National Security Program

DYNAMIC RESPONSE:
MILITARY STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE
INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
John F. Kennedy School of Government
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National Security Program Discussion Paper Series

91-07
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Dynamic Response: Military Strategy and Force Structure into the 21st Century

The purpose of this research paper is to introduce a new national security strategy and military force structure for the 21st century. The strategy, called "Dynamic Response," is based on defending clear and unequivocal national interests which are defined in the paper's discussion of America's "national security estate."

The authors contend that decisions on the size and shape of the US forces must rest on an enduring logic which is both clearly understood and endorsed by government institutions and the public. Without this logic—provided by the strategy of Dynamic Response—support for the military could erode, contributing to the gradual hollowing out of American forces and fostering an international environment that invites aggression.

The proposed strategy of Dynamic Response is placed firmly within the context of the evolving geopolitical landscape. The paper examines four of the most significant (Continued)
post-Cold War forces that are fundamentally reshaping this landscape: the demise of ideology; the impact of the domestic economy on military power; the cartelization of geopolitical structures; and the acceleration of global socio-cultural change.

To deal with these forces, a new national security strategy is required, grounded in the defense of the "national security estate." This estate is made up of those regions of the world which are necessary to the survival of the US as a free and economically viable nation. These regions may encompass a wide array of political, social, economic and territorial resources, whose value with respect to US interests will evolve over time.

To defend the national security estate, US military forces must be capable of executing four competent strategies incorporated in Dynamic Response: Deterrence, Integrated Defense, Compellence and Reconstitution. These strategies can be executed by a US military force, as long as the effectiveness of this force is not diffused by trying to provide a security umbrella for peripheral concerns.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**TABLE OF CONTENTS** .......................................................... iii

**LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES** ........................................... v

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** ...................................................... vii

**CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION** .............................................. 1
NATIONAL DEFENSE AT THE CROSSROADS ................................... 1
A NEW STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE ........................................... 3
NEED FOR A CLEAR FOCUS .................................................. 4
OVERVIEW ................................................................. 6

**CHAPTER 2 - MILITARY STRATEGY IN TRANSITION** ...................... 9
THE LEGACY OF CONTAINMENT ........................................... 9
CALL FOR TRANSITION .................................................... 10
PRESIDENT BUSH'S NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY ......................... 12
THE ALTERNATIVE OF DYNAMIC RESPONSE ......................... 14
SUMMARY .................................................. 14

**CHAPTER 3 - GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT** ................................... 19
A CHANGING WORLD ..................................................... 19
IDEOLOGY ......................................................... 20
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC STRENGTH .................................. 22
GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURES .......................................... 26
SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS ........................................... 29
CONCLUSIONS .................................................. 30

**CHAPTER 4 - AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD** . 33
INCREMENTAL PROSPECTS FOR VIOLENCE ............................ 33
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ESTATE .................................... 34
REGIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ESTATE ................. 36
THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES ..................... 38
WESTERN EUROPE ................................................... 41
MIDDLE EAST OIL SUPPLIES ......................................... 45
THE PACIFIC RIM .................................................. 47
THE AMERICAS .................................................... 50
SUMMARY .................................................. 52

**CHAPTER 5 - A MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY** ............ 55
STRATEGIC ELEMENTS OF DYNAMIC RESPONSE .................. 55
DETERRENCE ....................................................... 55
INTEGRATED DEFENSE ............................................... 58
COMPELLENCE ...................................................... 60
RECONSTITUTION ................................................... 61
CONCLUSIONS .................................................. 64
CHAPTER 6 - CONVENTIONAL FORCE STRUCTURE ........................................ 67
  PLANNING SCENARIOS ........................................................................ 67
  CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE .................................................. 69
  ENERGY ACCESS IN SOUTH WEST ASIA ............................................... 70
  CONFLICT IN KOREA ........................................................................... 71
  THE CARIBBEAN CONFLICT ................................................................ 72
  FORCE STRUCTURE TOTALS ................................................................. 73
  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 76

CHAPTER 7 - STRATEGIC AND SUPPORTING FORCE STRUCTURES .................. 79
  THE STRATEGIC FORCE OUTLOOK ......................................................... 79
  STRATEGIC DEFENSE ........................................................................ 84
  OTHER FORCES .................................................................................. 85
  Transportation .................................................................................... 85
  Space .................................................................................................... 86
  Intelligence .......................................................................................... 87
  SUMMARY ............................................................................................ 87

CHAPTER 8 - DYNAMIC RESPONSE BUDGET IMPLICATIONS ......................... 89
  BUDGET REQUIREMENTS .................................................................... 89
  BUDGET COMPARISONS ..................................................................... 91

CHAPTER 9 - CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................... 95

APPENDIX A - TOTAL FORCE AND DYNAMIC RESPONSE ......................... 97
  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 97
  HISTORY AND BACKGROUND .............................................................. 97
  ROLES AND MISSIONS ....................................................................... 98
  PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS .............................................................. 100
  Cost .................................................................................................... 100
  Readiness ........................................................................................... 100
  Cost Versus Readiness ....................................................................... 101
  Level of Organizational Integration ................................................... 102
  Level of Threat ................................................................................... 102
  Scope of Conflict ............................................................................... 103
  Operational Phasing .......................................................................... 104
  Law ..................................................................................................... 105
  Political Considerations .................................................................... 106
  ROUND OUT BRIGADES ................................................................... 107
  CADRE DIVISIONS ........................................................................... 108
  Costs .................................................................................................. 109
  Training ............................................................................................... 110
  Readiness ........................................................................................... 110
  Implications ....................................................................................... 111
  SUMMARY .......................................................................................... 111

APPENDIX B - MILITARY FORCE COMPARISONS ..................................... 113

WORKS CONSULTED .............................................................................. 117
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chart 2-1</td>
<td>Containment</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chart 2-2</td>
<td>Regional Containment</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chart 2-3</td>
<td>Dynamic Response</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2-1</td>
<td>Comparison of Strategy Components</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3-1</td>
<td>US Productivity Growth</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5-1</td>
<td>Weapons and Missile Proliferation</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chart 5-1</td>
<td>Allocation of Force Structure</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6-1</td>
<td>Summary of Regional Forces</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7-1</td>
<td>Strategic Balance</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8-1</td>
<td>Budget Requirements of Dynamic Response</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8-2</td>
<td>Budget Comparisons</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chart A-1</td>
<td>Force Structure Allocation</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table B-1</td>
<td>Naval Force Comparison</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table B-2</td>
<td>Land Force Comparison</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States enters the 21st century without a clearly defined global enemy. An ideologically and economically bankrupt Soviet Union has dissolved into a fragile commonwealth and jettisoned, at least for the time being, its aggressive quest for world hegemony. The Cold War struggle was not without cost, however, leaving an economically stressed America anticipating a "peace dividend" to redress its financial woes.

Events in the Middle East took little time in demonstrating that a world without an aggressive Soviet Union is still a dangerous place and that in carving out a peace dividend, Congress and the President must ensure that long-term American interests are not forsaken. This paper offers a strategy and force structure to safeguard these interests while moving beyond the echoes of Containment into the economic and political realities of the post-Cold War World. We call this new strategy Dynamic Response.

In developing this strategy, we examine the security implications of four of the most significant post-Cold War forces that are fundamentally reshaping the geopolitical landscape: the demise of ideology as an underlying rationale for national defense policies; the impact of the domestic economy on America's long-term
ability to project national power; the cartelization of geopolitical structures; and the acceleration of global sociocultural change. The scope and complexity of these forces will not only determine America's ability to develop and implement a national security strategy, but will radically alter this country's perception of itself and its role in the world.

While the formulation of US security policy is not likely to be detached from its partisan roots, we believe that the parochial aspects of the expected political debate on post-Cold War defense measures can be moderated by focusing on clear national security interests. By weaving these interests into a coherent fabric defined as America's National Security Estate -- those regions of the world that will be defended unequivocally by US military force -- the strategy of Dynamic Response provides a structure to withstand the corrosive forces of partisanship while addressing the evolving security implications of a new world order.

To deal with the uncertain, but enormously destructive threats of the post-Cold War world, Dynamic Response will employ a smaller and more flexible military force characterized by mobility and lethality. Assuming continued, verifiable reductions in the nuclear arsenal of the Commonwealth of Independent States, such a force would incorporate a smaller and more affordable strategic nuclear component with a heightened emphasis on deterring and eventually defending against the use of nuclear weapons in non-traditional theaters of operation. On the conventional side, the strategy of Dynamic Response proposes a notional force structure
consisting of a 450 ship US Navy, to include 10 carrier groups, an Army of 11 active and 8 reserve divisions, a Marine Corps with its three-division structure capped at 170,000 active duty personnel, and an Air Force of 15 active and 10 reserve tactical air wings and 900 airlift aircraft to protect American interests in the post-Cold War world. We project the cost of this structure to be approximately $240 billion in 1990 dollars.

In manning this force, we recommend some adjustments to current reconstitution concepts but endorse the basic themes established by US total force policy. The resulting structure incorporates three tiers of responsibility: primarily active forces for immediate threats; a mix of active and reserve forces to reinforce or respond to less time sensitive situations; and draft forces for situations where warning and political action times are very long.

Given a recession and a massive public deficit, there is a real danger that the venue for the debate of post-Cold War security issues will be an accountant's ledger. The goal of this paper is to return the discussion of national security to its first principles by offering a strategic vision and direction that will move America into the 21st century with the same strength and sense of purpose that has characterized its journey during the previous two centuries.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AT THE CROSSROADS

The speed and decisiveness of Operation Desert Storm should have surprised no one: for forty years American forces have trained to fight just such a war, but against a much stronger and more capable foe. In fact, during the past ten years, the tempo of preparation dramatically increased in response to a growing conviction that a conventional war against the Soviet Union could be fought and won on the European continent without recourse to nuclear weapons.¹

With the end of the Cold War, the fundamental question facing the US military establishment is "What battle should it prepare for in the future?" A new American defense strategy, first announced by President Bush on August 2, 1990 -- the day Iraq invaded Kuwait -- attempts to answer to this question by stating that in the post-Cold War world the US military will most likely be involved in conflicts against regional powers armed with advanced conventional and unconventional weaponry.² The President's new strategy rests
on the assumption that in the immediate future a global war is not likely to be precipitated by a major conflict in Europe.

Beyond the euphoria generated by Desert Storm is a post-Cold War world that will test over time the merits of a national defense strategy focused on responding to regional contingencies. This world is characterized by an uneven but accelerating process of change that will act as a source of constant friction to efforts aimed at promoting political stability. It is a world where regional industrial, trading, and financial blocs may lead to an "Economic Curtain" as damaging to international order and cooperation as was its Iron Curtain precursor. It is a world where the democratization of weaponry will take the polite equations of strategic deterrence and place them in an international arena that is sometimes indifferent and often hostile to Western rules and logic.

At the same time, the sizing and shaping of the military to respond to regional threats will take place in a domestic environment that is characterized by a long-term decline in productivity and an aging infrastructure. In this atmosphere, the cost of maintaining a quality force may become politically untenable without the justification provided by an ideological imperative. This may lead to an ever-shrinking definition of regional threats and the gradual hollowing out of America's military forces.
A NEW STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

In the face of this environment, we believe that the mission and structure of the US military in the post-Cold War world must rest on a solid, unambiguous definition of American vital interests. These interests must be placed within the landscape of America's national security estate: those regions of the world that will be defended unequivocally by US military force. The concept of defending America's national security estate is based on a strategy referred to in this paper as "Dynamic Response."

Unlike a strategy based on a shifting regional focus, Dynamic Response does not imply the United States must fulfill the role of world policeman. It is also not wedded to an inflexible definition of a new world order that accepts change only on its own terms. It recognizes that the world's political, economic, and military structures are not static, but evolving and that international security arrangements contain within themselves the seeds of their own obsolescence if they cannot adapt to change.

The composition of the future military force provides the critical focus for the strategy of Dynamic Response. A smaller force is inevitable: scheduled reductions already proposed by Secretary of Defense Cheney to meet legislative limits will reduce overall manpower on active duty by over twenty percent by 1995, and additional sharp reductions are expected given current trends in the domestic and international arenas. The key is not just how many units, but what these units must be capable of doing in a
post-Cold War world where the margin for error is rapidly being erased by the diffusion of weaponry and the increasing vulnerability of social and economic structures.

NEED FOR A CLEAR FOCUS

The danger inherent in a regional contingency strategy is that over time the ability to ensure the survival of the United States as a free and economically viable nation may be weakened as a result of trying to provide a security umbrella for too wide an array of peripheral concerns. A non-discriminating regional bias also makes it difficult to recognize and respond to threats that do not conform to political and military assumptions: witness the failure of Great Britain to accept its European security responsibilities during the years prior to World War II because of its fixation on defending anachronistic imperial interests.

While the United States cannot afford imperial notions in the post-Cold War world, neither can it afford to enter the 21st century as a new hermit kingdom, unwilling or incapable of defending its vital interests. It can afford and, in fact, requires a capable military component to underwrite the other elements of national power and ensure its survival as a free and independent nation.

