availability of active forces.

The Total Force Policy was adopted in part, to ensure that the Nation's political leadership would have to gain popular support for a major conflict by requiring the mobilization of citizen soldiers. The roundout of selected active Army Divisions with a National Guard brigade is one component of the Total Force Policy. Under the roundout concept, a National Guard maneuver brigade, when mobilized, is assigned to a two brigade Active Component division to form a fully structured three brigade division.

Active Component gaining commanders provide wartime mission guidance, approve Mission Essential Task Lists (METL), provide training guidance and priorities for wartime mission planning. The gaining division commander also reviews training programs, submits unit status reports,
recommends force structure and integration actions, and conducts the Annual Training (AT) evaluation. Reserve Component (RC) units are assigned a priority for allocation of resources equal to that of the AC parent unit. Roundout units are scheduled to deploy with their AC sponsor or, as soon as possible thereafter, according to supported CINC priorities.

In the first post-Cold War contingency, none of the mobilized roundout brigades were deployed to the Kuwaiti Theater of operations. However, the Marines and the Air Force were able to deploy roundout type reserve combat forces to the theater. Both of those services have total force affiliation programs that are similar in intent to the Army's roundout program, but are focused and structured differently. In light of their success, and the Army's perceived difficulties in employing roundout forces, it is appropriate to reexamine the Army's roundout brigade concept. This monograph will determine if the downsized U.S. Army should retain the current roundout brigade concept.

The non-deployment of three National Guard roundout brigades mobilized during Operation Desert Shield in 1990 generated considerable criticism and controversy, not only about the practicality of the roundout concept, but the active Army's overall relationship with the National Guard. Roundout provides one of the best opportunities for closer integration of National Guard maneuver combat units into the plans and operations of the active Army. Roundout can be
viewed as both a symbol and gauge of the status of the relationship between the active Army and the Army reserve components.

The Army leadership has recognized the need to restructure the force to meet changing security requirements and budget constraints of the post Cold War period. The Army of the future faces more varied and uncertain threats than has been the case in the post-World War II security environment. In the next ten years, the active Army will be smaller and more contingency focused. Perhaps the roundout brigade concept initially conceived to provide full divisions for a major war in central Europe is no longer needed.

The downsizing of the Armed Forces compels the Department of Defense to seek alternatives for reducing defense expenditures while maintaining an effective military force. One traditional method to achieve this goal has been to assign additional missions and responsibilities to the reserve components. As a result, Army reliance on Reserve Components has increased to about 50% of the total force.

The Department of Defense has experienced difficulty in developing a methodology for deciding what portions of the force should be Active or Reserve. In 1988, the U.S. Government Audit Agency (GAO) recommended to the Department of Defense the following criteria as a methodology for making force mix decisions: cost, force capability, training requirements, and personnel availability. The GAO did not
include political considerations as part of its criteria for force mix determination. However, any examination of Active and Reserve Component force structure must consider the political dimension. After examining the evolution of the roundout concept, this study will consider the GAO criteria, political implications and possible roundout alternatives to determine if the Army should retain the roundout brigade program.

II. EVOLUTION OF ROUNDOUT

A reserve force has long been considered an essential element by the professional military establishment in the event of prolonged hostilities. Roots for the roundout concept can be traced to Napoleon's Army of the French Republic. Under Napoleon, the Army organized its soldiers into demi-brigades consisting of one battalion from the old regular army and two conscript battalions. By early 1794, the French Army contained 198 demi-brigades.

The legacy of roundout is also deeply rooted in American history. In 1908, the War Department developed a program that called for integration of Regular Army and National Guard units located in the same geographic area. The first of such units came into effect in 1910 when three divisions were organized from Regular Army and National Guard units stationed in the New England states. Two years later the concept was abandoned and Regular Army and National Guard units began reorganizing into component divisions. Under the new plan Regular Army units were reorganized into
tactical divisions for use as expeditionary forces while National Guard divisions mobilized and trained for deployment.

The National Guard was reorganized on a regional basis under the National Defense Act of 1920. In the mid 1930's, the Guard activated its first separate brigade. During World War II, three Regular Army divisions were assigned National Guard regiments to round them out prior to their commitment to the war. This association continued throughout the remainder of the war.

In the early 1970's, as the Vietnam War drew to a close, the active Army entered a traditional, post-war demobilization era. By 1974, the reduction in personnel combined with the Army's desire to maintain and even increase Active Component Divisions, meant active units became more and more hollow. The Department of Defense faced the dilemma of retaining a force structure capable of responding to crisis situations and, if required, expanding for protracted war. Greater reliance on Reserve Component forces offered a possible solution.

In August 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, set forth the Total Force Concept. This concept was designed, in part, to utilize abundant resources available in the Reserves. In 1973, after several years of study, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger implemented the Total Force Concept as policy. The Total Force Policy increased the Reserve Component's involvement with the Active Component.
With the emergence of the Total Force Policy came the revival of the long forgotten roundout concept. The concept called for under-strength AC divisions to be assigned an Army National Guard brigade.

