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FOREWORD

With U.S. victory in the cold war, all aspects of military strategy and operations should properly be reevaluated in light of the new security environment. This monograph, focusing on the Pacific theater, projects a peacetime engagement strategy and specifies the contributions which can effectively be made by the U.S. Army.

The study assesses U.S. interests and objectives in the post-cold war security environment; suggests the strategic concepts which can provide guidance for the U.S. military, especially the Army, to achieve those objectives; and, lastly, discusses some important resource requirements and issues for the Army. The author's basic conclusions are that U.S. interests and objectives still require a military presence in the region, and that the Army has special opportunities and responsibilities—at least as significant as those of the other services—for enhancing them.

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SUMMARY

In present and mid-term security environments, the United States is not expected to face either global or Pacific regional military threats. There will be many challenges to U.S. interests in the Pacific, but they are likely to involve questions of world order, economic prosperity and democratic values rather than survival or sovereignty, the interests most closely associated with the cold war.

Objectives.

Assuring states of the region that the United States will remain engaged to help maintain stability will be the main priority of the United States in USPACOM. U.S. forces still are required to deter (with Republic of Korea forces) an enemy threatening a military attack on the Korean peninsula. Even there, developments which could result in the reduction of tensions between the North and South—even unification—are underway, and this remaining security obligation from the cold war may also atrophy in the next several years. Modern and capable military forces of the former global enemy of the United States, the former Soviet Union, are still deployed in and near the Pacific theater. At the present time, their state of readiness is low, their command and control is uncertain and they appear to pose no threat to the United States or U.S. allies. However, these capabilities cannot be ignored. Depending on the outcome of highly complex political developments in the former Soviet Union, Russia or another successor to Soviet power could become a source of instability or a formidable challenge to U.S. security interests in the Pacific.

Strategic Concepts.

In the absence of a proximate military threat, the U.S. military in the Pacific will pursue a strategy of peacetime engagement. The principal strategic concept guiding the execution of USPACOM’s peacetime engagement strategy will
be forward presence, which is obtained by deploying military personnel on foreign bases and U.S. territory within the region, and through a range of cooperative military activities. U.S. forward presence in the Pacific should include Army personnel stationed in a nation or nations of the region. This is not only because the timely execution of contingency operations in the theater is easier when forces are already present, but also because Army deployments overseas, less mobile than deployments of other services, best connote a lasting U.S. commitment to regional security. Removing military organizations and closing bases, especially in the aftermath of the departure of U.S. forces from the Philippines, would reinforce perceptions that the United States is disengaging from the region, and would reduce U.S. influence.

Because the dominant military organizations of almost all of the nations of the region are armies, the U.S. Army must assume the predominant role in the execution of the cooperative military activities which form a critical dimension of forward presence. USARPAC already has a well-developed program, the Expanded Relations Program (ERP), to carry out this responsibility.

Forward presence aids the United States in gaining and maintaining access to the region’s decisionmakers, and is a major factor in assuring nations of the region that the United States will remain engaged in the security affairs of the region. The concept relates to virtually every U.S. objective in the Pacific. The other concepts of U.S. national strategy are also important for USPACOM and USARPAC. Security cooperation and a robust capability for crisis response are particularly important.

Resources.

Four resource issues are examined in this analysis. They are bases, force structure, specialist personnel, and rational budgeting and funding.

Forward presence, at least in the Pacific theater, depends on bases. Given the history of U.S. involvement in the Pacific, it is unlikely that the region’s decisionmakers and their advisers
can be convinced that the United States will remain engaged in the region unless U.S. forces are deployed there. Because of this, retaining U.S. bases in Korea, even when the North Korean threat has diminished or disappeared, is extremely important. Without U.S. bases in Korea, Japan would be the only remaining host country in the theater for U.S. military personnel. Army bases in Hawaii are also highly beneficial for supporting the Expanded Relations Program and other peacetime engagement activities in the region.

During the cold war, U.S. Army deployments in the theater were sized and structured on the basis of ground threats of Soviet allies and surrogates, not of the Soviet Union itself. Therefore, recent changes in the international environment logically should not affect Army force structure in the Pacific theater as much as in Europe. In any case, the Army needs a corps dedicated to—not necessarily all stationed in—USPACOM. A corps headquarters will provide necessary command and control for contingency operations, and its component units will be adequate to support the exercise programs within the theater. Members of units dedicated to the theater will develop cultural sensitivity and knowledge about the region.

Planning and executing successful peacetime engagement activities require personnel who understand the region and nations in it. USARPAC and other units dedicated to the theater could effectively utilize twice as many Foreign Area Officers (FAO) as are presently authorized, as well as personnel who have undertaken less comprehensive programs designed to develop familiarity with the basic features of the cultures of the region. However, it would be counterproductive to increase the numbers of FAOs unless the present high standards are maintained.

Most peacetime engagement activities must now be financed from a variety of sources: e.g., various segments of Army appropriations for USARPAC; Title 10 funds, controlled by USCINCPAC; reserve component funds; and monies authorized for joint exercises. This not only makes for a cumbersome accounting procedure and complicates rational
budgeting and planning, but it also does not recognize the strategic significance of peacetime engagement.

USARPAC is uniquely positioned to assume a predominant role in executing a peacetime engagement strategy, and helping achieve the national security objectives of the United States in the Pacific. However, the focus on peacetime engagement should not distort the traditional Army focus on preparing for and engaging in conflict. U.S. military organizations, including the Army, will lack credibility and be unable to achieve peacetime engagement objectives unless they are perceived to be capable of achieving conflict objectives also. That perception will be maintained and reinforced as the U.S. Army and its sister services continue to demonstrate, through training and exercises, that they are fully capable of deploying sufficient force to deal with possible contingencies in the region.
INTRODUCTION

Strategists and military planners for the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) face a new and almost unprecedented security environment which was inconceivable before 1989, and which presents the problem, novel for American leaders in the post-World War II era, of developing a strategy and justifying a force structure without a clearly identifiable enemy. This report specifically addresses some of these regional strategic issues as they relate to the U.S. Army in the Pacific during this period of peacetime competition—a time when the probability of conflict involving the United States in the region, much less global war, seems extremely remote. Its focus, therefore, is not primarily on the orthodox Clausewitzian concerns of fighting and preparing for war, but on peacetime engagement activities. However, preparing for war is not incompatible with peacetime engagement, and some issues related to the upper ranges of the operational continuum are also included in the analysis.

Following a discussion of the security environment of the Pacific, the analysis is organized around the strategic paradigm of ends or objectives, ways or strategic concepts, and means or resources.

REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

From the U.S. perspective, the security situation in the USPACOM¹ has at least seven significant, if somewhat conflicting, characteristics. These are described below.

Uncertainties of a Transitional International System. As disagreeable as the cold war was to many of the region's leaders, the bipolar international system did provide some
structure to regional interactions. Many Asian policymakers and defense intellectuals believe that the cold war inhibited certain states (e.g., Japan, China, or sometimes others, depending on the observer) which may now pursue destabilizing behavior, or that as a result of the end of the cold war the United States will disengage from the region, leaving a vacuum which other, less benign, states will attempt to fill. Many Asian defense intellectuals, anticipating this possibility, advise their own governments to develop larger and more capable military forces. A dangerous cycle of increasing tensions and regional arms races has thus become a possibility.

Added to this systemic uncertainty is the chaotic situation caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Until new political arrangements are established which provide an authoritative structure or structures to act for Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union whose policies impinge on the theater, an unusual degree of confusion in the region's affairs will remain, reinforcing the underlying uncertainties implicit in a transitional international system.

Reduced Tensions among Major Actors in the Region. Compared to the dangerous tensions and occasional military confrontations typical of the cold war, relations among the major powers of the region are presently serene. There are no disputes of significance between Russia (which may or may not be properly considered an Asian/Pacific major power) and China or the United States, although both—especially China—are concerned that the dismemberment of the former Soviet Union will cause instabilities which will endanger their respective national interests. Japan's relations with the Soviet Union had been less confrontational just before the latter's dissolution than at any time since 1952, and its future relations with Russia may be even better. However, the Northern Territories issue will have to be resolved before the state of war which has technically existed since 1945 can be legally terminated with a peace treaty. Japan's relations with China are correct and friendly, even though many Chinese and Japanese may be worried about each other's future roles in the region. The only serious problems involve U.S. relations
with Japan and China. U.S.-Japanese trade relations are, to say the least, tense and controversial, but the security alliance is still flourishing. U.S.-China relations have been strained since the Tiananmen episode, and also are troubled by U.S. allegations of unfair trading practices and arms sales. Sino-Indian ties show some signs of improvement, as do India's relatively limited relations with the United States.

