War Termination:
Theory, Doctrine, and Practice

A Monograph
by
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AY 91-92

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ABSTRACT

War Termination: Theory, Doctrine, and Practice
by LTC Michael C. Griffith, USA, 51 pages.

This monograph discusses the theory and doctrine of war termination and evaluates their application during the Persian Gulf War.

It defines war termination across the operational continuum. It develops a theoretical war termination model using a rational actor model composed of four sectors -- the government, the military, the people, and the media. This war termination model portrays the rational actors operating within the framework of war expectations and conditions. Based on perceived war conditions of winning, losing, or stalemate, the monograph defines expected actions for each sector based on existing theory.

The monograph traces war termination theory developed in the rational actor model from the strategic level through joint doctrine to US Army doctrine, evaluating Army doctrine for consistency within both the strategic process and the doctrinal hierarchy.

Finally, having defined the war termination theory and doctrine, the monograph evaluates how the theory and doctrine were applied during the Gulf War by comparing model expectations with actual actions and outcomes. Based on this evaluation, the monograph identifies model and doctrinal shortfalls.

The monograph concludes that the war termination model and the US Army warfighting doctrine are fundamentally sound. While the term war termination is commonly applied at the strategic level, the term postconflict activities is more appropriate for the Army's operational and tactical focus. Army doctrine in FM 100-5 does not currently identify a requirement for postconflict activities; the planned 1992 revised edition will address this area. The addition of postconflict activities to FM 100-5 will provide the Army a doctrinal consistency with the joint operational and national strategic levels.
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title of Monograph: War Termination: Theory, Doctrine, and Practice

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Accepted this 27th day of April 1992.

Accession For
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Justification

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Dist. 1

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## Table of Contents

**I.** INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1  
**II.** THE STRATEGIC PROCESS .................................. 3  
**III.** WAR TERMINATION THEORY ............................... 5  
   - THE ACTORS ........................................ 5  
   - THE CONDITIONS ................................... 6  
   - THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL .......................... 11  

**IV.** THE WAR TERMINATION MODEL ............................ 14  
   - THE GOVERNMENT ................................... 14  
   - THE MILITARY ...................................... 19  
   - THE PEOPLE ....................................... 22  
   - THE MEDIA ........................................ 25  

**V.** DOCTRINE .............................................. 27  

**VI.** THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE: THE GULF WAR .... 31  
   - THE GOVERNMENT ................................... 31  
   - THE MILITARY ...................................... 34  
   - THE PEOPLE ....................................... 37  
   - THE MEDIA ........................................ 38  

**VII.** CONCLUSIONS ........................................... 40  

ENDNOTES .............................................. 43  

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................... 49
I. INTRODUCTION

[War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.]^1
Carl Von Clausewitz

No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.  
Carl Von Clausewitz

The study of war has intrigued scholars and professional soldiers alike for centuries. Indeed, two classics that still ring true for students today, Sun Tzu's The Art of War and Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, were written more than four hundred years before the birth of Christ. The theories espoused over the centuries have evolved into the military doctrine of today—much of which is still evolving—as technology, politics, and strategy continue to shape the art of war. As Clausewitz noted in the early nineteenth century, the aim of war and the manner in which it is to be conducted are key ingredients in the decision to enter war. The aim is achieved through the condition or endstate that results from the war; its conduct is the application of resources in space and time to shape the desired conditions. Although the terminology has changed since the Napoleonic era, what Clausewitz identified was the prescription for the strategic process. The "what...to achieve" and the "how...to conduct" of Clausewitz's warfare decision are today expressed in strategy as ends (the objective), ways (the method), and means (the resources).^2

Having decided to wage war, one is faced with the problem of conducting and ending the war under conditions that satisfy the aim or, at least, set the stage for achieving the aim through some other instrument of policy. In World War II, the termination of war was predicated on total defeat and unconditional
surrender of the enemies. Since that time, conflicts involving the United States have been more limited in object. Changes in global politics have shifted US military strategy and US Army doctrine. Commitment of US forces in hostile action presupposes pursuit of national interests and policy which define a required endstate. US Army warfighting doctrine, which supports national military strategy, focuses on the conduct of campaigns and major operations. Given the broad operational continuum faced by the Army, from peacetime engagement to war to postconflict activities, should Army doctrine include war termination?

The focus of this monograph is war termination. Through the process of identifying war termination theory, tracing its course to application in warfighting doctrine, and determining its practical value during war, the monograph will seek to discover any doctrinal modifications that could prove beneficial.

Some terms used require definition. As used here, war refers to the use of military force to achieve a national aim. The scope of the term "war" encompasses hostilities that ensue with or without a formal declaration of war and include police actions, conflicts, and other hostile actions that employ military forces in combat action as an instrument of policy. Shows of force, while employing military forces as an instrument of policy, do not meet the combat criteria and are excluded. War termination includes the process of bringing these combat hostilities to an end and the additional actions, if needed, to achieve the specified aim.

The methodology will consist of five phases. The first phase is the identification of the structure of strategy and the linkage with military objectives in war to provide the framework for evaluation. The second phase is the identification of a war termination theory and
framework to be used in the development of a theoretical war termination model. The third phase is the development of the war termination model based on the synthesis of generally accepted theories of war and war termination. This theoretical war termination model will identify the agents or actors in war and their expected actions under the range of conditions spanning success and failure. The fourth phase is the identification of military doctrine's treatment of the theoretical bases of war termination. The last phase is the evaluation of the theory and doctrine in application during Desert Shield and Desert Storm and the recommendation of any suitable changes. The criterion for the evaluation is the success of theory and doctrine in the achievement of desired endstates.

II. THE STRATEGIC PROCESS

Being incomplete and self-contradictory, (war) cannot follow its own laws, but has to be treated as a part of some other whole; the name of which is policy.5

Carl Von Clausewitz

Strategy is the process of translating national interests into the use of instruments of power in order to achieve those interests.6 It is the identification of appropriate resources and methods of their use to achieve a desired outcome. This process begins at the national level (where it may be influenced by alliance or coalition members) through the identification of national interests. These interests largely represent the foundations of American values, the "domestic tranquility, . . . general welfare, and . . . blessings of liberty" identified by the preamble to the United States Constitution. The interests spawn national objectives that more
specifically relate conditions to values. For example, an interest of the United States is its survival as a free nation; an objective to support the interest of survival is to deter or repel aggression that might threaten national security. 

Instruments available to achieve the national objectives include combinations of economic, political (or diplomatic), and military means. The economic instrument could include trade agreements to preserve the health of the nation's economy and technology export controls to protect the balance of military power.* Exercise of the political instrument is seen in such endeavors as the maintenance of alliances and the support of the United Nations.* The military instrument includes actual or threatened use of force. When these three instruments are combined with ways or methods to achieve objectives, the result defines a national strategy.

National military strategy defines the application of the military instrument to achieve national objectives—a further linking of ends, ways, and means. National military strategy is formulated by the executive branch at the national level and is complemented on a regional basis by commanders-in-chief (CINC) of unified commands who develop regional strategies and plans in support of national objectives. These regional plans are further defined through the lower operational and tactical levels by operations plans that specify unique missions which support the successive higher objectives. This linkage of interests with ends, ways, and means from the national strategic level down through the tactical level of war defines the military instrument’s role in achieving national objectives. As described by one security advisor:

*Policy decides what to do; grand strategy
(or national strategy) decides what mix of
assets . . . to use; military strategy explains
how forces will achieve politically useful
military goals; tactics specifies how forces
should fight . . .