Roundout was an effort by the Army to increase the total number of Army divisions from 13 to 16 (later increased to 18 in the 1980's), without increasing active Army manpower strength. There were several reasons for activating more divisions and assigning each a roundout brigade to complement the division's two Active Component brigades. First, with two Active Component brigade divisions, more divisions could be fielded to enhance deterrence of enemies and promote confidence of allies. Second, reserve forces generally cost less to keep on the rolls than active forces. Cost savings could be gained by having one brigade of several active divisions in Reserve Component status.

Third, the Total Force Policy was supported by many senior Army general officers. These senior leaders desired in the wake of Vietnam never again to allow the country to prosecute a major war without the national commitment traditionally associated with the call-up and use of reserve forces. General Creighton Abrams, Chief of Staff of the Army in 1973, remained sensitive to the difficulties of building up an the Army for Vietnam without mobilization. He was determined to ensure that a future President would not be able to send the Army to war without the reserves which were maintained for such a contingency. The act of
Reserve mobilization, filled with emotion and politics, would ensure American resolve and commitment, one way or the other. General Abrams, like Clausewitz, understood, "the passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people". General Abrams viewed the support of the population as critical to the prosecution of war.

A fourth reason for roundout was to improve the readiness and visibility of Army reserves. Assignment of roundout brigades to active divisions dictated that the Army leadership would need to focus greater attention to the roundout units. This gave new emphasis to the Reserve Component units, since they would now be tied to active duty fighting forces, and put teeth into the idea of a Total Army. As a result, modern equipment was acquired to equip the Reserve Components at the same levels as active units. In most cases training of the Reserve Component units improved because they were now linked to the training of active forces.

Roundout also provided a mission for the numerous National Guard separate brigades. In the 1960's, the Army deactivated a large number of under-strength Guard and Reserve divisions. These divisions were reactivated as full strength separate brigades without clearly defined wartime missions. The Army had more separate infantry brigades than it knew what to do with. Roundout provided a potential solution to this problem.
The first roundout brigade was assigned to the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii in August of 1973. The 25th was one of 13 active Army divisions. The roundout program grew as the relationship between Active Component divisions and Guard brigades seemed, by many accounts, to be a successful marriage. By October 1988, six of 18 active Army divisions had roundout brigades. Three other U.S. based divisions had a single roundout battalion. Only four U.S. based divisions did not require at least a roundout battalion to bring them to full mobilization. This basic outline of roundout in the force structure of 1988 had not changed greatly by August 1990, when Desert Shield began. By late 1990, the number of active Army divisions with roundout brigades had grown to seven out of 18.

By 1990, roundout brigades were predominately in divisions with reinforcing missions rather than forward deployed or contingency forces. The justification for maintaining contingency light divisions such as the 82d Airborne at full strength, while rounding out the heavy divisions, was based upon the assumption that a rapid response operation would require light forces. Heavy forces were reserved for the reinforcement of Europe or Southwest Asia. Planners apparently assumed that there would be ample strategic warning in the event of war with the Soviet Union. This would allow for the mobilization and training of roundout brigades. Light force proponents also argued that a light force deployed to a crisis immediately was worth more than a heavier force that might arrive too late due to
shortages in strategic sealift.

Clearly, Operations Desert Shield and Storm were rapid response contingency missions with an overwhelming need for armored and mechanized forces. These operations brought into question the assumptions on which the allocation of roundout brigades to light and heavy divisions were based. These assumptions for roundout brigades included reinforcement missions to developed theaters of war such as Europe or Korea with prepositioned equipment or adequate warning time.

The future role of National Guard roundout brigades had been an issue since President Bush announced a new military strategy for the United States on August 2, 1990. The key element as it pertains to the Total Army is his assertion that forces must be restructured to meet the contingencies and emerging challenges facing the United States.

The Army responded to this new military strategy by developing a force generation model that retains roundout brigades and focuses on a conventional deterrence based on forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution. This force is often called the Army's 1995 base force. Figure 1 depicts this force generation model.
The structural key to U.S. crisis management lies in
maintaining specific and adequate force generation levels designed for: (1) immediate contingencies; (2) early reinforcement; (3) follow-on reinforcement; and (4) total mobilization. These force generation capabilities are essential for prompt decision-making, deterrence, and defeat of a determined adversary.

In that portion constituting forward presence the combat units which are often referred to as above the line forces contain 100 percent Active Component elements. Combat support and combat service support units, considered below the line forces, are 95 percent active while 5 percent are reserve. This imaginary line separating combat from combat support and combat service support units is graphically portrayed in Figure 1.

The Continental United States (CONUS) based portion of the force considered rapidly deployable has five active divisions. Here again the above the line force is 100 percent active. However, the active below the line combat support and combat service support drops to 40 percent and the Reserve Component to 60 percent.

