"There's No Place Like Home"
Considerations For The Redeployment of a Corps

A Monograph
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"There's No Place Like Home." Considerations for the Redeployment of a Corps.

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ABSTRACT

"THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME." CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT OF A CORPS.
BY MAJOR KEVIN A. LEONARD, USA, 67 pages.

The purpose of this paper is to determine and analyze the considerations for the redeployment of a US Army corps. The redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division from Vietnam in Operation Keystone Blue Jay, Military Traffic Management Command's after action reviews (AAR) from various Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises, and AAR's from the redeployment from Operation Desert Storm form the basis of the study.

This paper begins with a discussion of the need to consider redeployment as the US Army downsizes in a changing world environment. The author's belief is that a smaller Army must be efficient in its redeployment in order to meet its various contingency missions. Headlines from the redeployment from Operation Desert Storm indicate a four to nine month-lag time between return to the United States and readiness to deploy.

The lessons from Operation Keystone Blue Jay, REFORGER exercises and Operation Desert Storm are examined to identify common ground. The common thread between all three events indicates a failure to consider redeployment during the deliberate planning process, combined with leadership failures while maintaining, moving, and loading equipment for redeployment.

The study concludes by examining the redeployment needs of a corps in four areas: doctrine, training, organization, and leadership. Doctrine for redeployment is virtually nonexistent. The author offers a proposal for doctrinal redeployment considerations that, if adopted, would alleviate a number of the systemic problems uncovered in the study.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I-INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY .................. 1

CHAPTER II-OPERATION KEYSTONE BLUE JAY ................. 5

ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 9

CHAPTER III-REFORGER, 1983 .................................... 12

MTMCs REDEPLOYMENT RECOMMENDATIONS ............. 14

CHAPTER IV-GETTING HOME FROM "THE STORM"- .......... 18
SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

GUIDANCE FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ................. 19

CHAPTER V- THE SURVEY .............................................. 22

DIVISION LEVEL COMMENTS .................................... 23
CORPS LEVEL COMMENTS ........................................ 24

CHAPTER VI-THE COMMON THREAD ......................... 26

CHAPTER VII-CONCLUSION .......................................... 35

CHAPTER VIII-A PROPOSAL .......................................... 40

ENDNOTES ...................................................................... 44

APPENDIX A .................................................................. 46

BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................. 65
"Once hostilities are over, Americans are spontaneous and headlong in their eagerness to return to civilian life. No people on earth have been known to disengage so quickly from the ways of war."--Harry Truman

CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION

"The 1st Infantry Division achieved a spot operational readiness rate of 90% December 10, 1991, marking the highest level in the division since its redeployment from Southwest Asia."--The Fort Leavenworth Lamp 31 Jan. 1992

As the headline above indicates, the redeployments of the U.S. Army from Operation Desert Storm and its subsequent readiness for combat are newsworthy issues. That it should take a mechanized infantry division in the middle of the United States nearly eight months to reach a spot operational readiness rate of 90%, indicates that Desert Storm redeployment did not go according to plan. In fact, one senior Military Traffic Management Command officer indicated that there was no plan for redeployment. Further, he intimated that the Forces Command (FORSCOM) redeployment plan was written immediately following the surrender of Iraqi forces. After action reviews of Operation Desert Storm indicate deficiencies in Army redeployment doctrine, training, organization, materiel and leadership. In a number of units, readiness rates of vehicles returning from Operation Desert Storm were as low as 30%. Also, a significant amount of equipment retrograded from Southwest Asia (SWA) failed to
return to its parent unit. In November 1991, there were still approximately 4,000 containers listed as "frustrated cargo" at European and American ports. A number of units report receiving equipment belonging to other units. In summary, confusion and inefficiency characterize the Army's redeployment from Operation Desert Storm.

Confusion and inefficiency have not always been the earmark of American redeployment efforts. For example, the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division (1st ID) from Vietnam in 1970 was well planned and executed. Operation Keystone Blue Jay offers stark contrast to the lack of detailed planning in the return from Desert Storm. The key element appears to be time. The redeployment from Vietnam was planned and executed over a period of months and years. The bulk of the redeployment from Desert Storm occurred over a period of three months. Given the relative brevity of America's last three conflicts (Urgent Fury in Grenada, Just Cause in Panama, and Desert Storm in Southwest Asia), it appears that planners will not have the luxury of waiting till the end of a conflict to plan for redeployment. As Dan Oberdorfer, a noted columnist for The Washington Post, observed:

"As the Army and nation shift from forward defense to power projection as a primary strategy, the armed forces of the United States must achieve the ability to execute major contingency operations as a seamless and interconnected strategic-operational design."
In a smaller Army with fewer resources, efficiency in redeployment is required for the force to maintain an acceptable readiness posture for future missions. A smaller force simply cannot afford to waste time in inefficient redeployment practices and remain a credible deterrent. Because there is no doctrine for redeployment, the question of how to redeploy efficiently becomes even more difficult.

The intent of this paper is to capture the essence of redeployment lessons from the Vietnam War, Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises, and Operation Desert Storm in order to synthesize generic considerations for the redeployment of a corps. The corps is selected because it represents the belief that a "capabilities" based Army focused on power projection will center on the corps as a deployment "package." Further, according to FM 100-15 Corps Operations, the corps is the link between tactical and operational levels of war, exercising operational as well as tactical responsibilities. The corps commander and his staff may be forced to translate strategic guidance into operational objectives. In a future Army of four or less corps, redeployment takes its place as an operational level concern because the readiness of each corps will have a tremendous impact on the Army as a whole. The search for "essence" of redeployment considerations need not utilize a methodology that encompasses the entire Army; rather, a cross section of units and experiences will suffice.
METHODOLOGY

The redeployment of the 1st ID from Vietnam in Operation Keystone Blue Jay, some generic REFORGER lessons provided by Military Traffic Management Command, and after action reports from VII Corps in Operation Desert Storm provide the basis of this study. The results of redeployment surveys sent out by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) following Operation Desert Storm (Appendix A- Sample Survey Forms) are compared with historical background to capture common redeployment considerations. Finally, the paper concludes with a proposal for the doctrine and planning of redeployment.
CHAPTER II-OPERATION KEYSTONE BLUE JAY

"The redeployment of the 1st ID from Vietnam marked the final phase of over four years of counterinsurgency warfare." 8

In accordance with United States Army Republic of Vietnam (USARV) OPLAN 183-69 published 1 October 1969, the 1st ID staff began planning for its possible redeployment from Vietnam. The division commander and staff were determined not to let the order to depart from Vietnam take them by surprise. The concept was to have a "redeployment contingency plan" available when needed. When the division was given the directive to redeploy to Fort Riley, Kansas in January, the redeployment contingency plan became 1st ID OPLAN 183-69. 9

In executing redeployment, commanders and staffs of subordinate units (provided with early redeployment information) were able to accurately inventory all property and equipment, increase the time and energy spent preparing equipment for shipment, and reduce personnel anxiety and confusion. A turn-in program of nonessential equipment was initiated as early as 20 January 1970, which provided noticeable benefits. First, the amount of equipment to be turned in during standdown was reduced. Second, units became proficient at preparing equipment for turn-in during the early stages of redeployment. In execution, the division essentially
pulled its three brigades into fire support bases and began the redeployment process.

The division standdown and final processing point were at Di An base camp because of its central location and facilities. The division utilized four segments for standdown. The first three segments were "brigade slices" consisting of a brigade headquarters and headquarters company, at least three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, and supporting engineer, signal, medical, military police and maintenance units. The final segment was the division headquarters, support command headquarters, and support and administrative units not included in the brigade slices. The Saigon Support Command provided personnel for redeployment control, supervision, and technical assistance.