Sustaining this military component into the 21st century demands a national security strategy that is more than the sum of ships retired, aircraft not purchased, and divisions deactivated.
It requires a strategy that establishes clear-cut missions in well-defined geographical areas. It requires public support for a force structure composed of fighter pilots and tank commanders who require years of training before they are ready for the type of intensive combat witnessed during Desert Storm. It requires an efficient administrative and logistics structure that does not consume almost 50 percent of service operation and maintenance funds for civilian pay and benefits. It demands a program of force reconstitution that will be prepared to overcome the threat in the field instead of just on paper.

In 1921, a General Staff Report to the British Cabinet concluded with the lament that "our [military] liabilities are so vast, and at the same time so indeterminate, that to assess them must be largely a matter of conjecture." This sense of indeterminacy paralysed the British defense establishment for almost twenty years and brought it to the point in 1938 where it believed there was no option but to support the appeasement of Hitler's claim to the Sudetenland.

Today, American political and military leaders face a similar, if more complex, predicament. The garbled realities of the post-Cold War world are rapidly undermining an entire generation of security assumptions and nibbling away at the military structures they spawned. During this period of indeterminacy, the failure to offer a defense strategy that maintains a clear focus on security requirements may foster both a national mood of cynicism and a paralysis of political will that could ultimately erode America's
ability to protect its vital interests. Dynamic Response was developed to maintain that clarity of focus.

OVERVIEW

The following chapters will outline the rationale, logic, and a possible force structure for America's national defense in the 21st century. Specific topics include the following:

- evolution of US national defense strategy in the post-Cold War era and an introduction to Dynamic Response
- a survey of the geopolitical landscape that defines and constrains strategy formulation
- a definition of the strategic goals of Dynamic Response
- a description of the military component strategies required to implement Dynamic Response
- derivation of a notional force required to execute the military strategies
- cost estimates of the notional force

NOTES


6. Howard 122.
CHAPTER 2
MILITARY STRATEGY IN TRANSITION

THE LEGACY OF CONTAINMENT

The national security strategy of Containment was adopted by the Truman administration as a pragmatic response to a bipolar world where the principle adversary, the Soviet Union, was viewed as both powerful and malevolent. A return to isolationism would have abandoned, to Soviet domination, Europe and other parts of the world just rescued at enormous cost from fascism. On the other hand, a strategy of direct confrontation seemed a prescription for national suicide. Opting for a middle course, America adopted Containment, a policy incorporating diplomatic, political, and military maneuvers short of face-to-face conflict to check the spread of Soviet influence.

Military strategy and force structure followed this clear policy lead. The predominant military belief was that as long as US forces were strong enough to deter the Soviet Union, less potent enemies could be overcome with only minor adjustments to strategy and structure. While this belief was shaken by the lessons of the Korean and Vietnam wars, it remained for 40 years the touchstone of American military policy. Military planners soon
learned that the closer their programs were tied to the concept of Containment and enhanced US capability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the higher the probability that these programs would be adopted.

As the nation's declaratory military policy evolved from massive retaliation to flexible response and forward defense, the broad elements of Containment were clarified to provide both a focus and a set of organizing principles for American forces in the Cold War era. The following graphic illustrates the basic military strategies of Containment and highlights the singular, but all-encompassing nature of the Soviet threat.

CALL FOR TRANSITION

Since the beginning of the Cold War, debates over America's national security policy have focused on war, either its deterrence or its conduct. With the fading of the Soviet threat, the debate quickly shifted to the issue of peace and the perceived dividend that can accrue from it. As a consequence, all existing military plans, programs, and infrastructure became subject to renewed questioning. In addition to the familiar adversaries, new critics emerged for almost every weapon system or manpower requirement once considered sacrosanct by the military services.

As the Cold War drew to a close, a number of senior congressional leaders professed that the Department of Defense lacked a compelling strategy to justify the size, structure, and cost of US military forces. Senator Sam Nunn referred to this
shortcoming as a "strategy blank."\(^3\) Whatever the merits of this accusation, there was clearly a perception by Congress that the defense establishment was either unwilling or unable to clarify the fundamental issues and critical choices that must be faced in determining its role and posture in the post-Cold War era.

To remedy this situation, Congress began to inundate the military with prescriptions for achieving strategic credibility. Even before the fragments of the Berlin Wall became collector's items, Congress set in motion a requirement for the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit annual national military strategy reports that address future threats, concomitant force requirements, and budget alternatives out to a period of ten years. From the military perspective, this requirement, reminiscent of the Ten Year Rule that immobilized British military defense planning during the 1920s, could only further constrain the process by subjecting strategy formulation to incessant political tinkering.

PRESIDENT BUSH'S NEW DEFENSE STRATEGY

The new defense strategy outlined by President Bush on 2 August 1990 and presented in detail by Secretary of Defense Cheney in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 21 February 1991 was a direct response to congressional criticism. This effort signaled the first clear attempt to provide a strategic foundation for American defense policy and force structure in the post-Cold War era. On the surface, the new strategy represents a major departure from the Cold War policy of Containment.

As depicted below, the new strategy is no longer developed around one major threat, but instead focuses on responding to potential, but undefined, regional contingencies. A closer comparison of the two strategies, however, reveals that their structure and key elements remain basically the same; the new strategy differs only in the changes forced by the reduction in forward-deployed forces and the overall downsizing of the military.
While some of the new strategy's elements, such as Crisis Response and Reconstitution, reflect current military preoccupations in a post-Cold War environment, the underlying theme remains one of containment. It is containment, however, on a different scale and without the focus or definition of its Cold War predecessor. It is designed to circumscribe the problems of a pluralistic world by containing regional crises before they expand into the broader world arena and threaten America's traditional quest for international equilibrium. Its genesis is best understood in light of America's steady evolution during the 20th century into a "status quo" nation intent on preserving a political-military environment where incremental perturbations, rather than radical changes, to strategy formulation have been the norm.
THE ALTERNATIVE OF DYNAMIC RESPONSE

The central theme of this paper is that a new American defense strategy must do more than rework the formulas of the Cold War to be effective. Such a new strategy must be animated and guided by a sense of depth, purpose, and context that will structure and justify military forces well into the 21st century. These contentions are based on the premise that a successful defense strategy requires a sharply defined goal set within an evolving domestic and international framework of constraints, challenges, and opportunities.

This paper presents an alternative defense strategy that will provide the coherence and long-term direction required to defend America's vital interests in the rapidly changing landscape of the 21st century. This alternative strategy, entitled Dynamic Response, is based on a systemic concept of security that is developed in response to explicit goals rather than working backward from peripheral threats. A graphic illustration of Dynamic Response is provided in chart 2-3.

SUMMARY

Dynamic Response departs from the Containment formulations in at least two respects: first, rather than simply reacting to contain crises, Dynamic Response incorporates an outward-directed strategy developed to protect US national security interests,
National Interests: Survival of the United States as a free and economically viable nation with its fundamental values and institutions intact

Chart 2-3: ALTERNATE STRATEGY OF DYNAMIC RESPONSE

referred to collectively as the national security estate. Secondly, Dynamic Response goes beyond applying conventional Cold War military strategies to a regional context by reshaping and sharpening these strategies to fit the broader and more volatile context of a pluralistic world. Table 2-1 is a comparison of the military components of the three national security strategies that will be explored in greater depth in chapter 5.

An evaluation of these strategies is meaningless unless placed in the context of the post-Cold War landscape. The next chapter will survey this landscape and the implications it presents for the
concept and exercise of a national defense strategy. The chapter will focus on four of the most significant forces that are fundamentally reshaping the post-Cold War world: the demise of ideology as an underlying rationale for national defense policies; the consequences of economic stagnation on America's long-term ability to project national power; the cartelization of geopolitical structures; and the uneven acceleration of global socio-cultural change. To achieve focus and perspective, a viable defense strategy must place these forces, which are reshaping the domestic and international landscape, into the "real world" geopolitical context of nations, national interests, and military force.

NOTES

1. While this is a simplistic rendition of Kennan's long telegram and NSC-68, the salient point is that Kennan and his fellows identified the Soviet Union as the primary long-term threat to US influence and power. See, for example, Amos Jordan, William

2. Richard Shultz in his course on "The Role of Force in International Politics" quotes former Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay's summarizing the situation by saying "If you can lick the cat, you can lick the kittens." (Class notes, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy: 19 November 1990).


5. Howard 89.
Chapter 3
Geopolitical Context

A Changing World

As the United States surveys the field at the conclusion of the Cold War, it no longer faces a relatively stable if antagonistic world order. Bipolarity has been replaced by a shifting mosaic of nations and movements that resonate to past political and social themes while being driven by the imperatives of an uncertain future. It is a world where political axioms quickly become historical anecdotes and where the careful geometry of international relations is dissolved in the whorls and eddies of ethnic, religious, and economic turbulence.

If the United States is to be prepared to face the challenges of the 21st century, it must establish its position on firmer ground than one built up by accretion of the Cold War assumptions. It must come to terms with the primary economic, social, and ideological forces that are stretching and reshaping the domestic and international environment. "Coming to terms" implies not just acknowledgment but an active understanding of how these forces will irrevocably alter the national security landscape.
The following sections examine the most fundamental changes that are taking place in the international environment and the implications they present for American national security. These changes fall into four broad, and at times overlapping, categories: ideology, domestic economic strength, geopolitical structures, and socio-cultural factors. Ongoing developments in these categories will determine to a very large extent the nature of future challenges as well as the ability of the United States to recognize and respond to these potential threats.

IDEOLOGY

The United States is entering a period in which the world is no longer confronted by an overriding ideological tension. During the 20th century, the twin specters of fascism and communism provided a framework and moral underpinning to America's national security strategy. Without this ideological context, the use of military force will become ever more contingent on identifying those nations or situations that pose direct and very concrete threats to US national security.

Competition between global ideologies such as communism and democratic capitalism provides the same stimulus and justification for military confrontation as those ethnic and religious rivalries that today fuel a seemingly endless succession of regional conflicts. The difference is one only of scale. For 40 years, the threat of a world-encroaching, totalitarian, communist regime
represented a direct challenge to fundamental Western values. The
demise of this dominant ideology does not necessarily remove the
threat posed by its former standard bearer, the Soviet Union, but
it does severely undermine the logic and passion behind that threat.

The ideological struggle at the heart of the Cold War was not
unique to world history. In duration and fervor it was but a minor
echo of the great quasi-religious conflicts that convulsed Europe
during the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth
centuries. Then, as now, an ideological confrontation provided
nations with a strong rationale for institutionalizing a Cassandra-
like national security strategy. Conflicts over strongly held
beliefs, unlike disputes over borders or natural resources, can be
so intractable in nature and ubiquitous in application that the
possibilities for resolution are limited to either wary detente or
total dissolution of one of the competing ideologies. In this
antipodal world, peace is viewed as but a prelude to war.

From a military perspective, there are definite advantages to
having an ideological movement as a nation's foremost enemy. In a
liberal democracy subject to the critical agnostics of press and
public, it provides the foundation for a national security strategy
that carries much more emotional resonance than one that simply
reflects balance-of-power interests. It justifies an
internationalist approach to world affairs and allows a government
to harness the national will to sustain long-term military
confrontations such as those on the scale of the Korean and Vietnam wars.

For almost half a century the military community has used the idea of a global ideological struggle to exhort Congress and the public to support its agenda. Now, without the universality and moral legitimacy of this struggle, the military should expect strong resistance to the idea and costs of a large peacetime force. Regardless of how necessary the national defense function may be, without an immediate ideological focus provided by an aggressive and credible enemy the discretionary nature of the national security account will render it particularly vulnerable to budgetary cuts.

DOMESTIC ECONOMIC STRENGTH

There is an element of irony in the fact that the week in which Americans finally saw firsthand the extraordinary capabilities of their high-cost weapon systems in the Persian Gulf was the same week the government reported a major decline in the nation's Gross National Product (GNP).\(^1\) While lacking the urgency of a Scud missile attack, the report on the GNP is a symptom of the major economic threat to America's defense capability. Since the beginning of the 20th century, America's ability to provide strategic military forces has ultimately been based on economic strength. Now that strength is beginning to atrophy.
In 1870, 60 years after the army of Napoleon swept across Europe, France was quickly and decisively humiliated in war by a Prussian state that had been one of the weakest of the European nations at the start of the century. The success of the Prussian forces was a triumph not only for superior military organization, but, more importantly, for a social-economic system that recognized and took full advantage of its growing industrial strength. In contrast, the French military forces that had once dominated the European continent were based on an economy that was described as "arthritic ... hesitant, spasmodic, and slow."²

Today, at the beginning of the post-Cold War era, the American economy could accurately be characterized by the same adjectives that were applied to the French economy over 100 years ago. For the past twenty years, America's productivity growth has been lower than at any other time in this century.³

Table 3-1: US PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH

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The historical correlation between economic and military strength is not normally considered by the military establishment in the formulation of national security strategy or development of force structure. In fact, the economic indices that receive the most attention in the corridors of the Pentagon pertain to the slice of the Federal Budget pie that will be allocated to defense. The fact that the growth rate of real GNP is declining -- especially relative to the economic growth of other nation states -- and that the federal deficit is financed in large part by foreign sources does not seem to enter the security equation. When economic decline is considered, it is often dismissed as only "relative decline" as if America's past "relative growth" did not provide the foundation for its current military strength.

