Organizational Politics, Participation in Decision-Making, and Job Satisfaction

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The study tested two hypotheses: (a) that organizational politics as measured by the Kacmar and Ferris (1991) Perceptions of Organizational Politics Scale would be negatively related to feelings of job satisfaction; and (b) that participation in decision-making (PDM) would moderate that relationship. In line with concerns for dispositional affect as a contributor to method variance and the possibility that biodata may explain some of the effects of organizational politics and PDM on job satisfaction, dispositional affect and biodata variables were included in the analyses. Hierarchical moderated multiple regression analyses conducted on data collected from 1,083 Federal employees confirmed the hypotheses.
ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS, PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING, AND JOB SATISFACTION

Experiential reality suggests that political behavior is a pervasive force in organizational life. As noted by several researchers (Farrell & Peterson, 1982; Mintzberg, 1985; Narayanan & Fahey, 1982; Porter, Allen, & Angle, 1983; Vredenburgh & Maurer, 1984), most organizations possess political norms as part of their informal structure. Discussed under the conceptual rubric of "organizational politics," political behavior in organizations has received increasing attention (e.g., Cavanaugh, Moberg, & Velasquez, 1981; Macher, 1986) since Gandz and Murray (1980) reported finding very little empirical research in a literature review of workplace politics. As noted by Kacmar and Ferris (1991), organizational political behavior has been described as both omnipresent and elusive. They suggested that its elusiveness is reflective of an inadequate conceptual understanding of organizational politics. Indeed, while we may "know it when we see it," organizational politics has not been well defined.

Gandz and Murray (1980) presented two categories of conceptual work on organizational politics. In one, writers have defined organizational politics as an inherent process associated with the use of power revolving around most policy decisions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974) or specific policy decisions, such as resource allocation (Wildavsky, 1964), or executive compensation (Ungson & Steers, 1984). In the second category, writers have discussed organizational politics in terms of self-serving behaviors often associated with organizational ineffectiveness (Ashforth & Lee, 1990; Cobb, 1984; Gray & Ariss, 1985; Martin & Sims, 1974; Mayes & Allen, 1977; Pettigrew, 1973; Robbins, 1976, 1983; Schein, 1977). With respect to the latter category, Batten and Schwab (1965, p. 13) wrote that individuals "engage in company politics because they believe that they can best achieve what they want in a devious, indirect, and underhanded way." Jones (1987) entered a third category arguing that definitions of organizational politics should include mutual caring, trust, tolerance, and sensitivity to others. However, most definitions focus on the negative consequences of organizational politics. For example, Frost and Hayes (1977, p. 8) wrote that political behaviors are:

"... the activities of organization members... when they use resources to enhance or protect their share of an exchange... in ways which would be resisted, or ways in which the impact would be resisted, if recognized by the other party(ies) to the exchange."

Similarly, Vredenburgh and Maurer (1984, p. 50) suggested that organizational politics:

(a) is undertaken by individuals or interest groups to influence directly or indirectly target individuals, roles, or groups toward the actor's personal goals, generally in opposition to others’ goals, (b) consists of goals or means either not positively sanctioned by an organization's formal design or positively sanctioned by unofficial norms, and (c) is objective and subjective in nature, involving real organization events as well as perceptual attributions.

Drory and Romm (1990) suggested that the domain of organizational politics should include any organizationally-controlled event desirable for the individual. Such an approach would make difficult operationalization of organizational politics. In contrast, Kacmar and Ferris (1991) argued that organizational politics may best be conceived as having three elements, namely general political behavior, going along to get ahead, and pay and promotion.

Following Ferris, Russ, and Fandt's (1989) call for work to assess both the antecedents and consequences of political behavior in organizations, the present study examined the relationship between perceptions of organizational politics and job satisfaction. Specifically, it was hypothesized that individuals working amidst high levels of organizational politics would feel less satisfied with their jobs (i.e., that organizational politics and job satisfaction would be negatively related). This hypothesis is consistent with arguments...
(Batten & Schwab, 1965; Drory & Romm, 1990; DuBrin, 1988) and empirical findings (Luthans, Hodgetts, & Rosenkrantz, 1988) suggesting that political behavior may be dysfunctional for organizations. Indeed, it may be difficult to be happy about job situations in which some individuals are behaving in an "underhanded" or "back-door" fashion to meet their objectives at others' expense. This rather straightforward relationship may be intuitively obvious but simultaneously impervious to intervention. In other words, there may be limitations on the extent to which any individual employee and his/her supervisor can directly influence and reduce organizational politics that may be organization-wide or traditionally inherent in the culture of an organization or organizational subsystem.