III. WAR TERMINATION THEORY

Every war must end. 11
Fred C. Ikle

How does strategy relate to war termination?
Clausewitz asserted that war is another means of
affecting a government’s policy aims. 12 The policy
aim, as previously noted, can be supported by one or
more instruments of power—military, economic, or
political. In modern war, while the military
instrument is surely one of the predominant forces,
political and economic means are likely to be tightly
interwoven to achieve the desired objective. Central
to Clausewitz’s theory of war is that war is not an end
unto itself, but a means to achieve the policy aim—the
linking of military means to the political end. In
arriving at the decision to terminate a war, a nation
must be satisfied that the aims of the war effort,
either in their original or some modified form, have
been achieved. To better understand the theory and
process, it is useful to construct a war termination
model—the actors, their actions, and the effect of
these actions on the decision to terminate a war.

THE ACTORS

Three groups comprise the actors in war: the
people, the government, and the military—the
Clausewitzian trinity. For war to be a viable policy
means, the policy, the military instrument and the will
of the people must be in consonance. Clausewitz
maintained that a theory which ignored these elements
would be useless.\textsuperscript{13}

A recent addition to these three includes the media as an actor.\textsuperscript{14} The media have achieved actor status through their ability--especially in the age of rapid communications--to provide information to the three primary actors. The media information can serve to unify or disrupt the balance required, in successful war efforts, among the primary actors. An independent media are therefore accorded a role of importance for this analysis.

These four groups are the influencing factors in the application of power to achieve political aims in war. Each group is interlinked to and, to a degree, interdependent on the others, but capable of acting independently in its influence.

The government establishes aims that protect its people and, in turn, is supported by the military and monitored by the media. The people influence government aims through public support (or lack of support) and they provide for the equipping and staffing of the military. The media influence the people and government by stimulating thought or, in the extreme, leading opinion. The military influences governmental aims by the assessment of risks in applying military means and ways. While there are a multitude of other actor definitions possible, these four capture the essence of power in the nation and will serve the requirements for this analysis.

THE CONDITIONS

What is the scope of conditions under which these identified actors will perform? Since the model is concerned with decisions to terminate war, it follows that the conditions of the war or, more precisely, the perceived conditions of the war should provide the framework for defining these
decisions. This is simple enough. At any time up to the point of decision to terminate, a participant in the war can be assessed as winning, losing, or stalemated. What is less simple is making this assessment in the context of aims (or ends) and expectations. Even more difficult—as discussed later—is making this contextual assessment with less than perfect information. Regardless of the pitfalls, the actors must arrive at what each concludes to be the existing condition given an expected outcome.

The expected outcome is the original political aim. Progress toward that aim may be difficult to measure during the course of the war. If the survival of the nation is the political aim, how are the actors to measure success as the war progresses? The national security may be threatened, but survival is binary—either it exists or it does not. Perhaps the degree of threat posed by the opponent can better serve as a measure of success of the war efforts in achieving the stated aim of survival.

The degree of threat remaining or the relative strength of the enemy—his will and ability—will result from the success or failure of the opposing strategies. Hans Delbruck suggested that two strategies of warfighting exist: annihilation and exhaustion. Annihilation focuses on destruction of the enemy’s ability to fight; exhaustion focuses on destruction of the enemy’s will to fight. The ability to fight is a function of the strength of the enemy’s forces; the will to fight includes the strength of enemy forces as well as the strength of its citizens, its leadership, its economy, and its infrastructure.

Each strategy—annihilation and exhaustion—produces attrition. Each has its own scale of sacrifices—costs and time—for the warring parties.
that factors into the warring parties' assessments of success. These national sacrifices ultimately drive a termination decision. As Clausewitz noted, the magnitude and duration of sacrifices are a function of the value of the object to be attained.\(^7\)

If the threat can be seen as diminishing and if the expected value of the aim exceeds the value of the sacrifices, then a winning condition is presumed. Conversely, when the value of the sacrifices exceeds the value of the aim and when the threat is not diminishing, a losing condition exists. A stalemate would result from conditions in which each side sees no diminishing threat and no significant change in relative strength.

As the war progresses, it is possible to establish a new aim in response to perceived stalemate, success, or failure.\(^8\) Where competing objectives of warring nations are concerned, one or possibly both nations must adjust aims if the war is to be terminated. If the original aims were mutually attainable, the war would have been unnecessary. Clausewitz noted that political ends, and therefore military ends, do require change.\(^9\) This changing of strategic aims has been suggested as the rule rather than the exception as the war progresses.\(^10\)

These changes in strategic aims are needed to guide the war to termination, either through achievement of success in battle or through negotiations reaching an 'overlap between one side's minimum acceptable gains and the other's maximum acceptable losses.'\(^11\) A decisive victory by one side rules out this negotiated overlap as the vanquished is faced with meeting the terms dictated by the victor.

Falling short of an early victory (or loss) the commander must assess policy changes as the conflict proceeds to ensure termination can be accomplished in
the best strategic interests of the nation... These changes in aims result from the actors' perceptions of conditions. By changing the aims, the actors effectively raise or lower their expectations of the end to be achieved.

What are the aims or expectations of the actors at the onset of the war? This question may be answered in the context of war termination theory, conforming to the constructs of the strategic process. As the war begins, the nation must have an interest that has been threatened to the point of requiring the use of military force. This interest is translated, in accordance with the strategic process, into national strategy that will protect or achieve the interest. The national strategy will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.

Limiting the military objective—as well as the ways and means to achieve it—by policy can result in a limited war. Clausewitz noted this fact in his discussion of war as an instrument of policy. He emphasized this point further by declaring that

*The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking. . . . This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.*

The resulting limitations on ways and means must not be so severe that they negate the possibility of successfully achieving the objective. The objective must be in balance with the resources and methods used.

If the nation has acted rationally in its strategic planning—ensuring that the ways and means can achieve the ends—the expectations of the actors will be success. The government, the military, the people, and the media expect to win by achieving the stated objectives. This does not imply unanimity.
Internal dissent, at varying degrees of credibility and audibility, will likely exist as the war continues toward its termination.