The follow-on reinforcement segment contains two phases. The first contains three active divisions each with one roundout brigade, and two separate reserve brigades. In this phase, below the line combat support and combat service support are divided 30 percent active and 70 percent reserve. The second reinforcement phase contains six reserve divisions.
In this force generation model, Reserve Component combat, combat support, and combat service support units have been pushed further toward the traditional reconstitution and major war end of the continuum. This proposed force structure concept reduces the Active Component's reliance on reserves and roundout brigades in the rapidly deployable peacetime engagement category. It can be argued that configuring a virtually 100% AC rapid deployment force simply recognizes the reality that it takes more time to mobilize and prepare reserve units for deployment. Placing roundout brigades further back in the deployment sequence, thus providing additional time to mobilize, also suggests a greater probability that these brigades will have adequate time to deploy and fight alongside their parent divisions. Although the force generation plan retains the roundout concept, the plan has fostered a perception among some Reservists that the Active Component may inadvertently turn away from the Total Army Policy.

The proposed force generation plan consists of an almost all Active Component Corps that is virtually self-contained and fully capable of being rapidly deployed for contingencies such as Just Cause in Panama. Several successful limited contingency operations may allow the nation to fall back into the syndrome of believing the Reserves are only forces of last resort in major wars. As a result, Reserve Component readiness would suffer, and
resolve to use them would diminish. This is one of the
problems the Total Force Policy sought to prevent.

III. **ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION**

The need for reinforcing NATO with ten divisions in
ten days has now been replaced by a more traditional,
gradual mobilization requirement to satisfy power projection
and reinforcement needs. Greater reliance on the
mobilization of reserves both in the U.S. and Europe to
reinforce smaller standing armies is directly related to a
longer response time resulting from the demise of the Soviet
threat.

A source of friction between the Active and Reserve
Components has been what criteria constitutes adequate
combat readiness and how long it should take to achieve.
Combat readiness is an imprecise term and has varied
meanings. For the purpose of this study, combat readiness
will be defined by the five criteria of cost, force
capability, training requirements, personnel availability
and political implications.

**Cost**

U.S. Army requirements have drastically changed due to
the changing threat. The Army no longer needs to be the
immediately ready forward deployed armored defender of
Central Europe. It is now shifting to a Continental United
States based Army focused on projecting the combat power of
its active forces, which could be considered a global
expeditionary force. The Army must compete for ever
diminishing resources to maintain this expeditionary force.

The Army's competition for resources is the result of a convergence of four factors: (1) the budget deficit and the political requirements to reduce the federal spending; (2) the trade deficit and attendant requirements to make U.S. industry competitive on the world market; (3) the social deficit visible in every congressional district in the form of local demands for resources in education, law enforcement, housing, public works, health care and environmental protection; and (4) the public's perception of a lack of an external threat. In other words, "We won the Cold War and the threat to Europe and to the Third World has retreated in defeat." The demise of the Soviet Union has meant a shift from a centralized threat of global war to a highly decentralized threat of diverse regional conflicts that will require the United States to have a more versatile yet cost effective army.

The cost effectiveness of the roundout brigades to perform their mission must be evaluated in terms of dollars, timeliness and expected human costs. Consistency in cost comparisons is important, but difficult to achieve, given the variety of data gathering systems and models available. The first step in attaining some degree of uniformity is to establish a common set of cost elements to be considered. Table 1 describes the basic cost elements that should be included in unit cost comparison.
TABLE 1

Elements of Direct Unit Costs

Unit Manpower Costs
- Pay and allowances
- Accrual for retirement pay

Unit Operating Costs
- Fuel and other POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants)
- Replenishment parts
- Consumable parts and supplies
- Other unit training costs
  - Unit funded transportation to training
  - Consumables such as ammunition
  - Unit funded contract services
  - Other sources of intermediate maintenance

Equipment Related Costs
- Replacement of mission equipment
- Major overhauls of primary mission equipment funded on a unit basis
- Modifications
- Replacement of support equipment

The factors that drive direct unit costs are: levels of manning, tempos of operation, and equipment. Manning levels for full-time and part-time personnel drive manpower costs. Operating tempos (e.g. flying hours & training miles) strongly influence unit operating costs. Equipment types and quantities largely determine recurring investment costs. The factors that drive unit costs are also the basic factors that influence unit capability and readiness. Figure 2 illustrates this relationship.
Direct unit costs are lower for forces that have lower full time manning levels, reduced equipment use, and lower operating tempos. The same factors that allow the cost of one unit to be lower than another usually tend to limit unit capability and readiness. However, this is not always true. Many factors interact in determining how units are affected by reduced operating tempos. Mission and equipment complexity, unit personnel stability, average experience levels, transferability of civilian skills, and the relative importance of unit level and individual skills all influence how annual training rates affect unit capability. It is possible for active and reserve units with differing operating tempos to have essentially the same readiness, given the right combination of conditions. Some aviation and field artillery units are examples of this similarity in readiness. Both of these types of units involve crew level technical skills that can be rapidly combined into collective unit tasks upon mobilization.

