ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (EPW) OPERATIONS
DURING
OPERATION DESERT STORM
BY
Lieutenant Colonel Jon F. Bilbo
United States Army

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On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Almost five months later, after numerous attempts to get Saddam Hussein to peacefully withdraw his forces from Kuwait and abide with the United Nations Security Council's Resolutions, the United States and its other 35 Arab and non-Arab coalition allies began the war to liberate Kuwait. After 38 days of constant around the clock bombing and 100 hours of devastating ground combat, the fourth largest army in the world had been driven out of Kuwait and soundly defeated. By the end of the war, 3,700 of 4,280 battle tanks, 2,600 of 3,110 assorted artillery pieces, and 2,400 of 2,870 assorted other armored vehicles were destroyed. Additionally, up to 42 Iraqi divisions were either destroyed, captured, or rendered combat ineffective. Finally, over 69,000 enemy prisoners of war (EPW), the largest number of EPWs captured and interned by the US since World War II, were captured and turned over to Saudi control. This paper analyses how the US Army active and reserve component (AC/RC) military police units deployed to Saudi Arabia performed their EPW missions during Operation Desert Storm. It begins with a discussion of the Army's current doctrine on how to perform EPW operations, examining MP organizational structures, missions, concepts, and planning considerations. Next, the author describes the AC/RC MP units that deployed to the Gulf; how they were tasked organized to accomplish their missions; and the theater concept of operations for evacuating, receiving and processing, interning, and transferring US, British, and French EPWs to the Saudi military for future repatriation operations with Iraq. Finally, the author discusses some of the noted shortcomings and weaknesses identified throughout the operation and recommended solutions to improve current EPW doctrine, force structure, and equipment capabilities so that the smaller Army of the future has the capability to meet enable the United States to meet all its international obligations under the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims.
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ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (EPW) OPERATIONS DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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United States Army

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On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Almost five months later, after numerous attempts to get Saddam Hussein to peacefully withdraw his forces from Kuwait and abide with the United Nations Security Council’s Resolutions, the United States and its other 35 Arab and non-Arab coalition allies began the war to liberate Kuwait. After 38 days of constant around the clock bombing and 100 hours of devastating ground combat, the fourth largest army in the world had been driven out of Kuwait and soundly defeated. By the end of the war, 3,700 of 4,280 battle tanks, 2,600 of 3,110 assorted artillery pieces, and 2,400 of 2,870 assorted other armored vehicles were destroyed. Additionally, up to 42 Iraqi divisions were either destroyed, captured, or rendered combat ineffective. Finally, over 69,000 enemy prisoners of war (EPW), the largest number of EPWs captured and interned by the U.S. Army since World War II, were captured and turned over to Saudi control. This paper analyses how the US Army active and reserve component (AC/RC) military police units deployed to Saudi Arabia performed their EPW missions during Operation Desert Storm. It begins with a discussion of the Army’s current doctrine on how to perform EPW operations, examining MP organizational structures, missions, concepts, and planning considerations. Next, the author describes the AC/RC MP units that deployed to the Gulf; how they were tasked organized to accomplish their missions; and the theater concept of operations for evacuating, receiving and processing, interning, and transferring US, British, and French EPWs to the Saudi military for future repatriation operations with Iraq. Finally, the author discusses some of the noted shortcomings and weaknesses identified throughout the operation and recommended solutions to improve current EPW doctrine, force structure, and equipment capabilities so that the smaller Army of the future has the capability to meet the United States to meet all its international obligations under the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims.
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INTRODUCTION

On 2 August 1990, elements from three Iraqi Republican Guard divisions invaded Kuwait. Four days later, the first US Army personnel arrived in Saudi Arabia to begin planning Operation Desert Shield to deter further Iraqi aggression, defend Saudi Arabia, enforce United Nations (UN) sanctions, and develop an offensive capability to liberate Kuwait.

Almost five months later, after trying but failing to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait without condition or further delay and comply with the UN Security Council Resolutions, the United States and its coalition allies went to war against Iraq. At 0230, Baghdad time, on 17 January 1991, we began Operation Desert Storm, the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi control, by conducting allied air strikes on major enemy military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. Over the next 38 days, thousands of allied sorties pounded Iraqi airfields, command control centers, missile sites, and chemical and nuclear plants and storage sites. Simultaneously, we flew myriad counter air sorties to gain total air supremacy. Any of Iraq’s 700 aircraft whose pilots dared to challenge us in the skies were immediately shot down. Many of those pilots who chose to hide in bunkers instead of fight were also tracked down and destroyed with our precision guided missiles and munitions. Still others fled the fight altogether and
flew to Iran where they remained until the end of the war. Toward the end of the air campaign, after gaining air supremacy, coalition aircraft began isolating and preparing the battlefield for the ground campaign. Increasing numbers of sorties were flown to destroy bridges, cut roads, block defiles, plant mines, attack reserves, obliterate supply bases, and pummel the Iraqi forces dug-in in Kuwait and southern Iraq with massive day and night attacks. Subsequently, after inflicting almost unbelievable damage on Saddam Hussein’s air and ground forces, we were ready to begin the ground phase of Desert Storm. The allied ground offensive began, on 24 February, when the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions and forces from the Arabic-Islamic Joint Forces Command in the east attacked toward Kuwait City, while the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Armored Corps, in the west, conducted a huge left flanking movement into Iraq to seal off and then destroy Iraqi forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO). Over the next four days, allied air, ground, and sea forces pounded Saddam Hussein’s forces from all directions. Our operations were so effective across the KTO that at 0800, on 28 February 1991, exactly 100 hours from the time the ground operations commenced and six weeks after the start of Operation Desert Storm, all US and allied coalition forces suspended combat operations, bringing the war with Iraq to an end. During the ground phase of the Gulf War, 3,700 of 4,280 battle tanks, 2,600 of 3,110 assorted artillery pieces, and 2,400 of 2,870 assorted other armored vehicles were destroyed. Additionally, up to 42 Iraqi divisions were
either destroyed, captured, or rendered combat ineffective. Finally, 71,204 enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), the largest number of prisoners taken and interned by the US since World War II, were captured by our forces and turned over to Saudi control.¹

The purpose of this paper is to describe how US Army active and reserve component (AC/RC) military police (MP) units performed enemy prisoners of war (EPW) missions during Operation Desert Storm. This project deals primarily with the deployment and employment phase of the operation from 2 August 1990 to 28 February 1991. In order to provide a common frame of reference, I will begin with a discussion of current EPW doctrine i.e., MP organizational structures, missions, concepts, and planning considerations. After discussing current doctrine, I will describe the AC and RC military police units that deployed to Southwest Asia (SWA) to perform the EPW mission; how they were task organized to support US and allied combat commanders; their missions and objectives; and the theater concept of operations for evacuating, receiving and processing, interning, and transferring US, French, and British captured EPW to the Saudi military. Finally, I will look at some of the noted weaknesses and shortcomings and provide recommended solutions to improve our current EPW doctrine, force structure, and equipment capabilities so that the US and the Army and the Military Police Corps of the future, the smaller force of 1995, will have the capability to meet our international obligations under the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, anywhere in the world.
where US Army forces are deployed to fight.

MILITARY POLICE EPW DOCTRINE REVISITED

**MP Missions**

Under the Army's current Airland Battle doctrine, military police provide commanders with a highly mobile and flexible force to perform four critical combat, combat support, and combat service (CSS) missions throughout the theater of operations (TO). These four missions are: battlefield circulation control, area security, law and order, and enemy prisoners of war (EPW) operations. When performing EPW operations, MP take charge of EPW captured by all US air, land and sea forces and evacuate them out of the combat zone as quickly as possible to theater internment camps. This allows the combat commanders to prosecute their war efforts without having to divert combat forces or critical CS or CSS forces to hold, evacuate, and secure enemy captives. It also enables the United States to meet its obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims by evacuating prisoners out of the combat zone to safe and secure environments in the COMMZ. Once at the theater internment camps, EPWs are processed by specially trained MP units and subsequently interned in a prisoner of war camp until they can be released or repatriated to their government.

In order to successfully accomplish all of its missions, military police units are divided into two types of units—general purpose forces and special purpose forces. General purpose forces are the military police combat support (CS)
companies and battalions in divisions, corps, and theater Army area commands (TAACOMs) that perform the full range of MP combat, CS, and CSS missions in their assigned area of operations (AOs). Because of the small MP force structure, all general support forces are committed at all times. Like the field artillery and engineers, MP are never held in reserve. Additionally, since MP wartime requirements always exceed MP assets, MP general support forces cannot perform all of their MP missions simultaneously. Therefore, specific missions conducted at specified times are based on the factors of METT-T, the echelon commander's desires, the intensity of the conflict, and the availability of MP resources.

Special purpose MP forces are units that perform only one specific MP mission. These units are predominantly national guard and reserve units that are integrated into a maturing theater as the need for their particular mission increases proportionally to the force being supported. Special purpose MP forces are assigned to corps and Theater Army (TA) functional commands to provide security and protection for designated key units, facilities, and installations, and to the TA Personnel Command (PERSCOM) to confine US military prisoners and to evacuate and intern all US captured EPW.

EPW Operations

Since the days of the American Revolution and before each conflict involving American personnel, our policy makers have always been concerned with providing protection and humane
treatment for the enemy prisoners of war in our custody. The
Gulf War was no different in this regard. Prior to and during
the conflict, US forces were responsible for enforcing the
provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for
the Protection of War Victims. According to the Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12,
1949, hereinafter referred to as the GPW, the United States, as a
capturing power, is responsible for providing proper and humane
treatment and accountability of all persons captured, interned,
or otherwise held in U.S. custody from the initial moment of
capture until final release or repatriation. Under the Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, hereinafter
referred to as the GWS, the United States is responsible for
searching and collecting the enemy wounded and sick; protecting
them against pillage and ill treatment; providing them adequate
medical and dental care; and burying the dead, if applicable.
The other two Geneva Conventions afford similar rights to civil-
ians found in the theater of war and enemy armed forces at sea.²
The Secretary of the Army is the Department of Defense (DOD)
Executive Agent for administrating the DOD EPW and Detainee
Program and, as such, is responsible for planning, developing the
policies, and coordinating the joint execution of the operations
of the DOD Program to comply with the Geneva Conventions Relative
to Prisoners of War.³ The EPW doctrine and tactics, techniques,
and procedures used by US, French, and British ground, air, and
sea forces during Operation Desert Storm were derived from the current DOD Program which has been constantly updated using data based on past US combat and EPW experience.

Prior to the commencement of hostilities in the Gulf, three separate categories of units were primarily responsible for executing the Army's EPW, Civilian Internee and Detained Persons Program. These three categories were: capturing troops, MP units in the combat zone and the communications zone (COMMZ); and the many combat, CS, and CSS units providing the assistance required to operate division EPW collection points, temporary and permanent EPW holding areas in the corps, and EPW/CI internment camps in the COMMZ.

Capturing Troops

The US chain of responsibility for enemy soldiers begins when US troops capture enemy soldiers. Whether they are tankers from the 4/37 Armor Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, breaching the minefields and crossing the Saudi-Kuwaiti-Iraqi border northwest of the Wadi al Batin or infantrymen from the 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv) attacking north into Kuwait, all capturing troops are responsible for immediately disarming and searching captured enemy soldiers for weapons and any documents which may be of any intelligence value. Sick and wounded captives are treated and stabilized, if possible, by combat lifesavers or medics, if available, or by the capturing soldiers, if medically trained personnel are not available. Once these initial steps have been taken, the prisoners are segregated by rank, sex, and
nationality. Helmets, gas masks, and similar health and welfare articles for personal protection remain in the possession of the captured soldiers. Except for weapons and documents of intelligence value, sums of money and sentimental and personal property will also be retained by the prisoners, unless ordered by a commissioned officer to be confiscated. If any military or personal items are taken from a prisoner, the capturing soldiers will give the prisoner a receipt for the items taken. Once the prisoners have been segregated, they are prohibited from talking among each other, protected to prevent harm or escape, and evacuated by the capturing troops, as quickly as possible, to the nearest MP EPW collecting point.

Combat Zone Operations

In the division, the military police company assigned to the division is responsible for operating division forward and central PW collecting points. At brigade level, each DS platoon sets up and operates a division forward EPW collecting point. These points are generally located in or near the brigade trains, preferably in existing jails, gymnasiums, sports stadiums, or other facilities or fenced or enclosed areas conducive for detaining prisoners. If there are no suitable existing facilities or enclosed areas, a field collecting point is established using concertina wire, engineer tape, or any other suitable materials available. Normally, capturing troops evacuate the EPWs to the division forward EPW collecting point. However, MP may go forward to accept the EPWs from the capturing units. Other
functions performed at the division forward EPW collecting point include: accepting and securing EPW from capturing units, to include receipting for any documents or property received from the escorting guards and ensuring that all prisoners and their equipment are tagged; providing medical care, within capabilities; searching EPW for concealed weapons and documents; providing shelter from the elements; providing food and water for EPWs; segregating the EPWs; and coordinating the use of backhaul transportation to evacuate EPW to the division central PW collecting point or the corps temporary or permanent holding area.

The division central EPW collecting point is set up in the vicinity of the DISCOM and is operated by one of the military police company’s GS platoons. This platoon sets up and operates a central collecting point to receive captives from the three forward EPW collecting points and from troops in the division rear who capture prisoners in the performance of their base defense or area security responsibilities. The central EPW collecting point is set up and operated similar to the brigade forward EPW collecting points, except this collecting point is generally larger in size, less mobile, and contains more tentage or shelters to protect the prisoners from inclement weather and bunkers or berms to protect the captives from enemy fire. The size of this point depends on the projected capture rate, the factors of METT-T, the necessity to be able to rapidly tear down and relocate quickly, and the number of civilian internees and detained persons in the brigades’ collecting points. The func-
tions performed at this collecting point are very similar to those performed at the brigade collecting points, except more time is spent identifying, processing, accounting for, and tagging the prisoners and their property. Normally, the division provost marshal and the MP company commander try to evacuate all of their prisoners to corps holding areas or theater EPW/CI camps within 24 hours of capture.

Corps EPW holding areas are either existing facilities, temporary structures, or enclosed areas that are established by corps CS MP units to temporarily hold EPWs that have been either evacuated from the divisions or received from capturing troops in the corps rear area. The number of EPW holding areas in a corps depends primarily on the size and type of the corps, whether the corps is on the defense or the offense, the type of terrain, the length of the main supply routes (MSRs) and the distance between the holding area and the theater EPW internment camps, and most importantly the number of EPWs and civilian internees and detained persons in the divisions and the corps rear area. Normally during defensive operations, when the expected EPW capture rate is low, the corps MP brigade commander will routinely establish one permanent holding area. This area will be centrally located in the corps rear area, along a good evacuation route and in close proximity to medical and supply units that provide the requisite medical and logistical support to the EPW holding area for the care and protection of the captives. When the corps shifts from the defense to the offense and greater numbers of
enemy soldiers are expected to be captured or surrender, additional temporary holding areas may be set up near the divisions' rear boundaries. The exact number of temporary holding areas will depend on the number of available MP in the corps as well as the number of EPW escort guard companies from the theater PW brigade. The more escort guard companies there are, the quicker the EPWs can be cleared out of the corps holding area thereby reducing the number of MP teams that need to be committed to the holding area mission.

**COMMZ Operations**

In a developing theater, the TAACOM MP brigade performs the same missions as a corps brigade and many of the individual missions that are performed later by functional MP units that are phased into the theater as it matures to the theater CINC's desired wartime force structure. In a mature theater, the TA PERSCOM is responsible for providing personnel, administrative, morale, internment, and confinement services to the theater of operations. MP support to the PERSCOM is provided by the MP prisoner of war (PW) brigade. The PERSCOM also has a branch detachment of the US Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee Information Center (PWIC) in CONUS to provide the information data and statistics on the number and types of US captured EPW required of all signatories of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims. Pending the arrival of the MP PW brigade and the branch PWIC, the TAACOM MP brigade commander charges one of his area battalion commanders to set up and operate a temporary
holding area. This holding area is similar to a corps holding area, except it is generally much larger to accommodate prisoners from several corps and the TAACOM, and the MP GS company, operating the holding area, must perform the same missions that two different units from the PW brigade, the MP PW processing company and MP guard company, perform in a mature theater. Additionally, the MP company must be prepared to transfer US captured EPWs to the host nation (HN) for internment pending repatriation; conduct war tribunals; process, care for, and protect other persons detained by the US; and perform the PWIC accountability operations. When the theater matures and the CINC’s wartime EPW force structure is in country, the TAACOM MP brigade commander transfers the theater level EPW responsibilities to the MP PW brigade.

MP PW Brigade

The EPW force structure in a mature theater normally consists of a MP PW brigade under the PERSCOM headquarters. This brigade commands and controls two to six EPW/CI camps. The specific number of camps is determined based on the size of the theater, the number of corps in the theater, the expected EPW capture rate, and the final disposition of the EPWs.

