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THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN EUROPE, 1995 AND BEYOND:
DETERMINANTS FOR A DUAL-BASED,
SMALLER YET SUBSTANTIVE FORCE

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

May 1992

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
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The United States Army in Europe, 1995 and Beyond:
Determinants for a Dual-Based, Smaller Yet Substantive Force

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The United States' military strategy and its force structure have both undergone careful reconsideration following the end of the cold war. The U.S. military will reduce by 25 percent by 1995, losing one million positions through cutbacks in the active component, the reserves, and Department of Defense civilians. These reductions do not include the projected decline in the United States industrial base. History has shown that every time in the 20th century that the U.S. military has experienced rapid drawdowns following conflict, they lost the warfighting edge necessary to perform well at the beginning of the next crisis. Allen argues that despite the attraction for a more rapid peace dividend, the drawdown plan that was designed in 1990 is an attractive solution designed to avoid future misfortunes.

Allen also argues that the United States continues to possess vital interests in the global environment and, although apparently more inward-looking, is not retreating to a "fortress America" mentality. Therefore, the new United States military strategy of strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution, will continue to be necessary to support American prestige abroad. The Base Force concurrently designed to support that strategy is still cogent. In Europe, the United States will remain strongly committed to NATO. In the near-term, the U.S. is prepared to continue to provide 150,000 troops forward deployed in Europe as her contribution to the Atlantic alliance, as long as it is clear that she is wanted there.

There are no further reductions planned in the Base Force in the FY 1993 Budget. However, if the current situation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union does not deteriorate, the United States could further reduce the size of its forces by 1995. There will be heavy pressure to return most, if not all, American troops to the U.S. Allen presents a plan for a smaller European force, dual-based and rotated annually by unit, that will be cheaper to maintain overseas, but will be able to maintain its warfighting skills. In his plan, the problems that plagued earlier rotation scenarios have been addressed and solved. This much smaller force could protect current American prestige in Europe, and ensure a seat at the head of the NATO table. Finally, the new force will be critical in sustaining the level of U.S. military capability necessary in the 21st century.
On August 2 1990, two significant events occurred that would determine the future course of United States' involvement in global affairs. The first event was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The invasion led to the ensuing Gulf War, where the American-led coalition soundly defeated the fourth-largest army in the world. The chain of events leading up to the final stages of the ground war and the Desert Storm campaign itself firmly established both the American will to fight and the credibility of her military forces.

The second event, and perhaps even more noteworthy in the long run, was a speech by President George Bush to the Aspen Institute Symposium at Aspen, Colorado. In his remarks, President Bush outlined future American foreign policy and the role that the United States' armed forces would play in supporting it. He spoke of a new military strategy, one which included a significant downsizing in the U.S. force structure as a result of winning the cold war. The American armed
forces would be cut by 25 percent in only five years. The speech was not given to set the stage for the United States to return to "fortress America" and abandon her role as the pre-eminent national power in the world today. In the new, post-cold war environment, the United States will continue to have just as many vital interests abroad and, as in the past, will continue to use her military in support of them.

The greatest change in U.S. military structure outside of the United States is occurring in Europe. From a U.S. force in Europe that numbered over 300,000 as late as 1989, more than 170,000 American troops will return home by 1995. The entire U.S. VII Corps which deployed to Saudi Arabia and led the coalition attack against Saddam Hussein has been retired from the Army's active force structure. Many troops who returned to the U.S. reverted to the civilian sector. For many in the United States Congress, a reduction of over 50 percent of the forward deployed European force is not enough. Some in the United States are now calling for a total U.S. withdrawal from Europe.

This paper examines the current national debate over "How much is enough?" in regards to the United States' forces in Europe. It will review the current U.S. vital security interests both globally and in Europe. The paper then examines how the United States will interact with the NATO alliance in the new security architecture evolving in Europe.
It will then explore the new national military strategy that was introduced in 1990 and explain the linkage between that strategy and how the Army will be postured to support it. Finally, the paper will take an in-depth look at a new proposal for a smaller future force that will support the current U.S. strategic concept of forward presence in Europe.

Despite the current resource-constrained environment, this paper concludes that:

* there is a valid need for current United States forward presence in Europe and the need for American troops in Europe will extend into the next century;
* the current plan to keep a U.S. force of 150,000 troops in Europe until 1995 is both valid and necessary. To reduce any faster would be impractical and illogical;
* between 1995 and 1997, the force of 150,000 (of which 92,200 are U.S. Army) can be reduced significantly. The U.S. Army's share of the force will be less than 60,000;
* the new, smaller force, if dual-based and rotated (by unit) on an annual basis, will be much cheaper to maintain and can maintain its warfighting edge as well as satisfy the current Congressional pressure to bring most, if not all troops back to the United States. This much smaller force will also retain current U.S. prestige in Europe, to include her seat at the head of the NATO table.

UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS: GLOBAL AND IN EUROPE

The United States won the cold war and its armed forces won a devastating victory over Iraq. The United States is now the only superpower in a new era, one that it was largely responsible for shaping. There are those who now argue that
the United States remains the only state with truly global strength, reach and influence in every dimension - political, economic, and military - and that to isolate itself now would further bring about another surprise. History has shown that victory in war has never assured that the American people or Congress would be willing to expend the resources necessary to make another conflict less likely. Therefore, to expect the Gulf War to be the last great American conflict is much too optimistic.

Following World War I, Americans were unwilling to assume international commitments that seemed unrelated to their traditional motives centered around "fortress America." There was no desire for conquest beyond the U.S. borders. President Wilson was unable to sell his idealistic vision of an international body such as the League of Nations that would ensure U.S. participation in a global security system which would have replaced the classic European balance of power. Few recognized that the traditional United States' isolationist foreign policy orientation would ultimately lead to tragic and unforeseen circumstances, with the outbreak of another global conflict only 20 years later.

In the dark aftermath of World War II, the West united to defend democracy and advance economic freedom in a hostile climate. The world quickly divided into two ideological camps where issues of security predominated, international
organizations were formed and the United States set the priority for all Western economic policies. Fortunately, this time the American public accepted the need for its government to provide global leadership. America's chief assets were her military and economic strength, but she had another asset to call upon, one that was less tangible but potentially more valuable. In September 1945, America's prestige, like its relative power in the world, had never been higher and the United States was universally regarded as the disinterested champion of justice, freedom and democracy. As such, the security interests of the United States became inexorably international in purpose, and they have remained so since the end of World War II. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan (1947), and the formation of the NATO alliance in 1949, were representative of the American acceptance of leadership in the global environment. The explosion of an atomic bomb by the USSR in 1949 and the Korean War in 1950 amplified American fears of Soviet intentions and produced the defense dollars necessary to support large, permanent military forces stationed outside of the U.S. to support these new international commitments.

Many in the U.S. desire to return to an age of innocence where international events will have absolutely no effect on the United States. However, these citizens seem to be in the minority. Robert Osgood states:

"Basically, most Americans resent the existence of foreign relations. They would be glad to let the rest
of the world go its own way if it would only go without bothering the United States. But Americans sense that they are bound to participate in the sordid society of nations for the sake of their own survival."10

Because of this, there is a deep-rooted sense of responsibility that most Americans share towards involvement in the international arena.

Accordingly, United States security interests and objectives of the 1990s remain largely unaffected by the current international situation and New World Order. The interests are broad enough to preserve the basic sources of our national strength yet focused enough to deal with the real threats that still exist. These global interests are:

* The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

* A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.

* Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

* A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.11

These interests are fundamental in nature and have generated little national debate in the United States. The challenge for the U.S. now becomes one of how to support these vital global interests without the traditional forward deployment of large military forces.

Joseph Nye argues that the use of coercion has certainly
become more difficult; therefore, the use of "co-optive" behavioral power" - getting others to do what you want - and "soft-power resources" - cultural attraction, ideology and international institutions - are becoming more important. He states, "Power is becoming less functional, less coercive and less tangible." However, he also asserts that "the United States remains the largest and richest power with the greatest capacity to shape the future." In an article in *Foreign Affairs*, Paul H. Nitze reinforced the idea of "soft-power resources" with his proposed strategic concepts:

* The central theme of the policy of the United States should be the accommodation and protection of diversity within a general framework of world order.

* Our aim should be to foster a world climate in which a wider array of political groups are able to exist, each with its own and perhaps eccentric ways.

* Supranational institutions, such as the United Nations and its organs, NATO, the European Community, CSCE and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, should be given the role of providing stability and forward movement on important global and regional issues that transcend national or ethnic boundaries.

* The United States, with inherent political, economic, cultural and military strengths, and no territorial or ideological ambitions of its own, can and should play a unique role in bringing its powers to the support of order and diversity among the world's diffuse and varied groups.

