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Signature

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A COMPARISON OF U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT MOBILIZATION AND USE IN VIETNAM AND DESERT SHIELD/STORM (U)

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A comparison of Army Reserve Component mobilization and employment during Vietnam and Desert Shield/Storm provides excellent lessons for use in the establishment of future combat readiness priorities. The purpose of this paper was to determine if General Creighton Abrams' 1972 vision of reserve component mobilization for combat was properly focused, trained and ready for employment during the past eighteen years or if the Total Army Force concept needs to be changed. The Total Army Force concept has proven to be required and that the combat readiness of the reserves has increased greatly since the Vietnam era. However, refinement must be prioritized in the areas of mobilization call-up, equipment commonality, formulation of comprehensive plans, training, and integration with active component forces.
ABSTRACT

A comparison of Army Reserve Component mobilization and employment during Vietnam and Desert Shield/Storm provides excellent lessons for use in the establishment of future combat readiness priorities. The purpose of this paper was to determine if General Creighton Abrams' 1972 vision of Reserve Component mobilization for combat was properly focused or trained and ready for employment during the past eighteen years or if the Total Army Force concept needs to be changed. The Total Army Force concept has been proven to be required and that the combat readiness of the Reserves has increased greatly since the Vietnam era. However, refinement must be prioritized in the areas of mobilization call up, equipment commonality, formulation of comprehensive plans, training, and integration with Active Component forces.
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INTRODUCTION

"Many thousands of members of the National Guard and other Ready Reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces have been called to active duty for Operation Desert Storm. The service of the guard and reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, and the marines will be crucial to the American victory over Iraqi aggression."

Honorable Dick Cheney
Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Dick Cheney’s quote points out the fact that the Total Army Concept of operating Active Forces, Army Reserve and Army National Guard, was organized and relied on for combat operations in Desert Storm. The concept for the Total Army Force has its roots in the vision of General Creighton Abrams after his experience in four important assignments; first, in the 1950s as the Deputy to the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs; second, as the Vice Chief of Staff, Army; third, as a senior officer and then Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of forces in Vietnam during the Reserve Component (RC) call-up and finally as the Chief of Staff, Army in 1972. The Vietnam mobilization and employment of the RC provides a unique contrast with the mobilization and employment of Reserve Component Forces for Desert Shield and Desert Storm.¹

As Army Forces downsize, hopefully the lessons learned will provide an azimuth which will continue our progressive

path to a smaller, but better Army. As Mahan stated in Naval Strategy of 1911, "...the one thing needed, namely, to be ready to the utmost on the day of battle." A critical element of the Reserve Component mobilization is the recognition that on the day of battle, 23 February 1991, we were ready, but what was the cost; how did our readiness for combat differ from the mobilization of Reserve Component forces for the Vietnam conflict in 1968, and what is needed for greater combat efficiency in the future?

BACKGROUND

"To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff."


On the surface, the above quotation is contradicted by the Total Army requirement for Reserve Component integration and General Abrams' vision to ensure, "they can't take us to war again without the reserves."

The Army RC forces that General Abrams watched evolve between 1965 and 1972 was one of tremendous cost to the Regular Army and to the country. President Johnson failed to activate the Reserves until 1968, even though his advisors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and SECDEF recommended that he activate a call-up as early as 1965. There was only one dissenting vote, General Westmoreland, the CINC, working under a pre Goldwater-Nichols chain of command, and providing a
weighing factor to the President's decision. Westmoreland's "justification" was that "he knew the administration was not likely to approve" the call up and that without Congressional approval, a year call-up would not accomplish the desired results. The JCS recommendations were designed to establish a greater commitment from Congress and gain the support of the American populace. The recommendation was woven into an increase in the numbers of soldiers drafted each month and an extension of military tours. One can not accurately predict what would have happened if these April 1965 recommendations were taken, but we can identify some areas which were affected by not making the decision to activate a call-up.