The present study also examined participation in decision-making as a possible moderator of the organizational politics-job satisfaction relationship -- a moderator in the practical sense through which individual employees and supervisors may be able to reduce the negative effects of organizational politics on job satisfaction.

**Participation in Decision-Making**

The outcomes of increased worker participation in decision-making (PDM) have been of theoretical and practical interest for several years. Argyris (1964) argued that workers will manifest responsible adult behaviors only when their managers realize that they want to be involved in making decisions. Indeed, "psychological folklore" (Greenberg & Folger, 1983, p. 235) suggests that PDM will generally have positive outcomes. Although empirical investigations of the effects of PDM have yielded mixed results (cf. Cotton, Vollrath, Foggatt, Lengnick-Hall, & Jennings, 1988), a number of positive outcomes have been identified, including more favorable job attitudes (Argyris, 1964), improved employee health (Jackson, 1983), increased organization information-processing capabilities (Castrogiovanni & Macy, 1990), and a better understanding of work tasks (Niehoff, Enz, & Grover, 1990).

Dachler (1978) suggested that inadequate and differing definitions of PDM have caused problems for PDM researchers. Thibaut and Walker (1975) conceptualized two forms of participation: (a) choice or decision control, where the participant has some control over the outcome; and (b) voice or process control, where the participant articulates his/her interest to the decision-maker. Voice may include influence over defining the problem, gathering information bearing on the decision, and identifying alternatives, but not making the decision. Cohen (1985) argued that to the extent subordinates can express opinions to the supervisor, they have a "voice."

It is suggested here that both voice and choice reflect PDM. When subordinates make decisions without discussions with the supervisor, they are acting autonomously and essentially have choice, but they are making decisions without the supervisor's voice. This reflects a low level of PDM. A low level of PDM is also reflected in situations where decisions are made by the supervisor without discussion, as the subordinate has neither choice nor voice. Two moderate levels of PDM occur when: (a) the supervisor usually makes the decisions following discussion, as both have voice but the subordinate usually has little choice; and (b) the subordinate generally makes the decision after discussion, as both have choice and voice (the supervisor has choice, because he/she permitted the subordinate to make the decision). However, it may be likely that the supervisor did not engage the issue if the subordinate usually makes the decision, even if the supervisor has globally assigned permission to the subordinate to make decisions. When supervisors and subordinates discuss issues and reach a decision based on consensus (i.e., a collaboration to find resolution), both have optimal voice and choice, which results in a high level of PDM.

Based on this conceptual definition of low, moderate, and high levels of PDM, it was hypothesized that PDM would moderate the relationship between organizational politics and job satisfaction. In other words, employees who actively engage in discussions about important issues with their supervisors and who, as a result, develop a consensus to resolve the issues might be able to reduce the negative conse-
quences of organizational politics on job satisfaction more so than employees who make the
decisions or whose supervisors make decisions for them. Indeed, such a joint decision provides
both joint ownership and understanding, which may generate feelings of security and protection
in a political environment.

This notion is consistent with findings in both
the PDM and organizational politics literatures. Baumgartel (1957) reported that employee performance,
job satisfaction, and positive attitudes toward the supervisor were higher among employees whose supervisors engaged in participation,
were lowest among employees whose supervisors directed activities with no discussion,
and were intermediate among employees whose supervisors who took a laissez faire (subordinate decides) approach. An argument in the organizational politics literature (Cobb, 1986a, 1986b; March & Simon, 1958; Tushman, 1977) suggests
that uncertainty is central in the development of political behaviors. Empirically identified uncertainty-related antecedents of organizational politics include: (a) a disparity between formal authority and actual influence (Dalton, 1959), (b) incomplete knowledge about cause and effect (Tushman, 1977), (c) the absence of objective performance standards (Pfeffer, 1978), (d) rewards based on non-performance criteria (Robbins, 1979), (e) decisions about important issues made in secrecy (Pfeffer, 1978), (f) overall uncertainty (Madison, et al., 1980), (g) concerns for career success (Luthans, Hodgetts, & Rosenkrantz, 1988), (h) career stage, confidence, and maturity (DuBrin, 1978, 1988; Schein, 1978), and (i) a discussed disagreement over outcomes (Tushman, 1977). High levels of PDM are likely to reduce uncertainty between the subordinate and supervisor, as the subordinate will have a consensually-developed decision and some anticipation of the supervisor’s responses to outcomes.

