ACTIVATION/PARTIAL MOBILIZATION OF THE US ARMY RESERVES
AND ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROBLEMS

BY

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On 22 August 1990, the President of the United States signed Executive order 12727 which implemented, for the first time, the Title 10 US Code 673b authority to order to active duty the Selected Reserve of the United States Armed Forces. This gave the Department of Defense authority to activate up to 200,000 Selected Reservists for a period not to exceed 90 days, with the authority to extend that period for an additional 90 days. This authority was further delegated to the Secretary of the Army. This paper analyzes the myriad U.S. Army Reserve personnel management system problems experienced during the activation and partial mobilization of the U.S. Army Reserves in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The lessons learned from those operations have been analyzed and the paper discusses not only the problems, but also recommends statutory and regulatory changes necessary in order to preclude a re-occurrence of those same problems in future activations, partial mobilizations and/or mobilizations.
ACTIVATION/PARTIAL MOBILIZATION OF THE U.S. ARMY RESERVES AND ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROBLEMS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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On 22 August 1990, the President of the United States signed Executive order 12727 which implemented, for the first time, the Title 10 US Code 673b authority to order to active duty the Selected Reserve of the United States Armed Forces. This gave the Department of Defense authority to activate up to 200,000 Selected Reservists for a period not to exceed 90 days, with the authority to extend that period for an additional 90 days. This authority was further delegated to the Secretary of the Army. This paper analyzes the myriad US Army Reserve personnel management system problems experienced during the activation and partial mobilization of the US Army Reserves in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The lessons learned from those operations have been analyzed and the paper discusses not only the problems, but also recommends statutory and regulatory changes necessary in order to preclude a re-occurrence of those same problems in future activations, partial mobilizations and/or mobilizations.
INTRODUCTION

On 22 August 1990, the President of the United States signed Executive Order 12727 which implemented, for the first time, the Title 10 US Code 673b authority to order to active duty the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces. This gave the Department of Defense authority to activate up to 200,000 Selected Reservists for a period not to exceed 90 days, with the authority to extend that period up to an additional 90 days. This authority was further delegated to the Secretary of the Army.

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm required the Commander in Chief (CINC), US Forces Central Command (CENTCOM) to utilize the Active Component of the US Army (AC) and the Reserve Component of the US Army (RC). Activation, mobilization and deployment required the different components to maintain their respective personnel systems. This in turn caused many personnel problems for both components.

The thesis of this paper is that current legislation, e.g. Title 10 US Code, is inadequate and requires modification (based on Lessons Learned in SWA) so that it addresses the personnel management systems of both components in order to preclude the many personnel problems experienced in SWA from re-occurring in future activations and mobilizations.

This paper is formatted into three parts. Part I is a presentation of the analyses undertaken to define the multiple
personnel management system problems of the AC and the US Army Reserve (USAR). The US Army National Guard (ARNG) personnel management systems will not be included in this paper because of their vast differences from the AC and USAR systems and because the ARNG has both federal and state statutes that affect activation, mobilization and deployment. In order to fully analyze the differences between the personnel systems, the author also looked at the impact of assigning civilian personnel, to include Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) specialists, Red Cross personnel, Safety personnel and Army and Air Force Exchange personnel to the theater of operations. Part II discusses the specific personnel management system problems regarding Mobilization Plans/Planning, the Individual Ready Reserve activation, and the impact of the various automation systems on the AC and USAR personnel management systems. Part III provides conclusions and recommendations for modification of the existing policies, procedures and legislation to prevent re-occurrence of the personnel management system problems experienced during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
I. ACTIVATION/PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT
OF THE US ARMY RESERVES

Long before 22 August 1990, the AC and USAR were involved in
the planning and training for mobilization. Many USAR units had
spent many training hours side by side with their AC counterpart
units. There were go-to-war alignments that had USAR units
commanding subordinate AC units. Conversely, there were
alignments where AC units were to command subordinate USAR units.
All of this was a result of more than twenty years of planning
and training for mobilization by Headquarters, Department of the
Army (HQDA). HQDA had also developed plans in the event of
activation of 200,000 selected reservists by Presidential
Executive Order under the provisions of Title 10 US Code 673b
authority. Those plans were put to test on 22 August 1990.

