NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI

IS THERE A PLACE FOR A NAVAL DOCTRINE?

by

W. H. Roberson
Captain, U.S. Navy

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: [Signature]
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Chairman, Department of Military Operations

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IS THERE A PLACE FOR A NAVAL DOCTRINE? (UNCLASSIFIED)

CAPTAIN W. H. ROBERSON, USN

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U.S. Maritime Strategy is examined in the light of generic definitions of doctrine illuminated by the examples of U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force doctrine. Concluding that the U.S. Navy has no overall doctrine, the question whether one is needed is posed. Probing the benefits that could be gained from an overall U.S. Navy Doctrine and exploring the ends that a U.S. Navy Doctrine should or could serve, this paper advances a proposed Naval Doctrine.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the academic atmosphere of the Naval War College, we Navy students are chided by our colleagues from sister services when the curriculum syllabus brings us to discussions of service doctrines. After recovering from an initially defensive reaction to this criticism, I resolved to examine the issue more deeply. The goal was a convincing argument that the U.S. Navy does have a Naval Doctrine and, moreover, that it is an enduring, viable statement of how we in the Navy pursue our chosen profession of arms.

As this title suggests, I concluded that my search was in vain. Examination of doctrine in general, military doctrine in particular and service doctrines specifically, revealed benefits that our sister services derive from their doctrines, benefits that do not flow from what we in the Navy have been pleased to call doctrine. The U.S. Navy has abundant doctrine, but it is concentrated at the tactical level of operations.

Borrowing from existing service doctrines, adapting to the medium of the oceans, and incorporating the emerging concepts of "jointness" for the U.S. military and Total Quality Leadership (TQL) within the Navy, this paper offers a proposed Naval Doctrine.
Definitions and Perceptions.

Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary defines doctrine as "1. something taught; teachings. 2. something taught as principles or creed of a religion, political party, etc.; tenet or tenets; belief; dogma. . . ." This definition sounds as though it could reasonably be applied to military endeavors. Teaching, training, and a body of experience to draw from are steps in the right direction. We know there are principles of war and several service doctrines we will examine later have tenets. The troubling word "dogma" is here, though, carrying connotations that limit and restrict important military concepts such as freedom of action, initiative and innovation. In the definition, "dogma" comes at the end of a string of less imposing words describing concepts that are more frequently associated with scholarship and knowledge: taught, teachings, principles, creed and tenets. But "dogma" is a powerful word that lends itself to application of authority for which the military is renowned.

The American Heritage Dictionary provides this definition: "1. Something that is taught. 2. A principle or body of principles presented for acceptance or belief as by a religious, political, scientific, or philosophic group; dogma. 3. A rule or principle of law, esp. when established by
Here is a new concept of "principles presented for acceptance or belief," suggesting that doctrine can change, evolve or be altered by a variety of influences. Here too is the concept of rules and principles established by precedent. This is an important notion for the military tactician—deriving rules and principles from what worked and what did not work. "Dogma" makes another appearance, though, with the stigma that taints the image of doctrine. In his Essays, William Graham Sumner condemned doctrine as "... the most frightful tyrants to which men ever are subject." Sumner must have felt that doctrines were too rigid, too difficult to change or alter.

Military Doctrines.

The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines doctrine as, "Fundamentals by which the military force or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application." Several distinctions appear here that separate military doctrine from the "civillian" definitions and that eliminate the implications of dogma. The first is that the fundamentals will be used to guide actions, but are not prescriptive in nature. The second, that doctrine is authoritative, implies that reliance upon those fundamentals will justify actions taken. The third, that doctrine requires judgment in application, removes the protection of doctrine's authoritative nature. If
judgment leads a commander to vary from doctrine, only success will justify that variance: If defeat results from adherence to doctrine, judgment must be faulted. Herein lies the root of responsibility.

Strategists, tacticians and military theorists treat doctrine from a wide range of scopes. On the simple end of the scale is France's Marshal Ferdinand Foch: "A doctrine of war consists first in a common way of objectively approaching the subject; second, in a common way of handling it, by adapting without reserve the means to the goal aimed at, to the object." Foch's unreserved application of means is reminiscent of Clausewitz's "absolute" war, but Clausewitz had a better understanding of the factors mitigating against his abstract "absolute" war. Trench warfare's victims of World War I might question the marshal's objectivity in the war's conduct, but they would all agree that both sides followed common doctrines. Dogma figured heavily in the strategies and tactics of that war, particularly as weapons technology and effects outpaced strategy and tactics.