There is an ongoing debate in the U.S. concerning the extent of its future external involvement. The rapid fall of the former Soviet Union drew immense publicity to the concerns of critics such as Paul Kennedy, who argue that long-term economic well-being is at the center of truly great power.
Kennedy joins the school of thought that criticizes excessive expenditures on defense issues, particularly the continued commitment of overseas obligations. They contend that U.S. economic prosperity is hindered needlessly by spending money for overseas military forces, and cite Japan and Germany as examples of countries who have flourished because they devote less of their GNP for defense, thereby freeing up funds for investment in economic growth. Moreover, they argue that with the end of the cold war the United States should look inwards and that foreign policy should become secondary to challenges such as strengthening the American economy, pursuing increased social justice, greatly enhancing internal education systems and caring more for our elderly citizens. Some in this camp would argue that there is no longer any superpower, and that the United States should take a lesson from the collapse of the former Soviet Union to ensure that the U.S. does not suffer the same fate. This is the declinist viewpoint and most subscribe to an expenditure of around three percent of GNP for normal defense programs.

On the other hand, the revivalist viewpoint states that there is now only one first-rate power, the United States, and that there is no prospect in the near future of any rival to that status emerging. Followers of this school of thought agree that there is a current juncture in history but do not agree that a withdrawal of U.S. forces is the cure for a perceived economic decline. They subscribe to the need for
a visible United States' presence throughout the world. Many in this camp even extrapolate this position, suggesting that the United States should become even more assertive, and not only set the rules for a New World Order, but be prepared to make absolute, unilateral decisions to rigidly enforce those rules. These revivalists would conclude that the Gulf War was an example where strong leadership and the application of its military power reinforced a U.S. role that is necessary to provide security in a potentially chaotic world.

What is interesting to observe is that the current U.S. administration seems to be clearly revivalist in the nature of its statements pertaining to the future application of its military forces; however, the percentage of GNP devoted to defense over the next five years is nearly in the declinist camp. This would suggest some "straddling the fence" tactics in the 1992 election year. Nevertheless, for a great power such as the United States, even if it is looking slightly inward, the definition of a vital interest will continue to include any issues, political or economic, that have a basic bearing on the functioning of the international system.

In this century, Europe has held the key to global balance and it is now experiencing fundamental change. The cold war was won in 1989; the Warsaw Pact is a thing of the past; a unified Germany remains in NATO; the Soviet Union is gone and in its place is the new federation of the Commonwealth of
Independent States with an uncertain future. The United States has already responded two times in the 20th century when problems arose due to the sudden influx of massive changes to liberal democracies in Europe, and it is in her continued best interests to quickly stabilize the equilibrium of power in Eurasia.

Politically, the challenges are somewhat different between Eastern and Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, the United States must insure against the total disintegration of the former Soviet Union. U.S. leadership in a $24 billion international aid package sent to Russia in April 1992 is the first of many actions that will assist in the process of reconstruction. The United States must also strongly support the new democracies forming in the other Eastern European countries. Simultaneously, in the West, the U.S. must attempt to limit German power in the new Europe while promoting the evolution of the European Community in the direction of a looser, purely economic entity with broader membership rather than a tighter political entity with an integrated foreign policy. President George Bush summed up the United States' strategy at The Hague, the Netherlands in November 1991:

"We welcome the emergence of the new Europe in the European Community's march toward a single market and political union...Revitalizing the Atlantic Alliance and building a European Union go hand-in-hand," and that "A continuing American role in Europe can facilitate integration, doing that by fostering stability."
The United States naturally has an enormous stake in Western Europe’s economic prosperity. Although the U.S. trade with the EC is smaller than with Asia, it has the domestic political advantage of generating a slight surplus for the United States in contrast to the deficits of U.S.-Asian trade. Vice President Dan Quayle even related trade issues directly to future U.S. security positions in Europe, when, in an attempt to convince United States’ European allies to support tariff reductions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), he stated, "Friends, we have got to get on with it. Trade is a security issue."22

Therefore, there is ample evidence to support the proposition that the United States has a vital interest in the maintenance of political and economic liberalism in Eastern and Western Europe. The most important question that must now be answered is: What type of security relationship will best ensure that another major challenge to these interests will not arise, or, if it does arise, how will it be handled?

THE UNITED STATES’ ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

At 7:00 p.m. on November 9 1989, Politburo member Gunter Schabruski told a group of stunned reporters assembled in East Berlin that effective immediately, East Germans could henceforth cross the border, totally unrestricted, into West
Germany.23 The Berlin Wall and all that it stood for were history. Only ten days later, on November 19th, the Conventional Army Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed, representing such a significant change in the conventional forces balance in Europe that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for either the former Soviet Union or NATO to launch a ground offensive in Europe without an extensive buildup. Was now finally the time to disband the European security architecture that had been carefully built and nurtured over the last 40 years? Would America quickly abandon its European allies and return to U.S. soil?

The United States responded optimistically towards the rapid changes of events and was prompt in reassuring its European allies that the U.S. would still continue its significant contributions toward European security. In December 1989, U.S. Secretary of State Baker, addressing the Berlin Press Club, talked of a "new Atlanticism" and how America's political, military and economic security would remain linked directly with European security issues.24 In January 1990, in his Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Secretary of Defense Cheney stated that, "events in Europe would take the highest priority in the security challenges in the coming years."25

At the same time, however, cries for an immediate "peace dividend" filled the headlines. In March 1990, Senator Sam
Nunn was among the many who challenged President Bush to make decisions quickly about needed adjustments in the United States' defense strategy, posture and defense budget. As a result, by the summer of 1990, the United States announced a drawdown of some 25 percent of its total forces, with a 50 percent reduction in Europe. Britain had already announced that it would reduce its Army of the Rhine by half, the German Bundeswehr was reconsolidating and drawing down to below 370,000 and most of the other NATO allies had announced similar troop reductions. The former Soviet Union had committed itself to withdrawing all its forces from Eastern Europe by 1994. The threat had considerably subsided.

However, the initial euphoria had scarcely faded when the world realized that the time had not yet arrived to relax and contemplate a new age of peace and prosperity. Significant world events such as the U.S. invasion of Panama, the reunification of Germany, the Persian Gulf War, the crisis in Yugoslavia, and finally, the attempted coup and ethnic fighting in the former Soviet Union, expanded, rather than condensed, the debate over future global U.S. roles and military strategy. The times seemed to support scholars such as John Mearsheimer, who had argued that, "the demise of the cold war order was likely to increase the chances that war and major crises would occur in Europe."28

These rapid changes were coupled with the dilemma that has
characterized contemporary United States' foreign policy: an inherent inconsistency regarding support for the process of European integration. For many years, U.S. administrations had encouraged their European allies to shoulder more of their own defense burden. Now that Europe is less reliant on U.S. conventional military power for its security, a stronger European "pillar" has suddenly become apparent in the Western alliance. However, the United States does not want the pillar to turn into a bloc against it.

Therefore, despite the announcements of U.S. troop reductions in Europe, the United States continued to voice strong support for a united Europe, one that included significant U.S. involvement. The views of the Bush Administration were clear from the start, beginning with the President's remarks at the Paris Summit in 1990. President Bush reemphasized the American commitment when he said, "We will remain in Europe to deter any new danger, to be a force for stability, and to reassure all of Europe - East and West - that the European balance will remain secure." The most pertinent question, then and now, seems to be: Through which conduit does the United States now proceed to achieve the desired degree of European security?

THE UNITED STATES AND NATO

"Are NATO's days numbered?" asks Hugh DeSantis of the U.S.
"NATO should be reformed as a spy network," asserts Britain's First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Julian Oswald. Some say, "NATO, job well done, it's time to call it a day." There is no doubt that the policy of containment has come to an end. Nevertheless, it can be argued that there is still a useful function for NATO to perform, one which demands U.S. involvement.

Organizations in Europe such as the CSCE, the WEU and the EC are all rapidly "flexing their muscles" in the security arena of post-cold war Europe. However, there is no doubt that the United States' current allegiance to a European security organization is her long-standing affiliation with NATO. Many authors note that NATO is the one organization that links the United States and Canada with Western Europe and that Europe lacks the characteristics of a true defense "community" without the U.S. Despite the absence of the former Soviet threat, NATO has no plans to fade quietly away. Many statesmen, scholars and military leaders assert that NATO's role will, in fact, become even more important as a European stabilizing institution.