*The North Korean Threat.* The Korean conflict is a direct result of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, but it early developed a dynamic of its own and still persists despite the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are more heavily armed forces and lethal weapons systems confronting each other across the DMZ than anywhere else in the world, and the Korean peninsula is the only spot in which military personnel of the United States are in imminent danger of attack. A particularly unstable situation is expected when the original Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) dictator, octogenarian Kim Il Sung,\(^2\) dies or otherwise surrenders authority. Nonetheless, the potential for a resolution of the dispute between the two Korean governments, or even reunification, is greater today than at any time since the division of the peninsula in 1945. A series of recent developments (North-South agreements on nonaggression and nuclear weapons, the cancellation of Team Spirit and D.P.R.K.'s willingness, finally, to agree to IAEA inspection) suggests the possibility of more substantial developments in the future.

*The Persistence of Three Marxist-Leninist Regimes.* There are more persistent residues of the cold war in the Pacific than in Europe because China, North Korea and Vietnam are still controlled by Communist parties which continue to pursue relatively orthodox Marxist-Leninist policies, and because they explicitly oppose liberal democratic ideals. Currently, all three regimes rail against the West generally and the United States specifically for pursuing what they purport to see as a cynical strategy of "peaceful evolution" designed to undermine socialism, among other things. However, except for North Korea, there are no direct conflicts of interests between these states and the United States that are likely to lead to the use
of force. The increasing isolation of these states as their aging leaders struggle to retain power in an increasingly inhospitable international system may become a source of regional instability. For Vietnam and North Korea, which depended heavily on assistance from European Communist states, the collapse of the Soviet Union has been a traumatic event.

**Regional Disputes and Conflicts.** USPACOM is extremely large, extending from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of the United States, and extremely diverse. It contains conflicts, disputes with the potential to lead to conflicts, and emnities, many of which (e.g., Kashmir and the Sri Lanka civil war) may have little or nothing to do with the global geopolitical concerns or major regional interests of the United States. Others (Taiwan and the territorial disputes in the South China Sea) potentially threaten U.S. interests because of political commitments, possible interference with important SLOCs or interruption of profitable economic intercourse.

**Military Capabilities of the Former Soviet Union.** There is a widespread belief that the regime or regimes succeeding the Soviet Union will be more concerned with economic interaction with its/their Pacific neighbors and trading partners than with military adventures, at least for the short term. However, the military capabilities of the former Soviet Union which could be targeted against the United States and Japan, while currently at a very low state of readiness, are only marginally smaller than during the cold war. While they present no danger to U.S. interests at this time, these capabilities cannot be ignored. In the long term, a successor of the Soviet Union could become a major military force in the region.

**Prominence of Armies in the Region.** In most nations of the USPACOM theater, armies are the most significant military service, and in several cases they exercise predominant political influence within their countries. Moreover, five of the eight largest armies in the world—potentially dangerously destabilizing forces—are located in the region. Though less significant than the other six factors in geopolitical terms, the existence of these armies is a major consideration in planning peacetime engagement activities for USPACOM. Access to
these forces by the U.S. Army provides a useful channel to obtain information and influence.

The new security environment in the Pacific is more the result of the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union than it is of the evolutionary developments within the region. The end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union have created a political milieu in which the threat of global confrontation is not credible, and a reduction in U.S. resources available for security is virtually certain. However, even though the great danger which haunted U.S. military planners for over 40 years—the Soviet threat—has disappeared, old challenges to U.S. interests in the Pacific unrelated to the cold war remain, and new ones which have their origin in the evolving international system and changes within the region are emerging.

U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

National objectives for USPACOM have been established by political and military leaders of the United States, and appear in various official documents. What is especially significant about these lists of objectives, published by various departments and observers, is their similarity with each other and with similar lists prepared in prior years. As long as the analysis remains at a relatively high level of abstraction, regional U.S. interests and objectives as officially recognized by the National Security Council, Department of State, and Department of Defense are remarkably consistent over time and across authorities, even when fundamental changes in the security environment have occurred. While the continued suitability of these objectives is an appropriate focus of inquiry (and possible new objectives for USPACOM are suggested in this analysis), most strategic adaptation takes place in the assignment of priorities to objectives and modification of strategic concepts.

Following the pattern of the National Security Strategy of the United States, U.S. security objectives for USPACOM are listed below in conjunction with the national interests to which
they most directly apply. This list is, for the most part, a composite of several existing unclassified statements.

*National Interest: The Survival of the United States.* In the context of international politics, the only threat to the survival of the United States since the end of World War II has been a nuclear war. Intercontinental missiles are still deployed in and near the USPACOM theater by forces of the former Soviet Union, and China also possesses the capability to reach targets on U.S. territory with nuclear warheads. This threat still exists in the Pacific, although the possibility of nuclear attacks against the United States appears extremely remote. The authority for countering this threat through deterrence or defense is primarily within the jurisdiction of national rather than regional officials, although there are linkages between the strategic, substrategic nuclear, and conventional levels of conflict which assure USCINCPAC a role with respect to these objectives.

There are two USPACOM objectives which, while they relate to less apocalyptic outcomes than nuclear war in the near term, could involve the survival of the nation in the long term. As with many other objectives listed below, achieving them will require coordination with diplomacy, international economic policy, and other instruments of power. They are:

- Restrain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- Reduce the flow of illegal drugs.

*National Interest: Independence and Sovereignty of the United States, Including the Integrity of Its Values, Institutions, and Territory.* The distinction between the national interest in survival and the national interest in independence and sovereignty is valuable because political leaders may react differently to risks which involve survival than to those which endanger lesser values. During the cold war, however, the objectives related to this interest were viewed as equally important as survival objectives, because the putative enemy in a conventional attack in the USPACOM was the same power which had the capability to destroy the nation in a global nuclear conflagration.
Whenever objectives in the independence and sovereignty category are threatened, as some of them are in Korea today, they must be given a high priority even if survival is not at issue. A major global power must provide military capability, in conjunction with other instruments of power, to achieve these objectives. But with a greatly reduced conventional threat, without linkage to a credible nuclear threat, the priority on these objectives will inevitably be reduced in terms of strategic and political standards. In USPACOM, the sovereignty and independence objectives include:

- Deter aggression against the United States and its allies.
- Protect U.S. territory and freely associated states for which the United States retains defense responsibilities.
- Maintain security of LOCs—especially to the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and East and South China Seas.
- Assist allies in regional defense as appropriate.
- Provide for the safety of U.S. citizens and property.
- Maintain and broaden access to bases and facilities throughout the region.

National Interest: A Healthy and Growing U.S. Economy to Ensure Opportunity for Individual Prosperity and Resources for National Endeavors at Home and Abroad. With the possible exception of the confrontation in Korea, economic interests may be the major motivation for U.S. military activity in the Pacific. The economic significance of this region to the United States is well known, and need only be summarized here.5 U.S. trade with states of the region is very large, and exceeds that with the European Community (EC). In 1989, trade with the Pacific—especially Northeast Asia—exceeded that with the EC by some $134.9 billion. While the United States experiences a trade deficit with the region and with its largest trading partners there, it also exports much more to the Pacific than to the EC—$103 billion against $82 billion in 1989. Japan was the single largest overseas purchaser of U.S. goods in 1989.
spending $44.5 billion. Moreover, the USPACOM theater represents one of the world's strongest regions by the measure of gross domestic product (GDP). The sum of the GDPs of EC Europe and the sum of the GDPs of 13 major economies of the Pacific were approximately equal in 1989, with differences small enough to result from variations in accounting methods or statistical error. However, one of the most significant factors about this region must be that for the 13 Pacific nations the rate of growth was some 5 percent in 1989. If these rates of growth continue (and there are good arguments that they will even increase), the combined GDPs of the Pacific may represent an even larger ratio of world economic activity in the future, depending on developments in the EC and other areas. In any case, the economic importance of the Pacific to the United States will not diminish. The only measure in which the Pacific region falls short relative to the EC is U.S. direct investment, heavy in Europe and light in the Pacific.

While the satisfaction of several military objectives, particularly those discussed below in relation to the national interest of a favorable world order, will indirectly affect the ability of the United States to succeed economically in the region, the only generally cited military objective directly related to U.S. economic interests is to assure access to markets and resources. Obviously, the military is not the only foreign policy instrument available to the United States in pursuing economic interests in the region.

_National Interest: A Stable and Secure World. Where Political and Economic Freedom, Human Rights and Democratic Institutions Flourish._ As basically a status quo power, the United States should benefit from a stable security environment in which resort to force is minimized and the exchange of material and people is relatively unencumbered. During the cold war, pursuit of this interest tended to be overshadowed by survival and sovereignty concerns: a favorable world order for the United States was considered to be an international system in which the influence of the Soviet Union and communism, the perceived threats to a stable and secure world as well as to the security of the United States, was as limited as possible, and the anti-Communist coalition
led by the United States was as strong as possible. Although U.S. declarations routinely supported the creation of an international system based on international law and justice, in practice very little was done to create or strengthen international structures unless U.S. survival, sovereignty or economic interests were likely to directly benefit.