General George H. Decker, USA, tells us that "Doctrine is indispensable to an army... Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort." Given the legislated birth of "Jointness" 26 years after he spoke these words, the general's definition is prescient in its reference to a common philosophy, but it does tell us that doctrine should apply to key military aspects of communications, organization,
objective and unity of effort. The principles of war begin to make an appearance.

At the comprehensive end of the scale, Trevor N. Dupuy gives an all-inclusive meaning to military doctrine, a "combination of principles, policies and concepts into an integrated system for the purpose of governing all components of a military force in combat, and assuring consistent, coordinated employment of those components. Doctrine is implemented by tactics." Dupuy furthers doctrine as a system for making things happen at the tactical level. To Morris Janowitz, military doctrine is the "logic of [generals' and admirals'] professional behavior. As such, it is a synthesis of scientific knowledge and expertise on the one hand, and of traditions and political assumptions on the other." Gone is the "coup d'oeil," the inward eye of Clausewitz's military genius. The scale and scope of today's military actions demand doctrine to win the wars.

The proposed U.S. Basic National Defense Doctrine says that while military doctrine is an accepted body of professional knowledge and reflects existing capabilities based on solutions to past military problems, it offers no guarantees of future success. Doctrine's best utility is as a commonly understood starting point from which to develop solutions to specific warfighting challenges."
The U.S. Army's AirLand Battle Doctrine.

Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, is the U.S. Army's 'Bible.' In one concise manual it embodies how the U.S. Army is to think about war.

An army's fundamental Doctrine is the condensed expression of its approach to fighting campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. Tactics, techniques, procedures, organizations, support structures, equipment and training must all derive from it. It must be rooted in true-tested theories and principles, yet forward-looking and adaptable to changing technologies, threats, and missions. It must be definitive enough to guide operations, yet versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of worldwide situations. Finally, to be useful, doctrine must be uniformly known and understood."

This excerpt stipulates an "approach" to fighting throughout the spectrum of the operational and tactical levels of conflict. This is key since the military's job is to translate political objectives into campaigns; we have gained another rung on the strategic-operational-tactical ladder. Notice all the properties that derive from FM 100-5: everything needed to train, equip and organize a fighting force. AirLand Battle Doctrine's "approach" reflects the "structure of modern warfare, the dynamics of combat power, and the application of the classical principles of war to contemporary battlefield requirements." FM 100-5, AirLand Battle Doctrine, stresses primary reliance on joint operations throughout while outlining the four basic tenets, the dynamics of combat power, and ten imperatives that comprise its accepted body of professional knowledge. The Army's Doctrine
sounds very much like our first two definitions minus the appearance of "dogma" and its implications.

Most importantly, perhaps, as part of the doctrinal statement, FM 100-5 mandates uniform knowledge and understanding.

**U.S. Marine Corps Doctrine.**

General A. M. Gray's foreword to FMFM-1, *Warfighting,* heralds the small booklet as his philosophy on warfighting. The Marine Corps Commandant states clearly that FMFM-1 "is the Marine Corps' doctrine, and as such, provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight." FMFM-1 contains no specific techniques or procedures for conduct, but provides broad guidance with concepts and values requiring judgment in application. General Gray's doctrine is based on rapid, flexible and opportunistic maneuver in space and time to both gain positional advantage and generate fast tempo. These concepts allow the numerically inferior Marine Corps to achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place. Shattering an enemy's cohesion, philosophy of command, shaping the battle, decision making, commander's intent, and focus of effort are the tenets that FMFM-1 explores to form the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war from its nature and theory to its preparation and conduct.
Most importantly again, perhaps, General Gray charges every officer "to read--and reread--this book, understand it, and the its message to heart."... U.S. Air Force Doctrine.

Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, embodies what the Air Force holds true about aerospace power and the best way to employ it. It is promulgated as a "guide for the exercise of professional judgment vice a set of rules to be followed blindly."...