If, as stated by Lord Ismay, NATO's purpose during the cold war was to keep the Soviets "out", the United States "in", and the Germans "down", the rules of the game in Europe have now been altered. According to U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger, NATO's future will depend on the
ability to meet three principal challenges:

"(1) the challenge of convincing our publics that continued material sacrifices to keep the alliance viable militarily are necessary;

(2) the challenge of managing U.S.-European relations both within the Alliance and outside of it; and

(3) the challenge of responding effectively to a range of contingencies which could possibly threaten peace and security in Europe." 37

NATO reacted very quickly to the changing developments in East-West relations that occurred between late-1989 and 1991. The Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, 38 released on November 8 1991, was the first formal statement of the future orientation of the Alliance. Within its twenty-one paragraphs, the declaration outlined NATO's new organizational structure, its new strategic concept, its new European security identity and defense roles, future relations with the former Soviet Union, other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the CSCE, future arms control issues, and the broader challenge of Alliance security in a global context. Of particular significance was the new concept of consultation and cooperation with the Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union. The formation of a new North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was an important first step in the new era of an enlarged European partnership. This was the first hint of NATO's change from its previous two-dimensional focus of dialogue and maintenance of a collective defense capability to a more diverse, multi-dimensional approach with a much greater emphasis on future
political issues.

Leaders of the sixteen countries of the current Atlantic Alliance were unanimous that the current order was essential (although not sacred as emphasized by French President Mitterand) for the present security and stability of Europe. When the talk drifted to the possibility of an eroding NATO with less U.S. involvement under the new catchword "European Defense Identity," President Bush quickly stemmed the tide:

"It would be a mistake to leave this hall with blissful ambiguity on the point of Europe's defense identity. Our premise is that the American role in the defense, and the affairs, of Europe will not be made superfluous by European union. If our premise is wrong - if my friends your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defense - the time to tell us is today."  

President Bush welcomed the collective assurances by the West European leaders that the American presence was still needed and wanted in Europe.

The future NATO force will not be structured toward the threat of the past, that of a surprise attack in Central Europe. That was clear in the Rome Declaration. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, which was also released in Rome on November 7 1991, discussed a more detailed, long-term direction. The new strategic concept affirms that the structure of NATO's future force will be based on:

"the risk of adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries
What is the current plan for NATO's conventional forces? The military capability of Russia and the other former Soviet republics still constitutes the most significant security challenge. However, NATO now faces not only this challenge, but also other risks, and their forces will be initially tailored to combat the adverse consequences of possible instabilities arising from the realignment of Central and Eastern Europe. These instabilities include overpopulation, religious and ethnic disagreements and mass migration. The force will also serve as a deterrent against the southern periphery of Europe, where there is a significant build-up of military power and a great proliferation of weapons technologies, possibly including weapons of mass destruction. Other concerns are the environment and violations of international law such as terrorism and sabotage. Finally, there is talk of the NATO force being postured to counter violations of NATO security interests in a global context. Addressing out-of-area problems, long an important concern of the U.S., is now being seriously considered by both Germany and France, and offers many more opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broader approach to security.

The NATO force that will be constructed will be much smaller
than in 1989; the question is, "How much smaller?" Virtually every country in NATO has significantly cut the size of its armed forces. By mid-1991, cuts in the size of the forces directly committed to NATO had already approached 22 percent of its strength on the date the Berlin Wall fell. In January 1992, NATO Secretary General Woerner announced that by 1995, NATO forces would be cut by approximately one-half of its pre-1990 strength, and that as a result, future forces would be much more mobile and flexible. Future emphasis would be on multinational units and smaller troop formations capable of being transported rapidly to any part of the Alliance territory vis a vis the traditional NATO cold war strategy of large standing forces deployed throughout the area. Dr. Woerner also supported the position that Europe should shoulder more of the defense burden than ever before. However, the United States will continue to be a significant contributor and the size and shape of that contribution will be discussed in much greater detail later in this paper.

What is the future for NATO nuclear forces? Russia alone has a larger nuclear arsenal than any NATO member except for the United States and there are nuclear weapons in the Ukraine, Kazakhastan and Belarus. This threat cannot be discounted. Since the early 1950s, the United States has had the responsibility of providing a nuclear umbrella for Western Europe. This task was shared amongst the U.S. Army, Air Force and Navy. On September 27 1991, President George Bush
announced a major nuclear arms initiative:

"that the United States would eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched, short-range, theater nuclear weapons. The U.S. would also withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships, attack submarines and those nuclear weapons associated with its land-based Naval aircraft. All nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles on U.S. ships and submarines, as well as nuclear bombs aboard aircraft carriers will be removed."^48

The President did, however, ensure that the U.S. preserved an effective air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe. The strategic nuclear triad of the United States, that is the combination of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and strategic bombers, will continue to exist in order to provide the political guarantee contained within extended deterrence to NATO.49

With the exception of United States nuclear submarine assets available to the SACEUR, the only U.S. nuclear forces left in the NATO theater in Europe will be the necessary Air Force units that support President Bush's new policy. Some have argued that it would be extremely difficult to justify any U.S. ground forces in Europe. These are the proponents of the "no-nukes-no-troops" thesis.50 However, the removal of virtually all SNF weapons from Europe is not a new idea and has actually been seriously discussed since early 1991.51

The dramatic cutbacks in SNF weapons, unilaterally announced by President Bush, coupled with an additional reduction in aerial-delivered systems approved by NATO's defense ministers
at Tsaormina, Italy on October 17 1991, decreases NATO's tactical nuclear arsenal by some 80 percent.\textsuperscript{52} NATO's Heads of State and government, through their acceptance of the Rome Declaration, apparently agree that the strategic American nuclear umbrella, coupled with the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France, is a credible deterrent. The only force structure affected will be the standdown of the U.S. Army's 59th Ordnance Brigade and the other American forces whose duty is the support, maintenance, and custody for the nuclear weapons storage sites that remain in Europe. Top officials at the U.S. European Command acknowledge that all nuclear weapon withdrawals ordered by President Bush could be easily accomplished in three years or less.\textsuperscript{53} Some future items of importance that could arise in the NATO nuclear arena are subjects such as a new targeting structure, even deeper post-START strategic reductions, the future of the ground-based ABM system, possible U.S./CIS alliances in the areas of nuclear technologies, and future nuclear testing bans.\textsuperscript{54} None of these initiatives will enhance or reduce significantly the U.S. troop posture in Europe in the 1990s.

In summary, despite the recent emergence of the CSCE, NATO, with its North Atlantic Cooperation Council, is the only formal organization that ties the United States and Canada to the emerging security architecture with Europe. Many European leaders, especially in Germany, desire a continuing strong American forward presence through her ties with the
NATO is also a convenient bridge for the United States to transition from her traditional means of power projection through the forward positioning of large numbers of troops with their traditional tactical nuclear weapons umbrella to a new position of influence through the use of other forms of economic security. The substance of U.S.-Western Europe security relations will not escape unchanged as it is clear that there will be a substantial reduction in the size and shape of future U.S. forces in Europe. However, the United States will continue to maintain close ties with NATO as long as the Alliance continues to expand its horizons to include:

* working with the new NACC to aid to European stability and assist in the peaceful transition of the Eastern and Central European nations,
* working to expand NATO deterrence and power projection to out-of-area locations beyond the traditional treaty areas, and
* working to expand current plans to develop a creative resource strategy where Europe pays more towards her collective defense.

President George Bush stated in his speech to the Aspen Institute Symposium:

"The U.S. will keep a force in Europe as long as our allies want and need us there. As we and our allies adapt NATO to a changing world, the size and shape of our forces will also change to suit new and less threatening circumstances. But we will remain in Europe to deter any new dangers, to be a force for stability - and to reassure all of Europe, East and West, that the European balance will remain secure."

UNITED STATES ARMY STRUCTURING DETERMINANTS
The United States armed forces structure of the post-cold war 1990s and beyond will be based on a new military strategy. This military strategy promotes significant shifts in focus, primarily away from the spread of communism and the containment of Soviet aggression to a "more diverse, flexible strategy which is regionally oriented and capable of responding decisively to the challenges of the decade."^{57}

Strategic concepts have had many names over the years, to include; attrition, annihilation, countervalue, counterforce, deterrence, flexible response, warfighting, direct and indirect approach, search and destroy, assured destruction, containment, and forward defense, among others.^{58} History has yet to "coin a phrase" for the new U.S. military strategy as there are many valuable principles that continue to prevail from the past. The fundamental objective of the U.S. armed forces is still to deter aggression; thus deterrence remains the primary and central motivating purpose underlying national military strategy. Despite improving East-West relations and the shift in focus away from global war, regional crises will continue to threaten U.S. vital interests and, as such, the United States must provide the leadership necessary to promote global peace and security. Where U.S. interests dictate, she must retain the capability to act unilaterally. Therefore, the new strategy, in many ways, is more complex than the strategy of the cold war era.
The four foundations of this new strategy, originally articulated by President Bush at Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990, and further developed by the Secretary of Defense, are: (1) Strategic Deterrence and Defense, (2) Forward Presence, (3) Crisis Response, and (4) Reconstitution.