One of the most critical tasks the 1st ID faced as it attempted redeployment was to coordinate its departure from the combat zone with other units in III Corps. In conjunction with the 5th ARVN Division, 1st ID planners developed a detailed plan for 5th ARVN to assume 1st ID's sector without easing pressure on enemy units. Since most outprocessing could occur within the Di An base camp, 1st ID was able to continue combat operations for an extended period of time while redeploying. Finally, the use of nearby units to assume responsibility for defending Di An allowed support units to remain intact and support the redeployment of combat units before redeploying themselves. Given the time to plan, it is not
surprising that the 1st ID would also develop a process to expedite its departure.

As the units of the 1st ID rolled into Di An, they became OPCON to division headquarters for redeployment. This action relieved subordinate commanders from the responsibility for accomplishing a task for which they had no resources. Each unit was then allocated a certain number of days (D+1 to D+7) to turn-in all major end items.\(^1\) Since units had reached standdown status, it was necessary to have accurate information regarding the amount of equipment remaining at the end of each standdown day. Accordingly, each property book officer submitted a complete inventory of equipment on hand by 1700 the day before standdown. Each day thereafter, a report of what had been turned in on that day was submitted. Following the turn-in of major end items, the remaining time was devoted to turning in all other equipment and supplies and out-processing departing personnel.

Interestingly, by 15 February 1970, the division staff was able to estimate the length of time it would take for each subordinate unit to turn-in equipment and redeploy.\(^1\) Planners were able to forecast redeployment time because the logistical concept, preparation, and support for the redeployment of the 1st ID was equally as well planned and executed as the maneuver and turn-in portions.

Because of prior planning, by 14 February 1970 the 1st ID had completed the turn-in of 25% of its equipment at Di An. Prior to 15 February one maintenance company was ordered to
stand down and establish turn-in points for supplies and equipment at Di An.\textsuperscript{12} Subsequently, a large amount of supplies and materiel were turned over to other units in Vietnam. However, the bulk of the division's heavy equipment was processed and turned in to the Saigon Support Command at Long Binh. Ultimately, the division's prudent use of its own maintenance company to assist turn-in made the redeployment a smoother, more efficient operation.

Some specific logistics lessons learned from the 1st Infantry Division's after action review follow. A number of lessons learned from this experience may be relevant to an overall consideration for redeploying a corps.

1) Turn-in standards --soldiers did not understand vehicle preparation requirements, and high pressure cleaning equipment was not available.

2) Transfer/turn-in of equipment-- detailed procedures were not ironed out in advance; accounting for equipment temporarily loaned to other units was problematic. The recommendation was that a representative from Military Assistance Command Vietnam J-4 (logistics) be present to preside over equipment disputes.

3) Early turn-in should start thirty days prior to the standdown of the first unit.

4) Turn-in points should co-locate with wash racks whenever possible.
5) Insufficient tie down equipment hampered the ability of units to move to processing locations.

6) Requisitions for all kinds of supplies increased during redeployment. Redeploying units must anticipate and program their needs early during the standdown process to allow the supply system to work. 13

The execution of Operation Keystone Blue Jay officially began on 15 February 1970 and concluded on 7 April--52 days later. 17,000 personnel and 45,000 major end items were processed for redeployment; and a total of 3,600 square kilometers of area of responsibility were transferred to other units. Analysis of this redeployment effort may yield considerations that apply to any redeployment effort.

Analysis

While it is true that the redeployment from Vietnam was largely a division effort, some generic "truths" about the redeployment process are apparent. First, periodic guidance from the next level higher headquarters concerning redeployment must be emphasized and given on a regular basis. The benefits are obvious: planning guidance, even if informal, provides units with the ability to at least think about how they will organize for a particular task. (For example, the use of a divisional maintenance company to establish turn-in points for supplies and equipment.) Second, upon notification of redeployment, units must initiate accountability of supplies and equipment. Whether the equipment will be shipped out, turned over to another unit, or turned into some type of
prepositioned stock, it must be accounted for. Postponing the accountability process simply delays the inevitable. Finally, the concept of an early turn-in for nonessential equipment is superb. Simply, early turn-in of equipment maximizes available time for other tasks like preparing vehicles for shiploading, airloading, etc.

A review of the 1st ID's redeployment indicates division leaders organized their move by paying attention to several key areas. While no real doctrine was available for "how to" redeploy, planners used common sense and basic organizational skills to establish what became in effect a standard operating procedure (SOP) for redeploying brigades. The division also organized and trained for their redeployment--for example, standing down units in brigade slices and utilizing a division maintenance company to facilitate turn-in of equipment. The division provided the materiel and leadership to get the job done. The logistics base at Di An provided the best available turn-in site for equipment and was accessible to Saigon Support Command. Ultimately, leaders had a central location for which to focus their efforts and ensure timely redeployment.

It is difficult to determine what happened to the institutional knowledge about redeployment gained from Vietnam. Some might even argue that the lessons from Vietnam are division level lessons and as such are not applicable to considerations for redeploying a corps. However, a review of other division level redeployments from Vietnam
highlights the same experiences—indicating a commonality throughout the Army. For example, the 9th Infantry Division's AAR for redeployment from Vietnam highlights the following as critical factors in the success of its redeployment:

1) The early formation of a staff group dedicated to redeployment upon receipt of the warning order to redeploy.

2) Cooperation from higher headquarters—especially the Saigon Support Command. 14

Despite the common experience of the Army's redeployment from Vietnam, doctrinal literature of the post Vietnam 70's still did not address principles, concepts, or execution of the redeployment process. Instead, what developed were either local SOP's or (later) guidance from a fledgling organization known as the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). The lessons learned from MTMC in a number of Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises provide an interesting contrast (on a larger scale) to the Vietnam redeployment experience.
CHAPTER III-REFORGER 1983

REFORGER 1983 was the eighth in a series of annual exercises involving the strategic sealift and airlifts of major Army units to Europe. As a part of REFORGER, units deployed with their vehicles and equipment to Europe via rail and highway through continental United States (CONUS) sea ports of embarkation (SPOE) and air ports of embarkation (APOE). Ocean vessels were discharged at various European sea ports of debarkation (SPOD) and aircraft at air ports of debarkation (APOD). Through host nation support, soldiers were moved to SPOD's, linked up with their equipment, and subsequently moved to an exercise area. Following a two week corps on corps (usually V Corps versus VII Corps) exercise, units moved back to European SPODs and APODs for redeployment back to the United States.

MTMC's involvement in REFORGER 83 began with a planning conference at Fort Hood, Texas in March 1983 and continued through November 1983 when the final piece of cargo reached its home station. One objective of these conferences was to prevent incomplete railcar scheduling problems that occurred during the REFORGER 1982 rail redeployment to Bremerhaven, Germany. Final CONUS deployment plans were published in June 1983. In general, shiploading for deployment began on 1 September from three SPOD's and was completed on 3 September. The REFORGER 83 deployment process is best described as "careful planning
combined with detailed execution." Redeployment from Europe would prove to be another issue entirely.

On 4 October 1983, following the conclusion of the maneuver portion of REFORGER 1983, units began to send vehicles and cargo back to Bremerhaven. As usual, the German rail system was extremely supportive and units had no problem getting to the SPOD. However, upon arrival at the port, several problems began to arise:

1) Vehicular cargo from unit assembly areas arrived poorly maintained and with unsecured equipment and personal items in the cabs or cargo beds.

2) 95% of all cargo for redeployment arrived without documentation. Of the documentation received, 80% had to be redone.

3) Units were not annotating damage to vehicles from the maneuver exercise prior to shipment. The crews of the roll-on roll-off (RORO) ships would not accept damaged vehicles for shipment without proper documentation.

4) 35% of vehicles required starting assistance. 5% of the outgoing vehicles were nonoperational. The Port Support Activity (PSA) at Bremerhaven had only one maintenance contact team with limited jump start capability. This often resulted in lengthy delays in getting vehicles loaded on ships.