Intended as a starting point for solving contemporary problems, it is a standard against which to measure efforts, gauge success and illuminate problems. Explicit is the admonition that Air Force Doctrine should be alive, evolving, and maturing. AFM 1-1 outlines Air Force roles, associated missions and seven tenets of aerospace power. Operating in warfare's newest dimension and given the tremendous strides in aviation technology, the U.S. Air Force has always been attuned to the need for doctrine to keep pace. General H. H. "Hap" Arnold said in 1945 that

National safety would be endangered by an air force whose doctrines and techniques are tied solely on the equipment and process of the moment. Present equipment is but a step in progress, and any air force which does not keep its doctrines ahead of its equipment, and its vision far into the future, can only delude the nation into a false sense of security."

Most importantly, though, General Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff, entreats "every airman, every
non-commissioned officer, every commissioned officer to read, study, and understand Air Force doctrine.""

Are Military Service Doctrines Self-Serving?

Epitomizing those who are wary of the motives behind service strategies and doctrines is Carl H. Builder, whose book, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, takes all U.S. armed services to task. Mr. Builder allows that while service strategies should ideally be components of the defense strategy, services more than likely supplant their own strategies to establish their institutional agendas, rationalize requirements, and argue for a larger share of the budget. The specter of a U.S.-Soviet conflict afforded fertile ground, Builder asserts, for services to justify plans, programs, and budgets by interpreting Soviet military capabilities that highlighted their own particular emphasis.

Echoing the civil-military relations gap between Bismarck and Moltke, Carl A. Summers notes that, "For both domestic and international political purposes the civilian leaders want maximum flexibility and maneuverability and are hesitant to fix on firm objectives. The military on the other hand need just such a firm objective as early as possible in order to plan and conduct military operations." This need to plan toward clear objectives compels the military toward strategy and doctrine. Coupled with lead-times required for force structuring and weapons systems acquisition, the military's
bent toward far-reaching strategy and doctrine seems natural and prudent. Builder argues that it is the services' "concomitant desire for institutional independence and control that attracts them to advance separate service strategies for national security." He goes on to note that when service strategies are used as proposals for the dominant element of national military strategy and as declarations of independence of specific missions, operations, and forces, they are at least contentious, if not counter-productive to national security... not to mention "jointness."

The U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy comes in for some special attention in this indictment by critics of service strategy and doctrine. Carl Builder observes that the Navy touted its maritime strategy in the 1980s, "coincidentally with a preferential buildup of naval forces, arguably at the expense of the other services' budgets." The American institutional budgeting process does encourage and reward service competition for strategies, roles, missions, and budgets.
CHAPTER III

DOES THE MARITIME STRATEGY CONSTITUTE A NAVAL DOCTRINE?

Focus of the Maritime Strategy.

As an initial defender of naval doctrine, I thought at once of our Maritime Strategy. Digging it out of my carrel's safe, I thumbed quickly through it looking for a handy list of tenets, principles, or imperatives with which to assuage the U.S. Navy's critics. Finding no convenient lists, I settled down for a more detailed examination.

The Maritime Strategy tells us what it, The Maritime Strategy itself, does: "As a component of our national military, [it] supports national goals in peace, crisis and war." On the same first page Maritime Strategy outlines three basic concepts of forward posture, seizing the initiative and directly pressuring the enemy. Then began what was to be extensive reference to Soviet intentions and capabilities and how the U.S. Navy planned to wage a general U.S.-Soviet war. Further, The Maritime Strategy is to be the basis for tactical development--the intellectual underpinning for development of fleet warfighting plans, the U.S. Navy's contribution to joint and allied cooperative planning efforts and the development of Navy POM and testimony on Navy programs and budget. There it was, right there on the first page where one would expect the initial "punch" of an inspiring doctrinal statement. I was not yet flushed with pride and purpose when
stunned by "Navy POM and testimony on Navy programs and budget."

On page 3 The Maritime Strategy revealed itself as a "statement of application of U.S. seapower through a cogent strategy." Here too is the statement that The Maritime Strategy "adapts and evolves to accommodate new threats and capabilities." The thought of a Navy doctrine that fosters adaptation and evolution was comforting, but if this document was Navy doctrine, how often must it change... or was it what it purported itself to be: a "cogent strategy"?

Flipping back to the front for the document's date, 23 February 1989, I pondered the world's changes over the last three years and began to wonder if The Maritime Strategy was responsive enough to serve even as a cogent strategy, not to mention a naval doctrine.