ACTIVATION AND THE 200,000 PRESIDENTIAL CALL-UP: Overall,
the activation and partial mobilization was a success and the
USAR units and personnel performed in a commendable manner.
Unlike previous mobilizations, this one came prior to significant
peacetime force reductions and massive defense budget cuts.

Although the activation and partial mobilization procedures
were extensively tested by Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm,
there continue to be problems with mobilization that must be
resolved. Resolution should achieve maximum effectiveness should
a downsized Army of the future be required to expand to meet a
threat to National Security. Legislative restrictions, poor
application of mobilization and deployment plans, inadequate initial supply of trained fillers, depletion of units later required and inadequate reporting systems all contributed to a "rocky" start at the initiation of the activation.\textsuperscript{2}

**EXECUTIVE ORDERS:** Several Executive Orders were signed by the President which enabled the US Army to both retain and increase its strength to support the conflict. In addition to the previously discussed Executive Order 12727, the President issued Executive Order 12728, on 22 August 1990 which implemented Title 10 US Code 673c, delegating the President's authority to suspend any provision of Law relating to the promotion, retirement or separation of members of the armed forces (STOP-LOSS). The STOP-LOSS provisions provided the US Army with force stability, increased personnel strength and a sufficient manpower pool of fully trained, immediately available personnel for manning units worldwide.\textsuperscript{3}

Problems began with the signing of Executive Order 12727 on 22 August 1990, two weeks after the start of deployment operations. This two week delay created serious personnel problems with the initial deployment which impacted on the personnel management systems of both components. For example, the USAR transportation units which operate seaports of embarkation were not immediately available. The delay precluded the early deployment of key echelon above corps (EAC) headquarters and round-out units which are a part of the USAR. The failure to activate these key USAR units in a timely manner
caused a strain on an already overtaxed personnel system, and units already deployed had to assume the missions of the non-activated units in order to deploy the force to the theater.

The initial identification of units and selected individuals did not include the individual ready reservists (IRR) who could have been utilized early-on as filler personnel at the mobilization stations in order to more rapidly deploy AC and RC units. The IRR was not activated until 18 January 1991, some five months after the initial activation of the selected reserve. In that five month period, legislative, regulatory and documentation changes were required to permit discretionary individual call-ups from reserve units and increase the call-up tour lengths to 180 days each. The initial activation of 200,000 selected reservists was under a statutory limitation of 90 days with the authority to extend that period an additional 90 days. This created confusion and, later on, many errors in unit and individual orders. It was not until the additional call-up of ready reservists and suspension of strength limitations authorized under Presidential Executive Order 12743, dated 18 January 1991, could the US Army expect the USAR soldiers to remain on active duty for a period of 180 days with the provision that that time could be extended for an additional 180 days. Executive Order 12744, dated 21 January 1991, officially designated the combat zone.

**HOME STATION CROSS-LEVELING:** During a mobilization or partial mobilization, cross-leveling normally occurs at the
mobilization station. Due to the nature of the situation, the 200,000 Presidential call-up caused cross-leveling to occur during pre-mobilization at unit home stations. In many cases filler personnel came from like units or like military occupational specialties (MOS) within the command. HQDA approved several exceptions to policy and regulations to facilitate cross-leveling at home station. US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) deemed these actions necessary because under the 200,000 Presidential call-up, Individual Reservists, e.g. Individual Ready Reservists (IRR), Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) and the Retired Army pool were not available. By cross-leveling at home station, commands depleted personnel assets from units that were not activated by the 200,000 Presidential call-up, but which eventually would be activated under the partial mobilization. The end result was that non-activated units were incapable of performing their missions. If the conflict had lasted longer, the USAR potentially would not have had the personnel assets to activate units to minimum deployment standards.7