5) Only 60% of container express (CONEXs) were banded. Few had valid packing lists.

6) About 90% of the keys for the M-880, M911, M915 and M-916 vehicles were missing.
7) Cargo was not loaded on ships with a stow plan designed to assist the receiving port. For example, maintenance and recovery vehicles were not readily accessible to receiving port personnel. Adherence to a ship load plan would have prevented this.

8) Inexperienced stevedores caused delays in the loading and off loading of equipment.¹⁸

The list of REFORGER lessons learned could drag on ad infinitum, however, it may be more interesting to note what recommendations came from MTMC concerning the REFORGER 83 experience.

**MTMC'S REDEPLOYMENT RECOMMENDATIONS**

First, MTMC recommended that redeploying units be provided documentation assistance in the assembly area. Next, it was recommended that Forces Command (FORSCOM) and United States Army Europe emphasize that the exercise directive be followed for redeployment. For example, the exercise directive required CONEXs to be banded, but only 60% made it to Bremerhaven banded.¹⁹ Most of the CONEXs were more than 15 years old, and without banding, subject to pilferage—which did occur. Third, MTMC recommended that material handling equipment at each port be made available for on/off loading. Noticeable delays in loading occurred when ship crews had to load using the ships own material handling equipment. Specifically, MTMC wanted the use of shore cranes which can lift forty pieces per hour as opposed to five pieces
per hour by the ship. Finally, FORSCOM was asked to develop a standard format for Port Support Activities to eliminate maintenance support shortfalls. The idea was to ensure sufficient maintenance personnel were on hand to get vehicles loaded and off loaded. In summary, the MTMC REFORGER 83 experience reinforces some of the lessons from Vietnam and introduces some new ones.

Like Vietnam, the lessons seem to fall into several categories: redeployment doctrine, training, organization, materiel, and leadership. An integration of lessons learned from REFORGER 83 by each category follows.

1) Doctrine. Again, no specific doctrinal publication addressed the redeployment process, however, MTMC had several deployment planning guides which should have aided the process. Unfortunately, redeployment did not get the kind of months long planning as the deployment. The mindset that redeployment is not important shows up in MTMC's after action report for REFORGER 83 where the last item, on the last page, is a recommendation that, "MTMC coordinate documentation teams to monitor exercise redeployment documentation in the staging areas."  

2) Training. Deficiencies in training for redeployment are highlighted by vehicles and units randomly showing up at Bremerhaven without cargo documentation or a plan for shiploading and redeployment. The fundamental truth is that units simply do not get enough practice at deployment and redeployment as an activity. Standard operating procedures
(with a doctrinal base) and soldiers trained to execute movement, cargo documentation, and shiploading could have prevented unnecessary delays at the SPOD.

3) Organization. In 1983, as now, the Army had a limited number of companies capable of handling port activities (terminal transfer units). As a result, Port Support Activities were created to execute the off loading requirement. Typically, these ad hoc organizations have difficulties in both manpower and equipment. Depending on where the task "redeployment" falls out in a unit's mission essential task list, may determine the amount of training put in to moving and off loading equipment. An alternative may be to state up front that the U.S. Army intends to contract much of the deployment and redeployment process. However, the absence of those skills in the force structure limits the Army's ability to go (or leave) where and when it wants to.

4) Materiel. Perhaps the most glaring materiel shortfall came in the area of material handling equipment (MHE). Designated Port Support Activities (PSA) were generally without the kinds of MHE necessary to assist in loading or off-loading a ship. A detailed redeployment plan could have forecast this situation and allowed for contract of the necessary shore cranes and other MHE to get the job done.

5) Leadership. REFORGER 83 seems to provide the classic example of the focus of most Army leaders, i.e., "How do we get there?"-- as opposed to "How do we get home?". An example of this mindset occurs in the absence of maintenance personnel
provided to the Port Support Activity. Further, leadership present at the redeployment assembly areas could have prevented most of the maintenance problems if leadership had been as keyed to redeployment as deployment.

The advent of the REFORGER exercise allowed the U.S. Army to get some practice at large scale movement of men and equipment. Yet, like the post-Vietnam lessons, there appears a reluctance on the part of the Army as an institution to incorporate the redeployment lessons learned from its REFORGER experience into doctrinal literature. A review of MTMC REFORGER AAR's dating back to 1978 indicates the same problems are apparent in every exercise. Continual problems are highlighted as:

1) Cargo documentation procedures—units do not understand the requirement.

2) Accurate unit equipment lists for shipping—units do not have an exact fix on what is to be shipped.

3) Identification of sensitive items and security of cargo in general—packing lists left off CONEXs, etc.

4) Movement control of equipment once it reaches the SPOD—vehicles that will not start, lack of maintenance crews, failure of units to communicate with port agencies, and failure to commit leadership to the redeployment. An analysis of these recurring problems indicates that they were all "fixable" had the institution desired to do so.
CHAPTER V--GETTING HOME FROM "THE STORM" - SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

Success: Coming about, taking place, or turning out as was hoped for. Failure: A falling short, a losing of power or strength.  

On 4 August 1990 the President of the United States ordered American Forces to deploy to Southwest Asia (SWA) in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Six months later, the Iraqi Army had been decisively defeated in what came to be known as the "100 hours' war." The story of the operational "end run," to avoid Iraqi strength and bring about quick victory, has become well known to the American public and throughout the U.S. Army. A story that is only now getting the attention it deserves is the story of how American forces came home from Operation Desert Storm.

As soon as it was apparent that victory was complete, the American public began to clamor for the troops to come home (see Truman quote page 1). American redeployment began as announced in the 6 March 1991 Washington Post:

"The key issue is that the American public views the war as having been successfully fought and wants to bring the troops home as quickly as possible."  

The Post article went on to describe some interesting facets of the "planned" withdrawal. First, a symbolic redeployment of 4,000 members of the XVIII airborne corps would take place,
on 7 March, followed a week later by 15,000 members of other services and units. The rest of the redeployment schedule had not been determined. One source indicated, "That's [a redeployment plan] clearly what we have to come up with." and another indicated, "It's going to be a very carefully thought-out plan." These statements in the *Washington Post* reinforce the point that redeployment planning for Operation Desert Storm did not occur until after the victory. Whether or not such planning was sufficient for redeployment execution remains to be proven.

**GUIDANCE FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS**

The official FORSCOM redeployment after action review (AAR) recounting the salient points and lessons of Desert Shield and Desert Storm opens with the following statement:

"The redeployment of Active Component (AC) and reserve component forces and the subsequent demobilization of RC forces were much more difficult than we expected." The report goes on to make several recommendations. First, supported and supporting combatant commanders, the services, and the joint staff need to participate in redeployment exercises based on future scenarios. Second, little if any guidance exists to assist combatant commanders in developing, planning and executing major redeployment operations. Finally, the paper indicates that a smaller, "capabilities based" force must be able to redeploy rapidly anywhere in the world.
Some other key lessons learned from the strategic/operational perspective include:

1) There was an almost instantaneous requirement to redeploy large numbers of troops and a massive volume of equipment with an inadequate redeployment structure. The short duration of the war, combined with the demand for a rapid redeployment, also placed huge demands on air and sea lift resources that had been operating beyond peak capacity for a number of months. The scarcity of air and sea lift resources limited the FORSCOM redeployment effort to about 5,000 soldiers a day. (In fact, Army allocations never got above 4,000 personnel a day.)

2) Initially there was no overall plan for redeployment. According to a United States Army Central Command (USARCENT) memorandum for record dated 21 May 1991, redeployment planning began on 27 January 1991. However, the first mention of redeployment planning with subordinate units involved is a 4 March 1991 CENTCOM J-4 redeployment conference held in Riyadh, three days before the "symbolic redeployment" began. Clearly, until required, redeployment had not been anywhere near the forefront of the FORSCOM or CENTCOM staff's planning thoughts.