Baseline cost data is presented in Table 2.
tempo driven costs are scaled in accordance with the reduced operating rates associated with Reserve Components. Currently, National Guard units operate at 36 percent the rate of equivalent active units to achieve the same nominal readiness level (i.e. C-rating).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Direct Unit Costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS Mechanized Division (34)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manning level</th>
<th>16,753</th>
<th>16,753</th>
<th>16,753</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost (millions of FY 92 dollars)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Operations</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Recurring</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment related</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-Term avg cost</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DOD concluded in 1990 that the long term average yearly costs of an Army National Guard armored division are about 40% of those of an active Army armored division. This figure is based on recurring personnel and operating costs, plus an amortization of equipment costs. Figures for Guard and active armored or mechanized infantry brigades are very similar. Based on the preceding cost comparisons, it can be argued that roundout brigades constitute a national security bargain. However, there are more than just the monetary cost factors to consider.

While roundout units represent a monetary bargain, they also represent a time penalty. An all-Active force can be
more rapidly deployed ready to fight than a composite force of Active and Reserves. History has demonstrated that an all-Reserve force takes longer to deploy due to increased post-mobilization training requirements. Roundout offers a compromise in responsiveness. The Army's planned force structure for 1995 (Fig 1), will place divisions with roundout brigades within the time gap between the rapidly deployable forces and the reinforcing forces. This future force structure proposes to capitalize on this fact by making forward deployed and rapidly deployable combat forces all active. Reinforcing forces will be a mix of Active and Reserve Components. Finally, reconstitution will consist of cadre units and total mobilization. The only problem with this logic is that the United States is limited in its strategic lift capability. Because of the limited sea and airlift, even the rapidly deployable forces must be lifted to a crisis sequentially rather than simultaneously. This limitation is what ultimately allows the time for roundout units to train before deployment.

The human cost in terms of casualties are difficult to determine. The Army's roundout concept has not yet been tested in combat. Staff planning manuals for casualty rates, which use historical data, do not differentiate between regular and National Guard units in combat. However, history has shown that inadequately trained or prepared units suffer higher casualty rates. This concern, in part, led Army leaders to the decision not to deploy the roundout brigades to the Persian Gulf War without additional
Force Capability

Force capability in this study includes the roundout brigade's ability to perform assigned missions, deployability, availability of equipment resources and interoperability with the active force. On one side, some defense officials and legislators contend that the roundout combat brigades not only have the capability of performing the missions already assigned to them, but should assume an even greater role in these missions in the future. Current National Guard roundout missions include: ensuring national security, cleaning-up natural disasters, combating civil disorder, and participation in the Drug War. Supporters of an expanding role for the National Guard point out that the Guard is uniquely qualified to perform all these missions because of its dual federal and state status.

On the other side are critics who argue that roundout brigades have been given missions that they will be unable to fulfill. These missions include deployment and combat operations. Critics argue that roundout brigades will always have trouble meeting the demanding deployment schedules imposed on them. Additionally, their lack of proficiency when they are deployed into combat will pose an undue risk to the nation's security. However, in the final analysis, the combat capability of the roundout brigades remains uncertain.

The debate concerning roundout capability continues
because assessments of potential military capability are inherently difficult and imprecise. Most peacetime performance measures are inadequate and the results of peacetime training exercises, the best available surrogate for wartime performance, are often in dispute between the Active and Reserve Components. Until Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the critics of reserve forces generally had history on their side.

The Army encountered significant political and technical problems during the full mobilization in World War II and during three partial mobilizations prior to the Persian Gulf war. Varied circumstances make it difficult to compare the amount of time required to validate the combat capability of the roundout brigades for Desert Storm with past 20th Century mobilizations. Factors such as national deployment strategy, transportation shortages, and equipment shortfalls constrained the capability of Guard brigades and divisions mobilized for the Vietnam War, the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the Korean War, and both World Wars. Analysis of earlier mobilizations reveals that prior to Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the average time between activation and combat readiness was about 12-15 months at minimum. Validating the roundout brigades at 3-4 months indicates a quantum leap in readiness compared to their predecessors in past mobilizations.

All reserve units, especially roundout units, have benefited from the increased focus on equipment in the Total
Army. The roundout concept and the larger focus on Total Army places priority on providing the National Guard brigades with comparable equipment levels as the active Army. In recent years, the Army has made great strides in fielding modern equipment to active and reserve component units. The equipment capabilities gap between active units and National Guard units involved in roundout has been significantly reduced.

The major criticism leveled at the capability of the roundout brigades has been that the brigades, for whatever reasons were not ready to deploy with their parent divisions during the Persian Gulf War. The 48th Brigade was validated as combat ready after 90 days of post-mobilization training. It was never envisioned, prior to the Persian Gulf War, that roundout brigades would be able to deploy without this post-mobilization training. The conclusion can be made that given a reasonable period of time for training, roundout brigades as currently configured, have the capability to perform their combat mission.