EPWs received from the combat zone are either interned in US EPW camps, transferred to HN custody, or evacuated out of theater to CONUS. If EPWs are evacuated to CONUS, the PW brigade contains only the units required to support the evacuation plan. The number of EPW units required to support the plan will be
based on the number of EPWs projected to be captured before transportation to CONUS is available. When the EPWs are detained in country, they are sent to US EPW camps where they are interned for long periods of time or interned until they can be transferred to the HN for repatriation. If a HN agrees to secure the captives, the US is still responsible for processing and retaining the EPWs until they are repatriated. In this case, cellular liaison or processing teams under the supervision of a command liaison team assigned to the PW brigade, collocate with HN PW camps and processing points to advise and assist the HN in PW operations and to ensure HN compliance with the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Regardless of the ultimate disposition of the EPWs, all US captured prisoners must be processed through a US EPW camp.

US EPW camps are semi-permanent facilities established for the internment and administration of EPWs. There are three types of EPW camps in the PW brigade. They are EPW reception and processing camps, internment camps, and branch camps.

In a developing theater, EPWs are evacuated to the rear using the existing MP chain of command to provide guards for their security. Division MP evacuate prisoners from the division forward collecting points to the division central collecting point or a temporary corps holding area. Corps MP pick up the prisoners from the divisions or temporary corps holding areas and evacuate them back to the corps holding areas. There the prisoners are turned over to a GS MP Co from the TAACOM MP Brigade that
will take the prisoners to the theater EPW camp or holding area. When the theater matures and the PW brigade and its subordinate units are in country, brigade MP escort guard companies go forward to the corps holding areas to take custody of EPWs. These MP may also go as far forward as the division collecting points to collect EPWs, if distances, combat operations, the enemy, transportation assets and MP resources permit. Prisoners evacuated from the division collecting points bypass the corps holding areas and go directly back to EPW camps in the COMMZ. MP escort guard companies can evacuate prisoners on foot, by vehicle, by rail, or by air. Evacuation by rail and air are the quickest and most effective means to transport prisoners to the rear but rarely used because trains and fixed and rotary wing aircraft are rarely available for this mission. Evacuation by foot is extremely time consuming, manpower intensive, and dangerous. This method is rarely used by MP but often used by troops in airborne, air assault, and light infantry divisions. The most commonly used method to evacuate prisoners is by vehicle, preferably backhaul transportation provided by division, corps and theater medium and heavy truck companies. MP escort guard companies also provide guards for EPWs who are litter patients evacuated through medical channels and EPWs who are hospitalized in hospitals specially designated to care for seriously injured EPWs. These guards also provide security for prisoners selected for interrogation by prisoner of war interrogation (IPW) teams at brigade, division, corps, and theater level.
Military Intelligence and Psychological Operations in Support of EPW Operations

During combat, EPWs provide our combat commanders a very important source of current intelligence that is reasonably accessible for exploitation. For that reason military intelligence (MI) IPW teams and psychological operations (PSYOP) units collocate with MP at collecting points, holding areas, and EPW camps.

In divisions and corps, MI IPW teams from the Division MI Battalion and Corps MI Brigade collocate with MP units operating EPW collecting points and holding areas. At these locations the senior interrogator or team chief coordinates with the MP platoon leader or company commander to set up a specific location for interrogation operations. Ideally, this location should be close to the collecting point or holding area and inside its secure perimeter because the interrogation team is not organized, manned, or equipped to interrogate prisoners and provide for its own security. In the COMMZ, the interrogation and exploitation (I&E) battalion commander in the MI brigade is responsible for forming a joint interrogation facility (JIF) using I&E battalion assets. This organization is comprised of interrogators, counter intelligence (CI) personnel, and analysts from the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and various other US national agencies as required. This facility is established under one commander to exploit enemy documents and personnel. It is located in the immediate vicinity of the TAACOM EPW camp in a developing theater, and near a centrally located EPW camp in a mature theater.
In addition to the MI elements that collocate with MP units, PSYOP companies and battalions also support EPW operations throughout the theater. Division MP companies and corps MP brigades receive PSYOP support from the DS PYSOP companies and battalions that are attached to divisions and attached or assigned to corps, respectively. Additionally, a PSYOP battalion is attached or assigned to the MP PW brigade to support EPW camp commanders in the administration of their camps by conducting reorientation and education programs to condition the EPW/CI population to accept the authority and regulations of the EPW camp commander during internment. Normally, this battalion, which is comprised of up to 10 individual cellular teams, is organized into camp teams that are assigned to each of the EPW camps in the COMMZ. PYSOP teams support the MP custodial mission in the camps by identifying malcontents, rabble rousers, trained agitators and political officers within the prison population who may attempt to organize resistance and create disturbances. These teams also develop indoctrination and pacification programs to reduce or eliminate dissident political activities of recalcitrant prisoners and civilian internees, provide assistance in controlling the prison population during emergencies, and plan PYSOP campaigns to produce in the camps an understanding and appreciation of US policies and actions. If these teams are properly deployed and supported at all of the theater EPW camps, they can be a tremendous asset to the camp commanders. They can help bridge the cultural barriers between the prisoners and the
camp staff and reduce frustrations and prevent disturbances and riots like those caused by the North Korean prisoners on February 18 and March 13, 1952 at the US prisoner of war camp on Koje-do, an island near Masan Korea.

Civil Affairs and EPW Operations

Army AC and RC personnel and units provided to unified and specified commanders are responsible for preparing and executing policies and procedures for the care, control, and disposition of dislocated civilians (DC). Dislocated civilian is a generic term that includes a refugee, a displaced person, a stateless person, an evacuee, or a war victim. Dislocated civilians are different from EPWs and civilian internees (CI), but in large numbers and not controlled they can hinder military operations just like massive numbers of EPW\CIs. They are different in that they are innocent people who may or may not support the US effort and are not involved in the conflict, but because of their presence in the theater of operations and close proximity to the fighting, they are forced to leave their homes and seek assistance from the US. Unlike EPWs and CIs, they have very few rights and privileges; consequently, they must be treated differently and kept separated from the other detained persons. The Army has a very limited CA capability during peacetime. This capability is generally provided by G-5/S-5 staffs at brigade level and higher and by the only AC CA unit, the 96th CA Battalion, located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Since the majority of the CA units are RC units and late arrivers in a theater of war, during peace
and war, MP planners must coordinate with their local G-5/ S-5 staffers to ensure that the theater commander’s CA guidance concerning DCs is clear, understood, integrated into theater operational and logistical plans, and executed. During this coordination process, MP planners should attempt to identify the existing and potential volume of DCs by region, the direction of their movements, required troop and logistical support, and the pertinent policies and procedures for conducting DC operations. Policies and procedures need to be specified for the evacuation and control of the DCs; the location of civilian collecting points (CCP), assembly points, and assembly point administration; the location, number, and design of DC camps; the types, numbers, and locations of DC medical facilities; and the screening process, to name a few. Additionally, in the absence of CA units, MP units must be prepared to execute the DC mission in conjunction with their other circulation control and EPW missions. When CA units arrive in theater and assume the responsibility for the DC mission, MP planners and units must continue to work hand in hand with the CA units to take advantage of their unique skills. Every attempt should be made to have joint CA/MP teams screen, identify and separate dislocated civilians from EPWs/CIs as far forward in the combat zone as possible, and direct each category of individuals into the proper support channels as quickly and efficiently as possible. CA and MP units should also be prepared to assist each other in the performance of each branch’s unique mission, especially when faced with massive numbers of EPWs/CIs.
Significant Planning Factors

Since the Korean War, the US Army has fought in Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama. In each of these conflicts EPW operations were of only peripheral concern and often considered a issue after the fact. Even though the number of prisoners captured and civilian internees detained in these three conflicts were small compared to those in World War II and the Korean War, we did not have the proper mix of military police units on the ground to adequately complete this extremely sensitive mission; nor did we properly plan the EPW operations. EPW operations cannot be discounted in planning for combat operations. MP leaders must be proactive and identify their EPW requirements in the OPLANS of their higher headquarters. When planning for EPW operations, MP leaders must consider the following areas of interest.

1. Host nation Support. Early in the development of a theater EPW plan, we must determine whether or not the HN will accept our prisoners and civilian internees. Once this is determined, we must find out the HN’s capability to receive, intern, and repatriate our EPWs. Specifically, we need to know how many EPW camps there will be and where they will be located; where the international transfers will occur; and what HN transportation assets will be available for evacuating EPWs to the HN EPW camps.

2. Host Nation Agreements. Determine whether there are any signed support or operational agreements between the U.S. and the HN. If not, develop joint administrative procedures that cover, as a minimum: US responsibilities before transfer, transfer verification paperwork, U.S and HN responsibilities after transfer, segregation and medical care requirements, reporting procedures, and the functions of the U.S. Liaison Team (USLT).

3. EPW Capture Rate. The Army’s current EPW force structure is based on an EPW capture rate of 24,639 EPWs for a NATO scenario assuming 180 days of static defense against a
superior force. This does not track with the offensive nature of our Airland Battle doctrine. Consequently, if offensive operations are expected or executed at some point in a future conflict, the EPW rate may escalate beyond the holding capacity of the theater CINC’s EPW force structure. This escalation would require either implementation of an EPW evacuation plan, or increased EPW holding capacity in the theater. When preparing an EPW plan to support offensive operations, there are some factors that an MP planner should examine to determine a more realistic EPW capture rate. Some of these factors are: the enemy soldier’s loyalty to his government and political ideology, the army, his leaders, and his unit; his will to fight; reported or suspected desertions; internal strife within the military; the tactical cohesion of the front line forces; and the reasons why the army is fighting.

4. Location of EPW Camps, Holding Areas, and Collecting Points. According to FM 19-40, one of the most significant and critical decisions that has to be made by the theater EPW planner is the site selection for the EPW camps. This is also true for MP planners at division and corps level. There are many critical factors to consider when selecting an EPW site. Among the more important factors are: the proximity to major transportation terminals, supply bases, and medical facilities; the rear area threat; the distances from supporting and supported EPW collecting points, holding areas, or camps; the terrain as it relates to constructing temporary and semi-permanent facilities; the existence of adequate sources of water and electricity; and the attitudes of the local civilian population and the prisoners, respectively.

5. EPW Camp Construction. The specific type of construction to satisfy the minimum requirements varies with the climate, the permanency of the camps, the availability of labor and materials, and the conditions under which we billet our forces. For the best results, coordinate as soon as possible, after arriving in theater, with the command engineer and provide him with the minimum construction requirements and then let him assume responsibility for the coordination, design, and planning for the construction of the camps.

6. Transportation. One of the most critical phases of any EPW operation is the evacuation of the prisoners out of the combat zone to EPW camps in the COMMZ. When planning for these operations, it is essential to identify evacuation routes and transportation requirements and get commitments from the command logisticians to provide the requisite U.S. and HN highway, air, and rail assets to move the captives and civilian internees out of the combat zone to EPW\CI
camps as expeditiously as possible. If HN vehicles are used, MP planners should specify the need for a maintenance and repair parts contract to keep the fleet of vehicles operational and ready to perform the evacuation mission. MP planners also need to know what type of vehicles will be provided and their passenger capacity; are they open or enclosed; how will they be configured i.e., with trailers, side panels, canvas tops; and will drivers be provided. Lastly, MP planners should address the transportation requirements to handle large numbers of EPWs.

7. Medical Support. Under the provisions of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, we are responsible for collecting and treating sick or wounded US captured prisoners and properly caring for and disposing of the remains of prisoners who die in the EPW camps. When planning for EPW operations, coordinate with the theater medical command for sufficient dental, surgical, and medical treatment for the projected number of EPWs; for the locations of the hospitals providing treatment to EPWs; for standardized procedures for accounting for EPWs in military or civilian hospitals; and to determine the security requirements for each EPW hospital. Additional consideration should be given to coordinating with the HN for joint guard forces for EPW hospitalized in HN facilities.

8. Logistics Support. Based on the theater’s projected capture rate, MP planners must coordinate with their division G4, COSCOM, and area support group (ASG) counterparts to obtain the supplies and equipment to operate the camps and provide the prisoners the minimum essentials for periods of short and long term internment. Items to consider include: a basic daily food ration sufficient in quantity, quality, and variety appropriate to their culture and to keep them in good health; clothing and sleeping equipment suitable to the weather conditions and the work requirements; hand tools for camp maintenance activities and work projects; housekeeping supplies such as water bags for drinking water, soap for bathing, and personal comfort items; janitorial and cleaning supplies; mess equipment; chapel materials; and recreation equipment.

9. Protecting Power Visits. According to the Geneva Conventions and AR 190-8, a neutral state or a humanitarian organization, like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), may be designated as a protecting power to monitor whether prisoners and civilian internees are receiving humane treatment as required by the Geneva Conventions. Representatives from the protecting power may visit captives or detained persons anywhere they are held by the capturing
power and question the individuals as to the conditions of their internment, their health and welfare and their rights. US personnel may not prevent these visits, except for imperative military necessity.10 It is suggested that MP planners coordinate with their operational planners and supporting staff judge advocate officers to determine what operations constitute an imperative military necessity; thereby preventing confusion, frustration, and the possibility of an unfavorable international incident.

EPW PREPARATIONS--DESERT SHIELD

Arrival of the XVIII Airborne Corps

Operation Desert Shield presented the first ground units deploying to the theater with a monumental challenge not encountered in many years. For the first time in recent military history, US Army forces deployed into combat in a friendly Third World Nation where no formal agreements for host nation support or basing of US or coalition forces existed. This situation was further exacerbated during the early weeks of the buildup because the lead elements of the 82nd Airborne Division had been ordered to deploy without their organic support units. Consequently, when those forces arrived at the airfield in Dhahran on 9 August 1990, there was no logistic structure to support the troops, no transportation, no shelter from the 130-degree heat, no A-ration meal support, little water available, no available sanitary facilities, and no postal support.11 This bleak environment soon began to change when logisticians from the Support Command (SUPCOM) arrived in country and, assisted by the 1st Corps Support Command (1st COSCOM) from the XVIII Airborne Corps, worked indefatigably to obtain necessary life support items from the Saudi Arabian government. Additional relief came when pre-positioned
ships from Diego Garcia arrived and their cargo of food, tents, material, supplies, and ammunition were unloaded.

Between 10 and 25 August 1990, 40,000 troops from the XVIII Airborne Corps flew into Dhahran, which had been designated as the theater aerial port of debarkation (APOD). Several days later, equipment for the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) began to arrive at the port of Ad Damman. The first brigade’s worth of Marines also began arriving at the port of Al Jubayl. These two seaports later became the theater’s major seaports of debarkation (SPODs). Within 60 days from the arrival of initial XVIII Airborne Corps forces, three of the Army’s most elite divisions were in place to defend the Eastern Province. This force consisted of the 82nd Airborne Division, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and the 12th Aviation Brigade.

By the first of November, there were approximately 97,000 troops in and around Dhahran. This force included 1,000 military police men and women from the division military police companies, the XVIII Airborne Corps military police brigade, and a small element, from the US Army Central Command (ARCENT) Provost Marshal’s Office, led by Major Robert Voss, the first US MP on the ground in Saudi Arabia.

The first non-divisional military police on the ground in Saudi Arabia were from the 503d Military Police Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne) out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Throughout the month of August, planes loaded with Corps
MP departed Pope Air Force Base for Saudi Arabia. Once on the
ground, the Battalion and Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters
Company (HHC) left the APOD and moved into a vacated compound
outside Al Khobar, which is adjacent to Dhahran and approximately
25 kilometers from the port of Dammam. From there the 503d MP
Battalion began performing its normal contingency corps missions.

On September 27, 1990, a day after the 49th Anniversary of the
Military Police Corps, the first Army Reserve MP unit, the Head-
quartes and Headquarters Detachment (HHD), 160th Military Police
Battalion from Tallahassee, Florida arrived in country. The
first two National Guard MP units to deploy to the theater, the
210th MP Company from Asheville, North Carolina, and the 211th MP
Company from Clyde, North Carolina flew in from Fort Bragg on 2
October and, subsequently, were attached to the 101st and 24th
Divisions, respectively. Over the next 30 days, the 16th
Military Police Brigade expanded to almost 2500 soldiers with the
addition of two more MP battalions-- the 519th Military Police
Battalion from Fort Meade, Maryland and the 759th Military Police
Battalion from Fort Carson, Colorado. By early November, the
corps MP force had matured to four battalions and 15 companies.
(See figure 1.)

While the 503d Military Police Battalion was performing BCC,
area security, and limited law and order missions (only as requi-
red) in and around Dhahran and the port of Ad Damman, the brigade
commander and his staff began preparing an EPW concept plan for
OPLAN Desert Shield I, the defense of the vital north-east area
contiguous to the AL Jubayl, Ad Damman, and Dhahran coastline.