3) Logistics operations underlined the need for dedicated transportation assets during periods of crisis. Many unit equipment sets were shipped in an administrative fashion, without regard to unit integrity, to a number of ports.
As a result, the reconstitution process was delayed.
(Witness the 1st Infantry Division's 10 December 1991 announcement on page 1.)

4) Original forecasted shipping time from SWA was 45-60 days. This period was extended to 60-90 days. Unit readiness was impacted due to non-receipt of critical equipment in a timely fashion. By 10 September 1991 over 16.8 million square feet of Army unit equipment had returned to the Continental United States (CONUS). One hundred and fifty ships, totaling 249 voyages, had been used to move this cargo. Eleven CONUS ports supported the redeployment. Despite this tremendous effort, the 1st Infantry Division would take another 90 days to reach a spot readiness rate of 90%.

The story of other VII Corps units is roughly the same, begging the question, "Can the U.S. Army afford a six to eight month lag time between redeployment from combat and full preparation for deployment?" Intuitively, the answer must be no. A smaller force will mean less crisis response capability unless that force can sustain a high level of combat readiness even upon redeployment. Given the absence of redeployment doctrine and a propensity to repeat the same mistakes, it remains to be determined, "What must be done?"
CHAPTER V-THE SURVEY

In an attempt to answer, "What must be done?", the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army directed the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) to survey units returning from Desert Storm about their redeployment experience. (See Appendix A-Sample Redeployment Survey.) The results of this survey resound like a chime ringing from the Army's collective past. Vietnam, numerous REFORGERs and now Desert Storm are offering the Army of the Nineties an opportunity to learn from the past. In as much as the force structure of the future seems to be focusing on the corps as the centerpiece of operations, an attempt will be made to apply the results of the analysis at the corps level.

CALL initiated distribution of Desert Storm surveys on 17 November 1991. The CALL survey was sent to every returning CONUS unit, targeted towards achieving responses from both organizational (Infantry, Armor, Artillery, etc.) and direct support (forward support battalions, main support battalions, etc.) units. In total, 774 organizational and 121 direct support surveys were sent to seven divisions, two armored cavalry regiments, and two reserve field artillery brigades. Overall the return rate for the CALL survey was approximately 50%.31 The intent of this paper is not to recount the results of every CALL survey; instead, it will focus on common, Army-wide issues with particular attention to recurring lessons from Vietnam and REFORGER--attempting to identify the redeployment
considerations for a corps. As a cross reference, similarities between Vietnam, REFORGER, and Desert Storm will appear parenthetically beneath the Desert Storm finding. Using a building block concept, the analysis will begin with comments from the division level and move to corps level.

**Division Level Comments**

Organizational units from virtually every division offered the following:

1) "No one was responsible for the redeployment assembly area (RAA) except us." The absence of a coherent redeployment plan left divisional units on their own to plan and execute much of the redeployment. The conditions, in what eventually became the RAA, were described as "worse than six months in the field." (Because of the haste involved, this lesson may be unique to Operation Desert Storm.)

2) In the rush to redeploy, even SOPs were thrown out. For example, simple things like wiring keys to steering columns were overlooked. (This lesson was first encountered on REFORGER 1978.)

3) Equipment accountability- "No one wrote down serial numbers of shipping containers loaded with their equipment." Sensitive items and weapons were loaded into containers without documentation. The result was a number of "misplaced" sensitive items and weapons. A number of commercial containers also ended up at the wrong location as "frustrated cargo." (REFORGER.)
4) Inadequate availability of material handling equipment. The increased trend towards containerizing equipment for movement has caused shortages in material handling equipment. (Vietnam/REFORGER.)

5) Class IX (repair parts) necessary for the repair of vehicles were also packed and in transit. As a result, a number of not mission capable (NMC) vehicles had to be towed on to ships. (REFORGER.)

**CORPS LEVEL COMMENTS**

Building on the division level comments, the CALL surveys offered a number of comments particularly relevant at the corps level:

1) A number of corps units were given only one day to prepare for redeployment after traveling 300 miles to the redeployment assembly area (RAA). Since corps controlled the movement of units back to the RAA, some forethought should have been given to time requirements for maintenance, preparing vehicles for shipment, etc. In general, divisions commented on the lack of guidance from corps to prepare them for redeployment.

2) Corps provided no specific point of contact (POC) for redeployment. No standard procedures were established to account for and prepare materiel for shipment. Exacerbating the problem was the late addition of customs inspections with an entirely different set of standards for shipping equipment.
3) The redeployment assembly areas and the forward staging area for shipment were too small for the divisions to accomplish what was expected.

4) Direct support units became overwhelmed by lack of parts and a huge workload. No one at the corps level was managing the maintenance and class IX effort in support of redeployment.\textsuperscript{32} (REFORGER)

This list of corps level redeployment "lessons learned" is by no means all inclusive. However, the most salient considerations for redeployment planning have been touched on. A recapitulation of these redeployment lessons-- from Vietnam to REFORGER to Desert Storm-- utilizing the categories of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, and leadership might prove useful.
CHAPTER VI-THE COMMON THREAD

"REDEPLOYMENT Completes the successful airland operation campaign. As the requirement to maintain the full, forward deployed force abates, redeployment considerations increase. Redeployment will be driven by such factors as redefined world threats, revised national military strategy, demobilization decisions, and the nature of current contingency requirements." TRADOC PAM 525-25B (Draft) 33

DOCTRINE

Beginning with Vietnam, a doctrinal void is apparent concerning redeployment. Primarily, the absence of doctrine seems to come from the Army's focus on getting to the battle as opposed to coming home. A large army may be able to afford such a focus; a smaller Army with an equal number of commitments probably cannot. The alternative of selectively choosing to honor our commitments may be politically unacceptable. In recognition of the need for mobilization, deployment and redeployment doctrine, the Army has begun work on Field Manual (FM) 100-17 devoted entirely to those areas and is including redeployment as a topic in the new FM 100-5 Operations. Additionally, MTMC has developed and published Pamphlet 700-2 Logistics Handbook For Strategic Mobility Planning and a Deployment Planning Guide that offer planners mileage data and load factors for aircraft and sealift. Using MTMC's data, a planner can estimate the number of lift
assets required for a unit as well as the travel time to a particular destination. When the hard data provided by MTMC is combined with the principles (hopefully) outlined in the projected FM 100-17, and FM 100-5, the Army may have fixed its doctrinal shortfall.

**TRAINING**

The foremost training problem that stands out is: failure to plan for redeployment, i.e. conceptualizing redeployment, RAA activities, and shiploading. With the apparent loss of the REFORGER exercises, the Army will have to rely on rotations to its combat training centers to teach the lessons of deployment/redeployment. Most divisions utilize a deliberate planning process for training center rotations that begins anywhere from eight months to one year prior to execution. The obvious advantage of a training center rotation is that units know their approximate redeployment date well in advance. The deliberate planning for redeployment is lengthy and detailed. In order to shorten the time required to develop effective redeployment plans, the Army must standardize the manner and techniques for which a unit deploys to and redeploy from a training center. As it now stands, each division does business its own way--when a division redeploy as part of a corps, this "we do it this way" attitude can be counterproductive. Hence a requirement exists for standardized planning and tactics, techniques, and procedures for redeployment.
The training centers cannot provide practice at shiploading. While some units such as the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Georgia get significant practice at the art of shiploading, others get none at all. One Desert Storm after action document went so far as to suggest that the Army only station combat forces along American coastal areas in order that it become more deployable. In as much as moving all forces to coastal areas is not achievable in the short term, it would seem prudent for the Army to develop a system for routinely training all vehicle crews in the art of shiploading. Additionally, the establishment of routine working relationships with RORO ships, container ships and their crews could provide a synergistic effect that hastens both deployment and redeployment.