Training

The decision to retain roundout brigades also depends on the impact of training requirements, including the type, length, and availability of training facilities. The major mission of the Army National Guard is to provide trained and equipped forces when mobilized by Congress or the President. Article one, section eight of the Constitution empowers Congress to provide for calling the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections and repel invasions. To fulfill this mission, National Guard units must be trained to the level organized. Training to the level organized can be defined by the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) under which a unit is formed and operated. For example, a brigade commander trains his unit to fight as a brigade combat team.

Training to the level organized is combined arms Mission Essential Task List (METL) training employing combat, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) using all seven battlefield operating systems (BOS), in a demanding maneuver oriented field training exercise (FTX). This does not mean that the entire unit is required to execute the training at the same time. However, conducting training to the level organized does require employing a brigade based combat team in accordance with Airland Battle doctrine, under the control of a division or Corps command element, with the support of the appropriate organic or attached corps, joint and coalition slices. Being trained to the level organized means therefore, that a unit is capable of performing those organizational tasks outlined in its TOE plus those tactical tasks required to accomplish its Mission Essential Task List (METL).

The combat maneuver brigade is one of the Army's most complex units to train because the complete synchronization of all seven of the BOS begins at this level. The tasks and standards associated with these synchronized skills change at all levels as battlefield conditions change.
Their execution is more an art than a science, and they take considerable time and effort to master. The state of training is also difficult to quantify. For example, an artillery unit has a mission that is visible and measurable. The artillery unit has time and accuracy standards that can be quantified. However, the evaluation of a maneuver unit is more subjective. The limited amount of training time, facilities, geographical dispersion and complexity of new equipment have further complicated an already difficult task for the roundout brigades.

Roundout units normally train one weekend each month, called Inactive Duty Training (IDT), and two weeks during the summer months, labeled Annual Training (AT). Together, these equal a minimum of thirty-nine annual unit training days. The 1989 FORSCOM/NGB Regulation 350-2, Reserve Component Training, delineates exactly what types of training will be coordinated during the two periods. During IDT, units concentrate on training up to platoon level. During AT, only wartime mission related collective training should be conducted with the maximum amount of training time devoted to tactical field training. Unfortunately, units can sometimes lose as much as one-half of weekend drill time that should be directed toward mission training. Training distractors include: Annual General Inspection preparation, recruiting, ceremonies and parades, and administrative details. However, roundout brigades which are designated to train at the National Training Center (NTC) also receive up to eighteen additional training assemblies and extra
training days for pre-NTC training.

The training of National Guard units is the responsibility of the commander and state or territorial governor with resourcing and coordination by NGB, and with overwatch authority provided by U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) as the senior Army agent. The unit commander has dual responsibilities through his chain of command. First, his peacetime chain is the one that resources his training and efforts. Second, his wartime chain approves his METL and his training program.

Estimates as to how much training roundouts require vary greatly. An Army response to questions from the House Armed Services Committee written after Desert Storm ended stated that there were no scenarios which called for roundout brigades to deploy before post-mobilization training. The unit's combat readiness would determine whether the training time would be minimal or substantial. The Army National Guard Bureau has argued that the roundout brigades met Department of the Army standards for deployability when federalized and could have been validated and deployed within the 30-60 day period. However, after they were federalized the deployability criteria were changed to reflect a higher standard.

All three roundout brigades mobilized during the Gulf War were rated either C-2 or C-3 in the DOD joint readiness reporting system. Using this readiness report, planners could be led to believe that these units should have
required between 15-28 days (C-2) or 29-42 days (C-3) of post-mobilization training to be ready for deployment.

The difference between figures for the amount of post-mobilization training required indicates that the Army, Active and Guard, did not have a clear, agreed upon understanding of exactly what the post-mobilization training requirements of the roundout brigades should be. It is possible that some active Army senior officers underestimated the capabilities of the roundout brigades. The 48th Brigade was validated for deployment in 90 days without the wholesale replacement of Guard officers with active Army officers that General McCaffrey, Commander of the parent division which the 48th rounded out, felt would be necessary. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Stephan M. Duncan stated, "The remarkable enthusiasm of the roundout brigades permitted them to perform in training in ways that were not predicted on the basis of their actual experiences."

The original employment planning considerations as outlined in AR 11-30, Capstone Program, called for roundout brigades to be scheduled to deploy with their Active Component parent division or as soon as possible thereafter according to the supported CINC's priorities. Therefore, under certain circumstances, divisions could deploy without their roundout brigades. The latter would follow, and then fight alongside their parent division when post-mobilization activities were complete and sufficient strategic lift was available to deploy the brigade with its equipment. The
other alternative involved the roundout brigades deploying simultaneously with their divisions, but only if the divisions did not deploy until several months after mobilization.