Even in the short span of time that marked the Cold War, the United States changed dramatically. The most telling statistic of change has been in population: Americans have increased by over 65 percent from the 150 million who lived in the United States when Winston Churchill coined the term "Iron Curtain." While there are positive aspects to this growth, at the same time the increase means that there are over 100 million more Americans who require schools, hospitals, roads, and, unfortunately, prisons, than there were at the start of the Cold War. The burden placed on the federal and state governments to support this increase is apparent not only in the record deficits faced by governments at every level, but in the hard evidence of growing poverty, deteriorating
infrastructure, burgeoning prison populations, and high infant death rates.⁷

Within the last 30 years, the demand for increased social maintenance programs has exploded. This eruption is only partially in response to the strains of population growth; a much more significant factor has been the dramatic political shift toward an entitlement-driven system of government that encompasses all income groups. Since 1960, for example, in dollar terms the federal benefits for the elderly have increased on a per-capita basis by 400 percent.⁸ The long-range budgetary impact of these programs cannot be discounted by the military establishment. Even if the defense budget were cut in half, the projected growth of just Social Security and Medicare alone during the next 10 years would absorb all of the savings.⁹

Productivity and national savings provide the domestic foundation for the country's long-term economic growth and through it, the ability to create and exercise military power. For 45 years this foundation has supported America's political-military requirements in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. Now these requirements are being overshadowed by a pressing social and environmental agenda that cannot be ignored.

In sizing its force structure, the military establishment must carefully weigh the costs of meeting likely but peripheral challenges to US security against the costs of defending against less certain but more direct threats to vital national interests. This weighing process will take place in a domestic environment
that will lack the economic strength to maintain a massive global military commitment on the order of magnitude seen during the Cold War.

GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURES

For over 500 years, the maintenance of a power equilibrium was an issue that concerned no more than a handful of powers with the locus of this balancing act located primarily in Europe. The inward-directed kingdoms or colonial territories that made up the rest of the world were essentially peripheral to the international structure or were used as counterweights by the great powers to maintain the equilibrium. The carnage of World War II reduced the playing field to a superpower bipolar confrontation, but as the "great game" of the Cold War progressed, the spectator nations not only lost interest, but grew in number, and began their own competitions. Today, at the beginning of the post-Cold War era, there are over 170 nations competing at multiple levels to secure social, economic, and political objectives that cover the spectrum from radical political change to reactionary fundamentalism. The dominant image of this new world order is not equilibrium, but entropy.

The focus of the post-Cold War competition is clearly in the economic sphere. Nations have long recognized that economic strength provides both the leverage to secure domestic and international objectives and a foundation for expansion into other
realms of national power. This recognition of economic strength as a component of national power has assumed a special urgency in the post-Cold War world where governments are increasingly being held accountable for the economic and social well-being of their people. The emergence of the "cradle-to-grave" liberal welfare state has already fundamentally altered perceptions of national sovereignty in Western Europe, where geographical borders are being subsumed under economic arrangements.

The precipitous growth in domestic obligations and the corresponding requirement for economic growth has increased the vulnerability of liberal welfare-state nations to economic coercion, as attested to by the political and social impact of the massive increases in the price of world energy supplies in 1973-1974 and again in 1979-1980. Underlying this vulnerability is the fact that the ability to coerce is a function of a nation's absolute or comparative advantage in a critical economic or military resource. One of the most salient features of the last decade has been the dramatic shifts in comparative advantage as factors of production and international trade patterns are manipulated by nations to achieve superiority in critical industrial sectors.

The military ramifications of "Desert Storm" loom large in the minds of national defense planners, but the inability to successfully conclude the Uruguay Round of the GATT trade negotiations in December 1990 may prove in the long run to be of far more consequence to American interests than the forces of
Saddam Hussein. The collapse of the Uruguay Round confirms the growing international trend toward the cartelization of the world economy into regional trading and industrial blocs. While this move away from the Cold War liberal economic order may present in the short term only moderate economic costs to Americans, on a deeper level it signals a return to the policies of neomercantilism that provided the impetus and rationale for some of history's most violent wars.

At the opposite end of the geopolitical spectrum is the growing tension between the pursuit of national or ethnic autonomy and the fealty to the status quo in the form of vestigial political structures that were imposed on much of the developing world at the conclusion of World War II. This tension centers on the validity, boundaries, and composition of states. While Iraq's attempted annexation of Kuwait provides the most recent and visible evidence of this tension, it is an issue not confined to the Middle East, but extends to the former republics of the Soviet Union and many of the nations of Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. Unfortunately, since it is an issue with an overwhelming emotional dimension, affected populations often do not respond to appeals to rationality as incorporated in the calculated equations of balance of power politics. This is especially true in North Africa and Southwest Asia where religious fundamentalism may foreshadow the possibility of a future great ideological confrontation with the democratic free-market institutions of the West.
SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS

The bloody civil war in Lebanon, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict over West Bank settlements, and the Iraq invasion of Kuwait should have come as no surprise to Americans whose heritage includes over a half-million dead in the Civil War, the forced resettlement of native American tribes on reservations, and the military annexation of Mexican territory under the banner of "Manifest Destiny." That America's leadership often appears unprepared or confused by events in the third world is a result of a cultural bias that frequently treats everything that happens outside the compass of Western civilization as historical anomaly. This bias stems from viewing the world's nations and tribes as collectively flowing at the same speed along the broad continuum of history, when in reality they each form distinctive eddies with their own structure and movement.

Beyond the simple fact of discontinuity is the more complex evidence of a world where change is accelerating and where the process of institutional and cultural adaption to this change is telescoping down from centuries into decades. This acceleration is fueled by a technological revolution that fosters a "competition to acquire civilization" among the nations and ethnic groups that do not inhabit the "first world" sphere of the technological powers. The spectrum of this competition ranges from the internecine warfare of Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka to the aggressive mercantilism of the newly industrializing countries, confronting
the status-quo interests of the United States and its allies at every turn. It is a competition aggravated and intensified by the political and economic pressures generated by the mass movement of populations from third to first world countries in search of the benefits of civilization.

Global communications provides the center of gravity and conscience of this post-Cold War competition as it simultaneously dissolves and sharpens political, economic, and social boundaries. From a national security perspective, the immediacy and cultural pervasiveness of global communications signals a popular involvement in the application of military power that is in significant contrast to the closed, expert systems that have governed war-making since feudal times. The force multiplier effect provided by global communication networks to world public opinion will likely influence America's national security strategy and commitments in the future to a far greater degree than the antiseptic calculations of professionals. This influence first became apparent during the Vietnam War and has taken on even greater proportions during Operation "Desert Storm," where even battlefield target selection reflects, to a degree, the mood of public opinion.

CONCLUSIONS

In the fluid environment of the post-Cold War era an effective national security strategy must take into account the evolving
forces of change that are irrevocably altering the national security landscape. It must also go beyond the static formulations of Containment to a strategy that recognizes that inducing and supporting favorable change may be a far better fulcrum for achieving long-term security objectives than supporting the continued quest for status quo.

The next chapter will discuss the cornerstone of the strategy of Dynamic Response: the concept of the national security estate. It is this concept that provides Dynamic Response with the clarity, coherence, and concreteness that is necessary to sustain a viable military force into the 21st century. Without an explicit focus, there is a danger that political and public support for the military will slowly erode, leaving the nation without an effective defense establishment.

NOTES


4. The most detailed discussion of this relationship is Kennedy's Rise and Fall of Great Nations, whose thesis is that "victory has repeatedly gone to the side with the more flourishing productive base" (xxiv).


CHAPTER 4
AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

INCREASING PROSPECTS FOR VIOLENCE

Although the success of Operation "Desert Storm" will provide the defense establishment with a grace period of public and congressional acquiescence, budget realities will quickly force security issues back to the partisan present where the most formidable weapons system may become a hand-held calculator.

Contrary to some end-of-Cold War predictions of an era of universal peace and harmony, the prospects for violence throughout the world may be increasing. Democratic governments in Eastern Europe, which were greeted with such hope only a year ago, now face renewed ethnic jealousies, populations impatient with economic progress, and political fragmentation. The disintegration of political and economic structures within the former Soviet Union may shred the charter for a "new world order" by removing any prospects for stability in Europe or Asia. One issue raised by this disintegration, the control of a nuclear arsenal in a nation where the center no longer holds, presents a security challenge of nightmarish dimensions.
In the face of the turbulence and uncertain violence of the post-Cold War world, a security strategy focused on containing unspecified regional contingencies may not be a viable approach, since over time it is extremely susceptible to the whims and exigencies of domestic political concerns. What is required is a strategy based on an unequivocal but necessarily evolving definition of America's vital interests. In the strategy of Dynamic Response, this definition is imbedded in the concept of a national security estate.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ESTATE

The concept of a national security estate goes beyond the limited definition of homeland to encompass all regions considered vital to a nation's national security. From this perspective, a national security estate incorporates not only the territory that defines a country as a political and social entity, but all de facto extensions of this territory, to include other nation-states. It is not a static concept, but assumes that the definition of the national security estate is continually evolving.

Of the four major armed conflicts the US has been involved in since it achieved world power status, two of these conflicts, the Korean War and the recent war in the Persian Gulf, can be traced in part to an initial failure of the United States to clearly and emphatically define its national security estate. In contrast to the initial ambiguity of the American position toward defending
South Korea and Kuwait, there has been for over 40 years a sharp
definition of our country's national security boundaries in Western
Europe. These boundaries were established by the North Atlantic
Treaty of 1949 and have been continually validated by the extension
of the American nuclear deterrent and the forward presence of US
military forces. This continental commitment has guaranteed the
longest period of continuous peace in Europe during this century
while providing the US defense establishment the primary
justification for the size and composition of its conventional
force structure.

On 3 October 1990, the borders of the American national
security estate were fundamentally altered by the unification of
East and West Germany. Prior to that date, the political changes
in Eastern Europe and the accompanying Soviet troop reductions were
viewed as transitory and reversible events; formal German
unification provided prima facie evidence that the European
geostrategic map had undergone a sea change of momentous
implications. The overriding security question raised by this
change is how America will define the new boundaries of its
national security estate in the post-Cold War era. As proven by
the lessons of South Korea and Kuwait, failure to clearly
articulate this definition can lead to a political-military vacuum
that fosters miscalculation and invites aggression.
REGIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ESTATE

Defending America's national security estate is at the core of the strategy of Dynamic Response. There is one essential criterion that determines whether a region falls within the boundaries of the national security estate: it must be necessary to the United States' survival as an independent and economically viable nation. This criterion invites pedantry unless it is further qualified as follows:

a) A region may encompass a wide range of political, social, economic, natural, and territorial resources.

b) All, some, or only one of these resources may be necessary to the survival of the United States as an independent and economically viable nation.

c) These resources can be controlled, depleted, or destroyed by the threat or application of aggressive military force or criminal acts.

d) These resources can be defended by the threat or application of US military force.

e) The value of these resources with respect to US vital interests may evolve over time.

f) The magnitude and/or likelihood of a definable threat to these resources justify a US military force structure capable of responding to the threat.
This paper contends that as the United States prepares to enter the 21st century there are at least five key regions that fall within the boundaries of America's national security estate:

- the territory of the United States of America
- the countries of Western Europe, Greece, and Turkey
- the Saudi Arabian peninsula and the land/sea routes necessary for unimpeded access to its energy resources
- the Asian trading states of Japan and South Korea
- the countries of North and Central America including the islands of the Caribbean basin

Some may argue that this listing is far too narrow in scope. For example, does it imply that the United States sanctions military aggression against countries that do not fall within the boundaries of our national security estate? Does it overlook America's interest in promoting democracy in third world nations or preventing the disintegration of political structures in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? Does it indicate that the United States has no interest in preventing another Arab-Israeli war or a potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan?

The answer is that the United States cannot ignore these issues, threats, and concerns, but its response should be channeled through the framework of regional and international regimes. Threats to regions that fall outside the evolving national security estate do not provide a nation that lacks the focus of an ideological confrontation or the luxury of a bottomless purse with a durable rationale for a military force structure. This
observation does not diminish the significance of these threats, but places them in a different context from those situations that directly affect the survival of the United States. While US military forces may ultimately be required to assist in deterring or overcoming these second-order threats, the primary justification for the existence and composition of US forces must remain the defense of America's national security estate.

One may also argue that the list of regions does not take into account the strategic importance of the oceans and space. The point here is that oceans and space are significant only in terms of their contribution to the security of the national security estate. This contribution may be economic (fisheries, trade routes) or military (buffer zones, intelligence stations, or basing for power projection assets). To argue for military forces without any justification beyond the control of the oceans or space is to place these forces at long-term budgetary risk in an environment that cannot afford imperial notions.

The remainder of this chapter will provide a political-military framework for evaluating future developments and challenges in the regions that comprise the national security estate.

THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES

The heartland of any country's national security estate is its own territory: the regions that define a country as a political and
social entity. For over two hundred years the territory of the United States has been almost immune to foreign military attack; except for the British shelling of American cities in the War of 1812, the relatively few foreign attacks made on this country were against US overseas possessions. Within the last four decades, an arsenal of nuclear strategic weapon systems growing unchecked in the Soviet Union has transformed the historical fact of national immunity into fiction. As the United States enters the post-Cold War era, the nuclear arsenal threatens to proliferate throughout the world body politic while efforts to develop an antidote, such as SDI, remain only in the developmental stage.