Affect and the Problem of Method Variance

The notion of method variance (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) suggests that collecting data with a single type of measurement leads to an artificially inflated relationship between the constructs measured, because the ratings for each individual may share a single information processing and dispositional basis. Implicit in this argument is
the notion that individual disposition influences the relationships of interest. A problem in assessing
method variance has involved identifying the disposition that underlies job attitudes and then measuring the operationalized disposition. Recent advances in the affect literature provide a means of approaching a resolution to this problem.

Factor analytic studies of self-reported mood have indicated that negative affect (NA) and positive affect (PA) are the two dominant and relatively independent dimensions (Diener & Emmons, 1985). Watson and Clark (1984) argued that the tendency to experience negative or positive affect reflects a stable, ongoing disposition. They stated (p. 483) that "high-NA individuals are more likely to report distress, discomfort, and dissatisfaction over time and regardless of the situation, even in the absence of any overt or objective source of stress." These individuals focus on their disappointments, mistakes, and shortcomings, generally taking a negative perspective of life experiences. Low-NA persons, on the other hand, tend to be more self-secure, calm, and satisfied, adopting a more resilient approach to setbacks and focusing less on daily frustrations. Watson and Clark (1984) stressed that negative affect represents subjective differences in temperament, mood, and cognitive orientation rather than an index of psychological health. Individuals high in PA are characterized by high energy, full concentration, and pleasurable engagement, whereas low-PA individuals typically experience sadness and lethargy. Previous research (e.g., Levin & Stokes, 1989; Witt, 1991) has demonstrated the utility of affect as a predictor of job attitudes, suggesting that dispositional affect may confound relationships between self-reported job attitudes and other variables of interest.

The Present Study

Following the literature cited above, the primary purpose of the present study was to test
the hypotheses that perceptions of organizational politics would be negatively related to job satisfaction and that participation in decision-making would moderate that relationship. Given the often
levels 11 to 13 (43.3%), and grade levels 14+ (16.1%).

Measures

Participation in decision-making (α = .90, M = 10.77, SD = 4.21) was examined by 6 items asking respondents to indicate "what best describes the way you and/or your immediate supervisor make decisions about:" (a) "your performance appraisal review," (b) "most things," (c) "communicating information outside your work unit," (d) "overall work activities of your work unit," (e) "what your job duties will be," and (f) "how or when you will get your work done." These items were presented on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = "we discuss things a great deal and come to a decision based on consensus regarding the issue at hand;" 2 = "we discuss things a great deal, and his/her decision is usually adopted;" 3 = "we discuss things a great deal, and my decision is usually adopted;" 4 = "we don’t discuss things very much, and his/her decision is usually adopted;" and 5 = "we don’t discuss things very much, and I make most of the decisions"). Items 4 and 5 were recoded as a 1, responses 2 and 3 were recoded as a 2, and response 1 was recoded as a 3. Item means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1. A sum of the responses was computed to provide a total PDM score. High scores reflect perceptions of greater PDM.

Job satisfaction was measured by the validated (McNichols, Stahl, & Manley, 1978) 4-item Hoppock (1935) job satisfaction scale (α = .79, M = 14.22, SD = 2.71). High scores reflect feelings of high job satisfaction.

Organizational politics was measured by a revised version of the 12-item Kacmar and Ferris (1991) Perceptions of Organizational Politics Scale (POPS; α = .93, M = 38.25, SD = 11.51). Response options were presented on a 5-point, Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = inclined to disagree; 3 = neither disagree nor agree; 4 = inclined to agree; and 5 = strongly agree). For this study, the wording was changed slightly for two of the items — from "no place for yes men" to "it is safer to agree with
managers than to say what you think is right," and from "pay and promotion policies are not politically applied" to "pay and promotion decisions are consistent with policies." This scale was selected, because it includes items assessing both proactive promotion of self-interests (e.g., "Generally, people around here build themselves up by tearing others down") as well as defensive behaviors (e.g., "It is safer to agree with managers than to say what you think is right") as discussed by Ashforth and Lee (1990). Moreover, it was validated on employee samples rather than scales developed by other researchers using university students holding jobs (Drory & Romm, 1988). Although Kacmar and Ferris (1991) presented a three-dimension model of organizational politics, work by Nye and Witt (1992) suggested a unidimensional model of the POPS, and this one-factor approach was adopted here. Item means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2. High scores reflect perceptions of greater levels of organizational politics in the organization.