In the Pacific, attempts to create a NATO-like organization to form and structure the coalition in opposition to Soviet expansion was abandoned when the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization collapsed in 1975. Instead, the United States relied upon a series of bilateral relationships, some formal and some informal, including one with the People’s Republic of China after 1972. The United States also supported a number of regional organizations, but in every case as much because the organization supported the U.S. anti-Soviet global strategy as for a commitment to regional structure per se.

In the post-cold war security environment, the pursuit of "a new world order," using President Bush’s term, is less likely to conflict with other national interests than formerly. Indeed, in the absence of conflict among the major powers, U.S. interests in world order and its other national interests seem much less likely to conflict, and much more likely to reinforce each other. Globally, this is evident in the increased reliance on the United Nations and other international institutions. In the Pacific, it is expressed in a search for regional arrangements to foster economic exchange, and could involve support of political consultation which incorporates former adversaries as well as long-time allies. However, the United States still requires a system, globally and in the Pacific theater, in which it is consulted on all major issues and has the ability to influence important outcomes. Cited as a primary justification for OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and much subsequent foreign policy activity, the achievement and maintenance of a stable and secure world order are now awarded the highest priority by the United States.

As stated in the National Security Strategy for the United States, this interest includes not only a stable and secure world, but also one "where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish." Analytically, a
stable and secure world and the extension of U.S. political values are separate interests, although in practice the pursuit of one frequently coexists with pursuit of the other. At any rate, the new security environment is also more compatible with the extension of human rights than was the cold war, when containment of the Soviet Union frequently seemed to require U.S. support of undemocratic regimes with extremely poor human rights records. Absent a serious threat, the United States is now freer to include a strong ideological content other than anti-Communism in its foreign policy by providing incentives for movement toward democracy and respect for human rights and sanctions for retreats from democracy and conspicuous violations of human rights.

Nonetheless, objectives primarily related to maintaining stability, as well as to objectives related to other national interests already discussed, and objectives primarily related to extending U.S. political values will sometimes conflict, leading to charges of inconsistencies in U.S. policy.

The traditional objectives most directly related to the U.S. national interest in a stable and secure world order fall into two categories. One contains objectives which relate to maintaining stability within the existing system, and the second consists of objectives having to do with U.S. influence and ideological values in the region. A third set of objectives, to be discussed below, related to reform of the international system in USPACOM, while not thus far articulated in official documents, also seems appropriate.

With one exception, the stability objectives of the first category have routinely appeared in strategic documents. In the post-cold war era they have much greater salience than formerly, however, because incipient instability is the most serious threat to U.S. national interests in the region, and achieving these objectives would either eliminate or significantly diminish that threat. Given the current security environment, these objectives are as central to the overall strategy as the objective of deterring the Soviet Union and its allies was to overall strategy in the cold war. In fact, they imply a broader and more fundamental objective which both subsumes and provides the proper context for the others, and
expresses the broadest strategic goal which the United States pursues in the region. This heretofore implied objective, listed as the first in this category, is to:

- Assure regional states that the United States will remain engaged in the Pacific theater. 8

The other objectives are to:

- Maintain stable military balances of power and prevent the rise of a regional hegemon.
- Promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes.
- Reduce tensions where possible.
- Combat terrorism.
- Aid friends and allies in combatting threats to legitimate institutions.

The objectives of the second category related to world order interests require no elaboration:

- Develop and maintain access to military decisionmakers in order to retain the ability to influence decisions which would affect U.S. interests.
- Promote the ideals of human rights and democracy among military organizations in the region.

Assuming the absence of a militarily threatening rival, there will be continued pressure from the domestic political system in the United States to reduce the resources committed to security. In USPACOM, where there are relatively few and immature international structures, an approach to satisfying the U.S. need for a secure and stable regional order with a more limited expenditure of U.S. defense resources would be to support the creation and strengthening of regional structures which could provide for stability. The United States has regularly supported security cooperation among regional states and itself. The objective of establishing a security structure even partially independent from U.S. participation would be a new but reasonable and logical departure. Two
possible objectives in this category to which USPACOM could contribute might be:

- Foster security cooperation among the states of the region.
- Support development of regional security organizations.

STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

U.S. National Military Strategy, as outlined in National Military Strategy: 1992, is organized around the four "key foundations" of strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution, and eight "strategic principles," which include, among others, collective security and arms control. Five categories of "forward presence operations" are also listed. In the traditional language of strategy as taught at U.S. Army service schools, they are the ways of strategy—the strategic concepts by which the armed forces contribute toward the achievement of U.S. national interests and objectives—for the post-cold war national military strategy. These foundations, principles and operations apply to the complete range of the continuum of military operations, i.e., peacetime engagement, hostilities short of war, and war. For this analysis of a peacetime engagement strategy for USPACOM, the key foundation of forward presence and the principle of collective security are primarily involved. A peacetime engagement strategy of necessity also concerns preparing for the upper ranges of the continuum of military operations, and thus also incorporates the other key foundations and strategic principles, although all of them will not be specifically addressed in this study. In addition, a number of supporting concepts have special significance for a peacetime engagement strategy.

The military services were not the sole instruments for achieving national security objectives during the cold war; interagency cooperation was always required. A successful strategy of peacetime engagement depends even more upon mutual contributions by many departments of government. Moreover, unlike the strategies of the cold war, frequently the
leading role will be the responsibility of the State Department, Drug Enforcement Agency, or other organizations other than the Department of Defense. Both planning and execution of the peacetime activities will demand close consultation among government departments in Washington and between USPACOM and the regional offices of civilian departments in the Pacific.

**Forward Presence.**

Forward presence is a flexible concept, capable of contributing to a broad spectrum of strategic objectives. The core of its meaning is the visible existence of U.S. military activity within the region on a more-or-less permanent basis.

Forward presence as defined in this report\(^6\) was not a frequently mentioned concept in the United States until strategists began to think about the post-cold war era. During the cold war, the analogous concept was forward deployment, a term which connoted stationing U.S. forces abroad and posturing them to deter the Soviet Union and its allies from aggression or intimidation against the United States or its allies. This concept is still applicable on the Korean peninsula, where U.S. forces face a large, offensively postured military threat. Forward deployment may also still be applicable in the region to deter whatever entity assumes control of the powerful capabilities which previously belonged to the Soviet Union.

Deterrence and forward deployment are not particularly valuable concepts for thinking about strategy for the rest of the region, however. The United States cannot credibly assert the authority to forward deploy a major capability to deter ambiguous and amorphous threats like uncertainty or instability or dissuade as yet unidentified regional aggressors. Regional states would view such a policy with suspicion at best, and with hostility at worst. Moreover, Congress is no longer likely to fund forward deployed forces to deter unknown or unlikely enemies. The physical presence of U.S. military personnel may be useful—indeed, may be essential—to achieve U.S. objectives in the theater, but their existence and posture should be rationalized and controlled by strategic concepts.
which are not identified with the cold war or confrontation with enemies in areas where enemies are not present. Forward presence is such a concept.

Forward presence is compatible with peacetime engagement because it implies highly mobile forces flexible enough to deal with a range of hypothetical military contingencies which might concern U.S. allies and friends in the region as well as the United States itself, and also fulfill a range of peacetime engagement responsibilities. In the generic meaning of the term, it provides a deterrent against behavior which could threaten U.S. interests. Forward presence may even be achieved through the use of military units which are only temporarily assigned to the region. However, in USPACOM, units permanently stationed in the region must be involved for the present.

Forward presence relates to all peacetime engagement objectives. It is especially critical for gaining and sustaining access to policymakers, for assuring states of the region that the United States will not allow a vacuum to develop within USPACOM, and for maintaining military balances within the region and its subregions. In the long term, it could help create an atmosphere which would be compatible with the development of regional structures which might preserve stability with a more limited U.S. engagement.

America's influence in USPACOM, especially East Asia, depends heavily on the U.S. regional military presence. Economic, diplomatic, and cultural activities are also important, and they may become relatively more significant in the future. Many observers expect that the salience of economic factors especially will dramatically increase. But the military role of the United States in this region has assumed a significance which is greater than a capabilities analysis alone would justify.

In the post World War II era, the United States fought two wars in East Asia, and developed a network of alliances which were based on security and military cooperation. Unlike the relationship of the United States with Europe, which also was fundamentally based on security concerns, the ties with Asian and Pacific nations were not supported by common historical
experiences and common value—the shared legacy of Western civilization. Even the guarantees of the security treaties with the states of the Pacific are less explicit than those of NATO.\textsuperscript{10} Due largely to this history and Asian perceptions of U.S. relationships with Europe, regional policymakers and their advisers view the U.S. military presence as an important symbol of—the surety for—U.S. engagement in the Pacific, and will continue to perceive that a military presence is an extremely important indicator of U.S. interest in the region at least into the first decades of the new century, even if other sources of influence increase in salience.

