DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
CONTENTS

2 Just Cause and the Principles of War
   by Lieutenant Colonel William C. Bennett, US Army

14 Joint Fire Support in Low-Intensity Conflict
   by Major Samuel S. Wood Jr., US Army

19 Force Protection: Military Police Experience in Panama
   by Captain (P) Anthony M. Schilling, US Army

28 Force Projection in Short Wars
   by Colonel Robert B. Killebrew, US Army

38 Destination Stanleyville
   by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen D. Brown, US Air Force

51 Sun Bin and His Art of War
   by Lieutenant Colonel Karl W. Eikenberry, US Army

58 Insights:
   Operation Just Cause: The Best Course of Action?
   by Major Lyie G. Radebaugh, US Army

   Does Latin America Matter Any More?
   by Abraham F. Lowenthal

63 Summaries the best from other journals

64 Letters

67 Book Reviews contemporary reading for the professiona
Reflections on a 100–Hour War

At midnight, 27 February 1991, the ground phase of the 42–day–old Gulf War was suspended in a cease–fire. The five–week around–the–clock air campaign had wreaked death, destruction and an enormous amount of ordnance on the heads of what, at the beginning, was the world’s fourth largest army. With the onset of the ground campaign, the Iraqis virtually evaporated in the face of a wide–front multinational attack.

Kuwait City was liberated by US Marines and coalition forces in scenes reminiscent of the liberation of Paris in 1944. The Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps charged north into Iraq, then turned eastward in a grand sweeping movement that carried them into combat with the Republican Guards in what was billed as “the largest tank battle since the Battle of the Bulge.” When the dust settled, the two Army corps had closed in on Basra and effectively “closed the door” on the retreating Iraqi army. The “line in the sand” turned out to be a disheveled, defeated file of vanquished Iraqi soldiers, thankful that their part of the fight was over. They left behind the burnt–out remains of their modern mechanized force.

Many feelings flooded our senses, including pride and patriotism, and a crescendo of joy reflected on the faces of liberated Kuwaitis and proud US family members. Throughout America, the collective sigh of relief was a welcome change from the building anxiety and trepidation that had dominated the past several months. A significant number of US combat units had “seen the elephant” of close combat and had performed magnificently.

Clearly, all Americans should rejoice in the fact that our Army performed well. What is heralded with astonishment by some is no surprise to the generation of Army leaders who matured with the Army after Vietnam. The excellence of this All–Volunteer, Total Army has been proved on the battlefields of Southwest Asia.

As General H. Norman Schwarzkopf said in his remarkable eve–of–victory briefing, our love of and dependence on technology, fueled by a decade–long modernization program, were deciding factors. The Patriot, the Abrams, the Bradley, the Apache, the MLRS (multiple launch rocket system), the Black Hawk and many previously maligned pieces of machinery, all worked as advertised. The deception plan carried out by farsighted professionals and orchestrated by Schwarzkopf and the CENTCOM (US Central Command) staff was classic. Furthermore, from the outset, the war was waged with unprecedented cooperation among the services, each playing a vital and apparently unselfish role in the overall victory.

The real champions, however, are the foot soldiers, supply clerks, gunners, tankers, pilots and truck drivers; in short, all of the soldiers and leaders who operated the tools of war and who had the guts and perseverance to answer the call to arms. AirLand Battle doctrine has been validated by this war, and clearly, victory in the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO) was forged in the California desert as surely as victory at Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton.

Carl von Clausewitz states that war is an extension of policy by other means. The beginning of war does not mark the end of politics and diplomacy; rather, all elements of national power must work in concert. Victory in war improves dramatically the context for politics and diplomacy, and the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines have provided that context. The national will was mobilized along with its Armed Forces, a national will that bolstered the determination that this was not to be another Vietnam.

The KTO is still a dangerous place to be, and challenges are everywhere. No doubt the troops performed outstandingly, but there will be other times when their mettle will be tested. We must continue to train for that eventuality. There is much to be gained from a thorough evaluation of the Gulf War, but after–action reviews must not breed complacency. It is our responsibility to see that we continue to meet the daily challenges of a dangerous world in order to reap the full benefit of a lasting peace.

SFR
JUST CAUSE
and the Principles of War

Lieutenant Colonel William C. Bennett, US Army

Copyright © 1991

In the many debates regarding future missions and doctrine for the post–Cold War Army, contingency missions such as Operation Just Cause must surely be examined in detail. The author uses the framework of the principles of war to analyze Just Cause and finds many interesting insights while describing many aspects of its planning and execution. He concludes that the principles, viewed from a broad perspective, still apply to current US doctrine.

Historically, nations and their armies learn best from their defeats. Seldom do they learn from their successes. On 20 December 1989, the US Armed Forces conducted one of its most successful operations ever. In the aftermath of such a resounding success, there is a tendency not to critically examine our performance and, hence, not to learn from it. Future knowledge and competence rest on a foundation of a thorough understanding of the past. Additionally, as a future general officer once stated, “There are those in Washington who expect us to be able to do our job, and when the time comes, they will accept no excuses.”¹ This article is an attempt to critically examine our performance during Operation Just Cause against a known doctrinal base with the hope that we may gain in professional competence.

The method used in this article will capitalize on the technique used in Retired Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr.’s landmark 1982 work, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context.² A major part of that work analyzed applying the principles of war against our performance in that conflict. A telling point Summers made in that study concerned our inadequacy in doctrinally applying the principles of war during the 1960s. Since that study, our principles of war have been resurrected and refined, and are well presented in US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. But, now, in the aftermath of Just Cause, we must ask how well the principles of war were applied in our operations in Panama. This article addresses that question.

Objective. The military objective must flow from the nation’s political purpose. In the case of Panama, the nation’s political purpose had been clearly enunciated by two presidents: safeguarding American lives, protecting the Panama Canal and removing Manuel Noriega. Militarily, steps had been taken toward those goals. Military dependents were drawn down, and the profile of the US civilian community was reduced in Panama City. Additionally, US forces conducted exercises to improve military preparedness for defense of the canal as called for in the Carter–Torrijos Canal Treaty. As the events of the fall of 1989 unfolded, it became obvious that merely removing Noriega as head of the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) would not accomplish the other goals. As Noriega successively purged his officer corps of those with professional tenden-
cies, none remained who could reform the institution. Some of the potential successors to a deposed Noriega were at least as bad as Noriega, if not worse. And merely creating a "promotion opportunity for another thug," as General Fred F. Woerner, commander, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), phrased it, would be insufficient to solve Panama's problems or to further the US strategy of encouraging democracy throughout the region.3

The strategic objectives of the operation were clearly and concisely expressed in the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) execution order; namely, "To ensure: continuing freedom of transit through the Panama Canal, freedom from PDF abuse and harassment, freedom to exercise US treaty rights and responsibilities, the removal of Noriega from power in Panama, the removal of Noriega's cronies and accomplices from office, the creation of a PDF responsive to and supportive of an emergent democratic government in Panama, and a freely elected GOP government which is allowed to govern."4

These strategic military objectives were translated into the mission to "neutralize the PDF." The unified command translated the overall strategic objective into operational objectives. Viewing Panama as a target with the bull's-eye centered around the Panama City-Canal complex, SOUTHCOM selected operational objectives that were located within or could directly reinforce that battlefield. Three categories of objectives were identified. The first category directly and solely addressed the mission of neutralizing the PDF. Generally, these objectives were force-oriented instead of installation-oriented. The second category was composed of objectives that attacked the PDF and supported unilateral US goals. The third category solely supported US actions without neutralizing any PDF units.

For example, an objective of the first category was the primary command and control node of the PDF known as La Comandancia. Its isolation and seizure would critically disrupt PDF operations. An example of a second category objective was Tinajitos, home of the PDF 1st Infantry Heavy Weapons Company. Also representative of the second category, the Tocumen-Torriojos Airport had to be seized not only to facilitate future US operations but also to neutralize the

2d Infantry Company. A third category objective, the Bridge of the Americas was seized to secure the lines of communication between the east and west banks and to defend the canal.

From the earliest planning, the intent was to immediately neutralize forces within the bull's-eye with the H-hour operations. The PDF response to the 3 October 1989 coup attempt had been adroit and flexible. Infantry forces were airlifted from Rio Hato to the Tocumen-Torriojos Airport to link up with transport from the motorized battalion at Fort Cimarron. The force then attacked the Comandancia from the east through Panama City. Nearly two battalions of the PDF were located on the two bases, and their quick response in October indicated a high degree of training and motivation. Ignoring these forces may have put the rest of the plan in peril. Both bases were included as D-day objectives. More important, attacking these units directly supported the mission of neutralizing the PDF.

An explicit goal of the operation was removing Noriega from power in Panama. Detailed plans had been developed to capture Noriega. In the months before, an attempt was made to develop an effective program of surveillance of Noriega. Confronted with Department of Defense
An objective of the first category was the primary command and control node of the PDF known as La Comandancia. Its isolation and seizure would critically disrupt PDF operations. An example of a second category objective was... the Tocumen–Torrijos Airport [which] had to be seized not only to facilitate future US operations but also to neutralize the [PDF] 2d Infantry Company.

Although Noriega initially eluded coordination process, subsequently, the effort contributed little to Noriega’s capture. Here the institutional peacetime national intelligence policies of the United States severely constrained the ability of the operational commanders and planners to obtain real-time and meaningful information on Noriega’s whereabouts. Several raid rehearsals were conducted before D-Day. It was also hoped that the concentration of forces against the Panama City–Canal complex would essentially clamp down on the city. The effort was likened to casting a net over the city, prohibiting any movement. The net could then be drawn in. If any of the initial raids failed, planners thought the net would catch Noriega with the flotsam of the operation. Although the net itself did not ensnare Noriega, it effectively denied him any method of egress from Panama. Although Noriega initially eluded capture, the totality of the PDF’s neutralization effectively removed him from power.

Should additional objectives have been assigned in the hope of capturing Noriega? After all, there were those who felt his capture was the sole criteria by which to judge the success of the operation. In hindsight, it is difficult to see how additional objectives would have made much difference without the freedom to conduct the appropriate operations to develop adequate information on Noriega and the PDF.

**Offensive.** The offensive was seized in the opening moments of the conflict, and the initiative never once passed to the PDF. Isolated drive-by attacks and uncoordinated attacks by small elements did occur after the initial D-day operations, but they were so insignificant and random that they cannot be described as an at-
tempt at a counteroffensive. Additionally, most of the attacks were thwarted before they came to any sort of fruition. For example, nine vehicles, including a V300 armored vehicle, were destroyed by the 2d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, as Dignity Battalion or PDF members attempted drive-by attacks at Panama Viejo on D-day.5

It should be noted here that, even though the principles of war should be valid for any conflict, they are written in the context of a conventional war. As lethal as Panama was in isolated places, the conflict was essentially part of a low-intensity conflict (LIC). As such, many of the manifestations of the conflict were political in nature. Consequently, the current principles, especially the principle of the offensive, must be applied with a broader interpretation. The offensive must not only be applied militarily, which it was, but it must also be applied across the entire spectrum of conflict, to include political actions.

The massive looting that occurred in Panama City and Colón may be the greatest tragedy of the conflict. Months after the invasion, the economy has yet to fully recover from that depredation. It has been alleged that this looting was instigated by Dignity Battalion members to undermine the fledgling democratic government. If the looting was not actually instigated by the Dignity battalions, it was the mindless rampage of a citizenry with no restrictions of law and order. The bottom line is that US forces lost the initiative either to the Dignity battalions or to some set of sociopolitical factors. The result was the same; forces of law and order were stripped away, and for too long a time, nothing was substituted. In the final analysis, the looting made the task of the “freely elected GOP” infinitely more difficult.

An argument might be made that the looting was indeed unfortunate, but it would have no relevance to a discussion of the principles of war. Such a view is too narrow a perspective in LIC where political factors play a much larger role. A stated objective of the operation was “to ensure a freely elected GOP which is allowed to govern.”6 Consequently, anything that hindered the accomplishment of that objective is relevant to an analysis of the operation. Viewed then, in this LIC perspective in which the offensive must be waged across the entire spectrum of conflict, the US forces failed to maintain the offensive. The looting ran counter to the effort of assisting the new government. Consequently, it must be viewed as an integral part of the military campaign. Since US forces failed to stop the looting in a timely manner, they abdicated the initiative to either the Noriega factions or to sociopolitical factors embodied in the mobs.

US forces did maintain the offensive in the move to the interior of Panama, however. The fact that the PDF garrisoned in the interior of Panama made no apparent effort to resist US forces does not change the fact that, militarily, the US forces maintained the offensive. The absence of fighting does not negate this successful
application of the offensive.

**Mass.** The philosophy of both General Maxwell R. Thurman, commander in chief (CINC), SOUTHCOM, and Lieutenant General Carl W. Stiner, commander, Joint Task Force (JTF) South, was to emphasize the principle of *mass.* Time and again during the planning process, the idea of applying overwhelming combat power was espoused. The purpose of applying overwhelming combat power was to shorten the conflict. An enemy faced with vastly superior combat power is less likely to resist, and the force with superior combat power obviously enhances its force protection capability. Applying overwhelming force is likely to decrease the number of casualties on both sides of the conflict.

In Operation Just Cause, more than 12 infantry battalions, supported by an impressive array of combat support (military police, aviation and engineer) and air fire support platforms, conducted the initial assaults on D-day. They were followed by an additional six infantry battalions in the days that followed. This force was pitted against a PDF force of four battalion equivalents. The majority of the PDF was organized into separate companies. Consequently, the disparate organizations and strengths of the PDF companies make direct comparison with US forces difficult. The disparate organization of the PDF force and the dispersed nature of its garrisons in fact enhanced our mass advantage and allowed the US forces to attack and defeat each company in detail, maintaining a 3–1 superiority while doing so. The ability to mass combat power against each objective quickly and nearly simultaneously gave the PDF no chance to react or regroup. No one principle is decisive in war, but properly applying the principle of mass was the key factor in this victory.

**Economy of Force.** *Economy of force* is difficult to examine because, once again, Just Cause was not strictly “conventional” at the operational level. As with the offensive, it must be examined in a broader context, and the best example of its application at the operational level was the use of Special Forces. Before H–hour, three Special Forces teams were to provide reconnaissance and surveillance against two D-day objectives and a critical bridge. These teams had the additional task of interdicting any military forces leaving those sites. At the Pacora River Bridge, situated between Fort Cimarron and the Tocumen–Torriojos Airport, a 22-man Special Forces team executed the mission. In the course of the evening, the team prevented several mounted attempts at crossing the river toward the Rangers’ airhead at the airport. Throughout the night, six vehicles were destroyed by the team and its AC–130 fire support platform.7

**Force Ratios on D–Day** *(exclusive of air support weapons)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>PDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Comandancia</td>
<td>Mech Bn TF</td>
<td>2 PDF Cos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tocumen–Torriojos</td>
<td>4 Rgr Cos</td>
<td>1 PDF Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Hato</td>
<td>5 Rgr Cos</td>
<td>2 PDF Cos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Amador</td>
<td>1 Inf Bn</td>
<td>1 PDF Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curundu–Balboa</td>
<td>1 Inf Bn</td>
<td>Various Police Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Cimarron</td>
<td>1 Inf Bn</td>
<td>0 (Bn 2000 missing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinajitos</td>
<td>1 Inf Bn</td>
<td>1 PDF Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama Viejo</td>
<td>1 Inf Bn</td>
<td>1 Cav Sqdn (ceremonial) &amp; Elements of Special Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Espinar</td>
<td>1 Inf Co(+)</td>
<td>1 PDF Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coco Solo</td>
<td>1 Inf Co(+)</td>
<td>100–Man Naval Infantry Co</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

March 1991 • MILITARY REVIEW
Psychological operations (PSYOP) and electronic warfare (EW) are also economy-of-force or force multiplier operations. The EW effort was particularly effective just before H-hour. A broad range of transmitters was effectively shut down by the effort. PSYOP also was to have played an effective role in the initial battle. A Special Forces team temporarily disabled a television station transmission site. In its frequency, an EC-130 airborne PSYOP transmission platform broadcast prepackaged tapes.

The effectiveness of that effort was questionable, however. After the battle, reports tell of the seal of the DOD being broadcast over the channel without any accompanying message. In Panama, PSYOP units scrambled to produce additional tapes. Although the television channel was denied to the Noriega forces, Radio Nacional continued to broadcast its pro-Noriega message for several days. On the airwaves, it was a case of too little, too late.

Special Forces also played an economy-of-force role in the maneuvers to disarm the remainder of the PDF in the interior of Panama. When a town was selected to be the next objective, a small Special Forces element was inserted into the airfield. Opposition was not expected, but by leading with a small team (supported by an AC-130), the larger force, which was close behind, was less likely to become decisively engaged. The level of confrontation was kept low by using a small team initially and the overt threat of the large follow-on force, Ranger or infantry battalion. The demonstrated effect of employing overwhelming combat power in the opening phases of the campaign at H-hour, D-day, made smaller, less threatening moves subsequently possible. This method resulted in the remainder of Panama capitulating to US forces.

**Maneuver.** According to FM 100-5, maneuver consists of “three interrelated dimensions: flexibility, mobility, and maneuverability.” Maneuver implies movement but doctrinally includes other dimensions. Maneuver includes fire and movement, the “considered application of the principles of mass and economy of force,” and flexibility in “thought, plans,
Additional ground movement was hampered by the unfortunate results of the 82d Airborne Division's heavy drop. In a bid to keep the Tocumen–Torriojos runways clear for follow-on operations, the wheeled and tracked vehicles were dropped by parachute on a neighboring drop zone. The land, however, was low, and the majority of the unit's vehicles became stuck in the mud. The unit attempted to improvise with rental cars, but the lack of transportation had a detrimental impact on mobility. The absence of those vehicles undoubtedly contributed to the inexplicable delay in moving into the city to stop the looting.

Flexibility is also an inherent component of maneuver. In many respects, the major battles of Just Cause resembled "set-piece affairs." Although Stiner had verbally outlined his thoughts on subsequent moves to his commanders and staff, no written campaign plan had been prepared for actions past the initial assaults at either the unified command level or the JTF level. Operationally, little flexibility was required during these initial operations. There were glimpses of flexibility, however.

Within the ground forces and aircrews from Continental United States (CONUS), completing the outloading process and marshaling for the assault was a gigantic exercise in flexibility as they struggled to maintain some semblance of order in the face of a severe ice storm in the Carolinas. Tactically, the reconnaissance and surveillance teams at the Pacora River Bridge were forced to extemporize as the first of six PDF vehicles neared the bridge before the team was fully settled. The mechanized task force also practiced flexibility as it encountered obstacles across its routes to isolate the Comandancia. The technique employed to pacify the interior of Panama was developed nearly on the run by the units involved. Its acceptance by the chain of command of JTF South exhibited not only flexibility but also a willingness to accept calculated risks as well.

Despite the absence of large armored forces rolling across the plains to conduct deep penetrations or slashing envelopments, the compo-
nents of fire and movement, the principles of mass and economy of force, and flexibility were all applied to an appropriate degree. Consequently, when viewed in all of its components, the principle of maneuver was applied throughout *Just Cause*.

**Unity of Command.** When addressing unity of command, FM 100-5 states, "Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved by vesting a single commander with the requisite authority to direct and to coordinate all forces employed in pursuit of a common goal." One of the primary results of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act has been to place "requisite authority" in a single commander—the unified command's CINC.

Throughout the planning process and execution, there was a clear chain of command from the president to the CINC. In fact, since Thurman gave Stiner operational control of the entire fighting force, that clearly delineated chain of command proceeded down to the tactical levels. Unlike other contingency operations, service rivalries and politics were not allowed to hamstring the planning and execution of the operation. There was never any doubt in Stiner's mind for whom he was working. As he said in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "There were no problems with ambiguous relationships or units receiving guidance from multiple sources. These were direct results of the Reorganization Act and Special Operations legislation." 13

Despite parochial comments, *Just Cause* was a joint operation. All four services, with a diverse array of tactical units, participated in *Just Cause*, as did a host of supporting CINCs and agencies. Thurman, as the supported CINC, was the warfighting CINC, and he had a great deal of latitude in how he fought the war. Despite the preponderance of one service, it was the Joint Staff in Washington that monitored and supervised the unified command. The conflict was very much a joint effort.

Tactically, throughout the operation, care was taken to ensure that the chain of command did not become muddled. Subordinate units had their higher headquarters change on them in the course of the battle, but the passage of operational control was clearly delineated and stated in appropriate fragmentary orders.

Operationally, then, unity of command was applied. But it was applied, on one hand, by the US Congress. The Reorganization Act has effectively placed the operational employment of troops in the joint system. Therefore, the single responsible commander, the CINC, is no longer fettered by conflicting operational direction from the services. Unity of command was also facilitated by Thurman's decision to place all forces under the operational control of JTF South. Such had not always been the plan, and there was a conscious decision on Thurman's part to direct that change.

**Security.** Security can be achieved by three means: namely, applying operational security (OPSEC) measures, hiding a force or being deceiving as to its intent, and using combat power. The planning and execution of *Just Cause* saw the application of all three of those measures.

Planning for the possibility of US forces being involved...
From Noriega's perspective, the United States did not have the will to take any truly decisive action. The previous troop deployments and exercises lulled Noriega into believing that the United States did not have the will to act in Panama.

Combat preparations were effectively hidden from PDF cognizance. For example, while the PURPLE STORM and SAND FLEA exercises, which JTF Panama conducted during the latter half of 1989, were to exercise US treaty rights, they also served an ancillary purpose of conditioning the PDF to US force movements in Panama. Additionally, tactical commanders could rehearse their missions on their actual objectives.

committed against the PDF in Panama began with the JCS Planning Order of 28 February 1988.14 Although the resulting Blue Spoon operation order was updated in October 1989, many of the objectives remained virtually unchanged. The fact that the US forces did not encounter more difficult obstacles and resistance on their respective objectives indicates that the OPSEC of the plan was maintained throughout the nearly two years of its existence. Proper OPSEC appears to have been maintained.

Combat preparations were effectively hidden from PDF cognizance. For example, while the PURPLE STORM and SAND FLEA exercises, which JTF Panama conducted during the latter half of 1989, were to exercise US treaty rights, they also served an ancillary purpose of conditioning the PDF to US force movements in Panama. Additionally, tactical commanders could rehearse their missions on their actual objectives. The six separate deployments of security enhancement forces to Panama over the preceding two years conditioned the PDF—and more important, Noriega—to the United States dispatching troops without decisive result during periods of increased tension.15 Other preparations, such as infiltrating and hiding M551 tanks and AH-64 helicopters, were conducted more conventionally. These weapon systems arrived during the hours of darkness and were kept from public view until they were operationally required. As the foregoing relates, security was enhanced by each of these actions.

Finally, security can also be achieved through strength. There is little doubt that one reason the enemy never “acquired an unexpected advantage” is because he generally chose not to fight. After the initial actions, he realized his military position was hopeless. The PDF, despite its organization as a military force, did not have the means to counter the armed strength of the United States. The PDF was essentially destroyed as a conventional fighting force and was not able to make the transition to a guerrilla army throughout the operation, if such was its intention. Strength ensured security.