TABLE 1. PDM Items, Means, and Standard Deviations

1. To what extent do you and/or your immediate supervisor make decisions about your performance appraisal review? \( M = 1.63, SD = .81 \)
2. To what extent do you and/or your immediate supervisor make decisions about most things? \( M = 1.94, SD = .90 \)
3. To what extent do you and/or your immediate supervisor make decisions about communication outside your work unit? \( M = 1.84, SD = .87 \)
4. To what extent do you and/or your immediate supervisor make decisions about overall work activities of your work unit? \( M = 1.85, SD = .87 \)
5. To what extent do you and/or your immediate supervisor make decisions about what your job duties will be? \( M = 1.80, SD = .86 \)
6. To what extent do you and/or your immediate supervisor make decisions about how or when you will get your work done? \( M = 1.70, SD = .85 \)

Positive and negative affect were assessed by the Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988) PANAS measure based upon their earlier research indicating that the experience of positive or negative affect represents a stable, ongoing dispositional trait (cf. Watson, & Clark, 1984; Watson et al., 1988). The PANAS consists of a 10-item Positive Affect Scale \( (\alpha = .89, M = 36.04, SD = 7.12) \) and a 10-item Negative Affect Scale \( (\alpha = .86, M = 16.22, SD = 5.7) \), respectively. It measures to what extent the respondent generally perceives him/herself to experience certain feelings. Results reported by Watson et al. (1988) suggest that these measures assess dispositional affect that may be independent of situational influences in which the measure is taken. Response options were presented on a 5-point, Likert-type scale (1 = very slightly or not at all; 2 = a little; 3 = moderately; 4 = quite a bit; and 5 = extremely). High scores indicate high PA or NA, respectively.

TABLE 2. Organizational Politics Items, Means, and Standard Deviations

1. It is safer to agree with managers than to say what you think is right. \( (M = 3.27, SD = 1.29) \)
2. There is one group of people (i.e., in an office or work unit) that usually gets their way here. \( (M = 3.63, SD = 1.24) \)
3. There is one very influential group of workers here that people know not to cross or get in their way. \( (M = 3.39, SD = 1.30) \)
4. Overall, policy changes are designed to help only a few people here. \( (M = 3.95, SD = 1.23) \)
5. Generally, people around here build themselves up by tearing others down. \( (M = 3.87, SD = 1.27) \)
6. Favoritism (not merit) gets people ahead here. \( (M = 3.35, SD = 1.37) \)
7. Around here, it is not smart to speak up, because there is retaliation against people who do. \( (M = 3.97, SD = 1.32) \)
8. Promotions go to top performers. \( (M = 3.19, SD = 1.25) \) [Reverse-scored]
9. Rewards come to hard workers. \( (M = 3.05, SD = 1.27) \) [Reverse-scored]
10. Pay and promotion decisions are based solely on merit. \( (M = 3.49, SD = 1.19) \) [Reverse-scored]
11. Pay and promotion decisions are consistent with policies. \( (M = 3.04, SD = 1.20) \) [Reverse-scored]
12. People here are encouraged to speak out. \( (M = 3.00, SD = 1.22) \) [Reverse-scored]
RESULTS

The intercorrelation matrix is presented in Table 3. As shown there, the biodata variables (sex, minority vs. non-minority status, supervisory status, education, pay grade levels, age, and time in organization at current site) were weakly related to perceptions of PDM, perceptions of organizational politics, and job satisfaction. However, both PDM \( (r = .37, p < .01) \) and organizational politics scores \( (r = -.62, p < .01) \) were significantly related to job satisfaction scores. PDM and organizational politics scores were significantly related \( (r = -.49, p < .01) \). As shown in Table 3, PA and NA scores were correlated with PDM, organizational politics, and job satisfaction scores.

Results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 4. Biodata variables were entered as a block into a regression equation predicting job satisfaction scores. As shown in Table 4, they accounted for a modest amount of variance \( (R^2 = .04, f = 5.1, p < .01) \). Positive and negative affect scores were then entered as one block into the equation. They added significant variance over-and-above that contributed by biodata \( (R^2 = .27, f = 179.6, p < .01) \). The biodata and dispositional variables accounted for a modest amount of the variance in job satisfaction scores (total adjusted \( R^2 = .30 \)). PDM and organizational politics scores were then put into the equation, and they added significant incremental variance \( (R^2 = .17, f = 313.2, p < .01) \).

Hierarchical moderated multiple regression analyses (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) were used to determine whether or not PDM scores moderated the relationship between perceptions of organizational politics and job satisfaction. As shown in Table 4, the cross-product term added a significant albeit small amount of variance to the equation \( (R^2 = .01, f = 18.0, p < .01) \). Overall, the predictor variables accounted for a moderate amount of the variance in perceived job satisfaction scores (total adjusted \( R^2 = .48, f = 74.5, p < .01) \).