For the United States, therefore, a military presence provides avenues to advance all national interests and objectives in the region, not just those which relate to security. Conversely, the withdrawal or significant reduction of U.S. forces, especially if done rapidly, risks that policymakers and their advisers will perceive that the United States is disengaging, and begin to limit the U.S. ability to affect all U.S. objectives.

Assuring states of the region that the United States will prevent a vacuum from developing which less benign regional powers might fill, and maintaining regional balances to sustain stability and associated objectives, are all supported by forward presence. Assurance of stability also is a matter of perceptions, and would certainly be difficult to sustain in the current and expected environments without a U.S. military presence.

To the degree that the United States can provide an atmosphere of stability through forward presence, this strategic concept also contributes toward achieving most other security objectives in the region. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is less likely in a stable environment than an instable one, and the presence of military forces inevitably contributes toward deterrence, the protection of U.S. territory, security of LOCs, protection of U.S. citizens and their property in the region, etc. Obviously, combatting terrorism and the drug trade is easier with military personnel present in theater rather than in CONUS.
Security Cooperation.

The strategic principle of collective security in *National Military Strategy: 1992* may be viewed as a component of a broader strategic concept, security cooperation. The narrower concept is the appropriate focus when the upper ranges of a continuum of military operations are under consideration, but the broader notion has more utility for peacetime engagement.

The United States has always emphasized coalitions and alliances in its foreign policy and security strategy. During the cold war, "collective security," actually referring to NATO and the bi- and trilateral mutual security alliances in Asia and the Pacific, was a major pillar of U.S. strategy, coequal with forward deployment. The achievement of U.S. security objectives still requires the collaboration of allies and other friendly nations of the region. Critical to the execution of a peacetime engagement strategy, the subconcepts or programs which make up security cooperation are not only strategically important in their own right, but also support forward presence by providing U.S. military activities in most nations of the theater, including those which do not host U.S. forces. The components of security cooperation in USPACOM are:

*Mutual Defense Alliances*. There are bilateral mutual defense agreements in force between the United States and Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines. Under the terms of the Manila Pact and the Rusk-Thanat Agreement, the United States and Thailand also have mutual security obligations. (The Taiwan Relations Act places obligations on the United States for the security of Taiwan, but the law requires no reciprocal responsibility from Taiwan.) While the significance of these alliances has changed since the end of the cold war, their very existence creates the presumption of U.S. engagement in the region. They will provide the framework for bilateral security cooperation ranging from consultation to combined exercises and planning. Bases for forward deployed and forward presence forces will continue to be justified by formal treaty alliances. While except for Korea the requirement for collective defense has all but
disappeared for the present, the need for collaboration to achieve stability and other U.S. security objectives persists.

Security Assistance. Security Assistance is one of the established formal security cooperation programs of the United States, authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1960 and the Arms Export Control Act as amended and annually funded by Congress. It is a Department of State program, but affected by the recommendations of USCINCPAC and other military officials in the region. While its funding has been declining regularly, security assistance is still a valuable tool to obtain access, influence military regional balances, and achieve other objectives.

Most U.S. representatives in the region consider the International Military Training and Education (IMET) program, which provides for the training of Asian and Pacific military personnel in the United States, to be one of most cost-efficient and successful foreign aid programs operated by the U.S. Government. Relatively inexpensive ($45 million was budgeted for IMET worldwide in FY91), it has the potential of not only improving the professional standards of military organizations in the region, but also exposing the students (many of whom subsequently acquire positions of national leadership) to democratic values. Most IMET students probably develop an enhanced appreciation of human rights and democratic practices as a result of their experiences in U.S. military schools. More attention to this objective by U.S. curricula, instructors and students would make IMET a better vehicle for expanding human rights and democracy.12

Two other components of Security Assistance are Foreign Military Finance (FMF) and Economic Support Funding (ESF). In the USPACOM region, the Philippines has been almost the only benefactor of these programs in recent years, although Fiji was the recipient of a small ESF grant in 1991. Were they available, grants and concessional loans through FMF would improve the ability of the United States to attain and sustain access to the regional military leaders of less developed nations through sales of American military equipment. Grants or concessional loans are available from many other weapons exporting nations.
One of the most controversial tools which is available to the United States for influencing regional developments is approval authority for the sale of military equipment and weapons systems. Whether Foreign Military Sales (FMS), with or without FMF grants or loans, or regular commercial transactions, the sale of munitions and equipment can be a source of influence for the United States, contribute toward stable regional military balances, and provide profits to American businesses. During the cold war, the failure to allow the sale of military commodities could sometimes result in the potential customer purchasing from the Soviet Union or one of its clients, thus increasing the access of the adversary to a nation of USPACOM. This obviously is a much less significant concern in an environment with no powerful global adversary, but the consequences of providing other nations avenues of access is still a valid consideration for decisions involving the sale of military items by U.S. companies. On the other hand, military sales can also disrupt stable military balances, enhance the status of antidemocratic leaders, and divert resources from economically and socially beneficial programs, among other evils. Notwithstanding these potential pitfalls, the authority to provide judicious and controlled military exports should be retained in the arsenal of strategic concepts or tools available to U.S. policymakers.

Military-to-Military Relations. Forward presence can be partially achieved through cooperative programs between the armed forces of the United States and the armed forces of Pacific theater countries. Since the army is the major service in most USPACOM countries, the U.S. Army logically should take the lead in shoring-up forward presence through military-to-military programs. USARPAC and its predecessor organizations have in fact done so through the Expanded Relations Program (ERP). ERP coordinates Army participation in military-to-military activities originating outside of the theater (e.g., JCS-sponsored exercises and educational exchanges) with a variety of programs initiated at USARPAC. maximizing their impact in support of U.S. regional security objectives. The complete ERP, only part of which is analyzed in this report, is described in Appendix A.
Military-to-military activities which effectively illustrate American engagement in the region enhance the general sense of U.S. presence and continued commitment to regional stability. High-level visits and field training exercises are particularly valuable components of ERP for achieving this result. Visits of senior officers such as the Chairman of the JCS, the service Chiefs of Staff, USCINCPAC, and service component commanders, attract the attention of the host country's military and political elite, and, through the media, the entire public. Reciprocal visits by the regional nation's senior officers to Washington or Honolulu also enhance the bonds between the United States and countries of the region. In the majority of regional countries where armies are predominant, exchanges of senior army officials tend to be most effective. Moreover, these exchanges stimulate the regional governments to focus on interests shared with the United States and provide U.S. officials with opportunities to emphasize the importance of U.S. relations in the region. Combined field training exercises of U.S. and regional forces, whose direct objectives normally involve enhancing stability by improving the quality and interoperability of both nations' forces, indirectly reinforce perceptions of a U.S. forward presence as well, because they involve relatively large numbers of personnel and items of equipment, attracting broad attention.

All of the ERP programs foster better relations between the U.S. Army and armies of regional nations, thereby maintaining access to influence those nations' policies. They improve the military capabilities of the cooperating nations, supporting stable balances of power. They also provide opportunities for U.S. personnel to explain democratic values to their regional colleagues, and for regional military personnel to observe some aspects of democracy through the behavior of the U.S. Army and U.S. military personnel. Finally, U.S. participants in military-to-military programs gain familiarity with the host nation and the host nation military organization, providing information and understanding which can facilitate planning and executing contingency operations if they should become necessary.
Were a crisis similar to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to occur in the Pacific theater, military-to-military programs would provide a basis for the formation of an ad hoc coalition to conduct military operations. U.S. military leaders would know their counterparts, and the latter would have some familiarity with U.S. doctrine and equipment.

Crisis Response.

Crisis response is a strategic concept which implies the deployment of military force, and thus involves the upper ranges of the continuum of military operations. It is primarily concerned with ensuring those objectives listed in conjunction with the national interest in sovereignty and independence—deterring aggression against the United States and its allies, protecting U.S. territory, maintaining security of LOCs, assisting allies in regional defense, and providing for the safety of U.S. citizens and property. But the capability to execute crisis response operations is also critical for a strategy of peacetime engagement to be effective because it adds credibility and rationale to the U.S. forward presence posture. Without a credible U.S. regional response capability, leaders of the region would view the United States as a paper tiger.

Strategic Deterrence and Defense.

With the probability of a global nuclear war lower than at any time since the Soviets developed a nuclear capability, the salience of strategic deterrence and defense has receded along with other U.S. strategic concepts designed for global confrontation with the Soviet Union. But nuclear deterrence and defense as they apply to regional nuclear and near-nuclear powers (in USPACOM, e.g., China, India, Pakistan and North Korea) rather than a global superpower are still important to many allied and friendly Asian and Pacific states. The U.S. nuclear umbrella not only deters possible regional antagonists from using nuclear weapons, but also reduces the incentive for near-nuclear states to develop a nuclear capability in the first place. This limitation of the nuclear threat consequently reduces the pressure for proliferation by friendly and allied states. Successful implementation of nuclear deterrence by
national authorities facilitates the tasks of USCINCPAC in achieving regional security objectives.