PERSONNEL READINESS: Many personnel were determined to be non-deployable at the mobilization station because of medical, dental or personal reasons. Some soldiers had not completed basic entry training or its equivalent. Commanders had not removed non-deployable personnel from their units. The USAR activated reservists without screening their personnel records which resulted in the activation of individuals who did not meet
the US Army accessioning standard. The end result was the discharge or separation of activated reservists at the mobilization station. This not only created an additional administrative burden on the CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) at the mobilization station, but also cost the government thousands of dollars in pay and allowances, travel expenses and administrative costs. Another problem was the disposition of the non-deployable soldiers who were being released from active duty rather than being discharged. There is a negative impact on the mobilization pool of manpower resources if non-deployable soldiers are returned to that pool. Non-deployable soldiers were also being returned to non-mobilized units and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). This placed a burden on the gaining unit commander because of administratively cumbersome procedures to discharge soldiers from the USAR. Many non-deployable soldiers were retained on active duty and remained at the mobilization station to perform support functions or were transferred to the major US Army Reserve Command (MUSARC).

DENTAL CARE: Individual dental condition was a major problem with the USAR soldiers. Routine dental care is not provided to USAR personnel in any status except when on active duty for a period of thirty days or longer. The panographic x-ray is the only dental procedure required of USAR soldiers. Approximately one of every four USAR soldiers was categorized as Dental Class III, which means that emergency dental care may be needed within one year. Mobilization station dental facilities
were able to upgrade approximately ninety percent of the Dental Class III personnel to Dental Class II, which means they are deployable.10

DERIVATIVE UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE (UIC): During the activation period, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Health Services Command (HSC) requested authority from HQDA to activate portions of some units, particularly medical units, because the unit’s full capabilities were not required for a specific mission. The whole unit was not activated because of the restrictions placed on the number of selected reservists that could be activated under the 200,000 Presidential call-up. The HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) approved the mobilization of partial units by creating the derivative UIC, and FORSCOM loaded the derivative UICs into the Status of Resource and Training System (SORTS). Because the various army management systems were not programmed to recognize derivative UICs, serious personnel, pay and logistics problems resulted.11

THE ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT: The Army Chief of Staff directed that health care provided to military and dependents would be maintained in the quantity and with the quality as before the 200,000 Presidential call-up.12 The directive was a significant change in policy. The US Army Health Services Command provides physicians, nurses and other health care workers to deploying units through the Professional Filler System (PROFIS). The impact of PROFIS on the US Army Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF) was an immediate loss of over 300 health care
providers which required immediate backfill. The IRR is the planned source of backfill for PROFIS losses; however, the IRR was not activated until January 1991 by Executive Order 12743. The non-availability of the IRR as a manpower resource required the activation of selected reservists through derivative UICs.

Personnel qualifications and training of medical officers were issues. The credential files of USAR medical personnel were not always accurate or complete and the officers did not always meet the Area of Concentration (AOC) requirements for the positions they held. Over 2,000 USAR medical officers did not meet minimum training requirements for deployment.13

**FINANCE AND ACTIVATION/PARTIAL MOBILIZATION:** Although finance procedures during the activation and partial mobilization can be declared an overall success, this success was not without its problems. The finance community successfully rolled over 127,000 USAR and Army National Guard soldiers' pay accounts from the Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS)-Reserve Components to the JUMPS-Active Army in record numbers in a short time frame and continued to pay these soldiers throughout the deployment. Three to six week delays occurred in the rollover process which resulted in soldiers receiving a manually computed casual payment by field finance activities in lieu of an end-of-month centrally generated payment. Initial delays resulted when unit rosters were purged of soldiers who were non-deployable. In addition, delay was caused by a limited number of computer system updates available for reconciliation and the rollover process. Again,
USAR unit commanders had not properly prepared for activation and partial mobilization by including in their mobilization packets updated documentation for proper processing into the JUMPS-Active Army finance system.\textsuperscript{14}