- The draft was greatly increased.
- Equipment modernization for the RC was diverted.
- Draft dodgers entered the Reserves as protection from the draft.
- Animosity between professional reservists and draft dodgers increased causing decreased unit effectiveness/morale.
- The Active Army units stationed in Europe, Japan, and in the United States became the "Hollow Army of 1973", stripped of manpower, equipment and training resources, while President Johnson was convinced that he could muster popular support without being too "provocative or war like" and "that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now."

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1. Pistarius, Joseph H. and Stuckey, John D., Mobilization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserves: Historical Perspective and the Vietnam War. (Strategic Studies Institute,
Westmoreland and Johnson remembered President Kennedy’s 1961 Congressional authorization, no state of emergency was declared, to activate up to 155,800 Ready Reserves, of which 119,622 were Army Reserves and Army National Guardsmen, for the Berlin crisis. Units were undermanned, short required equipment, and operational readiness was low. Within a year the home communities were screaming "to bring our boys home." In 1965 President Johnson’s priority was to conduct the Vietnam conflict at a low visibility level and with the least interference in his plans for the "Great Society." The JCS and SECDEF recommended mobilization of the Reserves in 1966 and 1967, to no avail. The JCS analysis of a possible mobilization proved that combat effectiveness had been drastically reduced over the previous two years. Large quantities of equipment had been withdrawn from numerous Reserve units and sent to South Vietnam, thus degrading the combat effectiveness in the RC units ability to train. The 1967 JCS recommendation for mobilization specified a 24 month call-up and a 12 month service extension, but President Johnson failed to approve and execute it.

Regardless of his advisement to mobilize the Reserves, President Johnson took George Washington’s advice literally. He placed no reliance on the Reserves contribution to the war effort, but more importance to a contribution to the "Great

September 1984), p. 12

1. Ibid; p. 20.
THE DECISION FOR VIETNAM

On 25 January 1968, President Johnson exercised his executive powers by ordering a partial call-up of the Reserve forces. Johnson's use of Public Law did not declare a national emergency, consequently he was limited in the number of reservists ordered to active duty for not more than 24 months. The major initiator of this action was not the activities in Vietnam, but the capture of the Pueblo by the North Koreans and the fear that South Korea would pull its troops out of South Vietnam in preparation for a possible conflict with North Korea. There were no Army Reserve or Army National Guard soldiers in the 14,800 ordered to active duty, only Air Force Reserves and Navy Reserves. Again, the JCS recommended a mobilization for the Vietnam War but wanted to defer on their deployment date. The Tet Offensive of 31 January 1968 added "fuel to the fire." Even Westmoreland now recommended a call-up! On 13 March, Johnson made his decision to conduct two call-ups, one in March and one in May. Specific limitations were stipulated by Johnson: there would not be any extensions of terms of service and only units, not individuals would be activated. Even though the March mobilization did not include any


Army Reserves or National Guard, the Army Staff recognized they had no mobilization plan. They began in January to formulate a plan for partial mobilization based on the basic Berlin plan from 1961.

The formulation of troop lists, by unit, was done without the knowledge of accurate operational status of the units in three major categories; personnel, equipment, and training. A lack of coordination existed between the Continental U.S. Armies (CONUS), the State Adjutants General, and the Reserve Commanders in the formulation of the troop lists. Precious time and energy was wasted finding combat ready units.6

President Johnson's 31 March 1968 public statement authorizing the SECDEF to "call-up any unit of the Ready Reserves of an armed force to active duty for not more than 24 months", was the same announcement in which President Johnson acknowledged he would not "seek or accept" the nomination of his party for President. I think this indicates the seriousness with which he viewed the act of mobilization, his goals and objectives for the Great Society compared with the previous three years of refusing to mobilize.