The maintenance of a reliable strategic deterrence remains the number one defense priority of the United States. Despite the reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons as a result of recent arms control agreements and unilateral decisions, there are still thousands of warheads and other nuclear devices still present in the global environment. Instabilities in the former Soviet Union coupled with the threat posed by the increasing number of hostile states developing weapons of mass destruction requires the U.S. to retain a reliable warning system as well as modern nuclear forces. Because of the trend towards the accidental or unauthorized launch of a ballistic missile, higher priority will be established to develop a system to provide Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). This is a modern replacement of the SDI program of the 1980s.

Forward presence of U.S. forces has been a visual sign to the world for the last 45 years of the American commitment to prevent crisis and avoid war. Although the number of U.S. troops stationed overseas will be reduced, it is critical to
maintain the current capability to rapidly respond in a crisis with adequate force. This capability can be exercised through periodic deployments and rotations, storage and prepositioning of equipment and supplies, combined exercises, port visits and continued military contacts with U.S. allies. There will also be a large increase in multinational military formations. The U.S. must ensure that the collective defense measures that are currently in effect are not lost.

Crisis response to any regional contingency that may arise is the third key foundation in the new U.S. military strategy. Rapid deployment to deliver a full range of options, from a single discriminate strike to overwhelming force, is essential. Because a potential aggressor may attempt to take advantage of the United States or her allies during one crisis, forces cannot be reduced below a level which would preclude simultaneous deployments to more than one area.

Reconstitution of forces is essential in the new military strategy in light of the reduction of the overall size of the military. Reconstitution does not just involve forming, training and fielding new units, but also includes the mobilization of the available reserve forces and activating the industrial base. During peacetime, reconstitution involves retaining the warfighting edge of the military through maintaining technological advantages and keeping the current forces highly trained. This key foundation was
readily evident in the recent Gulf War.

As the primary land power arm of the U.S. armed forces, the Army’s fundamental purpose is to deter war and, if deterrence fails, to gain victory on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{80} The U.S. Army of 1992 and beyond must remain the same trained and ready force that contributed to the triumph of the strategy of containment for more than 45 years. Four enabling strategies will guide the much smaller force to meet future challenges:

These strategies include:

* maintaining a warfighting edge by ensuring that the Army possesses the most modern equipment, tough and confident leaders, and effective doctrine;

* reshaping the force through reductions in active and reserve forces, prepositioning of smaller forward deployed forces, and recasting of war plans to capitalize on rapid deployments;

* providing resources to the force by improving force structure to preserve readiness despite budget constraints; and

* strengthening the total force by fully integrating active and reserve components, keeping early-deploying units fully “mission-ready,” establishing strong training relationships, and integrating readiness standards and operating systems.\textsuperscript{81}

The Army has born the brunt of every major military force reduction since June 2, 1784, when the American congressional legislators, in the aftermath of the American Revolution, left 25 privates to guard stores at Fort Pitt, 55 more for that purpose at West Point, and a “proportional number of officers,” none above the rank of captain.\textsuperscript{82} Thus began the historical pattern of dangerously low readiness levels that
generally occur following major conflicts. The drawdown in forces following World War I ultimately resulted in a force that was not ready to fight in World War II, as attested by the U.S. performance at the Kasserine Pass. The debacle that befell Task Force Smith at the beginning of the Korean War left 3000 dead, wounded, missing or captured during the first week of ground combat and 6,000 casualties the first month. General Gordon R. Sullivan, the current Army Chief of Staff, uses "No More Task Force Smith's" as his watchword as he carries his message of caution towards too quick a drawdown in the current Army force structure to soldiers, commanders, and the U.S. Congress. President Bush mentioned in his 1992 State of the Union address that we must never again return to the days of the "hollow Army."

Where do we go from here with our forces? Karl von Clausewitz stated that the decision on the size of military forces "is indeed a vital part of strategy." Force planning is not a very precise activity, but the normal procedure of first identifying a threat, then developing the military strategy, structuring a force, providing resources for priority requirements, and planning for deploying those forces to meet contingencies (which was essentially the same process each year until 1989) is now totally disrupted.

There is no doubt that the Army force available to support the new strategy will be much smaller. Primarily due to the
reduction (some say the end) of the old Soviet threat, a systematic drawdown of forces was begun in 1990. Despite the temporary hold and mobilization of troops for the Persian Gulf War, the reductions are still on track. Resources have been cut accordingly. The U.S. Defense Budget has been in a steady decline since 1980. Fiscal Year (FY) 1991 reflected a 12 percent cut from FY 1990 followed by a one percent dip for FY 1992 and almost four percent in FY 1993. After FY 1993, the decline will average about three percent per year. By FY 1996, the overall decline in real terms from the defense peak of FY 1985 will approach 34 percent. Additionally, by the end of FY 1996 defense will be down to 3.6 percent of the GNP (4.6 percent for FY 1992) and 18 percent of federal outlays (19.6 percent for FY 1992). Both of these ratios are the lowest in more than 50 years.88

Constrained resources are a primary planning factor when designing future force structure. As mentioned above, before 1990, budget dollars were allocated after a force was designed against the hostile strategic environment. However, as depicted by Figure 1 below, resources now impact near the beginning of the force structure plan in the current cycle.
The Army that will emerge in 1995 will be perilously small for a nation with the United States' worldwide commitments. The Army will be restructured as part of the new Base Force which has been built specifically to counter the regional challenges of the next decade. The Army will then consist of 4 regionally-focused Corps and 20 Divisions. The divisional formations include 12 active component (AC) divisions (8 heavy, 3 light and 1 air assault), 8 Army National Guard divisions (5 heavy and 1 light), and 2 cadre divisions (heavy) and the requisite support forces. According to the current U.S. Army leadership, when reductions to this level are complete, the United States will be at the limits of acceptable security risk with regards to its land forces, even with the current nonconfrontational posture of the
former Soviet Union. Figure 2 shows the geographical layout of the future force, with forward presence in both the Atlantic and Pacific Theaters. The majority of units are in CONUS.


The U.S. Army will reduce overall by 25 percent in the next three years. This is a greater percentage reduction than any other branch of the service. The FY 1992 National Defense Appropriations Act approved Army force reductions of 50,000 AC and 22,000 reserve component (RC) before September 30, 1992. The AC will eventually reduce from 770,000 in 1990 to 535,000 in 1995 and the RC will diminish from 776,000 to 567,400 in the same time period.
The AC drawdown is on track through the use of a combination of reduction programs including reducing accessions, voluntary early-out programs, selective early retirements for senior officers and noncommissioned officers and involuntary reductions-in-force (RIF). This is the first RIF since the post-Vietnam era. Planned reductions in the RC are facing a hostile U.S. Congress reluctant to commit to losses in their own districts.\(^\text{70}\) An initial "hit-list" of 830 U.S Guard and Reserve units (26,000 soldiers) was released the final week of March 1992.\(^\text{71}\) All of these reductions have been a part of the Army's original, long-range drawdown plan that was developed in 1991.

In his 1992 State of the Union Address to Congress, President Bush offered an additional $50 billion in defense cuts above and beyond previously approved plans. However, he was adamant that the troop levels in the original Base Force were as low as they would go under his administration and that the cuts would come from strategic systems and procurement.\(^\text{72}\) In March 1992, new defense cuts were proposed in plans submitted by both House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis) and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Rep. Aspin proposed a plan with reductions of $91 billion over five years along with substantial reductions in the Base Force. Senator Nunn's plan called for cuts of up to $85 billion over the same time period; however, Nunn opposed any deeper cuts in the Fiscal
Year 1993 budget over those proposed by President Bush due to the current pace of ongoing reductions which are already playing havoc with military personnel and their families. Because of the character of the American political process, the size of the military force is constantly at risk.

However, as this paper is being written, despite the constant fluctuations in plans and the rumors that abound in a U.S. election year, the Base Force envisioned by the national leadership back in 1990 is still in effect. The next section of this paper on the future force in Europe is based on the premise that the overall structure of the current Base Force will not be significantly altered.

THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN EUROPE

The contribution that the United States' military makes to Europe's defense is often the subject of debate. The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is a force that is controlled by a Congressionally-mandated troop ceiling and is therefore not necessarily decided by a threat assessment. The force has grown much larger since the post-World War II era. Following the defeat of Germany, U.S. troop strength in Europe fell from over 2,600,000 in 1945 to only 80,000 in 1950. However, in 1950, the Korean War erupted, and the fear of a similar event arising in Europe caused President Truman to order four additional U.S. divisions to Europe to join the two already
there. More significantly than the increase in size was that the status of the U.S. forces was formally changed from an occupation force to a combat force designed to contain the Soviet Union. The size of U.S. forces in Europe increased to over 300,000 by 1954, and, with the exception of a one-third reduction in size during the Vietnam era (1968-1973), remained that large until the end of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{75}

Political and economic pressures in both the United States and Europe prompted an in-depth review of these stationing policies beginning in late 1988. This review was based primarily on three factors:

* the fall of the U.S. dollar against other major currencies, in particular the D-Mark, since 1985,
* the continued growth of the budget deficit over the same period to about $170 billion (since risen in FY 1991 to some $390 billion), and
* continued pressure from some European countries for high base access costs and threats of denial of access if the bill was not met.\textsuperscript{76}

The priorities in the United States were shifting to domestic issues and the U.S. Congress was taking a very hard look at the Department of Defense estimate that the cost of the U.S. commitment to Soviet containment in Europe was 60 percent of the U.S. defense budget, on the order of $180-200 billion in FY 1987.

Using the accounting procedures of the U.S. Department of Defense, estimates for European defense included the forces, the training and equipment, and the overhead associated with
U.S. troops who were stationed in the continental United States and earmarked for reinforcement in Europe. These procedures were the cause for serious debate. Some argued that only the forces and facilities actually operating in Europe should be counted towards defense expenditures and that a truer figure would be closer to $50 billion. This would entail only 15 percent of the defense budget. In fact, they argue, the incremental costs of supporting forces in Europe over supporting the same forces in the United States is only $2 billion annually. These debates were beginning to receive much more attention in the Congress, when, on November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell.

The first gradual U.S. troop withdrawals occurred in 1988, those being the ones serving with the Cruise and Pershing II missile units that were disbanded in the wake of the INF Treaty. When those withdrawals were completed, the U.S. strength in Europe would be 305,000. This was the planning figure in force as the former Soviet Union began to dissolve.

In February 1990, the foreign ministers of the CFE's negotiating panel agreed to place a new upper ceiling of 195,000 each for both the U.S. and the former Soviet forces in Central Europe. This was a reduction of 80,000 U.S. troops from the initial CFE planning figure of 275,000 that was proposed by the Bush Administration in May 1989.
The troop reductions in Europe were only a part of the Bush Administration's plan to reduce the total size of the U.S. military by 25 percent by 1995. In early 1990, a bi-partisan base closure committee confirmed the recommendation of Defense Secretary Cheney and announced the closure of 35 bases in the United States. This prompted immediate calls from Congressmen, who were about to suffer unemployment and other disruptions within their districts, to speed up and deepen the cutbacks in Europe. As a result of the pressure from Congress, the Bush administration proposed a further reduction of 40,000 troops, thus leaving only 150,000 forward deployed troops in Europe. All withdrawals would be completed by 1997. The net effect of the withdrawal plan was a 52 percent drop in U.S. troop strength in Europe in seven years. Along with the troop reductions, more than 50 medium-to-small sized bases and other installations in Europe were to be closed or realigned. Moreover, nine large bases in Western Europe were to close, including seven U.S. Air Force bases, the naval base at Nea Makri in Greece and a munitions storage site at Eskisehir, Turkey. This represented a decrease of 15 percent of the European base infrastructure. Despite United States' involvement in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Congressional pressure caused the Bush Administration to further increase the pace of the drawdown in Europe. The first change occurred in summer 1991, when the first drawdown goal of reducing troop levels to 150,000
by 1997 was compressed to being completed by the end of FY 1995. The total effort now meant moving 160,000 U.S. troops, more than 200,000 dependents, pets, automobiles, and personal and family property, not to mention the amount of military equipment destined to return to the U.S., from Europe in four years rather than the original six. The Pentagon also announced that concurrent with the troop reductions, approximately 500 sites in Germany would close. 83

The 1991 plan had barely begun implementation when, in late January 1992, another plan was announced. The current plan now calls for the drawdown of 106,000 of the planned 160,000 troops from Europe by September 30 1992, the end of the budget year, an increase of 20,000 over previous schedules. In addition, 144 more military installations in Europe would end or reduce operations earlier than originally planned, bringing the total to 524 since the base alignment plan began in January 1990. 84 In total, more than 35 percent of the bases and sites in Europe that were occupied by U.S. troops in 1989 are planned to cease operations and/or revert to host country control by 1995.

As of late April 1992, the projection of 150,000 U.S. troops in Europe has survived further cuts. 85 The drawdown is on schedule. Withdrawals from Europe would be hard-pressed to proceed at any faster pace. Approximately 900 United States soldiers, their families, and personal belongings are moved
from Europe every week. This movement schedule has put a tremendous strain on the facilities in both Germany and the U.S. to keep up with the exodus from Europe. Troops and their families who are relocating to units inside the U.S. are finding unprecedented problem areas in many locations. Housing is a particular concern as stateside units are now well above their authorized strength figures. Facilities like Ft. Stewart, Ga., Ft. Riley, Ks., Ft. Campbell, Ky., Ft. Sill, Ok., Ft. Bragg, N.C., and others cannot keep up with the influx of new arrivals and many families live as far as 60 miles from post. Some soldiers have to wait as long as two years for on-post housing. There is also a longer than expected lag in receiving private automobiles, furniture and other household goods from Europe. Troops are being housed in motels or in mobile trailer parks. Increasing the pace of the current schedule could be catastrophic to soldier and family support systems at stateside posts and further reduce troop morale.

The United States Army Europe (USAREUR) has always had the vast preponderance of the troops stationed in Europe. In 1988, there were over 217,000 Army soldiers stationed in Europe, with over 90 percent located in Germany. This Army force is shrinking rapidly. Since the end of the Gulf War, two of the former four combat divisions stationed in Germany, the 3d Armored Division and the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), have been totally disbanded, and their colors
retired. The VII Corps headquarters was formally deactivated in March 1992, and with the disbanding of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 2d Armored Division (Forward), the Army will be well on its way to a maximum strength of 92,200 in Europe by 1995. Figure 3 presents the major units that are scheduled to remain under the current strength ceilings.

Figure 3: U.S. Army Structure in Europe - 1995.


The core of the issue concerning the amount of soldiers in Europe and the future structure of the force is not linked directly to numbers, but rather to how the force will support future United States policies and strategy. Therefore, the decision to retain a U.S. Army Corps in Europe is the cornerstone of the current structuring philosophy. This force
sends an unequivocal signal that the forward presence posture is being maintained to support U.S. interests in Europe. Furthermore, it is signaling a continuing commitment to NATO's position of strength in the future security architecture in Europe, however that evolves. In relation to other NATO allies, the United States' overall contributions to NATO remain the same as before 1989. Therefore, the U.S. should retain its traditional leadership role in NATO's integrated military command structure.

Under the current stationing plan in Europe, the combat-capable Army Corps will require approximately 73,000 troops. It will have two heavy divisions, an armored cavalry squadron, one corps artillery group, a corps-level aviation brigade, and the requisite corps-level combat support and combat service support elements. The remaining 19,200 soldiers will be support troops. These soldiers will be assigned primarily to USAREUR, which includes a large headquarters staff, a training command, a medical command and other units. Personnel not assigned to USAREUR include U.S./NATO command staffs, some intelligence and communication systems commands and 19 other small units. This figure of 19,200 represents a decrement of over 50 percent from the approximately 43,000 personnel assigned to these units at the beginning of the drawdown. Many of these units have strategic-level missions, which are basically the same in peacetime or war, and to reduce their size has been much more
difficult to accomplish.

The current force of 150,000 U.S. troops in Europe should not be further reduced before 1995. Tactically speaking, one U.S. Army Corps is currently needed in Europe to support NATO in its era of transition to its new strategic concept. Also, the present economic situation in the United States does not support a faster exodus of U.S. servicemen from Europe.

The United States Congress has now realized how severe the economic impacts of force drawdowns of the planned magnitude are as a result of winning the cold war. Earlier cries for rapid drawdowns in Europe have taken a back seat as Congress ponders the effect of a reduction of one million servicemen on both the national and local economies. Coupled with the loss of these servicemen are losses in the defense industrial base. Congress is now considering a variety of proposals to cushion the blows both to communities and to the displaced military personnel. The active Army alone will reduce by 200,000 in three years, with the net effect not only resulting in more necessary jobs in the civilian sector, but also the inevitable increase in base closures that will occur as the force reduces in size. "The truth is, we are not prepared for peace in the world," said representative Julian C. Dixon (D-CA).