Past mobilizations, to include the Persian Gulf war, have demonstrated that National Guard combat brigades were not sufficiently trained prior to mobilization. Some amount of post-mobilization has always been required in order to bring units to a level of training that permits them to be validated as being ready for combat. The current goal of Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) is to validate a roundout brigade in 90 days of post-mobilization training. In order to achieve this goal, FORSCOM has implemented an initiative labeled Bold Shift. This initiative is based upon the lessons of the mobilization for the Persian Gulf War.

The purpose of Bold Shift is to guide the way the roundout brigades train for war. Under Bold Shift, the focus of training in combat units is platoon level and below. National Guard units will still conduct multi-echelon training. Battalion and brigade staffs will develop their skills largely through computer simulations and command post exercises. Following mobilization the units would build on the basics and train-up to the level organized. This back-to-basics approach envisioned in the Bold Shift concept for premobilization training results from the experience of roundout units having to learn basic soldier skills during post-mobilization training. FORSCOM
believes that this approach takes advantage of the small unit nature of IDT and AT periods.

The National Guard Bureau's recommendation concerning the Bold Shift program is that the platoon level should be a training floor not a ceiling. In other words, do not hold a well trained unit back at platoon level if they are qualified to move to company and battalion level training. They believe that the real key to shortening post-mobilization time is leader development. Leaders must be forged in the fire of stressful real maneuver unit training if they are to be successful in combat. Major General Rees, the Director of the Army National Guard Bureau, argues that you cannot develop company, battalion and brigade commanders, nor can you develop staffs, first sergeants, and command sergeants major in 60 days of post-mobilization training. It takes a career of experiences.

**Personnel Availability**

The high profile mission of the roundout brigades has produced a positive effect on recruiting and retention of personnel in the National Guard. These units are more successful in recruiting than other Guard and Reserve units. It also reduces the total recruiting requirement on the Active Component division because of the corresponding CS and CSS slice that comes with roundout and roundup brigades.

A critical factor in maintaining reserve capability is an effective group of full-time personnel to assist in training and administration. Department of Defense civilian
and military personnel who work in these positions are generally referred to as full-time support (FTS) personnel. The Army Inspector General report on the roundout mobilization contains the injunction to not only increase the number of FTS but increase quality as well. This would mean placing the right type and amount of FTS personnel in Guard units who can contribute to improving mobilization readiness in mission essential tasks, as well as handling mundane administrative responsibilities.

Because of their high priority mission, roundout brigades require a larger number of Full Time Support personnel than a non-roundout brigade. Few people involved in the roundout program question the desirability of assigning more FTS personnel to Guard roundout units. Full time support, it is universally acknowledged, can reduce peacetime administrative and logistical burdens from part-time reservists so unit can concentrate on mission essential training. It can also bring a familiarity with current active force procedures and techniques to reserve units.

**Political Implications**

The visibility of National Guard roundout brigades plays an important role in generating community support for all national military forces. In the highly segmented U.S. political system, where as former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neal was fond of saying, "all politics is local politics," reserve forces serve as the popular face of the Regular
Army. Because the U.S. Army is either deployed geographically distant from population centers or tends to maintain itself in isolated enclaves, most Americans have very little contact with regular military officers or soldiers. United States reliance on an all volunteer force has meant that what most citizens see of the military is often limited to television or newspapers. Most Americans come in contact with military forces only through their local reserve units.

For members of the Army National Guard (ARNG), the roundout program appeared to achieve a long sought after goal, full acceptance by the AC in one Army. As former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stated, "The basic concept of a Total Force has in itself provided a new sense of purpose. Guardsmen now see growing evidence that they will be called and have a role to play in future emergencies."

The political climate in Congress has traditionally been favorable toward the National Guard. This support has been bolstered by the concerns articulated by the National Guard resulting from the roundout experience in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Any part of the new strategy which reduces the Reserve Component role in contingency operations may have little chance of being accepted by Congress or the American public.

**Roundout Alternatives**

In an attempt to maximize its force capability, the Army has examined several alternatives to the current roundout
brigade concept. This section briefly examines five of these alternatives and considers their advantages and disadvantages.

(1) **Roundout with smaller units.** The first of these alternatives to roundout brigades is to round out with battalions or companies. Under this option, roundout would be implemented with smaller units. There could be two active battalions and one Guard roundout battalion in each of three active brigades. At a lower echelon, there might be two active companies and one Guard roundout company in an active battalion. The Marine Corps Reserve has done this with the maneuver combat arms for many years. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, active Marine combat regiments and battalions of infantry and armor were in effect rounded out with Reserve battalions and companies. The Marine Corps system appears to have worked well in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

The degree of complexity involved in reaching and maintaining unit readiness, and the requirement for the synchronization of the various arms and services of the Army, decreases as unit size decreases. It is easier and quicker for battalions and companies to attain prescribed readiness standards than it is for brigades and divisions. More might be accomplished with companies or battalions before mobilization, and post-mobilization training might be shortened.