Reconstitution.

The fifth major strategic concept listed in the National Security Strategy for the United States, reconstitution, has less immediate significance for USPACOM. Defined as expanding the base force to accommodate long-term changes in the security environment, it probably has relatively limited impact on the perceptions of leaders in the region or on contemporary security conditions. Of course, demonstrated inability to expand the base force would undercut the credibility of U.S. forward presence. In any case, it is clearly a national responsibility.

Supporting Concepts.

There are many supporting strategic concepts,13 most of them limited applications of the broad concept of forward presence, which are extremely important to a strategy of peacetime engagement for the Pacific. The execution of some of them, like nuclear deterrence and reconstitution, is controlled from Washington, and can only be influenced, but not directed, by USCINCPAC and component commanders. Others (the concepts included in the Expanded Relations Program) are executed within the theater, with authority over them vested in the Commander, USARPAC.

Forward Deployment. This concept, and its relationship to the concept of forward presence, has been discussed in the previous section. It is sufficient at this point to repeat that this concept is applicable in Korea now, and that its execution tends to reinforce the military presence of the United States in the region. Premature reduction or withdrawal of forward deployed forces deterring North Korea would not only risk conflict on the Korean peninsula, but also would impair the achievement of a range of other objectives which depend on U.S. forward presence.

Arms Control. Except for the Korean peninsula, arms control is not likely to be directly relevant for the U.S. Army in
USPACOM, although arms control negotiations or measures could affect the overall security situation in the region as they might apply to the nuclear, maritime, or aerospace dimensions of U.S. strategy. However, the United States may support the creation of arms control regimes among states of the region (possibly in Korea, Indochina or on the subcontinent) and U.S. Army personnel could provide assistance and advice (based on the Army's expertise gained from the European theater) in developing and administering them. The implementation of arms control regimes in the theater could advance the long-term objective, urged on the United States earlier in this report, of creating regional institutions with the capacity of assuring stability with only limited intervention by the United States.

**Peacekeeping.** As the concept has evolved under the United Nations, only nations neutral to a dispute are acceptable as participants in peacekeeping operations. Since virtually every dispute during the cold war era was related to the U.S.-Soviet confrontation or exploitable by one of the superpowers, peacekeeping operations remained in the province of smaller, mostly nonaligned or neutral, states. In the post-cold war international milieu, however, major powers, including the United States, may be acceptable to perform peacekeeping roles to enforce ceasefires and otherwise limit or prevent conflict. Even when U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations in the region is not appropriate, the United States may support those that advance U.S. interests by providing transport and other logistical support. The advocacy of, and participation in, peacekeeping operations could also advance the long-term objective of developing regional institutions with the capacity of assuring stability.

**Civic and Humanitarian Action.** Civic and humanitarian actions are administered by USARPAC as part of ERP, but they differ in fundamental ways from the other elements of that program and should be considered separately. First, civic and humanitarian actions, which typically involve medical or engineering projects in poorly developed areas, are designed to benefit the population—not the military establishment—of the recipient country. The U.S. units engaged in these projects
may receive valuable training and interesting experiences, but that is normally secondary to providing needed services to the host population. Second, civic and humanitarian actions in the Pacific theater are often not military-to-military operations. In some South Pacific nations where U.S. medical or engineer detachments have been deployed for humanitarian purposes, there are no indigenous armed forces.

In improving the conditions for citizens of some of the less developed areas of the region, civic and humanitarian actions, although they are normally modest in scope, also contribute toward the achievement of U.S. regional security objectives. These actions create goodwill for the United States, which tends to improve the access of American diplomats and defense officials to policymaking tribunals. Insofar as they are successful in mitigating economic and social grievances, they reduce potential sources of instability.

Miscellaneous Supporting Concepts. Two important strategic concepts, directly related to the ongoing responsibilities of all theater commanders, are noncombatant evacuation operations and disaster relief. USPACOM incorporates these concepts in its planning and force structure requirements. The execution of both of these concepts would frequently require participation by the U.S. Army, particularly when land operations would benefit from a strong support capability.

While they are not directly related to the major strategic concepts of the national military strategy, the strategic concepts related to the objectives of combating narcotics and terrorism should be mentioned. The Army’s participation in the campaign against terrorism in the region focuses on an antiterrorism program designed to protect Army facilities and personnel throughout the theater. The program has resulted in modernization of equipment, upgrading of law enforcement procedures and training and better intelligence coordination. The counternarcotics efforts of USARPAC have at least four components: counterproduction, countertrafficking, cooperation and support, and education. The most visible activity of the Army has been participation of the 25th ID and the Hawaii National Guard in marijuana eradication operations in Hawaii initiated by
state and federal law enforcement agencies. Countertrafficking activities in the theater are largely the responsibility of the Navy and Air Force, but Army Military Working Dog Teams have aided in the detection and confiscation of narcotics at airports in Hawaii and Alaska. Other cooperative support has been provided, and continuous education programs to reduce demand are presented on Army installations for military personnel, and through schools, for the larger military community.

RESOURCES FOR PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

The most critical decisions affecting resources available to USPACOM (and, of course, the rest of the Department of Defense) will be made through the appropriation process, and will be based at least as much on domestic economic and political factors as strategic ones. Strategists and military planners do not make the fundamental choices between security and other dimensions of national policy, but they must attempt to indicate to political decisionmakers what is required to achieve national and regional military objectives at acceptable levels of risk, so that politicians understand the strategic consequences of their decisions. At a time when it is certain that, barring the emergence of new global military threat, defense budgets will shrink, this responsibility is especially significant.

For a successful strategy of peacetime engagement in USPACOM, the United States requires bases to reflect its enduring commitment to the security of the region and to garrison military units in theater, a force structure adequate to execute the strategic concepts, and appropriate funding procedures. These resource issues are, for the most part, discussed as conceptual questions rather than as exact quantities of money, specific weapons systems, and numbers of personnel in the following analysis.

Military Bases.

Forward presence for the United States, at least in USPACOM for the next decade or so, connotes bases on the
territory of other nations. Throughout the post war era, U.S. military forces in the region had been recognized by the leaders in Washington and in capitals of the region as the principal instrument of the United States to represent its determination to be a Pacific power and to actually influence events in the region. At one time there were some 480,000 Army personnel forward deployed or stationed in five countries of East Asia.\textsuperscript{14} Today there are only about 125,000 military personnel from all services afloat in USPACOM or stationed in there—soon to be two, with the closing of Subic Naval Base—nations of the region.\textsuperscript{15}

While most observers believe that the opportunities for the United States to influence events in USPACOM by the deployment or employment of military force will be limited in the post-cold war environment—and therefore a smaller force structure in the theater is appropriate—a widely held perception remains that U.S. engagement in the affairs of the region depends upon a credible military presence which includes personnel stationed there. The absence of U.S. military bases in the Philippines, whatever its significance in operational and tactical terms, diminishes the perception of U.S. commitment to the region. It is not unlikely that U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps bases on Okinawa will also be forced to close due to especially strong local anti-base sentiment, and, if so, that will further diminish the perception of U.S. engagement. The reduction in the number of U.S. bases and host nations for U.S. bases is politically much more significant than marginal decreases in personnel or numbers of weapons systems.

The United States has already acted to offset the political and operational effect of closing Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base. The main action with relevance for forward presence has been the negotiation of agreements with Singapore to gain access to ship repair facilities there, more-or-less continuous rotation of Air Force F-16 detachments in-and-out of a Singaporean military air base, and the relocation of a Navy logistics headquarters from Subic. There are small Air Force and Navy detachments permanently stationed in Singapore. Similar arrangements with other Southeast Asian countries are being explored, and probably are feasible if the agreements
have more the appearance of commercial arrangements with security implications rather than security arrangements with commercial implications. While the repair and transit facilities at Singapore, even if added to similar facilities in other states of the region, cannot substitute for those which have been relinquished or destroyed by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, they indicate that the United States is retaining a military presence in Southeast Asia, and they provide limited repair and replenishment capabilities closer to the South China Sea or Indian Ocean than Tokyo Bay or Pearl Harbor. In the expected low threat environment of the 1990s, Singapore-type agreements plus some expansion of capacity on Guam and other U.S. territories may be an acceptable and affordable adjustment to the closing of the bases in the Philippines in terms of retaining credible forward presence. The loss of additional bases probably could not be compensated for in the same way unless there are even more radical changes in the security environment.

There are also some 70,000 military personnel on U.S. territory within the boundaries of USPACOM, which includes Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and some smaller territories. U.S. based forces are not full substitutes for forces based within other nations of the region, however. Placing U.S. forces on U.S. territory in the Pacific does demonstrate U.S. interests in the region, but it does not reflect a strong political commitment or indicate effective regional engagement as effectively as forces placed on the territory of allies. Moreover, for many operational purposes, Alaska and Hawaii are geographically on the periphery of this vast region, and Guam and the smaller territories, which do have relatively good geostrategic locations, cannot adequately support large bases.