A review of past wars does not, however, give cause to believe that such an ordered, harmonious relationship has been the norm. Fred C. Ikle of The Rand Corporation is particularly critical of the lack of vision in defining the purpose and objectives of the war, which ultimately determine its termination point. He observes that much of the effort of war planning is centered on the means and ways—the military instrument and its employment—and too little effort is devoted to relating these to the ends.20 Above all, he notes, both civilian and military leaders do not define how a war is to be terminated, citing Japan’s failure to answer its own question of war termination before it launched its attack on Pearl Harbor.27 In this regard, Ikle claims that war plans focus merely on the initial campaigns, leaving civilian leadership with a plan that has a beginning, but no ending.20

There is also reason to reassert the theory that wars should be limited for political reasons, if not for popular reasons—a tenet that was supported by Clausewitz.20 Richard Simpkin, in Race to the Swift, also supports limiting the use of military force. He observed:

*The proper aim of conventional armed forces may therefore be not to defeat the enemy, but to ‘restabilize’ the situation at some different level, thus allowing . . . negotiation or mediation to resume. . . . In sum, ‘diplomacy becomes a continuation of war by other means’.*

This limiting of force to allow for a negotiated peace rather than focusing on the destruction of the enemy has met a stiff rejoinder from other strategic thinkers. One group states:

*Modern students of limited war who approvingly
quote Clausewitz's injunction that war must be
governed by political objectives are apt to
forget (as Clausewitz did not) that the surest
way to achieve war aims is not to nibble at an
opponent but to render it incapable of
interfering.31

Public opinion in the United States also appears
to support a less limited application of military ways
and means. Americans do not wage war lightly, but seek
instead to flex their military muscle. "[O]nce the
nation has committed itself to war, self-restraint in
the use of force goes against the historical
grain."32

The model of initial conditions is, therefore,
one in which the government sets political objectives
for and limitations on the prosecution of the war, but
not necessarily for the termination of the war. The
military sets its ways, means, and ends in consonance
with the political objectives. The people expect
success, although they may disagree with the
limitations imposed. The media are poised to watch and
evaluate the course of the war and to provide its
information coverage.

THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL

Before the initial set of actor expectations are
shaped by ensuing war conditions to predict actions,
the behavioral model requires definition. A generally
accepted approach in assessing and predicting behavior
is the concept of the rational actor.

The rational actor technique is found throughout
disciplines that rely on decision-making as the
variable for determining possible outcomes; disciplines
such as statistics, game theory, economics, and
strategy are based largely on assumed rational
behavior. The rational actor is presumed to make the
rational or proper choice when confronted with
competing alternatives, each of which has a cost and a
payoff or benefit that are known by—or available (at a cost) to—the actor. The actor in these cases can be an individual such as a purchaser of goods in the market place or a group of individuals such as a staff arriving at a recommended course of action. Similar models have been used in an historical perspective to explain processes leading to decisions and outcomes such as those which occurred during the Cuban missile crisis.

Factors that make rational war termination decisions difficult are uncertainty—the ‘fog of war’—and the actions of the opposition. The actor must not only assess the uncertain outcomes of his own decisions, but he also must attempt to anticipate enemy actions and reactions.

The uncertainty of outcomes is a result of the stochastic nature of war. In war, from any given action, a range of outcomes is possible. Clausewitz compared war to a game of cards. Were the results of wars deterministic—if, for every possible set of conditions, one and only one outcome were possible—then war would be useless in its defined role of a continuation of policy. The outcome would never be in doubt and the war would be unnecessary.

Michael Handel identifies other problems in using the rational model for war termination. He cites incomplete information as one limiting aspect of rational decisions. Handel also notes that values may overshadow the rational process. Slogans such as ‘peace with honor’ or ‘remember Pearl Harbor’ can outweigh rational arguments to terminate wars.

Ikle also questions the strict applicability of a rational model to war termination. He argues that although new information may lead—through new evaluation and decision—to a change in objectives, rarely do governments reverse decisions once committed
to war. In Ikle's analysis, the rational actor war termination model is actually tainted by the influence of partisan and personal motivations on the individual actors. This argument would have greater merit were it not for the contradiction he presents in acknowledging that a nation "almost always has to revise its war aims . . ." to bring the war to termination. Ikle further states,

*If the decision to end a war were simply to spring from a rational calculation about gains and losses for the nation as a whole, it should be no harder to get out of a war than to get into one.*

Perhaps what Ikle overlooked in this observation is that war is a multi-sided, opposed venture. While a nation may in fact reach a rational decision to terminate a war, circumstances presented by the enemy—or by allies—may not provide the nation an opportunity to exercise the decision.

Theorist Colin Gray recognized this effect on the decision process. He acknowledged that "[t]here is much to be said in favor of the proposition that the amount and character of combat that may be required really is in the hands of the enemy to determine." This point was illustrated in the Korean War when the United Nations Command and the Chinese Communists reached early agreement in 1951 on the demarcation line, but could not agree on repatriation of Communist prisoners—an impasse which effectively ended the war for two years. Based on this evidence, Ikle’s argument against using a purely rational model—that governments do not use rational decisions to terminate wars—must be rejected. The rational model is applicable for war termination analysis.

The appropriate war termination model for this monograph is, therefore, based on rational decisions by the defined actors. This allows for establishing initial aims, providing ways and means to achieve these
aims, evaluating information, gauging risk, and deciding rationally among choices--to include changes in ends, ways, or means--as the war progresses.

IV. THE WAR TERMINATION MODEL

Following identification of the basic elements--the actors, their initial aims and expectations, and the rational model--the next step for analysis is an examination of how each actor is expected to act under the defined range of conditions in a hypothetical war. These combinations of rational actors, conditions, and expected actions will serve as the war termination model--the filtering lens--for viewing the utility of theory and doctrine in practice. In effect, the war termination model will establish the criteria for determining if theory is correct and if doctrine complements theory.

THE GOVERNMENT

When the hypothetical war began, government leaders had decided on the war aims that would serve the nation's interest and policy. These aims were molded into a strategy that provided the ways and means sufficient to achieve the end. If the means proved insufficient, either they were increased or the objective was modified accordingly. As any war progresses, rational leaders in the government continually assess the chances of attaining the military, and hence the political, objective. They make their decision to either continue the war or terminate it. One such measure of projecting success or failure--proposed by Handel--is to estimate relative power over time. This is accomplished by comparing friendly power with perceived enemy power--including not only military power, but also the power of the
economic and political instruments.  

If the government sees that its power will always exceed—or will grow rapidly to exceed—the perceived power of the enemy, its objective will likely be achieved so it should continue the war. This constitutes the winning condition for the model. When the United States mobilized in World War II, the combined Allied power exceeded that of the enemies, and the decision to continue toward the objective of unconditional surrender was, therefore, rational.

The government must determine the degree of destruction it intends to inflict on its enemies. The level of destruction achieved should be sufficient to realize the political end. Too much destruction may generate unforeseen—and unwanted—added conflict by creating a power vacuum or enraging the will of the defeated enemy. B.H. Liddell-Hart cautioned that

\[ A \text{ too complete victory inevitably complicates the problem of making a just and wise peace settlement. . . . there is no longer the counter-balance of an opposing force to control the appetites of the victors. . . .} \]

This power vacuum can cause follow-on wars, possibly with former allies. However, by terminating the war short of destroying the enemy, the victor not only avoids creation of a vacuum, but may gain, in his former enemy, an ally and a more lasting peace.  

The Allied victory over Germany in 1945 illustrates these points. With Germany completely defeated militarily, the victorious Allies were at odds to control their own appetites in carving the spoils; the United States successfully rebuilt Germany, repairing the power vacuum and gaining an ally.

Terminating the war before achieving the necessary level of enemy destruction is equally undesirable. Policy aims may dictate, for example, a requirement to restore a national boundary without specifically establishing the level of enemy
destruction necessary. This can lead to continued conflict and the threat of renewed hostilities. Forty years after the armistice in Korea, United Nations forces still patrol the demilitarized zone.