In order to identify the form of the interaction and thus test the hypothesis that organizational politics would be less salient to the development of job satisfaction among individuals perceiving higher levels of PDM, regression analyses were run without the biodata and affect scores. By removing them from the equation, it was possible to cleanly plot the interaction. Following the approach advocated by Stone and Hollenbeck (1989), a graph was derived by plotting three slopes, one for a low PDM score (one standard deviation below the mean: \( f = 6.59 \)), one for an average PDM score (at the mean: \( f = 10.81 \)), and one for a high PDM score (one standard deviation above the mean: \( f = 15.03 \)).

As shown in Figure 1, among employees perceiving higher levels of organizational politics, job satisfaction was highest among those engaged in higher levels of PDM. In contrast, among employees perceiving little organizational politics, the moderating effect of PDM was minimal, as most of these employees expressed high levels of job satisfaction.

DISCUSSION

Several caveats should be emphasized before discussing the results. First, the subjects most likely responded to the survey in one sitting; thus, these data may be subject to common method variance. The inclusion of PA and NA scores in the equations permitted some assessment of the contributions of PDM and organizational politics above the variance contributed by dispositional affect, but other components of method variance (e.g., cognitive orientation) were not assessed. Second, the civilian government employees sampled in the present study may not be representative, and replication in the private sector and military organizations is needed. Third, these data were cross-sectional, and a longitudinal design might permit an assessment of causal linkages between job satisfaction, PDM, organizational politics, and dispositional affect. Fourth, as noted by Madison, et al. (1980), reliance on perceptions of organizational politics may be subject to attributes of self-serving biases and self-defensive interpretations of events. Fifth, the immoral vs. moral aspect of organizational politics (cf. Drory & Romm, 1988) was not examined. Despite these limi-
tions, the results support the hypotheses that perceptions of organizational politics are negatively related to job satisfaction and that PDM moderates that relationship.

While some individuals may prefer highly political work environments because they are predisposed to thrive in political climates, most individuals may be less satisfied with their jobs in such situations. Indeed, it may be difficult to be job-satisfied when promotions, awards, and/or pay raises are based on political, rather than merit considerations, or when there are cliques closely tied to organization leaders that typically get their way even at the cost of productivity.

The importance of organizational politics as a target problem for organizational assessment and intervention has been increasingly identified (Bateman, 1980; Cobb, 1986a, 1986b; Cobb & Margulies, 1981; Margulies & Raia, 1984). Direct attempts by individual supervisors and managers to reduce political activity may be limited in potential for success, because norms of organizational politics may be beyond the influences of a single individual. However, a supervisor or manager may be able to reduce the negative effects of organizational politics on job satisfaction by providing more PDM opportunities for subordinates.

As noted by Witt and Myers (1991), the importance of PDM as an antecedent of organizational outcomes has been empirically identified, yet some managers avoid PDM and sharing information. Some of these managers may do so because they do not know how to collaborate with their workers, while others may explicitly decide to maintain or exercise power and authority to keep their people unaware of goings-on, and others may simply have not thought about alternative management styles. Some managers may also believe that they have more information than subordinates and thus do not engage in what they may perceive as needless PDM. Whatever the reason, the present data and the growing PDM literature provide sufficient evidence to indicate that efforts to increase PDM may lead to favorable outcomes, although affective predisposition may affect the extent to which it does. Nogradi and Koch (1981) argued that providing additional opportunities for decision-making for personnel who are involved in fewer than desired decisions is extremely important from an organizational perspective. They stressed (p. 157) that allowing “individuals to move toward a decisional equilibrium state must be a high priority for the manager.” Indeed, high levels of PDM are neither always appropriate nor always wanted.

Additional research is needed to examine: (a) individual differences in preferences for PDM levels, (b) voice versus choice aspects of PDM and their comparative effects on perceived PDM and related outcomes, and (c) the extent to which different stages of development or career status may affect the extent to which PDM reduces the negative effects of organizational politics on job satisfaction.

REFERENCES


### TABLE 3.
Intercorrelation Matrix

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
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Note: Correlations $\geq r = .06$ are $p < .05$. Correlations $\geq r = .09$ are $p < .01$ (2-tailed tests of significance).

### TABLE 4.
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses
Predicting Job Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor Variable(s)</th>
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<th>$p&lt;$</th>
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<td>.01</td>
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<td>Addition of PDM and politics scores</td>
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<td>Addition of interaction term</td>
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Figure 1.
Job Satisfaction Regressed On Perceptions of Organizational Politics: Low, Average, and High PDM Scores

Note: $Y = (-0.204 + 0.006f)X + (-0.179f + 21.51)$, where $f =$ one standard deviation below the mean of PDM (or the mean of PDM or one standard deviation above the mean of PDM), $Y =$ the job satisfaction score, and $X =$ the politics score.