There followed a "concept of employment across the full spectrum of conflict"; page 4 lists six such concepts, four of which center on the Soviet Union. Page 5 outlines five purposes of The Maritime Strategy:

1. provides global view of fleet operations for deterrence and crisis control
2. should deterrence fail, how fleet operations can be integrated for a global conventional war with the Soviets
3. context for day-to-day fleet operations
4. framework for operations requests which shape Navy and Marine Corps inputs to the Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS)
5. drive priorities for Research and Development programs and govern decisions relating to future force structure
More war with the Soviets and more programs and budget concerns. If *The Maritime Strategy* was a Navy doctrine, it certainly focused heavily on the Soviets and the budget. When the Soviet Union disappeared as a military threat, was it replaced by our sister services as threats in the budgeting process?

On page 8 the concept of joint and combined operations appears, "... it is essential that U.S. air, land and naval forces operate jointly and in conjunction with our allies." The U.S. Navy will achieve this goal by strengthening partnerships with our sister services and by improving interoperability in peacetime. Interoperability will be achieved through multi-service procurement programs, through foreign sales aimed toward achieving commonality and through joint/combined exercises. The word "joint" appears twelve times in the 51-page *Maritime Strategy*; eight times on page 8 and four times elsewhere when discussing joint and combined exercises. If the U.S. Navy is as serious about "jointness" as the law says we should be, should it receive more attention in *The Maritime Strategy* if that is U.S. Navy Doctrine?

The remaining unclassified portion of *The Maritime Strategy* is occupied by peacetime objectives, applications of maritime power, confrontation or war with the Soviets, global movements of maritime forces, contemporary strategic thinking (dominated by the Soviet challenge) and discussions of the future global security environment with its defense implications. All these things say much about what the U.S.
Navy can and will do, but precious little about how it will get the job done—the U.S. Navy's "Way of War," if you will.

The U.S. Navy is an armed service that operates in a three-dimensional world—under, upon and over the world's oceans and seas. With the Marine Corps, that "theater" of operations extends to the land and into the skies above the land. Arguably, the U.S. Navy should have a "Way of War," a doctrine. If such a doctrine is resident in The Maritime Strategy, all U.S. Navy men and women are not enjoined to read, study or understand their doctrine, because Admiral C. A. H. Trost, Chief of Naval Operations, made no such overture when he signed the fourth revision in February 1989.

The Maritime Strategy is a classified document—SECRET NOFORN—available only to those with a SECRET security clearance and who have access to secret material. Mr. Edward Forest, OP-09 N-2, relates that as of December 1991, while 90 percent of all U.S. Navy personnel have the investigative basis for a SECRET clearance, access is limited as part of the effort to preclude espionage activities. Eighty-three percent of all U.S. Navy officers and 29 percent of all enlisted personnel have sufficient clearance and access to even read The Maritime Strategy. Overall, 63 percent of the total U.S. Navy force structure is not privy to whatever doctrinal truths are resident in The Maritime Strategy.² Of its 51 pages, 17 are SECRET, 4 are CONFIDENTIAL and 30 are UNCLASSIFIED. Information herein relating to the Maritime Strategy was all gleaned from those 30 UNCLASSIFIED pages.
Maritime Concepts for the 1990s and Beyond.

In September 1991, a briefing, "Seapower and Global Leadership--Maritime Concepts for the 90s and Beyond," was prepared by the same Deputy CNO for Plans, Policy and Operations that produced The Maritime Strategy and its revisions. This briefing posed the question of what to do with a "Maritime Strategy focused on global conflict with the Soviet Union?" The answer was to "extract the strategy's 'enduring principles' . . . and apply them to current planning." The Maritime Strategy was just that all along--a strategy. But here were its enduring principles, at last perhaps a clue to the elusive doctrine. From the drafters of The Maritime Strategy here are its enduring principles:

1. Quick transition to combat
2. Seize the initiative
3. Carry the fight to the enemy
4. Conclude on favorable terms

The most telling denial of The Maritime Strategy as doctrine comes from its framers also in this briefing, "The Strategy itself remains 'on the shelf' . . . 'bookended' by Atlantic and Pacific Theater OPLANS . . . ready to be taken down again should a global threat re-emerge." Not with the same reverence that accompanied its withdrawal, I returned The Maritime Strategy to my safe.
CHAPTER IV

DOES THE U.S. NAVY NEED A DOCTRINE?

The Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) library on every U.S. Navy ship is filled with doctrinal publications that speak to the tactics, procedures and techniques employed by the Navy. These NWPs are the nuts-and-bolts that standardize those tactics, procedures and techniques so that commanders may exercise effective command and control. Where is the doctrine that guides those commanders in the decision-making process that produces commands?

The U.S. Navy's Combined Warfare Commander concept provides guidance and directives for each battle group, via its OPGEN and Warfare Commander OPTASKS. However, for every battle group there is a unique OPGEN and for every Warfare Commander there is a different OPTASK. Every carrier air wing has its own set of tactical procedures (TACPROS). OPGENS, OPTASKS and TACPROS are reviewed, rewritten and repromulgated after virtually every change of command. Every new battle group commander, warfare commander and air wing commander brings his own emphasis, experience and personal "Way of War" to his new job and quite naturally will use his increased authority and responsibility to explore the utility and feasibility of his ideas. Recognition of the efficacy of those ideas is what elevates those officers to high positions.
of command. But where is the standardization? Should there be standardization between air wings, battle groups or fleets?

Commander William E. Short, USN, pondered the question of conceptual expansion of doctrine beyond the tactical level. He contends that U.S. Navy doctrine is "focused on the tactical level of war because we have yet to construct an adequate conceptual framework with which we or others can view the employment of naval forces above the tactical and below the strategic levels of war."

Could it be that there is no doctrine at the operational level of war, nothing authoritative requiring judgment in application, only operational commanders exercising judgment without authoritative guidance? Fleet commanders would counter that operational commanders had better be following fleet fighting instructions, but where is the authoritative guidance from which a fleet commander's judgment generates his fighting instructions?

Is lack of doctrine a weakness or a strength? Innovative and creative ways of employing, commanding and controlling maritime forces are being developed constantly. Frequently change is forced, as when a commander must make do with what he has at his disposal, which may be other than what he considers optimal. At other times change is planned, programmed, funded and finally fielded as when new systems come on-line. Often change is necessary to counter an emerging threat and sometimes the U.S. Navy just "re-invents the wheel." If the Navy does a credible job of sharing
lessons learned, all the old and new wrinkles go into a "bag of tricks" that is frequently drawn from. Change is not always progress, but it is always change; those lessons are important, too.

Just as Helmuth Von Moltke ("The Elder") is to have said, "No plan survives contact with the enemy,"2 a U.S. Navy dictum might read, "We have a plan, we are ready to deviate." The former Soviet Navy observed that if the U.S. Navy had a doctrine, it is not followed and further observed that the U.S. Navy operates so well under chaotic conditions because it was practiced on a daily basis. To be sure, the Soviet Navy had a strict doctrine of centralized control; anything approaching the decentralized execution and command by negation principles of the U.S. Navy would seem chaotic to them. But there is order and purpose to that seeming chaos; if it could be distilled would doctrine result?

James L. Lacy, who joined ranks with Carl A. Builder in questioning service strategy motives, allowed that the U.S. Navy needs something akin to doctrine:

A navy still requires a theory of a navy. Whether stated explicitly or discernible only through after-the-fact examination, there must be something to a fleet--a policy, a strategy, a plan, some sort of expectation of the conditions and anticipation of consequences--which, if not the source of inspiration, at least provides a fair means for explanation.3

Captain C. H. Amme, USN, would agree, as would I; in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1964, he said, "Doctrine is
codified common sense . . . it is what tells a commander or a soldier what to do when specific directions are lacking."

If a Naval Doctrine were written today what should it encompass, what requirements should it satisfy and what ends should it serve?
 CHAPTER V

WHAT ENDS SHOULD A NAVAL DOCTRINE SERVE?

Thoughts of Some Naval Theorists.

Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret.), believes that "Clausewitz thought that useful principles could be applied more frequently to tactics and that these principles could be transformed into doctrine more readily than strategic principles." This supports the earlier observation that doctrine seems to be concentrated at the tactical level of operations. But we are searching for insight to an overall "Naval Doctrine." Captain Hughes gives us just that: "Doctrine at all levels should be specific, designed to achieve the best results from a united team, but should also allow room for inspired tactics and initiative." Here are keys to two important principles that should contribute to a "Naval Doctrine": a united team and allowing room for inspired tactics and initiative.