Retaining military bases in Korea (even after U.S. forces are no longer required for deterrence, the antagonisms between the North and South subside, or all of Korea is unified), would be an important step in sustaining the perception of a U.S. forward presence in USPACOM. If the United States removes all forces from Korea and closes its bases when their current role is obsolete, then Japan will be the only nation in a region stretching from Pakistan to California.
that hosts the armed forces of the United States. Absent a clear threat common to the United States and regional states, no other nation will likely grant base rights, with all of the jurisdictional problems and presumed derogations of sovereignty they imply. The loss of all redundancy in U.S. basing posture would be damaging militarily and politically.

Although there has been a surge in anti-Americanism in South Korea in recent years, particularly among college students but also in many other segments of the population, there is a possibility that the Republic of Korea or its successor government will extend an invitation for U.S. forces to remain in Korea after North/South detente or unification. Some Korean officials and security analysts, mindful that there will be potential instabilities in the security environment—they fear Japan—even without a threat from the North, now publicly advocate a permanent U.S. presence. Moreover, with the relocation of U.S. Forces Korea Headquarters out of Seoul and changes in U.S.-R.O.K. command relationships, Korean national may soften their opinions of the United States.

Even though bases on U.S. territory have less impact on perceptions than foreign bases, a U.S. Army installation in Hawaii is especially important for the execution of a peacetime engagement strategy in the region. Hawaii’s position on the periphery of the region, a disadvantage for conveying a sense of military presence, is an advantage for implementing much of the Expanded Relations Program of USARPAC. Military personnel from all over the area pass through Hawaii on their way from and to the United States for official visits and educational exchanges. Stop-offs at Ft. Shafter or Schofield Barracks allow USARPAC to reinforce military-to-military relations established in CONUS, and sometimes provide opportunities for practical applications of skills learned at U.S. Army schools. The loss of these facilities would restrict the effectiveness of the entire ERP.

The political significance of U.S. foreign bases may diminish as regional structures to preserve stability evolve and become institutionalized, developments which are unlikely to flourish in the near term but which might mature once a new international system evolves. They will also become less
salient if the pace and scope of U.S. economic activities, which have been stable or declining, intensify, especially in relation to the economic presence of the Japanese in the region. This kind of development does not seem likely at the present time, unfortunately. If these changes take place, the need for a visible U.S. forward presence will probably not disappear, but will become much less urgent. Forward presence with few or no foreign bases may then become feasible, especially if the Navy and Air Force retain commercial facilities in the region.

**Force Structure.**

USPACOM has traditionally been considered a maritime theater, with the USCINCPAC always an admiral. Its vast jurisdiction is mostly water, and with the mission of sea control, the Navy logically assumed a dominant role. As the capabilities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet were improved during the last decades of the cold war, the responsibilities of the U.S. Navy became increasingly critical. The Air Force's focus on the Soviet threat meant that it placed more emphasis on Europe than the Pacific, but the Pacific did provide bases suitable for reaching targets in the Soviet Union, and useful staging points to project power into the Middle East should Soviet adventures make that necessary.

For the Army, however, USPACOM was clearly an economy-of-force theater during the cold war, especially after the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Korea and Vietnam, which did lead to temporary surges in Army strength in the theater, were typically viewed as distractions from the main focus of the cold war. In contemplating general war with the Soviet Union, the eventuality which determined how the force would be designed and allocated for the long term, the first priority was always Europe, where the massive Soviet/Warsaw Pact armor and mechanized divisions, which seemed capable of literally destroying Western Europe, threatened NATO. In the Pacific theater, the credible Soviet ground threat was against China (from 1960 on) rather than U.S. allies. The danger to the latter came not from the enemy superpower itself, but from Soviet allies, China in the 1940s, and in the 1950s, North Korea and North Vietnam. The Soviet threat was at most
a marginal factor in determining the Army’s cold war strength in USPACOM.

At any rate, the cold war standard for establishing force structure is obsolete with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, even though most of the sizable military capability deployed in the region by America’s former adversary still exists. Moreover, there are no identifiable regional threats other than North Korea, although a long list of potential, but relatively improbable, disturbers of regional stability or military challengers of U.S. interests in the mid- or long term could be constructed. Instead, instability and uncertainty are the principal focus of U.S. security policy in the new international environment. Accordingly, the strategy outlined in the previous pages gives priority to assurance over deterrence (although a deterrent must be maintained in conjunction with the Republic of Korea to restrain North Korea until this unresolved cold war dispute is settled) and forward presence over forward deployment. The major considerations in structuring U.S. armed forces in USPACOM, then, should be the execution of the strategic concepts most critical to peacetime engagement: forward presence, security cooperation and crisis response. Since these concepts are similar to, and to some degree incorporate, elements of the concepts of cold war strategies, sizing and shaping forces according to the requirements of peacetime engagement in itself should not diminish the U.S. capability to achieve traditional security objectives in the region.

With forces structured according to the new priorities, the Army would no longer be only a supporting player in USPACOM. It would bear much of the responsibility for implementing the strategy, and USPACOM could no longer properly be designated as a maritime theater with an economy-of-force role for the Army.

Ground forces are needed as a part of the U.S. military presence for both military and political reasons. Militarily, they are necessary because the risks of depending entirely on CONUS, or even Hawaiian or Alaskan, deployed ground forces to deal with contingencies in USPACOM are unacceptable because of the enormous size of the theater which stretches
from the Indo-Pakistani border to the coast of California, and from Antarctica into the Arctic Ocean. Timely response to crises by U.S. based ground forces to many parts of the theater could be extremely difficult to achieve and, equally importantly, will be perceived as such in the region. A credible, and therefore effective, forward presence depends partly upon widely held perceptions that the United States can respond rapidly and decisively to regional crises and contingencies. Moreover, ground forces, lacking the mobility of air and naval forces, are a more enduring symbol of commitment and engagement.

The Army and the Marine Corps each have advantages for performing military operations which might be required of U.S. forward presence ground forces. Because they are complementary, both services contribute to U.S. forward presence in the region. Politically, the Army may be more valuable for at least two reasons. First, Army units are normally structured with greater logistics capabilities and sustainment features than Marine Corps units, and thereby give the appearance of greater permanence. While Marine Corps installations may contain permanent buildings and equipment, the Corps has the primary mission of amphibious operations—achieving a beachhead and turning the rest of the ground operations over to the Army—and is not identified with long-term operations as the Army is. Second, the Army is in the best position to establish and foster military-to-military operations between the United States and the nations of the region, a key for achieving several peacetime engagement objectives, for the simple reason that armies dominate those nations, and most nations do not have a marine corps at all.

This is by no means to suggest that the Navy and Air Force are not important components of the U.S. forward presence in USPACOM. There are critical regional objectives which only the Navy or Air Force can achieve. In fact, according to many of the region’s policymakers and security analysts, the Navy is the most critical part of U.S. military capabilities in the Pacific theater, partly because the United States is correctly perceived as a maritime power which naturally requires large naval forces and partly because the fleet, with frequent port calls throughout
the region, is the most visible military capability which the United States can deploy.

To meet its responsibilities for the execution of a peacetime engagement strategy for the 1990s in USPACOM, exclusive of the requirements for a deterrent against North Korea, the U.S. Army needs a force structure committed to the theater which consists of a corps headquarters and component organizations, no fewer forces stationed in theater than are currently deployed there, and, at least for the near term, no substantial reduction in the U.S. forces occupying foreign bases.16

A U.S. Army corps, "the fundamental Army unit capable of credible theater warfighting, possessing organic logistics, communications, and intelligence infrastructure,"17 should be dedicated to—but not necessarily all stationed in—USPACOM, as is anticipated by the base force concept of the Department of Defense. The corps would consist of both active and reserve component units. It would provide the region with valuable C³ capabilities for contingency operations, facilitate combined planning with allies in the region, afford continuity for U.S. participation in large-scale exercises, and support representational activities. As a dedicated corps, it should have the expertise and familiarity to anticipate regional eccentricities and understand the physical and political environment. And only a dedicated corps could maintain the continuing relations with the area which would allow it to anticipate needs and develop a broad body of basic intelligence data on the region, as well as personnel with intimate familiarity with the region. A corps commander and his staff would also provide USCINCPAC with an excellent joint task force commander when needed. Moreover, many contingencies in the Pacific could require the full combat and support capabilities of a corps, and the full variety of forces available to a corps is likely to routinely be necessary to satisfy the diversified exercise requests from the region. If the corps headquarters were fully or partly deployed within the theater, there would be obvious additional advantages.

It is important in the near term not to substantially reduce the sizes of Army deployments in the theater, especially those
stationed in Korea and Japan, because of the impact on officials and observers who reside in the region. With the departure of U.S. forces from the Philippines, the already widely-held perception that the United States is disengaging from the Pacific has been strengthened; any additional major reduction of forces will further reinforce this position. Significant reductions in forces stationed on foreign territory—even eliminating or substantially downgrading the status of the small Army presence in Japan—could be particularly damaging. In the future, if the security environment changes and regional security structures are established, significant reductions in U.S. Army forces may involve less risks to U.S. interests.