Surprise. There has been a good deal of discussion on whether the PDF was alerted to Just Cause and whether surprise was maintained. With the cable news networks’ coverage of events at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, over the two days before H-hour, only a megalomaniac would have discounted the possibility of an invasion. That a leak occurred in the hours before the invasion has been neither denied nor confirmed. Regardless of a leak, no army can strike without giving indications of impending operations. As a snake must coil to strike, so also must an army reposition and marshal its assets and move to its jump-off point, either by air, ground or sea. Since firing actually began before H-hour, surprise was lost at least at one location.16

Surprise is not a homogenous factor on a battlefield and must be viewed at several levels. As I have discussed, Just Cause may have been compromised at the operational level. Whether through prior notification, the reporting of the news networks, or proper analysis of a variety of indicators, certain leaders within the PDF expected the invasion. From the tactical perspec-
Despite parochial comments, Just Cause was a joint operation.
All four services, with a diverse array of tactical units, participated in Just Cause, as did a host of supporting CINC's and agencies. Thurman, as the supported CINC, was the warfighting CINC. . . . Despite the preponderance of one service, it was the Joint Staff in Washington that monitored and supervised the unified command. The conflict was very much a joint effort.

despite all of these actions, nothing changed. Noriega and his government remained firmly in control. From Noriega's perspective, the United States did not have the will to take any truly decisive action. The previous troop deployments and exercises lulled Noriega into believing that the United States did not have the will to act in Panama.

Simplicity. Just Cause was a complex, finely tuned military operation made executable only through clear, concise orders and realistically conducted rehearsals. So, from the outside looking in, simplicity appears to have been lacking. Subordinates had not understood their tasks and had the operation not been rehearsed, military disaster might well have been the result.

Panama was not a neat, linear battlefield. Although, at the operational level, linear unit
When a town was selected to be the next objective, a small Special Forces element was inserted into the airfield. . . . The level of confrontation was kept low by using a small team initially and the overt threat of the large follow-on force, Ranger or infantry battalion. The demonstrated effect of employing overwhelming combat power in the opening phases of the campaign at H-hour, D-day, made smaller, less threatening moves subsequently possible.

bay, less than a mile distant, a mechanized battalion attacked to the southeast to isolate the Comandancia. Supporting this mosaic was a variety of fixed- and rotary-wing lift and gunships, all of which required refueling either from Strategic Air Command tankers or forward arming and refueling points deployed to field sites. Air traffic control was a colossal effort at the local level.

Air traffic control was a monumental effort not only in Panama. More than 200 sorties deployed in an air train 67 miles long. Planes marshaled from bases all over CONUS, converged, rendezvoused with tankers to refuel en route, evaded detection and delivered their loads at the appropriate place. Just Cause was complicated, indeed, but, as with many of the principles, the perspective changes between the operational and tactical levels.

The fact that the operation was not a failure testifies to the simplicity of the plan at the tactical and lower end of the operational level. At the battalion level, the tasks were relatively straightforward, in that units were tasked to conduct doctrinally appropriate missions. Combat operations are never "easy," but in Just Cause, they were straightforward: conduct a parachute assault to seize an airhead, attack to isolate . . . and so forth. The most complicated battalion missions fell to the battalions of the 82d Airborne Division. These three battalions conducted a parachute assault and assembled and subsequently conducted an air assault to seize an objective.

At the lower end of the operational level, simplicity was enhanced by using clear, concise orders and using standard control measures to the brigade task forces. The brigade task forces from the 82d Airborne Division had the eastern half of Panama City. The Panama-based 193d Infantry Brigade was allotted the western portion of the city and the canal operating area. The Marine task force was responsible for the Bridge of the Americas and the west bank, while the brigade from the 7th Infantry Division was responsible for Colón. Using standard orders and overlays simplified understanding the tasks and enhanced communications between headquarters.

It was primarily at the upper ends of the operational level of war that the operation became complicated. Delivering the force to the battlefield was a challenging, complicated task, possibly the most critical of the entire operation. A force must be delivered to the battlefield in a combat formation—ready to fight—to be able to fight. Despite tremendous obstacles, the Military Airlift Command delivered the combat formations.

Was the principle of simplicity applied? The answer is mixed. At the tactical and lower end of the operational level, the operation was kept simple. At the upper end of the operational level, Just Cause was a complicated, yet finely tuned, military operation.

Was Just Cause as successful, doctrinally, as it appears to have been portrayed? Were the principles of war applied? Should the principles be
reviewed for applicability to short-duration contingency operations? There can be no doubt that the operation was extremely successful. But certain events indicate that, when the principles of war are applied to short-duration contingency operations in a LIC environment, the interpretation of the principles must be viewed within a broader context than normal. The forms that some of the principles may take are likely to be less traditional or "military" and more "police" or "political" in nature. As the analysis of the principle of maneuver showed, the principles are not always what they appear to be at first glance. Maneuver is more than just movement; only by understanding the components can the whole be understood. It is by examining the components of each of the principles against the political backdrop of LIC that we identify the forms they may take in contingency operations.

This discussion has been an attempt to generate thought on the applicability of the principles of war on Just Cause in particular and on contingency operations in general. If we are not to stagnate as a profession, we must critically examine our performance in the crucible of combat. Future knowledge and competence are founded on a thorough understanding of past conflict. The many after-action reviews (hot washes) of the participating units provided them with specific items toward which to guide future training. Hopefully, this discussion will spark a corresponding study of our doctrine. Remember, when our forces are committed to combat, not only will those in Washington not accept excuses but neither will the American people. **MR**

---

**Panama was not a neat, linear battlefield.** Although, at the operational level, linear unit boundaries were assigned during the initial operations, they were of little value. The battlefield more resembled a lethal mosaic of separate attacks conducted by land, sea and air from the four points of the compass.

---

**NOTES**

1. Major General Wayne A. Downing, as battalion commander of 2d Battalion, 75th Rangers, in a talk to his officers in 1978.
4. Message from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), DTG 182252Z December 1989. Subject: Execute Order.
6. JCS, Execute Order.
7. Ibid.
8. Author's notes.
9. JCS, Execute Order.
11. Author's notes.
12. FM 100-5, Operations, 176.
16. Author's note.
18. SOUTHCOM Command Brief, "Just Cause—The Rebirth of a Nation.”
19. JTF South OPORD 90-1 (Blue Spoon), dated 3 November 1990.
20. Ibid.
Low-intensity conflict situations demand a flexible approach to using military force. This is especially true in employing fire support assets when it becomes necessary to use military force. The author describes the restrictions on, and adjustments made by, US fire support planners and commanders in using fire support assets in Operation Just Cause to reduce civilian casualties and collateral damage.

Published during the month of Operation Just Cause, December 1989, US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), provides new doctrine for warfighters:

"At the operational and strategic levels, military operations in LIC are best understood as indirect operations conducted for political, economic and psychological effects. While the concepts of direct and indirect operations are different, they are complementary, not mutually exclusive. It is possible, and sometimes necessary, to secure policy objectives by indirect operations, direct operations, or both."

The use of military force in Panama began as a politico-military confrontation and ended in a shooting war. Just Cause had to be quick and had to use all of the military options that would limit American and Panamanian casualties. Furthermore, the operation had to deliver Manuel Noriega to the Department of Justice, restore a democratically elected government to power and, finally, allow the Panamanian people to return to a normal way of life. Operation planners had to make it clear to the US forces and the Panamanian people that the United States had declared war only on Noriega and his forces—not the Panamanian people, their homes and their property.

Operation Just Cause was a unique operation with respect to joint fire support. The operation introduced new roles for fire support in LIC. In a 1988 address, President Ronald Reagan set the stage for the need for those new roles:

"Low intensity conflict typically manifests itself as political—military confrontation below the level of conventional war, frequently involving protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies, and ranging from subversion to the direct use of military force."

In Panama, because the direct use of military force was constrained, fire support was restricted, and new roles were given to the fire support community. Operation Just Cause demonstrated that the joint fire support community must prepare for constraints in employing weapon systems and in assuming new missions. These constraints were a result of the combatant commander's rules of engagement, new missions for the fire supporters and targeting restraints upon weapon...
system employment.

The joint fire support community is made up of persons in the traditional arms or branches of service that support maneuver forces and includes the weapon systems they use. For the Army, the weapon systems in the community include mortars, field artillery, attack helicopters, electronic warfare, and rockets. The Air Force component includes any aircraft that provides ordnance at the request of ground forces. Naval fire support includes Marine air, Navy air and naval gunfire.

The commander of the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), as well as the Joint Task Force (JTF) South commander, decided that, in many cases, using available fire support assets was not in the best interest of the military and political objectives. The realities of LIC illustrate the need for fire supporters to re-examine their operational missions and to understand that LIC places more restraints on firepower than any other level of conflict. FM 100-5, Operations, states that firepower provides the destructive force essential to defeating the enemy’s will to fight. Firepower may also be used independently of maneuver to destroy, delay or disrupt uncommitted forces. To the fire support community, LIC places [great] restraints on firepower than any doctrine places more restraints on firepower than any doctrine. The commander of the Field Artillery Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, Major General Raphael J. Hallada, addressed the issue:

“...FM 100-5, Operations, states that firepower provides the destructive force essential to defeating the enemy’s will to fight [and may] be used independently of maneuver to destroy, delay or disrupt uncommitted forces. To the fire support community, this doctrine is nothing new. But in Panama, the rules of engagement made applying firepower a critical decision.

The commander of the Field Artillery Center...
At H-hour on 20 December 1989, AC-130 gunships provided the majority of the fire support. So accurate were their fires that buildings brought under fire were heavily damaged, but collateral damage was limited. In the case of the Balboa police station, which was a target for the gunships, a nativity scene outside the station was still standing after the attack.

- 30U Bp
- 1
- JW
- It Il-hour on 20 December 1989. (C-130 gunships provided the majority, fire support. So accurate were their fires that buildings brought under fire were heavily damaged, but collateral damage was limited. In the case of the Balboa police station, which was a target for the gunships, a nativity scene outside the station was still standing after the attack.

The need to develop an area weapon system, such as mass destruction with little regard for collateral damage, at the instant called for the eliminating, neutralizing, or suppressing an enemy, field artillery was the weapon of choice. Avoiding collateral damage caused this perception to take in Panama. Fire-support planners had to choose either direct fire weapon systems to accomplish the mission.

The conventional support systems related only to artillery systems. Use of tactical fixed-wing aircraft for air support of US ground forces was constrained by several factors, including the proximity of much of the fighting to civilian population centers. The long, traditional use of naval gunfire support was also restricted. As the USS Vincennes was steaming on the coast of Costa Rica, the fire-support coordinator at the IFF headquarters requested that the ship be used as a backup fire-support system in case the AC-130 task to support the 7th Infantry Division (Light) could not perform its fire-support mission. It was decided that naval gunfire was too restrictive a system for the area where the Army forces were to operate. Not only was the request denied, but the USS Vincennes was not even allowed to go on station.

Beyond the restrictions imposed, the fire-support community was tasked to assume new missions not usually associated with standard operating procedures. Conventional military options such as show of force and demonstrations were among these new missions. The 7th Infantry Division, light artillery commander, Colonel Michael DeMars, commented that artillery was used to present our national military strategy of deterrence at the tactical level. In a show of force demonstration, it was seen that mortars were being loaded beneath helicopters and transported around the Panamanian countryside to show the PDF that the United States was willing to use artillery.

On another instance, a demonstration of force was delivered to the PDF that it was better to surrender than be killed. At Fort Amador, US forces used loudspeakers to demand that the PDF surrender. After more than an hour of negotiations, the commander of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 508th Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel B. R. Fitzgerald, chose to demonstrate his force's su-
Indirect-fire weapon systems were virtually eliminated as a primary system; however, artillery could be used in a direct-fire role [against buildings and fortified positions or, in desperation, against an armored threat] with fewer restrictions. During fighting in Panama City and Colón, 105mm howitzers were used in a direct-fire role against PDF [units] which refused to surrender.
the artillery used in a direct-fire mode. Constraints were necessary because the operation plan was to defeat the PDF on one day and rebuild the country the next day. 12

The lessons learned for future conflicts are many. Operation Just Cause introduced the difficulties of coordinating and controlling joint fire support in LIC. Joint fire support planners, coordinators and tactical unit commanders were introduced to new missions. Weapon system capabilities came under close scrutiny to avoid collateral damage. In an urban environment, using minimum required force to minimize the loss of life and destruction to property is vital. All fire support in a LIC environment requires detailed planning, coordination and control.

Commanders must be prepared to use military options short of combat to convince the enemy to stop hostile acts. As a result, knowledge of the spectrum of military options and their application must be understood in fire support units, as well as in other units and agencies employed in LIC.

The rules of engagement used in Operation Just Cause must be studied and wargamed in future exercises. The fire support community must educate maneuver forces on the limitations of fire support in LIC. Furthermore, the likelihood of having the precision platform of an AC-130 to answer all calls for fire will be minimal. As a result, the fire support community must have a backup system always available. It should be noted that traditional field artillery was always considered the backup system during Just Cause. Its use would have required additional coordination, but it did remain ready.

Finally, rules of engagement will have to be refined to weapon systems and, in certain instances, to particular types of ordnance. LIC that culminates in the direct use of military force will not easily conform to the traditional role of fire support. The imaginative and responsive role that fire support played in Operation Just Cause may well be the traditional role of the future.MR

NOTES

4. FM 100-20. E-9
7. MAJ Edward J. Lesnowicz. USMC, assistant fire support coordinator. Joint Task Force South. Personal interview, 6 May 1990
10. Ibid
11. Ibid
12. XVIII Airborne Corps. "Joint Task Force South Operation Just Cause"

Major Samuel S. Wood Jr. is assigned to the Combined Field Army Headquarters at Camp Red Cloud, Korea. He received a B.A. from The Citadel, master's degrees from Webster University, and is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College. He has held a variety of assignments in the Continental United States and Europe, including commander, 2d US Army Field Artillery Detachment, Pfullendorf, Germany, and duty with the 59th Ordnance Brigade Staff Element, Central Army Group, Heidelberg, Germany. He was inspector general, US Army Recruiting Command, Fort Sheridan, Illinois, and assistant S3, battalion executive officer and assistant fire support coordinator with the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

March 1991 • MILITARY REVIEW
The focus of most scrutiny will appropriately fall on the performance and cooperation of the combat forces that executed Operation Just Cause. But, another aspect of the Panama crisis that deserves some study is the significant role played by the military police (MP) in the tense and often violent environment that was present in the two years before the intervention. The author describes the many complex and changing missions assigned to the MPs and their performance in numerous direct confrontations with the Panama Defense Forces.

At 0705, 3 March 1989, the Department of Defense Dependent School system (DODDS) called the Fort Clayton military police (MP) station. The Panama Defense Forces (PDF) had just detained a school bus carrying US children and had taken it to the Traffic Police Headquarters in Panama City. At 0710, one MP from the liaison section departed for the scene. By 0715, the situation had worsened. DODDS now reported seven buses had been detained. The provost marshal (PM) and operations officer moved to the scene. En route, the PM issued orders to contact the MP Emergency Operation Center and Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama. The 463d MP Company, the reaction force, was alerted but did not deploy. When the PM arrived at 0726, the PDF was holding nine school buses and approximately 100 children hostage in the parking lot and adjacent street.

The PM, operations officer and the one MP liaison section went to the buses, removed the vehicle keys and ordered the children to stay on the buses. This stopped the PDF from moving them to another location. The PDF brought in more troops and vehicles to stop the MPs. In response, the PM called for additional reinforcements. Three patrols from the 534th MP Company and eight plain-clothes MPs from the Provost Marshal’s Office (PMO) arrived within 20 minutes. The PM placed them on the buses and in the parking lot to protect the children and prevent the PDF from boarding the buses.

The PDF refused to negotiate the release of the children or buses. At 0745, the PDF tried to tow a school bus with the children still on it. MPs blocked the tow truck. At 0800, the PDF...
PDF decided to negotiate and agreed to release the children. At 0830, MP evacuation teams and DODDS personnel safely evacuated the last child. With the children safe, the PM demanded they release the buses.

A series of tense and hostile negotiations began between the PM and Major Luis Cordova, the traffic police commander. At 0915, JTF Panama deployed the MP reaction force company to Albrook Air Force Station. At 0930, the 463d MP Company also moved into Albrook. At 0935, the PDF released the buses, and MPs cleared the scene by 0950. By noon, Cordova had explained to General Manuel Noriega why another attempt to terrorize US residents and discredit the MPs in Panama had failed. But, the Panama crisis continued.

In accordance with the Panama Canal Treaty, the PDF was responsible for protecting Americans off-post. The PDF was composed of approximately 14,000 military, police, customs and investigation personnel. It ran the government, and it controlled the courts. As the relationship between the United States and Panama deteriorated, Noriega used the PDF and its power to put pressure on the US population.

The incident involving the children epitomized the MP role during the struggle with Noriega. They played a critical role in protecting American lives and property in Panama. MPs were the first line of defense in a frustrating and dangerous security operation that included protecting US military and civilians off-post, as well as from the mounting threat of infiltrations and crime on US installations.

The Situation Before the Coup

The situation off-post was a powder keg waiting to explode. Nearly 7,000 military personnel and their family members resided off-post, and thousands more traveled through Panama daily. The quality of life was poor for most Panamanians. Their discontent resulted in frequent strikes, demonstrations and riots. Power blackouts occurred frequently. There was a major increase in off-post crime directed against Americans. And instead of providing for the safety of all residents, the PDF became major contributors to the harassment and abuse directed at Americans.

With the PDF failing to protect Americans, the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) looked to the MPs to fill the void. This led to even greater requirements for the MPs. Not permitted to patrol in Panama itself, the MPs devised other methods of protecting the Americans. The liaison teams and immediate reaction forces that acted so quickly in the school bus incident provided the needed protection and still operated within the constraints of the Canal Treaty and the rules of engagement (ROE) imposed during the crisis.

The PMO was best organized to the protect Americans living and traveling in Panama. Their daily mission enabled them to have outstanding knowledge of Panama and the PDF. The 11-man MP liaison section was the workhorse for all off-post operations. It contained highly trained Spanish linguists whose mission brought them into constant contact with the PDF. The Panama Canal Treaty authorized the liaison section to operate in Panama on a cooperative basis with the PDF.

In July 1987, the PMO instituted measures to protect US personnel. The MP liaison section monitored all riots and demonstrations. They sent reports on the routes, levels of violence and PDF activity. The PMO relayed the information to SOUTHCOM television and radio which then warned Americans to avoid those areas.
Nearly 7,000 military personnel and their family members resided off-post, and thousands more traveled through Panama daily. There was a major increase in off-post crime directed against Americans. And instead of providing for the safety of all residents, the PDF became major contributors to the harassment and abuse directed at Americans.
MP liaison teams responded immediately to any American detention or arrest, resolving it at the lowest possible level. If this failed, available MP reaction forces deployed to the incident scene to assist Americans and defuse the incident. Despite these and other measures, the situation still escalated. Confrontations between the MP and PDF patrols occurred regularly after June 1987. The PDF often locked and loaded weapons over minor disagreements. MPs walked a fine line in numerous volatile situations. Meetings between the PDF and the PM were occasionally successful in reducing tensions, at least for the short term.

The security mission to counter base intrusion was equally difficult. MP patrols protected Americans living on base from infiltrations by PDF "intruders." The PDF infiltrated to gather intelligence on units and key personnel, and to probe the perimeters to test reaction forces. MPs also protected Americans from the criminals who penetrated the bases to steal food and property. This security mission became more difficult with the declining Panamanian economy. The US bases became a source of food and profit, resulting in increased property crime and infiltrations. The MPs continued their effort to secure the bases but were unable to cover all on-base areas.

When the Panama crisis started in June 1987, there were two MP companies stationed in Panama—the 534th MP Company on the Pacific and the 549th on the Atlantic. The headquarters company, containing the PMO and command and staff personnel, was also stationed on the Pacific. These units secured 15 major installations and training areas. They handled all MP patrol operations, out-of-country deployments, and support to SOUTHCOM. This resulted in a serious manpower shortage when the MPs were needed the most.

Less than 10 MP patrols protected the installations. Most bases did not have MPs to man the gates. Patrols worked 12 hours or longer with little time off. They did not have heavy weapons. The only reaction force consisted of lightly armed teams from the PMO. The PDF, realizing the vulnerability of the MPs, became more aggressive.

The base security situation became increasingly worse by December 1987. However, the MPs gained the support of the 193d Infantry Brigade for Operation Bushmaster. This involved joint MP–infantry patrolling of the jungle around the bases. The patrolling, when available, helped reduce infiltrations.

Confrontations at joint US–PDF installations occurred with increasing frequency from January through March 1988. The MPs were at a disadvantage, always being outnumbered and outgunned at the scene. Back up came from any available MP patrols or the PMO. Cooperation between the PDF and US MPs became nearly nonexistent. The PDF negotiated with its weapons locked, loaded and off–safe.

The coup attempt on 16 March 1988 caused serious trouble and threatened US bases and personnel. Escaping coup plotters exchanged gunfire with the PDF as they ran to US bases. Railroad cars, burning barricades and demonstrators blocked the streets. The PDF deliberately parked gasoline trucks in front of the US Embassy and Fort Clayton, and closed the main supply route (MSR) between the Pacific and Atlantic bases.
Tilt' chaos resulting from the elections quickly struck the US population.
To regain control and protect Americans, President George Bush deployed 1,900 combat troops to reinforce the MPs on 11 May. The force included a light infantry battalion task force, a mechanized infantry battalion(-) and a Marine light armored infantry company. The evacuation of all US family members continued while the units deployed to Panama.

From January to March, these teams prepared for an evacuation. They identified primary and alternate evacuation routes to US bases. The teams located possible helicopter landing zones in Panama City and Colon, and they conducted day and night reconnaissance of the routes. They developed and covertly exercised the
The evacuation teams were used extensively in their secondary assignment as rescue teams. They rescued an American soldier's wife wounded by stray bullets during a riot and others assisted families overcome by tear gas in their off-post quarters. The teams were often the only expedient reaction force for MP patrols in confronting the PDF.

By March 1988, the situation had reached crisis proportions. The serious installation protection problems were too much for the available MPs to handle. After the coup attempt, the situation off-post was chaotic, and General Fred F. Woerner, the commander in chief, SOUTHCOM, requested an MP brigade from the United States.

The Augmentation Security Force Arrives

The 16th MP Brigade (Airborne) deployed in late March. By early April, there were eight MP companies in Panama. The brigade commander immediately used his manpower, mobility and communications assets to establish a strong presence. The residents began to feel secure and safe again.

New patrols and checkpoints were instituted, and key facilities were secured. Communications sites along with JTF Panama and SOUTHCOM headquarters received special emphasis. One MP company was available as a reaction force at all times. The brigade established an intensive training program and began joint training exercises. These also served as a show of force to the PDF. By June, the 16th MP Brigade had restored order in Panama.

By September, the crisis situation showed noticeable improvement. Harassment and infiltrations occurred but at a much lower rate. SOUTHCOM reduced the augmentation force to one MP battalion of four companies. With the reduction complete, the PDF sensed an opportunity and acted. By November, infiltrations were increasing, and the on-post crime rate rose accordingly. The MPs had to refocus missions to meet this renewed challenge.

Again it was manpower-intensive. Three companies of MPs were on patrol over a 24-hour period. Some patrols roved in marked cars, while others were assigned by the PM to patrol on foot in isolated or crime-prone sections of troop and family housing areas. They remained highly visible to the residents and provided additional security to the area. This "high-visibility enforcement patrol" used tactical vehicles to allow them to operate in a garrison or tactical environment. They were not tied down to one sector but spread out to blanket the installation. They also were an asset that could react quickly to a situation in a different sector or on a different base.

To stop infiltrations, MP teams and squads deployed into the jungle surrounding the bases. Patrols followed strict ROE. They operated only within installation boundaries and could not pursue intruders or trespassers into Panamanian territory. The patrols and observation posts proved useful as an early warning system against an attack on US bases.