The U.S. Congress was quick to recognize the need for statutory changes in entitlements in order to partially compensate USAR soldiers for lost civilian wages and disrupted careers. These changes in law and supplementary guidance further exacerbated financial problems because of USAR unfamiliarity with their active duty entitlements to pay and allowances. The lack of direct communication links between the operational area and the Finance Center limited feedback to once a month via the Leave and Earnings Statement (LES).\textsuperscript{15} Difficulties were also experienced in the preparation of orders to accurately reflect the proper status of the activated USAR soldier and/or unit which determines their travel and transportation entitlements. In addition, written guidance available to resource management personnel did not clearly address the funding responsibilities of the various mobilization station installations.\textsuperscript{16}

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL:** The deployment of Department of the Army Civilians (DAC) was essential to the success of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. There were many success stories such as the conversion of over 960 M1 tanks to M1A1 tanks. Overall, unclear, inadequately applied, nonstandard and inconsistent policies and procedures in the selection, processing and deployment of DACs hampered the ability
of the Army to support the operations. The lack of pre-existing plans and policies created a great deal of confusion and delay and hampered mission accomplishment. Although a system exists for designating civilian positions as "emergency essential", very few of the DACs deployed were in positions so designated. This resulted in no real definition of the skill, physical and mental qualifications required for deployment. Personnel were often not prepared to deploy, and short notices caused family and personal problems and sometimes the deployment of unqualified personnel.

Due to the lack of pre-existing policies and procedures, especially in the early stages of mobilization, there were numerous personnel problems. Pay entitlements were not made clear to the DACs. Health and life insurance benefits and options, customs in-country, living conditions to be faced and expected conduct and responsibilities were not adequately briefed to all personnel. Medical, dental, and eye examinations were sometimes inadequate resulting in deployment of physically unqualified personnel. Personnel records did not contain all of the data elements necessary to ensure proper data was available for casualty assistance and notification. Legal assistance was often not adequate and not equal to that afforded to military personnel. There was no standard for clothing and equipment issued items, and DACs were issued a variety of personal clothing and equipment depending on the mobilization station through which they processed.

Many individuals were not properly trained in Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical (NBC) protection, operations in the desert, communication and transportation procedures and their duties in support of temporary duty to a hostile area. Some did receive follow-on training immediately upon arrival in the theater of operations. Individuals were often not trained in the use of protective gear, antidote administration and other NBC hazards. Personnel were selected who had weight and other health problems which would have precluded the sustained wear of protective clothing.

DAC personnel were often unclear as to the chain of command. There was confusion over who had personnel management authority over the DACs and who was responsible for personnel matters such as discipline, performance ratings and incentive awards. Pay entitlement was not always known and procedures were applied inconsistently. Overtime, overseas differentials and imminent danger pay were problem areas. This resulted in many individuals working many hours for which they were not compensated. Many deployed DACs were not satisfied with the pay procedures and required pay adjustments upon redeployment.

During the operation many DACs were unsure of their status under the Geneva Convention. Most received Geneva Convention cards but questions arose as to their status as they were performing military-type duties (maintenance of vehicles, driving military vehicles, etc.). Some were issued firearms but were unsure of the impact of noncombatants carrying weapons.

**MORALE, WELFARE AND RECREATION ACTIVITIES:** Because the U.S.
Army only has Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) spaces in garrison Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), supporting MWR programs in Southwest Asia was accomplished in an ad hoc manner. Commanders do not have the staff expertise to plan recreational support during contingency operations and a MWR structure was needed during the early deployment stages. Over $234,000 worth of recreational items were purchased for the operations.22

In addition, numerous items were donated from countries such as Germany and Japan along with numerous donated items from corporate America. These items along with the designation of Half-Moon Bay and the Oasis recreational facilities contributed to the huge success of the MWR program.

The Army and Air Force Exchange System (AAFES) Imprest Fund Activities (AAFIFA) is another area where commanders do not have the necessary expertise for program management. Sales of goods and running of the imprest fund were accomplished using borrowed military manpower. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, soldiers spent $105.9 million on retail and catalog sales and $8.8 million at food concessions.23 Because AAFES had three stores operating prior to deployment, AAFES merchandise was available on day 1. Sealift merchandise arrived three weeks ahead of schedule. AAFES operated 16 direct civilian-managed locations.