The model’s rational government, armed with its perceived winning condition, and bearing in mind the need to specify the necessary level of enemy destruction, proceeds with the war. As it proceeds it continually reassesses relative power.

If the government leaders see that their perceived relative power will decline, they must conclude that they are losing and that the war should be terminated. When a losing condition is sensed, governmental proponents and opponents of war intensify their opposition as the latter gain in strength. Those who were labeled as traitors for opposing the war now can label the proponents as truly treasonous for bringing the nation to defeat. The leaders may become confused in their actions and may suffer a loss of resolve in making a decision to terminate the war "without profit." There may be discussions of continuing the war if their military force has not been destroyed. This argument must quickly be put aside as irrational since the remaining force may be the only bargaining power available for negotiating a peace settlement.

The leaders may be reluctant to terminate a war they are destined to lose for fear of losing political support. This too is irrational since the inevitable cannot be postponed and these same leaders are perhaps destined for removal from leadership either as a result of losing the war or failing to end it. Indeed, some of Hitler’s military leaders, sensing the nation was being led toward destruction, attempted unsuccessfully to assassinate their leader after the Allies had landed at Normandy.
Once the consequences of the alternatives have been explored, the government leaders of the losing nation must face the fact that the war objectives must be reduced since the means are insufficient to attain them. Given this realization of a losing war effort and the need for a lesser objective, "[o]nce the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow." Handel argues that the time for the declining nation to begin efforts to end the war is while it is still the stronger, so that it retains hope of finishing the war with no worse than equal power and can enhance its bargaining position." At whatever point the government recognizes its disadvantaged relative strength, it has no rational option but to terminate the war to preserve its remaining strength.

The rational decision process, for governments which are apparently winning or losing, appears simple in comparison to that of one whose war efforts have resulted in a stalemate. Government leaders face a difficult decision when they determine that relative power will remain in approximate equilibrium. They can continue the war at its same level, which would eventually lead to exhaustion of both sides—as was the case during the indecisive offensives on the Western front in World War I." Alternatively, they can escalate their efforts. To be successful, the escalation needed to overcome a stalemate would require resources sufficient to deliver a powerful stroke. Short of nuclear war, this level of escalation may not be possible. The decision not to escalate in force or space may serve to escalate the war in time by prolonging its course." This was the case in both Korea and Vietnam, where the geographic limitations of the theaters of operations and the rejection of
increasing force levels contributed to a longer struggle. The final alternative in a stalemate is to seek a negotiated settlement, a decision whose outcome is largely dependent on the corresponding relative power assessment of the enemy.

In stalemate, the debate over the value of continuing the war is likely to be intense. Both hawks and doves will propose alternatives to terminate the war. Domestic pressures to terminate the war can be expected to increase. World opinion will likely turn against the nation as the war continues. The longer the war continues in stalemate, the higher the costs will mount. These increasing costs, too, will place correspondingly increasing pressure on the leaders to terminate the war.

Despite the pressures, government leaders may be reluctant to terminate a war in stalemate, having failed to achieve the objective for which men have died and are still dying. Both Clausewitz and Liddell-Hart recognized the futility of waging war in perpetual stalemate. Clausewitz believed that once stalemate is reached, the rational decision is to terminate the war, since costs will grow to exceed value. Liddell-Hart also recommended this course of action to reduce the costs. He observed,

Peace through stalemate, based on a coincident recognition by each side of the opponent's strength, is at least preferable to common exhaustion—and has often provided a better foundation for lasting peace.

To summarize, the government has, for given war conditions, certain theoretical rational actions. These are:

If winning, the government should continue the war effort, guarding against a victory too harsh or too light;

If losing, the government should terminate the war as quickly as possible, preferably while their power is still sufficient to influence negotiations;
If faced with stalemate, and if the government cannot or will not muster sufficient power to achieve decisive victory, it should terminate the war to avoid further losses.

THE MILITARY

The military leaders in war are provided the strategic objective and the resources to prosecute the war. The military strategic objective is selected to achieve or support the political objective. Clausewitz asserted that while the two objectives are sometimes the same, it is possible that the political objective will not be usable as the military objective and, therefore, another military objective will have to be adopted to symbolize the political one. This point is an extremely critical one in the strategic process, in the decision to enter the war, and ultimately in the decision to terminate it.

Before committing its military forces, a nation must define their capabilities and, in turn, decide if these capabilities serve the political objective. What then can the nation expect to achieve through the military instrument? Again, Clausewitz provided insight into this question. For the military instrument, he prescribed four suitable objectives that will "bring about the enemy's collapse." The first of these, he noted, is the destruction of the enemy forces, either in total or in part as defined by the political objective. The second is the conquest of territory to provide the advantage of heightening the enemy's fears. The third is the use of the military to increase the enemy's suffering and expenditure of effort, to expedite the exhaustion of his resistance. The fourth military objective is purely defensive: the resisting of the enemy and the attrition of his forces.

A fifth objective Clausewitz proposed is one
that has direct political repercussions, such as the disruption of enemy alliances and the strengthening of one's own. He did not, however, offer a solution for how a military force can achieve this direct political objective "without defeating the enemy's forces." He simply noted: "If such operations are possible ... they can form a much shorter route to the goal than the destruction of the opposing armies." He left the work of defining "such operations" to the reader, perhaps because he could not himself provide an example of the military's disrupting an enemy alliance without defeating an enemy force. To achieve the goal of increasing the enemy's suffering, he observed that the military is suited for defeating enemy forces; if the enemy forces cannot be defeated, the political instrument can be used to increase the enemy's suffering.

This discussion leads to the conclusion that the military instrument is suited for two purposes: to defeat enemy forces--either destroying them or inflicting sufficient losses to cause defeat--and to seize and hold terrain. The use of the military instrument then is warranted if, and only if, these military objectives will serve the political objective, and if the ways and means are sufficient to achieve the military objective. This tenet will provide the basis for the rational military leader across the range of possible conditions in war.

If the relative power comparison favors his side, the military leader is on the road to success in achieving the military objective, for he is fighting the war with sufficient ways as well as means. He can ask no more of his government leaders; he has been provided the resources, including the time and space, to accomplish his mission. The mobilized US economy and population during World War II provided the means
to achieve the desired end--the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers. An interesting note, however, is that in winning that war quickly, the Allies may have lost the ensuing peace because of General Eisenhower's military decision that impacted on the political outcome. By pursuing an early end to the war in Europe by "speeding victory," the Western Allies forfeited an opportunity to reach Berlin ahead of the Russian Army, and thereby set the conditions for Germany's subsequent geographic division. Eisenhower's *Crusade in Europe* provides an interesting insight into the military's balancing of military and political objectives in this regard. Churchill approached Eisenhower with a proposal to divert forces from Western Europe to the Balkans--a move designed to deny the Balkans to the Russians. Eisenhower cites his reluctance to comply based on his assessment of the military factors involved. He wrote:

> I well understand that (military) strategy can be affected by political considerations, and if the President and Prime Minister should decide that it is worth while to prolong the war, thereby increasing its cost in men and money, in order to secure the political objectives they deemed necessary, then I would instantly and loyally adjust my plans accordingly.

Thus the military can be expected to follow a quick, decisive course to the military objective. However, military leaders can, perhaps grudgingly, modify this course for political expediency.