Seventy-six (76) Army Reserve Component units were alerted for activation, with each soldier given 30 days notice to report. Of the 76 units, only 43 Army units actually deployed to Vietnam. The remaining 33 units remained in the U.S. as strategic Reserve Forces stationed at regular Army

6. Ibid; p. 64
installations.

The SECDEF also announced that 3600 Individual Ready Reservists (IRR) would be called to active duty to fill those units that had personnel shortages. Since a declaration of an emergency was not made, 99 percent of the IRR were not eligible for mobilization. Any soldier who had completed two or more years of active duty or had fulfilled their lawful reserve obligation was not eligible for this mobilization. Out of the IRR, numbering about 680,000, the number of enlisted members eligible for activation was only 2,752.\(^7\)

In order to activate the units to their authorized 93 percent deployment strength, 1,800 Active Army enlisted personnel and 152 Active Army officers had to be assigned to the deploying Reserve units.\(^8\)

The Army Staff had no idea as to the operational status of the 76 units. After the units were notified and equipment requirements became known, all of the units had a C-4 equipment rating, requiring until 12 July 1968 (61 days after alert) to bring them to a "C-1," equipped status for deployment. Accountability of transferred property was a major problem due to the lack of Active Army supply and


\(^8\) Ibid; p. 2-8
maintenance procedures. The three years of pulling equipment from the Reserves as well as not providing any new production equipment caused major delays in unit training standards for deployment.

Operational collective unit training was slowed by the delay of equipment and the technical skill qualifications of individuals. The original training required prior to deployment was projected at eight weeks. This had to be extended for 58 of the units. Reserve Component units trained at Active Army installations for any where from four to six months prior to deployment.  

It is interesting to note that General Westmoreland, as the theater CINC, and his U.S. Military Assistance Command had no real input as to type of unit or the deployment schedule used by the RC units to arrive in Vietnam. Once they did arrive, many of the 43 units lost their identity by having individuals used as "fillers" in other existing units. Westmoreland's insistence on a one year tour would cause severe problems if the entire unit rotated back to the U.S. after a 12 month tour. Some units were assigned to larger organizations, battalions and hospitals, where the detachment or company could be used as a "filler." All RC units were demobilized by 12 December 1969 with the shortest period of time on active duty being 14 months, and the longest being 19 months.

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9. Ibid; pp. 3-4 and 3-5
10. Ibid; pp. 3-8
months." The units that were demobilized in Vietnam did so with no equipment returning to the U.S. and the units that remained in the U.S. were demobilized with so little equipment that they could not conduct individual or collective training.

**THE TRANSITION**

"Abe said, "If we're ever going to war again, we're going to take the reserves with us."

General Walter Kerwin

General Abrams, assigned as the Chief of Staff, Army in 1972, worked diligently to increase the Active Army combat power from its 13 Divisions to a smaller individual end year strength Army of 16 Divisions. His vision and conviction in doing this was the reliance on the Reserve Component for not only combat power, but combat support and combat service support, and also support of the U.S. public in any future conflict. In the years to follow, the Army not only met Abrams' objectives, but added two additional divisions for a total of eighteen (18) by FY90. His vision during the two short years as the Army Chief of Staff focused on reducing Active Army combat support and combat service support units by shifting units to the RC. General Abrams saw the combat

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readiness challenge in five major areas; mobilization, planning, equipping, training, and integrating.

History has proven that we have relied on the Reserve Components and we have applied previous "lessons learned" to our future requirements. General Abrams concept was to structure the military forces so that in order to execute the commitment of military forces for the "long-term" or "in volume", required a simultaneous decision to activate RC forces to augment and support the mission. This mobilization tied the "citizen-soldier" to the National commitment, involved people, and the Congress. General Abrams was convinced that this would be a cohesive factor in public support, precluding the unsatisfactory public support seen during the Vietnam era. With an all voluntary force, early mobilization was a key which enabled forward deployed forces and the strategic Reserves to maintain their full complement of personnel and equipment, consequently remaining combat ready as a regional and strategic deterrent.

General Abrams, from past experience, recognized the problems that existed in mobilization planning. He directed the Army Mobilization and Operation Planning System (AMOPS) and the Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) to be organized in order to provide mobilization guidance and policy to both RC and to Active Army installations.

General Abrams established priorities for equipping
certain round-out units with the same type and model equipment
as their Active Army affiliates. The brigade round-out
structure was designed to fill a division with its full
complement of combat power, and would be deployed with the
Active unit or as soon after its post-mobilization training
was completed. A total understanding that post-mobilization
training was required for a brigade sized unit.