With regard to rest and recuperation (R&R), the U.S. Army operated a three tier program which, through May 1991, provided...
R&R to over 58,000 soldiers at Half-Moon Bay and over 36,000 military personnel on a contracted cruise ship (the Cunard Princess) since 24 December 1990. The third tier, out of country R&R was not implemented. DAC MWR specialists were key to the huge success of the in country R&R programs.

The various musical groups, especially the bands that travelled throughout the theater were a tremendous success. The bands were tasked organized into smaller rock groups to provide the widest amount of coverage. These bands provided commanders with an MWR resource that could be used repetitively.

SAFETY: Desert Shield/Desert Storm accidental deaths during mobilization, deployment, combat and redeployment exceeded the total deaths from combat. In addition, over 1,150 soldiers were injured by accidents during the operation. The total costs of the deaths, injuries and lost equipment from accidents exceeds $153 million. The basis of a successful safety program should be the same as a successful campaign: strong leadership, clear objectives, a sound plan, adequate resources and support of the plan by all soldiers. The Desert Shield/Desert Storm safety performance was not successful because a safety plan was not part of the overall U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) operations plan and a safety program was not resourced or staffed. The safety structure at Army, Corps and Division is staffed, primarily by DACs, and TDA organized. The go-to-war Army is primarily Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) organized. Civilian safety specialists were key personnel to
deploy with the various units; however, when they did deploy they were without organic equipment such as NBC protective gear, personal combat uniforms and equipment, etc. Basically, there were no uniformed deployable safety structures to mobilize and deploy with the combat units. The lack of safety personnel as members of the joint staff limited the CINC's capability to reduce or keep to a minimum accidental manpower and equipment losses. Historically, transportation systems, fuel systems, and ammunition supplies are vulnerable to accidents. The problem increased dramatically under the impact of current operational concepts, e.g., Rapid Deployment, Coalition Forces Operations, and the increased complexity and lethality of the modern battlefield. Increased dependency on the employment of high cost, high technology weapons systems that are limited in number, posed a problem that required special consideration to protect soldiers and equipment against accidental loss. A safety staff as part of the joint staff and at echelons above corps would have enhanced the development of an effective operational concept which in turn would have aided the CINC in protecting soldiers and mission critical resources."

**RC LIAISON TEAMS:** During Desert Shield, the myriad personnel problems that were occurring required the development of RC Liaison teams in theater in order to assist commanders in resolving personnel issues. The theater consisted of Army National Guard units attached to AC higher headquarters, USAR units attached to AC or Army National Guard units, AC units
attached to RC unit higher headquarters, etc. In addition, there were filler personnel from the AC and RC, to include the IRR who could be found in AC and RC units. With this diversification it became necessary to establish RC Liaison Teams comprised of USAR and Army National Guard personnel experts to assist commanders with the multiple differences in the multiple personnel systems. This innovative concept was a huge success because it provided Personnel Action Assistance Teams (PAAT) to the commander for his use in processing personnel actions no matter what component the unit members were originally assigned. The PAAT were comprised of Active Guard Reserve personnel from the USAR and from the Army National Guard who volunteered for duty in the theater and were available to all unit commanders in theater to assist with their personnel actions and problems.
II. MOBILIZATION PLANS/PLANNING, THE IRR/IMA
AND AUTOMATION.

MOBILIZATION PLANS/PLANNING: The Army Mobilization and Operation Planning System (AMOPS) and the Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) do contain policy, plans and procedures to be utilized upon mobilization but do not include plans for a 200,000 Presidential call-up. The plans are based on the requirement to activate installation base operations (BASOPS) which require a large infrastructure to support sustained operations. Such an infrastructure includes central clothing and equipment issue, transportation, medical support, CONUS Replacement Centers (CRC), automatic data processing and training/training aids and devices. These installations become Mobilization Stations (MS) during a mobilization and depend on selected activated USAR units. Because of the reduced requirements of the 200,000 Presidential call-up and the fact that AMOPS/FORMDEPS do not adequately address relatively long-term operations under Title 10, US Code 673b, Presidential call-up, most mobilization stations suffered from severe support personnel shortages to adequately staff the CONUS Replacement Centers and process the thousands of individual soldiers and units for overseas shipment. A basic assumption of AMOPS/FORMDEPS is that mobilization will be declared on the same day that deployment operations begin. The 200,000 presidential call-up is supposed to take place prior to this
point to provide the support personnel and units required immediately to support mobilization and deployment. As stated earlier, the President did not authorize the 200,000 call-up until two weeks after deployment operations began. HQDA eventually activated some of the USAR units to establish the CRC; however, the shortage of support personnel and activated USAR units at the mobilization stations had a negative effect throughout the mobilization and deployment.