Operating as we do—in, on and over the sea—the U.S. Navy has developed distinct communities that each concentrate on their respective warfare specialty . . . and that each compete for forces, equipment, programs and funding. Our doctrine should speak to a united team.

As quickly as our world is changing, our navy should stay ahead of technical developments in weapons and systems. Just as well, we should stay ahead of the many varied and still
unheard of concepts and methods of employment that will be defined by the world's political, social and economic climate. Our doctrine should speak to continually evolving roles, missions and tactics.

Horatio Nelson commanded naval forces in a navy that was bound by doctrine comprised of rigid, permanent fighting instructions. Nelson was notorious for departing from established doctrine, but his greatest notoriety came from his brilliant successes in doing so. The "judgment in application" clause in our earlier definition of military doctrine might have been written with Nelson in mind. As often as he strayed from the doctrinal path, "Nelson always had a plan of action, a comprehensive one. He always transmitted it to his captains and practiced it so that they were of one mind about what was wanted." Here is an important concept, a heavy responsibility for both commander and subordinate—to be of one mind about what is wanted. This concept is echoed in the process of planning at the operational level of war; the commander's vision and intent must be clearly understood by the executors. This thought should be articulated in our doctrine.

Julian S. Corbett presaged "jointness" when he wrote:

Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided... either by what your army can do... or else by fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do. The paramount concern, then... is to determine the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war. When this is done, and not till then, naval strategy
can begin to work out the manner in which the fleet can best discharge the function assigned to it."

Our doctrine should speak to the Navy’s supporting role in warfare, support to the overall team that will bring victories in future conflicts. (More on "jointness" later.)

In his book, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, Ken Booth outlines a navy’s purpose and function. Navies exist to ensure use of the sea to further passage of goods and people, passage of military force and to further resource application. A navy’s many roles and missions fall into three broad functional areas: military, diplomatic and policing. A navy doctrine must summarize roles, missions and functions but should not consist of lists of all conceivable capabilities. Our Naval Doctrine should address itself not so much to what we do but how.

Arleigh Burke contends that

> U.S. Navy doctrine has its origin in the ideals and aspirations of our nation. It is firmly rooted in our constitution, which all commissioned officers in the services of the United States take a solemn oath to support and defend. It is based on generations of naval combat experience and study of the art and science of naval warfare.

Admiral Burke opens the window on the "art and science of naval warfare." Science lends itself to the myriad of tactical doctrines; our overall naval doctrine should speak to the art of naval warfare.
Statutory Roles and Missions.

JCS Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF), charges that

Each of the military departments and services shall coordinate as appropriate with the others and have responsibility for organizing, training, equipping and providing forces to fulfill specific combat functions and for administering and supporting such forces.

More specific to the Navy, UNAAF mandates that the "primary functions of Navy and/or Marine Corps is to organize, train, equip and provide Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea." Clearly, our doctrine must speak to organization, training, and equipping forces and providing them with the strategies, tactics, techniques and procedures that will allow them to conduct prompt, sustained combat at sea.

NWP 1 (Rev A), *Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy*, echoes the guidance in UNAAF and quotes Title 10, U.S. Code in stating the Navy's mission, "to be prepared to conduct prompt, sustained combat operations in support of U.S. national interests." NWP 1 also offers another list of specific roles for naval forces.

Our doctrine should address itself to how the Navy will respond to the direction provided in *The National Military Strategy of the United States*. This document implements the Defense Agenda of the President's National Security Strategy and Policies of the Secretary of Defense spelled out in Defense Planning Guidance and in the Annual Report to the
President and the Congress. General Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, highlighted the four "key foundations of the National Defense Strategy:

- Strategic Deterrence and Defense
- Forward Presence
- Crisis Response
- Reconstitution"

In supporting U.S. national interests, the Navy will call upon a variety of characteristics that are not unique to naval forces; strategic strength, offensive power, defensive strength, power projection ability, logistic independence and command, control and communication capabilities. We share these characteristics in common with our sister services; the more we combine capabilities the better we will operate together.

Jointness.