The overall training readiness of the Reserve forces
became a high visibility function of active Army units. Three
round-out brigades trained and were evaluated by "parent"
active Army divisions. Any training assistance was rendered
by the units. Other combat units of the RC were affiliated
with Active Army units for training assistance and for the
conduct of annual proficiency evaluations.

The first four focal areas culminated in the fifth, the
integration of the Reserve unit into an active Army
organization. In addition to the round-out units, the Army is
looking at round-up units which could operate as separate
units or be aligned as a fourth maneuver brigade to an active
division. A round-up unit's priority of resources is
determined by the Department of Army Master Priority List
(DAMPL) rather than an Active division, but has a training
affiliation with a wartime "trace" to an Active division.
Individual integration can be done early with volunteers,
retirees, and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), but
the major pool of trained individual replacements in the
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) cannot be activated until partial mobilization, a problem area in both Vietnam and the Gulf.

General Abrams saw the need for an early mobilization of Reserves in 1965 and saw the tremendous "cost" of that mobilization being deferred for thirty-eight (38) months. His vision for the future incorporated the need for RC units to operate on the front line with Active Forces. His memory was very clear of the 150,000 reservists activated in the 1961 Berlin crisis to "fill-in" for Active soldiers who executed the priority missions, producing dissatisfaction and developing low Reserve unit morale. He was adamant that the future Total Force would have to rely on Active and Reserve Component units and individuals.

**ON TO THE GULF**

"An Army should be ready, everyday, every night, and at all times of the day and night, to give all the resistance of which it is capable---The soldier should always be furnished completely with arms and ammunition;---and the different divisions of the Army should be constantly ready to support, to be supported, and to protect themselves."

Napoleon I: Maxims of War, 1831

Operation Desert Shield produced the military conditions and boundaries for a test of General Abrams vision and how well the Total Force policy had been implemented through the years. The policy, formally adopted in 1973 provided the use
of Reserve Forces, rather than a draft, to augment the Active Forces. Many Congressional representatives desired an early call-up of partial mobilization to identify if the investment over the years had been the correct one. If not, the results of the mobilization and deployment would be a central theme for organizational change in the future, considering that at the time of Desert Shield, the Army had just announced its plans to reduce forces from the FY90 structure of 5 Corps, 28 Divisions (18 Active and 10 Reserve) to an FY95 structure of 4 Corps and 20 Divisions (12 Active and 8 Reserve Component, 2 of which would be of only filled at cadre strength). The right mix of forces is critical, they must be versatile, flexible, deployable, consequently, highly trained and ready. Keeping this Total Army Force structure in mind, consider the following percentages, of Army totals, by "type units" currently in the Reserve components: 70% of all combat service support, 73% of all chemical units, 94% of water distribution units, 97% of civil affairs units, 87% of the psychological, 69% of maintenance units, 64% of transportation units, 60% of field artillery battalions, 54% of the maneuver battalions, and 100% of the Army’s TOW Light Anti-tank Infantry Battalion. These percentages of the Total Army structure capability are in the Reserves and must be activated through a mobilization decision by the National Command Authority (NCA).

in order to provide these capabilities within a number of functional mission areas.

Mobilization

As President Bush stated shortly after his announcement to activate special categories of reservists, "The United States considers its Reserve Forces to be an integral part of the total military command. These essential personnel will soon be joining the cohesive organizations around the Arabian Peninsula, and I have the highest confidence in their ability to augment the Active Forces in this operation."

President Bush could have activated up to 200,000 selective reserves with his call-up on 22 August 1990. An upper limit of 48,800 reservists was established by the SECDEF, who on 25 August released a list of unit activations with a ceiling on Army units of 25,000 (the remainder being Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), with all Army activations from combat support and combat service support units. No Army combat units were activated. Initially, the 22 August mobilization announcement seemed to be in keeping with the Total Force planning concept. However, the NCA was required to incrementally expand the call-up on 19 November to 80,000 and on 1 December to 115,000. This increased the Army "slice"
by 20,129 and 13,614 respectively.\textsuperscript{13} It was not until 15 November that alert mobilization orders were issued to the three round-out brigades (155th, 48th, and 256th) and their battalions for training, rather than for deployment, on 7 December.\textsuperscript{14}