Under this plan, National Guard and Active brigades from the Royal Saudi Land Force would deploy in the Eastern Province along the Saudi-Kuwait border. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) with the 12th Aviation Brigade and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3d ACR) would deploy as the covering force, behind the Saudis and in front of and to the north of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The 82nd Airborne Division would be located directly behind the 24th protecting the left rear avenue of approach to Dhahran. After fighting the covering force battle, the 101st would screen the Corps left flank. Elements from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1st MEF) and XVIII Airborne Corps units would deploy to the east between the 101st and 24th Divisions and the coastline. The EPW concept to support this operation was based on the following three assumptions:

1. The EPW capture rate ranges from 10,000 EPWs on the first day to 15,000 EPWs on the 2nd and 3rd days and 10,000
EPWs on the 4th and 5th days of the conflict:

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The number of EPWs transported from the divisions to the corps rear will be constrained by the number of vehicles that can be contracted through the host nation and US backhaul assets. The number of captives evacuated per day is based on a planning factor of contracting 40-65 passenger buses with drivers, making three trips per day. This equates to evacuating approximately 8,000 prisoners per day from the division collecting points to the Corps rear EPW cage. As a result of this transportation constraint, there may be an EPW residual within the 24th’s AO where the Corps forward EPW cage is located.

2. Military intelligence CI/IPW teams in the 24th Infantry Division area will set up a maximum of 15 screening points and take a minimum of three minutes per EPW to determine each EPW’s exploitative valve. At that rate, these teams will be capable of screening 7,200 EPW per day.

3. Echelons Above Corps (EAC) MP will establish a Theater EPW camp by D-Day in the vicinity of Damman and evacuate EPW from the MARCENT (1st MEF) central collecting point and the corps rear EPW cage to the theater EPW camp.

Upon examining these assumptions, several interesting points surface that had a direct impact on how the brigade commander tailored his forces to accept EPW as far forward in the combat.
zone as possible so they would not slow down or hinder combat operations, and to evacuate the prisoners to the Corps EPW cage as soon as possible to protect them from direct contact or collateral damage in the divisions' areas of operation. First, the brigade commander realized from the beginning, that based on the large projected capture rate, the division MP companies could not evacuate prisoners from the brigades and temporarily hold them at the division EPW collecting point without corps augmentation. Second, the limited number of CI/IPW teams might not be able to quickly screen large numbers of EPWs unless they were collocated with the EPW collecting points and even then they might not be able to meet their objective of screening a prisoner every three minutes, and as a result EPWs might remain in the divisions longer than desired, thus establishing a requirement for more guards. Finally, organic backhaul transportation would not be adequate to move large numbers of EPWs to the rear quickly, so additional HN support would be required. Based on this rationale and the three assumptions listed above, the brigade commander decided to leave the 210th and 211th MP Companies attached to the 101st and the 24th Divisions, respectively, to help evacuate prisoners from the brigades and to operate the division forward and central collecting points. Prisoners from the 101st and 24th Divisions would be evacuated to the Corps forward EPW cage in assembly area (AA) Vidalia in the 24th's AO and then to the Corps main EPW cage, near Judah, in the 82nd's AO. The 503d MP Bn was tasked to conduct the escort guard missions between the divisions
and the corps cages and to operate the corps cages. From the Corps rear EPW cage and the MARCENT central collecting point, prisoners would be evacuated, by an unidentified (UI) theater escort guard company, to the theater EPW camp near the port city of Damman. (See figure 2). This camp would be operated by an UI theater EPW camp from the Reserve Component. All required classes of supplies and HN transportation would be pre-positioned at each EPW collecting point, cage, and camp. Finally, CI/IPW teams from the divisions' MI battalions and the 525th MI Brigade would collocate with their MP counterparts and operate brigade and division and corps interrogation facilities, respectively. From a doctrinal standpoint, this EPW concept was sound; following the principles outlined in FM 19-1 and FM 19-4. The 16th MP Bde was standing ready and willing to execute it, but without the UI theater MP units on the ground, I'm not convinced we had sufficient resources to effectively control, evacuate, and hold 60,000 EPWs in less than five days. Luckily, Saddam Hussein did not push south into Saudi Arabia, and we didn't have to execute OPLAN Desert Shield I.

The Build Up Continues

During late September and early October while the 16th MP Bde was deep into performing its contingency missions, getting acclimated to the harsh desert environment and familiarizing itself with the corps rear area, and preparing plans to support OPLAN Desert Shield I, diplomatic initiatives and economic sanctions failed to budge Saddam Hussein's forces in Kuwait. On 29
September the U.S. told the world that the timetable for a peaceful settlement and possible military action against Iraq was shortening. This was confirmed on 1 October when the U.S. Congress gave President Bush a vote of confidence and passed a joint resolution supporting our efforts to "deter Iraqi aggression."15

On 13 October, the HHC of the Theater Army (TA) MP brigade, the 89th Military Police Brigade out of Fort Hood, Texas, arrived in Dhahran. By the end of the second week in January, the 89th MP Bde rounded out to its full wartime structure of four battalions when the second of the five GS MP battalions from the National Guard, the 210th Military Police Battalion from Detroit, Michigan, arrived in Dhahran. (See figure 3).

Shortly after the 89th MP Bde arrived in the theater, on 16 October, the brigade commander and his staff received an IPB, mission, and force disposition briefing from the Commander, 16th
MP Bde, and began assuming responsibility for the theater EPW mission. Since the preparation of the 16th MP Brigade's EPW Concept for Operation Desert Shield I, the ARCENT Provost Marshal, in conjunction with the theater intelligence officer, had increased the projected EPW capture rate from 60,000 EPWs to 100,000 EPWs during the first week. Based on this tremendous increase, the ARCENT Provost Marshal (PM) had submitted, through the CENTCOM PM, to FORSCOM and the FORSCOM PM, an immediate request for the call up of additional National Guard GS MP battalions and a Reserve Component EPW brigade. The first units were called up in late October and subsequently deployed to Fort Meade, Maryland where they were validated for overseas deployment, and deployed to SWA between 4 November and 8th December. These units included: the 313th Prisoner of War Information Center (PWIC), 400th MP Bn (EPW), and the 200th, 290th, and 1138th MP Guard Companies. Other units deploying at that time included: the 342d and 344th Escort Guard Companies and the 800th Military Police Brigade (PW) Forward. All of these units were in
country by 11 December 1990. Since these units were not on the ground when the Brigade arrived, but due in country soon, the 89-th MP Bde commander and his staff developed an EPW plan to support a one corps attack based on the in-theater MP assets and this group of projected gains.

The 89th MP Brigade’s EPW plan was based on several critical assumptions. They were: the Iraqi Army, after being pounded by the coalition’s air campaign, would not likely put up much of a fight, and we would capture up to 100,000 EPWs during the first week of combat; and the 89th MP Bde would be augmented by a corps MP battalion until National Guard GS MP battalions and Reserve EPW camps, battalions, and companies arrived in theater. (See Appendix A for additional information on the EPW capture rate used to develop this plan as well as the required force structure to execute it). Additionally, the brigade commander and his staff believed that theater transportation assets would be available to evacuate EPWs from the corps cages to the theater camps, and the host nation would provide sufficient supplies to support up to 10 EPW camps. With these thoughts in mind, the 89th MP Bde developed a very adventurous plan for a one corps limited offensive. Instead of building several semi-permanent EPW camps in the COMMZ and evacuating the captives to those camps, the 89th MP Brigade’s plan, called OPLAN (Theater EPW Camps), intended to reverse the process and take the EPW camps to the prisoners. It was the brigade commander’s intent to initially have one EPW battalion establish four 10,000 man EPW
camps west of Ad Damman and prepare sites adjacent to the XVIII Airborne Corps EPW Rear Cage and the MARCENT EPW holding area for two additional 10,000 man camps. Subsequently, as the combat units engaged the enemy and gained ground, the MP battalion would move forward and set up EPW camps in vacant assembly areas and the sites of previous division EPW collecting points rather than try to evacuate large numbers of EPWs to the rear. Additionally, since these camps would be continuously receiving large numbers of EPWs over short periods of time, the commander also envisioned that his MP would only be capable of field processing the captives and minimum camp administration. Detailed processing of each EPW would be accomplished in the theater EPW camp. Finally, as the preponderance of EPWs shifted from the forward camps to the theater facilities, an additional battalion from the XVIII Airborne Corps would have to be chopped to the Brigade to assist with the internment mission. 

OPLAN Theater EPW Camps was divided into five phases. During the first phase, the pre-hostilities phase, construction would begin on the four 10,000 man camps. Additionally, the MP battalion responsible for the camps would locate existing facilities for temporary use until the permanent camps were completed. Coordination was also made to stockpile material adjacent to the MARCENT holding area and the XVIII Airborne Corps Rear EPW Cage. Simultaneously, the PWIC would begin establishing points of contact, publishing guidance for field processing of prisoners and assisting the 400th EPW Camp standardize the operation of the four camps. The second,
third, and fourth phases of the operation increased the size and scope of the EPW operation based on incremental increases in the size of the captured force from 60,000 and 90,000 to over 100,000 EPWs, respectively. The remainder of the 89th MP Brigade’s EPW plan was essentially the same as the 16th MP Brigade’s concept for OPLAN Desert Shield I. This plan was later modified dramatically after it was staffed with the ARCENT (FWD) G3, 20th Engineer Brigade, ACS Log, and XVIII Airborne Corps. In the end, the 89th MP Bde was directed to be prepared to establish one fixed 12,000 man EPW camp in the vicinity of Ad Damman and stockpile materials for seven additional camps which could be established in the future, if required. This concept was later incorporated into the Brigade’s Desert Shield OPORD 003.18

Arrival of the VII Corps

As it became obvious that diplomatic efforts and UN imposed economic sanctions were having little, if any, effect on Saddam Hussein, General Schwarzkopf was asked to prepare a plan for ejecting Iraq from Kuwait with the limited forces that were on the ground and enroute to the Gulf. Subsequently, the General stressed in presenting his plan, “This plan is not what the commander-in-chief of Central Command is recommending. It is a weak plan, it is not the plan we choose to execute, and here are all the things that are wrong with it. If in fact we are serious about ejecting them from Kuwait, what we need is more forces to be able to execute a proper campaign.”19 In order to execute a proper campaign, General Schwarzkopf believed he needed a second
heavy corps with three divisions, two armor and one mechanized infantry, and an armored cavalry regiment.

On 8 November 1990, General Schwarzkopf's need for additional troops was made public when President Bush, at a White House news conference, announced that he planned to send the VII Corps from Germany, the 1st ID(M) from Fort Riley, Kansas and a requisite number of additional CONUS RC CS and CSS units to Saudi Arabia, almost doubling our force structure to nearly 400,000. During the next 97 days, VII Corps units, the 1st ID(M), and myriad Reserve Component (RC) CS and CSS units converged on SWA by sea and air. To provide efficient, effective, and responsive MP support to this second corps in an austere desert environment, the ARCENT PM planned to increase the VII Corps MP brigade, the 14th MP Bde commanded by Colonel Richard A. Pomager, Jr.. By the middle of January, this brigade had more than doubled its USAREUR size with the addition of two National Guard MP battalions, the 118th MP Battalion from Providence, Rhode Island and the 372d MP Battalion from Anacostia, Washington, D.C..20 (See Figure 4 for the composition of the 14th MP Bde at the end of the VII Corps deployment).

In November, after the President decided to double the forces in Saudi Arabia, planning dramatically shifted from fighting a defensive battle and a limited offensive campaign with a light contingency corps to fighting an aggressive offensive campaign with two U.S. Army corps, one MEF with two reinforced USMC divisions and a British Brigade, and an Arab-Islamic Joint Forces
Command with two combined coalition corps with Saudi, Egyptian, Syrian, Qatari, and Kuwaiti forces.

Figure 4
VII CORPS MP BRIGADE

THE EPW PLAN TO SUPPORT OPERATION DESERT STORM

When General Schwarzkopf and his subordinates shifted their planning efforts from a defensive campaign to an offensive campaign to liberate Kuwait, the projected EPW capture rates were raised from 60,000 EPWs captured during the first week of combat to 100,000. Subsequently, the ARCENT and FORSCOM Provost Marshals developed a plan for building an EPW force that could effectively and efficiently handle 100,000 EPWs and provide responsive support to the 94,000 marines in the 1st MEF and the two corps ARCENT force. This plan centered around the 800th Military Police Brigade (PW) which had been selected to deploy to Saudi as the ARCENT designee for the conduct of the theater EPW mission.

The Arrival of the 800th Military Police Brigade (PW)

The 800th Military Police Brigade (PW) is an Army Reserve
Brigade from Hempstead New York, and it was commanded by Brigadier General Joseph F. Conlon III. The Brigade was selected because it is routinely CAPSTONE aligned under the 1st PERSCOM as the theater EPW brigade under the USAREUR OPLAN 4102. Additionally, in the years just prior to the Gulf War, it had participated in 10 theater level CPXs, to include Toreador Sword 90-- a rear battle exercise which included scenarios for two EPW camps and their subordinate units-- and two ODT FTXs in Europe with its CAPSTONE trace and the 1st PERSCOM. This field experience as well as the unit's trained leaders qualified the 800th Military Police Brigade (PW) as the most combat ready PW brigade in the RC and the most prepared unit to deploy to SWA. The Brigade force structure under the USAREUR OPLAN 4102 consisted of two EPW camp headquarters, a PWIC, a psychological operations battalion, two processing companies, three escort guard companies, 12 guard companies, and the Mannheim Confinement Facility. This force structure would have to be doubled for the 800th to handle the projected 100,000 Iraqi EPWs. In early October, the Brigade Forward and one of the MP battalions, the PWIC, three guard companies and two escort guard companies were called up and deployed to Saudi Arabia. (See figure 5.) As soon as these units arrived in country in early December, the Brigade Forward began preparing to receive the remainder of the Brigade headquarters. It also began conducting the initial coordination required to have the Brigade assume the theater EPW mission and to execute the Brigade's EPW plan to support ARCENT and MARCENT. Concurrently, the newly
arrived RC EPW units began to coordinate the operational and logistical support required to execute the 89th MP Brigade’s concept for supporting a one corps limited offensive campaign.

On 6 December 1990, the HHC, 800th MP Bde (PW) was mobilized and ordered to Fort Meade, Maryland to prepare for deployment to Saudi Arabia. While at Fort Meade, the Brigade communicated with the ARCENT PMO and the 89th Military Police Brigade, but it did not receive sufficient information to do more than give many of its subordinate units training and limited operational guidance because of the security classification of the Desert Storm OPLAN.

Much of this time was spent providing training guidance to RC MTOE 19-077 combat support companies that had been assigned EPW guard and escort guard missions and companies that had been reconstituted as processing companies. These organizational changes were required because the revised capture rate of 100,000 EPWs and the 800th’s plan to support ARCENT and MARCENT caused
the EPW processing, escort guard, and guard requirements in theater to exceed the number of processing, escort guard, and guard companies in the National Guard and Army Reserve available for deployment to SWA. Over the Brigade's objection, MP combat support companies tasked with the guard and escort guard missions were directed to strip down their MTOEs to the MTOE 19-047 (Escort Guard Co) and MTOE 19-247 (Guard Co) level and leave their tactical vehicles and radios at home. The Brigade and the units were told by FORSCOM that all required equipment was available in country.\textsuperscript{22} This decision would have a major impact on the Brigade and some of the reconfigured companies before the air campaign started when many of these units were diverted from their EPW missions to conduct collateral area and site security missions i.e., ASP, POL, and VIP security, for which they were not properly equipped. After working these types of issues, making minor alignment changes to the EPW force structure, and completing the preparation for overseas deployment (POM) requirements, the HHC, 800th MP Bde (PW) departed Fort Meade and arrived in theater on 25 December. Subsequently, the 800th MP Bde (PW) was aligned under the 22nd Support Command (SUPCOM) for command and control purposes. This alignment differs from Army doctrine which states that MP units to support EPW and US prisoner confinement operations are assigned to the PERSCOM when the latter is formed.\textsuperscript{23}

The EPW Plan to Support ARCENT and MARCENT

On 26 December, Brigadier General Conlon and his G-1 and
G-3 participated in an ARCENT MAPEX in Riyadh. During this MAPEX, General Conlon presented to LTG John J. Yeosock, the ARCENT Commander, his concept for supporting ARCENT and MARCENT and for transferring US captured prisoners to the Saudi military. Key components of this plan included: the theater camps, support to the combat commanders, the evacuation process, support to the Saudi military, and the international transfer of EPWs to the Saudi government.