A continuous and aggressive system of patrolling worked. By March 1989, the patrols proved their success with large numbers of sightings and apprehensions. The property crime rate dropped considerably, and infiltrations dropped to nearly zero. The jungle was no longer providing an easy access route onto the bases.
MP units lack a viable antiarmor weapon and a combat vehicle. This could have been a very serious problem had the PDF used their V-300 armored car in combat before the reinforcements of May 1989. To be a credible force in similar situations, the MPs require a system with an antiarmor capability and better protection than a [HMMWV]. Without these capabilities, it will be necessary, as it was in Panama, to divert combat units from other missions to assist in force protection and security missions that could be better handled by MPs.

The Panama Elections

By January 1989, as the security on the bases improved, the off-post situation started to deteriorate again. This time, the main target was the MPs. They were shot at, attacked with machetes and knives, detained and harassed. The PDF confiscated vehicles and stole license plates. It tried to limit movement around Panama City and along the canal. The MPs were deployed to counter this campaign and to enforce the rights of Americans to travel freely throughout Panama. Confrontations often resulted, and the PDF would back down only when met with force. Words had little effect.

With the approach of the elections, the PDF detained school buses, troop convoys and MPs. Others broke into off-post US housing, searching for "spies." The PDF used massive checkpoints and roadblocks to control the population. The MPs challenged the PDF to protect US rights under the Panama Canal Treaty. MP-PDF confrontations erupted throughout the area along the Canal.

This led to a strong reaction. The PDF Battalion 2000 and Dignity battalions were now active in Panama, and these units manned checkpoints in Panama City. For the first time, they deployed their light armor: V-150 and V-300 armored cars, the latter equipped with a 90mm gun. Despite the new threats, the MPs continued to perform their security missions in and around Panama City. Despite this escalation of tension, the ROE remained unchanged, and MPs steadfastly adhered to them. SOUTHCOM did not want to provoke the PDF into an incident that could cancel the election or lead to war.

The MP liaison sergeants handled many confrontations on their own. Careful negotiation, patience and diplomacy usually led to favorable results. When this tact failed, additional personnel, including the PM and his staff, deployed to the crisis scene. A show of force and steadfast determination resulted in the PDF backing down and releasing detained Americans.

By April 1989, this system was in jeopardy. The PMO still provided the off-post reaction force, using evacuation teams in their secondary role. But the increase in incidents and tension...
left our security forces outnumbered and outgunned by the PDF. At 0230, 6 April, 10 members of the PDF, carrying pistols and automatic weapons, surrounded two MPs from the PMO. The PDF prevented them from intervening during a search of an American civilian’s home in Panama City. Under these circumstances, the PMO teams could hardly protect residents or themselves.

The MP reaction company also had its restraints. It could not deploy until authorized by JTF/Panama and was not allowed off-post. It had no armored vehicles or heavy weapons available. After part of the MP forces had returned to the United States the previous September, the PM used reaction forces to cover some missions. These constraints prevented its effective use in areas away from the canal.

The situation during the May 1989 election grew very hostile. The PDF feared an imminent US invasion, and at 2100, 5 May 1989, it sealed off the former Canal Zone area. The checkpoints came as a surprise to JTF/Panama and SOUTHCOM. The PMO deployed its reaction forces to the 13 checkpoints to protect any Americans returning to the bases from Panama City. JTF/Panama alerted the MP company reaction force but did not deploy it.

Americans caught up in the blockade were detained and harassed. The PDF pulled its weapons and tried to search or confiscate the cars. Pushing and shoving occurred between MPs and the PDF at some checkpoints. Despite the problems, no Americans were injured, and as most were returned to secure areas, the situation eased. JTF/Panama stood down the PMO reaction force at 0230, 6 May 1989, and SOUTHCOM allowed the checkpoints to remain in place.

After the election on 7 May, Panama erupted into violence when Noriega overruled the election results. On 8 May, a PDF company deployed into the jungle north of Fort Clayton, and on 9 and 10 May, the PDF detained and tried to arrest several evacuation team MPs at the checkpoints. On 10 May, the Dignity battalions violently broke up anti-Noriega demonstrations and strikes. The crisis was now at a flashpoint.

**Reinforcements**

The chaos resulting from the elections quickly struck the US population. To regain control and protect Americans, President George Bush deployed 1,900 combat troops to reinforce the MPs on 11 May. The force included a light infantry battalion task force, a mechanized infantry battalion(-) and a Marine light armored infantry company. The evacuation of all US family members continued while the units deployed to Panama, arriving on 18 May. All off-post residents were evacuated onto US bases or sent back to the United States.

Operations to reinforce the command and the deployment of infantry and armored vehicles changed the picture. SOUTHCOM relaxed restrictions on the reaction force and reinforced it with infantry and Marine units. This, plus an aggressive ROE, provided the firepower essential to enforce demands at the confrontations.

The effects were significant. In August 1989, the PDF detained MPs at Amador and Curundu. The United States responded with a reaction force of MP patrols, mechanized infantry and Marines which deployed and sealed off the area. Sniper teams moved into position. The PDF aimed weapons at US forces and found itself facing overwhelming firepower. Unable to mount a credible response, the PDF released the MPs...
and withdrew from the confrontations.

The MP, infantry and Marine units performed many freedom-of-movement operations. These units patrolled the main supply route along the canal, using armed convoys of light armored vehicles, M113 armored personnel carriers and MP vehicles. These “roadrunner” missions were supported in the air by helicopter gunships and Air Force A-7s or A-37s. These efforts prevented the PDF from closing the roads as it had done during the elections.

Regularly scheduled joint training exercises prepared the MPs and combat units for any contingency. During the second coup attempt in October 1989, the MPs and combat units were deployed to secure the canal area and were generally successful in protecting US bases and personnel from harm during the final two months of the crisis.

However, the death of a Marine officer and the harassment of a Navy officer and his wife at a checkpoint seemed to demonstrate the seriousness of the constant state of confrontation. Operation Just Cause was executed, and by the first week in January 1990, Noriega was in a Miami prison, bringing to an end more than two years of crisis.

The Lessons

Force protection requirements increased tremendously during the crisis, highlighting MP capabilities and suitability in security operations. After the 16th MP Brigade arrived, there were enough MPs to handle both the on- and off-post missions. The force reduction, in September 1988, led to severe shortages of manpower as the PDF harassment increased. The MPs, even after transferring missions, could not meet the steadily increasing demands placed on them.

MP units lack a viable antiairor weapon and a combat vehicle. This could have been a very serious problem had the PDF used its V-300 armored cars in combat before the reinforcements of May 1989. To be a credible force in similar situations, the MP's require a system with an antiairor capability and better protection than a high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). Without these capabilities, it will be necessary, as it was in Panama, to divert combat units from other missions to assist in force protection and security missions that could be better handled by MPs.

Despite the problems, MP force protection operations in Panama were successful. For two years, the MPs were the only armed force confronting the PDF. Throughout the crisis, they provided reassurance to Americans in trouble who knew that, if they needed help, the MPs would respond. SOUTHCOM and JTF Panama considered the MPs the experts and used their experience and training to develop and carry out solutions to the security problem. They performed this complex mission daily in a very tense and often hostile environment.

---

Captain (P) Anthony M. Schilling is a maneuver tactics instructor, Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations Department, US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He received a B.S. from St. John’s University and a master’s degree from Oklahoma City University. His previous assignments include assistant S3, 503d Military Police (MP) Battalion, 16th MP Brigade (Airborne), and commander, 65th MP Company, 503d MP Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and operations officer, Provost Marshal Office, US Army South, Fort Clayton, Panama.
SURROUNDED by seas and secure borders, the United States has been a “force projecting” nation since the days of Presley O'Bannon and the Barbary pirates. But recent changes in the political, technological and social makeup of the world have made the use of military force far more complicated than even 20 years ago. This article discusses the current state of Army “force projection” and its growing importance to the Army of the future.

In response to a national requirement to project power rapidly, the Army has always maintained a capability to deploy certain units, with little notice, to worldwide theaters; some may remember the US Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) initiative in the late 1950s. More recently, interest in global deployability began to revive in the early 1980s as American and allied strategic interests were threatened by aggressive global policies and by the spread of sophisticated weaponry in the hands of unstable regimes in the developing world. Certainly, the Carter administration’s reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a key factor. Since then, Operations Urgent Fury, Golden Pheasant, Just Cause and, most recently, Desert Shield have shown increasing sophistication in the Army’s capability to rapidly deploy and employ forces on little notice. Force projection will continue to grow in importance in the Army’s future.

The Army’s force-building and force-projection philosophy has been mapped recently in a Chief of Staff of the Army White Paper, A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond, which outlines the principles guiding the Army into the post–Cold War future. The White Paper comments, in part, that “in the 1990s and beyond, the United States will have to rely even more heavily on the rapid deployment of Army forces from the United States to guarantee its security.” Other official statements, as well as the evolving AirLand Battle–Future doctrine, emphasize the Army’s continuing emphasis on force projection.

Since the early 1980s, the terms “rapid deployment,” “contingency operations” and “force projection” have tended to be defense community buzzwords. They have been so frequently...
invoked that there is a decided tendency, in and outside the Armed Forces, to confuse means and ends or, rather, deployment and employment. Rapid deployment is only a movement process; the task to be addressed is how to direct and execute joint contingency operations in the world today.

Technically speaking, any force projection is a "contingency" operation as it reacts to a circumstance that requires a reaction by the United States. For the purposes of this article, a "contingency operation" is an unplanned response to a crisis that requires immediate use of military power. A contingency operation can be an operation complete in itself, as occurred in Operation Just Cause, or it can be the opening phase of a larger force-projection operation, as was the initial phase of Operation Desert Shield. The Army must maintain forces sufficient not only for initial contingency operations but also for reinforcement and follow-on missions.

By their nature, contingency operations are risky enterprises. For a global superpower like the United States, they are doubly so. The success or failure, or even perceived success or failure, on the part of a small US military operation has great meaning to our friends and potential enemies. An inadvertent tactical lapse can have strategic consequences. This urgency drives a concomitant requirement for very high states of training and readiness on the part of Army forces identified for rapid response or type missions. There is also a demand for a high degree of expertise in joint operations since Army units will always deploy and fight as part of a joint force.

As a general rule, US military involvement abroad usually takes the form of low-key military
The true "lesson of Vietnam," in Clausewitzian terms, is that the strategic "center of gravity" of any future conflict, for both the United States and its enemies, is American public opinion. In other words, once conflict erupts or is even likely, both sides will target the US public to support or deny use of US military power.

assistance or training programs. In most areas of the world, US interests are well served by the slow, painstaking process of working with allied forces and economies in what used to be called "nationbuilding" activities. In these cases, Army forces operating quietly and without fanfare support a major pillar of US foreign policy.

Even given the desirability of low-key security assistance, however, situations such as faced the United States in Panama and the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf require an immediate, overt response. Technology in recent decades has provided the military services an almost exponential surge in capability to do so, as will be discussed. Coincidentally, political and technological changes in this country and overseas have profoundly changed, or should change, some basic assumptions under which contingency operations abroad are conducted.

The major impact of these changes affects joint military operations in terms of distance and time. Historically, the physical distances involved in carrying out military operations overseas provided policy makers and military commanders some room for error. The technologies of transportation and communication were comparatively slow. If distance made resupply and reinforcement difficult, it also delayed public reaction to setbacks and inhibited second-guessing the commander in the field.

Today, however, distance has ceased to be the major consideration in force projection because of communication technology and vastly improved transportation capabilities. The addition of a few thousand miles need no longer make much difference in terms of cost. In fact, the most urgent consideration today is time, as in the time it takes to plan and execute a contingency operation without forfeiting the support of the American public. Understanding that there is a public support "timer" on military operations is one of the most critical factors facing American strategists today, and it is the reason why America's future wars must be short.

The true "lesson of Vietnam," in Clausewitzian terms, is that the strategic "center of gravity" of any future conflict, for both the United States and its enemies, is American public opinion. In other words, once conflict erupts or is even likely, both sides will target the US public to support or deny use of US military power. Wrestling the media initiative from the US government and undermining public support for US objectives has become a primary strategic objective of the other side.

Witness the extraordinary, even theatrical, efforts of Saddam Hussein to court US and world opinion. The necessity of seizing the media "high ground" has been read quite clearly by all of our adversaries, some of whom today routinely attempt to influence US public opinion through advocacy groups and public relations firms. Two researchers at the US Army War College have stated the issue concisely:

"... the available evidence shows that the US public will seldom approve of a hypothetical military intervention, while it invariably will support the use of military forces once they are committed—at least in the short run. The consequences of these facts for the strategist are as obvious as they are important.

"In a democracy, public support is a priceless commodity that must not be squandered. Since the strategist can initially count on public support, his challenge is to devise strategies that will retain this support and, at the same time, achieve the political objective."

The strong support for President George Bush's decision to initiate Operation Desert Storm evidenced in the early public opinion polls bears this out. We are thus faced with a requirement for "short wars," an approach to joint con-
The proliferation of worldwide television has shown . . . that the smallest skirmishes are liable to make the evening news—or perhaps even be carried “live” by CNN—and that both sides are liable to have equal time. Television’s immediacy gives great weight to visual impressions. During the March 1988 deployment of US forces to Honduras, for example, the good discipline and obvious high spirit of individual US soldiers had an obvious impact on favorable news coverage. In a fighting war . . . that effect intensifies and directly affects US opinion.

Tingency planning that will focus on short, highly focused conflict designed to achieve national objectives while retaining public support—or at least to achieve national objectives and end before the initial surge of public support expires. The operation plan for Operation Just Cause was designed explicitly with these considerations in mind: to achieve a rapid overwhelming victory and to minimize cost, both to friendly and enemy forces as well.

There are two fundamental points to be noted here. First, the need to gain or retain public support will heavily influence all decisions, including those at the tactical level. The armed services’ most vital contribution to maintaining public support is to field expert, highly trained and motivated forces and to employ them in an effective and successful way. The proliferation of worldwide television has shown during Desert Storm that the smallest skirmishes are liable to make the evening news—or perhaps even be carried “live” by CNN (Cable News Network)—and that both sides are liable to have equal time. Television’s immediacy gives great weight to visual impressions. During the March 1988 deployment of US forces to Honduras, for example, the good discipline and obvious high spirit of individual US soldiers had an obvious impact on favorable news coverage. In a fighting war, such as Just Cause or Desert Storm, that effect intensifies and directly affects US opinion.

Second is the timer effect. Whatever objectives are to be achieved must be accomplished, and the operation terminated, as rapidly as possible. The effect of mass communication on US public opinion since World War II has
We are thus faced with a requirement for "short wars," an approach to joint contingency planning that will focus on short, highly focused conflict designed to achieve national objectives while retaining public support—or at least to achieve national objectives and end before the initial surge of public support expires.

been so dramatic that it is difficult to imagine sustained long-term public support for conflicts overseas except for the most desperate and obvious struggle for national existence. This point has not been lost on Hussein—his warfighting strategy is blatantly designed to destroy US public support by causing high US casualties.

The decision to deploy US forces in a contingency setting lends a degree of urgency to planning and security measures that contrasts sharply with the daily routine of peacetime military operations. Planners find themselves caught in several binds. The complexity of joint operations, particularly joint and special operations, requires the widest coordination, but operational and intelligence issues remain highly compartmented. Rehearsals for precise missions, often involving two or more services, must be conducted under cover of normal exercises and operations; often, the rehearsing troops are unaware of the actual plans. Finally, timing may become all-important—so important that coordination and rehearsal may be dropped, as was the case in Grenada. In writing about "the importance of timely, decisive action" in Grenada, a US Navy War College researcher pointed out that:

"The bloody events of 19-25 October provided the United States and its Caribbean allies with a 'window of opportunity.' In international politics, time is often of the essence. It was important to act while the memories of the Coard faction's atrocities were still fresh, and the regime was weak and unsure of itself. Had the United States waited, this 'window of opportunity' would have contracted and eventually disappeared."

In contrast to Grenada, and with the advantage of that operation's after-action review, Operation Just Cause was meticulously planned and rehearsed, both within Army units and across services and special operations forces. The contrast between the two operations highlights how possessing the strategic initiative allows the United States to control the timing of a specific contingency operation, at least to some degree.

Since we cannot always plan on having the strategic initiative—as we did not in the early stages of Desert Shield—Army units committed to contingency operations must be cohesive and very well trained. The Army's fundamental qualities of versatility, deployability and lethality will be tested and must continue to be the key for developing forces in this regard. It may be, in some future expedition, that forces will be denied the chance to conduct the kinds of in-depth preparation permitted in Just Cause. Should that be the case, unit standard operating procedures, battle drills and on-the-spot leadership at all levels will give employed forces a breathing space while more definitive plans are made.

Strategically, contingency operations to be mounted from the Continental United States (CONUS) require "backward" planning; that is, planning that begins with the termination of the operation and redeployment, works backward through operations subsequent to the entry of US forces, and back to entry and staging.

Such a "strategic raid" thus requires narrowly defined military objectives that can be achieved comparatively quickly. The operational outline for contingency operations that emerges is of a military campaign that is markedly different from the traditional model of deliberate buildup, followed by a number of air-land operations. To achieve operational and tactical surprise, there is no overt buildup, either in the United States or overseas. Joint contingency forces and their carriers will mass quickly and in strict secrecy.

To capitalize on surprise and speed, deployment and opening engagements are combined in a single joint operation that simultaneously attacks the enemy's own centers of gravity on as
The operational outline for contingency operations that emerges is of a military campaign that is markedly different from the traditional model of deliberate buildup, followed by a number of air–land operations. To achieve operational and tactical surprise, there is no overt buildup, either in the United States or overseas. Joint contingency forces and their carriers will mass quickly and in strict secrecy.

Many levels as possible by joint air and naval operations, combined with airborne and amphibious forced-entry assaults against major objectives. Following the initial forced entry, follow-on reinforcements are rapidly deployed to quickly mass and achieve other operational objectives, if required. The campaign's objectives are limited since initial planning places a time constraint on joint operations that requires rapid combat operations, consolidation and redeployment within a short time.

Time is vital in other areas. Considering vulnerability in the early stages of parachute and amphibious operations, achieving strategic, operational and tactical surprise is a vital necessity. The almost instantaneous nature of modern communications, now including commercial satellite imagery of a quality formerly only available to governments, permeates every aspect of modern life. Troop movements, the requirements for extensive multiservice planning by large joint staffs and the extreme newsworthiness of armed action by US forces virtually guarantee eventual compromise of contingency plans.

Joint contingency staffs must be expert, well-trained in joint procedures and, vitally important, solidly welded together by exercises, experience and common standing operating procedures because, at the operational/tactical level, the action may be no-notice, very fast and totally intermingled. Marine air will fly for Army paratroopers, and Army wounded will wind up in naval sickbays. The days that an effective joint task force headquarters could be formed ad hoc are gone forever, if they ever existed.

Strategic security is also critical at the tactical level, especially if forced-entry assaults are to be conducted, since virtually all potential adversaries have an abundance of very effective firepower. The underdeveloped world is awash with arms, much of it unsophisticated but good enough in the hands of even poorly trained troops, and many of the "troops" are effective in their own surroundings. The Beirut militias, for example, would be formidable to any infantry force that entered their battlefield.
Pinning down transportation estimates for Air Force/Army forced-entrance operations is so situationally dependent that no really accurate forecast of requirements can be made far in advance. . . . Computer-mash[ing] the entire tonnage of an airlifted unit, right down to the last mess truck, into "type" aircraft bodies . . . is neat arithmetic but poor planning, and the unfortunate result has been to obscure the real capabilities of airlift in crisis.

At the planning level, where timing actually counts, manpower is hard to be roughly even in the early stages of contingency operations. The enemy is also likely to be tightening on his own transport system. He will probably rest and march. He is likely to have some capability to counter passive and active radar detection equipment, and his units may have a more sophisticated intelligence, supplied by more expert planners. He very well may have the capability for chemical warfare as well. Certain chemical-warfighting capabilities are proliferating in the Third World, and how may not have to come into the will of some time.

At the operational and tactical levels, an incursion of this nature should not be confused with a tactical battlefield operation, whatever that means called for by some critics in the aftermath of the Grenada operation. Though the high-complexity small-unit operations were executed in Grenada, in a large sense, the strategy and more resembles a sledge hammering than a . . . . After the United States' considerable joint mobility force must be focused on gaining overwhelming force on the enemy's defense line. US forces in the initial elements of the operation face an enemy who is not facing the situation in terms of the attack. The entire situation would be sustained at a minimum logistic burden. Gaining overwhelming ground power
An austere logistic base in contingency operations minimizes the effort that must be diverted to maintain bases and assists in maintaining operational flexibility. Additionally, austere bases will lend credence to our intention to leave once the job is done which may be a factor in maintaining US public support.

is an assurance that there is some margin for error in a risky operational environment.

A fundamental requirement for fast-moving contingency operations is the capability to rapidly mount a forced-entry operation to gain a secure foothold in enemy territory from which to accomplish—quickly—the operational and strategic objective. Strategic forced entry is the most taxing and risky of all joint military operations, and requires the closest coordination and execution by land, air and sea forces. The specialized nature of strategic assault and the high degree of risk involved give forced-entry operations virtually a separate technical identity in military planning and execution.

For example, in a paradox that Edward N. Luttwak would attribute to the peculiar logic of war, assault forces gain in battle capability by using transportation assets less efficiently at the precise time efficiency appears to be in greatest demand. This occurs because specialized assault forces cross-load and task-organize for combat rather than for economy of space. Because amphibious units embark on naval shipping dedicated to their use, their load planning is not scrutinized in the joint arena. This is not so with airlifted units and, in particular, parachute or assault air-land formations.

The most demanding contingency planning involves tailoring combat task forces. As opposed to Marine units whose shipboard basing allows some last-minute force tailoring, Army units deploying from CONUS task-organize for their particular mission just before deployment. This capability to tailor forces as appropriate is key to the Army's strategic flexibility and applies to units that deploy by sea or air. Combat units that deploy rapidly and entirely by air are particularly sensitive to tailoring because time is usually very short and missions are vague. Parachute units are even more sensitive, stripping away all but the most essential combat and support units and troops for the initial assaults. This fine-tuning process takes place virtually until deployment time, including last-minute adjustments for individual aircraft diversions or maintenance problems. Pinning down transportation estimates for Air Force/Army forced-entry operations is so situationally dependent that no really accurate forecast of requirements can be made far in advance. The frustration this causes the deliberate planning system shows up when, to get an estimate, someone computer-mashes the entire tonnage of an airlifted unit, right down to the last mess truck, into "type" aircraft bodies and then solemnly pronounces, "... it would take the entire MAC [Military Airlift Command] airlift fleet sixty days..." It is
neat arithmetic but poor planning, and the unfortunate result has been to obscure the real capabilities of airlift in crisis. Misunderstanding this point has been a serious and continuing problem in contingency planning. Hopefully, the lessons that abound in the wake of Just Cause and Desert Storm will shed light on this area.

The means by which forced-entry units can be projected has taken a quantum jump in the past few decades. In 1944, forced entry was based primarily on amphibious attack, supported by huge, slow-moving fleets and fairly short-range, limited-load cargo planes like the C-47. Today, however, forced-entry units can range globally, penetrate deeply into enemy-held territory and sustain themselves by combinations of air and seaborne logistics virtually anywhere in the world.