The majority of early mobilizations were for selected units rather than individuals. In total there were 1,045 Army units, with 123,615 personnel mobilized from the Reserve Component (398 Army National Guard and 647 Army Reserve), of these, 43 units with 9,088 personnel were used as back-fill in Europe for units deploying to Southwest Asia with VII Corps, 294 units deployed to U.S. installations as back-fill, and 708 Reserve Component units with 73,431 deployed to Southwest Asia.\textsuperscript{15} A dramatic increase from the mobilization of the 76 units during Vietnam. As for individual mobilization, the largest pool of trained personnel belonged again to the Individual Ready Reserves, which could not activate until President Bush issued an Executive Order declaring a national emergency under Title 10, USC 673, which he did on 18 January 1991. A national emergency was never declared during Vietnam. The fact that partial mobilization was not declared much


\textsuperscript {14} Ibid. p. E-41

\textsuperscript {15} U.S. Army, Headquarters Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, After Action Report, Desert Shield/Storm. (Fort Sill, Ok., July 1991), P. 38
earlier is a source of contention today with military leaders and with many members of Congress, especially with the RC unit drawdown. Until 18 January, the only source for individual replacements was from volunteers (5,536 served), retirees (1,355 served), and from the Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA). It is important to note that the IMAs are individuals assigned to and who train with specific Active Army units, in positions which are critical to mobilization requiring immediately available trained assets. In August 1990, there were approximately 14,000 RC soldiers assigned to these positions. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm only 1,580 IMAs were activated. The lack of IMAs caused a tremendously large problem at headquarters and mobilization stations responsible for processing both Active and Reserve deployments. Even CENTCOM Headquarters did not activate and deploy with all authorized IMAs. Another personnel issue, in not being able to use the IRR resource, was found in attaining Reserve unit personnel levels after individuals failed to report or were deferred and deleted from mobilization. Regulations allow a unit that has been mobilized, but has a shortage of authorized personnel, to reassign personnel from another unit that has not been mobilized, but only if the two units are within 50 miles of each other. In order to fill units to deployment standards the regulations required a change to allow a radius of 300 miles. If this had not been done, numerous units would have been non-deployable.
The Department of Defense (DOD) executed a DOD wide "stop-loss" program which eliminated a requirement for "filler" personnel to replace soldiers retiring or departing the service at the expiration of their term of service. Another distinct application not done during Vietnam. Mobilization in Vietnam took 38 months (3 years +) while the decision to mobilize in the Gulf took three weeks. A major difference in time, but still not early enough for the most efficient use of reserves. Even the CAPSTONE aligned signal unit, that has trained with 3rd Army (ARCENT) for years, was replaced with an Active Army signal unit, that had never worked with 3rd Army at any time. Not very efficient!.

The mobilization decision must be made earlier. Efforts must be made to change the legislation of Title 10 U.S. Code, enabling greater flexibility in activating units and individuals. The IRR pool must be accessible much earlier than the declaration of a national emergency and the IMA assets assigned to headquarters and mobilization installations must be activated prior to the deployment of units. The IMA must be an integral part of combat efficiency.

Plans

Planning for RC mobilization was directed during the 1970's to provide organizational direction for all aspects in regard to the deployment of combat ready units. The AMOPS and
FORMOEPS worked well during DOD mobilization exercises. A shortfall in the exercise program is that they focus on global scenarios and do not focus on mobilization aspects under the President’s selective call-up. Plans at all levels, unit, installation, Army Reserve, and National Guard must be better defined to delineate proper guidance in accomplishing the mission under less than full mobilization. A plan must have assumptions that are realistic. The Fort Bragg Mobilization Plan, Annex V, Deployment, has four assumptions, two of which are very interesting; (a) assumption # 3, "designated RC transportation units will be available for Presidential (200K) call-up." and (b) assumption # 4, "a major deployment of AC units may coincide with, at least, a partial mobilization of RC units and individuals." For Desert Shield, the transportation and terminal units were not available and the Deployment Control Unit was not available. All three are critical players in deployment operations. Forces Command, as the executing agency for the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army, coordinated their planning with Reserve and National Guard organizations to meet the CINCs requirements. It was through their efforts that the most combat ready units were selected and scheduled for deployment, many were initially identified, but cancelled due to shortages of personnel or equipment. At only one juncture during execution, the plan had to be altered, the CINCCENT preempted the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) with guidance
for additional heavy combat forces, (24th Mech), causing a delay of some already scheduled combat service support organizations. CINCCENT was able to tailor the reception and consequently the employment of his forces as they arrived in country. The coordination between supporting to supported CINCs worked well.