When analysis of relative power indicates that the war is being lost, the military must turn to the government leaders for a modified objective or an increase in means and ways. Given the goal or objective orientation of the military, as noted in Eisenhower's comment, it is valid to conclude that the military will seek to achieve whatever objective is established with whatever resources are available. This is not to presume, however, that the military will
be expected to fight to the last, toward an unreachable aim without expressing the need to change or abandon the aim or to escalate the means. When Jefferson Davis called for guerrilla warfare after the fall of Richmond in 1865, Confederate Generals Johnston and Beauregard "argued emphatically the uselessness of continued resistance," whereupon Davis ordered them to surrender to Sherman. 7

Given a stalemate, the same fundamental military judgement is expected to surface. A military argument for escalation is likely if the objective has not been modified to meet the reality of the stalemate, since escalation would be required to match the military means and ways to the political end. If the aim were limited in the beginning, then a further limitation, rather than escalation, is perhaps the preferred decision. When MacArthur sought escalation in Korea through air attacks on the Chinese north of the Yalu, Bradley countered that engaging China in an expanded war "would only jump from a smaller conflict to a larger deadlock at greater expense." 7 Without escalation, the objective must therefore diminish if the war is to terminate quickly. To continue to apply the restrained military instrument in perpetual stalemate is anathema to the military. In the absence of a lessened military objective or increased means or ways, the military recommendation must be to cut losses and terminate.

THE PEOPLE

While public opinion in many polities tends to be little valued in initially determining foreign policy, in those systems where the executive is in any way accountable to the populace it is a factor in the survivability of the government. 8

History has shown that public opinion can change during war. A rapid opinion shift can result from a
significant event, one which is perceived as threatening. Opinion can also move slowly, perhaps imperceptibly, toward change in the absence of a significant event. Regardless of the pace, these changes are relatively predictable.

Prior to wars, public opinion will usually run deeply against involvement. Perhaps the clearest example of this was before World War II. Isolationism in the United States was the prevailing mood; a February 1941 Gallup poll showed only 39 percent were in favor of risking war with Japan. Britons cheered Chamberlain upon his return from meeting with Hitler in Munich in 1939—a meeting that effectively destroyed Czechoslovakia as a nation—for achieving “peace in our time.” Deladier also returned from Munich to cheering crowds in Paris. For the United States, the significant event that was to instantly awaken it from its pre-war isolationism and galvanize its popular opinion in support of the war was the attack on Pearl Harbor. Public opinion in France and Britain was to change somewhat more slowly, but no less severely, as the failure of Munich became apparent.

Once a nation commits to war, its public opinion strongly favors winning, as evidenced by the enraged will of Americans after Pearl Harbor. This will can only intensify as losses increase in a winning cause. For as long as the public feels that its sacrifices are not in vain and that victory is achievable, its support will not diminish. In fact, the more the public is involved by the government in the war effort, the more likely support will remain high, especially through government appeals to patriotism.

In a losing war effort, public opinion may tend to stiffen in favor of the war as its forces (and
possibly the people as well) initially suffer damage.** As losses continue to increase, the public support for the war effort will turn more toward acceptance and resignation.** Finally, as the enemy threat grows and is seen as invincible, the will to resist, and therefore the support, will collapse.** The German population responded to the Allied strategic bombing campaign by a reinforced determination to resist.** The American public’s response to the Chinese Communist intervention and reversal in Korea was for retaliation with atomic bombs.** Despite the fact that such an action could have resulted in further escalation, this decisive blow might have instead terminated the war quickly.** The collapse of the Japanese will to resist after the August 1945 bombings demonstrates the final loss of popular support.** As the acceptance and resignation phase takes hold, public opinion moves from a desire for an outcome of the war "to justify past sacrifices" to a desire to end the sacrifices.**

Similar shifts in public opinion occur during stalemate, although the shift will stop short of collapse. The initial support for the war effort and the desire for an end that justifies sacrifices will wane to a mere acceptance of the war conditions. As the war ebbs and flows without real progress, the sacrifices become too great and opinion will slowly turn against the war.** This was seen in Korea. As noted previously, public opinion supported using atomic bombs on the Chinese Communists, but as the war ground on in stalemate, "[t]he national behavior showed a tendency to premature war-weariness and precipitate disenchantment."**

When the government downshifts to a lesser aim, public opinion may not follow; having been primed for a just cause, public opinion does not favor a lesser
object.* In the end, "the longer the war, the less
decisive and the more costly, the more problematic the
public support becomes." As noted in the opening
quotation of this section, the executive is ultimately
accountable to public opinion, and the result of
stalemate could lead to a change of leadership in
attempts to influence the termination of the war.*

The issue of escalation of the Vietnam War at a time
when 69 percent of the public supported withdrawal
appears to have contributed to ending Lyndon Johnson's
presidency.** Indeed, failure to win their wars
quickly cost the Democrats the presidency in 1952 and
1968.***

THE MEDIA

The framers of the Bill of Rights felt the value
of an impartial media was sufficiently high that they
explicitly defined the requirement for freedom of the
press. Along with the other specified freedoms, a free
press has been a cornerstone of the US for over two
centuries. A free press is an honest broker, a conduit
of truth. Subject primarily to its own standards of
integrity and limited only in its ability to access
information, the press has established and defined its
own credibility through responsible—or irresponsible—
reporting. In the twentieth century, the press has
been joined by the broadcast media—radio and
television—to form the mass media.

How influential are the media in deciding the
course and termination of war? During the two world
wars of the 20th century, censorship was applied in
varying degrees both at home and abroad and bad news
was rarely reported by the largely patriotic
media.** The public support for those wars was not
eroded by the press. In Korea, censorship was again
imposed on front line reporting to enhance operational
security and deny unintentional aid to enemy morale. The decline in US public support during the Korean War is attributed to two factors: the inability of armistice negotiators to end the war--and stop its casualties--and to the MacArthur Senate hearings. It is undeniable that the media played a part in conveying information to the public concerning these events. Perhaps without access to this information, public support for the war may not have waned so quickly. From this perspective, one can see that the media, as an information conduit, stimulate public thought and debate which ultimately can affect government policy.

The media’s ability to lead public opinion has been the subject of debate since the Vietnam war. According to one source, it was the number of casualties in Vietnam, not news coverage, that alienated the American public; the pessimism of the news media did not have much impact on public opinion. Another source attributes more influential power to the media and concludes that, with today’s information saturation, there is a “high premium on . . . swift decision.” Since Vietnam, there has been a media role shift “from one of communicating and explaining official policy to one of questioning and criticizing policy. In this more adversarial role, the press . . . and television . . . have unquestionably affected and influenced public debate and opinion on foreign policy issues.”

In the theoretical war termination model, the media will serve as a ‘sounding board’--objectively reporting events and information--as well as a potential adversary of government policy. The media’s adversarial stance is expected to become more pronounced in losing or stalemate conditions and less apparent in winning conditions. Assuming a nation of
rational people, capable of assimilating and filtering information and making rational decisions, one must further postulate that the relative ability of the media to lead opinion will have little significance.

V. DOCTRINE

Doctrine is an authoritative statement on how we, as a professional organization, intend to operate. An Army’s doctrine is the condensed expression of its fundamental approach to fighting, influencing events and deterring war. Doctrine is not pure theory.

