CLIC PAPERS

AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, 1980-1990

Army - Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia

This bibliography surveys about 200 items dealing with various facets of the US military growing involvement in counterdrug operations during the decade preceding 1990. Some entries are articles; others are government-produced reports and findings; still others are newspaper accounts and books. The annotations attempt to depict the utility of the publication to military personnel who are undertaking counterdrug missions. Ideally, the bibliography can serve as a starting place for those interested in the topic of the military role in counterdrug operations.
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, 1980-1990

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CLIC PAPERS

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DTIC AD#</th>
<th>DLSIE LD#</th>
<th>SHORT TITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A185 972</td>
<td>073892A</td>
<td>Operational Considerations in LIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A185 973</td>
<td>073893A</td>
<td>Logistical Considerations in LIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A185 974</td>
<td>073894A</td>
<td>Security Assistance and LIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A185 975</td>
<td>073896A</td>
<td>The Role of Reserve Forces in LIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A185 976</td>
<td>073895A</td>
<td>LIC References and Bibliography, Vol I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A185 977</td>
<td>073897A</td>
<td>Army Medical Department Roles and Functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A185 978</td>
<td>073899A</td>
<td>Operational Art in LIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A186 280</td>
<td>073898A</td>
<td>LIC Imperatives for Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A193 702</td>
<td>077085A</td>
<td>LIC Logistic Support Air Force Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A193 703</td>
<td></td>
<td>Competitive Strategies Development in LIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A193 704</td>
<td>077084A</td>
<td>US Armed Forces Public Affairs Roles in LIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A193 705</td>
<td>077086A</td>
<td>LIC Education and Training Within the DoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A193 706</td>
<td></td>
<td>Planning PCO Combat Employment of Air Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A198 670</td>
<td></td>
<td>Potential for Increased Terrorism Lethality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A198 668</td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic States Facing Revolutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A198 669</td>
<td></td>
<td>Technology Guidelines in LIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A199 026</td>
<td></td>
<td>Understanding Latin Americans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A203 707</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Literature of Low-Intensity Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A205 084</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIC References and Bibliography, Vol II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A205 085</td>
<td></td>
<td>US Military Civic Action in Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A205 086</td>
<td>079667A</td>
<td>Psychological Strategies in LIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A207 890</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arms Transfers and the Third World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A208 614</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIC Policy and Strategy Statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A209 046</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIC Overview, Definitions, and Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A209 047</td>
<td></td>
<td>Peacekeeping TTPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A209 048</td>
<td></td>
<td>African Coastal Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A209 049</td>
<td></td>
<td>A Theater Approach to Low Intensity Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A209 050</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve Component Support to LIC Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A209 072</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liberation Theology, Two Views</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A215 365</td>
<td></td>
<td>Key LIC Speeches, 1984-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A226 242</td>
<td></td>
<td>Counterinsurgency in the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A224 049</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Role of Military Working Dogs in LIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A229 716</td>
<td></td>
<td>The US and the Politics of Conflict in the Developing World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A229 717</td>
<td></td>
<td>LIC Education and Training Within the DOD Using Counterinsurgency Tactics in the Domestic &quot;War on Drugs&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. DISCLAIMER ............................................... iii
2. LIST OF PREVIOUS CLIC PAPERS .............................. iv
3. FOREWORD ................................................... vii
4. INTRODUCTION ................................................ ix
5. PURPOSE ..................................................... x
6. SCOPE ......................................................... xi
7. METHOD ......................................................... xi
8. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS ....................................... 1
9. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................... 13
FOREWORD

This annotated bibliography about the use of the military in counterdrug operations contains 194 entries chosen from the scores of publications relevant to the subject. Appearing over an eleven-year period, 1980-1990, these entries epitomize, in the opinion of the author, the main currents of thinking about this important employment of the military resources of the nation. Obviously, however, the items are selections -- the winnows or siftings, as it were -- from a staggering array of materials of equal, or, perhaps (in the views of some authorities), even greater importance.

Such selectivity is an inescapable characteristic of any work of this nature, and, so to mitigate the exclusiveness of the bibliography, the presentation begins with a chronology of significant drug-related events that commences in the late 1960's and comes forward to the waning days of 1990. While many of these events do not pertain directly to the development of the concept of the putative need for the national government to employ the military in counterdrug work, many in fact do so. In addition, these events reveal a pattern of inconsistency and uncertainty characterized by the creation and abolition of offices and agencies and the shifting of functions. Such machinations usually are indicative of a government's inability to address a problem effectively and may explain much of the frustration Congress felt about the alleged failure of federal drug programs by 1980 and hence its ultimate willingness to involve the military in counterdrug activities.

Whatever the exact Congressional impact of all these happenings, a linkage undoubtedly existed between the burgeoning menace of the illicit drug trade, on the one hand, and the resultant quandary and frustration about proper policy enveloping so many authorities, on the other hand. The hope is that presenting this chronological sequence may assist the reader to place bibliographical items in a context of real-world activity and to associate them in some meaningful relationship to one another and thus to understand them better.
INTRODUCTION

One of the most harmful influences on contemporary society in the United States is that of illicit drugs. While these highly-addictive substances are extremely dangerous to the health and well being of their users, they also constitute a threat to society at large and the national security as well: they are the "currency of crime" that corrupts the law enforcement system, clogs the courts with drug-related trials, jams the penal institutions with convicted felons, and overburdens the medical system with life-and-death demands for critical emergency care. In fact, so great a crisis has the trade in illegal drugs become that a remarkable development has occurred in the United States in recent years. The Congress of the United States, reacting to the insistence of an alarmed public, has authorized and facilitated the participation of the Armed Services in a national effort at local, state, and federal levels of government to suppress the notorious trade.

The word "remarkable" is appropriate, because such sizable participation by the armed services in the enforcement of the anti-drug laws (albeit in this instance as indirect supportive elements) is the exception rather than the norm in the constitutional history of the United States -- at least, it has been since Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which marked the return to traditional practice following the atypical events of the Civil War and its aftermath, 1861-1877.

Subsequently, of course, instances of military involvement did occur, even in the twentieth century. For example, there was use of the federal military to enforce order in a devastated San Francisco, California, following the earthquake and fire of 1906. Even more recently, there were the deployments of federal troops with "federalized" National Guard units to sustain national law in the high school integration controversy at Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957 and in integration crises of the early 1960's at the University of Mississippi and the University of Alabama.

These military law-enforcement ventures were, however, unrelated to drug law enforcement. They were, moreover, short-lived episodic events, emerging in the context of federal-state governmental confrontation. In such environments, only federal military forces seemed the appropriate means to alleviate specific and acute threats to public order. They alone appeared able to compel obedience to the national law (in the guise of federal court rulings) when local authorities had been either unable or unwilling to do so.

Usually such national compulsory authority has been visible outside federal reservations only in a nonmilitary form and on a restrained and modest scale -- as when U.S. marshals acted to enforce the rulings of a federal court, or when agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation looked into an alleged breach of a Federal law or made arrests for violations of Federal statutes (or, indeed, in more recent years, when agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration carried out a "drug bust" under federal counterdrug statutes).

However, late in 1981 the relationship between the military services and drug-law enforcement underwent notable alteration at the hands of Congress. Subsequently, effective 1 December 1981, special modifications authorized broad-based, indirect military assistance for drug-law enforcement through a series of significant modifications to the then 103-year old Posse Comitatus Act. Upon becoming operative, these assistance provisions appeared at first glance to follow the long-established theme of restraint by putting significant restrictions on the military's drug-law enforcement activities. Yet, the magnitude of the drug problem and the variety of means the modified act made available to drug law enforcement agencies at all levels portended a protracted and sizable military involvement. In fact, the military has not seen legislation establishing the likes of this type of law-enforcement responsibility within this country since the tempestuous years of Reconstruction in the states of the defeated Confederacy following the Civil War. Whether the future holds more such duties for the military is uncertain, but if it does, the precedents created by the counterdrug role of the 1980's may comprise significant constitutional adumbrations indeed.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this project is to survey a particular genre of literature -- much of it in the form of legal and official governmental documents, and some in the guise of periodicals, newspaper accounts, and professional research papers. The subject matter of this literature pertains to the development of the notion that the U.S. military establishment has a definite role in drug law enforcement. The intent is to point out some of the printed materials showing the evolution of the concept that, through providing assistance to civil authorities, the nation's military services can (and must) make a positive contribution to the national counterdrug effort. Ideally, the information in these materials about the origins, content, and objectives of the plan to use military assets to suppress the drug menace may aid those involved in carrying out this effort to understand their mission better. Moreover, this information may also serve the purpose of showing the problems and considerations inherent in any effort to employ military assets to support civil authority, which, in the lexicon of current doctrine, is a form of contingency operations in low intensity conflict (LIC).
SCOPE

The scope of this project, chronologically, is eleven years; that is, the project comprises a survey of certain selected works treating the concept of military involvement in the suppression of illicit drug activities and appearing in print on some date between 1 January 1980 and 31 December 1990. It includes comments about the important legal and official documents, and, in all its estimations, confines itself to those pieces written and/or published in English. Of practical necessity, the project is selective in its choices, since the body of literature on the subject is vast and, without doubt, varies in quality.

METHOD

The method underpinning the survey is that associated with the production of any annotated bibliography: delving into governmental documents, laws, books, articles, book reviews, extant annotated bibliographies, and compilations of books in print; also, involved in the project is use of computerized library search networks to speed up and to simplify search effort. As much as time and local library resources permitted, actual perusal of the "better" documents, books, and articles gave opportunity for stronger assessments and recommendations.

Another word about methodology is in order. This bibliography evinces concern with timing and sequencing; that is, the order of appearance of documents seems of importance, since the basic assumption is that documents are both products of their intellectual environments and also catalysts that help to develop other notions that appear in subsequent documents.

The arrangement of the annotated bibliography is, therefore, chronological in approach. The listing begins with selected documents of the early phases of the decade and proceeds to those of a more recent time, ending with treatments of some from 1990. The theory is that such an approach, taken in conjunction with the chronology of significant events, potentially allows users of the bibliography a significant advantage: they can see the developmental stages of the movement to involve the military in counterdrug activities as presented by the relevant literature (from popular periodicals and newspapers to statutes and Presidential directives). Ideally, such tracking not only facilitates an understanding of current national counterdrug policy (including military involvement) but also leads to a better understanding of the process by which, in the democracy of the United States, the beliefs of a few can evolve into public policy obliging the actions of the many.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- In 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson's Reorganization Plan Number 1 established the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in the Department of Justice, which held the main responsibility for federal drug investigations.

- In 1971, President Richard M. Nixon set up the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP) to coordinate and to oversee all federal drug programs that were scattered among fourteen agencies. The SAODAP held no drug law enforcement authority.

- In 1971, President Richard M. Nixon also created a Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control to develop a strategy to stop illegal drug trafficking into the United States and to coordinate foreign efforts assisting in this task.

- In 1972, Congress passed the "Drug Abuse and Treatment Act" establishing the National Institute on Drug Abuse under the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to reduce the demand for drugs. This act also created the cabinet-level Strategy Council on Drug Abuse (SCDA) to develop a federal strategy to prevent drug abuse and to halt drug illegal traffic. The SCDA was also to issue the official counterdrug plan in the guise of the Federal Strategy for Drug Abuse and Drug Traffic Prevention.

- In 1973, Reorganization Plan Number 2, signed by President Richard M. Nixon, created the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the Department of Justice (DOJ) to investigate all drug law enforcement cases under federal drug laws. Other offices in the DOJ with functions similar to those of the DEA ceased to exist.


- In 1974, the federal government established the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) to centralize and to control information about the illicit drug traffic entering the United States. EPIC maintained the single authoritative set of statistics about drug seizures in the U.S., which it published annually, deriving the information from its extensive data bases.

- On 1 June 1975, the cabinet-level Strategy Council on Drug Abuse published its third Federal Strategy for Drug Abuse and Drug Traffic Prevention, the new national plan for counterdrug actions to supplant the previous year's plan.

- During November 1976, the cabinet-level Strategy Council on Drug Abuse published its fourth Federal Strategy for Drug Abuse and Drug Traffic Prevention, the new national plan for counterdrug actions to update and to replace the previous year's plan. (No additional Federal Strategy for Drug Abuse and Drug Traffic Prevention appeared until 1979, and none was forthcoming in either 1980 or 1981.)

- In 1976, Congress passed amendments to the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, including the provision establishing the Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP). The creation of the ODAP signified the disgruntlement of Congress about the inconsistency and confusion characterizing federal drug policy and manifested Congress' increasing concern about the rising incidence of addiction to illicit drugs.

- In 1977, President James E. (Jimmy) Carter abolished the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control.

- In April 1978, the federal government established the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers' Committee (NNICC). Chaired by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the NNICC coordinated the collection, analysis, dissemination, and evaluation of strategic drug intelligence, both foreign and domestic (although its primary concern was with the available domestic drug supply). This intelligence became essential to policy development, resource deployment, and operational planning in the counterdrug efforts of ten federal agencies with drug law enforcement responsibilities. The annual reports of this agency disclosed the details of the production, routing, consumption, and monetary aspects of illicit drug activity in the United States.

- In 1980, during the Presidential election campaign, both the incumbent, Democrat Jimmy Carter, and his Republican challenger, Ronald W. Reagan, promised to take measures to curtail illegal drug usage, if elected President.

- In November 1980, following his victory in the Presidential election, President-elect Ronald W. Reagan created a Transition Team to chart policies, among which was a "war on drugs," a move especially popular with the Congressional delegation and others from southern Florida.

- During 1981, the levels of defense spending began to rise rapidly under the Reagan Administration, encouraging members of Congress and other concerned citizens to claim that some of these expenditures should go to efforts to combat the menace of illegal drug trafficking.
On 1 December 1981, Congress modified the *Posse Comitatus* Act of 1878 to permit the military to play a larger role in counterdrug efforts. These modifications were part of PL 97-86, the *Defense Authorization* Act, and they marked the beginning of DOD involvement in the national civilian counterdrug effort. Heretofore, under the Act of 1878 (18 U.S.C. 1385), anyone who attempted to use the military for enforcement of the laws, unless specifically authorized by Congress or the Constitution, was liable for a fine of $10,000.00 and/or a two-year term of imprisonment. The U.S. Air Force fell under this restriction upon its creation in September, 1947, and the U.S. Navy had earlier chosen to impose similar restrictions upon itself and the Marine Corps, even though the Act of 1878 did not mention the U.S. Navy. In none of these restrictions, however, did Congress intend to prevent the military's use in direct drug interdiction activities outside the borders of U.S. territory.