**Equipment**

Equipping the RC units to meet full deployment criteria was a challenge bridging the supply and training aspects of mobilization. The Unit Status Reporting System differs between RC and Active Army requirements by allowing the Reserves to substitute equipment which is not considered deployable by Active standards. Time was lost making the proper equipment available and then training the personnel to operate it properly. The Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS) was not in most reserve units upon activation. The TACCS allows interface with active Army units in the personnel and logistics systems. Not an easy system to learn. Again the units lost time at the mobilization station because the TACCS had not been identified as a shortage in any report. Many Reserve units have equipment which is incompatible with Active units. The DAMPL must be reviewed by Reserve units in order to identify compatible equipment, which

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16. Ibid; p. 25

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may be used as authorized "in-lieu-of" items.

A unique problem in the National Guard is the funding of repair parts. Four (4) Maintenance Battalions, two (2) Supply and Service Battalions, and one (1) Quartermaster Battalion, all National Guard, turned their stockage of commodities in to the state prior to departing for the mobilization station because, during peacetime, the state pays for their authorized parts stockage. These units deployed and only after being linked to supported units in Saudi Arabia, did they order parts with federal funds. Until the parts began arriving, the units were unable to adequately perform their mission. Non-divisional combat units, without organic or divisional support structure, suffered greatly during the first two to three months of Desert Shield.

Training

The current drawdown with smaller Active and Reserve units demands commonality of equipment and a linkage between specific supported to supporting units. The cohesiveness of the linkage must be established through a more intimate training relationship than existed during the 1980s. The Active Army is increasing by 2,000 officers, its positions of advisors for Reserve Component units. This will provide a

better Active Reserve ration, but additional measures are required to enhance overall proficiency. Active units must send mobile training teams (MTT) to every RC weekend drill and their two weeks of Active Duty for Training (ADT). Reserve Combat Support and Combat Service Support Units should marry-up at the supported Active units location and provide actual support during their two weeks of ADT. Their equipment, supplies, and mechanics should be used, consequently, all aspects of mobilization, deployment, and mission support will be linked with a real war time unit relationship. The Active combat units providing the MTTs should be organized with the same equipment as the Reserve unit and be "first team" experts in their specialties. Currently, Active Army evaluation teams accompany RC units during their two weeks ADT. In my opinion, after several ADT trips, the "evaluations" need to be revamped with a greater focus on "training" rather than "evaluating."

A major interest in combat readiness is being directed at the three round-out brigades activated for training during Desert Shield. Is it appropriate to expect a round-out brigade to be deployed prior to 90 days after mobilization? Two specific areas must be evaluated, (a) premobilization training, consisting of a total of 39 days per year, spread over 11 weekends and then two consecutive weeks of ADT, and (b) post mobilization training conducted prior to deployment.

As indicated earlier, premobilization training has been recognized as needing more assistance. Post mobilization
training has two current arguments to it. One, that the units were unprepared and failed to meet mission requirements, and two, that the failure to recognize that a brigade sized unit requires collective training, prior to deployment, dictating that it be activated as early as possible, was a failure of our senior leadership, not the unit. With the Presidential Selective Call-Up in August, all three round-out brigades could have been mobilized, completed 90 days post mobilization training, deployed to Southwest Asia, and operated with other divisional or non-divisional units for 30 days prior to the beginning of the ground war. Our experience in the Vietnam mobilization demonstrated that units needed between three to six month post mobilization training prior to deployment. Desert Shield validated the need for at least three months of post mobilization training, in theater or in CONUS, before combat realism was attained.