**ORGANIZATION**

Redeployments from Vietnam and REFORGER featured command and control provided by organizations whose charter was to "get units home." These organizations were established well in advance of any redeployment effort. In Desert Storm such was not the case: centralized control of redeployment did not occur until after units had already begun the process. From the division perspective, "No one at corps was in charge." Interestingly, VII Corps did come on line in the May/June 1991 time frame with a "Redeployment Command" (RECOM). Essentially the RECOM utilized small Port Support Teams (PSTs) provided by the divisions (between 300-800 personnel) to finalize preparation and load vehicles and cargo for
shipment. At its peak, VII Corps RECOM totaled about 3,000 soldiers. It is unclear why it took two months for VII Corps to put a RECOM together—clearly, the difficulties in redeployment cried out for some agency to manage the effort. That the VII Corps did eventually do so is a credit to the corps leadership.

While the creation of PSTs is now generally accepted throughout the Army (as it was for the REFORGER experience), the organization and equipment necessary to run a PST is not. If the corps is to be the linchpin of future deployments/crisis response, this must change. Either through the corps support structure or through an increase in the size of the corps, the Army must build robustness in planning staff, maintenance units, automated property accountability, and material handling equipment to accomplish the redeployment mission. Doctrine must address the organization, mission, duties/responsibilities, training, and equipment (i.e. MHE, gloves, tools, hard hats, etc.) that PSTs and the redeployment effort require.

Currently much of the corps support structure is in the Reserves; this needs to be relooked in light of the shrinking force vis-a`-vis deployment/redeployment requirements. The lead time required for mobilizing so much of the corps support structure may prohibit both rapid response and redeployment.

MATERIEL

Materiel shortages highlighted since Vietnam include material handling equipment, cleaning equipment, and a method for accurately accounting for equipment before, during,
and after shipment. The first two problems might be easily fixed as the Army downsizes and more MHE and high pressure cleaners become available--provided these items become a part of the thinking/planning for the redeployment process.

Property accountability is another problem all together.

The Army's response to property accountability in shipment has centered on the Logistics Marking and Recording System (LOGMARS). LOGMARS uses preprinted bar code labels and bar code readers to identify supplies and equipment (much like a modern supermarket). The underlying problem with LOGMARS is the training of units concerning the labels and equipment. Misconceptions about LOGMARS include: (1) Any bar code label is sufficient to ship an item of equipment. (2) Using only one bar code label for two pieces of equipment, for example a truck with trailer. (3) The LOGMARS code sticker will not stick in cold or hot weather, and there was no standard location to place the sticker. These problems combined to create havoc, not only with manifesting and accounting for equipment to be loaded, but also on ship stow plans. One organizational comment during the redeployment from Operation Desert Storm pointed out the problem in stow plans:

"Stow plans have been considered a big joke by the Port Support Team. Not a ship has been stowed in accordance with the stow plan." 36

Additionally, it appears that terminal transportation units in charge of the stow planning process made an arbitrary (probably forced by MTMC's need to maximize space utilization
and the time shortage) decision to load ships by like equipment rather than by unit integrity.

Simply, if the Army intends the corps deploy, move, fight, and redeploy as a package, then it cannot accept the piecemeal movement of equipment. The results of the piecemeal redeployment of a corps could be disastrous if that corps were called on to respond to another crisis. One need only study the World War I campaign at Gallipoli to find numerous lessons about the pitfalls of reconfiguring shiploads before combat. Finally, the LOGMARS system did not extend to the numerous containers used to redeploy equipment from SWA. Currently, there is no system for tracking containers moving by commercial carrier. However, by studying commercial industry, which is capable of tracking shipment of goods anywhere in the world, the Army should be able to correct this problem. In fact, with the help of Federal Express, Army Materiel Command did develop a system for tracking parts during movement. Unfortunately, this system appears to be a temporary fix for what was perceived as a short term problem, instead of a systemic fix for a system wide problem.

Vietnam, REFORGER, and Desert Storm all point to four critical needs for redeployment. The first is sufficient shipping space— the planned purchase of additional RORO ships should go a long way in alleviating this concern. Second, all AAR's discuss the need for high pressure water systems to clean vehicles and equipment. As mentioned earlier, an effective
redistribution of existing Army assets could fix this problem as well as the third problem--lack of material handling equipment. Finally, a process that began in the REFORGER years seems to have peaked with Desert Storm, namely, the containerization of bulk supplies and equipment. A standard allocation of Sea-Land vans and CONEXs needs to be decided upon for use Army wide. Standardization would enable movement planners to know with some certainty the shipping needs of a corps. For example, the 1st Cavalry Division moved 10,300 pieces of equipment from SWA. This equated to 16 vessels. Additionally, the division shipped 156 commercial containers containing other cargo. (The size of 1st Cavalry Division's PST was 800 soldiers, and might serve as a model for others to follow.) If the standard corps is configured around four divisions (using the 1st Cavalry numbers as a guide), then the corps would require 64 vessels to move 41,200 pieces of equipment and 624 commercial containers. Essentially, the projected future RORO fleet means the Army could deploy or redeploy one heavy division at a time without outside assistance.

**LEADERSHIP**

A fundamental tenant of leadership is discipline and the building of a disciplined force. The failure to secure equipment prior to shipment, as in REFORGERs and Desert Storm, is generally ascribed to a lack of discipline on the part of soldiers and leaders at all levels. Simply, somebody failed to check the final preshipment status of equipment identified for
redeployment. This is almost exclusively a redeployment phenomena. A soldier reasons that he must have a particular item for combat-- but not when returning from the war. As mentioned earlier, this failure to consider the possibility of the "next" crisis could cause innumerable problems for a smaller contingency oriented (capabililties based) Army.

A similar leadership problem the Army must cope with is the political leadership that forces rapid redeployment of soldiers without considering equipment. Policy makers must be made to understand that a constrained U.S. Army cannot afford the kind of down time for maintenance and misplaced equipment that occurred as a result of Desert Storm. In this severely constrained environment, senior Army commanders must consider, as a part of deployment planning, the question: "How much time have I got to get reset before my next operation?" This change in the thinking about redeployment is a virtual paradigm shift for most Army planners and will not occur overnight. Nonetheless, a paradigm shift is necessary if Army forces (corps) are to maintain a high state of readiness.

The subject of leadership occurs throughout the discussion of the categories of doctrine, training, organization, and materiel. Besides those comments already directed towards leadership and redeployment, the greatest need is for Army leadership to consider the future. The decisions made now about force structure, equipment, organization, and doctrine will greatly impact on the future success or failure of a
capabilities based force. The author's argument is that Army leadership must ingrain redeployment into the thinking and planning of the Army and American political structure in order to avoid a six to eight month lag time in readiness following any major deployment.
CHAPTER VII-CONCLUSION

The military authors/analysts Eliot Cohen and John Gooch in their work, *Military Misfortunes*, outline three basic kinds of failure-- failure to learn, failure to anticipate, and failure to adapt.

"The failure to absorb readily accessible lessons from recent history is in many ways the most puzzling of all military misfortunes." 40

That the U.S. Army had failed to learn from its Vietnam redeployment experience is self evident. Failure to anticipate is defined as: "The inability to foresee and take appropriate measures to deal with an enemy's move, or a likely response to a move of one's own." 41 It could further be argued that the "enemy" in any redeployment is the factor of efficient use of time. Here the unwillingness of the U.S. Army to adopt redeployment "lessons learned" into its doctrinal literature points to a failure to adapt. Cohen and Gooch outline failure to adapt as follows:

"Where learning failures have their roots in the past, and anticipatory failures look to the future, adaptive failures suggest an inability to handle the changing present." 42

Perhaps a peacetime mentality prevailed which focused on the central element of most exercises, i.e. getting forces to the exercise area. This focus on deployment appears in contrast with typical American beliefs about war. That is, America’s
wars should be quick and decisive, with a rapid return of the armed forces to the U.S.A.  