On 4 December 1981, President Ronald W. Reagan signed Executive Order 12333 directing U.S. intelligence agencies to share information about foreign production and trafficking of illegal narcotics bound for the United States. This order changed the separation between foreign and domestic intelligence collecting activities.

On 30 January 1982, the Reagan Administration formed the "South Florida Task Force" (SFTF) and placed it directly under the Office of Vice-President George H. W. Bush. The SFTF held the responsibility of eradicating the illicit drug trade in Florida. Composed of nineteen federal, state, and local agencies grouped theoretically under the control of the Commander of the United States Coast Guard's District 7, the SFTF was the prototype of the "Joint Drug Task Force." Moreover, the SFTF included both active and reserve component military personnel; it stressed interdiction and operated both in Florida and outside the United States (in the Bahamas and in the Caribbean).

On 22 March 1982, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued Directive Number 5525.5 giving guidance for DOD components in handling requests for assistance in drug law enforcement (DLE) from federal, state, and local officials in DLE agencies.

By 30 June 1982, federal law enforcement agencies (LEA's) were associated with a Federal Coordination Group for Drug Interdiction (FCGDI). At this juncture, the DOD, which was represented on the FCGDI, was informing all federal LEA's about the personnel and materiel available to assist them in drug law enforcement.


By 31 October 1982, the Reagan Administration was operating Joint Drug Task Forces in twelve major U.S. cities.
- By 31 October 1982, the Reagan Administration was providing support to the counterdrug operations of the governments of the Bahamas and the Grand Turks Islands. These were the "OPBAT" activities in which aircrews provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration flew helicopters furnished by the U.S. Air Force to give the Bahamian Police Drug Strike Force personnel the tactical mobility to interdict illegal drug deliveries.

- By 31 December 1982, the Department of Defense, acting either as "a subcontractor," or "a service provider," was furnishing previously unavailable resources to drug law enforcement agencies at all levels, and, at this juncture, it had accepted 121 of 126 requests for assistance.

- By 31 January 1983, the Drug Enforcement Administration, acting through channels in the Department of Justice and the Office of the Vice President, was requesting direct military support for drug interdiction operations in the Bahamas and Grand Turks.

- By 31 May 1983, the USAF was maintaining two helicopters and twenty-two personnel to support the tactical mobility of drug interdiction activities in the Bahamas and Grand Turks, where operations, because of this additional assistance, were now functioning at full capability.

- By 30 June 1983, the federal drug law enforcement agencies had established the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS), an outgrowth of the South Florida Task Force to combat drug activities in Florida. The NNBIS attempted to coordinate and to rationalize the counterdrug interdiction activities of the federal government under the management of the Vice-President. The DOD dedicated military manpower to work with this organization.

- By 1 July 1983, the DOD had approved 436 of 453 requests for assistance from drug law enforcement agencies.

- By 31 December 1983, the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), created in 1974 and run by the Drug Enforcement Agency from a site near El Paso, TX, was assuming greater importance as a drug intelligence focal point. EPIC collected the information gathered by the various civilian drug law enforcement agencies and their assisting military components and then, after analyzing and integrating this information, disseminated the product as intelligence to all civilian drug law enforcement agencies.

- On 1 January 1984, the Army recalled Lieutenant General (LTG) R. Dean Trice, USA (Ret), to active duty to head the DOD Task Force on Drug Law Enforcement.

- In 1984, Congress passed the "Comprehensive Crime Control Act" which created the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board (NDEPB) to facilitate coordination among the federal agencies involved in drug law enforcement. The mission of the NDEPB was
to review, to evaluate, and to develop policy and strategy for drug law enforcement activities. The NDEPB held authority to set budgetary priorities, to coordinate federal efforts in drug law enforcement, and to coordinate intelligence activities associated with drug law enforcement.

- On 10 September 1984, President Ronald W. Reagan proclaimed the federal government's sixth National Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking. This iteration of the strategy called for all elements of the society to join their efforts with those of the federal government to eliminate the drug menace through coordinated drug law enforcement at all levels of government, broad educational efforts, and international cooperation. This strategy was originally the product of the Drug Abuse Policy Office within the White House's Office of Policy Development. During 1985, this strategy guided the efforts of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, a cabinet-level body under the chairmanship of the Attorney General of the United States who was responsible for establishing and coordinating policy in national and international drug law enforcement. There had been no such plan in 1983, and none was forthcoming during either 1985 or 1986.

- By 31 December 1984, the U.S. Air Force was strongly involved in assisting civilian drug law enforcement agencies: such assets as C-130's were deployed in the Gulf of Mexico to carry out surveillance missions; B-52's were collecting information during their training flights; airborne warning and control system aircraft were performing interdiction flights over the Southwest and the Gulf of Mexico; a special helicopter unit was operating in the Bahamas in support of local police; and the Air Force was passing information from the U.S. Air Force/Federal Aviation Administration Joint Surveillance System's ground-based and balloon-borne radars in Florida to the U.S. Customs Command Center, Miami, FL.

- On 24 April 1985, LTG R. Dean Trice, USA, Chief, DOD Task Force for Drug Law Enforcement, testified to the House Subcommittee on Crime that, during the course of 1984, the active and reserve components of the three military services had flown 3,100 sorties in support of the work of the civilian drug law enforcement agencies. These sorties amounted to about 10,000 hours' flying time, averaging about eight sorties per day during 1984. According to General Trice, the DOD was determining which requests for assistance were "viable" by balancing the requests' requirements and goals with those of readiness and traditional national security.

- On 27 February 1985, United States Senator Albert De Concini (D-AZ) introduced a bill (S. 537) to authorize funds for a Special Operations Wing of the USAF Reserve to combat illicit drug trafficking. This wing would have held a civilian law enforcement drug interdiction mission. Had the bill become law, it would have constituted a historical departure from the precedents and customs of U.S. constitutional law and practice.
regarding the military's role in civilian law enforcement by making the military direct law enforcers. A similar measure (H. R. 1307) also appeared in the House of Representatives and called for the funding of a special DOD Directorate, the "Directorate of the DOD Task Force on Drug Law Enforcement."

- On 8 May 1985, the U.S. Air Force responded to the Chairmen, House and Senate Armed Services Committees, regarding the creation of a Special Operations Drug Wing and a DOD Directorate for Drug Law Enforcement. The U.S. Air Force stated that it had no objection to the provisions of H.R. 1307 and S. 531, so long as the military selected the "platforms" for use in the suppression of the drug trade. The U.S. Air Force wanted authority to select the aircraft that were the most economically adaptable for the dual needs of civilian drug law enforcement and traditional national security missions.

- During December 1985, the U.S. House of Representatives tried to change the Posse Comitatus Act specifically to permit military personnel to engage in active search and seizure actions outside the land area of the United States and its possessions (H.R. 2553). The measure passed the House 364-54, but the U.S. Senate defeated the proposal.

- During December 1985, the Congress inserted a provision into the Fiscal Year 86 DOD Appropriations Act directing the U.S. Air Force to form a dedicated special drug interdiction element within a year.

- On 15 January 1986, the DOD republished its Directive 5525.5, "DOD Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials," to incorporate into its guidance the recent changes in the laws. This directive took into account the impacts of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 produced by the passage of PL 97-86 of 1 December 1981, Executive Order 12333 of 4 December 1981, and all other relevant laws and regulations pertaining to military involvement in drug law enforcement.

- On 8 April 1986, President Ronald W. Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 221, a classified document that described the threat to national security posed by the illicit drug traffic. NSDD 221 also complemented the National Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking that President Reagan had declared in 1984. In effect an "Operational Order," NSDD 221 charged the highest officers in the administration to pursue drug law enforcement and international cooperation to thwart the drug traffickers, and practically it further facilitated the use of DOD personnel and resources in drug control measures.

- On 11 April 1986, President Ronald W. Reagan signed the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) on Narcotics and National Security requiring, inter alia, that the U.S. government consider the counterdrug records of potential recipients of foreign aid as a factor in determining the granting of aid, that
the DOD expand its role in counterdrug activities, that U.S. officials place more emphasis on illicit drug trafficking as a national security issue in dealings with foreign powers, and that DOD intelligence components play a larger role in counterdrug work.

- Between mid-July and early December 1986, "Operation Blast Furnace" took place in Bolivia, whose government had asked for the operation to combat the growing menace of coca traffickers. Coming about three months after President Ronald W. Reagan announced an increase in the tempo in the "war on drugs," "Operation Blast Furnace" involved six U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopters and 170 officers and enlisted personnel from the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion, 193d Infantry Brigade, Fort Clayton, Panama. Working in concert with the Bolivian police, these U.S. forces operated from three bases and, by destroying jungle-situated, coca-paste processing laboratories, seriously disrupted the illegal coca trade for about three months. Long-term impacts of the effort seemed doubtful, however, since the drug trade returned to pre-operation levels after the force departed in early December. Also, repeating the operation appeared to be unlikely: the deployment was costly, and, more significantly, it raised the sensitive issue of Latin American sovereignty, because it required the presence of U.S. troops on national soil.

- On 27 October 1986, President Ronald W. Reagan signed Public Law 99-570, the "Anti-Drug Abuse Act." This measure required drug-producing countries to certify that they were cooperating in the U.S. campaign to reduce the production of illegal narcotics, to combat the traffic in these drugs, and to quash the "laundering" of monies made in the illegal drug trade. The nations not receiving certification as cooperative would lose U.S. foreign assistance.

- On 20 January 1987, the cabinet-level National Drug Policy Board published its National and International Drug Law Enforcement Strategy, the new federal plan for counterdrug actions.

- On 26 March 1987, President Ronald W. Reagan signed Executive Order 12590 officially authorizing the National Drug Policy Board to exercise oversight for all aspects of the federal counterdrug effort from diplomatic measures to domestic drug law enforcement, including prevention and treatment. In effect, this measure changed the name of the National Drug Enforcement Board to the National Drug Policy Board and expanded the authority of this agency.

- During July 1987, coca growers in Bolivia blocked highways and held demonstrations to protest the Bolivian government's cooperation with the U.S. coca-crop eradication efforts. The demonstrators also denounced the presence of U.S. Army Special Forces in Bolivia. The demonstrations forced the Bolivian Government to abandon the crop eradication program.
- In 1988, the United Nations Organization promulgated its Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

- In early 1988, the National Drug Policy Board published its Toward a Drug Free America: The National Drug Strategy and Implementation Plan, the new federal counterdrug action plan.

- In August 1988, thirty nations participated in a month-long cocaine-control project under the sponsorship of the International Drug Enforcement Conference, which exercised oversight in this cooperative, coordinated, multinational law-enforcement effort to seize cocaine and cash, to hunt down fugitives, and to impede the laundering of illegal drug money.

- In August 1988, the DOD coordinated the commitment of National Guard units of four states to work with the U.S. Customs Service in inspecting cargo entering the United States.

- On 29 September 1988, the President signed into law the DOD's Fiscal Year 89 National Defense Authorization Act, which assigned certain counterdrug tasks to the DOD under Title XI. Before the passage of this act, the DOD counterdrug role was limited to fulfilling specific requests from law enforcement agencies for designated services and loans of equipment. This act, however, broadened the scope of DOD counterdrug activities, since it made the drug problem a national security concern and assigned specific missions to the DOD. Thereafter, DOD guidance and systematic thinking about the drug menace and the military role in combating it followed swiftly.

- On 13 October 1988, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of the Drug Enforcement Support Directorate within the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel. This Directorate received the responsibility for coordinating the implementation of Title XI counterdrug tasks under the Fiscal Year 89 Defense Authorization Act, including the fiscal oversight of appropriated funds.


- On 8 December 1988, the Secretary of Defense issued a Warning Order to the Theater Combatant Commanders (Commanders-In-Chief, the CINCS) about counterdrug taskings and set up an organization to handle the DOD detection and monitoring mission and lead agency role. He also assigned missions to the CINCs and requested proposed courses of action.
- On 6 January 1989, the Secretary of Defense issued policy guidelines (Defense Guidance) for the implementation of the DOD mission contained in Title XI under the Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 89.

- 10 January 1989, the Secretary of Defense issued an Alert Order to the CINCs. He also approved courses of action and directed the development of operations orders for detection and monitoring activities. The CINCs immediately began defining their program requirements.

- On 3 February 1989, the Secretary of Defense issued an Executive Order to the Theater CINCs to commence detection and monitoring operations. He also authorized the expenditure of $10 million of operation and maintenance funds for start-up costs of counterdrug efforts.

- On 10 February 1989, the headquarters of Joint Task Forces (JTFs) 4 and 5 became operational. The DOD created these JTFs to conduct counterdrug surveillance and to coordinate federal detection and monitoring activities in the Southeast (JTF 4) and the Southwest (JTF 5). The Commander of JTF 4, Key West, FL, was a U.S. Coast Guard Vice Admiral, who reported to the Commander-In-Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT); the Commander of JTF 5, Alameda, CA, was a U.S. Coast Guard Rear Admiral, who reported to the Commander-In-Chief, Pacific (USCINCPAC). Operating twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, these two JTFs supported drug interdiction efforts, coordinated surveillance activities, furnished target data, and fused intelligence, passing it to the civilian law enforcement agencies' command centers.

- On 15 February 1989, the DOD began developing its counterdrug report to Congress. This report provided information about the implementation status of three mission areas: the command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) and communications integration plan, the National Guard support to the states, and the plan for the use of $300 million in funds to pursue the counterdrug mission.

- On 30 March 1989, the Secretary of Defense approved twelve National Guard plans to assist the states in counterdrug operations. National Guard troops began to conduct surveillance and inspection operations in support of state drug interdiction and enforcement activities as the DOD transferred funds to the National Guard for these purposes.

- On 28 April 1989, the Secretary of Defense approved thirty-six additional National Guard counterdrug plans, and the DOD transferred additional funds to support these plans.

- On 5 May 1989, the DOD completed its C3I report to Congress in response to Section 110.3 of the Fiscal Year 89 Defense Authorization Act.
- On 17 May 1989, the DOD Drug Coordinator approved $300 million for the Fiscal Year 89 DOD counterdrug program. Fiscal documentation commenced for allocation of Operation and Maintenance funds as did reprogramming for necessary procurements.