Drawing from the World War II European experience, General Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote in 1945 that Experiences . . . have indicated that in many operations, if not in the majority, the task was of necessity accomplished by contributions from two or three services acting under one command . . . . The welding of the forces resulted in the greatest possible concentration of combat power at the decisive point while at the same time permitting the greatest economy of force."

This positive observation of Eisenhower's is generous in speaking to the end result. In his book, Eagle Against the Sun, Ronald H. Spector illuminates the enmity that accompanied victory in the Pacific:
Yet for the U.S., the record of the Pacific war is not so much a story of how the services forgot their differences but rather of the ingenuity displayed by service leaders in devising courses of action which allowed them to get on with the war without having to settle those differences. 2

It took until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 for these lessons to be brought home to the U.S. armed services. In the intervening 41 years interservice rivalry resisted numerous legislative acts and reorganization efforts to be "welded" together. The 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act, the 1947 National Security Act, the 1947 Defense Department Reorganization, the 1958 National Security Agency Amendment and the 1960's McNamara "whiz-kids" all sought in vain to coerce the military into speaking with one voice. 3 Secretary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garrett III, CNO Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, and Marine Corps Commandant General A. M. Gray have acknowledged that

The unique missions and functional capabilities of the services are intended to be complimentary, enabling and enhancing, and they provide us with the means to generate the greatest total combat capability in the shortest time. 4

"Jointness" should be incorporated into our overall Naval Doctrine since it will dominate future employment of U.S. armed forces.

What Environment will a Naval Doctrine Serve In?

In the National Military Strategy, JCS Chairman Powell recognizes that with the demise of the Soviet Union, "Future threats to U.S. interests are inherent in the uncertainty and instability of a rapidly changing world." 5 Our doctrine
should speak to the spirit of adventure that will solve problems posed by the uncertainties that are certain in the future and to the emerging roles the Navy will play in contributing to stability in a world of accelerated change. All the services will "continue to deter and defend against strategic nuclear attacks and retain the potential to defeat a global threat, but plans and resources will be primarily focused on deterring and fighting regional rather than global wars." 7 Old lessons and capabilities will not be forgotten, they will go into our "bag of tricks," soon to be joined by as yet unforeseen roles, missions and capabilities.

In his National Security Strategy of the United States, President George Bush acknowledges the budgetary constraints facing our military and asks the question, "How do we reduce our conventional capabilities in ways that assure we could rebuild them faster than an enemy could build a devastating new threat against us?" 17 Gone are the days of the early 1980s when forces, equipment and systems could be upgraded to be made compatible with declared U.S. commitments. American strategic doctrine was perceived as inappropriate in 1981's geopolitical environment; increased spending brought means in line with designed ends. 18

American armed services are now in the position of focusing on regional conflict, but with a reduced total base force that will have finite employment limits. Instead of tailoring a force to meet any combination of possible commitments, commanders may find themselves in economy of
force theaters. The "two-and-a-half-war" strategy of the 1980s—"Be prepared to fight simultaneously major wars in Europe and Asia and a 'brush fire' war anywhere in the world"—has given way to something much less. Recognizing the limits to U.S. ability to employ forces (size of force, mobility, sustainability), the U.S. will "manage world and regional events to adapt to our limited restricted ability to deal with them by military force or threat of military force." These considerations amplify the importance of the force-multiplying benefits of "jointness," but the bottom line is defined by dollars. Our naval leadership has a plan to maximize the value gained from those dollars.

Total Quality Leadership (TQL).

Secretary Garrett, Admiral Kelso and General Gray have instituted a program to enhance effectiveness across the board:

The fiscal realities of the 1990s have made affordability an evermore important factor in sustaining our maritime strength. To meet this challenge, we have initiated a top-down Total Quality Leadership approach throughout the Navy and Marine Corps. Our goal is to strive for continuous improvements, in order to provide the best affordable mix of forces and capabilities and to maintain those forces in a high state of readiness, able to get the job done right the first time.

Here is a program that is prudent, practical and philosophical at the same time; it is derived from a doctrine of management and its anticipated benefits warrant incorporating TQL into our Naval Doctrine. The principle of continuous improvement supports and strengthens a positive
approach to the changes our Navy will inaugurate to meet the challenges ahead. Getting the job done right the first time--every time--is easier said than done, but is a worthy goal worthy of incorporation into our Naval Doctrine.