The detonation on American soil of even one nuclear device, regardless of its country of origin or method of delivery, is unacceptable. This acknowledgment should not obscure the obvious: the republics of the former Soviet Union, even after the 35 percent reduction in inventory promised by START, will have a strategic nuclear arsenal of at least 6000 warheads and 1600 delivery systems. The sheer magnitude and technological quality of this force establishes it as the primary threat to the United States well into the 21st century. The currency of this threat will be maintained regardless of whether command and control of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces becomes the special province of the Russian Republic or is shared by the regimes of the new commonwealth. Nuclear forces provide the basis for the commonwealth's world influence; it is the one component of power that cannot presently be diminished by Western technological superiority or economic
strength. Despite proposals for reductions beyond those offered in the START negotiations, there is little likelihood that the nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union will soon be dismantled to a point where their numbers cannot effectively threaten the total destruction of the United States and her allies.

The START arms control agreement and its extensive verification system offer considerable promise of reducing and stabilizing the Soviet nuclear threat. The deterrence of this threat, while facilitated by arms control regimes, remains the province of American strategic nuclear forces and will continue to be the highest priority of the US defense establishment. Attempts to marginalize or ignore the nuclear threat in light of the breakup of the Soviet Union will only foster a security environment that invites misunderstanding and adventurism. At the same time, the United States cannot allow technological and bureaucratic imperatives to drive the development of a US strategic nuclear force that is perceived by the new commonwealth to be capable of a disarming first strike. Such a perception, especially when nurtured in a political environment beset by internal dissension and colored by a siege mentality, greatly increases the risk of a nuclear war arising out of a self-sustaining process of escalation.

Over the next ten years the United States national security estate will become increasingly vulnerable to a limited nuclear attack from either a rogue nation, such as North Korea, or possibly from a former Soviet republic that retains control of strategic weaponry. This threat, because of its irrational nature, operates
outside the logic of deterrence and must be countered by either a preemptive operation or a defensive shield. A modified SDI program, such as Global Protection Against Limited Strike (GPALS), designed to defend against limited nuclear attacks offers a significant measure of security while not undermining the strategic balance.

WESTERN EUROPE

The history of modern Europe has revolved around the problem of dealing with one country whose strength and aggressiveness threaten to overwhelm the fragile European system of national states. In the early 19th century, France under Napoleon was the problem to be dealt with. The first half of the 20th century focused on the German problem, which in turn gave way to the Russian problem after World War II. Now, at the start of the 21st century, security perspectives have radically changed and the European problem is no longer the existence of a dominating state, but perhaps the absence of one.

A panoply of concerns has been raised over the stability and direction of the political, military, and economic structures that will fill the void left by the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. At one extreme are predictions that the void will be filled by a multipolar order whose structural tensions will dramatically increase the prospects for military conflict. At the other
extreme is the contention that Europe is entering a millennium of political benignity.5 Stretched between these two poles is the question of America's future role in Europe.

In addition to its historical function as a crucible of Western civilization, Europe has served as America's strategic frontier throughout most of the 20th century. During this period American forces have twice battled hostile European nations while the American taxpayer paid to rebuild civilizations plowed under by the destructiveness of war. For the past 40 years, under the auspices of NATO, the United States has constructed an elaborate network of military outposts to protect and ensure the stability of a region considered vital to the security of the American heartland. With the subsiding of the hegemonic threat posed by the Soviet Union, the eastward shift of the military frontier, and the growing economic dominance of Western Europe, our defensive network, including the NATO command and control structure, is in danger of becoming an anachronism.

While the historical cycles of the Russian Empire suggest that current policies of retrenchment may not signal a permanent lack of interest by Moscow in dominating its neighbors, there is now a strong consensus within the US national defense community supporting the assertion that the Russian capability to launch a conventional attack into Western Europe has been significantly reduced.6

A longer view of history -- and one possibly held by former President Gorbachev -- is that the reduction in Russian offensive
military capability is more than offset by the cap on German forces, the dissolution of NATO, and the removal of potentially all US Army divisions and Air Force tactical fighter wings from the European continent. It is also not clear whether Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's political and economic policies, by unleashing the forces of nationalism, may irrevocably weaken Russia or whether they represent, in the long run, corporate restructuring practiced on a grand scale with the associated risks of instability passed on to Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia.

The advantages and costs of this new European political order are as ambiguous to the United States as they are to Russia. For the duration of the Cold War, the United States accepted a status-quo policy of Containment that legitimatized the division of Europe while acknowledging the limits of the American national security estate. A central issue facing American leaders in the post-Cold War era is not only whether the boundaries of the national security estate should move, but in which direction. This issue determines at what point a future Russian military incursion into Eastern Europe becomes a threat to American national security. It determines whether the US will attempt to extend its influence into Eastern Europe by actively participating in Lorcano-type guarantees that incur a direct military response or whether it will attempt to mediate potential regional disputes from the sidelines. It marks the point where Russian-German rapprochement becomes destabilizing.

This issue forces a redefinition of our vital national security interests in Europe. At the forefront of these interests
is the requirement for an economically strong Europe that will contribute to the sustained growth of the world's economy. This economic strength is dependent on the existence of liberal market societies operating in a stable environment that rewards long-term investment. The military threat posed by an aggressive Soviet Union to these liberal market economies has been replaced, at least temporarily, by the escalatory threat of inter-state or regional conflict. From a longer perspective, the threat of economic dislocation and hegemonic war lies in the resurgence of Russian military ambitions, a resurgence comparable to that harnessed by Napoleon and Hitler less than 20 years after their countries were ravaged by political, economic, and social upheaval.

To protect its vital interest in an economically progressive Europe, the United States must actively promote continental stability. This effort will have to proceed along a number of axes: political, economic, and military. The military contribution must go beyond the frontier conception of security with its West-versus-East bias if it expects to play a role into the 21st century. What is required is a willingness to become an integral component of a multinational force whose primary orientation is not defense, but regional surety: the certainty provided by an effective force that there are no easy military solutions to political problems. Initially the forces utilized to maintain this concept of regional surety will be limited to the nations of Western Europe by the political baggage of the Cold War. The feasibility of its eastward extension is contingent upon the
Commonwealth of Independent States' acceptance of such a multinational force as an agent of regional security rather than one of Western political influence. Integrating Soviet military units into the multinational force is obviously one way of gaining such acceptance.

MIDDLE EAST OIL SUPPLIES

Energy, whether it be in the form of water, coal, oil, or nuclear power, has been the sine qua non of industrialization. Even today, in all post-industrial nations, open access to energy sources is crucial: without access, productivity would stagnate and there would be an inevitable erosion of the political and social structures that liberal market societies have built upon the foundation of economic progress. To paraphrase America's founding fathers, access to energy is fundamental to the pursuit of human happiness.

While one may point to alternative energy sources or decry its environmental costs, oil, at this point in history, is the primary fuel for the world's engine of economic growth. By a geological role of the dice, 60% of the world's known oil assets are located in the Middle East, and this unavoidable fact establishes the region as vital to the national security interests of the United States. Unfortunately, interest does not necessarily equate to influence in a region where tribal and religious conflict is
endemic and where national boundaries are as impermanent as the shifting sands they encompass.

America's vital interest in ensuring access to Middle East oil was formalized by the Carter Doctrine, but the veneer of security it promised to the region had obviously worn off by the summer of 1990. Iraq's annexation of Kuwait underscored the corrosive nature of balance-of-power diplomacy when applied to a national security policy of deterrence in the third world arena. The mixed signals sent to Iraq by US military assistance, congressional pandering, and State Department equivocation encouraged Saddam Hussein to gamble on the extent of our commitments. His gambit failed, but the price for staying in the game was high. It could have gone much higher if the United States had not shown the resolve to quickly destroy Iraq's military-industrial complex before it could significantly contribute to Hussein's coercive strategy of civilian and environmental destruction.

The national security compass points to oil on the Saudi Arabian peninsular, but it swings erratically when confronted with the conflicting ideological, ethnic, and religious forces that prevail along the Mediterranean arc from Turkey to Morocco. The emotional axis of this arc is the ethnically torn nation of Israel: a country that has become America's militant alter ego and national security spokesman in the Middle East. Our ties to Israel are often less political than they are familial, and it is this relationship that paradoxically reinforces and undermines stability in the region.
The political, economic, and social tremors generated by the Arab-Israeli wars have increased in scope and severity after each confrontation. The imprint another war will leave on the region and the world was foreshadowed by the Desert Storm images of Scud missiles over the night sky of Tel Aviv and the inexorable drift of a massive oil slick down the Persian Gulf. National interests should dictate that the United States cannot afford the implications of this apocalyptic vision of the future, but these interests have been clouded, over time, by the moral dimensions of the Palestinian problem.

Oil and the specter of escalatory war have redefined the nature and boundaries of America's national security estate in the Middle East. While this definition does not imply an American imperium in the region, it does necessitate a steady presence based on an unequivocal policy of deterrence. It also requires America to take and hold the moral high ground on the Palestinian problem and be relentless in pressuring the regional actors to come to an accommodation. The Middle East was civilization's cradle, but it easily could become its grave unless the United States continues to exercise a strategic role in the region.

THE PACIFIC RIM

If Europe has been important to the past economic development of the United States, Asia will be no less important in the future. Currently, over 30 percent of American trade is with nations on the
Pacific Rim, and the prospect is for continued growth.\textsuperscript{8} Since the turn of the century the US commitment to the region has been confirmed by a sustained series of diplomatic and military ventures, including the vested commercialism of the Open Door policy, the destruction of imperial Japan during World War II, and the aggressive, but not always successful, defense of ideological objectives on the terrain of Korea and Vietnam.

Unlike our involvement in Europe, American actions in Asia have always been colored by a high degree of ambiguity and political divisiveness. This stems from a foreign policy that for over a century has reflected an uneasy tension between national security objectives and commercial interests in the Pacific Rim. With the marked reduction of the Soviet threat to the area, this tension is being resolved in favor of commercial interests.

It is the magnitude of these interests that justifies Japan's inclusion in our national security estate. The increasing integration of American and Japanese economies has built a single massive "Nichibei" economy, which is characterized by enormous trade and capital flows and a tightly meshed confederacy of multinational firms.\textsuperscript{9} This Nichibei economy accounts for over 30 percent of world output and generates a significant portion of the resources required to sustain America's domestic infrastructure and national security posture. On a more fundamental economic level, Japan has become America's lender of last resort.

A major debate in Congress in recent years has been over the size of Japan's military contribution to stability in the region.
Much of the ardor of this debate seems to spring from economic concerns and overlooks the fact that a more powerful Japanese military force might serve only to fuel century-old fears of other nations and lead to a costly and potentially destructive arms race in the region. The destruction associated with Japan during World War II in its quest to establish a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is still vividly remembered by China and the Koreas.

Those who challenge the Japanese military investment of only one percent of its GNP often fail to remember that the strength of Japan's economy equates to an annual military budget that already ranks third in the world. Any dramatic increase in size of Japan's military establishment would significantly alter the military balance of power in the region and foster a security competition that would likely engage the growing military strength of China and eventually consume the economic benefits of an American military disengagement from the Pacific Rim.

While Japan is significant for its economic assets, the inclusion of the Republic of South Korea in America's national security estate is primarily justified by its role as a counterbalance to North Korea. It would be easy to dismiss North Korea as an obsessive, isolated nation on the fringe of Asia, if not for the increasingly significant level of its weaponry. This weaponry, which could include a nuclear arsenal within the next decade, has become the primary short-term threat to America's security interests in Asia.10
Although recent diplomatic exchanges indicate the possibility that North Korea may be moving toward a more mature, rational role in the society of nations, its deep-seated animosity toward South Korea could fuel an arms race on the Pacific Rim that would have serious economic and political repercussions. The United States cannot afford these repercussions in a region that is so essential to its long-term welfare. The most effective way to check the deadly schemes of this renegade North Korean state is to provide an unequivocal display of American intentions in the region. This is accomplished by a forward American military presence and a strong, sharply defined military commitment to South Korea.

THE AMERICAS

In addition to providing a security buffer, Canada and Mexico are currently two of the most significant trading partners of the United States. The importance of North and Central America to the US national security estate, however, goes beyond an obvious interest in the security and economic implications of Canada and Mexico. There is also the historical commitment to support emerging democracies in Latin America, the increasing economic significance of the Caribbean basin, a growing Latin American population in the United States, and an entrenched drug trade of epidemic proportions that threatens the economic and social health of America.
Almost 200 years ago the Monroe Doctrine affirmed the importance of this region to the United States, and the two recent military actions in Grenada and Panama bear out America's continuing willingness to uphold the spirit of this doctrine. Although recent American policy has downplayed military involvement in Central America and the Caribbean basin, the United States must remain prepared to defend its interests in the region.

Unresolved border disputes, longstanding insurgent movements, and imbedded narcotics networks are but a few of the potentially significant threats facing the military planner. At the same time, in a world that is emerging along the three economic axes of Europe, the Pacific, and North America, the importance for the US of maintaining close ties to its regional neighbors cannot be understated. Although direct armed conflict between nations in the Western Hemisphere appears unlikely during the next decade, the movement of non-democratic insurgent forces across international borders continues to be a problem that is compounded by a narcotics trade that is increasingly taking on a political dimension. In addition, a variety of military assistance, training, and supply programs are helping emerging democracies build the infrastructure necessary for long-term stability.