- On 25 May 1989, the Secretary of Defense approved the National Guard plan for the District of Columbia and authorized the transfer of the necessary funds.

- On 15 June 1989, the transfer of Operation and Maintenance funds was scheduled for completion as were reprogramming requests to Defense Committees in Congress.

- In July 1989, at the convening of the Economic Summit of Industrialized Nations, United States Secretary of State James Baker exhorted Canada, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany, and the United Kingdom to act more aggressively to quash the laundering of illicit drug money.

- In early September 1989, President George H. W. Bush, through the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), announced to the nation his strategy for the "war on drugs." This strategy appeared in the ONDCP's National Drug Control Strategy (first edition), which embraced an $8 billion program, including provisions for education, treatment, law enforcement, incarceration improvements, and aid to certain Latin American nations. The plan also allocated $1.5 billion for interdiction of illicit drug trafficking, an effort that was to incorporate DOD technology as well as $2 billion over five years in military and law enforcement assistance for Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.


- On 16 November 1989, the Secretary of the Navy issued a memorandum: Department of the Navy Guidance for Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy.

- In January 1990, President George H. W. Bush issued a second edition of the September 1989 National Drug Control Strategy. This document called for increased international cooperation against drug production, trafficking, and abuse with particular emphasis on cooperative activities with Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.

- In February 1990, President George H. W. Bush met with the Presidents of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia at the "Andean Summit" in Cartagena, Colombia, where the four chief executives arrived at an agreement to cooperate closely in counterdrug efforts,
including control of drug-processing chemicals, education against drug use, exchanges of tax information, and a more extensive role for the military establishments of the four nations in combating illicit drugs. The official statement emerging from this meeting was the "Declaration of Cartagena," dated 15 February 1990.

In July 1990, President George H. W. Bush announced that he intended to seek tariff preferences from Congress for Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru to help these nations' economies to offset the impacts of the suppression of the illicit drug trade. The basic concept involved a ten-year, one-way "free trade" on several important products from these nations.

On 10 August 1990, Federal District Court Judge Edward Rafeedie ruled that the United States Government had violated its Extradition Treaty with Mexico by permitting the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to arrange for the abduction of Humberto A. Machain, a Mexican physician implicated in the torture murder of DEA agent Enrique Camareno near Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, in 1985.

On 20 August 1990, Panamanian officials declared that there had been little significant reduction in the traffic of illicit drugs through Panama during the eight months following the fall of dictator Manual Antonio Noriega as the result of "Operation Just Cause" in December 1989.

On 5 September 1990, President Cesar Gaviria of Colombia declared that Colombian cocaine cartel chieftains who surrendered to Colombian officials would stand trial in Colombian courts and not be subject to extradition to the United States for trial on drug smuggling charges.

On 5 September 1990, President George H. W. Bush publicly vowed to prosecute the "war on drugs" vigorously despite the growing difficulties with Iraq in the Persian Gulf.

On 27 September 1990, in a speech to the Law-Enforcement Forum in New York City, Governor Mario M. Comuo of New York attacked the Bush Administration's "war on drugs" as inadequate and threatened to flood the United States District Courts in New York state with apprehended drug trafficking suspects unless the United States Government agreed to share more of the costs of drug law enforcement with the states.

On 2 October 1990, an explosion in a cocaine-processing laboratory in Medillin, Colombia, killed nine persons and injured fifty-seven others, including twenty children in an adjacent school building. Unfortunately a type of event now prevalent in Colombia, this explosion underscored the fact of the growing power of the drug interests to disrupt Colombian society and to threaten public safety.
- On 9 October 1990, the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to render a ruling in a case involving the right of the police to board a bus or a train and to search the luggage of passengers as a counterdrug measure. The crucial issue in the case (arising in Florida) was whether the police needed the basis of a suspected wrongdoing before undertaking any search.

- On 27 October 1990, Peru's newly-elected President, Alberto Fujimori, proposed a novel approach to stop coca-leaf production: the creation of a free-market environment in which peasants can find alternative crops economically feasible. However, this plan posed some difficulties, since it required giving land titles to peasants, cutting out state controls, eliminating state granted monopolies that make legal crops unprofitable for small growers, and rejecting emphasis on military and police repression. Some observers prophesied that the implementation of President Fujimori's plan would produce a civil war, given the sweeping nature of the scheme and the internal disorders endemic to the nation.

- On 28 October 1990, President George H. W. Bush promised the delivery of military helicopters to Mexico for use in that nation's participation in the "war against drugs." However, critics in the United States Senate denounced the delivery of the aircraft on the grounds that they would be under the charge of a Mexican official heavily implicated in illicit drug activities and corruption.

- On 7-8 November 1990, Mr. William J. Bennett, first Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, announced his intention to resign his post early in 1991. Critics of the Administration's "war on drugs" charged that Bennett and the entire effort against illicit drugs had been a failure, and in reply, Mr. Bennett denounced the efforts of the Mayor of Washington, D. C. (Marion S. Barry) and Congressman Charles B. Rangel as counterproductive to the "war on drugs."
1980:


Although coming to fruition during the late 1970's, this publication is important to anyone concerned with the drug problems of the 1980's. It reveals the magnitude of the illicit drug influx during the decade in which the nation began to be greatly concerned over the problem of addiction to hard drugs. It also points up the utility of additional and subsequent NNICC annual reports about the domestic drug problem. These are available currently in yearly volumes, 1979-1989, and reveal considerable statistical information about the extent of the drug problem throughout the 1980's; they are useful to military personnel wishing to understand the size (and growth) of the drug menace.


This study, appearing early in the decade, foreshadows an area of concern that began to plague military personnel acting in support of drug law enforcement as the 1980's progressed. The problems associated with command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) comprise a critical component in the DOD's detection and monitoring mission and also pose the question of how to measure effectiveness of C3I used in counterdrug work. This MITRE publication explores measurements of effectiveness in C3I and thus is useful as a background study for military counterdrug activities.


This work is concerned with methods of evaluation (MOE's) for the efficacy of the U.S. Coast Guard's traditional maritime law enforcement methods. It presents examples of the kinds of considerations that military commanders have to confront in the "war against drugs" and also demonstrates the difficulties of measuring effectiveness of drug interdiction operations in terms of resources and time.

This publication presents a synopsis of U.S. Coast Guard counterdrug interdiction efforts during the 1970's. It offers good insights into the nature of maritime interdiction operations and their effectiveness. Since the Coast Guard has had the most law-enforcement experience of any of the uniformed services (it of course functions under the direction of the U.S. Navy in time of war), its record and methods (even though oriented toward maritime events) may have utility for other military units facing missions in counterdrug activities.


This is a study undertaken by contract researchers for the U.S. Customs Service. A federal law enforcement agency with an honorable and hoary past, Customs not only has a visible presence in working cargo and passenger clearance operations at the various U.S. Ports of Entry but also carries out aspects of interdiction missions in conjunction with the U.S. Coast Guard. This publication suggests methods by which Customs may size up the drug threat by careful analysis and then apply its resources accordingly with the greatest efficiency. Military personnel involved in counterdrug activities can profit from reading this study because of its description of the illicit drug traffic and its potential vulnerabilities.


This is a useful study for military commanders faced with a counterdrug mission. While it concerns maritime interdiction methods, it may also reveal aspects of counterdrug work that all military commanders face in common. Lang explains the measures of effectiveness (MOE's) that ought to prevail and offers ways to induce more efficiency into the U.S. Coast Guard's counterdrug activities. All commanders should be aware of the importance and difficulties connected with devising sound MOE's.


This testimony to the House Select Committee well depicts the responsibilities of the various agencies and offices participating in the counterdrug effort at the beginning of the decade. It also presents some of the basic flaws and needs of these entities as they began to address the matter of the drug menace on the eve of the general elections of 1980 and -- so it turned out -- the assumption of power by the Reagan
Administration. These pages provide a good profile of the posture of the federal counterdrug machinery as the portentous decade got underway.

1981:


This interesting paper presents the necessary wherewithal for an effective maritime interdiction campaign by the United States Coast Guard (USCG). While Army and Air Force participants would not necessarily employ the same assets as the USCG in drug interdiction efforts, the paper does show that the counterdrug mission is neither inexpensive nor simple. Such a commitment demands consideration and planning equal to those involved in traditional national security missions.


This technical study is useful to military commanders as an orientation to the problem of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) associated with support to civilian drug law enforcement. Although dedicated to studying the measurements of effectiveness (MOE's) of maritime operations, this study demonstrates the nature and complexities of an area of concern that military commanders involved in counterdrug missions cannot ignore, if their units are to be successful. Sound MOE's are part and parcel of DOD's monitoring and detection of drug smuggling and hence the military must have familiarity with the basics in this rather arcane craft.


This report details useful information about an aspect of maritime interdiction in the Gulf of Mexico. The accounts of the U.S. Coast Guard's accomplishments and difficulties early in the decade may well comprise useful information to any military commanders participating in the support of maritime interdiction efforts.


This document (albeit lengthy -- 783 pages) is revealing and useful to any military official interested in understanding the intentions of Congress in altering the long-standing Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 so that, under its aegis, the military might increase its assistance to drug law enforcement officials.
The hearing explores the history of the original act, enabling the reader to come to an understanding of the traditional Anglo-American mistrust of military participation in law enforcement.


This statute still remains as one of the key pieces of legislation thus far regarding the use of military resources for drug law enforcement. It amends Section 905 (a) (1), Part 1, Subtitle A, Title 10, United States Code (the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878) by adding Chapter 18, "Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials," Sections 371-378. Section 371 permits the DOD to render assistance by providing information, equipment, facilities, training, and advising. Section 376 stipulates, however, that assistance is not to impact preparedness adversely. Military personnel working in counterdrug operations will find familiarization with these sections highly useful.

1982:


In Volume I, page 1116, this semi-official document describes in succinct fashion the key changes that PL 97-86 makes in the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. It affords a good, short-hand approach to understanding the important alterations that PL 97-86 introduced into the century-old statute.

In Volume III, there are several important presentations of documents important to the story of the military involvement in drug law enforcement. Included is the letter of then General Counsel, DOD, William H. Taft, IV, relating the department's objections to the use of the military in drug law enforcement matters. On pages 1785-1786, there is information about the hearings on the Fiscal Year 82 Defense Authorization Act and the significance of the departure from tradition triggered by the lifting of the strictures of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. These presentations are helpful and informative for military officials cooperating in drug law enforcement.


These hearings are of special interest to military personnel interested in looking into the record of DOD cooperation with drug law enforcement officials. They pertain mostly to the drug running activities in south Florida and the Miami, Florida,
areas, which were the sites early in the decade of the first dedicated, sizable DOD support to drug law enforcement work, both in Florida and in the Bahamas.


This short report is useful in portraying the extent and effectiveness of DOD support to drug law enforcement as the 1980's began and public alarm grew about the dangers of the illicit drug traffic. It can inform the military authorities looking into the history of DOD assistance about conditions in the early months after the modification of the Posse Comitatus Act.


These transcripts reveal Congressional viewpoints about the status of military aid to drug law enforcement at the beginning of the critical decade of the 1980's. They are harbingers of opinion and legislation that were to shape military involvement in counterdrug efforts later in this period. Any military personnel wishing to understand the background for counterdrug missions would do well to peruse this report.


This document is revealing in its discussion of the restrictions the Secretary of the Navy placed upon the U.S. Navy's maritime support to the drug law enforcement activities of the United States Coast Guard. The Secretary of the Navy limited the actions of the U.S. Navy to providing air and surface surveillance, towing seized vessels, transporting U.S. Coast Guard prisoners, giving logistical support to U.S. Coast Guard units, and embarking U.S. Coast Guard personnel to permit them to conduct lawful boardings of U.S. and "stateless" vessels (vessels without apparent national registration).

6. Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, "Study on Coast Guard Interdiction of Drug Smuggling at Sea" (Also known as "the OZ Study"), Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, D.C., September 1982.

This classified study (SECRET) is one of the official U.S. Coast Guard documents revealing the real "ins and outs" of maritime counterdrug interdiction during the earlier days of federal effort to halt the illicit drug traffic coming into the
United States. It reviews the accomplishments and shortfalls alike and presents considerable information for military personnel participating in counterdrug work to ponder.


These hearings revealed the depth of feeling among Congressmen concerning the need for wider military participation in the counterdrug effort. They also showed the consistent reluctance of the military to get too deeply committed in the counterdrug operations because of two concerns: fear that military readiness would suffer and distaste for the violation of the two-century-old tradition of no military involvement in civilian law enforcement that might place the DOD (or the Services) in an awkward and unpopular situation.

1983:


This document carries interesting information relative to the DOD's acting as a "subcontractor" in providing drug law enforcement assistance to the civilian drug law enforcement agencies. It also, as the title reflects, describes the extent and character of the illegal drug running menace along the frontier with Mexico almost a decade ago. To the military personnel carrying out counterdrug missions, this publication furnishes knowledge about earlier procedures and shows the need for more effective enforcement in the states bordering Mexico.


This is a useful publication for military counterdrug elements, because it depicts the nature and extent of the cooperative effort prevailing between the DOD and federal and state drug law enforcement agencies early in the 1980's. It reveals that the military already played an indirect role in drug law enforcement long before the modification of the Posse Comitatus Act. The change in this law merely codified, centralized, and amplified what had developed "naturally" under the aegis of extant federal statutes and traditional cooperation between levels of government in the matter of law enforcement.

This article examines the contents of Chapter 18, Title 10, United States Code, which clarified the intentions of Congress regarding the types of military assistance that could go to drug law enforcement agencies. This is a readable and clear source for military officials involved in counterdrug missions to consult about the legal standing of their activities.


These hearings assessed the successes and the failures of the Reagan Administration's "war against drugs" after the initial years of operations. Therefore, they hold relevant material for an understanding of the mounting public sentiment favoring greater military assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies. They provide good historical background for involved military personnel.


This article describes the activities of the DOD and the military services in the early days of their participation in the "war against drugs." It is a short account giving a good overview that military personnel can easily read to get an impression of the history of DOD counterdrug work in the early 1980's.


In this short article, Mr. Taft, Deputy Secretary of Defense, explains the DOD participation in the counterdrug effort of the law enforcement agencies. This is an informative piece for military officials doubtful about the part the military should assume in confronting the threat posed by illicit drugs.