It would be extremely unrealistic to expect the current
drawdown plan to be greatly escalated. Moving assets in Europe are already overextended and stateside reception for returning soldiers is severely strained. Neither Congress nor the Department of Defense are willing to place great numbers of soldiers and their families under severe hardships in the United States solely to expedite the current exodus from Europe. There is no money being saved by stepping up the current drawdown schedule; in fact, to increase the schedule may be more expensive due to the exit bonuses being given to the service personnel who are separating from the active forces.

The second important reason to keep the current force of 150,000 U.S. troops in Europe for the next three years is to convince our European allies that there will be a significant U.S. presence during the next three-to-five year transition of NATO's military restructuring and formation of its new strategic planning and also the process of European federation. As NATO shifts gears from the focused threat of the last 45 years to concentrate on regional instabilities, the United States could very well remain the most significant security blanket in the Alliance. As part of that security umbrella, it is absolutely imperative that the U.S. Army V Corps be able to concentrate primarily on warfighting and not concern itself with the further distraction of an impending drawdown. While the other European units continue with their displacements or drawdown planning, the V Corps will
continue to have an essential mission in support of U.S. forward presence. Although this mission is somewhat more ambiguous than its former task of defending the Fulda Gap against a massive Soviet attack, there are certainly valid scenarios that could keep the V Corps busy for the next three years.\textsuperscript{12} Once a new Army structure has emerged following the current exodus from Europe and the forces-in-place are stabilized, then and only then can the remaining units concern themselves with further reductions.

A CASE FOR A DUAL-BASED, REDUCED U.S. ARMY IN GERMANY IN 1995

Although there are no currently-published Department of Defense plans to downsize the European force below 150,000 troops, it is possible that beginning in 1995, the U.S. Army could transition the two forward deployed European divisions to a new dual-based forward presence, with one lead brigade of each division deployed in Europe and the remaining two brigades and most of the combat and combat support elements stationed in the United States. Additional reductions in either the remaining armored cavalry squadron or the corps artillery could also be accomplished, resulting in a total force of less than 80,000 U.S. Army soldiers actually stationed in Europe.

The current Base Force shows 12 active component U.S. Army
divisions remaining in the force structure in 1995. As of April 1992 there are still 14 divisions on active duty around the world, and therefore, by 1995, at least two of these divisions must be deactivated. Because no firm deactivations have yet been announced, options could be exercised to return the majority of both the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 1st Armored Division back to the United States from Germany. Only a small portion of the divisional headquarters and one combat-ready brigade task force from each division would remain in Germany. The headquarters detachment, led by an assistant division commander (a brigadier general), could participate in limited training exercises; however, its main function would be to interface with its higher headquarters and local allied units and to oversee the annual rotations of the brigades. The forward deployed brigade task force would train as a unit in Germany, to include exercising with multinational formations, and be prepared to deploy not only within the NATO area of operations but also out-of-area if necessary. Due to the smaller number of heavy combat units in the theater, only one major training area (MTA) need be operated by USAREUR personnel. Other MTAs should be returned to the host countries, producing substantial savings in both dollars and personnel to run the facilities.

The current V Corps headquarters and much of the corps-level combat support and combat service support units would remain in Europe in their current configurations. Soldiers assigned
to these units would remain on the traditional, three-year rotations currently in effect and could bring their families. The corps headquarters would do the requisite war planning and interface with other NATO allies in training exercises and could deploy when necessary. Corps-level support units could maintain the prepositioned equipment in Europe and also prepare to receive follow-on units during training exercises or deployments. Other corps-level brigades such as field artillery, air defense, engineer, signal, military police, aviation and intelligence could also have smaller, forward deployed detachments, depending on their peacetime missions in Europe.

It is feasible that the U.S. Army organizations currently located in Heidelberg, Germany, be combined and substantially reduced. USAREUR and 7th U.S. Army Headquarters is currently commanded by a four-star general. In addition to being the senior commander for the vast majority of all U.S. Army soldiers in Europe, he also serves as a commander in the NATO chain in his position as commander-in-chief of the Central Army Group (CENTAG). Although not formally announced, a new NATO reorganization shows CENTAG being disbanded and a newly formed headquarters in its place. The new headquarters, to be called Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT), may or may not have a U.S. commander, however it will probably have a joint staff. The current U.S. Army four-star general should remain in Germany and retain his dual-hatted position,
that being both as a NATO commander and the senior U.S Army commander in Europe. The staff necessary to fill LANDCENT and to run future U.S. Army operations in Germany would be much smaller than current levels. The 33,000 civilians currently on the U.S. payrolls under USAREUR could also be considerably reduced.93

Another important dimension in this suggested restationing plan is that the combat-ready brigades stationed in Europe beginning in 1995 will not be similar to the forward deployed brigades which are now permanently stationed in Germany. Under this new stationing option, forward deployed brigades will be rotated each year with a sister brigade located with the division headquarters (−) in the United States. Each brigade of the two divisions postured directly for support for NATO would therefore spend every third year in Europe. Soldiers in the affected brigades would be on overseas tours without their family members when their unit deployed to Europe. The Congressional Budget Office, in a February 26 1992 report, said that the government is paying for a large infrastructure that includes housing, shopping, schools and medical facilities that could be eliminated if families were gone.94 The temporary drop in combat readiness that would occur annually during the swap of brigades could be limited by overlapping the rotations by two weeks if the strategic lift assets were available. The trade-off in costs for two separate round trip moves in two weeks would have to be
compared to the level of readiness desired before deciding when to formally hand over responsibility to the incoming unit.

A typical rotation for a U.S. soldier in either of the two "European" divisions would be one of a four to six year stateside tour with the understanding that every third year would be an overseas, unaccompanied rotation to Europe. Married soldier's families would permanently remain at home stations in the U.S. while the soldier was overseas, taking advantage of the typical soldier support facilities that already exist at all major posts in CONUS. There would be substantial savings in money, time and the base support personnel needed overseas due to the lack of a requirement to support large numbers of family members in Europe. There would also be no requirement for the U.S. government to fund the shipment of personal automobiles or excessive personal property for the soldiers who deploy annually with their brigades. The drawback of unaccompanied tours is family separation, which could drive out some troops. The argument that to bring the majority of the American families home to the U.S. is signaling a lack of future U.S. commitment to NATO does not make sense in relation to the current military mission in Europe.

Two somewhat similar rotation systems have been tried in Europe in the not-so-distant past. One program, called
Operation Gyroscope, involved the rotation of whole divisions from the U.S. to Europe. This program, implemented in the 1950s, was soon abandoned because of extreme costs and other problems, primarily involving personnel assignments. Then, in the mid-1970s, brigades from both the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas and the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado were rotated to Germany under a program called Brigade 75/76. This program was also suspended for other soldier-related problems, the first being that since the units stayed in Germany for only 179 days, no overseas credit was received by the soldiers. Secondly, most of the traditional facilities in Europe were already full of U.S. units. Rotated elements lived in sub-standard locations such as tent cities at Grafenwohr Training Area. Since there is now no space problem for rotating brigades and since the tours will be 12 months in length, soldiers will receive a credit for an overseas rotation.

Exactly where in Europe that these remaining combat-ready brigades will be stationed is critical in the long term. Combat equipment and supplies for both divisions would remain prepositioned in central Germany or Italy, similar to the current Prepositioned Organizational Material Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) program. One Army armored or mechanized division’s major equipment items weigh about 100,000 tons and its supplies for a month of combat another 50,000 tons. To have to airlift one complete division and its equipment and
supplies from the U.S. would consume nearly all United States airlift assets for a week. Therefore, the forward deployed brigades stationed in Europe must be positioned near the parent division's prepositioned equipment and preferably near an active airbase that could rapidly receive reinforcement units from the United States. Every time a new brigade rotated overseas, it could use some of the prepositioned stocks for training during the year it was overseas. This eliminates another common problem, that of maintaining the significant amount of combat equipment at remote European locations that sits unused and is not exercised enough. With the reduction in numbers of active duty heavy divisions in the U.S. Army between 1990 and 1995, there would also be adequate modern training equipment for the stateside divisions to train with, to include the most modern Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and artillery assets. These stateside brigades would train at their home stations and also receive rotations at the National Training Center similar to the other heavy units permanently stationed in the United States.