According to General Conlon's plan, Theater EPW OPLAN 1-91, division and corps MP units would perform their traditional EPW missions. Division MP companies would establish brigade collecting points and a division central collecting point and evacuate the EPWs from the capturing units through the brigade collecting points to the division central collecting point. After being field processed at the division central collecting points, the EPWs would be turned over to corps MP who would evacuate the EPWs back to the corps holding area. Corps MP would operate these holding areas. In the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 16th MP Bde and the 503rd MP Bn would be assigned this mission and the division to corps evacuation mission. In VII Corps, the 14th MP Bde and the 93rd MP Bn would perform these missions. After additional field processing at the corps holding areas, EPWs would be turned over to MP escort guards from the theater camp or camps supporting the corps. Instead of the corps PMs having to call the MP camps for guards, the escort guards would already be stationed forward at the corps holding areas, as a communications
link to the theater camps and to provide rapid evacuation of the EPWs out of the combat zone. EPWs from the combat zone would be moved to four US camps for additional processing and for holding until they could be transferred to the Saudi military for repatriation. Additionally, as the ground campaign continued into Kuwait and Iraq, each PW camp would OPCON a company to their supported MP brigade to assume the corps holding area responsibility, freeing the corps MP to move forward to better support the divisions.

Initially, the 800th wanted to set up six camps, but the Saudi military did not like that idea. The Saudis wanted the 800th to build only two camps, one in the east and one in the west, because they were going to build four of their own camps. According to Saudi rationale, they could accept the international transfer of US captured prisoners faster than the US could receive the prisoners from their capturing units consequently, there would be no over crowding in the US camps and no need to keep an Iraqi prisoner in a US camp for longer than several days. The Saudis viewed the average Iraqi soldier as a moslem brother who was truly not their enemy. The Saudi government expressed a desire to play a major role in the care and custody of the Iraqi EPW, and in so doing pave the way for a long term peaceful relationship with Iraq after the war. Thus, they wanted the 800th to turn over all the Iraqi EPWs to them as soon as possible after capture. Eventually, US\Saudi discussions led to an agreement that allowed the US to build four camps, two in the
east and two in the west. Each of these four camps was tasked to escort, process, and intern, in a safe and secure environment, the EPW and civilian internees (CI) captured and detained by all US services and non-Arab allied forces, and when directed, transfer the EPW to three Saudi EPW camps for repatriation. It is interesting to note here that the 800th diverted from Army doctrine by placing both EPWs and CIs in the same internment camp. AR 190-57, Civilian Internee- Administration, Employment, and Compensation, states that CIs will be kept in camps separate from EPWs.) The Saudi EPW camps would be located at An Nu’Arriyah, Hafer Al Batin and Artawiyah.

In order to evacuate, process, and intern 100,000 EPWs, provide responsive support to the ARCENT and MARCENT combat commanders, and confine US prisoners in theater, General Conlon would require an unusually large EPW force structure. This force structure would consist of five PW camps, 31 guard companies, eight escort guard companies, five PW processing companies, one PWIC, one EPW/CI battalion, four processing advisory teams and three camp advisory teams. (See figure 6.) Additionally, the 800th would require extensive medical, psychological operations, military intelligence and engineer support.

The work horse of the Brigade force structure is the EPW camp. Each camp was assigned a mission of establishing a 12,000 EPW camp with a be prepared mission to expand to 24,000, with no additional force structure. In order to accomplish this mission, each camp was task organized with a camp headquarters and an MP
battalion with a processing company, five or six guard companies and one or two escort guard companies. PW camps also received engineer, military intelligence, and signal general support and finance, PSYOP, medical and dental direct support. According to

![Diagram](image)

Figure 6
DESSERT STORM EAC MP BRIGADE (PW)

the Brigade plan, the 301st MP Camp and the 400th MP Bn would support the XVIII Airborne Corps. The 402nd Camp with the 143rd MP Bn would support the VII Corps. The 400th MP Camp and the 34th MP Bn, the 401st MP Camp and the 193rd MP Bn, and the 403rd MP Camp with the 146th MP Bn would support the EPW mission in the MARCENT area of operations. Each camp was designated a base and two camps would collocate next to each other to form a base cluster with the senior camp commander designated as the base cluster commander. In the west, the 301st and 402nd MP Camps formed a base cluster called Brooklyn, with the 402nd MP Camp Commander designated as the base cluster commander. In the east,
the 401st and the 403rd MP Camps would form the base cluster known as the Bronx, with the 401st Camp Commander designated the base cluster commander.26

On 26 December, after briefing LTG Yeosock and obtaining permission to execute Theater EPW OPLAN 1-91, General Conlon and his staff immediately set out to accomplish several critical tasks that had to be completed in order for the 800th to begin processing EPWs on 15 January, the UN deadline for Saddam Hussein to have his forces out of Kuwait. The most pressing issue was the construction of the four camps. General Conlon seriously believed that the four camps had to be established, constructed, and operational at the time hostilities commenced, otherwise, there would be havoc in the rear area, and the US would possibly fail to meet its legal duties under the Law of War as directed by the Geneva Convention with respect to the care and safety of enemy prisoners of war.27 Consequently, since none of the Brigade’s camps were in the theater yet, General Conlon tasked his brigade staff to coordinate the location, construction, and logistics support for the camps. Between the end of December and the middle of January, the brigade staff coordinated with the 416th Engineer (EN) Command, the theater engineer headquarters, and the ARCENT and 22nd SUPCOM staffs to identify, survey, and select potential camp sites. After an exhaustive whirlwind search, members of the 411th Engineer Brigade, the Theater Water Manager, and members of the 800th staff agreed to the final site selections, but in both cases general officer assistance was
required to obtain land for the camps. The final site selection for the east camps was made on or about the 15th. The east site was located near the Bedouin village of As Sarrar. This village is about 120 miles south of the Kuwait border and 120 miles north-west of Dhahran near the city of An Nu’Arriyah. The final site selection for the western camps in the Brooklyn AO was not completed until 20 January when the Brigade staff selected a location south of the city of Hafer Al Batin. Both of these camp sites were barren desert locations, but they were selected because they were near the corps rear boundary, but out of the combat zone IAW the Geneva Conventions, and they were near the MSRs that supported the ARCENT and MARCENT force dispositions, sources of potable drinking water and two of the Saudi EPW camps. At the same time members of the G-3 Section were pinpointing the four camp site locations, the G-4 was coordinating with the 416th Engineer Command and the 22nd SUPCOM to decide on the proper camp design and the logistics support required to operate each camp. The G-4 submitted a detailed bill of materials to construct two sites, each containing two EPW camps. The original camp design was expanded to handle the "be prepared" mission to process up to 24,000 EPWs. The initial plan also caused the 800th and the 411th EN Bde to use the Army Facilities Manual to design the camps. This manual had camp designs that were not conducive to desert operations, for example, the manual called for chain-link fencing around each of the camps. After the G-4 computed the additional support requirements, it was
determined that the 800th would need over 450 miles of fence, 6,000 GP medium tents, 9,000,000 sandbags, 1.5 million gallons of water per day, 960 generator light sets, etc. These figures did not include life support items like laundry, bath, or latrines. As you might imagine, these figures overwhelmed the engineers and logisticians. They could not imagine a need for so many supplies, and were reluctant to support these requirements. As a result of the huge amounts of materials and supplies required to operate the four camps, and the SUPCOM’s reluctance to support the 800th, a compromise was reached on the camp design. The 800th would use concertina wire in lieu of the chain-link fencing, and the camps would be built under austere, bare base, emergency conditions. This compromise still translated into a very large logistical requirement to include over 76,000 rolls of wire to form the triple-strand barriers around the camps. (See Appendix D for additional information on the design specifications for each camp as well as a discussion on the logistics required to support the theater EPW mission.) The EN Bde also agreed to provide one horizontal and one vertical platoon for each site. Unfortunately, this force was totally inadequate to build four camps in a short time period, and the majority of the construction labor would be provided by MP units at the camps.

The first two MP camps to arrive in theater arrived after the commencement of the air campaign. They were the 401st MP Camp which arrived on 16 January 1991 and the 301st MP Camp which
arrived soon thereafter on 17 January. Since the air campaign was expected to take a devastating toll on the enemy, causing front line Iraqi soldiers to lose the will to fight and to surrender, the 800th needed these two camps to be up and running as soon as possible. According to General Conlon, these two units would be the corner stones upon which the Brooklyn and the Bronx base clusters would be formed. Initially, all engineer support and MP personnel at each site as well as the available materials would be focused on building the enclosures and compounds for the first camp while improving perimeter security on a daily basis. As materials, engineer support, and additional MP resources became available and time permitted, the remainder of the initial camps, to include the barriers, the lighting systems, towers, gates, sally ports, and latrines etc. and the second camp at each site would be built. Construction on the camps in the east and the west began almost as soon as the lead elements of each unit arrived at their camp site. In the east, construction began on the 401st Camp shortly after the unit arrived on the 17th when the camp executive officer and the Brigade G-4 obtained enough materials, to include 50,000 rolls of concertina wire, hundreds of lights, and tons of lumber, to initiate operations. A engineer platoon from the 864th EN Bn erected the physical barriers and the lighting system, and installed the sanitation services necessary to support the camp. By 0950 hr., 20 January 1991, the engineers and the MP of the 401st MP Camp had completed one holding area, one compound, and a
processing area. These areas were completed just in time to receive the first EPWs of the war, which arrived less than one hour after the compound had been completed. During the first several days of construction, the engineers also used their bulldozers and graders to level the barren desert landscape to improve construction and enhance mobility, and to build a 10-foot high sand berm around the three enclosure perimeter. Augmented by camp MP, the engineers also erected triple-strand concertina barriers between compounds and enclosures, emplaced a series of human waste disposal systems designed to pump human waste and waste water into an outside lagoon, and dug waste water pumps with gravel fill to provide drainage for showers. Later as the scope of the project became apparent, another engineer platoon was added to the camp’s growing support structure. Meanwhile, the 403rd MP Camp arrived in theater, deployed to its camp site, and commenced its construction efforts. Unfortunately, there were not enough engineer assets to go around, so this camp had to compete for the engineer asset that were still working on the 401st Camp. In the end, the commander of the 403rd MP Camp used many of his organic personnel, who were skilled electricians, construction workers, carpenters, mechanics, heavy equipment operators, and farmers in their civilian jobs, to build his camp. These soldiers were also used to set up the compound lighting system and trouble shoot problems. The unit’s farmers from Oklahoma built the gates for the camp. The story at the west camp was generally the same. All initial efforts were committed
to getting one camp up and operational. Engineers were used to build roads, security berms, and antivehicular ditches. Almost all of the other work was done by MP assigned to the camps. MP strung concertina wire, installed lighting systems, and built towers and gates. The 402nd Camp from Ashley, Pennsylvania used soldiers from the camp’s eight guard companies to build that entire camp in less than four weeks without engineer support.3

Between 1 January and 24 February, G-Day, construction on all of the camps was hindered by the lack of adequate engineer support, a shortage of materials, the late arrival of the MP camps, and the diversion of MP EPW units to collateral missions. Additionally, according to the commander of Task Force 45, the engineer unit responsible for building the camps in the east, the design and the construction of the camps was done in a piecemeal fashion and without coordination by the 416th Engineer Command and the 411th EN Bde. Designs for the construction of the camps were conducted in disjointed segments with the designs for the wire enclosures, electricity, water, showers, latrine sewage disposal, and force protection, all being given to the supporting unit separately. The lack of coordination caused many changes during construction which hindered completion in a timely manner.4 Consequently, when the ground campaign began, construction to enable each camp to hold up to 12,000 EPW was either completed or being completed at the time the camps started to receive EPWs. However, the construction required to bring each camp up to its maximum capacity of 24,000 EPW was not and
would not be completed before the war ended. Nevertheless, despite these handicaps, the 800th was making progress, and all of the camps would be fully operational and ready to perform their missions, but only if several other critical issues were resolved before the ground campaign began.

The next major obstacle that the 800th had to overcome in during Desert Shield was the availability of backhaul transportation to evacuate EPWs from the combat zone to the theater camps. Beginning with General Conlon’s briefing to LTG Yeosock on 26 January and a subsequent meeting with the commander of the 22nd SUPCOM, Major General William G. Pagonis, on the same day, the requirement for EPW transportation support was constantly emphasized. Doctrinally, EPWs are moved from the divisions to the corp and from the corps to the theater camps using division, corps, and theater transportation assets. As these medium and heavy trucks move forward to each echelon with supplies, many of the same trucks, once they are emptied should be identified to backhaul EPWs through the system to the theater EPW camps. These assets would be requested through the area movement control center or regional movement control team by the echelon MP holding the EPWs and requiring backhaul transportation to evacuate the EPWs to the next higher echelon. The escort guard MP from the next higher level would be notified, and they would move forward to the division central collecting point or corps holding area to link up with the transportation assets.

Early in the planning for Desert Storm, the 800th tried re-
peatedly to get a commitment from the 22nd SUPCOM for backhaul transportation, but to no avail. The 14th and 16th Military Police Brigades were also experiencing the same lack of support from their COSCOMs and the non-availability of assets in their Corps. It soon became obvious that US military truck assets would not be sufficient to meet all of the theater lift requirements. In order to make up for this shortfall, myriad vehicles were leased from host nation (MN) sources. Other friendly nations not actively participating in the warfighting effort, like Germany, Italy, and Czechoslovakia also donated a conglomeration of military and civilian trucks to the cause. Although this mix of military and civilian trucks seemed to provide a possible solution to the backhaul transportation dilemma facing the 800th, time and experience proved otherwise. Most of the heavy military trucks were configured as stake and platform trucks to carry large, heavy loads of cargo. These trucks would have to be reconfigured with sides in order to accept EPW, and where would the drivers or MP escort guards get the sides for the trailers at the corps holding areas? This reconfiguration issue combined with the inherent difficulty of controlling the large number of trucks operated by HN or third country nationals, were enough reasons to dismiss the retrograde movement of EPWs via medium and heavy truck assets as a viable option. There was also other related issue, backhaul transportation assets for the MARCENT forces, that had to be resolved. The theater solution was to provide the 800th with 120 HN buses and have MP guards and
escort guards drive the buses and conduct the movements. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the HN bus became the primary means for transporting troops around the theater. Since this mode of transportation was good enough for US soldiers, it was also good enough for EPWs. Subsequently, this alternative was approved and the 800th as well as the 14th and 16th MP Brigades began extensive drivers training programs to prepare and certify MP guard, escort guard, and combat support personnel for this additional duty. When the 800th began receiving EPWs, the plan was to have the camps' escort guards that were supporting a specific corps holding area drive the buses on a continuous loop back and forth from the corps holding areas to the theater camps. Although this proved to be a much quicker system than the normal Army transportation system because the 800th controlled both the guards and the transportation assets, the camps did experience major maintenance problems because the buses came without a maintenance contract or a contract team to perform maintenance on the equipment. Additionally, many of the buses had to be stripped inside to accommodate more than the standard load of 44 passengers per vehicle. Another major concern with this solution was its impact on the ability of the 800th to sustain operations in the camps if the war went on for a long time and the combat forces captured close to the maximum projected EPWs while the 800th was diverting a percentage of its camp forces to collateral missions. Only time would prove whether or not this was a valid concern.
Medical Support to EPW Operations

According to Article 12 of the GWS, capturing powers are responsible for protecting and providing adequate care to prevent the ill treatment of wounded and sick EPWs. The scope of this responsibility is defined in AR 190-8 as dental, surgical, and medical treatment. When the 800th and its subordinate camps deployed to SWA, it had a very limited capability to provide care to EPWs. This capability was provided by a five man Brigade Surgeon’s Office that was responsible for staff supervision to include technical supervision of all health services support (HSS) activities in the command and the one officer and nine medics (91A\91Cs) in the Medical Section of each MP Camp. The 800th and its subordinate camps did not have sufficient medical personnel or supplies to care for the 60,000 to 100,000 projected EPWs or the 7,305 personnel assigned to the Brigade. This deficiency was an obvious show stopper. The Brigade needed to have sufficient medical assets on hand in the camps to ensure the Army could meet its moral and legal obligations to enforce the GWS.

In late December, the 800th began identifying the gross shortage of medical personnel and Class VIII supplies to the ARCENT Surgeon, COL Tsoulas, and the 22nd SUPCOM staff. However, despite numerous attempts, the Brigade only received minimal guidance and support during Operation Desert Shield and through the early part of February. During this period, the 800th did not sit passively by waiting for this issue to resolve itself or for it to blow up into a major international incident. The Brigade took
the initiative and devised an approach that would work the three major aspects of the problem concurrently. First, the 800th maximized the capabilities of its organic medical assets. The Brigade Commander led the way in this endeavor. He made preventive medicine and environmental sanitation a top priority with all of his commanders. He demanded routine visits and inspections of the camp facilities (living quarters, water supplies, waste disposal, and food service facilities) to enforce the need for early recognition of the potential health risks at the camps. Trash pick up and compound sanitation details were routinely performed several times a day to keep the problems well under control. Additionally, the Brigade Surgeon Section published guidance on general health service procedures and preventive medicine measures. Concurrently, the 800th asked the 12th Preventive Medicine Unit to conduct field sanitation team (FST) training for the FSTs in the four camps. This training also included training on delousing equipment, sanitation inspections, and water quality testing and analysis. Next, the 800th continuously pushed the ARCENT Surgeon and the SUPCOM for additional medical personnel and Class VIII supplies. While this was happening, the 800th coordinated with the Saudi military to identify two hospitals for the long term care of seriously injured or sick EPWs. These hospitals were jointly shared by US medical personnel and HN units under the auspices of the HN Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA). These hospitals were the King Khalid Military City (KKMC) MODA hospital in the west and the 207th
Hospital at the King Fahd Military Medical Complex (KFMMC) in Dhahran. The Brigade also developed and published a field SOP that provided limited procedural guidance. This guidance, combined with the guidance contained in Appendix 2 (EPW Operations in Medical Channels) to Annex D (EPW Control) to the Brigade’s OPLAN 1-91, established the escort guard, administrative accountability, and international transfer procedures used to care for long term injured or sick EPWs. Lastly, the 800th assigned an EPW Liaison Team to each of the three Saudi EPW camps. These teams were tasked to coordinate and monitor transfers of EPWs to the Saudi military through medical channels.