As the United States becomes more involved in nurturing emerging democracies in Latin America, military forces may be called upon for a number of reasons: to support popular leadership in overcoming military obstacles to democratic rule; to safeguard
the lives and property of American citizens; or to prevent regional aggression by hostile, non-democratic states.

SUMMARY

The strategy of Dynamic Response is predicated on the belief that if an effective military force is to be sustained into the 21st century, it must be based on an unambiguous definition of national interests. The concept of an evolving national security estate provides this definition.

At the same time, this focus on defending national interests should not obscure the fact that the post-Cold War world is extremely susceptible to what is known in science as the phenomenon of sensitive dependence upon initial conditions: the recognition that tiny differences in input can quickly become overwhelming differences in output. In the field of weather prediction this phenomenon is known as the "Butterfly Effect" because it supports the notion that a butterfly stirring the air today in Peking can create storm systems next month in New York. In the field of international relations there is no shortage of butterflies. A Saddam Hussein or a Chernobyl disaster can quickly and dramatically alter the course of world events and present a significant threat to world security and world order.
NOTES

1. This is one thesis provided by John Mearsheimer in his controversial article "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security summer 1990: 5-56.


11. These developments include substantive discussions at the ministerial level, agreement to seek mutual North and South Korean entrance to the United Nations, and more active negotiation with the UN nuclear inspection agency.


CHAPTER 5
A MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

STRATEGIC ELEMENTS OF DYNAMIC RESPONSE

While Dynamic Response represents a shift in strategic formulation, it does not affect the nation's overarching security goals. The primary objective of the United States in any world, be it bipolar or anarchic, will continue to be its survival as a free, independent, and economically viable nation with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure. To assure this end in the post-Cold War world, Dynamic Response will depend on four strategic pillars:

♦ deterrence
♦ integrated defense
♦ compellence
♦ reconstitution

DETERRENCE

In a strategy of Dynamic Response, the component of Deterrence takes on new meaning. One of the certainties of the post-Cold War world is the steady proliferation of nations with the capability to
mount a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack. Table 5-1 provides the most recent status of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. The scope of deterrence must now be broadened beyond the Soviet threat to persuade an ever-increasing number of players to refrain from using weapons of mass destruction. While Iraq's Scud missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel were militarily ineffective, they provided even more incentive for nations that do not now possess such weapons to seek them for their arsenals.\(^2\)

In dealing with this situation, diplomatic efforts to support nonproliferation regimes will remain a critical aspect of deterrence. At the same time, the strategy of Dynamic Response demands that the military have the capacity to deter the use of these weapons and to destroy them if it appears deterrence will fail. Even an America eschewing the role of world policeman has a fundamental interest in protecting its national security estate from the global consequences of a nuclear conflict between regional adversaries.

In addition to its nuclear role, the strategic component of Deterrence also applies to conventional military aggression. Without the ideological motivation that fueled past commitments, America's long-term ability to deter aggression will be constrained unless a well-defined linkage is established between a threatened region and US forces. This linkage is established by the concept of a national security estate. Had Kuwait been publicly placed within the sphere of this estate, the rapid deployment of a small
deterrent force to that nation might have prevented Iraq's invasion and its enormous resultant costs.

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* Acknowledged possession
# Suspected possession/R&D capability
@ Monitored countries

Table 5-1: WEAPONS AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION³
INTEGRATED DEFENSE

Dynamic Response modifies the traditional Containment concept of Forward Defense. Positioning combat forces around the periphery of the Soviet Union was an effective way to contain that nation's perceived hegemonic ambitions in the Cold War. Public support for this approach was easily generated by the clear definition of the enemy embodied in the Cold War's ideological struggle. Without the underpinnings of a national security estate, as embodied in Dynamic Response, long-term support for the administration's new Regional Containment strategy will ultimately rest on a similar requirement for a clearly defined foe. Without such a foe, the permanent forward stationing of combat forces to support the administration's strategy will become increasingly untenable.

Dynamic Response responds to this reality not by identifying enemies, but by articulating interests. Rather than attempting to justify and juggle force structure to contain unknown threats of the future, Dynamic Response is a proactive strategy based on protecting a clearly defined national security estate. To support this strategy, US forces must be configured and positioned to defend the regions within this estate. Since in a post-Cold War world, threats to the national security estate may dramatically change or escalate over short periods of time, forces in being must be prepared to respond quickly. This response implies a military forward presence, but one that does not rest on the logic of
horizontal escalation that provided much of the rationale for US force posture during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{4}

The modification of the Forward Defense component does not suggest that Dynamic Response will bring all the forces home; in fact, a significant presence in Europe and the Pacific will be necessary as part of an integrated defense structure, both for transitional stability in areas undergoing great political change and for the long-term protection of the national security estate. In Europe, for example, American troops will remain as a part of the integrated structure to hedge against Soviet retrenchment, to discourage aggression by other powers, and to provide a logistical support base for the power projection component of Compellence.

While America will retain a forward military presence, limits on American resources combined with the growing strength of its allies will increase the importance of alliances under Integrated Defense. These alliances will ensure that the United States remains militarily engaged. Such engagement reduces the threat of future security competitions between current allies and counters those regional powers that are not aligned with the US and have the potential to commit aggression against the national security estate. American participation in the alliance structure also assures its involvement in the economic and political development of these regions. Balanced security arrangements with NATO and Asian allies provide a cost-effective basis for achieving a broad range of American diplomatic and security goals.
COMPELLENCE

The third pillar of the Dynamic Response strategy is Compellence, the coercive characteristic of military power.\(^5\) Compellence, as differentiated from Deterrence, is the active component of military force encompassing both the ability to inflict unacceptable damage and the credibility to use it in pursuit of vital interests. The implementing military strategy is power projection. With a reduced presence overseas and without a clearly defined enemy, the ability to credibly respond to threats and opportunities affecting the national security estate worldwide will be an even more critical aspect of US military capability. Not only must forces be ready to fight, but they must be able to project long distances and be prepared to employ forcible entry techniques if necessary to protect the resources of the national security estate.

An example of Compellence in the low-intensity spectrum of conflict was the El Dorado Canyon strike against Libya, which encouraged that nation to discontinue its policy of state-sponsored terrorism. Desert Storm was a graphic example of Compellence in the conventional war context, as the coalition forced the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. One lesson from the Persian Gulf is that public support for the commitment of US troops outside the Western Hemisphere is dramatically strengthened when the rationale is clear, international support is high, expected engagement time is short, and the resultant impact decisive. When the decision to
commit is made, forces must be able to mobilize quickly and deploy rapidly to protect the national security estate.

RECONSTITUTION

The final pillar of Dynamic Response is Reconstitution, which depends on three vital elements of military potential: science and technology, the industrial base, and manpower. Together these elements provide the capability to man and equip a flexible and combat-capable force that can expand to meet military threats and crises as they develop. The first two elements fall outside the direct control of the military and are related to the economic health of the nation. To maintain its technological edge, America must continue to invest in promising, high-leverage areas that exploit the nation's comparative advantages. At the same time, sustaining a responsive industrial base requires effective incentives for engaging in innovative defense work as well as improvement in America's primary and secondary educational system.

But while the industrial base problems in particular demand more creative solutions, the manpower construct for Reconstitution is already in place in the form of a comprehensive Total Force Policy that has been refined over two decades. This policy, modified to reflect the strategic imperatives of the post-Cold War world, requires a properly resourced reserve component to serve across a spectrum of missions in defense of the national security estate.
TOTAL THREAT POTENTIAL

Chart 5-1: Allocation of the Force Structure

Chart 5-1 portrays a generic force distribution, with forward-deployed, contingency, follow-on, and deep reserve forces programmed to defend the national security estate. Once a threat potential is determined, two force posture allocations are necessary. The first allocation divides military forces into the four mission categories listed above. The second allocation distributes forces within each category between active, reserve, and potential draft forces. If a threat is high, as was perceived during much of the Cold War, a larger percentage of the total force posture would fall in the forward deployed and contingency categories, while within each category, a higher percentage of forces would be allocated to the active component. Threat increases would require more units to deploy forward, the recall of reserve units, and eventually the activation of the draft.
Dynamic Response treats cost explicitly in making these allocations. As readiness requirements increase, so does cost. This relation is fundamental to the active/reserve mix and is of particular importance in a world characterized by receding threats and escalating budget pressures. Dynamic Response requires careful evaluation of the threat potential and clear understanding of the readiness/cost factors to structure forces to protect America's national security estate.

Force structuring must be sensitive to trade-offs between readiness and warning/political action time and reflected in the specific missions and expectations of the active and reserve components. If a certain increment of military power must be immediately deployable to bring decisive force to bear on a situation directly affecting US interests, all elements of such a unit should be in the active duty component. On the other hand, where forces are needed to hedge against potential long-term threats that offer longer reaction time, reserves should predominate.

The factors and methodology used to determine an appropriate active/reserve force mix are presented in much greater depth in appendix A. Effective management of the total force is a key to the successful application of Dynamic Response.
CONCLUSIONS

The end of the Cold War, and its relatively simple requirement to plan for a single long-term global enemy, signals the need for a new security planning construct. Dynamic Response, a strategy supported by deterrence, integrated defense, compellence, and reconstitution, meets this need by providing for the timely and sharply focused application of military power to defend the resources of the national security estate. This strategy offers a coherent vehicle for moving beyond Containment and regional balance-of-power notions to a concept based on the protection of enduring American interests. Conventional force structures, developed to address the range of potential post-Cold War conflict scenarios, will be presented in the next chapter.

NOTES


5. The authors are deeply indebted to Richard Shultz for his contributions to this section, both from his classroom lectures on "The Role of Force in International Politics," Politics 210, at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in November 1990 and during private discussions with one of the authors in March 1991 during the Fletcher School's annual security studies field trip to Panama.
In the American system, funding military programs and the acceptance of sustained military action depends on public support. Without an ideological imperative, support for a strategy of Dynamic Response will depend on clearly stated requirements to protect interests that the public can understand. If the purpose and the need for specific weapons or force structures cannot withstand public scrutiny, the likelihood of acquiring or maintaining such equipment and forces is remote. For planning purposes, then, it is vital that Dynamic Response forces be justified both in common-sense capability and cost as well as in terms of generalized scenarios that are understandable to both the professional military planner and the layman. While specific scenarios need not be developed for every eventuality, enough cases must be articulated to span the range of military capabilities necessary to defend all elements of the American national security estate. The job of the military establishment in peacetime then becomes maintaining these capabilities to be applied as directed in times of crisis or war.
Once established, planning scenarios are only the start of the debate. Relevant arguments also include what the combat capability of potential adversaries would be,* whether conflicts would be fought simultaneously, what political reaction time should be expected for each scenario, how much allied assistance is expected in each case, how much risk the nation will accept, and how this risk should be balanced along the military, economic, and political axes.

This chapter will present Dynamic Response force requirements for four possible conventional conflict scenarios concerning the portions of the national security estate outside the US and then will offer a notional force that could respond to each of these threats, although not to all simultaneously. The four scenarios are as follows:

- renewed military threat to Western Europe
- energy access in Southwest Asia
- conflict in Korea
- request for assistance by an emerging Caribbean democracy

While conventional force could be applied to a wide range of other circumstances, most, except for an attack on the US homeland itself, are variations of the cases presented here. Others that are not, such as nuclear blackmail by terrorists or assistance to the national counter-narcotic effort, are situations that offer only limited force structure implications. The force structure

* Appendix B contains current generalized data for the world's major military powers.
that emerges from the demanding deployment scenarios included here will be fully capable of defending the homeland as well.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty offers the prospect of moving away from the dangerous force ratios that prevailed in Europe during the Cold War. If implemented, the treaty would ensure that the conventional force balance in Europe would be stable; that is, the relative lethality of the remaining ground forces would always favor the defense.³ As constructed, CFE allows 45 Russian divisions west of the Urals. Should the Russians return to a more militant posture and for whatever reason initiate a "surprise attack" with just these divisions, Western European forces existing under the treaty would be large enough to repulse the attack, given an American contribution of two Army divisions and three Air Force wings in place at the outset of hostilities. By redeploying units from east of the Urals prior to initiating an attack, the Russians would generate a more potent attack and in turn require NATO to generate additional forces for the defense. These would include an American contribution of up to six aircraft carrier battle groups, six Army and two Marine divisions, and seven tactical fighter wings.

A final European scenario with force structure implications would be the return of a permanently belligerent Russia to the Eurasian stage. This scenario requires the Russians to undergo a
prolonged mobilization that would dramatically increase their offensive capabilities over those available under CFE. Such mobilization would be detected well in advance of any attack, providing the allies with over a year to respond to the buildup and movement of Russian troops. In this scenario, US forces necessary to reinforce Europe include eight more divisions (in addition to the eight Army and two Marine divisions already cited) and ten more tactical fighter wings. Given the low probability of this scenario, the bulk of such reinforcing divisions would come either from reserve units or from a reinstated draft.

Barring a complete reversal in current Russian military reductions and a major resurgence of the Russian economy, the peacetime contribution of two divisions and three tactical fighter wings to Europe's integrated force structure should meet all US objectives on the continent for the foreseeable future. Such a force structure would satisfy US integrated defense and deterrence requirements and support stability in the region.