A second reason for rounding out with smaller units involves the levels of competence that unit commanders and
staffs can be expected to achieve, and maintain, while in reserve status. Rounding out with Guard battalions or companies would decrease the numbers of National Guard colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors in roundout unit command and staff billets who are at a disadvantage due to the lack of sufficient training time to master the skills needed. Despite these potential advantages, there are several drawbacks to changing the current roundout model.

Without the political decision to mobilize reserves, a brigade minus one battalion, or a battalion minus one company, is a much less effective unit than a division minus one brigade. An active division with one roundout brigade can deploy with the brigade and still be reasonably tactically effective. It would be much more difficult for an active division with three roundout battalions or nine roundout companies to deploy with tactically effective units. A two company battalion or two battalion brigade is relatively weaker and less flexible ground combat unit than a two brigade division. Therefore, rounding out at smaller unit level would place even more pressure than currently exists on the national political leadership to mobilize reserves. This could in fact be an advantage, in terms of insuring popular support for a mobilization and a war.

Another drawback to rounding at smaller unit level would reduce the number of billets available for National Guard field grade officers. Attempting to change the current structure would generate political problems
disproportionate to the gains realized. This is a political reality. Some opponents to roundout brigades have argued that National Guard field grade officers are less competent and capable than active Army officers in the same grade holding the same position. One reason cited is the Guard officer's lack of sufficient training time to master the skills needed prior to mobilization. Most National Guard officers would argue that they be treated like active Army officers. If they prove incapable of performing their job during training, then replace or relieve them.

(2) Roundup. A second alternative, which the Army has in fact adopted, is Rounding up. This involves adding a fourth maneuver unit to the unit structure. Rounding up from three to four maneuver brigades allows an active division to go to war with three brigades without mobilization. Having a fourth brigade after mobilization adds combat power. The Army is planning to use this concept of roundup using fourth brigades for two U.S. based divisions.

Roundup may relegate the fourth brigade to a second class status in terms of command attention from not only its parent active unit but the active Army in general. Since Army doctrine is based on three brigade divisions the role of the 4th brigade is uncertain. This fourth brigade may lose its identity upon mobilization and become merely a source of individual or unit replacements for its parent division. Some Army Guard brigades were linked as a fourth brigade to fully structured active divisions in the 1970's.
This relationship did not produce any lasting gains in the allocation of resources to these brigades from the active Army.

(3) Active Army leaders. Another suggestion has been to fill key command and staff positions in roundout units with active Army personnel. There is no legal or constitutional barrier to filling key roundout positions with active duty officers and enlisted members. For example, a Regular Army officer could serve in an Army Guard unit and accept a commission as a Guard officer, for a particular period. After the tour of duty in a Guard unit had ended, the officer could proceed with his or her Regular Army career.

This action would inject active Army personnel with recent unit experience on modern equipment and current professional military education into key positions in roundout units. This is an advantage over the use of advisors, who are useful, but have limited authority and influence if the National Guard unit chooses to ignore them.

The precedence for placing Active Component leaders in National Guard units was established during World War II, when several National Guard Divisions required reorganization with active officers. This action was a direct result of the neglect of the National Guard prior to World War II. Improved training and increased attention by both the Active component and the political leadership has
improved the quality of Guard leadership. The decision to replace National Guard leadership is probably best done on a case by case basis if required.

The problem with this concept is that it is somewhat personality dependent. The active officer may be unable to mesh with the Guard unit. The members of the unit may simply wait out his tour of duty. If the active officer attempts to radically change the tempo or climate of the unit, the members may simply leave the unit.

(4) **Shift mission.** Some have suggested shifting the roundout mission from the Army National Guard to the Army Reserve. This would place the roundout brigades under federal control. This would improve the responsiveness of these units to active Army control which would improve readiness.

However, the three Army Reserve combat infantry brigades that do exist have severe recruiting and retention problems. They are in a much lower state of readiness than the National Guard brigades. The lack of a State orientation in these Reserve units may hamper the esprit and cohesion that are so important in maneuver combat units. These factors have been attributed to the rapid progress to combat readiness of the roundout brigades during the post-mobilization training for Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

(5) **Eliminate roundout.** A final option to consider is the elimination of roundout brigades. These brigades would be consolidated into a National Guard Division. This has...
the advantage of clearly defining chains of command as well as training missions. It also simplifies doctrinal problems, minimizes friction and reduces force structure issues by separating the active divisions from the National Guard Divisions. This option would likely be politically acceptable to the National Guard Bureau as well.