Behind this expanded capability has been a number of innovative sealift developments like the Navy's Tarawa-class Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA), with its 20-knot speed and capability to lift about a battalion of Marines. There is also the new Landing Craft, Air Cushioned (LCAC), which is key in the corps' innovative over-the-horizon assault concept. But by far the most significant development has been the advent of an airlift fleet with true strategic reach, resulting in a mix of C-5A/B and C-141B heavy transport aircraft, KC-10 tanker/cargo aircraft and shorter range C-130s.

The backbone of strategic contingency operations remains the C-141B. Production of the all-jet C-141 transport in the early 1960s was a major step forward in being able to rapidly lift strategic forces. But even so, the original version of the C-141 was just a faster, bigger C-130; it still required, in most cases, intermediate staging facilities (ISFs) to reach distant theaters. Using ISFs invariably meant unwanted publicity, loss of strategic and operational surprise and a large logistic effort just to operate the ISF itself.

But in the early 1980s, in response to awakened interest in force deployability, the C-141 fleet was modified to a stretched-out “B” version. The additional cargo space increased the fleet's cargo capacity by about 30 percent. The most important innovation, however, was adding an air-to-air refueling capability, giving the “B” model virtually unlimited range. Air-to-air refueling for troop carriers makes possible, for the first time, direct delivery of forces from CONUS into combat anywhere in the world. It is now possible to plan, load and launch a mission-tailored, multibrigade force directly from CONUS, fly it anywhere in the world in a matter of hours, and drop it directly into combat to execute a strike mission and capture a base for its own reinforcement. This is essentially the model followed in the airlift and parachute assault operations for Just Cause. If no base is available, one can be built, if time allows, with equipment and materiel dropped into the airhead.

Such a deployment would, of necessity, be light initially on support forces within the battle area and would depend on air resupply until either closure of sea transport or redeployment. Our capability to resupply by air has also grown significantly in recent decades. Virtually everything in the XVIII Airborne Corps' inventory can be airdropped as resupply or follow-on forces, and the rough-terrain landing capability of the C-130 fleet allows the use of dirt strips, captured or homemade, as outlined above.

With regard to armored forces, the Army's ability to rapidly deploy armored task forces was demonstrated in the early stages of Operation Desert Shield. Using a combination of fast sealift and strategic air transport, armored task forces arrived in Saudi Arabia very rapidly after the initial air-deployed units and early arriving elements of Marine Corps maritime pre-positioned brigades. This rapid projection of armored "staying power" by fast sealift is a key component of national military strategy. Further development of the capability to rapidly project armored forces will be a vital focus of Army planning for the future. Since tactical and operational success must be followed by rapid redeployment, the need for a large buildup in-country and the construction of a large support infrastructure as in Vietnam must be carefully watched. Retired Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr., in his On Strategy, says...
FORCE PROJECTION

The enemy is also likely to be fighting on his own terrain, near his stockpiles. He will probably be rested and acclimated. He is likely to have some capability to conduct passive and active radio–electronic warfare, and he will probably have access to sophisticated intelligence, supplied by a great–power sponsor.

Colonel Robert B. Killebrew is special assistant to the chief of staff of the Army, The Pentagon, Washington, DC. He received a B.A. from The Citadel, an M.A. from the University of South Florida and an M.A. from Salve Regina College. He is also a graduate of the Naval Command and Staff College and has been an American Defense Fellow of Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada. He has served in airborne, air assault, mechanized and Special Forces units, including commander, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

NOTES


MILITARY REVIEW • March 1991
DESTINATION
STANLEYVILLE


As the propensity to use hostages as political pawns seems to be an ever-growing threat, the US military would do well to increase its planning for operations to deal with hostage rescue contingencies. The author presents a detailed account of the joint US/Belgian effort to rescue large numbers of hostages in the Congo in 1964. His analysis identifies many of the political and military considerations that will undoubtedly confront planners of such operations in the future.

On 24 November 1964, two US C-130s appeared over the Stanleyville airfield, filling the early morning Congolese sky with US Belgian paratroopers. Within half an hour, these paratroopers had secured the airfield, allowing seven more C-130s to land and the battalion’s remaining men and equipment for an assault on Stanleyville. Their mission was to locate, rescue, and evacuate the European and US civilians and Belgian officials held under threat of imminent death by hostile rebel forces. This scenario was repeated on the morning of 26 November as the same combined force rescued hundreds from the town of Bunia and evacuated them from the nearby airlift strip.

The 1964 operation is sometimes known as Operation Desert Fox, with many operations without contemporary precedent. It was unique in that hostage taking by emerging political factions was a relatively new form of warfare, and there were no combined US/Belgian contingency plans “on the shelf” to deal with that type of crisis. Although Operation Rice preceded the official terminology by two decades, it was truly a military operation short of war, fraught with political limitations, time constrained crisis planning, and outside pressure from world opinion. Although the mission rescued almost 2000 people who might otherwise have lost their lives, the overall success of the operation must be qualified by the limitations, constraints, and pressures that reduced the element of surprise and forced a withdrawal decision before all of the hostages could be evacuated.
This article examines the 1964 Congo hostage rescue with an objective eye toward those political limitations, time constraints and external pressures from world opinion that impacted on employing military force short of war. First is a background review of the tribal/colonial struggle in the Congo between 1960 and 1964, the United Nations (UN) intervention during those years and the development of US interests in the area. There is a description of the interaction between the US and Belgian governments during the crisis planning for Dragon Rouge and an overview of Special Operation Plan (OPLAN) 319/64, the result of that planning process. Next is the execution of the Dragon Rouge plan, and it concludes with an assessment of the operation as a worthwhile study in the difficult employment of military force short of war.

**Background**

A review of the events in the Congo between 1960 and 1964 provides a clearer understanding of why a military rescue mission was necessary. During this four-year period, the Congo experienced independence, mutiny of the National Congolese Army (Armée Nationale Congolaise [ANC]), Belgian intervention to restore order, internal secessionist movements, the introduction of a UN peacekeeping force and, finally, the emergence of a rebel faction determined to overthrow the central government. Complete documentation of any of these events is enough to fill a book and well beyond the scope of this article. With that understanding, this review will be limited to those key events and personalities that shaped the political chaos of the Congo in 1964, mandating a military rescue mission.

At the heart of internal Congolese strife was the Belgian government's premature granting of sovereignty in June 1960. The spirit of independence had spread throughout Northern Africa during the 1950s, and by the end of the decade, the Congo was bounded by newly independent African states to the north and by white-dominated states to the south, as if to draw a line of demarcation between the old and the new. The world watched as this strategically located and politically unprepared Belgian colony clamored for immediate independence.

Patrice H. Lumumba was the most vocal nationalist leader during the struggle for Congolese independence. A young, energetic advocate of Pan-African unity, he had founded the Congolese National Movement which had national as well as tribal backing. Joseph Kasavubu, an early agitator for Congolese independence, did not enjoy the same wide popular support as Lumumba but was, nevertheless, a respected African nationalist with a colonial prison record for political offenses. Kasavubu supported a political platform advocating restoring an ancient tribal kingdom that would require redrawing colonial boundaries, thereby conflicting with African nationalists who promoted a unity transcending tribal boundaries. Although these two leaders had conflicting views of the post-independence Congo, they were united in their passion for Congolese sovereignty.

Faced with mounting pressure for Congolese independence, the Belgian government convened the Brussels Round Table Conference in January 1960. During this conference, Belgian administrators in the Congo presented a plan detailing a four-year transitional period to independence, but the Congolese representatives continued to press for immediate independence. Bowing to this pressure and wishing to avoid the bloody French experience in Algeria, the Belgians announced that the Congo would be granted sovereignty on 30 June 1960, allowing no significant period of political preparation.
On 24 June 1960, Lumumba was installed as the prime minister, and Kasavubu was elected president of the Republic of the Congo. The proclamation of Congolese independence followed on 30 June, and by 4 July, soldiers of the Union, Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba and had him confined under house arrest. On 13 February 1961, the Katangan minister of the interior announced Lumumba's death at the hands of the local population. In death, Lumumba became a powerful martyr, revered and worshiped by the Congolese representatives. The Belgians announced that the Congo would be granted sovereignty [within six months], allowing no significant period of political preparation.

Belgian administrators in the Congo presented a plan detailing a four-year transitional period to independence, but the Congolese representatives continued to press for immediate independence. . . . Wishing to avoid the bloody French experience in Algeria, the Belgians announced that the Congo would be granted sovereignty [within six months], allowing no significant period of political preparation.

ANC (formerly the Force Publique) mutinied against their white officers, plunging the new country into violence and conflict. To protect its citizens, the Belgian government sent in 10,000 troops without the Congolese government's consent. At the same time, the provincial government of Katanga declared its own independence under the leadership of Moïse Tshombe. On 12 July 1960, following Tshombe's declaration of independence, Kasavubu and Lumumba appealed to the UN for military assistance against what it considered Belgian aggression. As the UN troops began arriving in the Congo, Tshombe refused to allow them into Katanga province, preferring to enhance the effectiveness of his gendarmerie by hiring white mercenaries. This was an unforgivable sin for an African nationalist, and it earned him a reputation "not only as an outsider and a stooge to imperialism, but also as black Africa's arch villain." Lumumba became increasingly dissatisfied with the progress of Belgian troop withdrawal and with his inability to control the UN troops independently of the secretary-general. In an effort to rid the Congo of all white troops, particularly Tshombe's mercenaries, he accepted Soviet aid in the form of military supplies, technicians and transport aircraft. Incensed by the prime minister's unilateral dealings with the Soviet Union, Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba and had him confined under house arrest. On 13 February 1961, the Katangan minister of the interior announced Lumumba's death at the hands of the local population. In death, Lumumba became a powerful martyr, revered and worshiped by the rebel forces who would later seize Stanleyville and hold its white inhabitants hostage.

By 21 January 1963, UN troops entered and secured Kolwezi to end the Katangan secession, and by 8 February, Tshombe flew to Paris in exile, "considered a villain by most African nationalists, a hero by most Europeans, and the Congo's only full-fledged, pro-Western leader by Barry Goldwater." His exile would last until 6 July 1964 when rebel factions of irregular Simba warriors under Pierre Mulele and Christophe Obene were advancing with apparent impunity against the ANC. Facing rebel factions bent on completely overthrowing the central government, Kasavubu designated Tshombe as premier with the task of forming a new government.5

Faced with the withdrawal of UN forces and with Belgian reluctance to renew prolonged military operations in its former colony, Tshombe again turned to mercenaries to strengthen his ANC. In addition, for close air support, the United States provided T-28 and B-26 aircraft which were employed with deadly effectiveness against the Simba rebels. To the rebels, distinct lines were being drawn, and the United States was clearly their enemy. On 5 August 1964, Simba rebels stormed the US Consulate in Stanleyville, beginning a 111-day hostage ordeal for the consul, vice consul and two other consular officials.

US Strike Command (USSTRICOM) had followed the events in the Congo and developed a plan for a joint task force (JTF) to move in should the need arise. The plan was shelved in February 1964 but revised and executed in August, as JTF Leo was dispatched to Leopoldville with four C-130s, three H-34 helicopters and a
As the UN troops began arriving in the Congo, Tshombe refused to allow them into Katanga province, preferring to enhance the effectiveness of his gendarmerie by hiring white mercenaries. This was an unforgivable sin for an African nationalist, and it earned him a reputation "not only as an outsider and a stooge to imperialism, but also as black Africa's arch villain."

A platoon of airborne infantry. The JTF's mission was to "conduct rescue operations and provide such airlift support as might be required by the ambassador." However, attempts by Washington to prevent an escalation of military commitment in the Congo severely hampered its utility in the field. In the United States, 1964 was an election year, and the last thing the Johnson administration wanted was an African land war to coincide with the Gulf of Tonkin situation.

Nevertheless, the Congo problem would not go away. There was a growing suspicion that Soviet and Communist Chinese adventurism were behind the rebel activities, and conceding to their demands for hostage release would mean turning over a legitimate government unopposed. The rebels demanded a halt to US-provided B-26 and T-28 close air support and a halt of Tshombe's mercenary column advancing against them under the command of Belgian Colonel Frederic J. L. A. Vandewalle. As that column moved closer to Stanleyville, the rebels extended their terror campaign to the Belgians by seizing their consulate and imprisoning Belgian consular officials.

The situation in Stanleyville degraded to the point where the United States and Belgium realized the rebels had no intention of releasing their white hostages, short of completely overthrowing Tshombe's government. That was a condition to which the United States could not possibly agree, for it would result in Balkanizing the
Combined Planning. On 10 November 1964, in the wake of increased rebel attacks on Belgian consular officials, the Belgian foreign minister, Paul-Henri Spaak; the undersecretary of state for political affairs, Averell Harriman; and the US ambassador to Belgium, Douglas MacArthur II, agreed to begin contingency planning for a rescue mission. Belgian paratroopers transported by US aircraft would be used if necessary only if the government of the Republic of the Congo concurred.

Once this political decision was made, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) authorized the US Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR) to send three US European Command (USEUCOM) officers to Brussels with guidance to plan the employment of a company-size unit of Belgian paratroopers using US transport aircraft. The JCS also designated one officer to participate in the planning group to provide assistance and to keep the secretary of defense and JCS informed.

Due to the sensitivity of the operation and to keep a lid on the distribution of information, USCINCEUR directed the USEUCOM team to draft a single OPLAN to coordinate with the Belgian general staff and forward to the JCS for approval. Belgian and US forces would then execute the plan through fragmentary orders. Lacking combined US–Belgian doctrine, US planners decided to "follow the Belgian lead and adapt to their capabilities."9

Political limitations were evident throughout the planning process. The planners originally hoped to take the most direct route through Wheelus Air Base in Libya, but that option was disapproved on political grounds. Strict guidance was also given to US planners not to mention any existing US plans or give the impression that our participation in the planning process was evidence of a desire for military intervention to retake Stanleyville.

Special OPLAN 319/64. On 14 November 1964, four days after the political decision to begin planning had been made, USCINCEUR forwarded to the JCS for approval. Its stated mis-

Congo and inviting further communist interference. Faced with UN withdrawal and Belgian weariness with Congolese affairs, US options pointed increasingly to an armed military rescue mission.

Planning

US Unilateral Plans. The State Department's Congo Working Group had shelved two previous plans for unilateral US rescue missions: Operation Golden Hawk in September and JTF High Beam in October. Operation Golden Hawk was a 7th Special Forces Group plan to airdrop several Special Forces "A" teams at night near Stanleyville. These teams would then infiltrate the town on rubber rafts, rescue the hostages during a dawn raid and withdraw to a predetermined recovery area for helicopter extraction.

USSTRICOM OPLAN 519 created JTF High Beam, recognizing the difficulty a small unit such as Golden Hawk would have locating hostages during a surprise assault operation. This plan entailed capturing the entire city of Stanleyville with an airborne infantry brigade, 16 tactical fighter aircraft, approximately 80 troop carrier aircraft and 20 air-refueling tankers.8 Both plans were shelved because the political mood in Washington did not yet favor unilateral US intervention in Stanleyville, particularly with elections around the corner.
sion was to "(a) secure the Stanleyville airfield; (b) locate and liberate non-Congolese residents of Stanleyville being held as hostages by rebel forces; (c) escort non-Congolese nationals desiring evacuation to Stanleyville airfield; (d) evacuate such nationals by air to Leopoldville airport for further disposition as arranged by individual national diplomatic representatives."10

According to the plan, 12 US C-130Es would transport a Belgian paratrooper battalion of approximately 545 men, eight jeeps, and 12 AS-24 motorized tricycles from Kleine-Brogel Air Base, Belgium, to Stanleyville, with en route stops for fuel and crew/paratrooper rest. The plan specified the E-model C-130 because its external fuel tanks provided greater range than the A-model.

The 464th Troop Carrier Wing, based at Evreux Air Base, France, was to depart home station at 15-minute intervals for Kleine-Brogel to load the troops and equipment. From there they were to fly to Ascension Island with refueling stops planned at Torrejón or Morón Air Base, Spain, and Las Palmas, Canary Islands (the Las Palmas stop was later deleted as unnecessary). With a daylight arrival at Ascension Island, the crews and paratroopers were to rest for 12 hours. The aircraft were refueled for the flight to Kamina Air Base, Congo, in time to arrive during hours of darkness. The meager refueling capability of Kamina was to be augmented by a US fuel truck scheduled to arrive via C-124 before the C-130s from Ascension.

The major weakness of the en route phase was the absence of a credible cover plan to explain the deployment of a crack Belgian airborne battalion aboard US C-130s, particularly during a period of heightened tensions. . . . No precedent [existed] for combined US-Belgian operations upon which to base a believable cover plan.

The assault phase of Special OPLAN 319/64 called for an initial airdrop element of five aircraft carrying 320 airborne troops (chalks one through five) to depart Kamina with minimum interval spacing and fly in trail formation to the initial point of Basoko. From this initial point, the airdrop element planned to drop on to the Stanleyville golf course using a west-to-east run-in with 1-minute in-trail spacing. Visual drops were planned, using Belgian dispatchers.
A single OPLAN to coordinate with the Belgian general staff [was drafted and sent] forward to the JCS for approval. Belgian and US forces would then execute the plan through fragmentary orders. Lacking combined US-Belgian doctrine, US planners decided to "follow the Belgian lead and adapt to their capabilities."

OPLAN 319/64[s]' stated mission was to "(a) secure the Stanleyville airfield; (b) locate and liberate non-Congolese residents of Stanleyville being held as hostages by rebel forces; (c) escort non-Congolese nationals desiring evacuation to Stanleyville airfield; (d) evacuate such nationals by air to Leopoldville...as arranged by individual national diplomatic representatives."

on each flight deck to give alignment instructions and "green light on" to the pilot. Due to the size of the drop zone, each aircraft had to plan for three phases to clear all jumpers. Once on the ground, the paratroop commander was to split his force into three groups: "A—Block and control road leading to airport; B—Clear and occupy tower and Sabena guest house; C—Clear airfield." Chalks six and seven, carrying radio-equipped and armored jeeps and their crews, were to depart Kamina Air Base 30 minutes after the airdrop element and be immediately available for airlanding at Stanleyville when the runway was cleared. Chalks eight through 12 were to depart Kamina 1 hour after the airdrop element to airland at Stanleyville. If airlanding was not possible, the troops in chalk eight, nine and 11 were to be prepared for an airdrop. Chalk 10 carried the AS-24s and chalk 12 had medical supplies, rations and additional ammunition. After securing the airfield, the paratroopers were to assault the city with the radio-equipped and armored jeeps to locate and evacuate hostages.

The critical weakness in the assault phase planning was the length of time between air-dropping the first paratroopers and the assault on Stanleyville to rescue the hostages. Any element of surprise maintained throughout the en route phase was sure to be compromised by five C-130s making three passes each over the drop zone, followed by a built-in 30-minute delay before the assault.

The versatility of the C-130 was evident in the Dragon Rouge plan to use the assault aircraft to evacuate refugees. Chalks six, seven and 10, which had airlanded the jeeps and AS-24s, were to be the primary evacuation aircraft, remaining on the ground with engines running to receive the initial refugee flow. Chalk 12, with the medical supplies, ammunition, rations and a US medical officer, was the primary evacuation aircraft for drop zone injuries. During the evacuation phase, each aircraft planned to carry a maximum of 96 refugees to Leopoldville, with JTF Leo aircraft providing additional evacuation missions when the initial capacity of all Dragon Rouge aircraft had been used.

**Supplementary Rescue Plans.** On 18 November 1964, the same day the Dragon Rouge force was closing on Ascension Island, Brigadier General Russell E. Dougherty of the Brussels planning group received JCS approval to plan for additional rescue operations with the Belgians. These supplementary plans were to expand the mission of Dragon Rouge, to include rescuing and evacuating non-Congolese hostages in and around the towns of Bunia, Paulis and Watsa.

*Dragon Blanc*, the Bunia assault, was considered the primary target of the supplementary operations because of the numerous hostages in that area, including the women and children from Watsa. With additional jeeps and parachutes from Belgium, a company-size attack would be mounted involving the same concept of operations as Dragon Rouge except a C-130 would remain on call at Stanleyville with a reserve platoon for rapid reinforcement.
US airmen and Belgian paracommandos at Kamina airfield before the Stanleyville flight.

Rapidly transporting a military force through a sovereign nation's air space [requires] full diplomatic coordination [and] considerable advance notice with more information than military planners are comfortable releasing. Fortunately, in the case of Dragon Rouge, the French did not deny air space clearance, even though the aircraft were already airborne when the clearance was received.

Dragon Rouge, the main assault, was not a priority due to the combination of hostage situation in that area and the airport's runways barely fit for transport. The airport's main runway was unusable due to wetness, and the heavy rain. The airport's equipment was identical to the base assumed to retain additional goods and parachutes from Belgium.

Dragon Verd, the WAAS assault, was to reinforce a group of male hostages believed to be in significant danger from rival forces. This plan was given third priority, because the local attack was not strong enough to accommodate WAAS.

The alternative concept of operations required airlifting additional forces into Kamina, assuming that assault companies in the airstrip were to link up with an airborne assault force in Wawe. The restricted base was further exacerbated by storms. Airdropping heavy equipment was ruled out due to the problems of handling rigged equipment on a C-130 TAC forces-communing Belgian and US command.

There is an unmistakable air of internecine to these operations. The same plan sent a US Special Forces battalion to Wawe. The same day the US ordered the WAAS force from Wawe to Kamina. The WAAS operation was to be by US and WA forces; however, with the minimum essential force to be sent. With only one US reserve in reinforcement, the difficulty in carrying out these plans would be considerable, given that the force is 100% air-born, not by land, and WA forces have no chance to execute a strategic campaign.

Execution

Command and Control. According to the US State Department, Dragon Rouge was a Belgian operation using US logistic support. The air assault commander was responsible for all route recon missions concerning the capabilities and movement of the aircraft. The airborne commander was responsible for the development and execution of the operation. The airborne commander of the US elements belonged to USCENTUR until the force crossed into Ascension Island, at which time it passed to Commander-in-Chief USSSTRIKEWING, Commander in Chief Middle East, Southern Asia, and Arabian Sea Forces (USCENTAF). Ascension Island was chosen as the transfer point in the event the force was hunted for a direct insertion into Stanleyville, bypassing Kamina. Following the insertion at Stanleyville, the airborne commander maintained airborne overhead assets and monitored evacuation activities at
the two governments and signaled by the JCS to the Dragon Rouge force. The originator of the recommendation to launch transmitted “GO,” and the approval was transmitted to the assembled forces as “PUNCH.” For example, if US and Belgian officials in Leopoldville concurred, the US ambassador would cable “GO” simultaneously to Washington and Brussels. If Washington concurred, the JCS would cable “PUNCH” to the Dragon Rouge force. The Belgian government preferred to leave the decision to activate Dragon Rouge to Vandewalle, the commander of the mercenary/ANC column, through the Belgian ambassador in Leopoldville. Washington, then, assumed that any “GO” transmission originating from Leopoldville meant the Belgian government concurred.

**En Route Phase.** The airlift operation from Belgium to Ascension Island was executed with relative ease, although there were problems with diplomatic overflight clearances and maintaining secrecy. One of the most pressing problems in modern military operations short of war is rapidly transporting a military force through a sovereign nation’s air space. Full diplomatic coordi-

---

**When it became apparent that the mercenary column would advance on Stanleyville with or without Dragon Rouge, Washington decided to launch the force... to coincide with the Vandewalle column’s arrival, hopefully bringing maximum simultaneous pressure on the rebels.**

---

“GO-PUNCH.” The Congo Working Group developed a transmission procedure through which the decision to execute the assault on Stanleyville could be processed through the Dragon Rouge C-130 force.