There would be a decrement in field training at the corps and division levels, as there is no adequate replacement for the actual field deployment of the entire units. However, the recent advent of complex computer simulation training would fill the gap in the critical command and control of combat units and the synchronization of warfighting systems. The
annual Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercise is an excellent case in point. Between 1988 and 1991, there was a reduction in troop deployment from 97,000 to 28,321 and a reduction in equipment deployment (tanks, other tracked vehicles and wheeled vehicles) from 22,868 to 4,000. According to exercise directors, commanders and staffs were put through a more realistic and expanded tactical scenario on the computers than could be achieved on the actual ground due to maneuver restrictions. Using a similar scenario, CONUS divisions with forward based brigades could easily train together by using computers to simulate combat situations. General Crosbie E. Saint, USAREUR's Commander-In-Chief, has stated:

"REFORGER 92 and Certain Caravan (a follow-on exercise to REFORGER 92) will represent the wave of the future for training commanders and battle staffs in mobile warfare. But this kind of simulation-supported, mobile command post exercise - is not confined to the European environment; it can be done anywhere to train the leaders and staffs of corps and larger units. It is training smarter, taking in the realities of a changed world." 

Annual deployments of brigade-sized units to Europe would actually enhance training and combat readiness in several key areas. As the Army has learned from numerous deployments to the U.S. National Training Centers, a critical element in combat readiness is the necessary Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) procedures that are implemented prior to every unit-level movement. Proper POM procedures ensure that every soldier is physically and mentally prepared for deployment,
trained to standard, and that individual equipment is at a high state of preparedness. Pallets of equipment for individual sections, platoons and companies are consolidated and packaged for shipment. This critical team-building process would occur each year in the affected brigades going to Germany.

It is also very important to exercise the mass transportation systems in the U.S. as often as possible in an attempt to keep current on procedures involving the overseas movement of troop units. Although the annual rotation of only one brigade-sized task force is not truly a "large" troop movement in comparison to earlier deployments such as Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 or the Gulf War in 1990-1991, the reduction in size of the REFORGER exercise and cancellations of Team Spirit-like exercises in Korea does not leave much challenge for the U.S. strategic lift assets short of computer-driven scenarios. The actual airlift or sealift of combat-ready brigades to an overseas theater could provide valuable "lessons learned."

There would, of course, be disadvantages to this dual-based presence when comparing it to the forward deployment of a force of approximately 92,200 Army soldiers. First, there would be a degradation of the command relationships that occur with frequent face-to-face meetings and conferences. The lack of one-on-one mentoring from superiors would become
a constant challenge. Secondly, despite the sophistication of computerized war games, actual field deployments of large units cannot be totally simulated. However, these sacrifices have to be made if dual-basing is adopted, since funding a regular deployment of headquarters units back and forth from the U.S. to Europe could be as least as costly as the present system of permanently remaining overseas. Thirdly, and most importantly, it would require much more time to deploy a combat-ready brigade to a contingency area from the United States than from Europe. As the U.S. learned from Operation Desert Storm, there is no substitute for a forward deployed corps in Europe for rapid deployment to a crisis. Assuming that unit equipment was prepositioned in Europe, and assuming that host country approval was obtained, it would still take approximately 6.4 days to airlift a brigade from the U.S. to the Balkans (versus 3.3 days to move from Germany) and/or 7.0 days to move the same brigade to the Middle East from the U.S. (versus 3.9 days from Europe.) Similar deployment times are increased for corps or division-sized elements. These times are a "best-case" scenario using well-trained, full-up units and well-rehearsed, host country assets. With the current trend toward both the reductions in unit sizes and the reduction of readiness levels in host country support systems, times will probably increase. However, with the current lack of a real-time threat in Europe and the availability of space-based intelligence gathering assets to provide early warning, this decrement in deployment times may
be a realistic trade-off.

Other smaller programs and plans are currently under observation that would further reduce the number of United States soldiers permanently stationed in Europe or save money. One plan, which could save the U.S. $300 million per year, involves transferring the burden of maintaining facilities such as storage sites and contingency hospitals from the U.S. Department of Defense to a host country responsibility. Another plan would increase the numbers of host country personnel maintaining U.S. war stocks in Europe, thus reducing the number of support personnel necessary to be stationed in Europe. Either NATO or the host country would bear the costs of these programs, further reducing U.S. expenditures.

Because of this sizable U.S. commitment of a combat-ready, full-up corps headquarters and two forward deployed heavy brigades physically located in Germany and backed up by the remainder of the corps in CONUS, poised to rapidly deploy when necessary, an assertion that the United States is not fulfilling its obligation to the European alliance could be seen as lacking credibility. The U.S. Army contribution, in conjunction with U.S. European theater air assets and the presence of both U.S. naval forces and other strategic systems, will easily meet any future argument that the United States is returning to a "fortress America" mentality.
CONCLUSION

The end of history's latest bipolar relationship still provides another "great debate." The cold war is dead; however, more than two years later, there are still more questions to be answered than there have been problems solved. Rather than a peaceful new era, the end of the cold war has revealed the myriad ethnic hatreds and old patterns of behavior and enmities that 45 years of U.S.-Soviet confrontation merely kept dormant. Today, fighting rages in Moldova, Yugoslavia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. As fast as the former USSR's military forces are disbanding, former states such as the Ukraine are building up their own armies. More countries than ever before possess nuclear weapons and/or other weapons of mass destruction.

This is the international environment in which the United States begins the most significant downsizing of its military forces in the last 50 years. The demise of the former Soviet threat, coupled with the need to transfer efforts to internal problems such as the rising national debt and a lingering recession, presents a logical demand to reduce the military forces. However, there is the real risk that the United States will fall victim to its traditional postwar impulse to dismantle its military beyond prudent levels. The lack of a direct confrontation with another superpower simply means that the traditional military conditions requiring large,
forward deployed forces are gone, not that all U.S. military presence outside its borders is superfluous. There is still the chance that a regional threat, similar to the crisis in the Persian Gulf, will arise to challenge United States' vital interests, and thus the need for a limited U.S. forward presence.

Although as the only superpower the United States must be in a position to act unilaterally, its great preference is to use its friends in alliances. Therefore, the U.S. must go to the greatest lengths possible to maintain its long-standing ties with Europe through its leadership role in NATO. This Atlantic alliance is viewed as absolutely critical by the U.S. to ensure its vital interests in Europe remain secure, but considered just as critical by the leaders of the European nations who are concerned about the magnitude of the power vacuum that would result from a total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe.¹⁰⁰

NATO itself is revising its strategic plans and playing much more of a political role in the new Europe. Thus far, it has shown a remarkable ability to survive in a rapidly changing European security environment.¹⁰¹ The formation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) is a significant initiative to attempt to tie together common security issues of over 30 European nations, to include both sides of the old Iron Curtain.¹⁰² The newly formed military structure
involving smaller, multinational formations and out-of-area missions are plans currently under observation. NATO forces were called to intervene in eight crises in 1991/92, from the Gulf War to humanitarian missions in the former Soviet states and, therefore, there is utility for the United States to remain committed to the Alliance.\textsuperscript{103}

President George Bush’s new military strategy and the new Base Force designed in 1990 is still viable. The strategy will produce a robust, well trained, general purpose force. The force will be primarily stationed in the United States, but still forward deployed, albeit in much smaller numbers than in the past. The U.S. will maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, however the number of weapons is down by 70 percent from 1988. There are no longer any nuclear weapons in the U.S. Army. The U.S. military establishment will reduce by 25 percent by 1995, losing one million spaces through cutbacks in active forces, reserve components, and Department of Defense civilians. More than 700 bases in the United States and overseas will reduce operations or close.\textsuperscript{104} The current plan is to reduce to 150,000 U.S. troops forward deployed in Europe by 1995, an overall reduction of nearly 60 percent since the initial CFE levels were announced in 1989.

Earlier cries for both a faster overseas withdrawal plan and for even steeper reductions in the Base Force have been
temporarily suspended as the U.S. Congress studies the total impact of the current drawdown plan on both the U.S. economy and the morale of U.S. soldiers and their families. Further cuts in the FY 1993 defense budget have been avoided and the Base Force appears safe for at least one more year. Because of the current instability in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and the need to bolster NATO in the formation of its new strategic planning, the current U.S. V Corps that is stationed in Europe should remain in place until at least 1995.

Defense spending in the mid-1990s and beyond is likely to be much lower, requiring another restructuring of United States' military capabilities. If the threat of regional crisis in Europe has sufficiently diminished, a substantial portion of V Corps should return to the United States. In its place, a dual-based force, rotated on an annual basis in brigade-level configurations, could suffice to meet NATO requirements and retain U.S. prestige in Europe. U.S. Army forces could then be reduced from the 92,200 forward deployed soldiers in the current plan to less than 60,000 in the dual-based force.