This is a descriptive piece depicting the nature and extent of DOD activities in the earlier days of the counterdrug effort following the late 1981 modification of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. It affords an opportunity for the military personnel doing counterdrug support to gage the work of today by comparing it with that of a few years ago.

This publication is a further development in the U.S. Coast Guard's attempts to enhance the effectiveness of its maritime interdiction efforts. It attempts to relate accomplishments to expenditures of resources and to highlight the most productive procedures and activities. It is a good study for military personnel wishing to understand the nature and complexities of seaborne interdiction missions and, by judicious extension, other interdiction missions as well.


This report is interesting, because it delves into the strategies and policies of three leading federal agencies charged with drug law enforcement. The trio of organizations -- the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Customs Service -- are the federal wheelhorses in the counterdrug activities of the federal government. Their broad schemes to counter the drug problem are of close interest to any military personnel assisting them in counterdrug missions.


This research paper, written soon after the impact of the modified Posse Comitatus Act became obvious, examines the latitude of military forces to assist civilian authorities under the modifications Congress tacked onto the 1878 statute in 1981. The author has presented a good account useful to military personnel acting under the color of the new law to assist drug law enforcement.


This study describes the ill-coordinated, disparate federal counterdrug bureaucracy attempting to cope with the deluge of illicit drugs entering the country early in the 1980's. The faulty mechanisms with their lack of clear "chains of command" constitute, in the view of this report, an ineffective tool. Military personnel in support of civilian drug law enforcement
need to be aware of this document's contents to understand the history of the bureaucratic milieu in which they have to function.


This hearing points up the drug interdiction problem along the southern water frontier of the nation and describes activities that may be of interest to Air Force and Navy personnel who are about to assist the Coast Guard or Customs Service in that area. While some aspects of the problem have changed in the last seven years, many of the difficulties remain to plague law enforcement efforts in the waters of the Gulf, and military personnel would be well advised to be aware of their history.


This study examines the whole subject of military assistance to drug law enforcement agencies and points to needs and problems in the drug law enforcement network. It is reflective of Congressional thinking and hence foreshadows what Congress directed the military to perform later in the decade.


This is a useful document, because it officially describes the boundaries for Army personnel involved in supporting civilian drug law enforcement shortly after the implementation of the modified Posse Comitatus Act of 1981. It is one of the cornerstones of the Army's participation in counterdrug activities.


This report should be of particular interest to Air Force and Navy flying personnel who have undertaken airborne drug interdiction missions. It examines the air side of U.S. Customs operations and reveals the problems and accomplishments connected with this aspect of this federal service's work.

This is an interesting piece, because it explores the details of drug trafficking in the Bahamas and reveals the views of Congress regarding this harmful business. Like any Congressional Hearings, these show the thinking of Congress about counterdrug themes that probably will reappear in hearings and (possible) legislation in the future. Any published transcript of hearings reflects the opinion of Congress and therefore is of interest to military personnel involved in carrying out the intent of Congress in assisting civilian drug law enforcement.


This report, based partly on information gathered in hearings, paints a grim picture of counterdrug law enforcement in the early 1980's. It is useful for military personnel to peruse, since it reveals the growing alarm in Congress over the drug problem and helps to set the stage for greater military assistance.


This study analyzes the procedures and techniques in use during the early 1980's to determine the extent and timing of aid (usually in the form of equipment and limited training therein) from the DOD to civilian law enforcement officials involved in counterdrug work. The main concentration is upon the work of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System and the predecessor to this agency, the Federal Coordination Group for Drug Interdiction. Those in the military doing drug law enforcement tasks in the 1990's should find this account interesting and perhaps instructive as a means to judge the achievement of progress (or, perhaps, the lack of it) ten years later.


This document stresses the lack of cooperation and coordination prevailing among the nearly two-score agencies involved in the counterdrug effort at the federal level. It provides a good description of the fundamental bureaucratic
reason for the absence of progress in counterdrug operations, something military personnel cooperating with civilian drug law enforcement agencies ought to understand.

1984:


   On page 27, there are elucidating remarks about the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. Also included are some interesting comments regarding the use of the military to enforce the federal court desegregation orders during the 1950's and 1960's. This is useful background information for military personnel assigned to assist civilian drug law enforcement activities.


   This document discusses Air Force efforts to assist civilian drug law enforcement in the early 1980's. On page 7, the Air Force defines the limits and nature of the Air Force support to civilian drug law enforcement. This publication would be of especially strong interest to Air Force personnel involved in counterdrug work and interested in knowing from whence this involvement came.


   This source is instrumental in providing a perspective from the Presidential level. This document lays out the Reagan Administration's plan to combat the drug menace and so comprises a key document in the history of the involvement of the military in counterdrug operations. Military men and women working in counterdrug missions should be familiar with its guidance.


   The emphasis in this document is on the lack of sufficient intelligence to support counterdrug operations. This shortfall was one of the most persistent of all deficiencies in the drug combating mechanism of the federal government, especially early in the 1980's. Military personnel working in counterdrug missions should understand the crippling effects of this blemish in the counterdrug machinery and devise ways to remedy it.

This document is another sample of Congressional thinking about the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of drug interdiction early in the 1980's. The views and opinions, reflected in the questions and comments of the committee members, are useful in giving insights into the intent of Congress in the matter of military support to the civilian drug law enforcement effort.


This is an interesting paper, because it presents the views of the various states' governors about the drug menace and the problems of law enforcement in countering this menace. Military officials now involved in counterdrug support missions can glean from these discussions the basic viewpoints of politically and socially knowledgeable leaders from across the nation about the nature, scope, and solutions to the threat posed by the illicit drug traffic. These ideas and concepts constitute good intellectual armament to attack the problem of understanding the reasons for the military's ever expanding role in counterdrug activities as the 1980's progressed.


The author explores the legal ramifications of the modified law of 1981 that vaulted the DOD into the middle of the "war against drugs." This article is essential reading for any military man or woman about to assist civilian drug law enforcement agencies in the counterdrug effort.


This is a research paper considering the possible role of the United States Air Force in counterdrug work. It considers the impact of the counterdrug mission upon the Air Force and its national security mission, and it offers suggestions about the effectiveness of the Air Force in counterdrug missions.


This is a useful survey in that it describes the attempts of the United States Coast Guard to enhance its maritime interdiction activities in the face of the burgeoning illegal
trade in drugs in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Morgan's revelations are instructive and may have some relevance for military commanders and units endeavoring to fulfill counterdrug missions in the 1990's.


This is an article describing the Navy's support of counterdrug work in the early 1980's. As such, it affords a preview of the type of counterdrug missions Navy personnel facing assignments to support drug law enforcement agencies may have. It is good background reading.


This report is important to military personnel assigned to assist civilian drug law enforcement efforts in the Southwest, where the long and solitary border with Mexico presents a relatively easy access to the illicit drug markets in the United States. The document points to special problems in this region and explains, in large part, the movement in Congress to involve the military more extensively in illegal drug interdiction work.

1985:


This quasi-technical work deals with a matter that any military commander involved in counterdrug missions has to confront sooner or later: developing military measures of effectiveness (MOE's) to determine efficiency of his/her unit's work. Developing and employing MOE's mean declaring operational goals succinctly and clearly, laying down criteria for performance, and devising a system of reporting that furnishes the relevant data. This study discusses forms, properties, and considerable additional information that may be of use to a military analyst (or a commander) dealing with MOE's of counterdrug operations.


This three-volume study took shape late in 1984 as a result of DOD concern about the technical aspects of C^I as they are related to unit effectiveness in mission fulfillment. Volume I is composed of speeches made at the symposium and is classified SECRET; Volume II is composed of reports of the symposium's five working groups convened in November 1984 and is unclassified, while Volume III consists of unclassified appendices. The
military personnel supporting counterdrug missions can use these volumes eclectically to learn about the problems of C²I and then apply the information selectively to their counterdrug work.


   This is a notable newspaper article, because it presents the pleas and arguments of key state chief executives calling for a greater military role in drug interdiction. It helps military personnel doing counterdrug work to understand the views and pressures underpinning the DOD's commitment to the "war against drugs."


   This article is a fair sampling of the materials in the popular press depicting the supposed inability of the federal government to stop the entry of illicit drugs into the United States. It is one of those pieces of popular journalism that helped to mount the demand in Congress for greater military participation in the national counterdrug campaign. Military counterdrug officials should be aware of this type of publicity about the drug problem.


   This is the first appearance of the author's theory about the futility of controlling illegal drugs through overemphasizing law enforcement actions at the source of the trafficking. He explains the endemic weakness in such actions as almost a kind of fetish with law enforcement techniques and the supply side of the drug equations. Reuter presents considerable persuasive analysis and economic arguments to show the need for actions on the demand side of the drug problem. The article is of special interest to anyone disdainful of military involvement in drug law enforcement, since the military role is predestined to shore up this (to Reuter's viewpoint) feckless approach.


   This paper considers national security in light of the menace of illicit trading in harmful narcotics. It marks an early treatment of the relationship between the drug problem and the potential use of the military to interdict illicit drugs and raises questions that subsequently became debating points between opposing schools of thought on military involvement in counterdrug operations.

This report looks at the feasibility of military involvement in the national counterdrug effort. It considers advantages and disadvantages of using military assets and points to the required coordination between civilian and military entities. It is a useful publication for any military person wishing to learn about the military's part in counterdrug work in the early 1980's.


This is a plea by the then Mayor of New York City for the fuller employment of the military in the fight against the illicit drug traffic. Mayor Koch argues that the nation is under siege and facing a veritable ocean of drugs. His answer is to deploy the military along the borders and on the seas to interdict the drug traffic. Military personnel in counterdrug missions should note this article as one of the clearest reflections of the "use the military" school of thought in the nation during the mid-1980's.


This official study is of relevance to any military official participating in the "war against drugs" because of its description of the coordination (or rather the lack thereof) of counterdrug activities in the federal bureaucracy. The welter of agencies and offices struggling for influence and control in the period covered by this report (and afterwards) is staggering. The military counterdrug official should become acquainted with this document.


This article is interesting, because it reflects the growing school of thought in Congress that hewed to the traditional U.S. viewpoint about the national drug problem: most of the trouble came from the countries that permitted the production and trade in drugs within their borders. Therefore, these countries showed a "lack of political will" to eliminate illicit drugs. They were "guilty" and, consequently, should either suffer a diminution of United States assistance in reprisal or receive an enhancement in assistance dedicated to snuff out this traffic. It is useful to military counterdrug personnel to understand this frame of mind, which was one of the main origins of the later policy of the U.S. government to assist host nations in the eradication of their
drug crops and to assign U.S. military personnel to foreign posts to train indigenous police and military forces in counterdrug actions.


This article in a law enforcement trade journal looks at the Air Force efforts in counterdrug work from the eye of the professional policeman. Military personnel assisting these authorities in trying to thwart the drug runners and sellers can read this publication to see how the police view the drug menace as well as the policy and equipment required to contain it.


This piece, appearing in a professional law enforcement publication, is a measured, reasonable call for greater military participation in counterdrug activities. The drug runners are getting stronger and bolder, it argues, and the military, it declares, appreciates the demands of police work and is willing to assist (within the constraints of the law). Military personnel in counterdrug work should know about this article.

1986:

1. Steven Wisotsky, Breaking the Impasse in the War on Drugs, Contributions in Political Science, Number 159, Greenwood Press, NYC, NY, 1986. (Foreword by Thomas Szasz)

The author examines the production, distribution, and consumption of illicit drugs and also undertakes to show the consequences of President Ronald W. Reagan's "war on drugs," reaching the dismal conclusion that the federal government's policy has only worsened the problem. He additionally explores the corruption and violence accompanying the drug traffic and points out the international instability and terrorism that the nefarious traffic has abetted. Interestingly -- and questionably -- the author places the blame for addiction upon human behavior rather than the drug (cocaine) itself and calls for a network of drug controls based on the concept of individual responsibility. The book is well-written and well-researched. The data underpinning the arguable premises, however, end in 1981, and more data, 1982-1985, have shown alarming increases in addiction and other problems stemming from cocaine usage. Thus, to many, perhaps, the "human behavior" thesis is suspect: can people really stop using cocaine as an act of personal will when they see the harmful consequences? Nevertheless, this book is a good primer on federal drug policies and the international cocaine trade, and military personnel supporting drug interdiction efforts would profit from reading it.

This book is a useful survey covering the national problems growing from the illicit traffic in drugs. Military personnel can use it to gain a quick overview of the magnitude of the drug menace, especially as it had developed by the mid-1980's. Coupled with the Witsosky book (above), it can serve to lay a basic foundation for knowledge of the drug trade and the crime and social problems that come in its wake.


This article bemoans the lack of effective command and control so evident among the various drug law enforcement agencies during the early 1980's. It depicts the inherent problem of lack of coordination and cooperation plaguing law enforcement trying to stem the ever-rising volume of illegal drug importation into the United States. Military personnel associating with civilian law enforcement agencies should be aware of the contents of this piece.


This 1986 report is highly interesting, because it is a product of a highly-placed official in the Reagan Administration and an expert in matters of foreign affairs. Mr. Perl analyzes the various aspects of "Operation Blast Furnace" and depicts their impacts in terms of posing new policy choices for Congress in the "war against drugs." Those military personnel confronting a counterdrug mission should take account of Mr. Perl's findings and suppositions.


This printed version of the President's television address of 14 September 1986 marks an important step in the development of national drug policy. In this speech, President Reagan called for the public in the United States to mobilize for a "national crusade against drugs." This address set the stage politically for the "War on Drugs," which was ultimately to involve the military on a larger scale.


This piece deals with one of the first military units to became directly involved (in a dedicated support role) in drug
law enforcement. The background and mission of this organization are of interest to any military official tasked to perform a counterdrug mission.


This is a highly useful compendium for military officials who may find themselves involved in counterdrug efforts for the first time in their careers. A perusal of these summaries of drug laws can be conducive to a better understanding of the desires of Congress as well as the possible roles for the military's support to civilian drug law enforcement agencies.


This report examines the entire federal effort at drug interdiction, considers the shortfalls, and ponders how more activities might effectively strike at the illegal trade in drugs so harmful to the nation. The contents are important to any military official facing the task of carrying out counterdrug work. The testimony and other material reflect a broad array of interests and concerns with views about the counterdrug role of law enforcement and the military.