The legacy of the Army's failure to learn and failure to adapt for redeployment seems to be apparent in the Army's rapid return from Desert Storm. The definitive history of Desert Storm may not be written for a number of years, but in the short term, it seems prudent to examine our most recent conflict to determine if there are lessons applicable to the Army today. Towards that end, an examination (using Cohen and Gooch's model) of the redeployment from Operation Desert Storm may shed some light on the state of the institution regarding redeployment. Cohen and Gooch outline a five step process for mapping out "military misfortune"—for the sake of brevity, this paper will utilize only the first two of those steps.  

First, it must be determined, "What was the failure?"; next, "What were the critical tasks that went unfulfilled?"

The results of the CALL survey, examination of AAR's from Operation Keystone Blue Jay (the redeployment of the 1st Division from Vietnam), and several REFORGERs, highlighted one primary failure on the part of the U.S. Army—the failure to include redeployment planning as an integral part of planning for combat operations. As an adjunct to this failure to plan, the following are consistent, recurring "critical tasks that went unfulfilled":

1) Lack of doctrine and guidance from higher headquarters. In the absence of guidance, or doctrine, units
were free to do as they wished. Often this resulted in disparity in the execution of redeployment between units.

2) Units failed to plan as extensively for redeployment as they do deployment. This became especially apparent in the maintenance posture of units as they moved to SPODS. Numbers of vehicles were not mission capable—without mechanics made available to fix problems.

3) Equipment deficiencies for redeployment included the shortage of material handling equipment, cleaning equipment, and a method for accounting for and tracking equipment in the shipping process.

4) Shiploading was conducted by like equipment to optimize square foot utilization, as opposed to unit integrity to optimize combat capability/usefulness. Integral to this problem was a lack of understanding by MTMC and adherence to a stow plan.

When considering these recurring problems, several categories for consideration fall out. First, time—Vietnam and REFORGER allowed time for redeployment, Desert Storm allegedly did not. However, the author would argue that while Desert Shield was a contingency operation, subject to some rather severe time constraints, Desert Storm was a deliberately planned and executed theater offensive campaign plan. The Army simply was not prepared for rapid success and more important, redeployment had not been ingrained as part of the campaign planning process.
Second, security of the force and its equipment must be considered. In Vietnam, it was necessary to turn over the defense of a sector to other units and then redeploy. REFORGER and Desert Storm redeployments did not have to consider personal security due to the absence of any real threat. Therefore, the redeployment effort should have been easier and more readily handled.

Third, cost will arise as a factor to be reckoned with. While not discussed in any detail, the implication of a reduced budget is that armed forces must become more sensitive to how money is spent, even if redeploying from a combat zone. In the return from Desert Storm, thousands of containers were misdelivered to ports—costing money to re-ship. Further, hundreds of thousands of dollars were incurred in demurrage fees when the Army was not able to load or unload a ship in the time allowed.

Fourth, maintenance of a smaller force will have greater impact on deployment and redeployment. Maintenance also ties in to cost, as non-mission capable vehicles slow the loading and unloading of ships.

Lastly, available transportation will directly affect the ability to deploy and redeploy. As noted, a fleet of 16 ROROs can deploy or redeploy one division at a time. Consideration for commercial contracting to move a corps must be thought through in advance to avoid the last minute scrambling characteristic of Desert Storm.
If the Army is to avoid the potential catastrophic failure that Cohen and Gooch attribute to a combination of two or more kinds of failure, it must make basic changes in the institution regarding considerations for redeployment. These changes should be focused at the corps level.
CHAPTER VIII-A PROPOSAL

According to FM 100-15, the structure of a U.S. Army corps provides it the ability to fight at the operational level. A concept for redeployment of a corps should be developed that addresses the entire redeployment process so that future corps can continue to function at the operational level. Otherwise, planners at the strategic level may find themselves out of options when a particular corps is unable to meet a contingency mission because it failed to redeploy and recover from its previous mission in a timely manner. The author's recommendations based on the findings of this paper are as follows:

1) Establish planning for redeployment concurrent with planning for deployment. This should alleviate much of the time crunch experienced in Desert Storm. It is also probably "easier said than done." In this regard, a "nonwarfighting" staff like FORSCOM could take the lead in redeployment planning while the corps continues to focus forward. Since FORSCOM was intimately involved in the deployment of virtually all CONUS units to Desert Storm, they are certainly capable of this type of effort.

2) Determine the requirements for establishment of redeployment assembly areas (RAAs) and forward staging areas (FSAs). Include specifics about composition of port support teams, and numbers of personnel required to operate
an RAA and FSA. I would recommend two sources for this data. First, MTMC's after action reports from REFORGER. Next, a consolidation of all Joint Unit Lessons Learned (JULLS) reports on redeployment from Desert Storm. A correlation of like findings from both reports should allow a synthesis of a "how to" for RAAs, and FSAs.

3) Related to the first recommendation, determine requirements for combat support and combat service support units during redeployment. There is simply no reason why vehicles and equipment cannot be maintained, fixed (if necessary), and subsequently loaded. The example of the 1st ID "standing down" its divisional maintenance company first, so that the company could assist the redeployment effort when returning from Vietnam sets a good precedent. However, the use of internal CSS assets to redeploy a corps must also be executed with an eye toward future contingency missions. In other words, not all corps CSS units should be committed to the redeployment effort, some must "recock" for the next mission. Again, this calls for some up front thinking on what is required for redeployment.

4) Determine procedures to ensure units account for and prepare materiel for shipment. Proper understanding and attention to detail with LOGMARS will alleviate 75% of this problem. The other 25% is containers. Capturing the experience of civilian industry (like Federal Express) might offer some hope in this area.
5) Establish systems which allow turn-in and reissue of materiel of forces in a theater. This was prevalent in Vietnam and almost occurred in Desert Storm. The American way of war, which demands a rapid return home, suggests transfer of equipment to local forces may always be an option. The overriding concern may become the ability of the host nation to pay for transferred equipment. Ultimately, the status of equipment in a theater will be a political decision leading the Army to redeploy or redistribute equipment.

6) From beginning to end, establish corps as the executive agent for movement to and from SPOEs/APOEs and SPODs/APODs. This will allow the corps support structure to plan and execute its redeployment with other agencies in support, instead of the other way around. As currently stands, the corps is not the master of its own fate when it comes to deployment or redeployment. Instead, a number of agencies, both military and civilian (not the least of which is MTMC), attempt to lead the process. The result is often confusing and misleading guidance for units beneath the corps. The proposal is that the Army turn this process around so that all agencies involved understand they work for one boss, the corps commander. As a cautionary note, this attempt at unity of command may require a relook at the corps support structure to ensure adequate staffing.
The findings and suggestions of this paper are by no means all inclusive. However, if the Army takes note of the potential impact of a catastrophic failure in redeployment--and addresses the arguments made herein in doctrine, training, organization, and leadership --it will at least ensure that future Army corps are available to meet the needs of the nation in the event of a crisis. In as much as the corps structure allows the Army to fight at the operational level, it only seems prudent that operational planners consider the readiness of forces before, during and after a redeployment. The alternative--that is forces (corps) that are unable to redeploy to meet sequential contingencies--is unacceptable.
ENDNOTES

1 President Harry S. Truman as quoted in the official FORSCOM AAR for Desert Storm.

2 David Boe, "1st Infantry Division reaches pre-deployment readiness level." The Fort Leavenworth Lamp, (January 31, 1992), 3

3 In accordance with the Fort Leavenworth nonattribution policy, I cannot release the name of the author of this comment—nonetheless, the author's research indicates the comment is accurate. For example, the earliest date found on a FORSCOM redeployment document is 6 March, 1991.