On 7 February 1991, limited medical support was provided for both the east and the west camps. The 300th Field Hospital, a 400-bed hospital, under the 175d Medical Group, was designated to support the east camp. This facility was specifically intended for the treatment of EPW patients as well as any US personnel in the area of the camp. This field hospital could be divided into three medical treatment facilities (MTFs) called hospitalization units (HUs), each of which could operate in a separate location for a limited period of time. Each of the HUs was capable of separate operations and could provide nursing care for intensive, intermediate, and minimal care patients. These HUs could also handle mass casualties by performing the functions of receiving and sorting patients, providing emergency medical and surgical care, and preparing patients for further evacuation and treatment. Instead of choosing to divide the hospital into at
least two HUs which would have been much more conducive for
supporting two separate 24,000 man EPW camps, the hospital com-
mmander chose to keep his hospital consolidated in one location.
This location was approximately two miles from the east camps.
During Desert Storm, the 300th provided the following services
from its centralized locations emergency medical/ambulance
service 24 hours a day, routine medical and dental care, medical
holding facilities, the appropriate medical wards for the various
levels of patient care, and a 24 hour a day aidpost at each camp.
To enable the 300th to receive EPW patients medically evacuated
by aircraft from throughout the theater, the nearest airstrip to
the facility was upgraded by engineers so that it could accept
C-130 aircraft.41 In the west, the 947th Medical Clearing
Platoon was given the mission of supporting both the 301st and
the 402nd MP Camps. Additional dispensary, preventive medicine,
and dental detachments were also provided to these two camps to
offset the shortages. Since the 800th was in the process of
building four camps with the capability to build a fifth
facility, this support was deemed entirely inadequate to support
the 100,000 projected EPWs and the Brigade’s 7,305 personnel.
Consequently, the 800th continued to send out inquiries with
requests for additional medical support. According to the
800th’s Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report, "several
memoranda were written requesting resolution and guidance on
medical care and preventive medicine issues for EPW in accordance
with the GWS. No clear guidance was given by higher headquarters
on how the US forces and the 800th were to comply with Geneva Convention medical standards for EPWs.\textsuperscript{42} Subsequently, the Brigade Staff Judge Advocate gave a legal opinion that stated that EPWs would receive essentially the same care that U.S. forces received. Consequently, going into the Desert Storm air campaign, the Commander of the 800th realized that he did not have adequate support to provide medical, surgical, or dental care for the large number of projected captives, but that he would have to make do with what he had while continuing to raise a red flag for more support.

Military Intelligence and Psychological Operations In Support of Operation Desert Storm

During the planning phase, prior to Desert Storm, the 800th MP Bde (PW) coordinated with the ARCENT G-2 for counterintelligence (CI) support for its four camps. The ARCENT G-2 in turn tasked the 513th MI Bde, the unit with the theater CI responsibility, to support the 800th. This support never materialized because the 513th did not have enough CI assets in theater to cover all of its requirements, and the in-theater assets were committed to higher priority requirements. To counter this deficiency, the 800th G-2 Section coordinated with the Saudi police to establish liaison between the camps’ S-2 sections and the local police in Hafar Al Batin and Al Sarrar. Subsequently, the coordination was initiated and cooperation and support was obtained. Throughout the period between 1 January and the conclusion of their operations, MP camp commanders consistently received timely intelligence summaries from the local civil
police officials. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, there were no known terrorist threats reported against the camps.43

Although the 800th did not receive CI support from the 513th MI Bde, it did receive MI IPW support from the Brigade’s Alpha Company, 202nd MI Battalion. This unit established two joint interrogation facilities (JIFs) to support the four camps. By MI doctrine, the JIF is located within the immediate vicinity of the theater EPW camp(s). This definition is ambiguous, and prior to the establishment of the two JIFs, it appears that very little if any coordination was made between the 800th G-2/G-3 sections and the commander of the 202nd MI Company to clarify this definition and to build a consensus and establish an agreement on where to locate the JIFs to compensate for their lack of organic security. As a result of this lack of coordination, the JIF in the east physically positioned itself between the 401st and 403rd camps because neither of the camp commanders reserved space inside their camps for this facility. In the west, the JIF was located within the perimeter of the 301st MP Camp. From a security perspective, the latter position is much better and preferable. It reduces the escort guard requirements and keeps the movement of the EPWs to a minimum while increasing the facility’s security posture by placing it behind two levels of security, i.e. the guard companies securing the camp’s perimeter and the guard companies securing the compounds and enclosures inside the camp. Additionally, the two organizations did not coordinate and agree on the process and procedures the JIF personnel would use to
identify, move, interrogate, and isolate EPWs, and the guard and security support the 800th would have to provide the two facilities.

During its planning for Desert Storm, the 800th also coordinated through the ARCENT and FORSCOM Provost Marshals for the activation of the brigade's CAPSTONE aligned, direct support PSYOP Battalion, the 13th PSYOP Battalion (POB) (EPW/CI) from St. Paul, Minnesota. When the 800th was alerted and activated, the 13th POB should have been alerted at the same; however, this did not happen so the 800th had to play catch up ball in the PSYOP arena. On 27 December, the 13th POB was alerted, activated, and ordered to SWA. On 31 December, 32 of the unit's 142 personnel left St. Paul for Ft. Bragg. Subsequently, the unit arrived at Pope Air Force Base and Ft. Bragg, completed its SOF validation, and deployed 30 out of the original 32 people to Saudi Arabia. Two personnel were unable to meet the validation and remained behind. Shortly thereafter, two volunteers were found, and they too deployed with the battalion to Saudi.

On 15 January, the 13th arrived in Dhahran and immediately deployed to its wartime location which was a block away from the 800th's headquarters in Al Khobar and five hours away from its higher headquarters, the 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne), in Riyadh. Upon arriving in the theater, the 13th began preparing to send a five man EPW PSYOP Support Team to each of the 800th's four camps as they were being built. "In each team, either the team leader or NCOIC had worked with the 800th MP Bde on training exercises in the past.
and was knowledgeable of EPW camp operations. Additionally, one or more of the five soldiers from the 13th POB were qualified interrogators." However, because of the unit's European orientation, only one soldier spoke Arabic. During this period, each five man team was augmented by a five man loudspeaker team from the 338th MI Detachment and three to five Arabic speaking Saudi and Kuwaiti interpreters from the host nation government and some of the 15 interrogators that the 800th gave the battalion. The missions of these fully augmented teams were to: conduct an EPW Pacification Program, keep the prisoners responsive to MP authority, act as a force multiplier for the MPs, and advise the MP camp commanders on the psychological impacts of their actions. Additionally, the battalion started purchasing the requisite equipment (generators, loudspeakers, and video cameras) to support the PW camps from the local civilian economy. About a week later after the teams were adequately manned and equipped, the four teams in DS of the 800th's camps relocated to their respective locations and began to settle into their new homes. During this integration period, the teams got to understand and operate with their camp's staff, to help the MP build their camp, and to start working as a staff element of the camp headquarters. Subsequently, on 17 February, the last of the battalion's operational elements, the fifth team, commanded by CPT John Young, deployed to Al Kibrit to work at the MARCENT corps EPW holding facility.
Dislocated Civilians and EPWs, A Bomb Waiting to Explode

In the Gulf War, the DC/EPW missions were combined. Contrary to Army doctrine, "the ARCENT Provost Marshal assumed the DC mission, with the tacit consent of the ARCENT G-5, as well as the EPW mission, placing DC’s under MP authority and control." As a result of this decision, VII Corps and the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters tasked organized CA units like the 360th CA Brigade supporting the XVIII Airborne Corps and its subordinate units, the 450th Civil Affairs Company (CAC)(-) supporting the 82nd, the 489th CAC supporting the 101st, the 422nd CAC supporting the 24th ID and others to assist their division MP with their battlefield circulation control and EPW missions. Although this tasking placed the CA units under the authority and control of MP units, it did very little to solve the problem of how to handle DCs, especially in Iraq. During the later planning phases of Desert Shield, the 89th MP Bde planners considered the DC issue in Kuwait and Iraq and planned logistical support for DC operations in both areas. In their staff estimates, the 89th MP Bde planners concluded that ARCENT and ARCENT and MARCENT had DC responsibilities in Iraq and Kuwait, respectively. They also concluded that in Iraq the US and its coalition allies could expect up to 25,000 DCs and that food for 100,000 people for 10 days would be required to support DC operations. For Kuwait, they concluded that no camps would be required if the occupation was benign. On the other hand, if it was a hostile occupation, the US could plan on 100,000 DCs in
camps and as a prudent cautious step, the US should be prepared for up to 60,000 or more DCs and enough rations for 100,000 people for 10 days. The MP planners working in conjunction with the ARCENT G-5 Section even developed an emergency push package of supplies for 500 DCs with three days of water and five days of food. This package was preloaded on flatbed trailers and included such items as 945 cases of bottled water, 850 kilos of rice, 450 kilos of flour, 250 bars of soap, 28 lbs. of sanitary supplies, 500 blankets, 500 towels, etc. Unfortunately, it does not appear that this planning was ever converted into any type of official tasking order. In fact, there appears to have been little if any guidance from the ARCENT PM or the ARCENT G-5 on the estimated number of DCs to be encountered, their expected origins and routes of movement, screening and questioning procedures, and how to provide them proper emergency care. Additionally, there appears to have been little if any coordination between any theater or corps CA unit and the 800th concerning the CENTCOM/ ARCENT commanders' guidance on operating DC camps separate from the EPW/CI camps. Colonel Richard C. Blount, from the ARCENT G-5 Section, in his after action comments on civil-military operations during Desert Storm stated:

We knew our obligations under international law were to provide for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population in occupied areas, including providing DC camps, if necessary. However, our guidance to the field had been to avoid creating DC camps, if possible. Our rationale in cautioning on the creation of DC camps was threefold: (1) Operating DC camps could become resource intensive and a drain on US logistical capabilities; (2) DC camps serve as magnets, and draw people who are only marginally in need, thus exacerbating the logistical problems; and (3) Camps
tend to become permanent installations, and we intended only a very temporary occupation.50

So, as the US moved toward the 15 January showdown with Saddam Hussein, it appears that planners across the board, at every headquarters echelon from division to theater, either intentionally or unintentionally, failed to take into consideration the effects the air and ground campaigns would have on the citizens of Iraq. If our civilian and military leaders and planners truly believed that the Iraqi people were just looking for an excuse to leave the suppression and oppression of their evil leader, Saddam Hussein, then when they failed to consider the possibility of a mass exodus of Iraqi citizens to US controlled territory and failed to establish specific guidelines for handling those people, they ignored a time bomb that was sitting right in front of their faces waiting to explode. Would it explode and have a devastating effect on the military operations and reputation of the US led coalition? The US and its coalition allies would not have long to wait because on the 15th, despite a furious last round of diplomatic maneuvering to head off a conflict, Saddam Hussein thumbed his nose at the U.N. and left his troops in Kuwait to feel the heat and wrath of the approaching Desert Storm.

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD BECOMES DESERT STORM

The Air Campaign

At 0200 hours, 17 January, Kuwaiti time, hundreds of coalition aircraft commenced the air campaign of Operation Desert Storm by conducting precision attacks against Saddam Hussein’s most
critical strategic assets, i.e., his airfields, air defense systems, command and control facilities, and nuclear and chemical installations. The intensity of these attacks were so great that within the first several days of combat, the allied air forces had flown over 4500 combat sorties supported by another 500 air-to-air refuelling sorties, and had achieved complete air supremacy. Over the next several weeks, thousands of additional sorties were flown to continue the destruction of Iraq’s strategic warfighting assets. The strategic phase of the air campaign would be followed by an additional three weeks of sorties for the theater and tactical phases of the campaign. After the Iraqi forces in the theater had been cut off from their C3I and logistical support structures in Iraq and the combat capability of the Republican Guards significantly reduced, the ground campaign would begin.

While the coalition air forces were pounding Iraq, the 14th and 16th MP Brigades were heavily committed performing battlefield circulation control and area security missions in their assigned AOs. They were also busy building their initial corps main and temporary EPW holding areas and still coordinating for dedicated backhaul transportation for EPW evacuation operations. MP units from both brigades also began receiving, processing, holding, and evacuating EPWs captured as a result of the air campaign’s effects on the Iraqi front line forces and numerous day and night combat actions, raids, feints, and demonstrations throughout the theater.
The first EPWs captured by either the US or our non-Arab allies during Operation Desert Storm were captured by the 3d ACR during its move to the west. On the afternoon of 24 January, the 3d Platoon, I Troop, 3rd Squadron, one of the lead elements of the Regiment to initially close on Ash Shu‘bah, was out on a screening mission. The platoon ran into a Saudi border patrol fighting a reinforced platoon-size unit. Seeing the American Bradley fighting vehicles coming over the sand, the Saudi patrol requested immediate help. The Scouts from the 3rd Platoon were more than willing to assist their host nation counterparts. They quickly and effectively fired their 25mm chain guns into the Iraqi position, killing a number of enemy soldiers and persuading six to surrender.5

Prior to the commencement of hostilities, the 800th made an initial assessment that Iraqi soldiers would start surrendering shortly after the beginning of the air campaign. This assessment was based on a perception that many of the first line soldiers would flee their positions and cross their own lines and move south to waiting US forces. Whether or not you agree with this assumption is not important. What is of interest is that this assessment was used to predict a possible capture rate of between 2,000 and 4,000 EPW per day throughout the duration of the air campaign.53 If you extrapolate this estimate out over a 14 to 21 day air campaign, the 800th could expect to evacuate, process, intern, and ultimately transfer to the Saudis between 28,000 and 42,000 EPW before the ground campaign even started.
This possibility really concerned General Conlon for several significant reasons. First and foremost, by the end of January, the 800th had only three of its five camps in the theater, and one of those three had arrived without its equipment. Two, many of the compounds and enclosures in the two camps that were under construction at the beginning of the air campaign were not fully operational. Three, some of the 800th’s available resources were performing non-EPW missions. The equivalent of a battalion size force of three guard and two escort guard companies were still tied up performing collateral security missions. Although these missions were important, the MP units were not fully equipped to effectively perform them. Since the Brigade was already short engineers to build its camps, this diversion of critical assets severely hindered the 800th’s ability to use organic assets to complete all of the construction projects before the commencement of the ground campaign.

The actual capture rates during the air campaign were much lower than had been anticipated. Prior to G-Day, the 800th evacuated and interned less than 5000 EPWs in its camps. This low capture rate was probably a result of the total allied air superiority and extensive preparation of the battlefield by US and coalition air forces which discouraged and restricted movements south. The Iraqi soldiers were also terribly concerned and fearful about the treatment they would receive from the Americans. Throughout Desert Shield, the Iraqi government and its military leadership conducted an aggressive propaganda
campaign designed to discourage desertions, retreats, and surrenders. Debriefings of EPWs by our IPW, PSYOP, CA, and medical teams revealed that many of the Iraqi soldiers were told by their superiors that if they were captured by the American infidels, they would be mistreated, tortured and killed. 

During the air war, when the flow of EPWs from the divisions was slow, MP throughout the theater learned the intricacies of a forgotten trade, a job many of them had never performed at any time, except on FTXs/CPXs when the EPW scenarios were limited, unchallenging, and unimaginative. Emphasis during this period was placed on executing the Army's doctrine for handling and caring for EPWs.

On 29 January, General Conlon and several members of his staff witnessed the first of many international transfers of custody of US/non-Arab captured prisoners to the Saudi military police forces operating the three Saudi EPW facilities. This first transfer occurred at Camp Site #1, which was the Saudi camp in the west, near the city of Hafer Al Batin. During the conduct of this exchange, Brigadier General Othman Al-Beebe, the commander of the camp, gave General Conlon a detailed briefing on the activities conducted in the camp and a complete tour of the camp and its facilities. In a letter written to Major General Hatem Al Okasi, the Commander of the KSA Enemy Prisoner of War Facilities, on 6 February, General Conlon described his visit as "a truly magnificent experience. The cooperation between each nation's representatives was an experience that warmed the
Later, commenting on the conditions of the Saudi camp and the Iraqi prisoners being held by the HN, he wrote, "The facility was exceptionally clean, well lit and ventilated. All enemy prisoners of war... appeared to be in good health and to be receiving treatment that met or exceeded the international standards."