In a memorandum to all flag officers, Admiral Kelso highlighted what may very well be our stiffest challenge in the 1990s and beyond:

While we will work to ensure we have the resources available to do the job with an acceptable degree of risk, we will not have the quantities available to us we have had in the past. That is the reality of 1990 and beyond. . . . We need something to take up the slack . . . quality will become ever more important as our overall force levels and budgets decline.\(^2\)

In "The Way Ahead," our senior Naval leadership has opened the door for what can be the most challenging, rewarding and satisfying chapter of our Navy's history:

It is time to challenge many of our ground rules and assumptions. Some will require revision; others must be revalidated. We must reshape naval force structure, strategy, tactics, and operating patterns that are wedded too closely to the concept of an Armageddon at sea with the Soviet Union. . . . We must respond to new initiatives and be prepared to march in different directions. The old excuse, 'Because that's the way we've always done it,' no longer will do. . . . We must keep before us one goal: to maintain maritime superiority well into the 21st Century--through a Navy and Marine Corps able to meet the challenges of an uncertain future.\(^2\)
CHAPTER VI

NAVAL DOCTRINE

Every Navy man and woman is expected to read, fully understand and live by the spirit and intent of this doctrine.

In partnership with the other armed services of the United States, the U.S. Navy will support national goals in peace, crisis and war. Like our sister services, the U.S. Navy will play a supporting role in the fulfillment of United States policy as it provides domestic direction at home and as it guides our interaction with the world’s family of nations and peoples.

All U.S. armed services have in common characteristics of strategic strength, offensive power, defensive power, power projection ability and command-control-communications (C3) capabilities. As we share, expand and develop greater understanding of the complimentary aspects of those capabilities, our effectiveness will be enhanced enabling U.S. armed forces to generate the greatest total combat capability in the shortest time. Joint training, planning and exercises will ensure victory in time of conflict.

In a world of accelerating political, social and economic change, U.S. armed forces will play a major role as an influence for regional stability and may very well be one of the few constants in areas of potential conflict. While maintaining a strong strategic deterrence and defense posture,
the U.S. Navy will be a primary contributor to a forward presence to underscore America's commitment to peace and freedom. Should vital American interests be threatened by a crisis situation, our Navy will quickly respond as it has throughout our history.

To this partnership the U.S. Navy brings mobility, a high degree of self-sustainment and the ability to quickly transition to combat, determined never to take the first hit. Seizing the initiative, naval forces will directly pressure an enemy. Employing centralized control, decentralized execution and command by negation, the Combined Warfare Commander Concept will allow individual Warfare Commanders to prosecute targets on, under and above the sea as well as project power ashore. Clear articulation by commanders and full understanding by subordinates of the commander's intent and vision as they relate to designated military objectives will ensure that all hands are of one mind and can therefore make their best contribution to the goal.

The Navy will safeguard freedom of the seas in peacetime and in times of crisis or war will maintain maritime superiority to further the passage of goods and people, the passage of military forces in their diplomatic, policing or military roles and to further resource application.

The U.S. Navy will take care to ensure that strategy and tactics development keeps pace with technological advances in weapons and C3 systems. Likewise, political, economic and
social change in the world will inevitably lead to roles and missions for our armed forces that are as yet unforeseen. American initiative and innovation will sustain the continually evolving roles, missions, tactics, equipment, training and organization that will allow us to prevail.

The art of naval warfare as typified by centuries of advancement, adaption and flexibility, is now entering a period that will most certainly bring our most trying challenges.

The U.S. Navy owes every officer and every sailor a meaningful job, top-notch training to perform that job, knowledgeable direction, experienced supervision and to close the loop--an all-hands, top-to-bottom quality review that will spur continuous improvement and allow us to get the job done right the first time.
NOTES

Chapter II


12. Ibid., p. 9.


14. Ibid.


20. Ibid., p. 60.

21. Ibid., p. 65.

Chapter III


4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

Chapter IV

1. Commander William E. Short, Jr., USN, "The Concept of Doctrine: Of Critical Importance but Frequently Misunderstood" (Paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in satisfaction of the requirements of an advanced research project, March 1991), p. 126.
2. Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, p. 239.


Chapter V


2. Ibid., p. 273.


8. Ibid., p. 2-7.


11. AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force, p. 2-5.


16. Ibid., p. 11.


19. Ibid., p. 184.

20. Ibid.


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