Two National Guard combat units deployed to Southwest Asia, the 142d Field Artillery Brigade and the 196th Field Artillery Brigade. Their post mobilization training was very concentrated and required extraordinary measures on the part of the Active installations. The 142d Field Artillery Brigade was able to use the tremendous training and equipment assets at Fort Sill and the Field Artillery School to hone their skill, even after their equipment was shipped. Mobile Training Teams assisted the 196th Field Artillery Brigade as it trained and validated at Fort Campbell. Both units were
fielded and trained on the Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction Computer System prior to deployment. Both units received excellent compliments from General Powell, General Vuono, but more importantly the supported maneuver commanders. There is a perception on the part of many in the defense community and within the media that the round-out brigades were incapable of deploying. The facts are that they met the Army's deployability criteria but were never given the mission to deploy and no sealift was ever scheduled for them. They were mission ready "on the day of battle."

Integration

The force structure has gradually shifted from predominately Active Army units to a predominance in the Reserve Component structure. General Calvin A. H. Waller remarked that 60% of all combat support and combat service support units in Desert Shield/Desert Storm were reservists. One of every four soldiers in the Gulf was a reservist. The U.S. Army has integrated its forces with Reserve Components throughout history, and will continue to rely on them in the future. General Abrams' vision paid great dividends for the Army and the country. We need to continue to "fine tune" the process for complete integration and full Total Force combat readiness.

"Ibid; p. NGB-7

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CONCLUSION

"For a people who are free, and who mean to remain so, a well organized and armed militia is their best security."

Thomas Jefferson: Message to Congress, Nov 1808

The Army must be able to accomplish a variety of missions across the spectrum of regional conflict. The Total Force Policy requires that the Active Component, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserves are integral parts of the Army. The reorganization of the Active Army Contingency Corps to provide Active elements, which can deploy immediately, covering all combat, combat support, and combat service support functions, still cannot sustain itself for a prolonged period of time without reliance on Reserve Components. The structure should provide linkage to Reserve Component combat support and combat service support organizations, which are resourced for wartime missions, trained with the supported units, and deployed whenever the supported unit deploys. The CAPSTONE, round-out and round-up alignments are critical. The overall system works, we need only to fine tune it to provide a truly Total Force package able to meet all missions.

In order to make this a reality, a number of actions are necessary:

a. Legislation to change call-up procedures, for early partial mobilization providing the number of personnel and time on active duty to accomplish the mission.
b. Mobilization planning at Active Component installations must be more detailed and fully complied with by Reserve Components during premobilization. Deployment plans must assume all possible circumstances, with realistic assumptions.

c. Logistically, all units must be organized with the same type and models of equipment. Logistic and personnel procedures must be standard rather than component unique.

d. Active Component installation support must be increased at the first indication of mobilization. Another reason for change in call-up authority, IMAs assigned these critical mobilization and deployment jobs must be available early.

e. Better, more coherent training of Reserves by Active units on a continual basis. "First team" MTTs is a must for true useful integration. Active units must view this as an extremely high priority, not a training distractor.

As the defense budget becomes more austere, the Total Force provides a very cost effective defense strategy. It provides for the retention of trained personnel, the preservation of combat capability (fox hole strength), and with the "citizen soldier," enhances of our military readiness by providing depth to the force and public resolve to protect and preserve America.

Hopefully our leaders today have the vision that General Abrams had in the 1970's, and will fine tune the structure he
initiated as a function of combat readiness. Regardless of the future Total Force structure, our military and civilian leaders must press for better combat readiness in order to meet all aspects of our National Military Strategy. A major step in the right direction was the October 1990 establishment of the provisional U.S. Army Reserve Command. The command has assumed a "phased-in" command and control posture of Army Reserve units becoming fully operational on 1 October 1992. The command's primary focus will be to fix problem areas in funding, manning, equipping, facilities, logistics, and force integration. This structure should provide a more effective and efficient organization of control and is in fact a major step in the "fine tuning" process for better combat readiness.

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