For the remainder of the air campaign, MP units throughout the theater continued to perform their doctrinal battlefield missions and fine tuning their preparations for the impending ground campaign, while continuing to process a limited number of EPWs.

Rolling Thunder and Steel: the 100 Hour Ground War

At 0400 hours Kuwaiti time, on Sunday, 24 February, Operation Desert Sabre, the ground campaign of Operation Desert Storm, began. Within hours, across the front, from the Marines in the east to the French and the 82nd in the west, US and coalition ground forces were achieving almost unbelievable success. Units were over running a number of deserted positions with tanks, artillery pieces, and other items left undisturbed. After 38 days of almost continuous bombing and faced with thousands of combat vehicles stretched for miles and miles across flat barren desert and speeding toward their positions, the largest army in the world began to crumble. Many soldiers chose to fight and surrender; many more just chose to surrender without resisting.

In the east, Task Force Taro’s actions in the early morning hours are representative of the Marines’ experiences on the first day. Task Force Taro led the assault of the 1st MarDiv into Ku-
wait. At 0400, the Task Force advanced forward; breached a field of antitank, anti-personnel and chemical mines mingled between two lines of single-strand barbed wire on either side; met dug-in resistance, fought a short engagement, killing Iraqi soldiers and destroying their equipment; and took 3,000 prisoners in the battle. 58

In order to handle their EPWs, the Marines had initially decided to establish one corps level EPW holding facility at Al Kibrit, which was about 10-20 miles south of the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions. Later, when General Schwarzkopf ordered all US forces to move further to the west, the Marines decided to establish a second facility in the vicinity of Al Khanjar, which was 60 miles northwest of Al Kibrit and 5-15 miles south of the ground combat elements (GCEs). This facility acted as a temporary site to collect EPWs from the two Marine Divisions before evacuating them to Al Kibrit. 59

Since the Marine Corps does not have any EPW unique units in their active or reserve force structure, division and corps level service support groups are responsible for accomplishing the EPW mission using existing resources. During Desert Storm, the 1st Force Service Support Group (FSSG)(FWD) from Barstow, California, under the command of LTC Hock Spenser, was tasked to establish and operate the two EPW holding facilities and to evacuate the EPWs from the divisions to the corps holding facility where the prisoners would be turned over to Army MP escort guards from the 800th MP Brigade (PW).
From the early hours of the 24th, it soon became obvious that the EPWs were going to present the 1st FSSG with a major challenge. LTC Spenser's marines had planned and prepared well for their mission. They could and would handle the smooth flow of EPWs through the system. Transportation assets had been identified to evacuate the prisoners out of the combat area, and food and water had been pre-positioned forward to assist in the care of the prisoners. Unfortunately, like so many other Marine and Army units on the battlefield that day and for many more to follow, the marines of the 1st FSSG were not totally prepared to handle the large numbers of EPWs that flooded the system. The marines were overwhelmed. Although a lot of effort had gone into preparing logistical support for the EPWs, there were shortages across the board because of the massive numbers of prisoners that quickly accumulated in the holding areas. "At one time as many as 8,000 EPWs were assembled in one location." During the air campaign, the Marines had concentrated on following the doctrine and accomplishing the fives Ss (search, segregate, silence, safeguard, and speed) and capitalizing on the intelligence gained from IPW exploitation, but soon after the early hours of G-Day the emphasis shifted to providing the prisoners food and water and transportation to the rear as fast as possible. To handle the mass of prisoners, some units used their own MREs to feed the prisoners. Every type of vehicle imaginable, i.e., buses, tractor trailer trucks with CONEX containers on the flatbeds, 5 ton and 2-1/2 ton medium cargo trucks, and others were used to
backhaul EPWs to the holding facilities. Drivers from everywhere, regardless of their qualifications, were pressed into service. On one occasion, a general’s aide who was unfortunate enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time was drafted into service to lead a convoy of vehicles transporting prisoners to the main EPW holding facility. Subsequently, these EPWs and close to 17,000 more that were captured by the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions over a two week period were processed at the corps holding facility and evacuated to the 800th’s two camps at the Bronx. (Figure 7 lists the total number of EPWs captured and processed by the Marines during the ground campaign of Desert Storm.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EPW FLOW</th>
<th>25 FEB</th>
<th>26 FEB</th>
<th>27 FEB</th>
<th>28 FEB</th>
<th>1 MAR</th>
<th>2 MAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Processed</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>8,473</td>
<td>14,447</td>
<td>16,710</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EPW FLOW</th>
<th>3 MAR</th>
<th>4 MAR</th>
<th>5 MAR</th>
<th>6 MAR</th>
<th>7 MAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Processed</td>
<td>18,977</td>
<td>19,171</td>
<td>19,171</td>
<td>19,171</td>
<td>19,171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7
TOTAL EPWs CAPTURED AND PROCESSED BY MARCENT DURING DESERT STORM

In the west, the lead elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps, the French 6th Division and the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, crossed the LD at 0400 and began the second of the day’s supporting attacks. By 0900, because of the overwhelming success of the Marines in the east, General Schwarzkopf decided to move the remainder of the first day’s attack up. Subsequently, ARCENT gave the XVIIIth a warning order to be prepared to
have the 24th ID(M) and the 3d ACR ready to cross their LD at 1200. By noon, after rolling over the steep escarpment that defined the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and pushing through limited opposition and capturing about 700 EPWs, the 6th Division was approaching its first major objective (Objective Rochambeau), the dug-in Iraqi communications complex. After several hours of fighting, without any friendly casualties, the Division secured the objective and captured another 400 EPW. From there the 6th Division continued to drive toward its next major objective, the Al Salman Airbase. By the end of the day, the biggest surprise was the high number of prisoners taken. Almost 2,000 enemy soldiers surrendered to the 6th and 82nd Divisions; many surrendered without even a fight! Colonel Ron Roskoz, the Commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd, summarized the disbelief of many of the soldiers who fought that day when he said, "It’s the most incredible thing I’ve ever seen. Every soldier I saw surrendered. We could have gone a lot further except we had so many POWs." 63

EPWs captured by the French were field processed by French soldiers and evacuated to the French EPW cage which was collocated with the XVIII Airborne Corps’ main EPW holding facility which was located several miles from the city of Rafha. After further processing, all prisoners, to include those of special interest who were interrogated by the French CI/IPW teams, were transferred to the custody of the 503d MP Bn which was operating the corps main EPW holding facility. EPWs captured by the para-
troopers of the 2nd Brigade were field processed and turned over to the Brigade’s DS MP platoon. This platoon in turn evacuated the prisoners back to one of several pre-designated phase lines where they turned the EPWs over to Team EPW which was attached to the lead battalion of the follow-on brigade. Team EPW was a plan and a team that was developed by the Division Provost Marshal’s Office to process and evacuate EPW captured on the move. It was used very effectively in Operation Just Cause. Team EPW was a task force consisting of three MP teams (in-processing, security, and evacuation), members of the Division Band, a PSYOP team from the 4th PSYOP Group (ABN), CI/IPW personnel from the 313th MI BN, two 5 soldier CA teams from the 450th CA Company, and a medical team from the 307th Medical Battalion. This force was a self-sufficient force that was designed to relieve the lead brigade commander of the responsibility for the EPWs his units captured as far forward in the combat zone and as quickly as possible. Team EPW was specifically designed to handle up to 500 prisoners simultaneously at two different locations, if required. Due to the rapid tempo of the advance during Desert Storm, the security teams went directly to the brigade’s points of capture and assumed custody and control at that location and time. From there, after processing, the EPW were evacuated by the MP Evacuation Team to the Corps main EPW holding facility. Initially, EPWs were evacuated to the rear in commercial buses, driven by MP, that accompanied Team EPW on the battlefield. However, later as the 6th and 82nd Divisions drove deeper into Iraq, the dis-
tance between the capturing units and the corps cage was far too
great and the MSRs too rough for the buses to transit. Normally,
in this situation, the 503d MP Bn would have relocated the main
EPW holding facility closer to As Salman Airbase as the Divisions
pushed forward, but the tempo was too fast and the buses could
not make it over the rough terrain. The Battalion would not be
able to relocate and start operations before the war would be
over. Additionally, the temporary EPW holding area the 503rd
established at As Salman was being bypassed by the divisions. To
compensate for this deficiency and to speed up the 82nd’s evacua-
tion of the EPWs, the Division PM, LTC David Patton, requested
CH-47 helicopter support. Due to the criticality of the
situation, the request was approved, and CH-47s were diverted
from other missions to move prisoners to the rear. The 24th
Division also began to use helicopters to evacuate its EPWs from
the forward combat zone. The aviation support provided was
singularly outstanding and proved to be the right type of
transportation for a rapid attack across barren desert terrain.
According to LTC Patton, in the four days of the ground war, the
division military police, with some corps augmentation, took more
than 2,700 Iraqi prisoners without incident while moving 300
miles. When referring to his operations, he said, "Our division
MPs [registered and secured] over half the EPWs processed by
XVIII Airborne Corps using less than 5 percent of the corps’
available assets. I absolutely attribute that to planning and
division support." (See Appendix B for more information on the
As the XVIII Airborne Corps began its supporting attack in the west early February 24, the main attack, to be conducted by the VII Corps on G+1, was moved up to G-Day. Even before the attack began, Iraqi soldiers began surrendering. Prior to LD time, the 1st Brigade of the 1st ID(M) moved up to within 3 to 5 kilometers of the LD to refuel and reposition its units for the breach. The Iraqi soldiers, who were sitting in defensive positions across the border and who had just been subjected to several days of intense shelling from B-52s, MSLRs, and cannon artillery, looked out over the desert and saw the entire 1st Brigade preparing to breach the line. As LTC Dave Marlin, Commander of the 4/37 Armor, 1st Brigade, 1st ID (M) stated:

From a high ground position on Iowa, (A phase line before the LD) just east of the actual breach site, I was able to observe the entire brigade lined up against the trench line. It was an impressive sight. The Iraqi’s must have thought so also, because they began surrendering in mass. They started out in twos and threes and then their number grew to hundreds. . . . As the front line tanks received and secured them (EPWs), A/9 engineer platoons moved forward to escort and guard them to the rear (ALOC). The engineers were the only dismounted elements we had available as we were a pure tank battalion. The EPW mission was originally intended to be a secondary mission. The engineer tasks (breaching and demolition) were their primary missions during all rehearsals. The bottom line was, we had not anticipated the large number of EPWs we were about to receive. (See figure 8 for an example of a tank battalion’s EPW collection point.)

Early in the morning of 24 February, engineers from the 7th EN Bde breached the Iraqi line. At 0538, the 1st and 2nd Brigade of the 1st ID(M) charged through lanes created by the engineers
on the Corps' right flank. As these lead units moved through the Iraqi positions, they met little or no resistance while rapidly pushing up to a line 12 kilometers deep inside Iraq. By nightfall, the ID had successfully breached about 50 percent of the enemy's obstacle belt and forward defenses, and captured several hundred enemy prisoners. Later, on the 25th, engineers from the 249th Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy) (ECB/H), which was attached to the 176th Engineer Group that was supporting the 1st ID, were ordered to turn around from their forward most positions to return to build EPW compounds along existing and planned breach lanes. These EPW holding facilities consisted of bermed quadrangles capped and subdivided by concertina wire, and were designed to hold 1,000 prisoners. (See figure 9 for a drawing of this type of holding area.) According to 1st Lieutenant Ernie Edgar, who was assigned to the battalion during the Gulf War, "the vast numbers of prisoners taken early in the assault meant that more facilities than planned had to be erected. Our three companies built three more compounds by the morning of 26 February." To the west, the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions were charging through gaps in the Iraqi lines created the night before by the 2d ACR. During the evening of 23 February, lead elements of the 2d ACR had crossed the LD and pushed more than 30 kilometers to the north. Now, on line from west to east the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions were following the 2d ACR in sector. In the center, the 1st ID continued its deliberate breach of identified Iraqi positions to enable the 1st
(UK) Armored Division to pass through the Big Red One and continue the attack to the northeast.
By the end of the first day, the allied forces had captured about 15,000 EPWs; many of those were captured by US forces. Throughout Iraq and Kuwait, myriad combat forces and division and corps MP units were beginning to feel the strain of the mass surrender as they tried to move the prisoners to the rear, out of harm’s way, as rapidly as possible. This strain would progressively increase over the next several days as the coalition forces drove deeper and deeper into Kuwait and Iraq. Monday 25 February was mostly a day of rapid movement. In the east, "to the Marines' surprise, Day 2 brought thousands of Iraqi surrenders, which at times slowed the advance. Some Iraqis were pointed to the rear and told to walk because there were not enough trucks to carry them all." The 1st Brigade of the 2nd Armored Division, which was attached to the 1st MarDiv, captured about 2,200 prisoners during one of the biggest engagements of the war, the battle for the Kuwait City Airport. In the west, the heaviest fighting of the ground war came on 26 and 27 February when the 1st British Division attacked and destroyed more than seven Iraqi divisions. By the end of the third day over 30,000 additional prisoners had turned themselves into VII Corps units scattered across the desert. On the eastern flank, the British 1st Division captured 5,000 prisoners as it relentlessly attacked Iraqi positions throughout the evening of Day 2 and all of the following day. Like the French captured EPWs, these prisoners were handled initially by the 1st UK Division EPW Force until
they were transferred to the custody of US MP escort guards from the 93rd MP Bn from the VII Corps’ 14th MP Bde. The UK EPW Force consisted of three battalions (collection, escort, and guard). The collection battalion would go forward and round up the EPWs captured by the combat units, and then turn the prisoners over to the escort battalion. This unit would subsequently evacuate the EPWs back to the division’s holding area in the VII Corps rear area. Once at the division holding area, the EPWs would be processed and protected by the guard battalion until they could be turned over to the corps escort guard MP.

Over the next 24 to 36 hours, the Republican Guard, the pride of Saddam Hussein’s army, was caught between VII Corps and the 24th Infantry Division, and given a heavy beating. By the 28th, after trying to gain a cease fire and withdraw from Kuwait without accepting the UN Security Council’s resolutions, Saddam Hussein quit. He gave up the fight and agreed to immediately withdraw all of his forces from Kuwait and accept the UN resolutions. Almost immediately, President Bush ordered a cease-fire to take effect at 0800, Kuwaiti time, exactly 100 hours from the time General Schwarzkopf had launched the ground offensive.

Military Police Experiences During Desert Storm

Between 20 January and 20 April, US, British, and French forces captured 69,822 Iraqi soldiers. (See figure 10 for a break out of these numbers by capturing powers.) During the initial phases of the 100-hour war, while the initial flow of EPWs was still slow, there were enough personnel (MP/MI, medical,
and translators), transportation assets, and logistics available to process, care for, and evacuate the first day's prisoners. However, as the number of prisoners rapidly increased, division and corps MP unit capabilities were quickly exceeded, and these units encountered significant problems in the following areas: prisoner processing, accountability of prisoner property, medical care for the wounded EPWs, and transportation support for the evacuation of prisoners to the rear.

**EPWS BY CAPTURING POWERS**
**TOTAL 69822**

![Figure 10](image)

Initially while the numbers were low and the flow of prisoners was slow, units were generally able to devote individual attention to each prisoner. At the outset of hostilities, in the divisions and corps, EPW processing followed STRESS (search, tag, report, evacuation, segregate, and safeguard). Capturing and processing units thoroughly searched EPWs for items of intel-
ligence value. Capturing units were particularly sensitized to the potential military intelligence value of every piece of paper and the potential evidentiary value of property possessed by EPW who may have been involved in the looting of Kuwait. Because translator assets were available to examine this information, capturing units confiscated, tagged, and forwarded personal property to MP/MI units for possible use later. Unfortunately, these procedures changed quickly with the influx of prisoners. According to Major David Zeigler, a Center for Army Lessons Learned Desert Storm Observer from the Military Police School,

Capturing soldiers did not tag EPWs with DA Capture Tags, nor did they tag property taken from EPWs. Eighty percent of the EPWs arrived at camps without capture tags and were not manifested. Usually capturing soldiers confiscated everything from the EPW, to include money, wallets with identification, watches, rings, officers rank insignia and protective equipment and survival equipment (helmet, protective mask, canteen, etc.). This equipment was thrown in large trash bags and delivered to EPW camps without proper accountability documentation.