After the President initiated the partial mobilization, the AMOPS/FORMDEPS procedures for partial mobilization were not followed. This led to confusion and that confusion was further exacerbated by the development of a draft version of FORMDEPS which was partially distributed and not available to all USAR units. The whole process was complicated by the fact that rules were changing and/or being developed rapidly without dissemination to the using units. This resulted in a failure to properly support the 200,000 Presidential call-up and the mobilization stations.

Mobilization accession data is normally prepositioned monthly at the mobilization stations by the Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS). Because the mobilization and activation procedures were either not followed or were in constant change/modification, the accession data could not be used as intended. As stated earlier, units at the lowest levels were cross leveling before they arrived at the mobilization stations. The Derivative Unit Identification Codes (UIC) were
created and the derivative units were mobilized, but the mobilization data bases did not reflect the changes. The individual soldiers selected for activation were based on volunteer lists and the involuntary activation of the Individual Ready Reservists (IRR) who had been released from active duty within the previous 12 months (RT-12). This selection process negated the alignment process that is done monthly by the MOBPERS to match the IRR against known mobilization requirements within units and major headquarters. Individuals mobilized/activated were sent to installations other than those they would have normally been sent to because all were directed to installations with a Central Clothing Issue Facility.

The mobilization plans did not require the individual soldier’s military personnel record jacket (MPRJ) to be forwarded by ARPERCEN to the mobilization stations. Early in the mobilization process HQDA made the decision to ship the MPRJ to the mobilization stations. This created confusion at the mobilization station installations because they did not expect nor, in many cases, want the MPRJ. The installations considered the data antiquated and obtained the data directly from the soldier, the mobilization order and the data prepositioned on the Army Training Requirement Reservation System (ATRRS). Another problem was that as soldiers returned from Saudi Arabia, some did not return through the mobilization station that they originally reported to and their records were not available at the redeployment station. In late March 1991, all CONUS Replacement...
Centers closed down with the exception of Fort Jackson, SC, and all records were forwarded there as a central record storage area. This resulted in confusion among individual soldiers and unit personnel.

**INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR) AND INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEE (IMA):** The IRR partial mobilization occurred as a result of Executive Order 12743 on 18 January 1991. This implemented the call-up of the Ready Reserve under Title 10 U.S. Code 673 and was limited to RT-12 soldiers. RT-12 is defined as soldiers from the IRR who have been trained within the previous 12 months (RT-12). As members of the IRR, RT-12 soldiers are mobilization assets who have some period of contractual obligation of military service remaining or have voluntarily extended their military affiliation. They are not required to participate in Annual Training (AT) or Inactive Duty Training (IDT) for retirement points, but may voluntarily do so.

The U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN), St. Louis, Missouri activated 20,102 RT-12 soldiers for Operation Desert Storm. In addition, 818 volunteer IRR and Army National Guard soldiers volunteered and were activated along with the RT-12 soldiers. This made a total of 20,920 IRR soldiers voluntarily and involuntarily activated. Of that number, 17,329 RT-12 soldiers reported to the mobilization stations; 2,188 had orders revoked; 566 were exempted; and 837 were categorized as pending or authorized delay in reporting.
Mobilization stations conducted extensive inprocessing of each RT-12 soldier in order to determine what refresher training was required and also each soldier's suitability for service. Soldiers who reported to FORSCOM installations were transferred to U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) installations where they received Common Task Training (CTT), weapons training, briefings on customs and culture of Iraq another countries in Southwest Asia, and Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) specific training. The majority of the RT-12 soldiers were processed at CRC for shipment to Southwest Asia, U.S. Army, Europe, and U.S. Army Pacific as filler personnel. Due to the brevity of Desert Storm, the U.S. Army began releasing RT-12 soldiers in March 1991 with a schedule to release 13,323 RT-12 soldiers by 1 May 1991. During May 1991 approximately 2,500 additional RT-12 soldiers were released from active duty and by the end of July 1991 the remaining 400 activated RT-12 soldiers were released from active duty.37