This study has two useful purposes for military personnel (especially those in the Air Force) involved in supporting civilian counterdrug efforts. First, it presents an account of the Air Force participation in the interdiction campaigns of the first half of the 1980's, and, second, it contains bibliographical items that may be the keys to further study of the subject for "lessons learned" and technical aspects of monitoring, surveilling, and interdicting.


This study is a useful survey of the arguments prevalent in the Pentagon and Congress in the mid-1980's regarding the advisability and feasibility of employing the military more broadly in the "war against drugs." It therefore provides the military personnel facing responsibilities in counterdrug work a
good historical background, under one cover, on the views and pressures giving rise to their drug law enforcing missions.


This author raises an intriguing question about whether a military role in drug interdiction is a valid part of the protection of the nation. He poses the query in an interesting way and illustrates the quandary that military men and women face over the issue of "combat readiness" versus a larger role in counterdrug work.

12. CPT Jean M. Browders, USA, "National Guard Fights War on Drugs," National Guard, June 1986.

This article depicts the activities of several states' National Guard units in participating in some of the earliest state-sponsored efforts to assist law-enforcement agencies in interdicting the illegal traffic in drugs. It is a useful piece in that it is a harbinger of what was to come on a larger scale later in the decade.


This professional war college research paper explores the practical aspects of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) matters in the area of interdiction and joint service participation. As a Coast Guard officer, CMDR Philpott writes from considerable experience as a law-enforcement officer in maritime matters, and his research offers good insight into both problems of C3I and their solutions. Military commanders going into counterdrug work are well advised to read this study.


This report decries the lack of central control and coordination characterizing the national strategy of illicit drug containment during the early 1980's. It calls for the creation of a unified program with a central office in control -- one able to allot and to assign resources and personnel. Military counterdrug officials should know of this publication and recognize its contents as parts of the prelude to the creation of the Office of Director of National Drug Policy and stronger military participation in the "war on drugs."

This is a widely-read popular account spelling out the military's reasons for its reluctance to become more involved in the "war on drugs." It is one of those pieces that sparked disagreement about whether to get the DOD more fully committed to the national counterdrug campaign. It is helpful for military counterdrug personnel to understand these arguments and to realize the reluctance of many (both within the Pentagon and outside of it) to involve the military further in the effort.


This article constitutes an example of the kinds of pressures the DOD was sustaining in the mid-1980's to release more assets to the drug law enforcement agencies and thereby enhance their efficiency in the "war on drugs." The Customs' air interdiction efforts almost naturally raised the question of whether the Air Force should do more to assist in this critical effort against drug runners. The contents of this piece are part of the mosaic of opinion that evolved in Congress in favor of stronger military commitment.


This report, which took shape during the Army's "Operation Blast Furnace" in Bolivia during 1986, explores the potential part that U.S. military might play in counterdrug operations abroad. The views and findings it presents continued to appear for the next few years in arguments both for and against a broader role for the military in counterdrug operations.


This compilation of information pertains to the legal side of the problem associated with counterdrug law enforcement. It may be helpful in informing military personnel about the nuances and technicalities of the law involved in drug law enforcement.


This highly useful document, authorized by the Department of the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, analyzes the then pending expansion of the Army's
involvement in counterdrug activities. It describes the
dimensions of the drug problem and depicts the activities of
civilian and military agencies participating in the fight to
contain illicit drugs. Of great utility is the appendix
containing a copy of DOD Directive Number 5525.5 of 15 January
1986. The discussion of the contents of the Posse Comitatus Act
of 1878 and its modifications under PL 8697 of 1 December 1981 is
also very informative. COL Munger and COL Kee have developed a
foundation document for those wishing to understand the
military's role in counterdrug matters.

20. United States Congress, House of Representatives, House
Committee on Government Operations, Government Information,
Justice and Agriculture Subcommittee, Initiatives in Drug

This is a very informative document that analyzes both the
extent of the illicit drug menace and the drug law enforcement
requirements to contain it. Intelligence, for example, is a sine
qua non of effective drug law enforcement, and enforcement
agencies have need of extensive and timely human intelligence
(HUMINT) as well as signals intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT, known
to the Customs Service as "communications intercept exploitation"
(CIE), often means monitoring the radio frequencies of the drug
smugglers to learn of traffic schedules that drug law enforcement
officers can disrupt with arrests and seizures of cargoes and
vehicles. However, using electronics gear of ever-increasing
sophistication, smugglers routinely monitor Customs' radio
frequencies, learn of plans for intercepts, and avoid seizures
and arrests. All this information is educational for military
personnel doing counterdrug work.

21. David Fulghum, "Raids Cut Coca-Growing Profits," Army Times,
1 September 1986.

This article depicts the Army's "Operation Blast Furnace" as
a successful venture in Bolivia during the summer of 1986. It
furnishes arguments for those who desire to involve the DOD
extensively in the counterdrug effort of the federal government.
Military men and women should ponder its claims carefully.


This piece is of interest because of its presentation of
statistics about the magnitude of small boat and aircraft entries
into the United States during 1985. According to Federal
Aviation Administration estimates (shown in this article), these
entries numbered well into the thousands. The importance of such
numbers is that they amount to a strong case against the
military's capability of "sealing the borders" as some quarters
were advocating at this juncture. Also, the article asks the
impact upon readiness of commanders' and their staffs' having to
spend hours in court to testify against traffickers. The size
(and unpromising returns) from any such attempt serve to justify
only a limited "indirect role" (if any) for the military in counterdrug activity, so Morrison argues. Military officials should consider this article's contents with some care.


This article contains the main ideas of then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger regarding the involvement of the military in drug law enforcement activity. Important as a reflector of thinking at the highest DOD levels, this account encouraged others to oppose additional military participation in counterdrug efforts. Interestingly, Richard B. Cheney, Weinberger's successor (after Frank Carlucci) beginning in March 1989, took an entirely different viewpoint and supported a larger DOD role in counterdrug work. Weinberger's views are of mainly historical interest to military personnel involved in counterdrug missions.


This document reveals an important DOD viewpoint about the proper role of the military in supporting counterdrug operations of civilian drug law enforcement agencies. According to this document, the appropriate military actions consist of loaning sophisticated equipment useful to civilian drug law enforcement officials, providing aid to them for surveillance, communications, and intelligence matters, and showing their personnel the ways to maximize the effectiveness of training exercises and courses. The stress is on indirect support and the necessary limitations the military must observe under the strictures of the revised Posse Comitatus Act of 1981.


Titles II and III of this legislation are of interest to military personnel involved in counterdrug work, because they reveal the intent of Congress in the mid-1980's regarding appropriate law enforcement in these areas. Both areas later involved military personnel and resources more extensively.


This article discusses a particular aspect of "Operation Blast Furnace." It deals with the aviation support, a very critical feature of the operation, and so looks at the event from
a special vantage point. However, it is revealing and informative, and, if this operation has its sequels in the future, military counterdrug personnel should know its contents.


This article discusses the counterdrug operation "Blast Furnace" in Bolivia during 1986, and it explains the extent and nature of the Army's activities, generally putting them in a favorable light. This article, and others appearing elsewhere about "Operation Blast Furnace," convinced many in Congress and among the general public that the military could and -- indeed should -- do more to assist in the "war on drugs."


In this article, one of the nation's most famous elder statesmen, Barry Goldwater, the former Republican Senator from Arizona -- and still firm friend of the military -- declares his opposition to interjecting the military any further into drug law enforcement work. Senator Goldwater notes that the problem with illicit drugs in U.S. society has a history thirty or more years old and, hence, will not be amenable to any quick solutions. Using the military "to seal the borders," moreover, would be time-consuming, expensive, harmful to preparedness, and probably unsuccessful in the end. In addition, new equipment would be necessary, and its costs would cause public concern. More abrasive would be the enforcement actions of the troops when they began necessarily to interfere with the free movement of the public along the borders of the United States. With over 7,500 miles of border, north and south, and many thousands miles more of coastline, the United States constitutes an entity almost impossible to protect from illegal drug traffic effectively. According to Senator Goldwater, military assets are better left to the mission of national defense, a purpose that drug-enforcement involvement would significantly hamper. Any military official wishing to argue against military counterdrug work should know Senator Goldwater's views.


This is the official report of the unit and components from U.S. Army South, USSOUTHCOM, Fort Clayton, PN, which carried out "Operation Blast Furnace" in Bolivia, July - October, 1986. It shows the extent of involvement, describes the field operations themselves, and discusses various facets of this deployment. Whether it was "one of a kind" or the precursor of many more like it -- as of early 1991, it has not had an imitator -- it deserves study by any military official concerned with counterdrug actions in the 1990's.

This is an interesting article because of the attempt of its authors to connect the drug menace with "the Cold War." They evaluate the evidence and conclude it may well implicate Cuba and other communist nations in the traffic in illegal drugs. Such a conclusion, if valid (and many question its accuracy), makes the case stronger for military involvement in counterdrug actions.

1987:


   This paper is a fairly comprehensive source for the story of the evolution of the legislation that has increased military participation in counterdrug activities (at least through 1986). It contains an informative discussion about the Congressional intentions in altering the *Posse Comitatus* Act of 1878. It is rather specific in dealing with the authority of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy regarding the Navy's and the Marines' assistance in drug interdiction efforts of civilian drug law enforcement agencies. In addition, this is a useful paper because of its treatment of the main precepts of the 1982 and 1984 federal strategies for combating illicit drugs.


   This document adheres to the view that the best way to eliminate illicit drugs from the domestic scene in the United States is to destroy them at their foreign sources. The result of such thinking is to emphasize the need to institute bi-lateral agreements, to render foreign assistance to cooperating nations (some of it in the form of military advising and training -- at least by implication), and to arrange for effective interdiction of illegal drug trafficking, which strongly hints at the necessity for military assistance to drug law enforcement authorities. This document is of utility to military counterdrug personnel, because it builds the case for stronger military involvement in the "war on drugs."


   This official report examines the various aspects of military assistance to civilian drug law enforcement agencies during the mid-1980's. It presents descriptions of activities involving the loan of radar aircraft and their crews to aid interdiction
efforts, analyzes the U.S. Navy's support of the U.S. Coast Guard's sea-borne law-enforcement activities (LEDET), and looks into the effectiveness of U.S. Coast Guard personnel as they operate from U.S. Navy vessels while acting as drug law enforcement agents. It also presents some statistics regarding the accomplishments of military assistance to civilian drug law enforcement agencies in 1986 and 1987. This is a good historical document for background on military participation in drug law enforcement in the early stages of the Reagan Administration.


The thrust of this article is against military involvement in drug law enforcement, because it deals with the purported costs of such effort and finds them excessive and the results meager. The writer alleges that a recent determination of the Government Accounting Office determined that each arrest under drug interdiction assistance furnished by the Air Force cost $433,000. Indeed, the piece hearkens up visions of the famous expose of the supposed "$900 hammer" that DOD procured earlier in the decade. Although it distorts the picture of military involvement somewhat, it does provide material for the critics to use against the military's participation in the "War on Drugs."


This high-level official document presents a profile of the nature of the drug menace in the mid-1980's. It is a useful document in that it describes the magnitude and complexity of the problem.


This publication contains highly informative statistics about the consumption of, and the domestic traffic in, illicit drugs throughout the United States during the earlier years of the 1980's. It is an educational publication for military authorities undertaking counterdrug work and wishing to learn about the international aspects of the illicit drug traffic.


This publication deals with a significant aspect of illicit drug traffic interdiction: the development and deployment of appropriate technologies to use against the drug threat. Surveillance sensors, "sniffers" for drug vapors, communications devices, and other equipment enhance the ability of drug law enforcement personnel to carry out interdiction successfully, and
many advances have come in this realm. Military authorities involved in counterdrug operations should be aware of this publication.


This report presents some interesting (albeit perhaps questionable) arguments on behalf of using the military to assist in the enforcement of civilian laws. It refers to the somewhat dubious endeavor of military surveillance of civilian anti-war activities in the 1960's and early 1970's and also refers to the military occupation of campuses on several occasions during the early 1970's. Military personnel should be careful about taking these events as precedents for participation in drug law enforcement.


This newspaper article illustrates the drug law enforcement community's mounting pressure to involve the military in interdiction efforts. Here, Mr. Edwin Meese, the Attorney General of the United States, calls for the conversion of airborne early warning and command assets to the drug interdiction role. This is one printed indication of the building interest in use of the military and DOD resources in general in counterdrug activity.


This newspaper account presents the views of a key advocate in Congress for military involvement in counterdrug activities. Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL) was one of the strongest proponents of a DOD role at this point. Unlike Mr. Casper Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense throughout much of the Reagan Administration (until March 1989), Senator Dixon argues that the military has an appropriate mission in counterdrugs. The article makes use of "Operation Blast Furnace" in Bolivia to underscore the purported capacity of the military to produce results against the drug menace. It is a useful piece to read to understand the school of thought of Senator Dixon and his supporters, both within and outside of Congress.


This news story pertains to the bureaucratic struggle for influence and control in the national "war on drugs." It is of interest to military personnel as an example of the confusion and lack of cohesion that helped mount the cry to involve the DOD more in the counterdrug effort.

This piece of reporting highlights the late 1980's concern about the reputed connection between drug traffickers and insurgent groups. It stresses the theme that the profits from illicit drug running are finding their way into the coffers of anti-democratic insurgences bent on destabilizing democracies friendly to the United States. Thus, the reporter sees a direct threat to national security from the drug menace, aside from the moral and legal impacts so often depicted by the press.


This interesting document gives an excellent account of the crucial importance of intelligence to effective counterdrug activities. This document attests to the unimpeachable truth that both tactical intelligence -- which enables actual interdiction and arrests -- and strategic intelligence -- which permits effective planning and efficient deployment of resources -- are keys to success in the "war on drugs." It also describes the highly successful "Operation Hat Trick" in the summer of 1986. In this venture, employing careful planning, coordination, and sharing of intelligence, the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System guided several agencies through a maritime interdiction effort that maximized drug law enforcement potential and, for a time (so long as the resources and personnel were available), eliminated all smuggling activities in a particular sector.


Mr. Jones' testimony before these two Congressional committees comprises a key piece of information about the drug problem and the attempts of the federal government to combat it. Actually, these remarks constitute a brief historical survey of the federal government's creation of offices, programs, and policies to answer the demands for curtailment of illicit drug trafficking. It also includes an explanation of the contents of the *Posse Comitatus* Act of 1878 and, therefore, presents important background information relative to the crucial modifications of that act by some of the provisions in the Defense Appropriations Act of 1 December 1981.