Hostages shot by Simba rebels.
All Americans had been accounted for, and the airport was secure.
Approximately 1,500 non-Congolese nationals and 150 Congolese civilians had been evacuated to Leopoldville, and 33 foreign civilians had been killed. The US consul and vice consul, as well as two other consular officials, were safely evacuated. The paratrooper casualties were two wounded and one killed.
Congo Working Group in Washington struggled with the decision of when and if to launch the Dragon Rouge assault on Stanleyville. Of paramount consideration to Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley in Leopoldville was the installation of troops around the airfield. Approaching Stanleyville airport, the C-130s slowed down and stabilized at drop airspeed, altitude and heading which they maintained through an unexpected barrage of small arms and .50-caliber machinegun fire. Although the aircraft took several hits, the drop was flawless, with the first man landing within 5 yards of the planned point of impact.

Amid scathing criticism from the Communists and neighboring countries, and without overflight or basing rights from Spain, the Dragon Rouge force deployed to Belgium on 29 November through Ascension Island and Las Palmas. The plans for Dragons Blanc and Vert were abandoned, and an estimated 1,100 whites remained in rebel-held territory.

"scheduled" execution of Dr. Paul Carlson, announced by the rebels to take place on 23 November.16

Washington, on the other hand, was concerned with how the Dragon Rouge assault force would interface with the Vandewalle column's advance on Stanleyville. One suggestion was to maximize the humanitarian aspect of Dragon Rouge by getting in and getting out before the mercenary/ANC force arrived, while others felt the presence of the column ahead of the drop might avert military disaster to the Dragon Rouge force. When it became apparent that the mercenary column would advance on Stanleyville with or without Dragon Rouge, Washington decided to launch the force on 24 November to coincide with the Vandewalle column's arrival, hopefully bringing maximum simultaneous pressure on the rebels.

The next morning at 0245, the first C-130 took off from Kamina, leading the five-ship formation for the drop on Stanleyville. En route, the formation flew at 21,000 feet, descending to 700 feet and 280 mph, 100 miles west of the drop zone where they met two Cuban-piloted B-26s. The B-26s were to precede the formation and neutralize any heavy air defenses the rebels may have installed around the airfield. Approaching the Stanleyville airport, the C-130s slowed down and stabilized at drop airspeed, altitude and heading which they maintained through an unexpected barrage of small arms and .50-caliber machinegun fire. Although the aircraft took several hits, the drop was flawless, with the first man landing within 5 yards of the planned point of impact.17

On the ground, the paratroopers were successfully clearing the runway when the commander received a phone call in his control tower command post at 0635, informing him that European hostages were being held in the Victoria Hotel. At this point, he gave the order "to move into the city with all possible speed," but it was 0750 before the lead elements of the 11th Paracommando Company heard gunfire from the vicinity of the hotel and discovered a massacre.18

The best explanation for this delay is that, before assaulting the city, the paratroopers waited for their armored jeeps which arrived an hour late.19

Rescue operations continued throughout the city, one street at a time, until 1100 when the Vandewalle column arrived and assumed responsibility, freeing the paratroopers to guard the airport. By the evening of the 25th, all Americans had been accounted for, and the airport was secure. Approximately 1,500 non-Congolese nationals and 150 Congolese civilians had been evacuated to Leopoldville, and 33 foreign civilians had been killed.20 Among the dead were two Americans—Carlson, who had been shot trying to climb a wall, and Phyllis Rhine, a 25-year-old missionary who bled to death from a gunshot wound in the leg. The US consul and vice consul, as well as two other consular officials, were safely evacuated. The paratrooper casualties were two wounded and one killed.

**Dragon Noir (Paulis Assault).** On 24 November, as the Dragon Rouge operations were in progress, a mercenary unit, en route to Paulis, received reports of an increased number of hostages held in that garrison by disturbingly vicious rebels. In Washington, priority attention for the supplemental operations began to shift from Bunia to Paulis.
The US ambassador in Leopoldville was in favor of proceeding according to the supplemental plans for *Dragons Blanc*, *Noir* and *Vert*, but the political mood in Washington was to support whatever the Belgians wanted to do. On 25 November, the Congo crisis managers met in Brussels, and the result was a cable from MacArthur that the Belgians wanted “one more rescue operation against Paulis in the morning, and then get out of the Congo and let the chips fall where they may.” Late in the afternoon of the 25th, the JCS sent the order to execute *Dragon Noir* on 26 November.

On Thanksgiving Day, 1964, four C-130s departed Stanleyville for an 0600 drop on Paulis which was covered with a layer of ground fog. The lead aircrew was able to identify the drop zone by sporadic glimpses of the runway’s red clay surface contrasting with the dark green of the jungle. During the drop run-in, the aircraft took multiple small-arms hits, and the last paratrooper of the lead aircraft was shot in the chest as he jumped.

*Dragon Rouge* and *Dragon Noir* had the same concept of operations, with one important difference—at Paulis, one company was to move immediately into the town without waiting for the armored jeeps, while one company stayed behind to secure the airfield. This was a lesson learned from the *Dragon Rouge* operation, although it did not help the 21 Belgians and one American executed on the night of the 24th in reaction to the Stanleyville assault.

By early afternoon on 27 November, the *Dragon Noir* force had freed and evacuated 375 non-Congolese nationals, with five paratroopers wounded and one killed. “At about 1500, the last planeload of thinly stretched defenders, lit firecrackers all around the perimeter, jumped aboard their aircraft and safely took off—leaving Paulis to the Simbas.”

Amid scathing criticism from the Communists and neighboring countries, and without overflight or basing rights from Spain, the *Dragon Rouge* force deployed to Belgium on 29 November through Ascension Island and Las Pal-
A humanitarian mission in European eyes was seen as a military intervention to prop up Tshombe in the eyes of black Africa. Those perceptions were manifested in denying overflight and basing rights en route and... there can be little doubt that the vocal uproar within Africa played a role in the early withdrawal of the Dragon Rouge force.

The political implications of employing a military force in peacetime were evident during Dragon Rouge. Of particular importance were the different international perspectives with which a single mission was viewed. A humanitarian mission in European eyes was seen as a military intervention to prop up Tshombe in the eyes of black Africa. Those perceptions were manifested in denying overflight and basing rights en route and by the cries of outrage heaped upon the United States and Belgium after the mission. There can be little doubt that the vocal uproar within Africa played a role in the early withdrawal of the Dragon Rouge force.

Another political limitation that hampered the effectiveness of the operation was the focus on keeping the forces small. Limiting the force to a battalion meant that supplementary operations such as Noir, Blanc and Vert had to be executed sequentially rather than simultaneously. This allowed the rebels to move or execute their hostages and created excessive fatigue in a hard-pressed battalion. Whether the United States and Belgium would have been able or willing to plan and support a larger force under the existing time constraints and political limitations is a matter of conjecture. Dragon Rouge was not perfect, but no military operation is. It was planned and executed under time constraints and political limitations that were not commonplace in 1964. If it failed by leaving several hundred hostages in rebel hands, it succeeded by freeing almost 2,000. In an age when military operations short of war are on the increase, we would do well to study the difficulties and limitations involved in this rescue mission. Dragon Rouge was one of the first operations of its kind, but it certainly will not be the last. MR

NOTES

2. Ibid., 7.
4. Wagoner, 10.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 15.
7. Ibid., 31.
8. Ibid., 68.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 7.
13. Ibid., 6.
14. Lumpkin, 45.
15. Wagoner, 147.
16. The Simbas were unconvinced that Dr. Carlson was an Army major, because of his close-cropped hair and the circumstances of his capture. At the time, he was allegedly trying to communicate with a radio, and the Simbas thought all radios were used to call in air strikes.
18. Wagoner, 179.
19. After takeoff from Kamina, a flight experienced an in-flight release of one of the life rafts located in panels along the top of the wing. These life rafts are designed to inflate after release and are attached to the aircraft by a rope; this causes buffeting of the tail surface after an inadvertent in-flight release. The flight manual procedure for the situation is to make an emergency landing at the nearest suitable base, in this case Kamina.
20. Wagoner, 182.
21. Ibid., 187.
23. Wagoner, 187.
24. Ibid., 188.

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen D. Brown is squadron director of operations, 773d Tactical Airlift Squadron, Dyess Air Force Base (AFB), Texas. He received a B.A. from Angelo State University and an M.A. from Webster University. He is also a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and the US Army Command and General Staff College. His previous assignments include C-130 instructor pilot and flight examiner at Pope AFB, North Carolina, and Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany; staff officer, Headquarters Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph AFB, Texas; and chief, Standardization/Evaluation Division, 463d Tactical Airlift Wing (MAC), Dyess AFB.
Born more than 2,000 years before Carl von Clausewitz was another military strategist who combined that rare combination of military and political acumen. Sun Bin's classic treatise, *Art of War*, is examined here and found to have enduring relevance.

SUN TZU's *Art of War* is widely regarded as the ultimate expression of the wisdom of ancient military writers. Yet, Sun Tzu's contribution to premodern Sinic military thought, while formidable, was by no means exclusive. By the time of the fall of the Roman Empire, China had produced at least nine classics on warfare (including Sun Tzu's), and its dynastic histories described, in some detail, the campaigns of more than 50 great captains. One such outstanding strategist was Sun Bin, a descendant of Sun Tzu, who lived 100 years later. Sun Bin's generalship and own treatise on military art built upon the foundation laid by his famous ancestor and helped enrich the Chinese way of war.

Sun Bin was born in the fourth century B.C., during the Warring States period (475-221 B.C.), a time marked by continuous struggle as seven kingdoms fought to unify and establish hegemony over the rest of China. In his early life, Sun Bin studied the art of war with Pang Juan. When Pang Juan went on to serve as a senior general in the Kingdom of Wei, he feared the superior ability of his former classmate and summoned him to court. Sun Bin was falsely accused of criminal acts, and by the harsh justice of the day, his kneecaps were cut off and his face tattooed. With the assistance of a diplomatic envoy, he subsequently escaped to the Kingdom of Qi, Wei's powerful rival to the east. Sun was introduced to General Tian Ji who recognized his talent and had him appointed the senior military adviser of Qi.

In 354 B.C., the king of Wei ordered Pang Juan to march north with an army of 80,000 soldiers to besiege Handan, the capital of the Kingdom of Zhao. Zhao, in turn, sought assistance from Qi. After one year, the king of Qi
Sun Bin was falsely accused of criminal acts, and by the harsh justice of the day, his kneecaps were cut off and his face tattooed. With the assistance of a diplomatic envoy, he subsequently escaped to the Kingdom of Qi, Wei's powerful rival to the east. General Tian Ji...recognized his talent and had him appointed the senior military adviser of Qi.

Tian Ji adopted this plan, and Sun Bin used deception to conceal his intent from Pang Juan. Sun Bin first dispatched troops to feign an attack against the Wei stronghold of Pingling. The assault was easily repulsed, and Pang Juan now believed Qi's forces were weakened and their morale was low. Sun Bin then dispatched a small force of chariots and light infantry to rapidly move against Wei's vulnerable capital. As expected, Pang Juan withdrew from Zhao and rushed his forces southward, confident that he could destroy Qi's troops which he assumed were both qualitatively and quantitatively inferior. Meanwhile, Sun Bin advised Tian Ji to secretly move the main body to a position near Gaoling (about 50 kilometers north of present-day Kaifeng) where it would intercept Pang Juan's army during its forced march home. Upon its arrival at the battlefield, Wei's exhausted army was overwhelmed by Qi's forces, and Pang Juan was taken prisoner.
The expression "Besiege Wei to Save Zhao" remains in the Chinese military lexicon more than 2,000 years after the Battle of Guiling. Mao Tse-tung used this saying to describe his guerrilla army's tactics against the Japanese during World War II; that is, using the indirect approach of striking at weak points to gain initiative and surprise.1

Sun Bin's victory at Guiling did not end the struggle between Qin and Wei. In 340 B.C., Wei launched an attack against its neighbor to the southwest, the Kingdom of Han. In turn, Han requested assistance from Qi. Sun Bin felt that to commit forces early on would place Qi in a passive position by fighting as Han surrogates. By delaying his kingdom's entry into the war against Wei, its combat power would be conserved. An early practitioner of realpolitik, Sun Bin also argued Han would be even more psychologically indebted to Qi when finding itself saved in the 11th hour of its peril.2

The king of Qi accepted Sun Bin's strategy and did not raise an army until Han had reached the point of collapse. Again, Tian Ji was designated commander and Sun Bin chief of staff of a large Qi expeditionary force which crossed the Wei frontier and marched toward Duhang. Pang Juan withdrew from Han and hurried to meet the advancing Qi army. Sun Bin advised Tian Ji, "The soldiers of Wei are brave and arrogant. They look down on our men and consider them cowards. A skillful strategist should make use of this and lure them with the prospect of easy success."3

Sun Bin's plan called for the Qi army to rapidly withdraw in the face of Pang Juan's forces, lighting 100,000 campfires on the first night, 50,000 the second and 30,000 on the third. Sun Bin predicted an overconfident Pang Juan would be misled into believing the morale of the Qi force

MILITARY REVIEW • March 1991
Sun Bin retained the initiative by controlling the enemy's maneuver and not striking until the correlation of forces was in Qi's favor. To Chinese military leaders who have often faced more powerful opponents, . . . the Battle of Ma Ling has provided an early and inspired example of what is known within the People's Liberation Army as "luring the enemy in deep" to gain decisive victory. The majority of its soldiers had deserted, inducing him to begin a reckless pursuit. When Pang Juan aggressively detached from his main body and personally led a lightly armed elite force to maintain contact with the retreating Qi army, Sun Bin positioned units ahead of the Wei route of advance near Ma Ling. The Wei vanguard entered Sun Bin's ambush site after dark and was destroyed by a force of some 10,000 crossbowmen concealed behind rocks. Pang Juan was killed and Wei eliminated as a major Warring State power.9

Throughout his second campaign against Wei, Sun Bin retained the initiative by controlling the enemy's maneuver and not striking until the correlation of forces was in Qi's favor. To Chinese military leaders who have often faced more powerful opponents, whether in the days of the empire's fighting the northern barbarians or, in contemporary times, facing the Soviet threat, the Battle of Ma Ling has provided an early and inspired example of what is known within the People's Liberation Army as "luring the enemy in deep" to gain decisive victory.10

China's earliest dynastic records noted a work on military art written by Sun Bin. Not mentioned again in later historical annals, scholars concluded the treatise was either the same as Sun Tzu's or had been lost to posterity. However, in 1972, while excavating two early western Han dynasty (206 B.C.–A.D. 24) tombs in eastern China, archaeologists found more than 440 bamboo strips inscribed with what was subsequently identified as Sun Bin's original Art of War.11

Sun Bin's Art of War is divided into two parts, each with 15 chapters. Most researchers believe,
however, only the first part was written by Sun Bin or his students. Not as concise or organized as Sun Tzu's masterpiece, Sun Bin's work, nevertheless, stands on its own as an ancient classic. His writings made important contributions to Chinese military theory in its discussions on the relationship between the state and war, managing an army, and strategy and tactics.

Sun Bin's Art of War states: "Through military victory a state which is in great peril can be saved. . . . In defeat, the state must cede territory and the existence of the regime is threatened. Hence, it is imperative that detailed records be carried out on matters of war. . . . Yet, while Sun Bin, as did Sun Tzu, emphasized war's "vital importance to the state," he cautioned rulers that one who blindly pursues unjust wars will be defeated."

Sun Bin also understood the vital roles that a state's material wealth and its population's morale play in war. He wrote: "In war it is first necessary to make thorough preparations, and only then to act. The reason a small army is able to defend itself is because it has sufficient stocks of material. The reason a small army can have great combat power is because it is engaged in just war." Indeed, throughout Sun Bin's Art of War the reader can find passages as sophisticated as the writings of Carl von Clausewitz on the relationship between a nation and armed struggle.

Sun Bin, throughout his treatise, focused on the command and organization of the army and repeatedly stressed the need for unity of effort. He wrote that a nations' ruler, army commanders and soldiers were analogous respectively to a crossbowman, his weapons and the arrows he shoots. If the aim, crossbow and arrow are not perfectly aligned, the target will be missed. Similarly, an
Sun Bin encouraged senior officers to pay close attention to their men's morale. Devoting an entire chapter to this subject, he describes the importance of building and maintaining an aggressive spirit in the army from the time it is mobilized and organized until it achieves victory. It is vital, Sun Bin stated, for soldiers to "clearly understand the reasons for a war, its objectives, and its significance."  

Finally, Sun Bin encouraged senior officers to pay close attention to their men's morale. Devoting an entire chapter to this subject, he describes the importance of building and maintaining an aggressive spirit in the army from the time it is mobilized and organized until it achieves victory. It is vital, Sun Bin stated, for soldiers to "clearly understand the reasons for a war, its objectives, and its significance."  

Much of Sun Bin's discussion on managing an army, and especially his focus on morale, resonates with the modern Chinese armed forces' efforts to improve troop performance through political education and indoctrination. Sun Bin's *Art of War* is also noted for its profound analysis of strategy and tactics and goes beyond Sun Tzu in codifying the military art. Sun Bin developed what he called dao which can loosely be translated as doctrine or principles. To understand dao was to know all aspects of those conditions related to warfare, including, among others, weather, geography, intelligence, formations and maneuver. From among these factors, Sun Bin searched for objective laws that would enable a commander to predict the outcome of a battle. For example, he systematically developed appropriate guidelines for using different service arms on various types of terrain, recommending predominantly employing chariots on level ground, crossbowmen in defiles and cavalry against strategic locations. Sun Bin also recognized and studied the effects of weather on the battlefield, observing that attacks launched under the cover of limited visibility can strike fear in the enemy and achieve surprise.  

His most comprehensive discussions on doctrine, however, are reserved for formations and maneuver. He drew a parallel between a commander wearing a sword and his knowledge of tactics. A sword is carried but is rarely drawn to strike at an enemy; however, the user must always be ready. Likewise, a well-prepared army will
continuously drill and practice battlefield deployments although engagements are not often fought. Sun Bin provided one of the best descriptions of tactical formations found in any of the ancient classics on war and helped introduce a scientific approach to studying military art.

Above all, he held that the leading principle in warfare is using the indirect approach. Sun Tzu, himself, had written, "You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended," and he knew well the need to impose one's will on the enemy. Yet, Sun Bin advanced upon his ancestor's thoughts in this area. During a dialogue with Tian Ji, he said, "A major responsibility of a commander is to analyze the enemy's situation, terrain and routes. And then, he must resolutely attack the enemy's weak and critical points. This is the most important matter in war." Avoiding the opponent's strongpoints and applying dialectics to change his strengths into weaknesses were trademarks of Sun Bin and find currency in the doctrine of most modern armies.

Sun Bin wrote that a nation's military commanders and soldiers were analogous, respectively, to a crossbowman, his weapon and the arrow he shoots. If the arm, crossbow and arrow are not perfectly aligned, the target will be missed. Similarly, an army cannot attain victory unless the objectives at all levels of command are the same.

As the likes of Alexander the Great, Hannibal and Julius Caesar are prominent on the stage of ancient Western military history, so Sun Bin occupies a salient position in classical Chinese warfare. A bold, tested strategist and an advanced theorist, his treatise has proved timeless. Sun Bin's generalship is universal in relevance, yet helped shape the distinctive features of Sinic military art. MR

NOTES


4. Ibid., 136.


8. Sima Qian, 136.

9. Ibid. Sun Bin's tactics were possibly inspired by Sun Tzu's Art of War which elaborated on the danger of overzealous pursuit. In his chapter on maneuver Sun Tzu said, "One who sets the entire army in motion to chase an advantage will not attain it. ... it follows that when one rolls up the armour and sets out speedily, stopping neither day nor night and marching at the double time for a hundred or 200 kilometers, the three [columns] commanders will be captured. For vigorous troops will arrive first and the feeble struggle along behind, so that if this method is used only one-tenth of the army will arrive." (See Sun Tzu, The Art of War.


17. Ibid., 25-28

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 29-30

20. Ibid., 26-28

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 44-46

23. Ibid., 48-49


25. Huo Yinzhang, 20. Sun Bin's advocacy of using cavalry against "strategic locations" is not entirely clear. Possibly his meaning was to exploit the mobility of cavalry to rapidly seize key terrain.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 105-106


Operation *Just Cause*: The Best Course of Action?

By Major Lyle G. Radebaugh, US Army

On 20 December 1989, 27,000 US military personnel participated in an invasion of Panama "to protect American lives, restore the democratic process, protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties and apprehend General Manuel Noriega."

In a very complex operation, 27 targets were struck simultaneously by a combined force of US Army Rangers, paratroops, light infantrymen, Navy SEALs (sea-air-land teams) and Marines, supported by helicopter gunships, attack aircraft and light armored vehicles. After the eighth operational day, Noriega sought refuge in the Vatican's Papal Nunciature in Panama City, the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) were eliminated as a military threat and a determination of the civilian casualties and collateral damage began. Almost unanimously, observers hailed Operation *Just Cause* as a near perfect example of the "surgical" military strike—the "quick win"—typically sought by military planners, required by political leaders and endorsed by the American public. But is this the model on which to build future similar operations?

US preoccupation with the quick win is considered to be an expression of US efficiency and is equated with decisive, successful military operations. Several factors contribute to the development of this idea. Over the last 45 years, our perception of the Soviet threat has reinforced the idea that the quick win is critical to success. The concept of fighting outnumbered and winning requires speed, surprise and the concentration of overwhelming military force. The Vietnam experience also instilled in both the American public and the US military a desire for short, decisive operations.

US planners study the military philosophers (Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz and B. H. Liddell Hart) who stressed the need for speedy victories, thus apparently confirming the quick-win concept. Upon closer reading, however, it is found that these philosophers recommend taking "the enemy's country whole and intact" with minimal loss of life and property destruction as the first, best option; they advocate the speedy defeat of the enemy only as the next best course of action when the first has not been achieved. Despite the lip service paid to the indirect approach espoused by the philosophers, US military forces and operational planners continue to rely on firepower and attrition to defeat opponents.

The combination of emphasis on the quick win and little appreciation of military history leads operational planners to consider only a narrow range of possible courses of action and to unwittingly include exploitable vulnerabilities in their planning process. Planners recognize that plans based on the quick win are constrained from their inception by the courses of action considered, the choice of forces employed and the psychological and tactical opportunities given to the enemy. Failure to recognize these constraints increases the risk faced by the forces which carry out such plans.

**Courses of Action.** In identifying and selecting military courses of action, the operational planner considers the mission, the enemy, the environment and the troops and time available for the envisioned operation. Also influencing the selection of a course of action, however, is the desire to attain the objective as quickly as possible. The requirement for short-duration operations is the consequence of political (public opinion) and military (the quick win) considerations that predispose planners to consider, primarily, those options realizing the objective in the shortest possible time. As a result, the time-available factor becomes an artificial constraint, one not strictly dictated by operational requirements. All too often, therefore, the course of action recommended to decision makers is the product of little more than a determination of those types of similar force ratios designed to obtain the proper Clausewitzian balance of offensive to defensive elements needed to accomplish the quick win.

The pressure for a quick win, then, predetermines the range of military options considered. For example, the options of show of force, demonstration and blockade are not quick, decisive actions and may possibly require repeated operations and longer periods of time to be effective. On the other hand, the forced-entry option is decisive and can
use the amount of strength required to ensure a situation's resolution. Operation Just Cause was an example of this type of process.