This option might also take the National Guard back to one of the reasons roundout brigades were created. Since the National Guard could not man its divisions, the divisions were reformed as separate brigades. Eliminating roundout brigades and consolidating them into a division may simply bring the Army full circle. Another argument against separating these units is that it is a step backward in the effort toward a Total Army. Each force may simply retreat to its corner and work in isolation. Roundout has the advantage of encouraging the Active Component and Reserve Component to work closely together to resolve shortcomings. If nothing else, roundout keeps the dialogue open between the active Army and the National Guard.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Any reserve unit, including roundout, costs less to retain in the force structure. Savings certainly decrease as more money is committed to roundout brigades to buy increased readiness, but substantial savings still remain. The Congress, the States, and the National Guard Bureau are advocating the continuance of roundout. Roundout, and the existence of major Army National Guard maneuver combat
units of brigade or division size, is a political reality. The Army probably cannot eliminate these units, or the dual state-Federal status of the National Guard, which is mandated by legislation.

From a financial and political standpoint, it is best for the Army to continue the integration of Guard brigades with active divisions. This roundout integration will maintain active Army influence and control over those National Guard Brigades. This relationship also increases the budgetary resources devoted to the Total Army.

The roundout brigades compel the active Army leadership to generally provide more resources to all Reserve Components. The active Army must also focus organizational attention and command emphasis to their roundout units in order to successfully accomplish the division missions. If you eliminate roundout, the Army Guard and Reserve as a whole may suffer from less active Army priority, involvement and attention. Consequently, the readiness and responsiveness of the Total Army would be reduced if the roundout program is discontinued.

Roundout brigades remain untested in combat. However, under certain circumstances, roundout brigades can provide a force capability equal to that of their parent division's active brigades. These circumstances include improvements to training and reporting as well as at least 90 days post-mobilization training. Roundout Brigades are adequately staffed and equipped to accomplish their combat mission. In fact, because they are a separate brigade
structure, the roundout brigade has a more robust organization than a standard divisional brigade.

Many non-maneuver National Guard units received praise for their performance during Desert Storm. One can conclude that given sufficient time for mobilization and training, the roundout combat brigades would perform similarly. Some members of the National Guard argue that the Active Army was in a lose-lose situation concerning the deployment of roundout units to Desert Storm. If the roundout units failed in combat, the Active Component would be blamed for mishandling the resources provided for preparing roundout units. If the roundout brigades succeeded, then possibly political leaders would ask, "Why do we need to maintain a large Active Component when the Guard does the job just fine?"

National Guard units have historically performed well when placed alongside their Active Component counterparts. For example, after the 45th Infantry Division of the Oklahoma, Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado National Guard proved itself through a series of successful operations in the North African campaign, General George S. Patton expressed his respect for the Thunderbird Division by stating:

The 45th Division is one of the best, if not actually the best division in the history of American arms. (76)

Does the roundout brigade and the Total Force policy it represents work? One way to answer that question is to look
back at the Soviet perspective about the Total Force and the effectiveness of National Guard brigades. During a visit to London, General Makhmut Gareev, a Soviet Deputy Chief of Staff, complained that, "NATO's force ratio calculations of the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact do not include the (US) National Guard." His main concern was, "the U.S. National Guard level of preparedness was higher than our cadre units."

Retaining roundout allows more active Army divisions to remain in the force structure. This provides a conventional deterrent as well as a larger foundation for active Army commanders and staff officers to develop and maintain command and staff experience at the division level. These facts will become increasingly important in the small active Army of the post-1995 era. The roundout force structure will maintain a reservoir of doctrinal and tactical experience for future mobilizations.

The Army Chief of Staff, Gordon Sullivan, has stated, "Roundouts are here to stay." There is considerable agreement between the AC and RC that most of the roundout brigades' problems revealed by the Gulf War mobilization, can be corrected, and post-mobilization training considerably shortened, without altering the conceptual basis of roundout. What is unstated is the possibility for an increased role for roundout brigades. The total number of roundout brigades remains the same on the 20+ Division Force Generation Model. There are still roundout brigades for the 1st Infantry, 4th Infantry, and 5th Infantry.
Divisions. Other divisions have been rounded up. These units now include the 1st Cavalry, 24th Infantry and 2d Infantry divisions.

Roundup brigades offer an opportunity to include National Guard forces into the contingency force structure. The parent Active Component division does not have to rely upon the mobilization of roundup brigade to be a complete unit. However, this relationship may foster a lack of concern toward the preparedness of the roundup unit on the part of the parent division and the Active Component of the Army. This could result in a step backward in the already tense relationship between the Active and Reserve Components.

The Persian Gulf War validated the political and social basis of a reserve mobilization. As a result, mobilization is a viable option for future Presidents, and Congresses, facing future crises. The downsized active Army of the future will rely on Reserve Component combat unit augmentation for any major contingency despite its unpopularity with some leaders. Eliminating roundout will not change this overall reliance.

Although roundout may be a numerically small portion of the Total Army force structure, it has crucial political and social significance which far outweighs the numerical strength of roundout units. These National Guard brigades provide a crucial link between the Army and the people. This was vividly demonstrated in Desert Shield and Desert
Storm. Roundout reinforces that link because it involves the central reason for the Army's existence, the conduct of ground combat operations.
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15. Rollison, 2.


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