This is another version of the events of "Operation Blast Furnace" in Bolivia during 1986. Told from a rather adventuresome viewpoint, the article still has utility to the military man or woman who might be involved in a similar mission in the future. Taken with other more "official" accounts, this article can add to the useful store of knowledge about direct action (in support roles) against drug traffickers in foreign environments.


These remarks of LTG Olmstead afford a good opportunity to review the official DOD position on assistance to civilian drug law enforcement agencies as the "war on drugs" began to pick up momentum. LTG Olmstead, because of his experience as the Pentagon's ranking military authority with counterdrug responsibility, was in a unique position: he understood both the magnitude and complexities of the drug problem and the impact that greater military involvement in the counterdrug effort would have on readiness and force training.


These two authors hew to their thesis -- one they also advanced in 1986 -- that drug trafficking is a type of political warfare contained in "Druzba Narobov," the campaign allegedly initiated by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1962 when he supposedly urged Soviet bloc nations to employ drugs to fight imperialism. Such a strategy, if truly existing, would indeed comprise a threat of the first order to national security and justify employment of all military assets to confront and to destroy the drug menace. However, for these authors, the question remains: is there, in reality, such a threat?


LTG Olmstead was the top military figure in the Pentagon charged with the responsibility of directing and coordinating the military's involvement in counterdrug assistance to drug law enforcement agencies during much of the decade of the 1980's. His service, coming after the modification of the Posse Comitatus Act, afforded him an excellent opportunity to observe the counterdrug effort at a time when pressure was building to bring
DOD resources into the "war on drugs" on a even larger scale. This is, therefore, a useful article for military personnel to read.


This article from a prominent national news weekly points up the many bureaucratic and administrative shortcomings among the federal drug law enforcement establishment. It is another piece of evidence that helps explain the growing voice in Congress and among the general public favoring a larger role for the military in the "War on Drugs." It tells the military how the media, in reporting the ineptitude of drug law enforcement, might have been able to convince the public and Congress of the need for greater military involvement.


The General Accounting Office reports in this document that, in general, the military had thus far registered a high level of compliance with civilian drug law enforcement agencies' requests for assistance. Moreover, reimbursement, where appropriate, had been readily forthcoming from these drug law enforcement agencies. This positive account is encouraging reading for military counterdrug personnel.


This report treats the perhaps precedent-setting deployment of National Guard units from one state to another to carry out a federal mission: the suppression of illicit drug trafficking. The units involved in this episode were those of Missouri, and the site of the operation -- taken in conjunction with the U.S. Customs Service -- was the U.S.-Mexican border in Arizona during September 1987. The deployment was an ingenious use of reserve assets and possibly constituted a harbinger of future activities.

1988:


This document delves into the determination of the U.S. Coast Guard to tolerate no amount of illicit drug aboard vessels plying waters under United States territorial jurisdiction. The least trace of an illegal drug found in a search led to confiscation of the vessel and its equipment, which then went under the auction
hammer in due course. This "Zero Tolerance" policy raised a
great hew and cry among the public who looked upon the USCG's
actions as too draconian. The information here raises the issue
about public acceptance of military enforcement of a seemingly
harsh counterdrug interdiction effort. Military personnel
involved in counterdrug work should be aware of the Coast Guard's
experience in this regard.

2. Elaine Shannon, Desperados: Latin Drug Lords, U.S. Lawmen,

This book, loaded with interesting facts, concentrates on the
case of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent Enrique
Camarena, whom Mexican drug traffickers (some of whom were law
officers) kidnapped, tortured, and murdered near Guadalajara,
Jalisco, Mexico, in 1985. In addition to the Camarena episode,
the story emphasizes DEA counterdrug operations in Mexico. It
stresses the positive aspects of these operations and ignores the
negative. It points up the DEA's disagreement with the
Department of State, which maintained the marijuana eradication
campaign was a success. The DEA saw the situation entirely
differently and had evidence that eradication was a failure.

The author, strongly sympathetic to the DEA viewpoint,
suggests that drug law enforcement efforts taken in cooperation
with Mexican authorities remained at times subordinated to the
United States-Mexico "special relationship" and suffered
accordingly. Thus Shannon believes that the Reagan
Administration did not prosecute the "War on Drugs" as a high
priority. Military personnel seeking information about civilian
drug enforcement would find this book rewarding, but it is about
law enforcement and is without any ideas about the solution to
the drug menace.

3. Paul Eddy, Hugo Sabogal, and Sara Walden, The Cocaine Wars:
Murder, Money, Corruption, and the World's Most Valuable

This book is highly recommended to military personnel who
have a need to learn about the illicit trade in cocaine in
Colombia, the Bahamas, and Miami, FL. The story is well-
documented and delves into the aspects of law enforcement
corruption in Miami among the local police and in the Bahamas
among the highest government officials. It provides a good
account of the drug situation in southern Florida during the
early 1980's. Although highly readable and fraught with
interesting detail, this book ignores Panamanian corruption
stemming from the drug traffic and gives no "big picture" about
the drug problem facing the nation.

4. Office of the President, National Security Strategy of the

This publication is significant for the military counterdrug
effort, because it depicts illegal narcotics production as an
ingredient in a low intensity conflict environment that threatens
the national interest. This strategy document stresses that narcotics production adversely affects the stability of friendly nations as well as other strategic interests of the United States, and therefore the nation must address this menace with all means at its disposal. Military personnel involved in counterdrug work should be aware of its contents.


This document is generally a glowing report of the Reagan Administration's counterdrug program, including the military counterdrug mission. It discusses the interdiction strategy under the three "subcategories" of air, maritime, and land interdiction and maintains that there has been a 200 percent increase in activity in these categories in just a few months' time.

In the maritime category, the report states that the approach has been to use integrated operations, emphasizing single agency actions but encouraging the employment of interagency joint operations. Moreover, the report declares that the Reagan Administration has relied heavily upon counterdrug combined operations with both source and transshipment nations.

On land and in the airways, the stress has been on stopping drugs at the nation's borders in the ports of embarkation and international airports. The Administration has also been combating smugglers' use of the international mails. Utilization of timely and accurate intelligence has also been of growing importance in the Reagan Administration's counterdrug strategy.

This report (pages 21-22) presents a set of interesting statistics. These deal with the volume of illicit drug seizures, surveillance hours, and other data through 1987, all of it, at first glance, appearing to show success for the Reagan Administration's "war on drugs."


Mr. Bowsher's statement, beginning on page 6 of the document, gives arguments for implementing policies that work both the supply and demand sides of the drug abuse problem. He sees the military role as important but also concludes that Congress should support extensive efforts to persuade citizens not to use illicit drugs in the first place. Without such an educational impetus, military counterdrug activities, he states, would be bound to fail, since interdiction alone cannot successfully address the problem of drugs. Military counterdrug officials should be aware of Mr. Bowsher's viewpoints.

This is a key document for any military person who wishes to gain an in-depth understanding of the opinion in Congress favoring a larger role for the Pentagon in counterdrug activities. This report explores fully the pros and cons of military involvement and shows that many in the national legislative body held plausible reasons for believing in the efficacy of further military participation in the "War on Drugs."


This is an important study in the annals of materials opposing the interjection of the military into the counterdrug campaign. Reuter and his colleagues are quite critical about the value ("pay-off") of increased military interdiction activities. In short, they see these operations as lacking cost-effectiveness. They view the U.S. Navy as ill-suited to perform maritime interdiction effectively. Moreover, they see air interdiction as highly demanding both in terms of equipment and in the matter of coordination and integration of trained personnel. In addition, they conclude that these actions are deleterious to the state of readiness that the military must maintain in the interests of national security. These authors point to the conclusion of seven studies appearing between 1979 and 1988 on the matter of enhanced military participation: these studies, they maintain, are uniformly pessimistic about the effectiveness of such endeavors and should suffice to warn the DOD away from deep commitment to counter drug work. All military counterdrug personnel should be familiar with the Reuter study.


This report, starting on page 124, contains a discussion of the provisions of the 1988 "Omnibus Drug Law" that created the so-called "National Drug Czar's" office of which Mr. William Bennett later became the first director. Military personnel involved in counterdrug work should be aware of this statute and its contents, because the Director, Office of National Drug Policy, was -- and is -- a large player in the national counterdrug effort.

This is the document deeming it essential for the Congress to mandate that the military act as the leading agent in the command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) functions in drug interdiction. Consequently, it is of special interest to military personnel involved in monitoring and surveillance of illicit drug traffic.


This interesting news article reveals the capacity of the drug runners, well-financed and knowledgeable about the current technology in electronics, to remain ahead of law enforcement agencies in terms of equipment. It is a useful account for any military personnel acting to support civilian drug law enforcement officials, because it reveals the "enemy's" high-technology capabilities.


This document contains details about the air, sea, and land interdiction activities of the military and also describes policy and strategy growing therefrom. It gives details on some of the programs with accompanying objectives and quantification wherever possible. For military counterdrug personnel, it is useful for gaining an insight into the overall aims of the counterdrug effort.


This official report discusses the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters' (BINM) "inter-agency strategy" for counterdrug activities that emerged in 1988. The BINM devised a "five-year implementation plan" to reduce the availability of illegal international drugs. Founded on efforts for eradication of drug-producing crops, effective law enforcement, assistance in development to cooperating nations, "public diplomacy," and appropriate training of law enforcement officials, this plan takes cognizance of the international cooperation essential to quelling the drug traffic. Implied in the training aspects is the need for some form of military involvement in terms of instructors and resident advisers, at least temporarily, in these cooperating countries.

Taking the tack that the military's mission in assisting drug law enforcement is a gigantic undertaking with a doubtful outcome, Bagley's article describes the duties that the recent counterdrug legislation (National Defense Appropriations Act for FY 89) has placed upon the military. He notes that the Secretary of Defense, as head of the DOD, is the lead agent (agency) for the detection and monitoring of illegal aerial and maritime drug transits. Under this legislation, the Secretary also has the responsibility for the integration of all command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) connected with drug interdiction. The Secretary additionally holds the authority to approve and to fund the plans of the state governors to deploy the National Guard in drug interdiction efforts across the various states. Although these are sizable powers, the goals are Herculean, according to Bagley's viewpoint, and their accomplishment may elude the best efforts of the military.


This article emphasizes the dangers inherent for those, including the military, who undertake to address the drug menace by emphasizing the supply side of the equation. Hartlyn argues that such an effort, based ultimately on a "containment model," can theoretically succeed, if followed over a long period of time. However, so Hartlyn points out, the critics of this policy, which stresses eradication of sources and interdiction of traffic (both involving the military), maintain that the eventual result is that of a "balloon model" in which actions wiping out drug trafficking in one area simply force it -- or "squeeze" it -- into another area, where it begins anew. So containment forces have their work to do all over again, and the military's mission, by implication, remains unaccomplished. Even more potentially frustrating is the tendency, under the "balloon model," for drug runners and growers to return finally to their original area and initiate their nefarious business once more, thereby thwarting the enforcers' ability to fulfill their mission.


This lengthy article thoroughly explores what its author believes to be the harmful impact of United States' drug policy upon a friendly sister republic, Colombia. He sees the concept of emphasizing source control, bi-lateral international agreements, and strict law enforcement to combat the illicit drug menace, while largely ignoring the social and health aspects of
the demand side within the United States, as both bound to fail and harmful to Colombian democratic government. Also, by implication, he would no doubt argue that any U.S. military involvement with such a policy is tantamount to undertaking missions destined for failure and therefore wasteful of resources and manpower.


This article points up the glaring lack of a central authority among the federal levels and branches of government for defining and directing a coherent counterdrug policy. It underscores the legacy of Harry J. Anslinger, Director, Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 1930-1962, in moralizing and stressing the law enforcement aspects of counterdrug efforts. Mr. Anslinger's retirement in 1962, so the author argues, left federal agencies again to compete over leadership in the national counterdrug arena as they had earlier in the century. The author sees many of the mid-1980s' difficulties over policy definition and control reminiscent of those struggles before 1930 and offers accordingly good "food for thought" about current drug matters. These weaknesses help set the stage for demands for military assistance in the "War on Drugs." This is an article of general educational value to any military person interested in the civilian agencies associated with drug law enforcement and the philosophy behind that law.


This paper contains information on three key issues pertaining to the military's participation in the national campaign against illicit drugs. These issues are: (1) description of the nature and results of "Operation Blast Furnace," Bolivia, July-October, 1986 (2) explanation of the changes in the Posse Comitatus Act in December 1981 (3) discussion of the evolving military commitment to the counterdrug effort in the 1980's. It is a document highly useful as an introductory source to the subject of the military's role in the "War on Drugs."


One example of the NNIC's annual official reports, this document provides a good description of the types of illegal drugs entering the country in the 1980's and also discusses the countries where these drugs originate. It allows the reader to gain a fairly comprehensive impression of the magnitude of the drug menace in terms of a pernicious influx of harmful
substances. Military personnel supporting interdiction efforts should read this report.


The thrust of ADM Thorsen's thinking is that the military faces a difficult mission in the drug interdiction effort. This work cannot have an appreciable impact without other efforts of the federal government taking place in concert with the military's activities. Military interdiction and assistance alone, even if highly effective, cannot end the drug threat, because there are moral, social, and psychological aspects to the drug problem that lie beyond the capacity of military action to impact. The implication is that these aspects require the federal government's dealing with the demand side of the problem (education and information) as well as with treatment and rehabilitation needs.


This short article constitutes a further encouragement to those who view bi-lateral agreements and strong law enforcement as tools for hitting at the drug-source countries as an exercise in futility. It points to shifts in the sites of marijuana production in Mexico and Colombia as results of eradication and crack-downs of police and maintains that production even increased. This theme indirectly portrays military efforts at interdiction, therefore, as largely fruitless and frustrating for those involved in them. Military counterdrug personnel should be aware of this vein of thinking, pessimistic though it is.


This article is interesting, because it attempts to tie in drug traffickers with Fidel Castro's communist regime in Cuba. It presents evidence linking the Cubans to drug-running operations in the Caribbean aimed at reaching U.S. contacts and distributors. If Ehrenfeld is correct -- and many would dispute his claims -- the military, in concert with civilian authorities, has a greater motivation for involvement in counterdrug operations.