ENERGY ACCESS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

Protection of US interests in Southwest Asia during Desert Shield/Desert Storm involved seven and two-thirds Army division equivalents, two and one-third Marine division equivalents, nine tactical fighter wing equivalents, and six on-station aircraft carriers. These units, in conjunction with the smaller force components provided by the allied coalition, provided overwhelming
capability in the face of an adversary judged to be both experienced and numerically superior. A less numerous force might also have prevailed on the battlefield, but one of the lessons of this and other wars is that there is not a linear relationship between casualties and force ratios. Overwhelming capability can dramatically decrease the number of friendly casualties.

Based on current and projected force ratios in the region, high capability can be maintained by a US contingency force of six Army and one Marine division equivalents, eight Air Force fighter wing equivalents, and four Navy carrier battle groups. Desert Storm suggests that to be effective, dedicated forces will need to respond quickly to developing threats in the region while depending on allied support for basing and supply. If such support is not available, forcible entry techniques will be required and the prospect for prolonged warfare will increase. The initial combat power of such a force should be immediately deployable and drawn primarily from the active duty component. Follow-on combat and support elements should reflect a balance between active and reserve components.

CONFLICT IN KOREA

Defending South Korea from aggression requires the continued forward presence of US forces in the Pacific Rim. While South Korean forces have a larger reserve than their neighbors to the north, North Korea maintains the edge in active duty forces,
division equivalents, numbers of armored vehicles, and combat aircraft. These quantitative measures are balanced by qualitative advantages associated with South Korean training, equipment, and military leadership. Only in the face of a successful surprise attack by the North Koreans would South Korea and its American allies be left with the daunting task of mounting offensive operations to retake those portions of the country overrun by the North. William Kaufmann, in his monograph on the implications of Perestroika, suggests that even in the current climate, the US may need to augment South Korean forces with up two and two-thirds divisions and six air wings in any war on the peninsula. Naval contributions suggested by Desert Storm indicate that four on-station aircraft carriers would also be employed. Two Air Force fighter wings and a Marine division in Japan and one fighter wing and an Army division in Korea would provide the force structure to help blunt any initial attack in peacetime. The remainder of the air and naval forces would have to come from active contingency units.

THE CARIBBEAN CONFLICT

Protecting US interests in the Western Hemisphere goes beyond the counter-narcotics operations currently conducted in the Caribbean. While it is difficult to imagine a war between the US and any of its Latin American neighbors, at least twice in the past decade American forces have intervened on behalf of friendly
governments in the area to secure mutual interests. In both cases, a single division equivalent of forces would have provided sufficient capability to accomplish the mission. In addition, while major regional conflicts may require six to eight tactical air wing equivalents to support a regional war effort, five forces in the Caribbean or other third world nations would be overwhelmed by a force less than half that size. Along with a division and dedicated Special Operations Forces, two air wing equivalents and a single aircraft carrier would assure achievement of any security objectives in the region.

FORCE STRUCTURE TOTALS

In any force structure, force characteristics have a synergistic effect on overall combat capability. To be credible, a force must combine size with flexibility, mobility, sustainability, and lethality. Force planners must carefully balance all characteristics as they structure the force of the future. Air forces must include electronic countermeasure and surface-to-air missile suppression capabilities, for example, even if it means a smaller overall force structure. A smaller Navy must still include an effective mine-sweeping capability. On both the macro and the micro level of force development, balance is the key.

Table 6-1 summarizes the total forces developed for all scenarios and then uses the balance concept to recommend a smaller notional structure. Total forces to handle all four worst-case
scenarios simultaneously include 24 and one-third Army divisions, 35 Air Force tactical fighter wings, 15 Navy aircraft carrier groups, and 5 and one-third Marine divisions. The notional force structure recommendation is 19 Army divisions (11 active and 8 reserve), 25 wings (15 active and 10 reserve), 12 aircraft carriers (10 active, two nonoperational with one in overhaul and the other a training carrier), and four Marine divisions (three active, one reserve). This structure would provide active forces for all peacetime requirements and up to two contingencies involving the national security estate outside the homeland except for European crises. To mobilize for a European contingency and handle one other regional conflict requires the use of both active and reserve forces. Full mobilization for Europe would depend on a draft.

Given current naval operations doctrine, the 10 active carriers would be unable to man even three point locations simultaneously in peacetime. This force structure mandates a change in operations tempo and places greater reliance on the attack submarine force to protect the sea lines of communication. Responses to minor contingencies would not automatically include a carrier task force if higher priority activities are already in progress. Instead, plans must be ready to substitute ground-based air power for carriers.

Because the Marines offer a superb light expeditionary force capability, US Army structure should be designed to complement, rather than duplicate this capability. In reducing its size, the active army should retain its airborne, air-mobile, armor, and
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*3½ is the number of carriers in overhaul, work-up, and in transient necessary to maintain one carrier on station in peace.

**These forces need not be deployed in theater; rather, they need to be available to respond to contingencies.

**Table 6-1: Summary of Regional Forces**

mechanized capability while reducing the number of light infantry divisions. This smaller army should focus on responsiveness in both mobility and firepower characteristics and be prepared for action in theaters as different as the deserts of the Persian Gulf, the mountains of Korea, and the jungles of the Caribbean. Three divisions deployed in Europe and Korea and one division in Japan would be balanced by seven divisions stationed in the continental
United States to facilitate rotation policy. The Air Force would require a more aggressive rotation policy, since six of its fifteen active tactical air wings would be stationed outside of the US: three in Europe and three in the Pacific.

CONCLUSION

The analysis suggests that if the Russian military reduction continues along its current path and no new military challenge to US interests develops, then by the end of the decade the US would need a force of 11 active and 8 reserve army divisions, 15 active and 10 reserve tactical fighter wings, and 10 operational carrier battle groups to defend the national security estate. In a post-Cold War world where threats may dramatically change or escalate over a short period of time, a balanced force structure reflecting flexibility, rapid mobility, lethal firepower, forcible entry capabilities, and robust sustainability is essential.

NOTES

1. The authors recognize that past attempts to build credible and accepted scenarios have often allowed program bias and service parochialism to seep into the process. However, without such scenarios to test requirements and capabilities, these tendencies might become even more pronounced.

2. The scenario system of force structuring is not new; in fact, most analysts agree that it has been the basis of force development throughout most of the Cold War. In fact, planning for one and a half wars has been sacrosanct since President Nixon announced the shift from a "two and a half war" posture in 1972. See in particular William W. Kaufmann, Planning Conventional Forces: 1950-1980. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982).
3. In sizing conventional forces, the national security community has relied upon a variety of complex "war-gaming" models. Results of these models can be reasonably approximated by Lanchester equations, a useful shorthand technique of force comparison that translates initial force postures into projections of attrition and movement associated with a clash of opposing forces. These equations were used to help develop the notional forces derived in this chapter. For an excellent discussion of the measurement of military performance using Lanchester equations, see Appendix C of Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, US Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities and Risks (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989) 141-155.


CHAPTER 7
STRATEGIC AND SUPPORTING FORCE STRUCTURES

THE STRATEGIC FORCE OUTLOOK

A summary of existing and post-START strategic force structures for the United States and the Soviet Union is listed in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Systems</th>
<th>baseline</th>
<th>post-START</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers&gt;</td>
<td>290</td>
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<td>3356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBMs&gt;</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVs&gt;</td>
<td>2450</td>
<td>6410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Vehicles</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>3012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total RVs</td>
<td>14334</td>
<td>12766</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RV = Re-entry Vehicles
*Includes 510 Soviet Backfire Bombers

Source: Kenneth Gerhart, Anser Corporation

Table 7-1: Strategic Balance

table 7-1. Actual numbers of strategic nuclear weapons will differ from those listed here due to the complex counting rules associated with the treaty. The Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) category, for example, is not a missile count, but
rather a launcher count, even though many Soviet launchers and silos are reloadable. Bomber weapons will also be undercounted. US bombers equipped with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) will count as ten warheads, no matter how many are actually carried, while the non-ALCM bomber counts as one weapon only. This is in spite of an advertised weapons load for the B-1, for example, of eight nuclear-tipped short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) and eight nuclear bombs. Soviet bombers will generate an eight-warhead count for their ALCM carriers.

Because of the undercounting, the actual numbers of nuclear weapons remaining under START is estimated by the Arms Control Association staff to be 10,936 for the US and 8,564 for the Soviet Union. This is slightly less than the totals that would be generated by taking full advantage of all counting rules, but still represents a more modest reduction from current levels than publicly advertised. The Soviets plan to maintain 32 ballistic missile submarines to accommodate their allowable submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) numbers, while the US submarine force is projected to be 18 Tridents, down from the 41 fleet ballistic missile submarines of the 1970s.

While the START treaty provides an excellent tool to reverse the nuclear arms race and move toward stability, there is a minimum level of forces below which deterrent strategies lose their meaning. To be credible, deterrent forces must be able to impose unacceptable damage to any potential foe even after absorbing a first strike. A force structure whose very size renders it
vulnerable to a first strike is no longer credible. While survivability is a function of force mix, mobility, reaction time, and other variables, it does appear that further reduction beyond START would be possible, although probably not below a number that would assure 4000 penetrating warheads. The shape of these reductions, like those in the current START regime, must come through mutual negotiations. Any savings from such reductions, however, would likely be offset by the costs of modernization, improved survivability, and enhanced penetration capability of the remaining force.

Intentions for modernization on the Soviet side are explicit, even amidst conflicting reports about their overall military budget trends. Former Defense Minister Marshal Dmitri Yazov has indicated that "until strategic nuclear missiles are eliminated from each side's arsenals, Moscow will continue to replace around 10 percent of its rockets annually 'to ensure readiness.'" Already over 350 mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) have been deployed while seven Delta IV and six Typhoon Class submarines have joined the fleet.

As it faces this modernizing Russian or Commonwealth nuclear force, the US has no choice but to maintain an effective strategic deterrent of its own. However, a strategy that relies too heavily on one component of the triad or that consolidates too many warheads in too few delivery vehicles could undermine the credibility of the force. This could become a concern for the submarine leg of the triad, which maintains most of the US
retaliatory capability, in the event of a surprise attack. As long as any potential adversary lacks the capability to detect the submarines, a few boats with many launchers is the most cost-effective way to field the force. However, a detection breakthrough in conjunction with small numbers of deployed submarines could increase the risk of preemptive attack. As the US continues to shape its deterrent force of the future, it should consider maintaining greater numbers of submarines with fewer missiles per boat to hedge against this eventuality. Certainly, the numbers of deployed submarines should not drop below the 18 currently programmed.

At the same time, US ICBM modernization should continue to focus on deployment of a mobile limited-warhead ICBM, such as the small ICBM, to complicate the targeting problems of potential enemies while increasing US options. Since START constrains the total numbers of warheads, such a system would require the Soviets to either devote a higher percentage of what they have to destroy the system, leaving fewer warheads to threaten other targets, or else to accept the survival and retaliation of more US ICBMs. Because either choice increases the potential for and effectiveness of a US response, the overall deterrent effect is enhanced. At the same time, a dispersed limited warhead missile can provides a larger target footprint and more targeting options than a smaller missile force with the same number of warheads in a Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) configuration. Such advantages make a small mobile ICBM a desirable option for future deployment
because it complicates the targeting plans of the Soviets or other adversary, supports a broader range of US strategic options, and improves strategic stability.

While the increased costs of a small ICBM appear to be accompanied by increases in strategic effectiveness, current bomber modernization efforts are less compelling. Bombers form an essential leg of the triad: they are the only recallable element and as such provide a visible means of escalating strategic military pressure short of actual conflict. Bombers can also be exercised regularly to ensure their effectiveness and are able to contribute militarily to conflicts beneath the scale of global war. However, these advantages do not require immediate acquisition of a new bomber if the price tag for that weapons system creates an imbalance in the overall force structure.

In addition to providing stability and maintaining an effective deterrent, the START regime and modernization program suggested here could save up to $12 billion annually over current budget estimates. Following treaties and future weapons acquisitions should follow the logic presented here so that they neither ignite a new arms race nor invite adventurism on the part of the next generation of Soviet leaders or other budding nuclear powers. Nuclear force structure should flow from a deterrent nuclear strategy that, in turn, is codified in the ongoing arms control regimes.
Strategic Defense

Patriot missiles streaking through the night skies of the Persian Gulf suggests that ballistic missile defense is an idea whose time has come. While the Patriots did prevail over their Scud adversaries, they are of doubtful effectiveness against a nuclear attack. As a point defense weapon, Patriots can only target and destroy those relatively slow missiles that enter their limited cone of engagement. An effort to protect military forces or population centers over a large area would require literally thousands of systems to ensure coverage. Even if this coverage was possible, a ballistic missile defense system must either completely neutralize the incoming warhead or intercept it much farther away from the intended target than is possible with Patriot-like systems.