**Regional Specialists.**

Specialists familiar with cultural, political and economic, as well as military, characteristics of the region—the kinds of officers produced through the U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program—are obviously necessary to plan and set priorities for peacetime engagement activities. Senior officers require the scope of knowledge which comes not only from formal training, but also from extensive experience in a number of positions in the theater. Moreover, if these activities are to be of optimum value in supporting U.S. diplomatic and political objectives, some regional understanding—including language skills—is also required among officers and senior enlisted personnel who are implementing peacetime engagement plans in the field.

To meet the requirements for peacetime engagement strategy in USPACOM (and undoubtedly in other theaters), the Army must enhance the FAO program and also explore other methods for instilling cultural sensitivity and regional understanding. A reasonable long-term goal should be that every officer and senior NCO assigned to USPACOM or to units designated to support the theater receive enough regional training to become sensitive to the cultures of the region.

The FAO program for the USPACOM area probably should be enlarged. There are presently only 125 positions Army-wide.
for FAOs with the four concentrations (China, Northeast Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia) involving 10 countries in the USPACOM theater and Pakistan. There are no Southeast Asia FAOs concentrating on Burma, Cambodia, Philippines, and Vietnam, and there is no concentration for the small island countries of the Pacific.\(^{18}\) (There also are no FAOs for Australia and New Zealand, but there is an active exchange program with Australia, and probably sufficient personnel who understand Australian and New Zealand culture, which is similar to that of the United States in any case.) With expanded peacetime engagement activities, more FAOs would be appropriate at joint and Army staffs in Washington and Honolulu, within the Special Forces and within Army units designated for USPACOM. A good guess is that the Army should have twice as many FAO positions Army-wide as the 125 now required.

FAO officers are valuable not only because of their expert knowledge. Equally important, they are critical assets for implementing peacetime engagement programs because they tend to have a high degree of intellectual curiosity about, and balanced sensitivity to, other cultures. Expanding the FAO program without maintaining these characteristics of the typical FAO would be counterproductive. Obtaining larger numbers of FAOs as well qualified as those now serving from a shrinking officer corps will only be possible if incentives are offered to ambitious, intelligent young officers. At the least, the perception that membership in the FAO program is not career enhancing must be refuted by favorable recognition of FAO service by Promotion, Service School Selection, Reduction in Force and Selective Early Retirement Boards.

Most other personnel will require less intensive education and training in the countries of the region. The Defense Language Institute (DLI) and the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) offer language training, which also includes an introduction to the culture of nations using the language. These programs range from several weeks to a year in length and, thus, while much less costly than FAO training, are nonetheless very expensive. As a practical matter, authorization to attend these schools must be restricted to holders of key positions, as is the
case at the present time. However, in the peacetime competition environment of the future, fewer personnel should be excused from attending the "gateway" (8 weeks or less) courses than is now the practice.

For the majority of soldiers, programs to foster an understanding of political and cultural characteristics of nations of the region will have to be provided by the organizations to which they belong. These programs can be organized as concise briefings for units deploying to participate in exercises, or continuing educational programs for headquarters or units regularly engaged in the region. The activities need not be expensive, even for organizations which do not have FAOs assigned. Well informed qualified instructors are available from military organizations throughout CONUS and the theater, such as DLI, FSI, active and reserve component intelligence units, active and reserve component civic affairs units, Special Forces units and schools (e.g., USMA, USACGSC and USAWC). Personal attention of commanders will be necessary to assure that these programs are effective and interesting.

**Rational Budgeting and Funding.**

The overall effectiveness and efficiency of military operations in the region will be increased to the degree that USCINCPAC and the Commander of USARPAC (as well as other component commanders) have the authority and flexibility to rationally plan and execute peacetime engagement activities without some of the artificial bureaucratic and legal barriers which presently inhibit them. Earlier analysis hopefully establishes that the maintenance of stability in the Pacific is extremely important for the United States and deserves a high priority in the allocation of funds. but it is clear that personnel, material and financial resources provided by the nation's political and military leadership will be less than the planners at USPACOM and USARPAC desire. It is, therefore, especially important that the resources which are provided are used as efficiently as possible.

Such flexibility is now limited by a cumbersome funding arrangement which often requires a number of separate
funding authorities to implement a single peacetime engagement activity. For example, U.S. participation in non-JCS exercises is funded from Program 2 of operations and maintenance (O&M), part of the Army appropriation for USARPAC; support for the participation of other nations in the exercise would have to be provided by Program 10 of O&M; and purchase of material for a humanitarian/civic action activity in conjunction with the exercise would require monies authorized by Section 1051 of Title 10, U.S. Code, which is allocated by USCINCPAC with the approval of the Secretaries of Defense and State. If Special Forces participate, Program 11 of O&M comes into play. Participation of reserve component units would entail dealing with another set of funding authorizations. A deficiency in any one category might prevent the entire operation, even though other categories had an excess. Moreover, JCS-sponsored exercises, security assistance and a number of other important components of the complete ERP are funded from entirely distinct, Washington-based sources. Reducing the complications of funding peacetime engagement activities would not only facilitate rational planning and implementation of operations, but also recognize the significance of these activities in achieving fundamental strategic objectives.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The purpose of this study has been to consider the roles of the Army in a peacetime engagement strategy for USPACOM, and the emphasis has been on the peacetime competition portion of the operational continuum. Accordingly, the roles of other services and other agencies are only referred to when necessary to understand Army roles, which are preeminent in a USPACOM peacetime engagement strategy for a multipolar, more-or-less threat-free environment. Given this environment and a peacetime engagement strategy, the relatively greater significance of the Army under these circumstances compared to its purported limited possible contribution during cold war conditions is striking. There should be no inference that the roles of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps are not
important, however. Such a conclusion cannot be justified by this study.

The study has also focused on political effects of military operations in the region, which are the primary targets of peacetime engagement activities. But the raison d'être of the U.S. Army, like the other American armed services, is to achieve national goals through the threat or use of force, and, in peacetime, preparation for conflict must always be the Army's highest priority, even when—especially when—the necessity for conflict appears remote. This imperative does not contradict the study's earlier assertions that peacetime engagement objectives should take precedence over more orthodox military objectives relating to deterrence and defense. The well-known paradox of deterrence, that you prevent war by preparing to fight one, applies also to peacetime engagement objectives: the U.S. Army can only contribute toward achieving them when it is successful as a military organization; i.e., when it is prepared to use force effectively. Armies of the USPACOM theater want to exercise with U.S. Army units, acquire U.S. Army equipment and have their personnel trained at U.S. Army schools because they believe that the U.S. Army is a competent military organization. No matter how skillful USARPAC may become in deploying civic affairs operations or organizing international military conferences, it can only help the United States achieve its regional objectives if it represents, and is seen by observers in the region to represent, a modern, strong, effective Army.

The challenges of peacetime engagement call for new and creative approaches to military strategy and operations, and the performance of nontraditional activities. They do not in any way alter the fundamental purposes of the Armed Forces of the United States.

ENDNOTES

1. USPACOM contains the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the seas and island nations therein, plus the nations of the Asia mainland east of the India-Pakistan border. The territories of the former Soviet Union are excluded. The phrases "Pacific region," Pacific theater, or "the Pacific" are also sometimes used in the study to refer to USPACOM.
2. Kim II Sung became 80 in April 1992. His son, who reaches 50 in 1992, is being groomed to succeed his father, possibly this year.

3. They are China, India, the two Koreas and Vietnam. The others among the largest eight, as of 1990, were the Soviet Union, the United States and Iraq. The Military Balance 1991-1992, London: Brassey's, 1991.


8. The idea that the United States should focus on assuring states that it will remain engaged in international politics to contribute to the maintenance of stability rather than to deter enemies was suggested by Dr. Lawrence Korb in a lecture at the U.S. Army War College on June 24, 1991.

9. There may be no official definition of forward presence as yet. In any case, the definitions of the term and of forward deployment used in this analysis have been developed by the author.

10. In the mutual security treaties with Japan and the Republic of Korea, the United States acknowledges that an attack on its treaty partner would be dangerous to "its own peace and security." On the other hand, the North Atlantic Treaty provides that an attack on one signatory would be considered as if it were an attack on all.

11. "Collective security" has been regularly used by U.S. spokesmen and the press to refer to NATO, which is an organization to provide for collective defense. In the literature of the discipline of international organization, however, collective security refers not to alliances directed against an outside power or another alliance, but to a system by which the parties agree to act together against any nation (even one otherwise
considered an ally) which attacks any other nation (even one otherwise considered an antagonist).