According to officials in the Department of Defense, "the plans [for Operation Just Cause] ranged from waiting until Noriega could be located and then arresting him, to the 'maximum' option which called for the invasion of Panama with sufficient forces to not only capture Noriega but to secure the canal and neutralize the forces loyal to him." Selecting the maximum option met the political requirements and allowed the US military establishment to follow traditional force employment: firepower and attrition. Against the estimated 15,000 members of the PDF (approximately 3,500 were members of combat units), the United States committed 27,000 military personnel to the invasion, supported by the entire available conventional arsenal. In pre-positioned forces alone, the United States had 12,000 troops in Panama, but another 15,000 were added to assure success. Once again, the proper 3–1 force ratio in combat forces was attained, the quick–win option recommended and the range of possible military options reduced to one.

Choice of Forces. The quick–win concept also restricts the operational planners' range of choices in the type and composition of military forces employed. The military surgical strike requires units that can be readily and rapidly transported by our limited strategic airlift in sufficient numbers to execute the mission successfully. The strategic lift requirement of heavy forces (armor and mechanized formations) and the accompanying sustainment challenge render them unsuitable for employment on a global basis. Attaining surprise is hardly possible when the elements needed for the operation must first unload at a pier after a week or more at sea. The obvious choice, then, is to select units that are light infantry, special operations, airborne or some combination thereof to conduct quick–win operations.

The stress on such operations, as in Panama, is leading the United States to restructure its military forces, thus further reducing the scope of force selection options. The emphasis on having a quick–win capability is causing the US Army to "protect all light and special operations divisions from force structure cuts," while allowing the heavy forces to take the brunt of projected force draw downs. The force structure model for the 1990s, therefore, "will center on rapidly deployable forces such as the 18th Airborne Corps and its 82d Airborne Division, which played a key role in the assault on Panama"; the result is a force structure that relies primarily on a single–type military capability.

Opportunities Given to the Enemy. Unfortunately, the fascination with the quick win and the need to resolve a situation in "the grace period of public support . . . associated with American military operations" invite planners to lead with their psychological chin while telegraphing their operational intentions. The anticipation of a short–duration operation, combined with the limited selection of forces and means of employment, provides an enemy with opportunities to defeat US forces.

Planning to and expecting to win in a short period of time creates overconfidence and arrogance and leads to a failure to appreciate an enemy's capabilities. Also, the psychological impact of not achieving the objective as anticipated becomes a powerful weapon in the enemy's arsenal, attacking not only the morale of the units engaged but also the American public's support for continued operations. The German Operation Barbarossa in the Soviet Union in 1941 and our experience in Vietnam are obvious historical examples.

On the tactical level, the restrictions in the options considered and the type, composition and means of deployment of forces required by the quick win telegraph to the enemy how, where and with what the United States will conduct its operations. The only questions remaining in the enemy's mind are when and in what strength the United States will employ its forces. Planning restrictions, attributable to the quick–win concept, tell an opposing element that a US force will consist of some combination of light and special operations units, will deploy by air at night and will receive support (logistic and fire) from aerial assets. The enemy can easily anticipate which US units' activities to monitor, where insertions would take place (airfields and open areas near military and governmental targets) and then take measures to inflict high numbers of casualties on the invaders. The advantage of tactical surprise would be lost to US forces.

Although the PDF did not take advantage of such opportunities in Operation Just Cause, the potential for a US defeat was present. Underestimating the size of the Dignity battalions, the level of resistance encountered and the caches of weapons available created the prospect of "U.S. troops being tied down for months in guerrilla warfare." Had that situation actually developed, the United States would have faced a protracted, unpopular and expensive war instead of enjoying a successful, quick win.

The Best Course of Action? Despite its military success, Operation Just Cause is not the planning model for similar operations that will
face the United States in the next century. The advantages of pre-positioned forces, long familiarity with the area and local logistic support are not very probable in other situations. We can expect that potential adversaries will take note of the military option used by the United States in Panama and will prepare responses that increase the risk to US forces employed in a comparable quick-win manner.

The requirement to wage quick, decisive operations dictates that, as Clausewitz urged, we "use our entire forces with the utmost energy; [and if we do,] public opinion is won most rapidly." But the quick-win mind-set reduces flexibility by limiting the range of options considered and the type of forces employed, and it encourages enemy anticipation of our plans. The quick win, then, by its very nature, does not allow a second chance; it creates a must-win situation before the battle. Operational planners, therefore, must recognize that the emphasis on the quick win leads them to rely on overwhelming firepower and manpower and that reliance on these traditional methods renders their plans vulnerable to enemy exploitation.

**NOTES**
6. Ibid.
8. Thompson, 7; Almond, 7.

MAJ Radebaugh, US Army Military Intelligence Branch, is currently serving with the American Embassy in the Republic of Djibouti.

**Does Latin America Matter Any More?**

By Abraham F. Lowenthal

With the rapid changes in geopolitics, particularly the drastic reforms under way in the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Soviet empire, some analysts who have conceived the Western Hemisphere largely in Cold War terms are now suggesting that Latin America is becoming virtually irrelevant for the United States. As one well-known analyst has suggested, it may virtually "drop off the map" as far as Washington, DC, is concerned.

The truth, however, is that what is happening in Latin America today substantially affects the United States and will do so even more in the future. In a transformed global context that will compel greater attention to the domestic concerns of the United States, Latin America could well become increasingly significant.

Latin America's new importance derives from the region's proximity, size and degree of interconnectedness with the United States. US military security in the narrow sense is not seriously menaced by direct attack in the hemisphere. US security in the broader sense of its capacity to protect the individual and the collective welfare of the country's citizens will be influenced by Latin America because the region is close, large, growing demographically, demonstrably capable of economic growth and, especially, because it is already so intertwined with the United States.

First, Latin America's likely salience for the United States in the 1990s will derive from its economic impact, the influence of migration, the region's capacity to affect important shared problems and because of core values at the heart of American society, especially respect for individual human rights.

Economically, Latin America's importance as an export market for the United States could increase sharply in the 1990s. One by one, a few Latin American countries are beginning to emerge from the recession of the 1980s. If the region as a whole can overcome its debt-induced depression, it could begin to regain the high rates of economic growth sustained from World War II through the 1970s. The industrial transformation that occurred in Latin America during that period was comparable in scope and pace with that in the United States from 1890 to 1914 and produced a regional growth rate twice as high as that of the United States from 1950 to the end of the 1970s. Latin America's demographic growth has also been rapid; starting with approximately the same population as the United States in 1950, Latin America now has 65 percent more people than the United States and will have nearly twice as many inhabitants by the end of the century.
These facts, taken together, explain in large measure why Latin America was the fastest growing export market for US products in the late 1970s. US firms still have some comparative advantages in Latin American markets derived from proximity, familiarity, communication links, financial and other services, and cultural penetration. If Latin American economies rebound, they could absorb more US exports in a period when regaining trade competitiveness will be one of the main challenges facing the United States. Latin America could also continue to be a significant area for US banking operations, not at the artificially high levels that were produced in the 1970s when the commercial banks frantically recycled “petrodollars” in the Western Hemisphere but at a level high enough to make a major difference in the performance of several key “money-center” banks.

A second and growing importance of Latin America to the United States derives from massive and sustained migration, especially from Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America. More than 20 million people of Hispanic descent now live in the United States, and Latinos are the country’s fastest growing ethnic or cultural group. The flow of immigrants into the United States, steady for a generation and not easily stopped by restrictive legislation, reflects both the “push” factors in host countries and the “pull” of a US economy that needs unskilled labor and is likely for demographic reasons to require even more immigrant workers in the next decade. More than half of the public school students in Los Angeles County and in four southwestern states are of Latino descent. More than 10 percent of Central America’s population fled the region during the war-torn 1980s, mostly to come to the United States. And the influx from the Caribbean has been relentless; since the end of World War II, more than 5 million people from the Caribbean islands have come to the US mainland—about one of eight people born in the region. These massive migrations are affecting the United States in myriad ways—shaping education, employment, public health, business, politics, cultures, mores and cuisine. The immigrant communities from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean are bound to influence how the United States conceives its stake in the hemisphere’s social, economic and political conditions and how the United States relates to the countries of origin.

Third, Latin America is important to the United States because of major problems facing this country that cannot be resolved without sustained and intimate cooperation from Western Hemisphere nations. The most dramatic example is narcotics. Latin American countries produce or transship at least 80 percent of the cocaine and 90 percent of the marijuana that enters the United States. Although the drug scourge cannot be confronted unless demand in the United States is drastically reduced, domestic programs to do so will not succeed without effective complementary programs in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. And there are other vital issues of the 1990s on which Latin America’s cooperation may well make a critical difference: protecting the environment; developing and managing resources, including energy; combating terrorism; preventing the spread of AIDS and other diseases; and curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other armaments.

Finally, the prospects for preserving the values at the core of American society, particularly respect for fundamental individual human rights, will be shaped by conditions throughout the hemisphere. As a nation committed to freedom, equity and respect for the individual, the United States cannot comfortably condone repression in a region so historically and culturally connected to its society and where US influence remains important. Whenever Latin America’s governments are based on force rather than on public support and whenever there are significant violations of human rights in the Americas, Latin America will be on the US foreign policy agenda.

These main ways that Latin America will matter to the United States in the 1990s have the following key implications for forming US policies and particularly for the mission of the US Armed Forces:

- The United States should and probably will recognize that it has an objective stake in Latin America’s basic economic, social and political realities. In an earlier era, what mattered to the United States in the Western Hemisphere was mainly obtaining military bases, preserving access to raw materials, protecting the investments of US firms and securing the diplomatic support of client-state governments. The US government could then afford to rationalize a certain callousness about internal conditions within Latin America, ignore the poverty and inequity and even make its peace with repugnant dictators. But, if what concerns the United States about Latin America is the capacity of its countries to buy US products and repay loans to US banks; the rate and nature of migration; the prospects for sustained and effective cooperation on tough shared problems like drugs and the environment; and protecting fundamental human rights, then the United States should take a posi-
tive interest in the region's underlying internal conditions.

- This framework suggests which of the Latin American countries ought to be of greatest interest to the United States and why. The relationship with Mexico is of utmost importance, for Mexico scores high on all dimensions of US concern. Brazil, a megacountry of nearly 150 million people and the ninth or 10th largest market economy in the world, has little significance for the United States on demographic grounds, but it is considerably important on every other criterion. Venezuela will matter primarily because of its vast oil and gas reserves, the significance of which has been underscored by the Persian Gulf crisis. The Andean countries, at least for a time, will have salience for Washington, DC, because of drugs and related sociopolitical deterioration and their spillover effects on the United States. The Caribbean islands, including Puerto Rico and to some extent the countries of Central America, will have an importance beyond their size deriving from the high degree of interpenetration that has been caused by massive and sustained migration.

Conversely, the United States in the 1990s may perceive that it has much less at stake in combating leftist insurgencies than it thought in the 1980s. The nations of the Southern cone—Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay—may also recede to the relatively modest importance they had in US foreign policy earlier in the century.

- The issues at the heart of US-Latin American relations in the 1990s will increasingly involve both international and domestic aspects and players. Trade, immigration, narcotics control, resource development, environmental protection and public health will require complex management. They will involve the active participation of not only congressional, state and local authorities but also corporations, unions and nongovernmental organizations. The line between domestic policy and Latin American policy, consequently, will be hard to define in the 1990s. Far from becoming irrelevant, Latin America's problems and opportunities will increasingly become the United States'.

- The "security" issues that will likely involve the US Armed Forces in Latin America in the 1990s and beyond are not strategic questions, border conflicts or even combating insurgent movements. Rather, the US Armed Forces will become increasingly involved in fighting threats to US interests that derive from the narcotics traffic, criminal networks and the sociopolitical deterioration and disintegration in some countries.

These issues will challenge the US Armed Forces to develop capabilities not previously needed and to exercise this capacity in an increasingly complex and challenging political and social environment. MR

**Defense Strategy Correspondence Course**


Mr. Lowenthal is a professor of international relations at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, and executive director of the Inte-American Dialogue. He is the author of Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s.
Advent of the Nonlinear Battle: AirLand Battle—Future
By General John W. Foss
Army, February 1991

Studies titled “AirLand Battle—Future” are used by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) “to determine what changes are necessary in our doctrine, organizations and equipment. The result will be the evolution of AirLand Battle, the doctrine, with the type of organizations and equipment necessary to support it,” says General John W. Foss in the February 1991 issue of Army.

Foss says, “These studies have identified several important future trends.” They include “increased ... lethality, range and accuracy of modern weapons systems.” It is also “feasible to field surveillance systems that allow us to know where significant enemy forces are almost all the time.” Because of increased costs that correspond to these advances, “the result will be a future battlefield with fewer, more sophisticated and more expensive weapons systems.” Added to that are fiscal constraints that “move us and many other nations to smaller armies.”

“With fewer units and weapons systems, future operations will ... become more open and less linear ... With fewer forces on the battlefield, there will frequently be large gaps between forces (hence the nonlinear condition).”

Insights gained from a conceptual scenario developed and analyzed by TRADOC “indicate that AirLand Battle—Future operations can be categorized into four somewhat distinct stages.” The first stage is the “detection—preparation stage.”

According to Foss, this first stage includes a “detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield and ... the efficient use of sensors and reconnaissance forces to locate and verify enemy formations, targets and activities. The commander provides for the security of his force. In mid to high-intensity, this could involve dispersion.” The operational commander also decides upon his course of action during this stage.

As for the second stage, “the commander must gain and maintain the initiative from this point on and begin to establish those conditions necessary for his decisive operations.” This could include “the concentration of long-range fires from tactical air, MLRS [multiple launch rocket systems] and attack helicopters ... [to] set the conditions for maneuver by tactical units.”

In the third stage, the decisive operations stage, “the commander engages with maneuver forces supported by fires at a time and place and under the conditions of his choosing to have the decisive effect.”

“The fourth and final stage is reconstitution. Units disperse and reconstitute either forward or to the rear and prepare for future operations and the beginning of the cycle again.”

According to Foss, these conceptual stages “offer a framework for further development of doctrine.”

In discussing potential force structure changes, Foss says they “should be designed to improve agility and deployability without sacrificing lethality.” He says that TRADOC analyses show that combat, combat support and combat service support units should be mixed at a lower level than the current mix at division level. He suggests that combined arms brigades consisting of all three types of “units are required for the successful execution of future AirLand Battle doctrine.”

According to Foss, “these combined arms brigades ... could consist of three (or possibly four) assigned maneuver battalions, a direct support air defense artillery battery, and artillery, engineer and forward support battalions ... Battalions would contain three maneuver companies for an organization that is easier to control and fight on the battlefield.”

In addition, “a small scout platoon would be added to assist the brigade commander in reconnaissance and route control.”

Foss says the more open battlefield will require greater security and reconnaissance operations. The security tasks “will require placing tanks back in divisional cavalry troops.” The corps will remain “the base for organizing ... for combat and executing AirLand Battle doctrine.”

As for the type of leader the Army will need, Foss says, “The AirLand Battle—Future concept calls for leaders who can gather information quickly and make decisions, often in the absence of guidance from higher headquarters.”

He says we must teach use of mission orders that “clearly state the commanders intent ... The commander’s intent should be a short statement of the
relationship of friendly forces with respect to enemy forces and terrain at the completion of the current mission. It should also include how this end state will facilitate future operations.

And finally, “AirLand Battle—Future is an evolutionary concept that builds upon current AirLand Battle doctrine . . . It is a way of fighting that is designed to wrest the initiative from the enemy, to fight him on our terms and to minimize friendly casualties.”—DGR

**LETTERS**

**Mobilization Force—Vanguard of the Future**

“A Mobilization Force,” by Captain Jeffrey A. Jacobs and “A New Force Structure,” by Captain Richard J. Hyde, in the November 1990 issue were fine articles about the US Army of the future. It is great that members of the Total Army are thinking and planning for the future. With the changes in the world today, the Active Army, US Army National Guard and US Army Reserve will need all the future research, analysis and application possible.

Since the creation of the Total Force policy in 1973, the Army has been served quite well with the concepts of forward-deployed army, contingency army and reinforced army. Jacobs is right about mobilization being the vanguard of the Army in the future. Operation Desert Shield clearly points to this. The Persian Gulf area of the world has been the scene of many centuries of wars, battles and military adventurism.

Hyde’s article dealing with a reduced force structure, improvements and emphasis on the Army school system and more training and readiness for the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve was right on the mark. The one constant factor of mankind’s future is change, which both authors point out. The Army will have to change. Proper mobilization, an improved force structure, improved schooling, training and mission readiness are excellent ways to improve the Army and make it more flexible in an uncertain future.

The Vietnam War did a great deal of damage to the Army. Despite the damage, the Army through the Total Force policy made a decent and progressive comeback. If it could do that, the Army can change again to face the new realities and experiences of the 1990s and beyond. As Jacobs stated in his article, “It must be all that it can be.”

Charles Trudell, West Carrollton, Ohio

**Unmanned Vehicles are Here!**

I was very pleased to see Major Thomas J. Kelly’s article, “The Robots are Here!,” in the November 1990 issue.

The US Army and US Marine Corps have signed a Memorandum of Agreement establishing an Unmanned Ground Vehicle Joint Project Office (UGVJPO) at the US Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. The Army has an approved Organizational and Operational Plan for a light-weight helicopter transportable unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) that will conduct reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA). The Marine Corps is also staffing an Initial Statement of Requirements for a similar system. The two services are going to merge these documents into a Joint Service Operational Requirement during 1991.

In September 1989, UGVJPO demonstrated the feasibility of using teleoperated UGVs in a combat scenario to perform the RSTA mission. In addition to the primary role of RSTA, UGVJPO laser designated targets for copperhead and hellfire weapons systems and simulated a chemical attack to show the value of these systems in a contaminated environment.

In November of this year, UGVJPO demonstrated the interoperability of unmanned aerial vehicles with the UGVs. It used an offensive scenario in which the unmanned systems provided flank security to the maneuvering manned forces.

Presently, the UGVJPO is purchasing surrogate teleoperated vehicles for test and evaluation by the user. These vehicles will be used to develop and validate the operator’s concept of employment and to refine the requirements. A full-scale development decision is planned for the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 1993.

One of the biggest problems with this technology is the lack of user awareness. The technology
exists today to teleoperate unmanned systems on the battlefield, and the potential is unlimited. It is now up to the operational community to examine its application. I would like to encourage more soldiers and Marines to start thinking and writing about this subject.

LTC R. J. Harper, USMC, Unmanned Ground Vehicle Joint Project Office, United States Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama

Deception Obvious to Enemy

I read Captain (P) Paul A. Haveles' article, "Deception Operations in REFORGER 88," (August 1990 Military Review) with great interest as I was the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (8ID[M]) battlefield deception (BAT-D) officer during Operation Hero. Haveles accurately describes the operation and "lessons learned" but fails to state that he and other members of the V Corps staff were aware of many of the noted deficiencies prior to executing the plan. As early as June 1988, after the initial concept brief, the 3d Armored Division BAT-D officer and I pointed out many deficiencies or lessons learned.

Specific deficiencies noted were:
- The military intelligence battalion and division artillery in support of 10th Panzer Division were positioned away from the axis of advance portrayed by the deception story.
- The movement of 8ID(M) forces across the Main River loop area, Federal Republic of Germany, was obvious.
- There was a lack of combat vehicles (tanks and armored personnel carriers [APCs]) committed to the movement. V Corps planners were told that approximately one-third of 8ID(M)'s combat vehicles would be required to effectively portray the deception story.
- The insufficient number of bridges capable of sustaining movement of the division's tanks and APCs across the Main River eased the enemy's task of monitoring named areas of interest. Movement across the area designated in the plan would have been done at great risk of interdiction, making such a move by a division implausible.
- Deception events were executed beyond the range of VII Corps' intelligence collection means. A majority of the deception events executed occurred far behind the V Corps forward area of battle, increasing the likelihood of the enemy missing the events or being unable to confirm them by additional sources.

Another lesson learned from Operation Hero is that if deception story deficiencies are obvious to us, they are probably obvious to the enemy. The story must unfold as a logical extension of the battle. It must be both believable and plausible. Deception planners must evaluate the physical and signal (noncommunications and communications) signatures of both the true mission and the deception story. Planners must mask or enhance indicators and signatures, as required, to ensure the operation's security and success.

As often found in warfare, many lessons learned are lessons relearned. Failure should not be the reason to learn a lesson from the obvious. In warfare, such lessons are paid for with soldiers' blood.

Overall, Operation Hero was of significant training value. New doctrine, organizations (the battlefield deception elements) and equipment, both issue and prototype, were used on a scale unprecedented up to that time.

CPT James F. Merkel, USA, Battle Command Training Program, Combined Arms Training Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Division of Military and State

Captain Mark D. Rendina makes some excellent points in "An Officer Corps for the 1990s" (October 1990 Military Review). Too often we forget that the quality of an army is largely dependent upon the quality of its officers. Many officers are so immersed in "making it happen" that they neglect the duty to study their profession. Rendina reminds us that World War II was won by those who pondered strategy, at least as often as they reconciled document registers.

I am troubled, however, by Rendina's vision of a highly intellectualized officer corps providing "advice" and "crisis management" to the civil government. This seems to be more the proper role of the foreign service and the Central Intelligence Agency. Our mission must be to bring combat power to bear on the enemy: to deter the enemy in peace; to defeat the enemy in time of war. The last thing the "republic" needs is yet another club of self-important "eggheads" clamoring for the president's attention.

I am also concerned that Rendina confuses advanced degrees with education. Cicero reminds us that nothing is so foolish that some philosopher has not said it. Advanced civil schooling is an important part of an officer's education. Still, I think we would gain more in the long run by longer staff assignments, an end to "ticket-punching" and an officers' professional development strategy worthy of the name.

Any professor can advise the president on the nuances of this or that culture. Our role must re-
main to lead soldiers in combat and to be worthy of their obedience.

CPT Stephen C. Danckert, USA, 611th Ordnance Company, Miesau, Federal Republic of Germany

Expansible Defense Industry

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Rozman and Lieutenant Colonel William A. Saunders, the authors of “The Expansible Army,” (November 1990 Military Review) provide a model for a rapidly expansible post-Cold War Army that is well steeped in historical tradition. While the concept has served the United States well in the past, the primary stumbling block in the future will be maintaining a mobilization base to complement an expansible Army.

Accordingly, there are three issues to consider when relying on a force that must be reconstituted for significant conflict. First, critical funding in the form of direct subsidies must be provided to key defense industries, even when inefficient, to maintain the ability to field a credible modern force. The expansible Army model requires a defense industry capable of similar expansion.

Second, long procurement lead times for sophisticated equipment may generate bottlenecks in the industrial base upon increasing production, however robust industry may appear to be. In 1978, Exercise NIFTY NUGGET showed the significant mobilization shortfalls the United States had at that time. Despite the efforts to correct some of the problems, the ability to convert the civilian production infrastructure for defense use has decreased over time. While problems differ in mobilizing the heavy equipment manufacturers and electronics firms, military production requirements mandate at least a minor Department of Defense role in maintaining “warm” production lines. This additional capacity for military products must be paid for; a cost essentially transparent to earlier mobilizations for World War I and World War II.

Third, the decision to actually expand the Armed Forces to meet an emergent challenge will be both a political and military one. In a technical sense, converting industry will be more difficult than levying a draft to field increased forces. In a political sense, however, raising the size of the Army would call for significant forehanded leadership, akin to President George Bush’s actions in the Persian Gulf. Without that strong leadership and a well-thought-out and executable mobilization plan and requisite industrial base, the expansible Army concept may provide a false sense of security.