Technologies to accomplish a standoff area defense mission are still only in the conceptual phase and will require significant time and resources to bring to fruition. Dynamic Response supports the Strategic Defense Initiative program shift toward a more manageable and less destabilizing goal of protecting the national security estate against a limited nuclear attack resulting from an accidental launch, a renegade nuclear state, or terrorist organization. Such a system has not yet been developed and is projected to require as much as $4 billion dollars per year through the end of the century. 8
OTHER FORCES

Transportation

Throughout the Cold War, virtually every force structure study ended with a call to expand air- and sealift capabilities.\(^9\) Failure to do so caused concern during the initial days of Desert Shield as to whether the combat power needed to defend Saudi Arabia would be delivered before an Iraqi attack. While a buildup for offensive actions to regain lost territory can be much slower, giving time to facilitate diplomatic efforts, deployment of initial defensive forces must be almost instantaneous to minimize the loss of territory. During Desert Shield, personnel were deployed rapidly via airlift while equipment took several weeks to arrive, in part due to the lack of dedicated sealift. Only the Marine Corps, with its prepositioned shipborne supplies and tanks at Diego Garcia, was able to provide significant defensive ground power in a short time frame.

As early as 1963, studies showed that the US should develop the ability to move 600,000 pounds of equipment, half by air and half by sea, to respond to global contingencies.\(^10\) Airlift has approached its goal, although the current force of 338 strategic transport aircraft falls at least 20 percent short of the original objective. Sealift lags far behind, with only 7 of the 29 ships determined to be necessary having been constructed to date. This gap must be corrected.
To help the problem, new weapons systems must be designed to be able to optimize their movement within the existing transportation system, and new transportation elements must be fielded to move existing equipment more efficiently. A key to future US military effectiveness will be to arrive at the potential battle zone in a timely manner.

While enhanced lift capability will help ensure rapid response of integrated defense forces from the United States or other areas, prepositioning options should also be explored and adopted. Placing one armored division's equipment in the Gulf region would supplement existing Marine Corps capabilities and assure more rapid response to future contingencies in that area.

Space

A key to the outcome of Desert Storm was American technological superiority. Maintaining this superiority will require steady commitment to research and development. The relaxation of Cold War competitions will allow time for more thorough research to reduce the technical risk before investing significant sums in producing new systems. This is particularly true in the space arena, where global communications, reconnaissance, and other space-based capabilities suggest that this special force multiplier could take on new dimensions in the post-Cold War world. As military structure is reduced, care must be taken to maintain the robustness of these space capabilities to provide leverage in future conflicts.
Intelligence

Given the multiplicity of threats and the premium associated with early force posturing, intelligence must be more, not less, responsive in the post-Cold War environment. Without assurance that forces can move quickly to head off threats, US contributions to integrated defense arrangements in areas of US interest will need to be higher. This requirement for accurate, timely intelligence in a more uncertain world may mean increasing the intelligence budget while other areas of defense are reduced. Such growth is necessary to ensure warning of any reversal in Soviet actions or intentions, as well as to accurately report threats from new sources of hostility to the American national security estate.

SUMMARY

Dynamic Response security goals of nuclear deterrence and stability can be achieved most efficiently in the context of continued, balanced modernization and arms control. In addition, without the effective integration of the elements of transportation, space, and intelligence, force structure will take on an increasingly one-dimensional character that could undercut its effectiveness. The next chapter will provide some general information on the cost factors associated with the overall Dynamic Response force.
NOTES


2. Gerhart.


4. William Kaufmann has pointed out that after full implementation of the START and CFE treaties, the critical target list for the United States to cover to maintain its deterrent posture could be reduced to 2100 aim points. Assurance of the destruction of 80 percent of that target list would require 4000 penetrating warheads to survive after the United States absorbs a first strike. See Kaufmann, Perestroika.


7. The savings assume reduction of the bomber force modernization program by canceling the B-2 and continuing a more modest program for research and development; acquisition of a follow-on bomber would come after deployment of the SICBM, whose costs would be spread over seven years. Other savings are a result of the overall reduction in force associated with START and post-START agreements.


10. Kaufmann, Planning Conventional Forces 60.
CHAPTER 8
DYNAMIC RESPONSE BUDGET IMPLICATIONS

BUDGET REQUIREMENTS

Budget requirements enter the Dynamic Response equation both as an internal variable and an external constraint. Reductions in the Soviet offensive posture mean a smaller American force is required to defend the national security estate. In crafting the capabilities of this force, budget considerations for enhancing the responsiveness of the military must be balanced against educational, health, environmental, infrastructure and other concerns necessary for maintaining the nation's economic well-being. Dynamic Response achieves this balance with an estimated budget for its notional force structure of $240 billion in 1990 dollars, somewhat smaller than the budget goals currently proposed by the administration. The total amount equates to approximately 3 percent of the Gross National Product, the lowest defense investment in over 50 years.

Table 8-1 provides a more detailed accounting. Rather than divide the budget by branch of service or program accounts, this presentation gives the figures aggregated by specific combat unit, where each unit account is also allocated a percentage share of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Dollar outlays (in billions)</th>
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<td><strong>Strategic Nuclear Forces</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air defense</td>
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<td>ICBMs</td>
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<td>SLBMs</td>
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<td>11.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tactical Nuclear Forces</strong></td>
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<td>Interdiction</td>
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<td>Active</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
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<td>Carrier Battle Groups</td>
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<td>Carriers/Ships/Aircraft</td>
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<td>Amphibian ships/ Escorts</td>
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<td><strong>Total outlays</strong></td>
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</table>

Table 8-1: Budget Requirements of Dynamic Response
defense overhead in order to capture both direct and indirect costs of the combat units. The specific cost factors were developed by William Kaufmann and used in his 1990 book on *Glasnost, Perestroika, and US Defense Spending*. The figures differ from those suggested by Kaufmann's work in that they include more strategic nuclear investment, to account for bomber research and small ICBM deployment, as well as larger sealift and intelligence accounts.

**BUDGET COMPARISONS**

In February of 1990, the Congressional Budget Office published a paper highlighting estimates of various force structures that might follow ratification of the new treaty regimes between the United States and the Soviet Union. The CBO large-cut estimate, Secretary Cheney's 1990 and requested 1995 budgets, the Dynamic Response budget, and two deep reduction alternatives proposed by Kaufmann are included in table 8-2. The cost of Dynamic Response falls toward the middle of these estimates, somewhat below the administration's budgets, but above the deep-cut scenarios of CBO and Kaufmann.

A major discriminator between the various formulations provided in table 8-2 is the variation in the number of carrier battle groups in each formulation. Kaufmann's Case D drops the total number of aircraft carriers to six while eliminating the ships currently assigned to the associated battle groups. Dynamic
Response, on the other hand, includes modernization programs to maintain its technical edge as well as an increased deployment capability that appear not to be incorporated in the CBO or Kaufmann estimates. In addition, to ensure cost-effectiveness, the Dynamic Response figures require a disciplined approach to acquisition and civilian personnel costs in the operations and maintenance accounts. Overall, the table shows that the Dynamic Response force structure is an affordable alternative in an era of political uncertainty and fiscal constraints.

NOTES

1. The figures in this table were for the most part extrapolated from those presented by William W. Kaufmann, Glasnost, Perestroika, and US Defense Spending (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 92
1990) table 32. Figures were adjusted from this baseline to take into account items discussed in the text, such as Small ICBM development, increased intelligence, etc.


CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS

The easing of global ideological tensions, the consequences of economic stagnation on America's long-term ability to project national power, the economic cartelization of geopolitical structures, and the uneven, but accelerating, development of societies have profound implications for the concept and exercise of national security. Given the dramatic alterations in the international order, a policy of inducing and supporting favorable change may be far better suited to achieving long-term security objectives than merely supporting the status quo. Dynamic Response is such a policy.

As the primary security strategy of the Cold War, Containment effectively protected the United States from threats posed by a totalitarian, expansionist Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War, and its associated, relatively simple requirement to plan for a single long-term global enemy, signals the need for a new security planning construct. Dynamic Response, a strategy supported by deterrence, integrated defense, compellence, and reconstitution, provides this construct by developing military power to protect vital interests in the US national security estate. This strategy offers a coherent vehicle for moving beyond Containment and
regional balance of power concepts to merge enduring American national interests in a collective security framework. The force structure that results from this strategy is directly tied to sharply defined, concrete goals set within the "real-world" geopolitical context of economic, political, and social change.

Clearly, the need for innovative thinking about national security is greater now than during the Cold War, when military challenges were easily categorized and options fit neatly into familiar molds. Until recently, four decades of continuity in strategy and programs assured the manageability of the security problem. Now the dovetailing of major shifts in the geopolitical structure with momentous social and technological developments has moved the world into a highly unstable period that will generate security dilemmas that can be only dimly anticipated. It is a world where not only the rules but the game itself has changed. The patience and resources of the United States are too limited, and the stakes for mankind too high, to allow the American military structure to drift rudderless into the 21st century.
INTRODUCTION

The Total Force Policy, first articulated in the final stages of the Vietnam conflict, established a conceptual framework for using all available resources for the defense of the United States. In the broadest and most formal sense, these resources include active military forces, reserve military forces, civilian manpower, commercial contracting, and the support of allied nations. This appendix will explore the history and background of the total force, outline reserve component roles and missions, detail planning considerations for supporting a strategy of Dynamic Response, and address current issues of round-out brigades and cadre divisions.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

In 1973 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger implemented the Total Force Policy, charging the individual services with the task of developing roles and missions for their reserve components. The policy provided a catalyst for upgrading and integrating
reserve forces with their active counterparts. It overcame concerns about quality by providing for missions and infusing frontline equipment. At the same time, it saved money by sacrificing increments of operational readiness to achieve major cost benefits. Additionally, the policy achieved unexpected results by allowing reserve component units to perform missions for which they were uniquely qualified.

The mobilization for the Persian Gulf provided the first large-scale test of the Total Force Policy. By December 1990, approximately 134,000 reservists had been called to federal active duty and 50,000 had been deployed to the theater of operations. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Colin Powell stated that the reserve components' performance during Operation Desert Shield validated "the policies and decisions made over the last ten years to strengthen the total force concept." In sharp contrast to the spirit of this statement was the controversy surrounding the Army's decision not to field a round-out brigade because of the state of its readiness. Here was a clear dichotomy between the Army's concept of a contingency force and its longstanding sanction of the round-out brigade's reduced readiness profiles to achieve force structure credibility.

ROLES AND MISSIONS

Defining the role of the respective reserve component is the responsibility of the individual services. The following are
traditional reserve missions that are applicable in the strategy of Dynamic Response:

♦ assisting in the *projection of power* outside the continental United States. Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve efforts during the initial stages of Operation Desert Shield illustrate this mission.6

♦ providing a source of highly specialised units or individuals whose basic warfighting skill is compatible with the civilian economy. Public affairs units, civil affairs units, medical personnel, and pilots are typical examples of reserve component resources that might be included in this category.

♦ providing a source of combat support and combat service support for active component combat units, as was demonstrated in the Persian Gulf.

♦ providing a trained source of additional combat units. One such unit, the 8th Tank Battalion of the Marine Corps Reserve, fought one of the major tank battles in the Persian Gulf War and was credited with destroying about 300 Iraqi tanks and armored personnel carriers without any loss to themselves.7

♦ providing a source of combat support and combat service support for reserve component combat units.

In addition, the following missions are uniquely suited to reserve components:8

♦ serving as the primary force for the execution of special ongoing operational missions. Involvement in nation-building and drug interdiction efforts in Latin America exemplify this role.
providing trained and ready forces to reinforce local and state civil authorities in times of natural disaster or other civil emergency.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Cost

Reserve component units are generally less expensive to maintain. Factors such as equipment density, equipment complexity, required level of full-time support, required level of operational readiness, and operational mission all factor into cost; however, the use of reserve component units in lieu of active component units will, in the majority of cases, result in substantial cost savings. For example, certain Army ground combat units can be maintained at cost savings of up to 80 percent over their active component counterparts.\(^9\)

Readiness

Properly resourced reserve component units can maintain high levels of readiness. However, as a result of substantially reduced training time, reserve component units are generally less ready than the active forces. Although Operation Desert Shield vividly demonstrated that certain reserve units can effectively deploy in the same time frame as active units, the operational readiness of reserve units cannot generally compare to that of active units.
Chart A-1 shows the entire issue of operational readiness as a spectrum, with more active component units arrayed in the force categories requiring immediate action, such as forward deployed and contingency forces, and more reserve units at the less ready end of the spectrum. Potential draft forces fall at the bottom of the chart.

Cost versus Readiness

Another way to view the active/reserve component integration problem is to associate the vertical axis of the readiness chart to cost. As readiness requirements increase, so does cost. This relation is fundamental to the active/reserve mix and is of particular importance in a world characterized by receding threats and escalating budget pressures.
Level of Organizational Integration

While all services have varying degrees of integration depending on unit mission, Army ground combat divisions are currently configured with a varying mix of active and reserve components. Combat-ready active divisions maintain all combat power within the active component, with varying degrees of active and reserve combat support and combat service support. Units that are stationed overseas in a forward defense role use almost exclusively active support units; divisions based in the United States, including those with a contingency response mission, have much more of their support structure located in the reserves. Reserve divisions are comprised exclusively of units from the Army National Guard. Round-out divisions are a hybrid of the other two divisions, composed primarily of active component forces with one combat brigade being a unit of the Army National Guard.

Level of Threat

One of the most significant characteristics of the total force policy is the flexibility of its structure, which can be altered to deal with a changing threat. When a specific threat level is high, more active component combat forces will be deployed forward. Depending on the capabilities of the adversary and the size of the deployment, some reserve support capability, either deployed or in the basing area, may be required. If the threat increases, greater numbers of forces will have to be deployed, requiring an increasing amount of reserve support and the possible activation of reserve
combat units. As the threat level recedes, some or all of the forward deployed units can return to the United States and reserve units can be deactivated.