Military doctrine defines the way to conduct the business of war. For the Army this equates, at the operational and tactical levels, to the business of planning and fighting campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. The application of military power to achieve objectives or the threat of this application as a "backdrop for diplomacy" are the reasons armies are raised and maintained. To apply its combat power effectively, the Army as a body must have a guiding, unifying integration of principles that chart not only its ways of applying power, but also its necessary organization, equipment, training, education, and staffing--"the vehicle through which we manage the process of change."  

The Army’s current keystone warfighting doctrine, its guiding vehicle, is Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Last published in 1988, it defines the three levels of war--strategic, operational, and tactical--and the Army’s AirLand Battle concept of applying combat power at the operational and tactical levels. Clearly showing the influence of Clausewitz, its focus is on achieving military objectives that support political objectives through success on the battlefield. This is entirely in keeping with the classical theory of the use of the military instrument,
but may fall short of actions required between accomplishing the military objective and achieving the desired political endstate.

The Army's doctrine must mesh with and support strategic direction and guidance to facilitate its effective integration in joint operations. Two documents in development that are key in this regard are Joint Test Publication (JTP) 3-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations and, its companion manual, JTP 5-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations.

JTP 5-0 provides doctrine for planning joint operations, including the development of operations plans. In defining the integrated strategic planning process, the doctrine specifies that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the combatant commanders develop military objectives and options from national objectives and strategy. Once approved by the National Command Authority (NCA) these options, in crisis planning, are developed into courses of action and operations orders (OPORD) which are reviewed and approved. When authorized by the NCA, the CJCS initiates and the combatant commanders implement the OPORD.

Of particular note to this analysis is that JTP 5-0 specifies that a supporting termination plan should be prepared concurrently with the OPORD. It is worthwhile to cite and analyze the specifics of the requirement.

Termination. Military operations end when the objectives have been attained. The NCA define conflict termination objectives and direct the cessation of operations. Termination plans are designed to secure the major policy objectives that may be attained as the result of military operations. Termination plans must cover the transition to postconflict activities and conditions, as well as disposition of military forces.

The ending of military operations "when the objectives have been attained" appears to be
straightforward. Note, however, that the reference must be to the attainment of military objectives, not political objectives, since the two may not be identical. Securing of 'major policy objectives that may be attained as a result of military operations' must also refer specifically to military objectives— and only coincidently to political objectives. The 'transition to postconflict activities and conditions, as well as disposition of military forces' is less clear; however, the intent appears to be that military forces may be redeployed or left in place to 'secure' the policy objectives attained. These postconflict activities then would focus on maintaining the gains attained (the military objective) as well as assisting in the attainment of the political objective. In this light, the postconflict activities would encompass handling displaced personnel, stabilizing local security, providing medical support and humanitarian assistance, and coordinating the restoration of government services.

It is, therefore, a combatant commander's responsibility to ensure that postconflict activities are planned and, if needed, executed. From the occupation forces of World War II to the continued UN presence in Korea since 1953 and from the civil-military postconflict activities required in Grenada to those required in Panama, the United States has historically used its military in this role. In Grenada, Operation Island Wind was almost an afterthought and was not integrated into the Urgent Fury plan. In Panama, the original postconflict plan, Blind Logic, was not used and the eventual postconflict plan, Promote Liberty, was not generated until after the hostilities commenced. These planning shortfalls illuminate the current requirement for termination planning in JTP 5-0.
Interestingly, JTP 3-0, which was published some 18 months earlier, makes no mention of postconflict activities in the planning process and requires only that hostilities be terminated on favorable terms.\(^{115}\)

The inference from reviewing the doctrinal hierarchy is that only now have postconflict activities been explicitly required in theater planning; they were previously accomplished on an \textit{ad hoc} basis. The absence of postconflict activities doctrine in FM 100-5 is therefore not surprising.

Another key ingredient of Army doctrine, directly traceable to this theory, is provided by FM 100-1, \textit{The Army}. "The wartime objectives of land forces are to defeat the enemy's forces, to seize, occupy and defend land area, and assist in destroying the enemy's will to resist."\(^{114}\) This is a classic Clausewitzian statement and clearly outlines the role of the Army in war—an orientation on destruction of forces and objects, along with the corresponding effect on will—and follows closely our definitions of both annihilation and exhaustion. When this role is coupled with the intent of the Chief of Staff of the Army to achieve quick, decisive, overwhelming victory at low cost in American lives and equipment, the resulting combination defines the standard for Army warfighting.\(^{115}\) This military standard is precisely tailored to the theoretical war termination model in that the military objective is achieved—and war is terminated—without a costly, prolonged stalemate (or loss) that engenders internal stress.

How does Army doctrine relate to the theoretical model? Army doctrine meets the theory of the war termination model, a model which captures the strategic level of war; however, at the operational level of war, it falls short by not fulfilling the intent of JTP 5-0 in defining the Army's role in postconflict activities.
VI. THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE: THE GULF WAR

It is insightful to evaluate the war termination theory and doctrine in the context of the Gulf War, the defense of Saudi Arabia and the liberation of Kuwait in \textit{Operations Desert Shield} and \textit{Desert Storm}. To accomplish this analysis the focus will be on the actors and their actions in this most recent chapter in the history of war.

THE GOVERNMENT

The US national interests in the Persian Gulf were articulated by President Carter in the "Carter Doctrine" of January 1980.\textsuperscript{110} This statement recognized the America's vital interests in the region and the crippling impact on the American economy that would result from loss of oil supplies. Throughout the 1980's the US continued its strategic focus on the region, initially through the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and more recently through the unified United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). Planning for the defense of the Saudi Arabian peninsula and its vital oilfields was refined as recently as July 1990 in USCENTCOM joint command post exercise \textit{Internal Look '90}.

When Iraqi forces massed on the Kuwaiti border in late July 1990 and subsequently invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, President Bush began to execute US strategy using diplomatic and economic instruments.\textsuperscript{117} He banned trade with Iraq and froze both Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, encouraging other nations to follow his actions. He issued a warning to Iraq not to continue its attack into Saudi Arabia and began discussions with Saudi Arabia to aid in their defense.\textsuperscript{118} When Iraq failed to meet its self-announced withdrawal deadline from Kuwait on 5 August in response to UN Resolution
President Bush reached agreement with Saudi Arabia and ordered the deployment of US military forces. For the next three months, the US government continued to build regional and worldwide support for its actions. It achieved diplomatic and economic success through the pledge of forces or funds from Germany, Japan, Egypt, Syria, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France and engineered the passage of UN Resolution 678, authorizing the use of force if Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. The President outlined his aims to the public: the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait, the continued security and stability of the Persian Gulf, and the protection of the lives of Americans abroad. He appealed to the people for their support of the "American tradition" and informed them that achieving the aims "may take time and tremendous effort, but most of all, it will take unity of purpose."