As the operational tempo of the war increased and the prisoner population grew, units became overtaxed, and this process had to be modified. As LTC Dave Gross, Commander of 3/37 Armor, 2d Brigade, 1st ID stated, "We handled EPWs out of the book and it didn’t work. Processing took too long. We were moving too fast..." To alleviate this situation, detailed EPW processing was replaced by field processing. Field processing consisted of searching the individual and confiscating all weapons and items of intelligence value, allowing the prisoner to retain his personal belongings, and getting the prisoner’s rank, maybe his name, giving him a wrist band with a number, or when
the wrist bands ran out, marking the number on the prisoner's wrist with an ink pen. In VII Corps, at the 93rd MP Bn's corps holding facility, EPW processing went from logging name, rank, service number, MOS, and tagging with a corps capture number, to mere tagging with a corps capture number and total number of EPWs captured. Additionally, as the EPWs were brought into corps holding facilities, MP processing the prisoners tried to match prisoners with their personal belongings, securing each prisoner's property in a separate bag, and later giving the bag to its owner when the prisoner was evacuated to a theater camp. Although the MP were somewhat successful in reestablishing prisoner property accountability, there were some instances when prisoners did not get their property back. MP at the corps holding facility also tried to reduce the amount of time and effort spent conducting extensive medical and MI screening and MI interrogation. As the flow of EPWs increased, only those EPWs in need of immediate medical attention were identified, provided medical aid, and processed through medical channels. Those individuals with real-time intelligence potential were screened and interrogated, if required.

Another part of the processing procedures that presented some MP units problems during Desert Storm was medical support. This issue has three main subsets, i.e., the requirement to provide adequate medical care for wounded prisoners, guard the wounded prisoners as they are evacuated through medical channels, and account for all of the prisoners evacuated through the
medical system. Prior to Desert Storm, division PMs and MP brigade commanders coordinated through their respective headquarters to their medical counterparts requesting the requisite medical personnel and supplies to support their EPW operations. Although these requests met with varying degrees of success, at the beginning of the ground war, every division central collecting point, corps main EPW holding facility and theater camp had some degree of medical coverage. As the numbers of prisoners increased rapidly and flooded the system, units throughout the theater experienced a case of not having enough medical personnel to support the requirements. Reflecting back on his unit’s capture of 6,722 EPWs and the medical support they provided, Major Cook, the S3 of the 2nd Bde of the 1st ID(M) said, "We needed dedicated medical support at the battalion level. Aid stations as currently configured now can’t handle it. We had all the medics and every FSB asset and all the doctors working on nothing but EPWs." Major Dario Compaign, the Deputy Division PM, 1st ID(M), during the Gulf War, stated in his after action comments that medical support for wounded EPWs was one of his major problems. Throughout and even after hostilities, the 1st ID MP collected all classes of wounded EPWs, from those who had been provided emergency first aid by the capturing units to those who were seriously wounded and needed immediate medical attention beyond first aid. In these instances, his MP had to contact the division’s medical support units for assistance, and, at times, take the wounded prisoners to the medical facility.
During the air campaign, he had made plans with the DISCOM to have medical coverage at the division central collecting point, and he felt like that worked well. However, there were other instances, i.e., the temporary quadrangle berm EPW holding facilities built by the engineers, when medical support was needed but very difficult to obtain. In other instances like up front with the 24th ID, Chaplain (Captain) Dennis F. Bishop, who was assigned to the 547th Medical Company (Clearing) which was attached to the 41st Combat Support Hospital, stated that from G+2, for the next eleven days, his company offered aid to US soldiers and Iraqi and Kuwaiti civilians. He also stated, "The hospital treated EPWs. The Iraqi’s were very grateful for the kindness extended to them. Their wounds were being treated. They were being fed and given water. No one was interested in beating them or making them uncomfortable." The problem with this scenario is that once a wounded EPW was provided emergency medical treatment to stabilize his condition, he was suppose to be transferred to the 300th Field Hospital for additional care. Because of its remote location, the 300th was not initially utilized as intended. Consequently, wounded EPWs were transferred to many different hospitals in theater. Some of the hospital commanders did not know they were suppose to treat the EPWs, while others refused to treat any prisoners in their facilities. This situation really turned accountability into a real nightmare. On many occasions, wounded prisoners would be transported to a MTF before the capturing unit had the opportu-
nity to transfer the custody of the EPW over to the supporting MP unit. Consequently, some of these prisoners were not accounted for until an MP from the corps or the 800th MP Bde physically picked them up on the PWIS data base at the supporting hospital. This problem was further compounded when the prisoner required long-term (greater than 7 days) care at another hospital and the prisoner’s Saudi doctor would transfer the prisoner to another hospital without informing the responsible individuals. This problem was particularly bothersome when an international transfer was required. In that case, EPWs had to be transferred to the two joint US/Saudi facilities in Dhahran and KKMC. At those facilities, the patients were transferred to Saudi control which meant that the Saudi’s were responsible for guarding the prisoners. However, in many cases, the EPW continued to be cared for by US personnel. This problem was also exacerbated by the constant rotation of MP platoons through the security and processing missions at each of the hospitals and poor planning, and unclear guidance by the 800th on how to guard, process, and transfer prisoners in the hospital. This problem got to be so bad that the 800th required one of the PW camp commanders to establish a branch camp at the medical facility to clean up the problem. Two processing companies were also sent to the two hospitals. The 420th Processing Company was responsible for the hospital at KFMMC and generally did a very good job because there was a strong guard company and processing team assigned to the hospital, and they had an extremely effective liaison program.
with their Saudi counterparts. The situation was just the opposite at the hospital at KKMMC. The 431st Processing Company had this mission and was not initially well organized and experienced many problems. Some of these problems were attributed to an unusually poor guard company, a marginal processing team, and a late starting liaison affiliation.

Problems encountered included:

- movement of EPWs without guards, spreading of the guard assets over numerous facilities and wards, delays by Sausis in assigning Liaison Officers to the MODA hospital facilities, no holding/waiting area for discharged EPWs to be held until they could be transferred to KSA or to US camps, lack of medical transportation assets to move EPWs to camp hospital or other medical facilities, and after ground war was complete, the let's get home attitude set in, so get the EPWs out of MODA and other hospital facilities.

Once these problems were rectified, both hospital processing teams processed EPWs into the hospital without further difficulty. Generally, in-processing began when the processing team notified the hospital PAD and the MP guards identified the prisoner as a US captured prisoner. Subsequently, each US captured prisoner was assigned an Internment Serial Number (ISN) using the PWIS. Once the EPW’s information was verified by the 800th G-1, prisoners were transferred to Saudi custody while in the MODA hospital. From that point on, the Saudi MP from the joint security force picked up sole responsibility for the prisoner’s protection. Lastly, the transfer process could and would be slowed down by the frequent absence of the senior Saudi military officer responsible for approving and accepting the transfer.

In addition to streamlining the processing procedures and
wrestling with the stray EPWs meandering their way through the medical system, the 800th MP Bde (PW) also provided another solution to reducing the overtaxed MP units at the front. The Brigade supplemented the 14th MP Bde with a task force of a battalion and two additional companies. This enabled the 14th MP Bde to use the 800th’s task force to operate the corps main holding facility and the Brigade to move its assets forward with the corps as it pushed deeper into Iraq. It also allowed the Brigade to provide each of the divisions in VII Corps with a corps MP company, under the operational control of its parent battalion, to facilitate the evacuation of EPWs to the corps holding facilities. Although this solution provided some much needed relief, it wasn’t as effective as originally desired. The theater task force was hampered by the lack of communications and organic transportation to move its subordinate units forward in a timely manner. Additionally, placing an MP company OPCON to a division put a logistics burden on the company. It also created an operational dilemma for the division PM. As the company commander outdistanced the battalion’s support base, which is limited to start with, he had to rely on the division for life support. The division PM, in the heat of the offensive, then had to coordinate for additional support from the DISCOM, which had not planned to provide rations, fuel and maintenance support for an additional company. Most PMs would rather have the additional company attached to the division in lieu of having it supporting, but under the operational control of its parent battalion
commander who may be many miles away from the division and who can pull back the additional assets without prior notice. Attaching the company to the division solves the command and control issue, allows the DISCOM to plan effective support for the extra unit for a specified period of time, and gives the PM flexibility to operate without additional constraints. The 800th also provided another task force to the MARCENT main EPW holding facility in Al Kibrit. During the air campaign, the 800th had developed a contingency plan to provide US MP support to the 1st FSSG if the USMC capture rate exceeded the 1st FSSG's internal capabilities. This task force would consist of the 400th MP Camp, the 34th MP Bn, and up to five guard and escort guard companies. Between the 27th and the 1st of March, 1st and 2d Marine Divisions captured over 13,500 EPWs. Most of these prisoners were dehydrated, in need of food and shelter, and threatened to breach the compound wire. The 1st FSSG called for immediate assistance, and the 800th executed its contingency plan, sending elements of the 400th MP Camp, the 34th MP Bn and the 480th and 755th Guard Companies to Al Kibrit to help the Marines. The quick action, professionalism, and tremendous flexibility of these units enabled the MP task force, with assistance from several DS CA teams, to restore order within the compound and prevent a serious disturbance.3

By far the greatest challenge to EPW operations throughout the Gulf War was the evacuation of EPWs from the front lines through the theater PW camps to the KSA PW camps. MP leaders at
all echelons found the need for dedicated transportation assets to be one of their most, if not the most, critical requirements for the successful conduct of EPW operations. At the same time, they found the support provided to their units to be totally inadequate to meet the mission requirements for transporting more than 69,000 EPWs. Current Army doctrine requires the echelon holding the prisoners that need to be moved to go through the local MCC to request backhaul transportation and then the supporting commander provides the supported commander the resources to have the prisoners moved to the rear. Despite this fact and the numerous times when this issue was addressed, logicians from brigades to the 22d SUPCOM ignored their responsibilities. In VII Corps, the 2nd COSCOM initially refused to coordinate for the use of available backhaul transportation, and asserted that the MP should road march the prisoners to the rear using organic vehicles for logistics support. Realizing that road marching several thousand prisoners to the rear on numerous occasions during the war was not an acceptable answer, the 14th MP Bde initially did use its organic transportation assets and capturing units' assets for backhaul. It was only when the EPW numbers began to hinder operations, that general officer intervention produced transportation assets necessary for evacuation. According to the Brigade's Command After Action Report, even when the backhaul system was used, non-dedicated assets remained an erratic, situational dependent solution to the problem. On several occasions, MP from the 14th MP Bde commandeered empty
convoys which were heading south toward the corps cages. Additionally, despite an agreement between General Conlon and Colonel Pomager that the 800th would provide transportation assets for movements from the corps to the theater camps, it did not happen! The EPW Cell that Colonel Pomager formed before the war to handle EPW operations frequently coordinated with the Corps and theater MCC to facilitate EPW backhaul from the corps holding facility to the theater camps. Problems were also encountered with the commercial buses that the SUPCOM provided the corps and the 800th. The procurement of contract commercial buses as a viable substitution for backhaul transportation was poorly handled by the logisticians and the contracting officers because they obtained a large fleet of commercial buses without a supporting maintenance and spare parts package. Consequently, after several weeks of continuous 24 hour a day operation over rough roads, without the proper maintenance, the number of fully operational buses quickly dropped and in some instances directly impacted on the ability of the 800th to conduct scheduled and short notice international transfers with the Saudis. In order to meet the transfer requirements, the 800th had to shift bus assets back and forth from the east and west camps to get enough operational buses to meet the transfer requirements of one camp and transport the prisoners to the KSA camps.

Once transportation was obtained by the corps MP brigade commanders and their supporting MCCs, EPWs in groups of up to 2,000 were evacuated back to the theater camps for official
accountability, internment, transfer to the Saudis, and ultimately repatriation. Upon arriving at the theater camps, the prisoners were immediately taken off the vehicles and placed directly into compounds where they were given water, food, and a safe and secure environment. From these areas, the prisoners were moved to long term compounds in other enclosures. This procedure was routinely used to secure and control the prisoners with minimal risk to the guard force. Subsequently, each prisoner went through the PW camp’s in-processing line and stations. Before Operation Desert Storm began the CINC had established a policy that required all EPWs to be turned over to Saudi control within 72 hours of capture. In order to accomplish this objective, General Conlon established a goal of processing 500 EPWs per camp per day. In the early days of the air campaign and the early hours of the ground war, the two operational camps were able to meet the CINC’s objective, but it was taking the processing companies too long to do the job! Consequently, General Conlon increased the processing goal from 500 to 1500 per camp per day and directed the camp commanders to review their processing line and the procedures used therein to find ways to streamline the process so the Brigade could meet the new objective. In the 301st MP Camp, the camp commander used 125 personnel from seven different units to completely in-process between 5-10 captives in 45 minutes. (See figure 11 for the number of EPWs processed by each PW camp). In the beginning, in-processing included these stations: -rip search; proper-ty
Figure 11
record; banding; medical examination/delousing, and showering; fingerprint/ID-Photo; supply issuance; enrollment in the PWIS data base, and an interview with the ICRC. After receiving the brigade commander's guidance and his increased objective, the camp commander and his staff set out to find solutions to the dilemma. First, they coordinated with the camp's DS PSYOP Team for the PSYOP Team to use their MSQ-85 B multi-media van complex to video-tape the various steps in the in-processing procedures. Once this video was completed and assessed, the camp commander initiated some shortcuts that enabled his personnel to cut the processing time from 45 minutes per individual to 10 minutes per person. The shortcuts that were instituted included: EPWs keep their property, no shower during in-processing, financial activity was suspended, only the thumbprint was fingerprinted, only essential data was included in PWIS, and the cadre screened the printed DA Form 4237. The second step taken to
improve the efficiency of the operation was to conduct in- and out-processing simultaneously. Like his counterparts in the other camps, the 301st Camp Commander's personnel used laptop computers to record the data. This was the first time in the history of the Army that computers were used to conduct EPW in-processing. Going into the war, the expectations for this system were high, but its capabilities were really untested. The system was designed to go into a European type environment where there was a built-in, modern, stand alone communications network that would provide the theater PWIC the necessary analog data links to receive information from its subordinate processing companies and enable it to subsequently retransmit that information back to the National PWIC in Washington. This was the first real combat test for the system, especially in a harsh desert environment. In his after action report of Desert Storm, General Conlon would ultimately classify EPW processing in the camps a proven success for his processing units and the PWIS II system. However, there were some problems that significantly hindered the 800th's in-processing operations. The main problem centered around the restrictive identification requirements dictated by the software program in PWIS-2. The software program would only allow the computer operator to enter three names in the data base. According to the Arab-Islamic custom, it is not unusual for an individual to have four or more names, and the order of the names do not parallel the order of American or western culture names. Consequently, it was difficult deciding which of the EPW's names
to eliminate while ensuring complete individual identification, and it was hard to access names out of the data base. As the prisoner populations in the camps grew, the system had problems handling the large data base. The computers used to enter the PWIS data operate in a stand-alone mode, and processing routinely had to be stopped to consolidate information from the laptop computers that were being used to in-process the prisoners. As the data base grew, it took longer and longer to query information. Transfers of EPWs on the system did not work when the camp capacity exceeded 17,000 records, because the data base exceeded the storage capability of the machines. There were other technical difficulties that seriously hampered the operations, but they are too numerous to discuss at this time. Suffice it to say that the process was extremely time consuming and inefficient compared to today's expectations and standards of performance. One other problem that does need to be addressed now is the manner in which the data was retransmitted back to the National PWIC (NPWIC) in Washington. Because the PW camps were located in barren desert locations away from any two-wire analog signal for use with a dial-up modem, the PWIS data files had to be physically transported from each camp by courier to the theater PWIC in Riyadh where the data would be transmitted to Washington over data link using the SUPCOM's DDN line. As the capture rates and the prisoner populations increased, the volume of traffic eliminated this as a viable solution to information transfer. As a result of this major deficiency, arrangements
were made to ship the data files to the NPWIC by air out of Bahrain, causing a delay in the transmittal of EPW personnel records to the NPWIC and the ICRC. As a short term fix at the camp level and to speed up the processing time, the camp commanders purchased additional laptop computers and trained additional computer operators to allow them to expand their operations to accommodate a 24 hour a day processing schedule. They also received assistance from a Military Police Military Information System (MPMIS) Team, led by LTC Mack Yassey, from the NPWIC in Washington that enabled the operators to bypass time consuming steps in the PWIS-2 software.