LCDR Walter M. Kreitler, USN, Federal Executive Fellow, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC

Unique Window on History

Major George Knapp’s concern, in his review of Buffalo Soldiers in the December 1990 Military Review, that the book “falls short of the academic mark in documentation and general usefulness as a research tool” strikes me as that of the academician. The author’s claim to scholarship is very simple... he was there!

With the keen eye of the professional artilleryman, Colonel Thomas St. John Arnold describes the impact of mountainous terrain on a battlefield. With the cool assessment of the professional operations and plans officer, he depicts the operations of a truly unusual multinational force that includes Allied troops and two very unique US Army organizations: the 442d Regimental Combat Team (Nisei) made up of Americans of Japanese descent and the only combat negro infantry division in our history, the 92d Infantry Division.

Most of the descriptions of the 1944 to 1945 World War II period focus on the European or Pacific theaters of operations. The fighting in North Italy or the China–Burma–India Theater has been largely overlooked. Thus, I would recommend Buffalo Soldiers to anyone who desires a truly unique window on history.

COL L. R. Fortier, USAR, Retired, Virginia Beach, Virginia

The NCO Journal

The first quarterly publication of The NCO Journal is scheduled for standard Department of the Army (DA) distribution in April. Commanders wishing further copies should submit requests in accordance with DA Form 12-05-E. The NCO Journal will be a forum for the open exchange of ideas and information to support the training, education and development of the Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Corps. It is hoped that the majority of articles published will come from the readers. For further information, write to Department of the Army, Headquarters, US Army Sergeants Major Academy, ATTN: Editor, The NCO Journal, Fort Bliss, TX 79918-1270 or call AUTOVON 978-8550 or (915) 568-8550.

Operation Just Cause is one of the first book-length accounts of the US invasion of Panama in December 1989. It is not a panoramic view of the contingency operation but one soldier's perspective, as constrained by rank and geography. It provides several critical insights on what it is like to be a combat soldier engaged in hostilities at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. In this sense, First Lieutenant Clarence E. Briggs III, who was the executive officer for Bravo Company, 3-504 Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, is not speaking exclusively to his peers and subordinates. Field grade and general officers, not to mention policy makers, would profit immensely from reading his account of Bravo Company's exploits during Operation Just Cause.

Briggs' contributions in two areas merit special consideration. The first concerns the sober picture he paints for any soldier who has not engaged in hostilities. Briggs shuns the glorification of war and manly boasts of "kicking ass" and offers in its place a sober depiction of the pervasive fear one experiences before and during combat operations, a fear that can produce a state of "hyperconsciousness" in which reality plays out in slow motion. Confusion, exhaustion, isolation, survival, an instinct not to disgrace oneself before one's comrades, incredible acts of courage, regrettable incidents of indiscriminate and friendly fire—these constitute the essence of war's reality. Intensive training can prepare soldiers for combat but can never completely replicate combat conditions such as the near-paralyzing effect, as recounted by Briggs, that a wounded man's screams can have on unit self-discipline, leadership and momentum.

Briggs' second contribution moves into relatively uncharted territory. At the lower end of the conflict spectrum, infantrymen can expect to perform missions for which they are ill-prepared and ill-trained and which run contrary to the expectations of the "warrior." Furthermore, these missions will change rapidly, as will the rules of engagement (ROE) dictating what military behavior is allowed under each mission.

By Briggs' count, the paratroopers of Bravo Company performed five separate missions during the course of the Panama crisis. Before deployment to Panama, the men of Bravo Company were "gamesters" engaged in extensive training for possible contingencies in Panama. When the company arrived in Panama to undergo training at the Jungle Operations Training Center, it became an "agent" asserting US Panama Canal Treaty rights in Panama. With Operation Just Cause, the men of Bravo Company became "warriors," the mission for which they were best trained. But the combat phase of Operation Just Cause lasted only two or three days, after which Bravo Company had to make an all too rapid transition from warrior to "constable," responsible for reestablishing law and order. Finally, the soldiers became "guardians" charged with providing national assistance to the Panamanian government and people.

The most difficult transition for the men of Bravo Company was from warrior to constable, a mission for which they were woefully unprepared. Trained to close with and kill the enemy, the troops found the constraints of the ROE frustrating and, at times, confusing. Observes Briggs, "The role of police officer or constable is a difficult one to assume for an unbridled warrior still fresh from the fight. High-strung and chomping at the bit, we would soon be forced to suppress our aggression and adopt a more civil approach to dealing with our surroundings . . . Deadly force could only be used in self-defense and to protect American and Panamanian lives. Warning shots had to be fired in all cases, and it was mandatory to shoot only to wound. Chambering a round while not in imminent danger and clearing buildings by fire were forbidden."

The adjustment to a police role can be mentally agonizing for an infantryman. Yet, it is an adjustment that for a variety of reasons has taken place in virtually every US intervention since World War II (Lebanon in 1958 and 1982-1984; Dominican Republic in 1965; Grenada in 1983; and Panama in 1989). Briggs' recommendation that training (and I would add military education) be amended to include distinct modules dealing with the ROE
echoes similar appeals of those who have gone before. Briggs' account is testimony that those appeals have fallen on deaf ears in the past. He and others have served the military well by raising the issue again in the wake of Operation Just Cause. One can hope that this time the appeals will be taken to heart.

Lawrence A. Yates, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC


As Operation Just Cause got under way, five familiar figures, “Newsstand Ned,” “Photo Phil,” “Beltway Bob,” “Network Nellie” and “DOD Dan,” converged upon Panama City, Panama. The rush was on to gobble up all readily available information for subsequent production into news stories, magazine articles, photo albums, books and “lessons learned” papers. Within weeks, newsstands and military bookstores were stocked with a complete assortment of hastily penned and assembled publications. In January 1991, the one-year anniversary of Operation Just Cause, this book was published, claiming to be “the first serious attempt to consider the operation in its political and historical perspective.” Editors Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras provide a baker’s dozen of academically derived and individually authored chapters, giving inquisitive readers and military scholars an alternative to hurriedly concocted photographic books, war journals and “one soldier’s experience” books.

This book does not provide entertainment or drama but a compilation of facts and analysis on the historical background (1905–1988), the prelude, the operation and the aftermath for Operation Just Cause. As an intelligence staff officer at US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), Quarry Heights, Panama, I was in Panama during much of the prelude, all of the operation and a couple of months of the aftermath. As I started reading Operation Just Cause, I could immediately sense that I was gaining a much richer insight of that of which I had been a part. Aspects that were vague in my mind became better focused, and issues I was unaware of were brought to light.

If you like to pick up a book and read it in one setting, this book may be somewhat tiring, as the 13 chapters are unevenly focused and have different styles of presentation. The authors often cover the same ground, albeit from different angles. As can be expected in a work of this type, there are a number of inaccuracies. Watson, for example, repeatedly uses the acronym SOCOM to denote US Southern Command, when the official and widely known acronym is USSOUTHCOM or just SOUTHCOM (SOCOM stands for Special Operations Command). Such errors, although slight, tend to distance a reader who knows better.

This is a worthwhile book, a must for those who like to see the “big picture.” The writers have successfully collated a myriad of information that places Operation Just Cause in its historical and geopolitical setting.

MAJ Bruce M. King, USA, Military Review, Latin American Editions, USACGSC


If you are one of those who frequently use “Russia” and “the Russians” when referring to the Soviet Union and its people, this book was written for you. The “hidden nations” are the peoples of the Baltic States, the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia—non-Russians who have begun the long, complicated and sometimes violent process of leaving the Soviet empire. This process, in fact, may precipitate the breakup of the Soviet Union or, as we saw in January 1990, a violent reaction by the Soviet army.

The authors, a husband and wife team, wrote the book after traveling in the Soviet Union in the winter and summer of 1989 and early 1990. They discovered that the Soviet Union’s captive peoples, particularly those who at some time in the Soviet or Imperial Russian past were free and independent, now long to attain that status once again.

Two introductory chapters provide a historical and economic context of the nationalities question, followed by separate chapters on the Ukraine, Baltic States, Caucasus and Central Asia. The book continues with an important chapter on the Russian federation, itself searching for a non-Soviet identity, and then closes with a prognosis for future developments.

The authors clearly understand the issues that underlie and now exacerbate the rapidly deteriorating relationships, not only between Russians and non-Russians but also between Christians and Muslims, and Slavic and Turkic peoples. Some of
the problems date to czarist expansion during the 19th century, followed by forced “Russification.” Others, such as in the case of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, have more recent origins in the Soviet expansion just before World War II.

Not all of the hidden nations have suffered equally under the Russian/Soviet yoke. For the more recently occupied Baltic States, there has been political and cultural repression after an initial period of brutal invasion and deadly deportation. The Ukraine has endured the Stalin-contrived famine and murderous collectivization of the 1930s, followed by the German advance and retreat during World War II, then Soviet reoccupation and now widespread economic and ecological despoliation. The peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia are at the same time at war with each other and the Russian-dominated center and suffer the most severe economic deprivation of all the hidden nations.

The authors rightly point to the failure of the West, in particular the United States, to adequately consider the political aspirations of these hidden nations in forming their foreign policy. The most blatant example of this neglect, of course, is the recent refusal of the US government to recognize Lithuania’s independence, despite 50 years of denial of Lithuania’s forced incorporation into the Soviet Union. US government institutions have been reluctant to shift their efforts and resources from the Russian-language and culture-dominated Slavic north to outlying non-Slavic regions and cultures. One notable exception to this is the Voice of America which for years has broadcast into the Soviet Union in several non-Russian languages.

What does the future hold? The authors foresee three outcomes: severe political repression of a neo-Stalinist nature, complete collapse of the Soviet Union or the emergence of a confederation or commonwealth. While the authors, as well as prominent Western Sovietologists, hope for the latter, the news of the day points toward the former to prevent complete collapse.

Unlike so many books being published about the Soviet Union these days, this book will not soon be overcome by events. It has a few shortcomings: the neglect of Byelorussia and Moldavia (recently renamed Moldova by the Soviets) and too little analysis of the impact of the nationalities issue on the Soviet army (carelessly referred to by the authors as the Red Army). It is a concise, lucid and well-reasoned presentation of a problem too long ignored by Western scholars and governments.

Now the nationalities issue in the Soviet Union has reached a level of crisis that threatens to topple the empire. The *Hidden Nations* helps explain this crisis and fills a large gap in the literature on this subject.

MAJ James F. Gebhardt, USA, *On-Site Inspection Agency, Travis Air Force Base, California*


Not many people will immediately think of Leo Tolstoy’s *War and Peace* when they pick up Peter Hellman’s slim volume about a handful of people who have distinguished themselves in various ways during the four decades since the state of Israel has been struggling to exist within a hostile environment on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. But the parallels are there. Like the Russian novelist, Hellman focuses his attention not on the generals who control the war but on the soldiers and civilians whose lives are affected by the ravages of military operations. In fact, the thesis of Hellman’s book is similar to that of Tolstoy’s famous epilogue: history is made not only by those in positions of authority but also by everyone who is committed to a “cause.”

The individual chapters tell stories about people of widely differing backgrounds whose involvement in the various Arab-Israeli conflicts runs the gamut of possibilities. Professional soldiers, reservists, family members of those on the front lines, even innocent civilians who suddenly come face-to-face with the horrors of war when terrorists stage a raid on their coastal village, are the people Hellman selects. They represent thousands whose determination, courage and selfless pursuit of a life of independence based on religious and political (usually Zionist) ideals fortify them internally to continue life in Israel. The unifying principle of these disparate accounts is the steadfastness with which these heroes met the challenges of the war in which they found themselves (sometimes unwillingly) as participants.

Hellman tells his stories in vivid prose that recreates the excitement of desert tank warfare, the anxiety of family members who await word on the fate of loved ones and the horror of death at the hands of terrorists. There is little doubt that Hellman sides with the people about whom he writes; few Arabs emerge as distinct personalities in any of his narratives. That may be excusable in a book of modest length; after all, Hellman does deliver what he promises—a portrait of a nation engaged in a life-and-death struggle against neighboring states.
committed to its eradication. The men and women whose tales he recounts have something to teach all of us about personal courage.

LTC Laurence W. Mazzeno, USA, Retired, Grand Junction, Colorado


The US military is attempting to define its role within the new world order. It is perhaps defined by two examples of deployment to the Third World: first, the highly publicized Operation Desert Storm and, second, a more quiet rescue operation mounted off the coast of Liberia. As the United States moves into the 21st century, it will become increasingly involved in obtaining resources and markets from this area. With this emphasis, it is especially timely that Keith Somerville’s book becomes available to the professional soldier.

In this extremely readable book, Somerville conducts a detailed analysis of the most important conflicts occurring on the African continent. He examines them from the beginning of the “de-colonization” period to the present date. He addresses the historical origins of the conflict, the key personalities, the ethnic motivations and the involvement of foreign powers in these conflicts.

The opening, and most important chapter, defines the results of the colonial legacy on African politics. First, the colonial powers artificially dismembered large prosperous colonies into small economically unviable states which in turn became dependent on the former colonial power (both economically and militarily). Second, these borders were set to fragment ethnic groups. Third, the colonial powers were interested in economic exploitation, not building a nation for independence. Finally, the colonialists taught the native elites that the military force could be used to maintain power. These new rulers came to rely on armed force (to include use of foreign forces) rather than a popular mandate.

Somerville also presents case studies of African conflicts that involved foreign intervention: Chad, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia and Congo. The factors of the colonial legacy are demonstrated, and the motivations and involvement of the intervening states (to include the Soviets, Cubans, French, Libyans and Americans) are included.

Somerville loses his objectivity when describing the motivations of interventions by both the Western nations vis-a-vis the communist nations, and appears to have difficulty defining the relative value of foreign military aid. Despite these flaws, this book is a must for the military professional for its lessons in the political, strategic and tactical arenas and for the detailed information concerning many of today’s “shooting wars.” With the shift away from the European Theater, US soldiers will find themselves increasingly involved in supporting US policy in Africa and in nationbuilding, special operations or crisis management there. This book can provide an appreciation of the forces at work in these nations.

MAJ Robert D. Lewis, USA, Allied Forces Northern Europe, Kolsas, Norway


Expecting another biased account of the Israeli military, I was pleasantly surprised by Lon Nordeen’s Fighters Over Israel. This detailed and well-researched book presents an accurate picture of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) from its modest beginnings. Nordeen does a reputable job of maintaining a balanced story of IAF in its numerous encounters.

Nordeen’s historical transitions are concise and helpful in setting the context of the actions he describes. His understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict adds depth to his work and provides interesting background reading for those not familiar with the early history of the modern state of Israel.

Of particular interest to aircraft aficionados is the variety of aircraft used for combat by the IAF over the years. Ranging from single-engine commercial aircraft to the most modern jets, the IAF has been characterized by its diversity and ability to improvise. What may strike the reader as curious is the successful use of “obsolete” aircraft years after other countries have discarded similar models. The range of World War II aircraft used well into the 1950s is interesting for other reasons as well. Some of the planes such as the Avia S-199 (Messerschmitt BF-109 manufactured in Czechoslovakia), P-51 Mustang, Spitfire and Mosquito had distinguished service records from World War II (some against each other) and were still able to perform remarkably well in a number of roles for years afterward, even as they were being eclipsed by jets. The appendix that cites the types of aircraft and their important statistics is outstanding in its detail.

Minor errors in printing and spelling detract from the quality of the book; however, it is an excellent work that is an outstanding supplement to the
growing literature about the Israeli armed forces.

MAJ Edwin L. Kennedy, USA,

Center for Army Tactics, USACGSC


Using an innovative approach to examine the chronic problem of the Arab–Israeli conflict, John Quigley attempts to place the issues in a legal setting. Tracing the history of Palestine back to the beginning of the Zionist movement in the late 1800s and moving through to the current issues of West Bank settlements and the intifada, he overlays the rules of international law to support his conclusion that Israel’s existence is illegal.

While the author deserves considerable credit for his imaginative approach, the book reads like a carefully prepared, exhaustively documented (2,167 citations in 232 pages of text) legal argument. The author’s case against Israel is well-written and clearly articulated; however, the reader is left with the feeling that the other side of the story must have some merit but has no one to argue for it.

This is a piece of advocacy rather than analysis, and it needs to be viewed as such. For example, Quigley analyzes at some length the 1948, 1956 and 1967 Arab–Israeli wars and the 1982 Lebanon incursion, concluding that Israel is guilty of aggression in each of these cases, but does not mention the 1973 Arab–Israeli War anywhere in the book, not even in a footnote. Incidents in which the Israelis, or before them the Jewish settlers of Palestine, were victims are mentioned only in passing and are often dismissed as mere unfortunate occurrences. Whatever the reader’s personal views of the Arabs and the Israelis, after a certain point, one begins to suspect that there must be another side to the story. A companion volume laying out the Israeli arguments would be very interesting.

Still, the book is well-written and thought-provoking. If nothing else, it raises questions in the mind of the reader and offers a fresh perspective to an old and bewildering problem. Unfortunately, in a region in which “might” has long meant “right,” no courtroom resolution is likely to make a difference anytime soon. The book’s price is a bit high and its scope a bit narrow, but the Middle East and legal specialist might want to buy it. For others, it would be worthwhile to check it out from the library.


With the possibility of large-scale US military involvement in the drug war looming on the horizon, the professional need is growing for informative literature. Journalists Guy Gugliotta and Jeff Leen wrote Kings of Cocaine by expanding the series of award-winning investigative reports that ran in the Miami Herald in 1987. The book chronicles the expansion of the Medellin cartel into a multinational crime corporation that terrorizes the Colombian government and avoids US drug enforcement efforts, while saturating the hemisphere with drugs. Kings of Cocaine is a good read and an extremely useful reference that describes the methods, motives, history and personalities of the small group of Colombians that make up the Medellin cartel.

On a broader scale, the essays contained in The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security present views on the history and failure of US narcotics policy in the United States. This book is useful for three reasons. It presents the Latin–American view of (what they consider to be) the unilateral and rather heavy-handed anti-drug policies the United States has followed in recent years. It provides a very well-documented history of US policy toward narcotics throughout this century. The extensive research and documentation in the essays provide the reader with a large bibliography of narcotics-related articles and books.

I personally disagree with those authors who wrote otherwise excellent essays only to conclude that the only rational courses of action available are either the legalization of drugs or the exclusive focus of national effort on the user. The drug problem has both a supply and a demand side, and any solution which addresses only one component must fall short. Both books are good additions to the professional’s bookshelf.

CPT Kevin Smith, USA, Fort Rucker, Alabama


The decade of the 1930s, while commonly regarded as an “interwar” decade, was certainly not a peaceful one. It was a significant turning point in
the history of European civilization, as statesmen and commonfolk alike struggled to cope with the legacies of World War I. In this book, David Clay Large examines eight key episodes in European affairs of the 1930s. These include outbursts of political unrest in Britain and France, bloody purges in Germany and the Soviet Union, civil war in Austria and Spain, the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy, and finally, the infamous Munich conference that doomed Czechoslovakia.

Not all these affairs will be familiar to the military reader, yet they are very significant from the military perspective for two reasons. First, five of the eight crises directly involved military forces. Second, each of the eight bore directly or indirectly upon the coming of World War II. This book’s strength resides in the skill with which Large demonstrates the ominous portents that existed in seemingly unrelated incidents. Moreover, he shows that these portents went largely unperceived by contemporaries. Who could foretell that a political scandal in 1934 France would help open the doors for conquest and collaboration in 1940, or that Hitler’s surgical purge by the “Brown Shirts” in the “night of the long knives” set a precedent for “legalized” murder that would culminate in death-

PASS IN REVIEW


This work is a collage of the war experiences of a US Army helicopter pilot during his two very different tours in Vietnam. A third-person omniscient voice tells “Maverick’s” story throughout the book. The voice is engaging and has an uncanny ability to continually draw the reader deeper and deeper into the book. If you are a student of the Vietnam experience or interested in helicopter gunnery, you will enjoy this book.—CPT Mark T. Lisi, USA, US Army Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Attempting to predict whether the nation will be more secure 25 years in the future by anticipating the effects of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is nearly impossible. Most contributors to this anthology recognize this trap as they are forced to make giant assumptions—such as SDI technology works and is fully deployed. As one might expect, a smorgasbord of predictions are presented in these essays. The value of this work is the “visions” offered as a starting point to plan a strategy to anticipate the response of our adversaries. As with any set of crystal ball-gazing exercises, there are too many unknown variables to confidently arrive at any practical solutions to such a complex issue as SDI.—LTC Robert W. Duffner, USAR, Space Technology Center, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico


Then and Now provides horizontal linkage of historical events since 1945 and examines their relationships to the present from a number of different angles—political, social, cultural, technological and scientific. It provides a good basis upon which current global actions, such as Mikhail Gorbachev’s activities on the world stage and the reawakening of Eastern European countries, are presented and discussed. Not a scholarly examination but “a reporter’s narrative of things lived,” it is presented in a fast-paced journalistic style. The book presents numerous examples in which apparently disparate events over the past 45 years are shown to have an interwoven basis of cause and effect.—MAJ David A. Rubenstein, USA, Office of The Surgeon General, Washington, DC
camp genocide? Most ironic of all is the 1938 Munich conference, where the last attempt to salvage peace served instead to precipitate the most disastrous of wars. No one has put it better than Winston Churchill in his famous indictment of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain: “You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor and you shall have war.”

Large warns against the simplistic extraction of “lessons learned” from history; specifically, he asserts that the “lesson” of the Munich conference has been a dangerous influence in post-war statesmanship. Nonetheless, he offers three broad trends, which permeate seven of the eight episodes he analyses, that marked the 1930s. The first of these was a tendency for domestic turmoil to warp foreign policy. Second, was an inclination to use violence in attempts to resolve complex social, economic and political problems. Third, was a disintegration of political moderation as extremists from right and left grappled for power. We would do well to watch for similar patterns in the post–Cold War era, an “interwar” period that may prove to be no more peaceful than the 1930s.

Christopher R. Gabel,
Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

FOUNDATIONS OF THE NAZI POLICE STATE:

GLORIOUS DEFIANCE:


George C. Browder's detailed examination of the creation of the Nazi police state is thoroughly researched and meticulously documented. The narrative traces the organizational developments and personal power struggles that produced a mechanism for institutionalized terror and facilitated mass atrocities. This objective description of the evolution and architecture of a police state includes vivid portraits of Heinrich Himmler and Lieutenant General Reinhard Heydrich. An extensive index enhances reference value of the text.—LTC Neil M. Franklin, USAR, Montgomery, Alabama

First Battles always start a war, but heroic stands to the last man change history. Dennis Karl, in 11 narrative accounts of last stands, covers two and a half millennia of military history. These accounts give a good operational account and a strategical overview of each last stand, followed by a brief discussion of the nature of contemporary warfare and a commentary on the battles' historical significance. Perhaps the most outstanding part is the short, five-page conclusion in which Karl establishes four threads of continuity between the 11 last stands that sum up what he feels are the necessary ingredients leading to meaningful last stands: loyalty to state, pride in unit, loyalty to leader and ideology.—MAJ Dwain L. Crowson, ARNG, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Written from his World War II wartime journals, Brigadier George Taylor's accounts of combat are sharp, focused and blunt in his honest appraisal of his men, missions and responsibilities. While the book's major appeal is to an audience familiar with both British army terminology and its World War II campaign history, it is also a gem for other military readers. Taylor's candid record and assessment of his tactical decisions are especially valuable. Readers now have the opportunity to gaze upon the battlefield from the battalion command post of a tactically skilled and compassionate lieutenant colonel who struggled with balancing the lives of his men against the demands of his mission.—LTC Richard R. Seim, USA, Headquarters, European Command, Vaihingen, Federal Republic of Germany

James R. Arnold thoroughly analyzes the pivotal 1809 Austrian campaign, up to the battles of Eckmuhl and Ratisbonne. Relying almost exclusively on primary sources, with detail to satisfy the most discriminating Napoleonic scholar, the book is analytical, yet punctuated by interesting vignettes that both strengthen the account and facilitate easy reading. Arnold also provides the diplomatic intrigues leading to war, detailed campaign analysis and a comprehensive review of Napoleonic era weapons, tactics and armies.