The activation of the IRR was not without multiple problems. The U.S. Army did not follow the procedures outlined in the AMOPS and FORMDEPS. This led to confusion and incorrect actions. The draft FORMDEPS complicated the ability of support organizations to plan for and meet the requirements of the partial mobilization. The standard SIDPERS accessioning procedures were not followed in processing RT-12 soldiers onto active duty. The decision to access non-unit reservists to SIDPERS-AC, while simultaneously keeping the soldiers on the USAR data base created

21
personnel accounting problems. When the U.S. Army applied STOP-LOSS measures to the AC, it should have applied equally to the IRR in order to ensure that personnel with critical skills were retained in the manpower pool. Without STOP-LOSS application to the IRR, there was potential to lose personnel who would have been required had the operation lasted over an extended period of time.38

RT-12 soldiers were activated without a personnel record screening. As with the Selected Reserve activation, this lack of personnel record screening (automated and manual) created the situation of activating soldiers who did not meet the U.S. Army accessioning standards. The Mobilization Asset Transfer Program, for example, contains personnel who are untrained, or otherwise unsuitable for military service. These personnel were erroneously considered mobilization assets and were counted in the IRR end strength.39

As a rule, RT-12 soldiers do not have family care plans. This was prevalent during processing at the mobilization stations. Single parents and dual military parents presented a number of personal and personnel problems. Army Regulation 600-200 does not specify policy or procedures to establish family care plans by IRR soldiers. Even if there were such a policy, the regulation requires a "face-to-face" interview between the soldier and the unit commander in order to complete the plan. This is impractical for members of the IRR who are basically data elements in the ARPERCEN data base. Many of the RT-12 soldiers
brought to the mobilization stations the kinds of personal issues which are readily handled by company commanders in day to day operations. The lack of an "assigned unit/unit commander" for RT-12 soldiers prior to activation should have been anticipated and covered in an information packet to the soldier simultaneously with the issuance of the activation order.\textsuperscript{40}

The Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) were not activated to fulfill the missions for which the positions were established. Of the more than 14,000 personnel assigned to IMA positions, only 1,724 were actually activated/mobilized. The largest number on active duty at any one time was 1,550.\textsuperscript{41} Many other individual reserve soldiers were activated on temporary tours of active duty (TTAD) and assigned to commands to handle mobilization or operations duties normally performed by the IMA when the IMA were available. In many cases this resulted in an untrained soldier being placed in a position while the trained soldier was not activated. Many organizations were unclear on the procedures to be followed to activate their IMA personnel. The procedures are in the Army Mobilization Operations Planning System (AMOPS) but not all agencies have this document.

\textbf{AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING (ADP):} The ADP systems utilized by the AC and USAR for personnel, logistics management and mobilization did not interface and information therefore could not be transferred between components. This created multiple strength accounting problems both in the mobilization stations and in the theater of operation. In many cases the AC did not
follow standard personnel policies and procedures in accessing non-unit USAR personnel after mobilization. Accessing non-unit reservists into the AC version of the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS), while simultaneously keeping the individuals on the USAR data base created personnel accounting problems.\(^4\)

To alleviate the problem of accessioning into SIDPERS or missing data, a more extensive data base was developed at the US Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) and loaded into the Army Training Requirement Reservation System (ATRRS) prior to the arrival of the first reserve soldier. While this new procedure provided more data than normally available on reserve soldiers, the procedures were not clearly articulated or were misunderstood and resulted in numerous telephonic inquiries to ARPERCEN. Procedural errors then caused activated reserve soldiers to be gained to the active army data base while simultaneously remaining in the USAR. Upon demobilization, many reserve soldiers were discharged as if they were a new gain the the USAR. The end result--duplicate records.\(^4\)
III. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY

This paper began as a research paper to discuss the huge number of problems encountered in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm as a result of activation and partial mobilization of USAR personnel and the impact of the multiple personnel systems in place that created a majority of the personnel problems in theater. The research revealed that this topic is so broad and extensive that it requires far more time and research than is available for this effort. Hopefully, readers of this paper will see the need for far more extensive research from the lessons learned and will perform the necessary analyses to preclude such problems from occurring again or at least minimize those problems. The remainder of this paper will be dedicated to the aforementioned topics and the recommendations necessary to overcome the associated problem areas.

LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY CHANGES: The President of the United States and the U.S. Congress must enact the necessary legislative changes to the current Title 10, U.S. Code in order to activate the 200,000 selected reservists so that the reservists report to active duty under the AC personnel system and not with the USAR personnel management systems intact. It is of the utmost importance that the "One Army" be just that. One army under one personnel system.

The activation of 200,000 selected reserves must be done in a timely manner to preclude vital combat support and combat
service support units and personnel from arriving at the mobilization stations weeks and months after deployment has begun.

The American people must support the partial mobilization early on in an operation because that is the huge manpower resource pool available for filler personnel. To not activate the ready reserve (e.g. IRR) early-on creates additional delay in bringing units up to war fighting strength.

**REGULATORY CHANGES:** The U.S. Army must revise existing regulations, in their entirety, and include in each regulation a separate chapter dealing with all aspects of mobilization. This includes existing Civilian Personnel Regulations. That chapter must address policy and procedures to be enacted during activation, partial mobilization and mobilization. To accomplish this, the U.S. Army must change AMOPS and FORMDEPS to ensure that activation, partial mobilization and mobilization are adequately addressed.

**AC SEPARATION ACTIONS:** The AC must institute procedures to ensure separating soldiers are or are not qualified as mobilization assets and discharge those who are not. This would preclude those soldiers from becoming members of the IRR and subsequently be activated only to be discharged at the mobilization stations.

**USAR MOBILIZATION TRAINING:** USAR unit commanders must be trained in mobilization activities and must train their units for mobilization. The Full Time Manning personnel assigned to each
USAR unit must be the link between mobilization preparation and mobilization training. They must be deployable assets and if not these soldiers and civilians must be separated from government service. It is the commander's responsibility to prepare the unit for mobilization and that commander must be held accountable for the failure of the unit or it's personnel to mobilize.

SUMMARY

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were success stories never before seen in the history of the U.S. Army and U.S. Army Reserves. Over 647 USAR units were activated for duty in CONUS, Europe, the Pacific and Southwest Asia. These units and individual volunteers made a total of 89,990 USAR personnel activated comprised of 63,371 unit members, 13,170 IRR members, 5,536 Temporary Tour of Active Duty Reservists (TTAD), 1,558 Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and 1,355 Retirees. Over 61 percent of the U.S. Army unit activations were USAR."

Notwithstanding the many problems associated with an operation of this magnitude, the end result was victory. Victory of the Armed Forces of the United States and victory for the American people.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid.


4. Scott. p. 3.


10. Ibid. p. 16.


12. Ibid. p. 6.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid.


18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

29
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid. p. 15.
25. Ibid. p. 16.
27. Ibid. p. 21.


30. U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter, p.4.

31. Scott. p. 3.

32. U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter, p.5.


34. Ibid. p. 27.

35. Unclassified Interim Report., p. 9-1.

36. Scott. p. 11.

37. Scott. p. 11.

38. Ibid. p. 12.


40. Ibid.

41. Nishimura. p. 32.

42. Ibid.

44. Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) Briefing to Senior Army Reserve Active Guard Reserve Officer/Enlisted Conference, St. Louis, MO, 15-16 November 1991. Briefing slide "OPERATION DESERT STORM USAR CONTRIBUTION".
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---. Message 232100Z Jan 91, DAMO-ODO. Subject: Appointment of Temporary Officers in the Army of the United States upon Mobilization.


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36


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