5 US Army. After Action Review, "Operation Desert Storm and Desert Shield, Theater Level Observations" United States Army Europe undated, hereafter cited as "AAR USAREUR."


7 John H. Cushman in his paper Command and Control of Theater Forces: The Future of Force Projection Operations, dated June, 1991 offers the mythical XXI st Airborne Corps as the center of a future JTF. Further, close reading of numerous JULLS reports from Desert Storm point to the corps as the "centerpiece" of command and control.


9 AAR, Operation Keystone Blue Jay pg. 5
10 AAR, Operation Keystone Blue Jay pg. 5
11 AAR, Operation Keystone Blue Jay pg 9
12 AAR, Operation Keystone Blue Jay pg 10
13 AAR, Operation Keystone Blue Jay pg D-8-7
16 MTMC REFORGER 1983 AAR pg.1-1.
17 MTMC REFORGER 1983 AAR pg 1-1.
18 MTMC REFORGER 1983 AAR pg 1-33.
19 MTMC REFORGER 1983 AAR pg 1-34.
20 MTMC REFORGER 1983 AAR pg 1-36.
21 MTMC REFORGER 1983 AAR pg 4-1.

Benjamin Weiser, "First US Withdrawals to Cover All Services."

The Washington Post (6 March, 1991), 26

Benjamin Weiser, "First US Withdrawals to Cover All Services."


US Army. US Army Forces Command After Action Review
"Phase II Redeployment and Demobilization".pg.3. Hereafter cited as "FORSCOM AAR."

FORSCOM AAR," pg.4

FORSCOM AAR," pg.6


US Army Memorandum for record dated...

CALL survey results- specifically, 1st Cavalry Division

US Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-25B (Draft)

US Army. "Joint Unit Lessons Learned (JULLS) long report # 92437-06965."

AAR, 1st CAV"

JULLS long report# 92437-06965

The British excursion into the Gallipoli peninsula in WWI was marked by an absence of logistics planning including the failure to combat load ships. An excellent account of Gallipoli can be obtained from Alan Moorehead's book Gallipoli (New York: Harper and Row, 1982).


"AAR, 1st CAV"


"Cohen and Gooch" pg 27


Cohen and Gooch, page 46. Steps three, four, and five include the conduct of a layered analysis covering all levels of an organization, the production of an analytical matrix graphically portraying key problems, and the production of a "pathway chart" that lays out the steps taken to misfortune.

FM 100-15, Corps Operations, pg 1.

FORSCOM AAR, pg 1.
Appendix A- Center For Army Lessons Learned

Redeployment Survey Forms
In accordance with AR 11-33, Army Lessons Learned Program: System Development and Application, (CALL) is tasked to collect army lessons learned in peacetime and in war.

One of the methods used to collect information from Operation DESERT STORM in Southwest Asia (SWA) is through this survey. Your participation is essential as a source of information. This survey is on a nonattribution basis and all information will be kept confidential. Please feel free to expand on any questions. All information that you can provide is important.

In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, your name is not required. However, you are encouraged to include it so that any followup issues may be resolved. Strict confidentiality will be maintained, and your name will in no way be associated with the results of this survey.

Attach additional sheets for comments as required.

Background information:

NAME (Optional) ___________________________________________ RANK__
BRANCH/MOS ________ DIV/SEP BDE/GROUP ___________ TIME IN UNIT __________
TYPE UNIT ___ ___ DUTY POSITION ___________ TIME IN POSITION __________
HOME STATION LOCATION: (CONUS / OCONUS)

ARRIVAL MONTH/YEAR IN SWA __________ DEPARTURE MONTH/YEAR SWA __________
Other? ______________________________________

NUMBER OF CTC ROTATIONS: RCTP? ___ CMTC? ___ JRTC? ___ NTC?

When completed send to: COMMANDER
Combined Arms Command
ATTN: ATZL-CTL
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-7000

Survey Approval Authority: USAPIC
Control Number: ATNC-AO-91-38C, RCS:MILPC-3

9200426
URVEY PURPOSE:
To identify system failures in the process of redeploying division/separate brigade equipment to home station.

INSTRUCTIONS:
General and specific questions pertaining to the redeployment process are provided below. Articulate and delineate those problems that are correctable at the unit level through improved organizational techniques and equipment and materials, as well as those problems that you attribute to the overall system and subsystems of redeployment. Base your opinions of the redeployment process with respect to your specific duty position. Your perception of a problem may differ from those of fellow logisticians holding different duty positions. However, the compilation of all of these perceptions from different logistical points of view will provide insight into the improvement of overall process of redeployment.

When a unit entered the Redeployment Assembly Area (RAA), what specific and implied tasks was it required to comply with to accomplish the mission of "preparation for redeployment". (Be sure to include the standards for compliance, i.e., preparing equipment for redeployment, maintenance and accountability, movement to the port, personnel taskings, etc.).
2. What were the major "show stoppers", with respect to your logistical area of responsibility, in:
   a. the preparation of a unit's equipment for redeployment
   b. the subsequent movement to the port
   c. the control, security, operability, and accountability once staged at the port awaiting the loading process
   d. the actual loading process onto the ships
3. What were your responsibilities during these processes, and what recommendations would you provide to improve each process?
4. What system was used within the division/separate brigade to track and inform subordinate units of the status inbound equipment?

5. What organizations above the division/separate brigade provided you with this information: how accurate was the data provided?

6. How would you improve reception port operations, relative to your area of responsibility?
7. What major "show stoppers" were encountered at the reception ports in the areas of:
   a. equipment deprocessing into the port holding areas
   b. accountability of off-loaded equipment versus the ship manifest
   c. accountability and security of vehicles/equipment in the port holding area
   d. theft, vandalism and cannibalization of vehicles/equipment and end item components and BLI.
   e. accountability of BLI and subsystem components prior to departure from the holding area
Once consolidated at home station, were the DS-level organizations able to react to customer needs in the areas of supply replenishment, maintenance, property accountability, and transportation? Describe any problems encountered in the process and provide insight into possible "fixes" with respect to doctrine, training, organizations and equipment.
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE DIRECTED SOLELY TOWARD THE SUPPORT OPERATIONS OFFICERS AND THE MATERIEL READINESS OFFICER AND THEIR COUNTERPARTS AT COSCOM AND HIGHER LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS.

9. Did your ASL effectively support the customer during the redeployment process; would you restructure the current system of ASLs to better support your customers?

10. How effective was supply automation support during the redeployment process; did the ULLS and SARSS interface work once the supported units and the DSU were consolidated in the RAA; what were your demand accommodation and demand satisfaction percentages?
11. How could DS level maintenance and supply support be improved to better support the customer (i.e., implementation of new, or fine-tuning existing, doctrine, training, equipment, etc.)?

12. How effective were DS maintenance and supply units in the performance of their mission in the RAA; were they able to provide effective support or were they constrained by their own redeployment timeline?
In accordance with AR 11-33, Army Lessons Learned Program: System Development and Application, (CALL) is tasked to collect army lessons learned in peacetime and in war.

One of the methods used to collect information from Operation DESERT STORM in Southwest Asia (SWA) is through this survey. Your participation is essential as a source of information. This survey is on a nonattribution basis and all information will be kept confidential. Please feel free to expand on any questions. All information that you can provide is important.