To provide the "backdrop for diplomacy" needed to persuade Iraq to withdraw, the government continued its force buildup, deploying VII US Corps and activating reserve forces. In January 1991, Congress debated and approved President Bush's request for authorization to use force to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

When the 15 January 1991 deadline passed, the coalition forces began the Kuwaiti liberation, a combination of initial air operations and subsequent ground operations. On 27 February 1991, after 100 hours of the ground offensive, President Bush called a temporary ceasefire, announced to the American people that military objectives had been met, and stated that the challenge now was to secure the peace. US forces still in Iraq and Kuwait continued to provide
medical assistance to civilians, many of whom were in revolt against Iraqi forces. Others began the redeployment process. President Bush, in March 1991, responded to Iraq’s use of helicopter gunships on its own people by asserting that “it would be impossible for the US to withdraw from Iraqi soil under the circumstances.”

As this monograph is being written, a series of peace talks is underway among Arab states, Israel, and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The goal of the talks is to secure a lasting peace and regional stability in the Gulf, one of the original ends sought by the government.

The government appears to have fulfilled its role superbly in the war termination model in the Gulf War. It established clear objectives based on national interests and linked the ways and means necessary. It applied all instruments of power—military, economic, and political—to move toward its strategic objectives. It used measured response to attempt to resolve the conflict short of hostilities, building its legitimacy through the vehicle of Congressional, UN, and coalition support. It applied overwhelming force to achieve military objectives quickly and decisively, with minimum loss of American lives. It used the media to build popular support by keeping the public informed and appealing to its patriotism.

Finally, having achieved its military objectives, the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the government terminated the war, but continued its diplomatic efforts to achieve total political objectives. The government terminated the war without total destruction of Iraqi forces, and thereby prevented a destabilizing regional power vacuum. It retained forces in theater to monitor Iraqi compliance.
with UN resolutions and when the Kurdish population was attacked by Iraqi forces, it launched Operation Provide Comfort to aid the refugees and restore stability.

Overall, the Gulf War was a textbook example of the success of the strategic planning process and the government’s role as a rational actor in the theoretical war termination model. This fact remains despite recent criticisms that the government erred in ending the war with Saddam Hussein still in power and before all Iraqi forces in Kuwait were destroyed. President Bush’s August 1990 policy aims did not include either condition. While Saddam’s fall from power or greater destruction of Iraqi forces might have been a useful outcome, it was not the legitimate purpose for which the coalition entered the war. It is questionable that the coalition, the United Nations, or the Congress would have supported military action that sought objectives beyond rolling back the Iraqi invasion.

**THE MILITARY**

*The results of this battle will be great, and all the world and future generations will talk about it.*

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Saddam Hussein

The US military responded to the nation’s call by deploying over 500,000 troops to the Gulf. It focused its forces initially on terrain, holding and protecting the Saudi peninsula. When diplomatic and economic efforts failed to achieve the strategic aim, it launched its offensive operations. This campaign was one of annihilation, the destruction of Iraqi forces through direct attacks on the forces themselves, their command and control systems, and their lines of communication. The initial air operations focused on
Iraqi command and control, supply, offensive capabilities--the Republican Guard--and air defense. The ground offensive concentrated on further isolating the Iraqi forces and destroying them. The fact that their will to resist collapsed rapidly during the ground operations was a by-product of overwhelming force, not an objective. All this was accomplished with minimal loss of American lives; the total number of Americans killed during all phases of Gulf operations was reported to be fewer than the traffic fatalities for the United States in the month of January.

Postconflict activities included monitoring the withdrawal of all Iraqi forces, destruction of abandoned arms and supplies, providing medical support to civilians and soldiers, and enforcing the ceasefire terms. As Iraqi forces clashed with Kurds, additional forces were deployed to provide assistance on Operation Provide Comfort, from April through July 1991.

The US Army employed its AirLand Battle doctrine to defeat Iraqi forces. Seizing the initiative from the beginning of air operations and retaining it throughout ground operations, the Army struck quickly across the desert and destroyed dug-in forces at ranges that precluded detection. The Army demonstrated its agility as two corps sped deep into Iraq, where they turned into the Republican Guard flanks in a synchronized offensive. All the doctrinal imperatives of AirLand Battle were well met, most notably moving fast, striking hard, and finishing rapidly. The success of the Army’s ground offensive can be attributed, to a large degree, to the training, equipping, education, organization, and spirit that emanated from the doctrine of FM 100-5.

As noted previously, USCENTCOM had a plan for
the defense of Saudi Arabia before the Iraqi invasion. This plan was implemented and the planning for the liberation of Kuwait was developed in the following months. While the existence of supporting plans for postconflict activities on the scale of Provide Comfort cannot be ascertained in open sources, it is instructive to note that the USCENTCOM Army component, ARCENT, included an organization whose mission was the restoration of Kuwait.

Task Force Freedom, a tailored EAC organization, organized by ARCENT solely to coordinate the initial restoration of Kuwait contained elements from SUPCOM, 352d Civil Affairs Brigade, explosives demolition personnel and a number of other special units to assist the Kuwaitis in resolving basic services until a DOD agency was established to handle long-term restoration.

The forming of this ARCENT task force provides the inference, at least, that postconflict activities were integrated into a termination plan at Army component level. Operation Provide Comfort, as a follow-on operation, was apparently conceived and executed apart from Desert Storm postconflict activities planning. Provide Comfort began some seven weeks after war termination and the civilian uprisings in Iraq. The late start of the operation and its execution by the US European Command (USEUCOM) indicate that Provide Comfort was probably not a supporting plan for Desert Storm. The possibility exists that the Kurdish crisis was not foreseen or, more likely, that US involvement in Iraqi internal affairs was not supported by policy until public opinion rose to support it as a humanitarian effort.

The military in the Gulf War is assessed to have acted in accordance with its purpose as an instrument of policy. It responded to its mission, applied overwhelming force, suffered minimum loss of life and equipment, and quickly achieved its military objective. The Army applied its doctrine to achieve
operational and tactical success that contributed to the joint operational and strategic successes. Despite its failure to mention postconflict activities in its doctrine, the Army planned and implemented postconflict planning at the operational level.

THE PEOPLE

President Bush sought public support for US military efforts in the Gulf from the beginning, initially presenting his case for force deployment to the people on 8 August 1990. As observed previously under the government portion of section VI, he appealed to their sense of American tradition and prepared them for the possible high cost in time and effort. Their response to the government policy and to the military was one of strong support, perhaps fueled by the dismal media failures of Saddam Hussein throughout the war. His attempts to show empathy for the hostage children failed, his film of downed American airmen on television merely stiffened the will of the American people, and his pledge to use coalition prisoners of war as human shields enraged the public. While there were anti-war demonstrations in the United States and around the world, the pro-war demonstrations overshadowed them. As reported at the beginning of the ground operations in February 1991, "Fully 75 percent (of American public opinion) remained rock solid behind the President and his policies..." Support for the armed forces—the individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines—probably exceeded that figure. The outpouring of letters and care packages from families and strangers strained the capacity of the desert postal units.

The positive public opinion was no doubt influenced by the fact that the people were kept informed and that the war was over quickly—a decisive
victory with relatively few lives lost. They were not subjected to a protracted war or a losing effort with the possibility of tremendous loss of life. Fortunately, strategy and doctrine guided the war effort toward a quick, favorable termination.