12. A number of IMET students obviously did not learn to appreciate human rights and democracy, and they subsequently participated in coups d'état against democratically elected governments and violated human rights. However, transferring democratic values to international students has not been an educational objective of U.S. military schools.

13. The designations of supporting concepts used by different authors are not necessarily uniform. The list used in this study is based primarily on usage at Headquarters USARPAC.


18. This data was provided by the Chief of the FAO Proponent Team, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army (DAMO-SSF), by telephone on January 13, 1992.
APPENDIX A

1. THE GROWING SCOPE OF USARPAC'S EXPANDED RELATIONS PROGRAM. The USARPAC Expanded Relations program (ERP) was initiated in 1978 to provide an opportunity for increased interaction among Asia-Pacific armies. Several ongoing U.S. Army activities, together with a number of new initiatives, were merged into a coherent, multifaceted, progressively-phased program designed to accommodate each nation's interests. The new program soon consisted of reciprocal visits, personnel exchanges, conferences and seminars, on-the-job training and combined command post and field training exercises. Army-to-army dialogue enabled the U.S. Army to gain background knowledge, increase professional understanding, and contribute to the development and modernization of ground forces in Asia and the Pacific. This exchange of professional information serves the interests of Asian and Pacific nations by enhancing indigenous army capabilities, promoting self-confidence and mutual trust, and improving the ability of national armies to work with the U.S. Army and one another. It is the principal mechanism through which U.S. Army, Pacific works to attain the objectives of our peacetime engagement strategy.


   (1) PAMS is a major element of the Expanded Relations Program. Conducted on a nonpolitical basis, its purposes are to provide a forum for discussion of common military management problems in a professional environment, to stimulate ideas and to promote mutual understanding. While the seminar is designed primarily for mid-level army managers, usually in the grade of major, to brigadier general, a number of
senior general officers, chiefs of staff, ministers of defense and even presidents have attended. Presentations and discussion panels are designed to expose common problems to the widest range of tested or potential solutions, emphasizing techniques and methods used by attendees to resolve management problems.

(2) The first PAMS session was held in Honolulu in September 1978 and involved nine armies. Since that time the seminar has grown consistently, with the most recent conference including delegates from 25 nations. Senior U.S. and friendly army leaders play key roles in each seminar session. USARPAC normally co-hosts the conference with another army.

b. Reciprocal Visits.

(1) Reciprocal visits often constitute the first step in developing a program of country-to-country activities. Reciprocal visits result in better mutual understanding of organizations, roles, capabilities, and missions. Visits to allied and friendly countries show the U.S. Army's interest, allow the face-to-face interchange of ideas and encourage further interactions.

(2) Commander/general officer visits are usually annual and involve interaction with incumbent ground force decision-makers throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Discussions generally focus on bilateral Army policy issues and positions, the review of ongoing activities, and consideration of new initiatives, and result in guidance and approval for the conduct of specific combined activities.

(3) Senior staff visits consist of interactions with foreign officers charged with responsibility for policy formulation and program management. Staff or technical officer visits are made as needed to interact with foreign officers who "supervise and administer functional programs and who, by their positions, represent potential future leaders. Such trips are usually in conjunction with exercises, conferences, surveys, or security assistance reviews.
(4) Visits by foreign army leaders are an important facet of the ERP. These visits not only broaden U.S. Army contacts and enhance mutual understanding, but build a foundation upon which many other activities may grow. Self-initiated visits normally include trips to army activities and installations, historic military locations, and local cultural activities. Such an all-inclusive program seeks to provide a well-rounded view of the U.S. Army and its environment.

c. Staff Information Exchanges. U.S. Army, Pacific participates in and sponsors various conferences, seminars, and staff liaison or exchange meetings designed to foster mutual understanding, build rapport and exchange useful information with and among armies in the Asia-Pacific region. Staff formation exchanges are conducted with foreign armies in the fields of intelligence, operations, training, logistics, communications and electronics, automation, military engineering, acquisition management, civic action, disaster relief—virtually any functional area within USARPAC. Some good examples are participation in the annual Australian Army Chief of General Staff Exercise, Intelligence Exchange Conferences with the Japan Ground Self Defense Force, and the U.S./Republic of Korea and U.S./Japan Staff talks. The U.S. Army gains increased knowledge of staff and command procedures of the friendly armies involved, insight into the major professional issues under consideration in those armies, and practical experience in working with foreign staffs.

d. Individual Training. USARPAC also conducts a variety of individual training activities with foreign nations. Activities include security assistance-related observer training (OBT), on-the-job training (OJT), overseas in-country training, officer, NCO and enlisted exchanges, formal attendance at selected service schools, and in-country Foreign Area Officer (FAO) training.

(1) Observer training in Hawaii is both cost-and time-effective for Asia-Pacific army personnel. Many trainees stop in Hawaii en route home after classroom training in the Continental U.S. (CONUS), to integrate their new skills by training with an active U.S. Army unit for a short time. Training can be in any area of the wide spectrum of U.S. Army expertise,
and might include training opportunities with other U.S. services as well.

(2) The Pacific Armies Look Exercise (PALEX) is a short-term junior officer/noncommissioned officer exchange program between U.S. army personnel and the ground forces of allied and friendly armies. The program, which began in 1979, is designed for a duration of up to 3 months, giving participants an opportunity to contribute to the unit being visited, improve individual professional expertise, and get an "in-depth" feel for the foreign army and country being visited. The interchange of ideas, both professional and cultural, produces immediate tangible benefits as well as long-term value as these junior leaders rise to positions of greater responsibility in their own defense establishments.

(3) Foreign Observer Training Program (FORTOP) is a joint USARPAC-Pacific Air Force effort to provide visiting Army and Air Force officers with practical experience in joint air-ground operations. Presentations, discussions, demonstrations and practical exercises are conducted on doctrine, procedures, communications and coordination of rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft in support of the ground battle. Participants are exposed to U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard aviation assets, procedures and doctrine. Countries which have participated in this program include Malaysia, Australia, Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Brunei, Bangladesh, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Fiji, Tonga, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines.

(4) Personnel Exchange Program (PEP). The Personnel Exchange Program is a HQ, Department of the Army program designed to establish relationships with personnel of other nations, foster understanding, encourage mutual confidence and respect, and provide interesting and challenging duty. PEP is a 2-year exchange, with foreign PEP officers assigned to various stations in CONUS and Hawaii, while U.S. officers are assigned for a like period to each of the participating foreign countries. There are 26 U.S. Army PEP positions in Australia, and two in Singapore. USARPAC encourages and coordinates a dialogue among U.S. officers assigned to PEP positions throughout the theater.
(5) Military Schools. USARPAC coordinates directly with U.S. attaches and foreign armies to arrange for attendance by U.S. Army personnel at foreign army schools. These efforts have resulted in expanded U.S. attendance at military schools in India, Malaysia, and Brunei.

(6) Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Training. USARPAC is the FAO proponent for the Asia-Pacific Region, and as such monitors and assists FAO trainees throughout the region.

e. Small Unit Training. USARPAC conducts numerous small unit exercises with regional armies in several foreign countries including Thailand, the Philippines, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Singapore, Nepal, Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Bangladesh. USARPAC annually exchanges Active and Reserve Component small units with Australia under a program initiated in 1972. These exercises, in addition to providing an excellent training and leadership experience, provide firsthand experience to U.S. soldiers in working with foreign soldiers, broaden professionalism through exposure to environmental variety, and increase understanding of operational procedures through actual interaction with friendly armies.

f. Joint and Combined Training. USARPAC conducts some 35 joint, combined command post and field training exercises with Asia-Pacific armies. The objectives of these exercises are to train U.S. soldiers and units, establish interface with foreign armies and to operate on a variety of terrains. Participation may consist of providing observers or player cells, or the deployment of entire units. Exercises are conducted throughout the Pacific from platoon to division level.

g. Reserve Component (RC) Contributions. In keeping with the Total Force concept, USARPAC has made a highly successful effort to integrate Reserve personnel into the entire spectrum of Expanded Relations Program initiatives. This has resulted in highly relevant, mission-oriented training for reservists and guardsmen assigned from CONUS. The mutually beneficial deployment exercises which use RC civil affairs, engineer, medical and other special capabilities demonstrate the U.S. concern for countries in the region as a
whole and the small island nations of the South Pacific in particular.

2. CONCLUSION.

a. The Expanded Relations Program is always evolving—acknowledging regional developments, the changing needs of allied and friendly armies and our own training needs. Interactions with foreign armies have grown exponentially from eight countries in 1978 to 35 today:

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<th>Australia</th>
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b. Working with other ground forces in the region, the Expanded Relations Program is an effective mechanism to establish contacts, develop interactions and enhance mutual understanding among our allies and friends in the theater. This translates directly to expanded U.S. influence in the region, and promotes U.S. access to foreign bases and facilities in time of crisis. Moreover, the program demonstrates tangible American commitment to regional and international peace, stability, and friendship throughout the Asia-Pacific basin.

LTC Boivin/438-1077