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Background information:

NAME (Optional) ____________________________ RANK__________
BRANCH/MOS ________ DIV/SEP BDE/GROUP__________ TIME IN UNIT ______
TYPE UNIT ________ DUTY POSITION ______________ TIME IN POSITION ______
HOME STATION LOCATION: (CONUS / OCONUS)

ARRIVAL MONTH/YEAR IN SWA ________ DEPARTURE MONTH/YEAR SWA ________
Other? __________________________________________

When completed send to: COMMANDER
Combined Arms Command
ATTN: ATZL-CTL
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-7000

Survey Approval Authority: USAPIC
Control Number: ATNC-AO-91-38C, RCS:MILPC-3
REDEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY AREA (RAA)

1. How long was your unit in the RAA prior to redeployment to home station?
   a. One week
   b. Two weeks
   c. Three weeks
   d. One month
   e. Other: ______________

2. What was your unit mission upon entering the RAA?
   a. Prepare equipment for redeployment and shipment to home station
   b. Prepare equipment for turn-in into SWA POMCUS
   c. Prepare equipment for lateral transfer to another unit
   d. Other (explain):

3. What was the maintenance compliance standard for your unit’s equipment prior to redeployment, turn-in or lateral transfer?
   a. Operational with no "dead-lining" deficiencies and all shortcomings corrected or annotated with valid due-out requisitions for repair parts
   b. -10 / -20 level maintenance completed
   c. -10 level maintenance completed
   d. Other (explain):

4. What were the End Item supply standards for your unit’s vehicles, sets, kits, and outfits prior to redeployment, turn-in or lateral transfer?
   a. All End Items/sub-system components 100% complete
   b. All End Items/sub-system components inventoried, and all shortfalls annotated with valid due out requisitions
   c. Equipment redeployed, turned-in or laterally transferred as is
   d. Other (explain):

5. What was your unit DA Form 2406 reportable Operational Readiness (OR) rate prior to entering the RAA?
   a. 90% or above
   b. 80 - 89 %
   c. 70 - 79 %
   d. 69% or below
3. How much time was allotted for your unit to prepare equipment for redeployment, turn-in or lateral transfer?
   a. One week
   b. Two weeks
   c. Three weeks
   d. One month
   e. Other (explain):

7. What was your unit Class IX Perscribed Load List (PLL) zero balance percentage upon entering the RAA?
   a. 10% or below
   b. 11% - 19%
   c. 20% - 29%
   d. 30% or above

8. Did PLL replenishment occur in the RAA?
   a. Yes
   b. No (Explain):

9. Rate the effectiveness and responsiveness of the following categories of direct support (DS) level maintenance and supply operations in the RAA:

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<tr>
<td>DS-level Technical assistance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS-level Technical inspections</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of diagnostic test equipment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forward Support Battalion (FSB) Maintenance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Teams (MST)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of Recoverable Exchange</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(RX) items</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turn-around time for job-ordered equipment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Was your support unit's ability to provide DS-level maintenance and resupply constrained by its own redeployment timeline?
   a. No
   b. Yes (Explain):
11. What was your unit OR rate prior to redeploying your personnel?
   a. 90% or above
   b. 80 - 89 %
   c. 70 - 79 %
   d. 69% or below

COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING ONLY IF YOUR UNIT REDEPLOYED ITS EQUIPMENT TO HOME STATION

12. Describe your unit's organizational mission responsibility in the vehicle and equipment redeployment process.

13. How did your unit organize to prepare vehicles and equipment for shipment to home station?

14. Was equipment preparation performed in the vicinity of:
   a. The designated Sea Port Of Embarkation (SPOE)
   b. The RAA
   c. Other (explain):  

15. What external equipment and/or materials were needed to support the preparation of equipment for sea shipment?
16. How much time was allotted to prepare equipment for sea shipment?
   a. one week
   b. two weeks
   c. other (explain):

17. Were all vehicle Basic Issue Items (BII) inventoried and secured on the
    vehicles prior to movement to the sea port holding area?
   a. Yes
   b. No

   Describe what precautions your unit took to ensure the security and
   accountability of BII and other subcomponents (i.e., banding and sealing OVM
   boxes, recordkeeping of vehicle inventories, etc):

18. Which port(s) did your unit's vehicles and equipment depart from in Saudi
    Arabia?

19. Was your unit's final destination port determined prior to shipment?
   a. YES
   b. NO

20. Were all vehicles and equipment bar code labeled prior to loading?
   a. YES
   b. NO

21. Were vehicles staged in a holding area prior to loading on the ship?
   a. YES
   b. NO
22. Did your unit provide organic personnel to load equipment onto the ship?
   a. Yes
   b. No (if no, what type of organization was tasked with this mission, i.e. a detail from your BN, BDE or DIV, or some other Active or Reserve component unit?)

23. Did your unit provide super cargo personnel to accompany your vehicles and equipment on all ships that transported your equipment?
   a. Yes
   b. No

24. How long were your vehicles stored at the port holding area prior to loading?

25. Who in your organization ensured that all equipment was loaded or was this mission a responsibility of another agency within your BDE or DIV? Explain:

26. What type of ship(s) were your vehicles loaded on?
   a. "Roll-on/Roll-off ships"
   b. Ships requiring crane loading
   c. Both types

27. In your opinion, was unit integrity of equipment in the loading process attempted, or were vehicles loaded regardless of unit designation? Explain:
Did your unit keep track of the ship(s) on which your vehicles and equipment were manifested?

a. Yes
b. No (why not, explain):

Did your unit's equipment arrive at the correct destination port?

a. YES
b. NO

Prior to your departure from SWA, what was your equipment estimated time shipment from SWA to its final destination port?

a. One month
b. Two months
c. Three months
d. Other: __________________________

What was the actual time of shipment to the destination port?

Was your unit informed of any changes/delays in arrival times and/or new destination port locations?

a. Yes
b. No

What agency provided shipment status of incoming vehicles and equipment your organization?

a. Division Transportation Officer (DTO), G-4
b. Movements Control Officer (MCO), DISCOM HQ
c. Support Operations Officer, ________ Support Battalion
d. Other: __________________________

Did your unit aid in the equipment off-loading process into the destination port holding area?

a. YES
b. NO
35. Was your unit able to account for all of its vehicles in the arrival port holding area?
   a. Yes
   b. NO (Explain):

36. How were the vehicles organized in the holding area?
   a. By unit
   b. By vehicle type
   c. Indiscriminately parked
   d. Other (explain):

37. Was adequate security provided in the holding area?
   a. Yes
   b. No

38. Rate the occurrence level of the following problems discovered in the holding area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>LOW</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism/damage to vehicles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of BII</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannibalization of vehicle parts/assembly</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

39. Were vehicles inventoried for completeness prior to departure from the holding area?
   a. Yes
   b. No
40. Were the vehicles already CARC painted with your home station required camouflage pattern?
   a. Yes
   b. No
   c. Other (explain):

41. What was your unit's OR rate at the time of vehicle/equipment consolidation at home station?
   a. 90% or above
   b. 80 - 89%
   c. 70 - 79%
   d. 69% or below

42. How much time will it take/did it take (cross out one) for your unit to achieve an OR rate of 90% or higher?
   a. None
   b. One week
   c. Two weeks
   d. Three weeks
   e. One month or more

43. Were Class II and IX stocks at home station DS unit warehouses sufficient to respond your unit's repair and replace requirements?
   a. Yes
   b. No

44. Did your unit redeploy with 100% of its MTOE authorization for equipment?
   a. Yes
   b. No
PROVIDE INFORMATION FOR POSSIBLE "SYSTEM FIXES" IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

45. ORGANIZING AND PREPARING A UNIT'S EQUIPMENT FOR SHIPMENT AND LOADING ONTO A SHIP.

46. ACCOUNTABILITY AND SECURITY OF EQUIPMENT AT THE DEPARTURE PORT.

47. RECEPTION OF EQUIPMENT AT THE DESTINATION PORT.
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ARTICLES