Previously utilized U.S. rotation plans of the 1960s and mid-1970s had serious flaws, primarily because the rotations were too short and the reception facilities in Europe were inadequate. The rotation plan presented in this paper eliminates those shortcomings.
If one follows the historic record of the United States, every time the U.S. has cashed in on a peace dividend too quickly, the result has been a military force that is not well-trained, well-equipped or well-prepared to go to battle. This dual-based force will break that previous mold and is yet another example of the way that the United States will be able to sustain the appropriate level of military capability in the global environment into the 21st century.
NOTES


3A very recent, all-inclusive analysis of the current status of the U.S. military commitment to Europe (with emphasis on Germany, where over 90 percent of the U.S. Army is stationed) can be found in David G. Haglund and Olaf Hager, eds., Homeward Bound? Allied Forces in the New Germany (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

4This is the European (NATO) "slice of the pie" from the Army's build-down plan announced by Secretary of Defense Cheney in 1990. The specifics were briefed by General Colin Powell in "The Base Force - A Total Force" to the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee - Sub-Committee on Defense, 25Sep91. As of January 1992, the build-down was exactly on track with the deactivation of two Army divisions on January 17th. See Vince Crawley, "Army to Mark Subtraction of Divisions from Germany," European Stars & Stripes, 3Jan92, p. 10.

5As defined in Section 2801 of the FY 91 Authorization Act and as further described in the FY 1991 House Armed Services Committee Report 101-665, "dual basing" means the stationing of specific units and personnel of the Armed Forces on a permanent basis at military installations inside the United States with rotating short-term assignments to military installations outside the United States for purposes of training, conducting exercises, meeting obligations to other nations, and carrying out other international security responsibilities.


13Ibid., p. 261.


18The revivalists' basic arguments question whether the U.S. is actually in a decline, how to measure the decline and whether the decline is of the U.S. own doing, and therefore reversible. They also question whether the current share of GNP is excessive based on historical examples. These arguments appear in Joe S. Nye, Jr., *Bound To Lead*, (note 12) and Henry R. Nau, *The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Also see Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Movement," *Foreign Affairs - America and the World 1990/91*, pp. 23-24.
Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Movement," (note 18), p. 33. Also, a 46-page document circulated in the Pentagon and "leaked" to The New York Times in early March 1992 spoke to "the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S." and "the United States should be postured to act independently when collective assurance cannot be orchestrated." attests to the current military position. This "draft" is not officially sanctioned. See Patrick E. Tyler, "Pentagon's New World Order: U.S. to Reign Supreme," International Herald Tribune, 9Mar92, p. 1.


See President George Bush remarks at a luncheon hosted by The Netherlands Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, "Bush: West Needs to Write Last Chapter of Cold War," 9Nov91, text available from US Embassy, Ottawa, Canada, 11Nov91.


x.1.


29 See President George Bush's remarks at Washington D.C. 13Nov90, upon the departure of Italian Prime Minister and President of the EC Giulio Andreotti, U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol 1. no. 12. 19Nov90. President Bush further emphasized this point in his 1992 State of the Union Address, 28Jan92.


31 See article by Robert Dietrich, "Refocus NATO as a Spy Network," The San Diego Union & The Tribune, 7Jan92, p. 4.


34 Michael J. Brenner, "Finding America’s Place," Foreign Policy, Summer 1990, no. 79, pp. 25-43.

The U.S. position is also clear. See remarks by William Taft, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, at a workshop at Sentra, Portugal, "U.S. Encouraging 'A Strengthened European Pillar,'" 14Jun91, text available from US Embassy, Ottawa, Canada, 14Jun91. Also, see interviews with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, by Herbert Kremp; place and time not given, text available in International Affairs, 4Nov91, pp. 1-3., and Woerner interview, Der Spiegel (in German), 4Nov91, text available in International Affairs, 5Nov91, pp. 3-5.


38See Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, exact text published by NATO Press Service, Press Communique S-1(91)86, 8Nov91.

39See condensed texts of statements by the Heads of State and Governments of France, Spain, Germany, Britain and NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, International Affairs, 8Nov91, pp. 1-7.


41The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, from the Rome NATO Summit, Rome, Italy, 7Nov91, text from NATO Press Service, Press Communique S-1(91)85, 7Nov91.

42Ibid, p. 3.


46Multinational units (Corps and below) have been declared to be the backbone of the future NATO force structure. Two of the best current articles on these new


*See President George Bush - live broadcast to the American people, subject: Major Nuclear Arms Initiatives, 27Sep91, text available from US Embassy, Ottawa, Canada, 30Sep91.


U.S. then-Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci used the threat of withdrawing U.S. forces if Germany refused to accept modernized SNF, at the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich. See Detlaf Puhl, "Debate About Shifting Moods in NATO Alliance," German Tribune, 12Feb89, p. 1, and article in the Stuttgarter Zeitung, 30Jan89. Another who supports this idea is Beniamino Olive, "Europe After the Washington Agreement," European Affairs, 2, Spring 1988, pp. 42-44. see also David Haglund, Homeward Bound?, (note 3), pp. 148-149.

*See, "No Nukes, Please, They're German," Economist, 26Apr90, pp. 52-53.


See President George Bush’s speech to the Aspen Institute Symposium, Aspen, Colorado, 2Aug90, (note 1).


88Army Focus - June 1991, an official Department of the Army Publication. Produced by the U.S. Army Publications and Printing Command, HQDA, the Pentagon, DACS-DMC, Washington D.C. 20310-0200, pp. 7-11 and 51-56., and Trained and Ready - The United States Army Posture Statement FY92/93, a statement by The Honorable Michael P.W. Stone and General Gordon Sullivan to the 1st Session, 102nd Congress. General Colin L. Powell remarked to members of The Defense Writer's Group at the Westin Hotel, Washington D.C., on 4Feb92, that maintaining these minimums was absolutely necessary to fight two concurrent regional conflicts.


70A plan announced on 27Mar92 by Secretary of Defence Cheney ordered cuts of 140,000 from the U.S. reserves. Long one of Congress's political sacred cows, the news was met with immediate criticism on Capitol Hill. The Pentagon wants to cut 830 units with a total of 234,000 positions in five years, at a savings of $20 billion. The story was front page news on virtually every major newspaper. See, for example, Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Seeking 140,000 Reduction in Reserve Forces...Congress Criticizes Cuts..." New York Times, 27Mar92, p. 1., and related articles in The Minneapolis Star Tribune, 27Mar91, p. 1., and The Chicago Tribune, 27Mar92, p. 1. Also see William Matthews, "Guard Builds Hill Support," Army Times, 20Apr92, p. 18.


74The ceiling is 326,414 land-based military personnel. It was established in the FY 1985 Defense Appropriations Bill in the Cohen (R-Maine) Amendment to the Nunn (D-Ga) Amendment, adopted 94-3, 20 June 1984.


reactions are noted in Rick Maze, "Congress Whacks Away at Force Plan," Army Times, 9Mar92, p. 4. For effects on U.S. servicemen, see Army Times, 52nd Year, no. 37, 13Apr92, Cover Story, "The Long Way Home From Germany," and other special articles in that issue.


Steve Vogel, "Down to the Corps: V Corps to Cover Gap 'from garrison to God knows where' and 'Making up missions becomes an exercise in reality,'" Army Times, 2Mar92, p. 31-32.


Bernard Adelsberger, "Short Tours in Germany?" Army Times, 28Oct91, p. 3.


Childress, "REFORGER: Smaller but Smarter," (note 96), p. 11.


British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd was one of the first to acknowledge America as "the biggest security trump that Europe has ever had." See interview with *Der Spiegel*, "Hurd on EC, NATO Controversies, U.S. Links," FBIS-WEU-91-207, 29Oct91, p. 6. Also see remarks by leaders of the Netherlands and Germany (note 55). For the United States' response, see Secretary of Defense Cheney's statement at the 1Apr92 NATO meeting of defense ministers, "U.S. Security Tied to All States of Europe." Copy of remarks available from U.S. Embassy, Ottawa, Canada, (92-17), 2Apr92.

The changing architecture includes Canada's recent decision to withdraw all of its forward deployed troops from Europe by 1994. This prompted immediate concerns from European NATO members who now fear that the U.S. may follow suit. See Marc Fisher, "Europeans Ask: If Canada's Troops Leave, Can GIs Be Far Behind?" *The Washington Post*, 11Mar92, p. 16. As of 1May92, there had been no actions by the U.S. to indicate the effect of this action on its future stationing policy.


Interview with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, The McNeill/Leahr News Hour, PBS Network, 27Mar92.

As of 20Apr92, both the U.S. House and Senate had rejected plans to further reduce President Bush's 1993 Defense Budget. The votes narrow, but do not end debate about the level of defense spending for the fiscal year that begins 1Oct92. See Rick Maze, "Defense Budget Boosted," *Army Times*, 20Apr92, p. 4.