A longer term reduction in the threat could allow the conversion of active divisions to a round-out status with even more support units moving to the reserves. If threat levels are very low and expected warning time and political action time are long, the overall size of all elements of the total force could be reduced.

Scope of Conflict

Planning for the use of reserve components must be governed by the scope of the conflict in which they might be employed and, by extension, the political, legal, and time constraints involved in bringing them onto active duty. The laws governing the call-up of reserve forces reflect this principle.

Except in very limited and unique roles, the use of reserve forces should not be a major consideration during small-scale contingency operations. Use can be limited to highly specialized units and volunteer participation. This principle worked extremely well during operations in Grenada, the bombing of Libya, and in Panama.

During mid-level conflicts such as the Persian Gulf, the Guard and Reserves should play a significant role. This participation should be phased, escalating as the crisis itself escalates. Use of specialized units and volunteers should begin at the outset,
with these resources mobilizing and immediately deploying with active forces. Concurrently, the first reserve component ground combat units should begin training in case they should be required by the conflict.

While a total war reminiscent of World War II is the least probable conflict in the nuclear age, regional conflicts could conceivably spark crises in other parts of the world, thus threatening the American national security estate on multiple fronts. In such an event, the ground combat divisions of the Army National Guard could be mobilized and deployed within a four- to six-month window.

Operational Phasing

Operational phasing parallels the scope of the conflict discussion, except that timing, rather than conflict size, affects the mix of committed forces. The Persian Gulf provides an effective model of how these forces can be deployed through time to meet the requirements of the conflict.

In the initial days of a crisis, the immediate requirement is to rapidly deploy available forces. Affected forces should be, by necessity, air-deployable, in a high state of readiness, and from the active component. However, such forces have limited sustaining capability and require rapid resupply and reinforcement. Personnel from the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and the Naval Reserve operating in a volunteer status are vital to the initial force projection and resupply efforts.
Following the initial contingency force reaction, additional, more sustainable forces must be deployed. These units might require the first formally mobilized reserve component supporting forces. When it becomes clear that the crisis will be significant in both magnitude and length, the first Army National Guard round-out brigades should be mobilized, enabling them to train and deploy within two to four months of notification. As the crisis draws out in time and the requirement for unit rotation grows more critical, ground combat divisions of the Army National Guard can be committed to the operation. By this point, they will have had sufficient time to mobilize and attain the appropriate level of operational readiness. The final phase of mobilization activates the Army Reserve Training Divisions to process and train draft personnel to meet long-term requirements.

Law

Federal law, as it applies to the mobilization of reserves, constrains the use of reserve forces. Fortunately these constraints track closely with the logic presented above; as the situation becomes more critical and the projected length of military involvement increases, various levels of mobilization, subject to presidential and congressional control, come into effect. The levels of reserve component participation include

- use of volunteers. This authority was exercised by several reservists during Grenada, the bombing of Libya, and Operation Just Cause in Panama.
"673b call-up." When the scope of the operational mission is more significant, units of the reserve component and special individual reservists may be called to federal active duty for a period of up to six months. The total number of reserve component personnel called under this provision is limited to 200,000. During Operation Desert Shield the time constraints in particular rendered this category of mobilization inadequate.

- partial mobilization. Upon a declaration of national emergency by the President, up to one million reservists can be ordered to active duty for up to two years. It was this category of mobilization that eventually proved adequate to handle the circumstances in the Persian Gulf by allowing those already on duty to be extended beyond six months.

- full mobilization. Upon a congressional declaration of war or national emergency, all existing reserve component resources may be mobilized.

- total mobilization. Total mobilization involves the expansion of the existing force structure by organizing new units.

Political Considerations

A final planning consideration is the political environment surrounding the decision to commit American forces. All preceding considerations exist under the umbrella of this reality. Plans that would otherwise be militarily sound cannot be executed if the political climate will not allow mobilization and deployment of the required force. From this perspective, political action time, or
that period of time between the decision by a government to respond to a warning and the actual initiation of hostilities, takes on critical importance. Warning time, which begins with the first unambiguous detection of aggressive action or hostile intent, may be very long, but the decision to do something about it usually comes much later. With forward deployed troops, this may not matter much, since combat power is already alert at the point of conflict to counter any aggressive moves by the enemy. The same would not be true if, for example, forces maintained to respond to a Soviet threat in Europe were based in the United States. Even a two-year warning time would be irrelevant if decisions were delayed until after a resurgent Soviet Army occupied Germany.

ROUND-OUT BRIGADES

As pointed out above, the non-use of round-out brigades during the Persian Gulf Crisis was controversial. The Army's 24th Infantry Division, a round-out unit, was deployed to Saudi Arabia during the early stages of Operation Desert Shield. When it departed for the Gulf, it left without its designated round-out brigade, taking instead an alternative active component unit. When pressed to defend this action, Secretary Cheney cited unit readiness as the issue. The controversy surrounding the brigade's readiness obscures the real issue: that senior officials lacked faith in the round-out concept. This does not mean that round-out divisions cannot work. It does mean that the decision to
make the 24th a round-out division took insufficient consideration of the relevant planning factors.

To begin with, it is unreasonable to expect a major reserve combat component to be as ready as an active unit, given the difference in training time. Such units should not be expected to deploy with the first elements of a rapid response force. If contingency plans call for the 24th Division to deploy during the initial stage of an operationally phased mission, it should not be organized as a round-out division. The six-month time limitation associated with 673b mobilization, the need for a careful evaluation of potential public support prior to a major reserve call-up, an objective assessment of reserve component readiness potential, and the immediate availability of uncommitted active component ground combat brigades strongly mitigate against the assignment of a rapid response mission to a reserve combat unit. Dynamic Response suggests that active units form the bulwark of such contingency units. However, in view of the actual time frames established in the Persian Gulf, round-out divisions can contribute to the "follow-on" forces deploying three to six months later.

CADRE DIVISIONS

The final report of the Total Force Policy Study Group recommended the examination of an organizational structure known as the cadre division. Essentially, this unit would supplement or substitute for the ground combat divisions of the Army National
Guard. The plan calls for key leadership positions to be staffed on a full-time basis with soldiers of the active component. If and when these units are required for operational contingencies, they would be filled out by personnel from inactive reserve status or from other sources, such as a reinstituted draft. An evaluation of the merits of this organizational structure should be accomplished by comparing it to the combat divisions of the Army Guard, which it might replace in the context of the cost/readiness concepts developed earlier.

Costs

Both the cadre and Guard divisions have a full-time personnel component. Full-time manning in the cadre division will be exclusively by active-duty personnel, with the percentage of positions filled significantly greater than those filled full-time in Guard units. The result will be substantially greater full-time personnel costs for the cadre. These costs would be offset by the expense associated with "filler personnel," the traditional "weekend warriors" of the Guard. While the cost of these individuals is insignificant when compared to an active-duty force, they are clearly more expensive than the unfilled positions of a cadre division. Which division would cost more in the end would depend directly on what percentage of the cadre division was manned. The initial estimates of a 4,000-man cadre division, however, would make the cadre concept more expensive than a Guard division.
Training

Army Guard units are fully manned. They normally assemble and train one weekend each month and execute a two-week training period each year. In addition, their leaders and full-time personnel communicate with subordinates on a continuous and informal basis, thus establishing and solidifying an effective working relationship. This relationship would be absent in the alternative cadre division, which, in addition, would have limited opportunity to execute its primary training functions in a peacetime environment.

Readiness

Informal and unofficial comments by active component officers who have served in close association with Army National Guard combat units indicate that under circumstances similar to those of the Persian Gulf crisis, National Guard Divisions could be mobilized, trained, deployed, and committed to combat in six months or less. Official schedules may differ, but these estimates provide a useful outside limit and seem reasonable in view of the time frames established in the Persian Gulf. Combat readiness for a cadre division would take much longer. To begin with, political resistance to a "draft type" mobilization of non-drilling reservists might delay the initial call-up for a significant time period. Once the call-up is initiated, the process of identifying, notifying, and inducting individuals into federal service could consume weeks. These newly inducted personnel would require some
individual training before assignment to units, followed by unit training to reach the level currently maintained by the Guard units. Such delays could add six months to a year to the time necessary to bring a cadre division to the level of combat readiness already enjoyed by the Guard units.

Implications

Even the simple analysis provided here suggests that a cadre division would provide less readiness at a greater cost than that associated with the Army National Guard. Only a constraining consideration, such as the demographic challenge associated with maintaining a larger relative reserve structure, might force a shift to favor the more expensive, less ready cadre alternative.

SUMMARY

In order to man the force structure associated with Dynamic Response, total force policies will need to ensure that cost and readiness trade-offs associated with the active/reserve mixture are carefully plotted. Reserve performance in the Persian Gulf validated most of the assumptions associated with the Total Force Policy. More flexibility needs to be built into the law to allow selected individuals to be recalled for periods beyond the current six-month limit without moving to a higher crisis level. At the same time, internal manning strategies should be reevaluated to eliminate disconnects, such as placing round-out divisions in the
contingency force. Total force provides Reconstitution with a durable and flexible methodology for adjusting levels of readiness to a fluctuating threat. The post-Cold War military structure should be designed in accordance with these principles.

NOTES


9. OSD, Final Report 42.

10. United States Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, paragraphs 672 and 673.


12. OSD, Final Report 60.


14. The 42nd Brigade was most recently certified as fully combat-ready and available for Persian Gulf duty at the end of February, just over four months after mobilization.
APPENDIX B

MILITARY FORCE COMPARISONS

The proposed US military force structure for 1995 will be the smallest since the early days of World War II. Tables B-1 and B-2 put these proposals in context by providing analyst James Dunnigan's most recent comparisons of the world's military powers.¹ His methodology combines quantitative measures available in open sources with qualitative factors derived from judgements on weapons effectiveness, training, and each nation's historical experiences to develop an overall index of combat power. While the numbers imply an accuracy that far exceeds the precision of the estimation technique, the results provide a reasonable basis for discussion. His "Combat value" figures are the final integration of the quantitative and qualitative measures adjusted for climatic, geographic, and political factors after three days of mobilization. Other naval categories are self-explanatory, detailing active-duty personnel, total naval tonnage, and selected weapons systems.

Under land forces, the numerical categories are equally straightforward. "Mbl Men" is the total number of active and reserve personnel for each nation who serve in the army, air force, and marines. "Eqvl Divs" indicates the number of equivalent ground divisions planned under that nation's mobilization plans. "Armor
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation value</th>
<th>Combat Manning (000s)</th>
<th>Tonnage (000s)</th>
<th>Combat ships</th>
<th>Carriers</th>
<th>Subs</th>
<th>Air-craft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>3,498</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>3,887</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>2,661</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>44</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>72</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>58</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>69</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table B-1: Naval Force Comparison

"vehicles" are the total number of main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers and other armored weapon systems. "Combat aircraft" aggregates air force, navy, and marine fixed-wing combat airplanes, all of which could be used to attack ground and air targets.

While the tables have not been adjusted to reflect the value of precision weapons as demonstrated in the Gulf conflict, they do show that many of the variations in US force elements seen during the Cold War are inconsequential when compared to the American military's overwhelming superiority to other nations. Table B-1 indicates that in spite of the Soviet Navy's larger numbers of ships and submarines, US naval qualitative superiority makes its combat potential more than twice that of the Soviets. More startling is that US naval forces are ten times as effective as the next nearest country, Great Britain, which has long been an ally of the United States. In fact, of the top ten navies in the world,
### LAND FORCE COMPARISON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Combat power</th>
<th>Mbl men</th>
<th>Eqvl divs</th>
<th>Armor vehicles</th>
<th>Combat aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>132,000</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,715</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>17,400</td>
<td>5,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
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<td>1,600</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>9,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11,600</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7,100</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Korea</td>
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<td>1,100</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6,600</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table B-2**

only the Soviet Union and China, number five on the list, have no close ties to America. Most of the other top navies are NATO allies.

The same pattern emerges in a comparison of air forces. Although not explicitly shown in table B-2, US qualitative superiority over the Soviet Union more than makes up for the quantitative disadvantages highlighted in the charts. In addition, US air forces are almost twice as large as those of China and 12 to 20 times bigger than the other major powers. These figures reflect a historical US tendency to emphasize comparative advantages in air power and technology in the development of military power. While the strategy may be expensive in dollar terms, it was designed to result in fewer friendly casualties on the battle field. The
validity of the approach, which has yielded powerful US air and naval forces and a more modestly sized army, was demonstrated by Desert Storm.

The Bush administration's decision has been to trim the army even more, as well as to reduce naval and air force units, in response to expected Soviet trends. Active army divisions will be cut by a third, active air force wings will decrease by over 40 percent, and naval carrier groups will be reduced by 20 percent. The projected force includes 12 carrier battle groups, 12 active and 8 reserve army divisions, 171,000 Marines, and 15 active and 11 reserve tactical air wings. Such cuts are consistent with the Dynamic Response strategy. In fact, in the face of favorable Soviet trends, the force structure could be reduced slightly more by the 21st century, particularly in the naval arena, and still protect the US national security estate in the post-Cold War World.

NOTES

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