The most interesting aspect of the book centers on the Napoleonic method of dealing with crisis. Napoleon is always a whirlwind of initiative. Arnold examines the flexible decision-making process that set Napoleon apart from his Austrian counterparts. Napoleon had the courage to admit his mistakes immediately upon the receipt of fresh intelligence, change his entire plan accordingly and then execute a bold new plan—all within 15 minutes!

Emphasizing personal battlefield courage and individual leadership, Arnold lauds that displayed by both the French and Austrian leaders. Arnold


In this 50th anniversary year of United States' entry into World War II, Yank is one of what will surely be hundreds of commemorative books about "The Big War." It contains articles and excerpts by such notables as Irwin Shaw, William Saroyan, Andy Rooney and Merle Miller who were not then renowned literary figures but "GIs" on the staff of Yank, the US Army weekly magazine. Cartoons of the immortal "Sad Sack" of George Baker and Bill Mauldin's "Willie and Joe" are included, as are letters to the editor, jokes, poems and memorable photos that you just know you have seen somewhere before. If you are a World War II GI or history buff, you will almost have to have a copy.—John Reichley, Directorate of Academic Operations, USACGSC


Russian journalist Gennady Bocharov succeeds in making the reader understand why Afghanistan is referred to as the Soviet Union's "Vietnam." His detailed and often graphic combination of firsthand experience and in-depth interviews are blended together to superbly illustrate the tragic futility of the war. Bocharov's disregard for official "recommendations" on reporting the war, his examples of Soviet government and military mismanagement and pointed revelations about the inept Afghan puppet government are mild by US standards but must have caused a considerable stir at home. Easy to read, hard to put down, this book ended with me wanting more. I recommend it to leaders at any level who are looking for alternative insights into the war.—CPT David D. Moran, USA, 1–212th Aviation, Aviation Training Brigade, Fort Rucker, Alabama
points out that all soldiers look for inspiration. Good leaders provide it by personal example which often tips the scales of victory.

Arnold’s battlefield narrative demonstrates his intimate knowledge of the terrain. Military leaders familiar with professor William G. Robertson’s staff ride techniques taught at the US Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, will instantly recognize the potential that an analysis of the 1809 Austrian campaign offers.

Useful appendixes describe in detail how to get to the battlefields, points of interest and local dining and lodging recommendations; principal characters; the French and Austrian orders of battle; and (for wargamers) ratings for Austrian and French units and commanders. Maps are numerous and helpful, but difficult to use as the text refers to them by number though they are not numbered.

Crisis on the Danube is unique. Informative, challenging and entertaining, it will appeal to a wide range of scholars and military leaders. We can all look forward to Arnold’s second volume which carries the campaign to Aspern–Essling and the climactic battle of Wagram.

MAJ Thomas E. Christianson, USA, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC


North Korea’s contribution and organization in support of international terrorism is only slightly known. This volume shows its commitment to terrorism and the evolution of its special warfare capability, but little else. Established with veterans of China’s guerrilla armies and Soviet partisans, North Korea has been inconsistent and disorganized in its approach to unconventional warfare, engaging in special warfare with more enthusiasm than skill. Terrorism pulls together information available in no other source, but the effort is little more than a clothesline from which to display disparate incidents. The growing influence of the son and heir of North Korea’s dictator has brought the effort under a common leader. Whatever this bodes for the future of terrorism will not be learned from this book.—Kevin L. Jamison, Kansas City, Missouri


This lavishly illustrated coffee table book, a tribute to the men and machines of the US armored force, celebrates the 50th anniversary of armor’s creation. A superb introduction by retired Army General Donn Starry simultaneously praises the men and leaders of the armored force, while it bemoans those who have consistently forecast the demise of armor as a potent force on the battlefield. This chronological look at the force in battle, with great photographs complemented by excerpts from Cavalry Journal and Armor magazine, provides a brief, albeit impressive, history of US armor.—CPT Kevin E. McKedy, USA, US Military Academy, West Point, New York


Interesting, readable history of TEWU, the Chinese Secret Service, from its beginnings in the 1920s to the Deng Xiaoping years of the 1980s. The focus is on the career of Kang Sheng and his web of contacts throughout the world. Dozens of behind-the-scenes stories constitute a fascinating summary of Chinese history in the communist era. The documentation of events is somewhat scanty, but there is a good biographical supplement and a fair bibliography. The authors are French journalists whose focus is on the intelligence world. Their work will be of interest to the general public, as well as specialists in intelligence.—Daniel E. Spector, Command Historian, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama

The USS Indianapolis was destined to make history: not because she earned 10 battle stars or set a San Francisco–Hawaii speed record during World War II; nor is the USS Indianapolis remembered for her critical mission of delivering to Tinian half the uranium used in the atomic bombs that ended World War II; instead, her name is etched in history books as the worst, single vessel naval disaster.

Captain Charles B. McVay III, a respected and competent officer, commanded the USS Indianapolis, a ship known for its speed and survivability. After delivering the precious cargo to Tinian, he set a direct course for the Philippines, where his crew would undergo badly needed refresher training. Lulled into a false sense of security by flag staff and port officers, McVay did not expect a Japanese threat enroute. A determined Japanese submarine commander would make this their fatal voyage.

USS Indianapolis was struck by two, possibly three, torpedoes and sunk so rapidly that her crew made few preparations to abandon ship. About 400 sailors went down with the ship, while the remaining 800 or so were thrown into the water, some without life jackets. Few life rafts and supplies made it into the water.

Though the loss of any vessel at sea is a disaster, the ship's real tragedy began with the crew members adrift, injured and shocked, in the Pacific Ocean. Over the next five days, their numbers dwindled to just over 300, as men succumbed to dehydration, exposure, injuries and suicidal behavior brought on by hallucinations. There would have been no survivors without the chance spotting by a patrol plane.

McVay did not go down with the USS Indianapolis but survived to face a worse fate. In a controversial court martial, he was found guilty of hazarding his ship, the first and only US officer brought to trial for losing his ship in battle. Although the captain is ultimately responsible for the safety of his ship, McVay appears a scapegoat for the diffused responsibility found ashore. Indeed, McVay lost his ship at sea, but the shore establishment lost 500 survivors to horrible and senseless deaths.

Dan Kurzman's extensive research reflects in this tightly written account of the sinking of the heavy cruiser, USS Indianapolis. He brings to life the ship, her captain and selected crew members. He provides adequate coverage of the sinking and conveys the horrors encountered by the survivors without becoming morbid. However, I felt the chapter on the court martial was too condensed, leaving me with a sense that he only presented a case favorable to McVay. Overall, I think it is an excellent book that will be enjoyed by anyone interested in the US Navy's worst sea disaster.

LCDR Jane D. Boyer, USN, Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii


The Indian army is the third largest in the world and has the world's largest volunteer force. The army's 36 divisions, plus numerous independent brigades (not to mention its nuclear capability), make India the dominant, regional military power. It is odd then that so little about it is available for the general reader. Rajesh Kadian has written two very interesting accounts aimed at precisely this gap.

India and Its Army begins with a brief look at the pre-1947 Indian army. Although Byron Farwell's recent Armies of the Raj covers this in much more detail, it is useful to have a non-Anglocentric perception on this period. The bulk of the book is an account of the Indian army's structure, ethos and problems since independence, as well as brief accounts of its wars with Pakistan and China.

The degree of continuity of the Indian army with its imperial predecessor is the first thing that strikes the outside observer. This is not merely a matter of uniforms, pipe bands and mess customs, but the isolation from politics. Alone of the armies descended from European colonial forces, the Indian army has remained under the control of the civil government, indeed, as Kadian points out, more now than in the days of the Raj when Lord Horatio H. Kitchener was able to unseat the viceroy, Lord George N. Curzon. The Indian army's operational record since 1947 has been mixed: defeat by China in the Himalayas, balanced by victory over Pakistan in 1971. Like most armies whose focus is on conventional war, the Indian army has had difficulty adapting itself to low-intensity conflict.

In India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, Kadian analyzes in detail the story of the army's unhappy intervention in Sri Lanka, pointing out that, among other problems, the assumption that guerrillas would be no match for a regular, professional fighting force put the Indian army on the wrong foot from the begin-
BOOK REVIEWS


As US soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen encountered peoples, religions and societies in the Persian Gulf vastly different from their own, it is useful to look to the past to learn how their grandparents and great-grandparents coped with assignments to an equally strange territory. Dennis Noble's The Eagle and the Dragon is an interesting and often delightful social history of the US military in pre-World War II China.

A brief introduction provides a survey of Chinese history from the beginning of the 19th century through 1937, focusing on the contact Western military forces had with the Chinese. The book then presents chapters on the demographics of the US military in China over time, everyday life of the military in China, US perceptions of China and the Chinese, the Americans who remained in China and the performance of those who came under fire.

Perhaps the most interesting portion of the book is the chapter on US perceptions of China and the Chinese. The author points to the "cultural baggage" and inability to master the language as the primary reasons that most Americans did not develop a deep understanding of China. With some exceptions, most chose to minimize contact with the local population. The result was a stereotyped image of the Chinese that was often far from favorable.

The Eagle and the Dragon is an excellent social history of an often neglected segment of the military. The author, a retired Coast Guardsman with a great deal of practical experience in military history, completed this book as part of his Ph.D program at Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, under Robert E. May. The book represents rigorous research of primary sources, including military news publications from China. The author recognizes that the Privacy Act precludes examination of many important sources of information, but balances this by use of numerous oral history sources and questionnaires completed by dozens of veterans of this period. As a result, the book is often anecdotal, and the conclusions presented may be subject to refinement by further research. Noble's work is, nevertheless, an important contribution to understanding how the US military reacts to a non-Western culture, something that is likely to remain a matter of importance for some time.

Daniel E. Spector, Command Historian, US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama


In the early predawn hours of 19 August 1942, a dozen British destroyers began disembarking more than 6,000 troops, mostly from the Canadian 2d Division, off the small German-occupied French Channel on the English port of Dieppe. Within 12 hours, the remnants of the landing force had been reembarked and were heading back to ports in southern England. During those 12 hours, the landing force had been severely mauled, losing more than 60 percent of those who went ashore, and the largest air battle to that point of the war left the Royal Air Force counting its losses. The Dieppe disaster spawned one of the longest-running and most bitter controversies of World War II. Unauthorized Action is the latest salvo in that controversy.

Professor Brian Loring Villa has set for himself a rather formidable task. "The present volume," Villa writes, "focuses on the decision-making process... [and] seeks to assign responsibility and explain why the evidence surrounding the background of the Dieppe raid had become so hopelessly muddled... I hope that it will reveal the truth that has lain hidden in the murky water of doctored evidence."

On the first point, Villa demonstrates convincingly that Lord Louis Mountbatten, then chief of combined operations, was primarily responsible for the decision to remount the Dieppe operation after it had been canceled in the previous month. Mountbatten made this decision on his own without formal authorization from the chiefs of staff, the War Cabinet or the prime minister. Villa further argues convincingly that Mountbatten could only have made this decision because others in the decision-making loop, including Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, Lord William M. Beaverbrook, General Andrew G. McNaughton (the Canadian commander) and the three British service chiefs, acquiesced for a myriad of political and personal reasons.

Villa's second point is less convincing. The historiography of the Dieppe operation does indeed give rise to a number of intriguing questions, but many of the answers to those questions remain elusive. To be sure, there were many parties interested in how the history of the Dieppe operation would be written, or more precisely, how it would reflect on their contribution to the war, in general, and the Dieppe fiasco, in particular. Villa cites a number of instances where participants, their supporters, and some historians attempted to influence those writing the history, including the official Canadian histories and Churchill's work. Villa presents no evidence at all of "doctored" evidence, at least in the accepted sense of pilfered files, altered documents, and perjured testimony. The problem is really one of perspective and interpretation.

This volume is extracted from more than 1,700 typescript pages Villa has already compiled on the subject. The endnotes are extensive and demonstrate a depth of research few other Dieppe historians have achieved. The notes tend to be burdensome, however, due to the large quantity of discursive material. Much of this material should appear in the text. Nevertheless, I look forward to Villa's next volume and trust that it will be as thorough as this one.

Jerold E. Brown, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC


It is all there in Uncle Sam's Brides—everything you ever wanted to know about the unique and difficult lifestyle faced by military wives. In this comprehensively researched and most readable work, authors Bonnie Domrose Stone and Betty Sowers Alt capture the very essence of the hardships, upheavals, loneliness and stress faced by women with little control over their lives.

The reader must marvel at how military wives from diverse parts of the United States or foreign countries have managed away from family support and with limited help from the military establishment itself. Until the services undertook recent family program initiatives, primary focus was on the soldier, with little assistance for families. Great credit is rightfully given to the National Military Family Association's outstanding advocacy for sorely needed family benefits.

Anyone who has experienced life in the military environment, as the authors have, can attest to the authors' accuracy and remarkably sensitive analysis. They carefully present many different viewpoints, such as the enjoyment—or misery—of assignments in various foreign countries. Personal stories add interest and complete the picture, yet most remain anonymous. The authors touch on that most critical area—medical care—and note that this significant, though eroded, benefit does much to compensate for other hardships. Financial struggles surface with each move and with duty in high-cost areas. A change of station can mean a long, expensive trip across the country followed by the costs of setting up a new household; military families almost always face financial setbacks when they move.

The authors note the need for child care and the concern of parents for its improved quality. Thanks to the recent Military Child Care Act, quality care should become a reality in all the services as this new law brings adequately paid and trained staff, the addition of early childhood education specialists, accreditation of centers and quality control through annual unannounced inspections.

Stone and Alt are also very much in tune with the more independent and career-oriented interests of today's women. This reality must continue to be factored into future military planning. For that stubborn minority who still think, "If the military wanted you to have a wife, it would have issued you one," it is time to catch up with the world.

While military families have a truly difficult life, the quality of that life rests on one's attitude. For the strong, the extroverted and certainly the adventurous, it is the most interesting and challenging life one could hope to experience. For those who do well, it is, in the authors' words, because of their "strong conviction that serving in the military is more than a job; it is a commitment to keep the nation strong and the gossamer threads of peace intact."


Before I read this book, I was largely unaware that a clandestine organization such as the Military
Intelligence Service-X, or MIS-X, existed. Based at Fort Hunt, Virginia, MIS-X (code name 1142 for its post office box number) had been set up in November 1942, as a department of the Prisoner-of-War (POW) Branch of the Military Intelligence Service. Primarily, MIS-X functions included: instruction on escape/evasion, proper conduct after capture, debriefing of escapees from enemy POW camps, preparation and distribution of escape kits and liaison with the British MI-9.

The MIS-X (the escape factory) was the place where the purchasing, packaging and shipping of a wide variety of escape devices were done though the US postal system to German postal channels and on to the POW camps in occupied Europe. The materials used in preparation of escape kits included shaving cream, toothpaste, soap, flashlights, clothes, canned goods, games and letters. The trick was to insert into these "harmless" items the contact codes, escape route instructions, cutting tools, compasses and parts for building radios. The final step was the packaging of large volumes of escape material into normal-looking parcels destined for delivery to US POW camps in Germany and elsewhere. In fact, Lloyd R. Shoemaker, the author, was assigned to MIS-X during the period of its existence and was deeply involved in the purchasing, processing and packaging of the escape packets.

In hindsight, some might argue the ethics and legality of some of the methods used by MIS-X, because of the cover of using official Geneva-sanctioned POW channels for the purposes of intelligence gathering, packaging of escape materials and advocating resistance to German authority in the POW camps. However, at the time it was considered an essential wartime priority to keep the spirit of resistance and morale of our US POWs as high as possible. Once contact was established between MIS-X and the POW camps in Europe, an apparatus to receive, coordinate and implement escape operations was set up in most of the major POW camps.

Readers will find several significant and unanswered questions. Why were the files of MIS-X destroyed in a mass bonfire upon conclusion of World War II? Why have all other still existing records of the MIS-X been kept under strict classified wraps? Could some of the methods used by MIS-X during World War II also have been used during the Korean and Vietnam wars? Were they even attempted? Despite the intriguing and unanswered "whys," I recommend this interesting book to both the professional and military buffs.

Michael S. Evancevich, US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona


Professor Charles Gati, a leading US scholar of East European events, provides a lively and perceptive account of recent revolutionary changes in what once was known as the Satellite States. His book is intended to make the rapidly changing East European scene understandable to the general public.

Fort Leavenworth Military Bookstore

Persons eligible to use the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) may order books from the Fort Leavenworth Military Bookstore. The bookstore has issued a new catalog listing stocked titles but will accept orders for any other title in print such as those on the US Army Command and General Staff College and Military Qualification Standards reading lists. Most titles are discounted 10 to 25 percent, and 10-percent shipping is added. You may also charge an order by calling (913) 651–6552 or FAX (913) 651–6102. For a copy of the catalog, write to: Military Bookstore, AAFES, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.
audience, and both the free-flowing narrative and the small number of footnotes contribute to his success. There is an excellent balance between the historical analysis of why and how Soviet rule failed to create a viable pro-Moscow group of states in postwar Eastern Europe and the appraisal of the magnitude and direction of the current upheavals.

Unfortunately, the book appeared in early 1990 and, hence, does not cover some of the more recent events such as the unification of Germany or the summer 1990 elections in Prague, Czechoslovakia. Yet, the clear and insightful explanation of the dynamics of contemporary developments allows the reader to fit these changes easily into the general pattern of reform. If there is a single hero in this tale, it is clearly President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev, without whose efforts the current changes might have been accompanied by more violence and uncertainty.

A particular strength of this work is the author's ability to reveal individual differences among the states examined while retaining a generalized perspective that sheds light on developments as a whole. Contrast is drawn between the methods of domestic rule in post-1968 Czechoslovakia and Hungary that permits better understanding of why these two states followed different paths in freeing themselves from the common Soviet yoke. Differences as to both reliability and subservience are noted among the various armies enrolled within the common Warsaw Pact structure. A final chapter assesses the difficulties the East European states will confront as they continue to reform their political and economic systems. Suggestions as to what the West might do to facilitate these changes are provided.

This work is a major contribution to our understanding of causes, events and likely futures of the current dramatic changes in Eastern Europe. It will appeal to scholars and educated laymen alike.

Michael Boll, San Jose State University, California


New Thinking in Soviet Military Policy is a good starting point for understanding the open debate now going on in the Soviet Union. In his examination of the influence of "new thinking" on Soviet strategic arms policy, strategic defense, theater nuclear weapons and conventional force planning, Christoph Bluth, a research associate of war studies, King's College, London, uses the Soviet distinction between the political and military-technical aspects of "military doctrine." Although Bluth does not include a bibliography and the reader is dependent upon annotated footnotes to reconstruct his sources, the glossary of abbreviations is invaluable.

Bluth concludes that since Mikhail Gorbachev's ascendency, the political aspect has dominated, coupled with the emergence of new sources of military thought in academic "think tanks" and non-military governmental agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, the Soviets have come to accept that significant strategic arms reductions achieved through political means offer a more realistic hope of achieving a stable, strategic environment than simply acquiring more and more hardware.

Debate among military and civilian analysts has also focused on force postures and "reasonable sufficiency." No group advocates a purely offensive doctrine; the Soviets have always claimed that their doctrine was defensive. But in response to a NATO attack, a Soviet counteroffensive would carry the war into NATO territory. Civilian analysts favor an "active defense" by which each nation reduces to the point where it retains sufficient means to deter an enemy invasion but limits counteroffensives to reestablish prewar boundaries. Academic proponents of "defensive defense" completely renounce offensive and counteroffensive operations and would dismantle both sides' capacity to undertake large-scale strategic offenses.

Bluth's inability to pin down who in the Soviet Union is actually making the real policy decisions is both a reflection of the proliferation of voices within the new thinking and too great a willingness on his part to present the widest spectrum of debate. He is fascinated with the new radical academics without fully recognizing the influence traditional military thinkers still retain, especially as Gorbachev becomes increasingly autocratic. Bluth acknowledges that the transition to a new security arrangement might be very turbulent and dangerous and that the economic decline of the Soviet Union threatens the success of perestroika, but he does not foresee the reassertion of military authority in response to internal unrest, the disintegration of Soviet rule or a possible swing toward conservatism.

I am less optimistic than Bluth that these new voices will prevail and I fear that he has thrown away the old textbooks too soon in his rush to accept the new thinking. The changes of the last five years are not irreversible and the relative decline of the old guard military may prove cyclic rather than permanent.

LTC Dianne L. Smith, USA, United Kingdom Defense Intelligence and Security School, Ashford, Kent, United Kingdom
50 Years Ago
US Starts Lend-Lease

The United States' Lend-Lease Act, approved by Congress in March 1941, contributed greatly to the Allied effort in World War II. Created to provide vital provisions and equipment to countries whose defense against Axis aggression was deemed important to US security, the program gave President Franklin D. Roosevelt extraordinary discretion to place US industrial might behind the common effort. In all, 38 countries accepted assistance.

Lend-lease aid to Great Britain, the largest beneficiary, began before US entry into the war. As early as 1940, the United States turned warships over to the Royal Navy in exchange for basing rights in the North Atlantic. Britain received vast quantities of food, ships, aircraft, munitions and a variety of other items valued in total at approximately $30 billion, or nearly two-thirds of the $47 billion worth of all lend-lease aid. According to military historian John Keegan, by 1944, an British armored divisions employed Sherman tanks.

During the last two years of war, over a quarter of all British army equipment was American-made.

Less than six months after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Roosevelt reached an agreement in principle with Joseph Stalin for aid to the Eastern Front as well. The full impact of US aid to the Soviet Union has long been an object of dispute among US and Soviet historians of the war. Soviet scholars focused little attention on lend-lease beyond establishing two basic points. First, they consistently estimated the volume of US aid at approximately 4 percent of all the war materiel consumed by the Red Army. Second, they generally linked the suspension of lend-lease aid in 1946 to the outbreak of the Cold War. Although the United States did not seek full reimbursement, the Soviets felt Americans failed to account fully for the enormous human sacrifices made by the Red Army. As Nikita Khrushchev observed in his memoirs, "We had already paid back the US in the blood shed during our struggle with Hitlerite Germany."

In contrast, the American interpretation of lend-lease to the Soviets has focused above all on the raw totals of deliveries. Valued at about $10 billion, US shipments included 9,600 artillery pieces, 18,700 aircraft, 10,800 tanks, 2,600,000 tons of petroleum products and more than 400,000 trucks and other vehicles, as well as winter boots, foodstuffs and railroad cars. Although some of the American weapons were not of the latest design, the Soviets appeared to make good use of them. Trucks, however, probably constituted the single greatest materiel boost to Soviet strength.

Whatever the benefits to the Allies, the United States, too, reaped great advantages from lend-lease. By generously supporting the Allies, Roosevelt saved many American lives and accelerated US economic mobilization. Furthermore, the required expansion of US industrial production proved a tremendous stimulus to the American economy. Its manufacturing base undamaged, the United States emerged from the war as an economic colossus.

Robert F. Baumann
Combat Studies Institute, USACGS.