This newspaper article captures interest at once, because it contains the "worst case scenario" arguing against full-fledged military participation in the "War on Drugs." It depicts the huge numbers of personnel and large amount of other assets necessary for the military to undertake the massive kind of successful interdiction that some proponents were at this point
championing. Possibly, the article may be an attempt of the Pentagon to paint such a dismal picture that pressure in Congress for a military counterdrug role would disappear.


This is a useful piece to read for military authorities who may have difficulty in understanding how Congressional and public opinion reached the conclusion that a grander military counterdrug role was essential. This is a succinct, readable account that military "counterdrug personnel" should know about. It certainly presents the "pro-involvement" case clearly.


This newspaper article takes a dim view of the military's chances for successfully completing the drug interdiction mission. It maintains that since the profits associated with drug trafficking are so huge, smugglers have both the means and the incentives to devise ingenious subterfuges to get around law-enforcement barriers. Perhaps, military personnel doing counterdrug work should take this piece "with a grain of salt," but they should read it nonetheless.


These two writers disclose attitudes in the Pentagon in the spring of 1988, as Congressional and public pressures mounted for greater aid from the military in confronting the drug menace. Knowledge of these attitudes and pressures is useful to any understanding of the military counterdrug effort.


This account covers the events in Congress in the spring of 1988 that led to an even greater military involvement in counterdrug work. It marks a step in the direction to the fuller participation of 1989, and it is therefore of interest to any military authority having to take on a counterdrug mission.


In this article, Mr. Halloran points out the criticisms triggered by the military's somewhat restricted role in counterdrug activities by the spring of 1988. This piece reflects the disenchantment of many among the citizenry with the level of military participation and shows how the momentum was building for a greater military part. It helps explain the forces lying behind changes in the *Posse Comitatus* Act.
years earlier as well as those pressuring for even greater military involvement in counterdrug work near the end of the decade of the 1980's.


This article, expressing the opinion of the Reagan Administration's highly-respected Secretary of Defense, is a significant publication. It well reflects the intense opposition engendered by the notion of employing the military more fully to combat the traffic in illegal drugs. It also shows the growing pressure from Congress and the public over the issue of the military role in counterdrug work. It is important for military personnel to understand this aspect of the history of military involvement in the "War on Drugs" and to note that its timing presaged, by just a few weeks, significant Congressional action in favor of more DOD participation.


This article is highly critical of any military involvement in drug interdiction efforts. The basis for this dim view is the history of U.S. Coast Guard failure in attempting to enforce the Volstead Act, under the XVIII Amendment, during national prohibition, 1919-1933. While perhaps alcoholic spirits and their proscription do not engender the same intense opposition as do illicit drugs of non-alcoholic nature, the comparison may hold some truth. Meason has presented a piece military personnel ought to ponder in terms of deciding whether historical precedent holds any truth in this instance.


This is a brief but useful document. It references items in print dealing with the question of U.S. military participation in the counterdrug campaign during much of the 1980's. It presents materials about assistance, Congressional actions, and other associated subjects. It is a good tool for the military student of counterdrug thinking and activities to consult, either before beginning work in counterdrug operations or before undertaking research aimed at solving problems of the "work-a-day world" of drug law enforcement.


Mr. Enterline presents another argument against involving the military in the counterdrug campaign, and this notion, although
somewhat speculative, comprises a noteworthy consideration. Does the broad use of U.S. and drug-source country military in suppressing illicit drug traffic serve to weaken an already debilitated civilian leadership and foster the re-emergence of military governments, especially in Latin American republics? Moreover, is the use of military force uniquely ubiquitous? -- that is, does it spill over into other unintended areas and permeate the entire society? The author believes that such use of military force attained this end in Vietnam, and he fears it might also do so in Latin America. This is a question for the military to ponder carefully upon initiating drug suppression missions abroad.


This article is a fairly comprehensive treatment of the subject of military involvement in counterdrug operations. It deals with the views of the then Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, and explores the work of the Coast Guard, Customs Service, and Navy on this point. The arguments of the pros and the cons in the matter come in for fair consideration and thus constitute a good place for military students of this problem to commence their study.


Wardlaw's article is of interest to military and other DOD personnel, because it explores the ramifications of the popular term "narcoterrorism" to explain the purported connections between political terrorists and drug traffickers. If widespread and strong linkages between these two elements exist, then the threat to the national security of the United States would be immensely enlarged and the rationale to employ the military broadly in counterdrug activities enhanced. Wardlaw sees, however, no such menace, arguing that any unions between traffickers and terrorists (insurgents) represents only short-term "arrangements of convenience."


This document is an excellent source for study of issues Congress believed relevant to the problem of further involvement of the military in counterdrug activities. It helped Congress determine how to couch crucial counterdrug legislation and is useful background information for military personnel undertaking
counterdrug missions. Military counterdrug personnel should know which issues were uppermost in the minds of the Congressional legislators as the move toward widening DOD participation in counterdrug efforts shaped up in mid-1988.


This address by a well-known and highly-visible municipal law-enforcement officer calls for an immediate and effective national drug strategy that effectively coordinates all efforts (local, state, and national) by integrating them into a national plan. The federal government should, in the opinion of Chief Brown, create a "National Narcotics Commission" to lead this strategy and replace the ineffective National Drug Policy Board. Moreover, the Chief makes a plea for the immediate deployment of high-technology military assets in the attempt to interdict the drug traffic. He states that the federal government further needs a cabinet-level post to lead the anti-drug initiative and should also funnel the necessary financial aid to local governments without delay. Chief Brown's address reflects a strong current of opinion favoring enlargement of the military role and is a good source for learning about this viewpoint.


This reporter presents a piece that argues against military participation in the "War on Drugs." Her grounds are strictly on a cost-effectiveness basis. The article is the product of the school of thought that looks upon a drug role for the military as a misuse of military resources and that (in this article) frames its opposition quantitatively in monetary terms.

Nevertheless, the movement to bring more military assets into the "War on Drugs" continued to gain headway in Congress and among most of the general public. Military counterdrug officials should familiarize themselves with the contents of this article (after they have perused the GAO Report itself) so they may come to their own conclusions about the effectiveness of the DOD participation in the "War on Drugs."


This interesting and thoughtful piece is one example of a crosscurrent moving against the main stream in mid-1988. That is, while the majority of media presentations seemed to agree to some form of greater military participation in the "War on Drugs," some did not.

This article offers a rather extensive description of the linkages between traffickers in illegal drugs on the one hand, and anti-U.S. elements in various Caribbean governments on the other hand. It depicts a network of cooperation between drug-runners in Colombia, transshippers in Nicaragua, Cuba, and Mexico, and money "launderers" in Panama. If true, it depicts a dangerous threat in need of containment.


This article covers the aspects of one of the more controversial features that Congress mooted during its debate in 1988 about greater military participation in the "War on Drugs." Many military authorities opposed this arrest authority, and the whole tradition of Anglo-American constitutional experience was against it. Once it had died, the way was fairly well open for a greater military role.


This article, written by the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, presents a short survey of the history of the Coast Guard's work in interdicting illegal drugs. It shows the nature of maritime activities necessary to contain smugglers' attempts to bring narcotics into the United States and underscores the importance of the traditional mission of the U.S. Coast Guard as sole branch with extensive experience in law enforcement.


This article should be of interest to military personnel about to embark upon counterdrug activities, because it describes the strengths and weaknesses of the Customs Service's balloon aerostat radar detection system under development (at the time of writing) along the U.S.-Mexican border. The plan Rawles depicts calls for the ultimate deployment of five to six radar-bearing balloons covering the area lying between Brownsville, TX, and San Diego, CA, with long-range, low-altitude devices able to track small, slow, low-flying aircraft at ranges up to 150 miles. Coupled with the three Florida-based aerostats, these southwestern deployments afford nearly complete protection of the southern border of the nation. However, as Rawles points out, the aerostats, usually tethered at altitudes between 10,000 and 15,000 feet, are vulnerable to certain kinds of weather common to their sites and often become so unstable during these foul interludes that their crews have to retrieve them and cut surveillance for hours at a time.

This a useful account, because it describes the work of National Guardsmen assisting U.S. Customs officials in interdicting illicit drugs along the land frontiers of the nation. It is useful to military personnel involved in counterdrug work, both because it describes the actions of the guardsmen working under the authority of the state governor, and because it constitutes another step in the direction of further involvement of the military in the "War on Drugs."


This revealing piece of journalism discusses the Customs Service's aerostat radars, the moored balloons carrying AN/TPS-63 surveillance devices and providing long-range, low-level coverage. At first, merely a single balloon at south Florida's Cudjoe Key under the control of the Air Force, this system passed under the control of the Customs Service as the volume of illicit drug traffic burgeoned. In a few months, as a result of this rise in the influx of drugs, the number of tethered detectors rose to three with the second at Cape Canaveral and the third on Grand Bahama Island. However, while the balloon-borne radars tracked thousands of flights during 1987 and facilitated interceptions of smuggling operations, the overwhelming majority of questionable flights (nearly eighty percent) went unchallenged, either because of the lack of interception assets or the improper positioning of interceptors for timely interdictions. Leen's description depicts the difficulties of balloon-supported aerial interdiction with telling effect.


In this article, Mr. Walker explores the United States' cultural imperatives and historical experience associated with attempts to control illegal drug traffic from the early 1900's to the 1960's. He sees both "culture" (in the anthropological sense -- the patterns of habit and outlook that mold ways of doing things) and the overarching pressures of historical epochs (isolationism of the 1920's and early 1930's) as shapers of U.S. anti-drug policies. Internally, the U.S. government, until 1925, was impeded by struggles over who was to control policy development and direction (until 1925). Even afterwards, U.S. authorities continued to insist on control of drugs at their source as their main policy goal concerning foreign powers. This proclivity -- coupled with the advocacy of strict law enforcement as the primary tool -- outlasted the reign of Mr. John Anslinger, Director, Federal Narcotics Bureau, 1930-1962, reappearing in the days of the Reagan Administration. If this thesis be sound, it partly explains shortfalls in the counterdrug efforts and helps to understand calls for military intervention in these efforts.

This is an important article, one that anyone concerned with the counterdrug activities of the federal government (not just the military's role) ought to read and to ponder. The theme is simply that the benefits of illicit drug trade are so great for those Latin American interests growing the plants, transshipping the processed materials, and laundering the money that the U.S. government will not be able to curtail the traffic in any effective way. The local farmers raising the coca leaf crops have little financial incentive to till other crops, and others in these regions see drug abuse as an internal U.S. problem.

Moreover, Lee does not necessarily believe there is always a great degree of cooperation between traffickers and drug runners. (In Columbia, some of the narcotics interests are allied with the right wing political groups against the left wing guerrilla forces, whom they have attacked and harassed.) Many local citizens in these areas look upon U.S. intervention as an infringement upon national and local sovereignty. In addition, when U.S. aid strengthens local law enforcement officials, drug interests merely raise their rate of bribery and generally nullify its effectiveness. These are bleak thoughts, indeed, for U.S. drug authorities to ponder.


This article is noteworthy as a description of the means at the disposal of the United States Customs Service to carry out surveillance and interdiction from the air. It emphasizes the importance of the airborne radar (a General Electric AN/APS-125) carried by the P-3 Orion, the "Blue Eagle," whose original purpose was to perform antisubmarine missions for the United States Navy. This aircraft can track more than 2,000 airborne targets simultaneously as it scans a sector of almost 200,000 square miles of airspace. With a range of over 4,600 miles and an endurance of over fourteen hours, the Blue Eagle -- once the Customs Service procures four of the craft and bases them at Corpus Christi, TX -- can reduce considerably the demand on the flying hours of the USAF's E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System and the Navy's E-2C Hawkeyes, which have been providing interdiction assistance. Also, the Blue Eagle purportedly can effect faster response from drug law enforcement aircraft attempting to intercept suspicious aircraft entering the United States. Such information is highly useful for military personnel supporting these surveillance activities.


The Conference Report discusses the compromise measures hammered out by representatives of both Houses of Congress and, in doing so, reveals much about this key piece of legislation.
Military personnel involved in counterdrug support would do well to familiarize themselves with this document, since the issues that emerged in the Conference Committee undoubtedly reflect the intent of Congress on matters in the Authorization Act pertaining to military counterdrug work.


This source covers the Congressional debates that led to the resolution of the matter of military participation in the counterdrug campaign. These debates lay behind the section of the military Appropriations Bill for FY 89 that made the DOD the lead agency for detecting and monitoring illegal drugs entering the United States.


These debates afford a good description of the functions and interests of the various federal agencies and offices involved in counterdrug activities. They also show that Congress intended, through the Omnibus Anti-Substance Abuse Act of 1988, to eliminate overlapping authorities and to vest authority to quell the drug menace in one office. The thinking behind this act was to do away with the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, the National Drug Policy Board, and the White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy and to bestow their functions that still had relevance upon the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Congress intended that this Director have broad discretionary power to reprogram and to redirect funding for counterdrug efforts. If agencies are not cooperative, the Director holds the authority to take matters directly to the President for resolution. Specifically, the law empowers the Director to reassign personnel temporarily, to designate lead agencies to carry out missions, and to establish policy to guide the lead agency in accomplishing its mission. Military personnel working in counterdrug activities should be aware of the provisions of this law.


This article is a succinct account of Congress' work in setting up the Office of Drug Control Policy. It also discusses the elimination of three earlier-established counterdrug entities: the Drug Enforcement Policy Board, the White House Office of Drug-Abuse Policy, and the National Narcotic Border Interdiction System, two of which were instrumental in developing the seminal national counterdrug strategies of 1982 and 1984. The author has furnished an insight into the changing sentiments of Congress as it tried to address the complex drug problem.
military counterdrug personnel would be well advised to know about these Congressional viewpoints.


This article decries the cost effectiveness of military radar support in the drug interdiction efforts. The author describes the proposed "electronic picket fence" of balloon-bearing radars running from the Caribbean to the Pacific as akin to the ill-advised French belief in the efficacy of the Maginot Line along the German frontier in the late 1930's. While such an historical comparison may not be valid, military personnel working in support of counterdrug operations of civilian drug law enforcement authorities should read Mr. Isikoff's arguments and judge them in the light of their own professional tenets and experience.