THE MEDIA

... the very outbreak of the war was first reported not by an official announcement but rather by live TV from Baghdad.\(^1\)

The media deployed early to the Gulf, the first group of 17 reporters arriving on 12 August, and continued to deploy until their numbers had reached 1,600.\(^{140}\) From the earliest phases of the invasion of Kuwait through the humanitarian efforts of Provide Comfort, Americans at home were supplied continuously with scenes of the desert war. The reports ranged from the discussions of females in the armed forces and the viewing of destroyed equipment to Pentagon and CENTCOM briefings. As expected, some reports were favorable, some were unbiased, and others were sensational.

Three important facts mitigated against an adversarial media in the Gulf: the war was terminated quickly, our forces were successful, and the military handled its media role well. Whereas the media adversaries of the Vietnam War were able to feed on its protracted nature and an elusive strategy, the Gulf War media had few such opportunities. When they tried, the media suffered.

Media reporting did not deter American support for the war. The media were able to serve effectively as informers, but not as influencers of opinion.

... the fears of many that TV and the media would overshadow public opinion have been groundless. ... Americans have reacted as the media have long asserted--by deciding on their own whom to trust and what to believe.\(^141\)

The media who tried to revert to Vietnam-era
reporting methods were to pay the price of lost credibility during this war. One observer noted, "Many TV and media grandees must be hoping the American public . . . will soon forget the handwringing, skepticism, moral torpor, and downright misjudgement" the media displayed in the Gulf War. In this respect, the Gulf War was too short for the media. If the US had suffered more casualties or if the war had become stalemated, the media's impact on public opinion would likely have been more pronounced.

After the termination of the war, the media began to criticize governmental and military leaders for ending the war too soon--before Saddam Hussein was overthrown and his forces in the Kuwaiti theater were completely destroyed. The media's revisionist efforts ignore the legitimacy of the policy aims of the President, the Congress, the United Nations, and the coalition. Withholding the war's termination to achieve aims beyond those ratified by governing political bodies would not have served the diplomatic interests or credibility of the United States.

If the media's image suffered, the military's image prospered in the Gulf. Writing during the conduct of combat operations in the Gulf, one writer stated, "Paradoxically, the military, through TV, developed a real alliance with the public, whose confidence in the war has soared." The briefings by the Pentagon and CENTCOM staffs were informative and factual, without exaggeration or speculation. Perhaps the CINCCENTCOM briefing, 27 February 1991, was the crowning moment for military credibility. General Schwarzkopf provided a patient, detailed update of the ground offensive that displayed military professionalism in his depth of understanding and analysis, his deep regard for the lives of his forces, his determination to reach the military objective, and
his confident, warrior spirit. The media, in this briefing, served as an information conduit and a vehicle for building of public support.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

This war termination analysis began with a definition of the strategic process. It progressed through the formulation of a theoretical war termination model consisting of actors and their expected actions across a range of perceived war conditions. The analysis then pursued an examination of current military doctrine, evaluating both doctrine's internal consistency and its consistency with the theoretical war termination model. Finally, the analysis tested the theoretical war termination model and the current doctrine in the context of the Gulf War to validate inferences drawn previously.

The analysis reveals, first of all, that the scope of war termination is different in theory and doctrine. While theory treats war termination as a strategic decision process that focuses primarily on the point at which war should be terminated, doctrine is more concerned with the activities that follow war termination. This difference suggests a potential lack of clarity in communications between military and government leaders. A more precise term would aid the military in defining its intent. Perhaps doctrine should define postconflict activities more specifically as the military's role in achieving the broader governmental policy's war termination objectives.

The government as an actor in the Gulf War validated the theoretical model in a winning effort. The government followed the strategic process and applied all instruments of power to achieve its policy
objectives. The government used internal and international consensus-building skillfully, developing popular support for the war effort. The government matched sufficient ways and means with desired ends. Finally, the government terminated the war quickly and decisively with a relatively limited loss of friendly lives.

After terminating the war, the government continued to pursue its objectives. US forces were left in the theater to monitor ceasefire terms. The government provided humanitarian relief to the Kurdish population. Under US government sponsorship, regional peace talks were initiated and rebuilding efforts were begun in Kuwait.

The military paralleled our expectations in both the theoretical model and doctrine. In quickly achieving the military objective, the military avoided a stalemate or loss and the potential increase in casualties. The war was terminated after only four days of ground operations. The US Army followed its AirLand Battle doctrine tenets and imperatives. While US Army doctrine in FM 100-5 does not address postconflict activities, these missions and functions were nonetheless accomplished through the planning at the Army's operational headquarters, ARCENT. One can conclude, therefore, that Army warfighting war termination doctrine is necessary and sufficient, but that postconflict doctrine in FM 100-5 does not sufficiently meet requirements. The postconflict doctrine does, however, exist in other publications such as FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations. Its inclusion in FM 100-5 need not require full treatment; an identification of the Army's planning requirements and potential roles in postconflict activities is sufficient for the keystone manual.

The people also followed model expectations in
the Gulf War. Despite some initial reservations concerning the war, they quickly formed a solid base of support that was made all the more rigid by the actions of the enemy leader. Their support did not wane throughout the course of the short war despite efforts of some critics. Public support for and opinion of the military was high. One can be confident that the broad, visible popular support was a significant morale factor for the US forces and indirectly assisted in the quick victory.

The media served its expected model role as a conveyor of information and an occasional adversary in the Gulf War. The model did not predict the backlash of popular opinion against the media. The model might have predicted this behavior through a closer evaluation of the influence of time. Because of the quick, successful war termination, the media were unable to influence adverse opinion among the public. The media influence expected in a longer, protracted stalemate appears to be negated in shorter, decisive victories. Thus the media's attempt to establish an adversarial role was unacceptable to the public—and therefore ignored by the government. The media's ability to influence action in relief operations for the Kurds was more successful because it was able to portray innocent casualties of the war.

In summary, the theoretical war termination model and the warfighting doctrine are relatively sound when evaluated in the context of the Gulf War. Army doctrine requires only the addition of necessary postconflict activities to be consistent with joint doctrine and to be sufficient in the war termination framework.
ENDNOTES


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5Clausewitz, 606.

6Drew and Snow, 27.


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9Ibid., 13.


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13Ibid., 89.

14Model suggested by Mr. James Schneider, Military Theorist, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 13 August 1991.


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18Ikle, 96.

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23 Clausewitz, 81.
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25 Ibid., 88-89.
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27 Ibid., 6.
28 Ibid., 8.
29 Clausewitz, 81.
31 Jordan, Taylor, and Korb, 262.
32 Ibid., 260.
34 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1971)
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38 Ikle, 15-16.
39 Ibid., 96.
40 Ibid., 18.
41 Gray, 165.
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43 Handel, 474.
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46 Ikle, 11.
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48 Ikle, 60.
49 Ibid., 56, 82, 102.
50 Ibid., 34, 52.
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**Handel, 474.
***Craig, 352.
****Ikle, 55.
*****Ibid., 41.
******Ibid., 60,84.
*******Simpkin, 276.
********Ikle, 38.
*********Ibid., 98.
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***********Liddell Hart, 357.
************Clausewitz, 81.
*************Ibid., 92-94.
**************Ibid., 92.
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*"Jordan, Taylor, and Korb, 539.
*"Simpkin, 212.


**Command Decisions, 123.

*"Stokesbury, 62.


*"Simpkin, 213.
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Brodie, 100-101.
Hammond, 387, 371.
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