This account describes the U.S. government assistance furnished two key South American nations in the "war on drugs" during the 1980's. It is a helpful publication to read for military personnel who may be involved in working with Latin American governments in counterdrug campaigns. For example, Colombia and Bolivia are centers of illicit drug traffic in the cocaine trade, and some military personnel may well find themselves assigned to train and advise these nations' counterdrug establishments in the near future.


This is an interesting paper, because it points out four alleged "historically based flaws" in the U.S. authorities' approach to the matter of drug control. These flaws are: (1) emphasis on the supply side in attempts to contain illicit drugs (2) belief that the U.S. would have no drug problem, if there were no drugs available (3) conclusion that the solution to the drug problem is to eradicate the sources of drugs and (4) focus on interdicting the drug traffic with force, including use of the military, if ordinary police methods fail.

The paper also presents strong reasons against this use of the military as a solution to the problem of illicit drug usage. It additionally suggests alternative methods to combat the drug problem -- the main assumption being that the drug problem is primarily a national health problem, not a law-enforcement problem. Consequently, attention to the matter of drug demand within the United States deserves close scrutiny and appropriate policies.

Michale Abbott's article is a highly useful publication for anyone in the military involved in assisting civilian drug law enforcement. It describes in clear layman's terms the revisions of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (Title 10, U.S.C.) by the provisions in the Defense Appropriations Act of 1981 that legally opened the way for indirect military participation in drug law enforcement. This piece also delves into the politics underlying this celebrated statute of 1981 and points out the pressures leading to the passage of the act.


This *Times* piece argues that smugglers hold the advantage over the United States Coast Guard and other components trying to interdict the influx on illegal drugs, since coastal borders are vast, and equipment for effective interdiction is lacking. The Coast Guard is -- according to this article -- at best, stopping only five to seven percent of the contraband cocaine from entering the United States.

1989:


This is the key official document of 1989 that first spelled out the increased role of the military in civilian drug law enforcement. This missive laid down broad guidelines for the military leadership to follow and specifically named the DOD as the lead federal agency for air and sea surveillance and monitoring. It also called for command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) integration under DOD supervision. As such, it is an historical document that all military personnel involved in counterdrug activities should read as a kind of "General Orders" outlining their duties.


This legal citation is important for military units participating in counterdrug operations to understand, because it is the primary authorization for the loaning of military equipment to civilian drug law enforcement agencies. Under Title 10 USC 72, for example, the U.S. Customs Service has borrowed the Army's UH-60 Blackhawk assault helicopters for use in counterdrug interdiction efforts.

This is a primary source document to consult for developing an understanding of the extent of military participation in the national counterdrug campaign as authorized by Congress in 1981 and amended since that time. This piece is a useful historical background to the changes in the Posse Comitatus Act. It reveals the scope and nature of DOD attempts to comply with the wishes of Congress in reference to the "war on drugs."


This news piece underscores the strong views of Mr. Bill Bennett, former Secretary of Education and (at this juncture) newly appointed Director, Office of National Drug Policy, regarding the use of the military to augment civilian drug law enforcement efforts. The Times attributes to Mr. Bennett the opinion that the United States, as the world's "greatest economic and military power" can do more to prevent criminals in foreign nations from growing, processing, and dispatching illegal drugs to the United States. He also declared, according to this article, that the United States should consider using military force against both the production and shipment of these drugs. Mr. Bennett's statement reflects the official viewpoint about military counterdrug work early in 1989 and hence should be of interest to military personnel wishing to understand the political background of their counterdrug missions.


Mr. Moore, coincidentally with the newly-installed George Bush Administration's stressing the growing role of the military in the "War on Drugs," wrote this sobering piece. His theme is that even the strongest efforts of the military in counterdrug missions cannot curtail the supply of illicit drugs on the streets sufficiently to raise their prices high enough to make them inaccessible to users. The supply is too great; the demand is too constant; and the determination and ingenuity of the drug interests are too strong. Consequently, the military has an impossible mission that is bound to fail.


This article depicts the growing feeling in some quarters that the military should be the tool to move against drug traffickers in Latin American source countries. Military personnel would be interested in reading the arguments favoring a wider use of them in foreign counterdrug operations. These views
are good counters to claims that attacking the supply side of the illegal drug trade equation is non-productive.


This article traces further the growing pressure from Congress, facing an outraged public frightened over the magnitude of the drug problem, to draft the military as a drug law enforcement agency. Military personnel should note that the appearance of this article in one of the nation's leading newspapers reflects the strength of the "use the military viewpoint" at this juncture.


This article delves into some of the motivations behind the passage of the Drug Enforcement Act of 1986. In one interesting and revealing example, it relates that, as late as 1985, the U.S. Customs Service was working with woefully inadequate equipment and techniques. Customs was still operating a manual system of log books as the primary means of tracking and accumulating intelligence on the illegal drug traffic coming into the United States. Having written the piece of information about drug activity in the log book by hand, Customs then passed pertinent data by telephone to other interested drug law enforcement agencies. Meanwhile, Customs also wrote in grease pencil on a huge plexiglass board to maintain an ongoing record of resource availability for drug law enforcement. While perhaps adequate in earlier years, this manual log book system was overwhelmed by the tremendous volume of the drug traffic in the mid-1980's. In the Drug Enforcement Act of 1986, therefore, Congress appropriated $46 million to the U.S. Customs Service for the development of three automated command, control, communications, and intelligence (C^3I) centers to assist drug interdiction efforts along the southern border of the nation.

9. LTC E. C. Norman, USA, "Integration of the War on Drugs: Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence," United States Army War College, Carlisle barracks, Pennsylvania, April, 1989 (9 April).

The author has written a study on an essential aspect of drug interdiction. Indeed, command, control, communications, and intelligence (C^3I) poses many problems for the field operator supporting counterdrug operations. This study has some interesting C^3I suggestions that military commanders ought to consider.

This document is important for its presentation of statistics and descriptions of the military's counterdrug operations. It notes, for example, that military efforts in interdiction cost approximately $4.9 million in FY 82, while in FY 87 they rose to a total of $397 million.


This is a fairly recent technical consideration of the problems of employing reasonable measurements of effectiveness (MOE's) to gage the efficacy of DOD counterdrug activities. It offers the military official involved in these efforts an insight into the problems and nature of the MOE's which may well judge the worth of his work. Military personnel who support counterdrug work need knowledge of the matter of MOE's and their impact upon operations.


This article, recent and pertinent, is an excellent treatment of those aspects of the illicit drug trade that adversely impact the security of several of the Latin American republics whose stability and viability as democracies seriously concern the United States. The author sees the drug trade as "a transnational phenomenon" that spawns "states within states" in the drug-producing Latin American nations, whose very political sovereignty is threatened by the power of the drug cartels to bribe or to intimidate all would-be honest officials. Mr. Dziedzic surveys conditions in Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru (where the Sendero Luminoso "garners an estimated $30 million a year in return for their protection in the drug-growing regions of the country"). He concludes that drug dealers threaten the effectiveness of central administration and the pillars of institutional stability in all these nations. So, in his view, the drug threat has supplanted the threat of communism as the crucial menace in these nations.

He argues that the United States should assist in the training and equipping of "specialized police forces" to combat this drug threat. Using re-equipped and strengthened military forces to fight the drug traffic in these countries poses a risky situation, since these weak democracies may lose control of revitalized and enlarged military establishments and succumb to military dictatorships. He calls for more research and study on the cartels themselves and United States cooperation with these nations toward the "reasonable objective" of reducing the power of the cartels to the level at which they have neither the money nor the firepower to threaten national sovereignty.

This news article purports to explain the enthusiasm shown by the military, beginning in late 1989, for participation in the counterdrug effort. Interestingly, it portrays the DOD "change of heart" regarding a counterdrug role for the military largely in terms of the services' self interest: with the Soviet threat in Eastern Europe so diminished by late 1989, Pentagon officials concluded, so Jehl and Healy argue, that new drug suppression tasks could justify demands for funding personnel, ships, and training activities that, at this juncture, appeared threatened by a shrinking defense budget. If true, this article's contents merit careful consideration by military officials, lest they unwittingly commit their organizations to an effort on the basis of reasons that are not consonant with the assumptions underpinning the "War on Drugs" -- that the military can indirectly support civilian law enforcement while it also maintains adequate readiness for traditional military missions.

1990:


This official document provides information about the extent of the U.S. Army's counterdrug operations during the last quarter of 1989 and the first three quarters of 1990. On pages I-14 to I-15, the section entitled "Counter-Drug Effort" presents a succinct and useful account of the Army's assistance to drug law enforcement.


This official document presents the extent of the DOD's "Counternarcotics Programs" during the preceding months. It constitutes a good overview of the magnitude of DOD work in the counterdrug mission area, and, as such, it is a useful summary to gage the size of the DOD support to drug law enforcement late in the 1980's.


Containing 161 separate items treating the activities of the military in the "War on Drugs," this trio of publications comprise an excellent source of information that captures the situation as it existed in early 1990. The items consist of news
stories, editorials, periodical articles, transcripts of television interviews and news casts, and they cover events and personages involved in the counterdrug effort, both in the United States and abroad.


Maj Nance has written a very valuable study, a document extremely informative to anyone studying the involvement of the military in counterdrug activities in the 1980's. He discusses the various agencies and offices in the counterdrug effort, describes the rules guiding military assistance, and gives an account of ongoing military counterdrug operations at the time of writing. In addition, he offers recommendations for more effective military assistance and presents appendices containing two seminal official documents (House Conference Report 100-989 and Enclosure 1 to DODD 5525.5) regarding the extent and nature of military activities. This study is virtually a "source document" for any military official committed to counterdrug support efforts.


This is an excellent guide to the materials relating to the subject of military participation in counterdrug operations that the U.S. Army War College Library holds. It is an updated version of the earlier bibliography of the War College Library, published in June 1988. It lists books, documents (Army War College and Air War College Research Papers and Reports), periodical articles, and newspaper articles that furnish viewpoints from various schools of opinion. It is a useful tool to begin any study of the military's role in the "War on Drugs," and since many of the items listed are available in other large general libraries, it is of utility to the student of the drug problem in any locale where such a repository is in operation. In fact, this bibliography constitutes a basic resource for anyone looking into military counterdrug work.


This is a yearly recurring publication of the DOS appearing with an Executive Summary and also a Mid-Year Update in August or September. It is an important source of information, since it concentrates on the aspects of international trade in narcotics and the diplomatic ramifications of such trade. It is of use to military personnel involved in counterdrug operations, because it may tell which regions and nations are of consequence to the U.S. in the "war on drugs."

This is a classified study (SECRET) treating the matters of measures of effectiveness (MOE's) and the crucial link of communications in monitoring and detecting drug smuggling in interdiction efforts of the military acting in support of civilian drug law enforcement. It is recent and useful in informing commanders about feasible MOE's and the ever-present problems of communications in field operations.


This article presents the official views of the Secretary of Defense about the military's part in the counterdrug effort. It explains the mission in clear, unequivocal terms and erases any doubts that the military might be only a half-hearted participant in the "war on drugs." Mr. Cheney sees drug trafficking as a threat to the national security and hence within the purview of the DOD to confront. However, he stipulates that the DOD will do its part without "usurping the police role." He lists briefly the tasks he has assigned to theater commanders and mentions the work of the National Guard as well.


This is an interesting document, because it shows how the Army chose to implement DOD guidance about participation in the national counterdrug effort. Styled a "Memorandum of Instruction," this plan links Army counterdrug activities to extant Army processes and doctrinal concepts by stating the broad intent of the Army's leadership, setting up the boundaries for providing support to civilian authorities, and guiding the formulation and execution of the various courses of action.

The plan calls for the Army to be ready to provide forces to combatant commanders as well as to assist them in developing and carrying out plans. It also notes the Army's responsibility to furnish operational support, equipment, training, and personnel to U.S. government agencies and, by means of security assistance, to selected foreign governments. Additionally, the plan notes two broad categories for Army counterdrug support: providing assets for use of non-DOD agencies and selected foreign governments, and providing forces and equipment to the theater commanders-in-chief for support, training, and limited operational activities. Detailed study of this document offers a good insight into the ways the DOD is involved in the counterdrug work of the federal and other governments.

This 20-page bibliography is a treasure trove of information about documents pertinent to the subject of the military's involvement in the national counterdrug effort. It lists, with relevant annotations, various categories of documents: those containing the national strategy; those describing the DOD response; those holding useful statistics; and those pertaining to the efficiency of interdiction as well as those originating in Congress -- to mention a few categories. Anyone wishing to undertake a study of any aspect of the national crisis stemming from the trafficking and usage of illicit drugs in the United States during the last twenty years should be aware of this source and its contents. In addition, this publication contains information that military analysts, administrators, and commanders may use as a tool to arrive at an understanding of the multi-faceted drug problem and their attempt to address it in their missions.


This is a highly informative article that surveys the key features of United States drug policy in late 1990. It also presents some of the major recent actions of the Bush Administration in the realm of counterdrug effort. In addition, it offers a summary of the "Declaration of Cartagena" (February 1990) as well as the bilateral agreements stemming from that important counterdrug meeting. The article finally refers to the adverse environmental impacts of the coca production in Latin America. Military personnel deploying to Latin America in support of counterdrug operations there would find this article of particular relevance.


Composed of remarks made by the United States Department of State Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters to the Task Force on International Narcotics Control, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., on 10 October 1990, this publication reveals the Bush Administration's official view about the efficacy of the agreements made at Cartagena and the "status of the Andean Strategy." The comments pertain first to general intentions of the Bush Administration in international endeavors to contain the menace of the drug trade and then concern particular activities in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, ending with an update on the Declaration of Cartagena. While decidedly favorable to the Bush Administration's anti-drug campaign, the piece outlines the various federal efforts, especially those in
Latin America. Military officials following the "War on Drugs" south of the border would find this article especially useful.


This is a compilation of the briefings that participants presented at the conference of business, congressional, civilian drug law enforcement, and DOD representatives in Los Angeles during mid-December, 1990. As such, it offers a medley of counterdrug-related information that military personnel now involved in counterdrug support may find useful and stimulating. Included are such topics as "U.S. Drug Control Policy: A Congressional Outlook" (with selected excerpts from the "1990 Crime Control Bill"); "Operational Needs of the U.S. Coast Guard in the Drug War;" "Intelligence Support to the War on Drugs;" "Transferring NASA Technology to the War on Drugs;" and "New Business Opportunities in Surveillance for Drug Interdiction."