After in-processing, the EPWs were given blankets, a sleeping mat which also served as a prayer mat, and assigned a place in a tent. The 4x4 tents initially used were determined to be inadequate because they could only hold six to eight EPWs. These tents were replaced by 10x20 tents that could house many more prisoners. Once assigned a spot in a tent, the EPWs stayed in their compounds where they remained basically in a static posture until they were prepared for out-processing and repatriation. Because of the short duration of the war and the CINC's guidance for a rapid international transfer, the prisoners generally stood around waiting for the next meals. Unlike other conflicts of longer duration, few EPW work details or sporting events were organized to help the prisoners pass the time away, and EPW canteens were not established to allow the prisoners to purchase health and welfare items. Exceptions to this general
statement included the PSYOP EPW Pacification Campaign and the wounded or sick who were transported to and from the aid station and those prisoners being interrogated by the JIF MI IPW personnel. Otherwise individual movement was restricted to the compounds. To compensate for the lack of canteens, the KSA assumed financial responsibility for the prisoners and provided comfort packs, cigarettes and toilet articles to the prisoners, at no cost to the prisoners, until they could be transferred to the KSA.95

Overall, the relationship between the camp staff and the JIF personnel was pretty good; however, at times there were disagreements, especially with JIF East, over internal operating procedures, i.e., the JIF policy of blindfolding and handcuffing EPW during transport to the JIF which violated a directive put out by the PW Brigade Commander that explicitly prohibited the use of blindfolds and handcuffs. An additional source of irritation was the constant bickering over the requisite security for the JIF. Once again this problem was predominantly with the JIF East because it was located between the two camps and required a security commitment almost three times the size of the commitment in the west.96

The PSYOP EPW Education Campaign was particularly helpful in reducing the concerns and frustrations of the prisoners and also in providing them some small source of recreation, while at the same time accomplishing the PSYOP objective. According to CPT Sanderson C. Prescott, a member of one of the PSYOP teams from...
the 13th POB that conducted this campaign, team members used a man-packed loudspeaker system and locally procured mosque speaker systems to broadcast audio recordings throughout the camp. Music and news from a PSYOP radio station, EPW camp rules, and in-processing station procedures were also disseminated over these systems. Another very vital part of this campaign was the printed media. Myriad signs, posters, informational sheets, and camp newspapers were all printed in Arabic and distributed in all of the camps. A real big winner with the prisoners and a very good source of leverage for the PSYOP teams was the MSQ-85B multi-media complex that was used to show big-screen entertainment videos to the prisoners.9 Throughout the entire duration of the war and in the conflict termination phase afterwards, the PSYOP teams in direct support of MP units in the combat zone as well as in support of the 800th did a super job! They were particularly helpful in reducing confrontations stemming from the differences and misunderstandings over culture, customs, religious practices, and dietary habits. Between 20 January when the 800th received its first prisoner and 20 April, the units of the Brigade, and for that matter all of the MP units in theater involved in EPW operations, processed in excess of 69,000 EPWs without one serious incident. The one time when a situation could have quickly deteriorated into a major riot, a disturbance over the distribution of food, PSYOP teams from the 13th POB, augmented by Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti interpreters, quickly responded with the MP Quick Reaction Force and played a major
role in regaining control of the situation. Two other areas where the PSYOP teams really earned their money were their relationships and credibility with the prisoners and their relationship with the camp commanders. Regardless of the time of day, the members of the teams had the complete freedom to move throughout the compounds and enclosures to communicate with the prisoners. Over time this enabled the team members to develop the trust and confidence of the prisoners. Building on this relationship, the team members gained valuable insight into how the camp staff, policies and procedures were impacting on the prisoner population. With this in hand, they went to the camp commanders, gained immediate access to the main decision makers and voiced their concerns about the psychological impacts of camp policies, procedures, rules, etc. In the end, although they were small in numbers, the PSYOP teams proved to be a very valuable member of the MP EPW team and a true combat multiplier for the camp and brigade commanders.

On 29 January 1991, a little over a week after the first prisoner was captured during Desert Storm, the first 500 prisoners captured by US, British and French forces were transferred to the Saudis military at Camp Site #1, located near the city of Hafer Al Batin. According to General Conlon, this transfer was very well organized and went quite smoothly. Unfortunately all of the transfers that followed the first one did not go as well. Generally, the transfer operations were short notice missions with normally less than 12 hours to react characterized by
confusion and uncertainty. Initially, the Saudis planned on conducting transfer operations at three locations simultaneously. However, due to construction delays and overcrowded conditions, the Saudis began to alternate back and forth between all three facilities. They also seemed to have problems deciding on documentation they wanted with each transfer. Since each KSA camp developed their own SOPs, changes implemented at each camp impacted on the transfer procedures. Although you would think that the international agreement signed earlier in the conflict between the US and Saudi Arabia would have spelled out the transfer agreements, and it did in the most general terms; after the initial stages of politeness passed, each camp had the authority to control their transfer transactions. So the 800th fell prey to the personal quirks of the camp commanders and their transfer officials. Many of these changes required additional manpower and, later in the conflict termination phase, diversion of transportation assets from the camps in the east to those in the west and visa versa. Operational changes that affected the 800th camps included: three copies of the manifests instead of one, separate manifests for each bus of EPWs, and each bus having to be loaded in ISN sequence IAW the manifest numbering sequence."

Throughout the war and the conflict termination phase of Desert Storm, the ICRC visited the camps of the 800th and found all of them to be in total compliance with the GPW and the GWS. The 800th also continuously worked with the ICRC to resolve the
dilemma that was created when many of the Iraqi prisoners decided they did not want to return to Iraq. On 6 March the first repatriation between the Saudis and Iraqis occurred when 294 EPWs were turned over to the Iraqi Government. When the last repatriation occurred on 17 August, there were still several thousand prisoners who did not want to return to Iraq. This issue and the final repatriation figures would be actions that elements of the 800th and the CENTCOM and Army staffs would work for many months after the main elements of the 800th had begin their redeployments to CONUS in late April. In order to help track the final repatriation figures, three members of the 152nd PWIC remained on active duty at the unit’s armory in Moundsville, West Virginia, with all the EPW records, tapes, and other personal information, after the unit was released from active duty on 13 June. Over the next four months, this group of individuals verified the EPW data base, documented the repatriation process, and worked with the ICRC to resolve the number of cases of unaccounted EPWs. As of the middle of October, this team officially closed the books on the 800th Military Police Brigade’s involvement with EPW operations in Desert Storm when it reduced the number of accounted for prisoners to 316 and turned the project over to the Security, Force Protection, and Law Enforcement Division of ODCSOPS.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Gulf War was a spectacular show of the will of the American People to rally behind their President to support a just
and worthwhile cause, the political power of a coalition force acting under the auspices of the United Nations, and the special and unique characteristics and challenges of fighting with coalition forces. It also demonstrated the sophistication and awesome power of the highly trained, well motivated and professionally led US Armed Forces. In less than eight months, the Armed Forces of the United States deployed two corps with seven combat divisions, one marine expeditionary force with two heavy divisions; thousands of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces; and hundreds of ships, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft; and over 500,000 airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines to a friendly country without any host nation support agreements in place. Once deployed, US forces linked up with coalition allies; planned and executed a series of defensive operations to defend the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from attack; and when the time was right aggressively executed exceptional air, land, and sea campaign plans that resulted in the rapid and almost complete destruction of the 4th largest army in the world.

EPW operations during the Persian Gulf War were no less sensational. In less than 40 days of air combat and the 100 hours of the ground war and the conflict termination phase of Desert Storm, US, British and French forces captured, evacuated, and provided security and comfort for over 69,000 EPWs. Our Arab-Islamic Allies were responsible for another 25,000 prisoners.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, over 17,000
AC and RC military police men and women from four brigades, 22 battalions, and 100 companies, detachments, and teams either actively supported or aggressively conducted EPW operations. These forces went as far forward in the combat zone as possible and prudent to receive EPWs from the capturing forces. They escorted the wounded and sick to the supporting MTFs, and evacuated the remaining prisoners to a safe, secure and healthy environment. They also protected the captives until the prisoners could be transferred to the Saudi Government. This total force of AC and RC military police personnel did this all without any loss of life, any significant incidents of misconduct, or serious disruptions to the normal operation of the EPW collecting points, holding areas and facilities and the theater camps, and hospital detachments.

The great lesson coming out of Desert Shield and Desert Storm is the same lesson that many commanders like the author have known for a long time. People make the difference! As General George S. Patton once said, "Wars maybe fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and of the man who leads that gains the victory." 100 Active and reserve component MP soldiers who were highly trained, well motivated, and led by a professional corps of officers and NCOs successfully conducted EPW operations in support of the combat forces and contributed immeasurably to the overwhelming victory in the desert. From the lowest private assigned to the platoon in direct support of the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry
Division (Mech) as it punched through the Iraqi border defenses west of the Wadi Al Batin to the youngest corporal performing escort guard duty with the lead jump team of the 82nd’s Team EPW receiving prisoners from the 1st Brigade’s DS platoon outside A Salman, military police men and women made it happen. From the lonely tower guard in the Bronx looking out over 10,000 scared, hungry, and apprehensive Iraqi prisoners to the camp XO who along with the 800th’s G4 got enough materials in the later stages of Desert Shield to begin building the first PW camp in theater, MP officers, NCOs and young soldiers displayed the technical and tactical proficiency, initiative, and flexibility required to overcome the myriad logistical and operational obstacles they faced during Desert Shield. Special recognition should be given to those officers and NCOs on the FORSCOM, CENTCOM, and ARCENT PM staffs who continuously and consistently worked the EPW operational requirements from the early days of Operation Desert Shield to several months after the last US MP soldiers had left Saudia Arabia and Kuwait. Additionally, special recognition should be given the 800th Military Police Brigade (PW) whose officers, NCOs, and young soldiers, despite arriving in the theater on the end of the Desert Shield deployments, in some cases without their equipment, overcame equipment shortages; transportation, logistical, and medical shortfalls; and apathetic and unsupportive personnel from myriad support agencies; and performed their theater EPW missions in a singularly outstanding manner! In preparation for future
conflicts, the Army should not expect to have the same long, inordinate amount of lead time it had during Operation Desert Shield to build up its forces, to include the EPW force structure which is made up of predominately Army Reserve and National Guard units. Consequently, the Army’s combat CINCs must ensure that a small percentage of these units are moved up to a higher priority on their theater’s TPFDL to ensure that sufficient MP forces are on the ground at the commencement of hostilities to conduct EPW operations and to prevent the diversion of critical combat forces or scare CSS units to conduct these operations. EPW operations were also extremely successful because there were a lot of hard working, professional competent CA, PSYOP, MI, and EN personnel and myriad local level logisticians who went out of there way to do a truly superb job supporting EPW operations. It truly was a team effort that enabled the Army to achieve the great success it did.

The success of these soldiers can be directly attributed to the Army’s outstanding resident and non-resident professional military education courses as well as the Army’s dynamic individual and collective training program. Unit level mission essential battle focused training combined with participation in a series of challenging division, corps, and theater level CPXs and FTXs provided the MP force with the training base and confidant and competent soldiers and leaders needed to plan and execute well thought out and doctrinally correct battle plans.

While the Army’s training institutions and individual and
collective training programs provided the MP force with the tools it needed for accomplishing the MP Corps' four battlefield missions, there were some shortcomings that can be directly attributed to leadership and training failures in the academic and organizational training environments. I am specifically talking about the lack of knowledge about EPW operations and the limited degree of cooperation extended by some combat commanders and many of the theater's senior logisticians. Both of these shortcomings seem to indicate that little if any training on the Army's responsibilities under the provisions of the GPW and GWS is presented throughout the TRADOC Schools Community. During the preparation of this paper I wanted to canvas the TRADOC schools to determine how many hours of instruction at the officer basic and advanced courses, CAS3, and the CGSC are developed to teaching MP doctrine in a classroom environment. I also wanted to know how many schools used some type of simulation or war game scenario to reinforce the classroom instruction and stress the planning factors for conducting successful EPW operations. I regret to report that the author did not have the time to accomplish the intended survey. However, if my experiences at the Army War College can be used as a gauge to judge success or failure, then I believe the TRADOC professional military education system is not adequately addressing the issues surrounding EPW operations. During no less than three major and numerous minor war game scenarios, the only time we addressed the EPW issues involved in the scenarios was when the author initiated
the conversation. In Course 6 which is really the pinnacle of the class, we had two major scenarios and neither one of the two adequately addressed any aspect of EPW operations, or for that matter any detailed logistical considerations for the two scenarios. The second part of the educational deficiency should also be directed at TRADOC, and this deficiency addresses the inclusion of EPW play in the major division and corps BCTP training events. Conversations with the senior MP controller on the BCTP Team as well as acquaintances who have participated in these exercises indicate that the EPW play in extremely limited, if it is included in the scenarios at all. This shortcoming carries over into CPXs and FTXs. Again the author must draw on his personal experiences as an MP company commander in the 3d Armored Division, the Provost Marshal of the 2nd Infantry Division and the commander of a Theater Army MP battalion. In the two REFORGER and TEAM SPIRIT exercises and numerous division and theater level CPXs that the author participated in, EPW operations were rarely ever included in the exercise scenarios, and if they were, the incidents were unimaginative and not very challenging to the combat forces or the support structure. In order to effectively plan and execute EPW operations in the future with a smaller Army, we must do a better job than this. The academic and organizational training programs in the Army must include EPW operations in the course curriculums and the Army's premier war game simulations, respectively. Challenging, imaginative, and tasking scenarios must be built into our battle
scenarios and included in FTXs and CPXs at all levels, especially in annual JCS exercises like TEAM SPIRIT and REFORGER.

The second point well worth keeping in mind concerns the Army's current doctrine for conducting EPW operations. After reviewing existing Army EPW doctrine, the author firmly believes that we have the best doctrine that we have ever had for planning and executing EPW operations, with some reservations, and generally speaking, MP personnel throughout the theater executed EPW operations IAW the doctrine. However, during Desert Storm doctrinal shortcomings were noted in the use of backhaul transportation to evacuate prisoners to the rear; the use of MP resources to escort and guard wounded prisoners while in MTFs; the responsibility for accounting for the sick and wounded prisoners while they are in medical channels; security requirements and the physical location of the JIF; the integration of MP, MI, CA, and PSYOP personnel in a team concept to handle EPWs/CIs and DPs; and the command and control relationship of corps MP units supporting division PMs. To correct these and other noted doctrinal and equipment shortcomings noted herein and in the myriad Desert Storm After Action Reports submitted by all of the MP unit commanders and staff officers planning and executing EPW operations in Desert Storm and those non-MP units and staff personnel who supported the EPW operations, the author recommends that the US Army Military Police School do a complete scrub of the current EPW doctrine, organizational structures as well as the vehicles, communications capabilities, and EPW unique
equipment, and include the results of that scrub and all of the appropriate Desert Storm Lessons Learned in a new capstone manual on EPW operations. Specific attention should be paid to addressing the policies, techniques and procedures for conducting EPW operations, with a smaller Army with and without MP EPW functional units, in a scenario where host nation support agreements are non-existent, host nation logistical support is extremely limited, and the prisoners are hostile to the HN and the US. Additionally, the PWIS System software and hardware must be modernized to survive in an austere, rugged hot and cold environment. The system and its associated organization structure should also be included in the revised EPW doctrine. Today, its really hard to find a source document that adequately addresses the PWIS and the PWIC organizational structure.

Of all the issues that surfaced during Desert Storm the first and most important reservation concerns backhaul transportation. The Army’s current philosophy on the use of backhaul transportation to evacuate prisoners to the rear, for division and corps level operations, is clearly articulated in the outdated 1976 edition of FM 19-40 as well as the 1988 edition of FM 19-1. Nevertheless, in the VII Corps case, the 2d COSCOM commander initially refused to support requests from the 14th MP Brigade for the requisite support. For theater level operations, especially for movements from the corps holding facilities to the theater camps, the responsibility is less clear and sufficiently ambiguous to give the theater MP Bde (PW) commander and his staff
the loopholes to get around the Army's standard support philosophy of higher to lower and supporting to supported. There are two sides to this shortcoming. First, the MP School needs to take the lead and resolve the doctrinal dilemma. Second, once the doctrine is approved by the TRADOC community and the MACOM commanders and published, then senior combat commanders and logisticians should follow it or take aggressive steps to effect a change. Since this seems to have been a major concern of many of the senior logisticians in Desert Storm, the author recommends that the MP School, in conjunction with the Transportation Center and School, aggressively work to resolve this issue through workshops, conferences, and briefings, before pen is put to paper to rewrite the doctrine. Once unofficial consensus has been achieved, then rewrite the doctrine. Specific issues that must be resolved and included in the new doctrine are: dedicated versus on-call support and who is responsible for requesting and providing the support.

The second significant doctrinal issue concerns medical support for EPWs which must address security and accountability of the EPWs while they are in the medical system as well as adequate medical coverage for the camps. During Desert Storm, it was apparent to the author that the wounded or sick Iraqi soldiers received outstanding medical support from all levels of the medical support system in the theater. It was also evident that MP leaders at all levels made a concerted effort to make their medical needs known to their superiors and their supporting
medical staff officers. Some of these individuals supported the requirements while others did not. First and foremost, Army doctrine must clarify what type and how much support will be provided to the prisoner population. The author is not confident that the theater medical planners followed their own planning factors, found in FM 8-55, of 4% of the prisoner population plus a small diversion factor when determining the support requirements for up to 100,000 EPWs. Providing a medical clearing company for two EPW camps that could have held between 24,000 and 48,000 prisoners was completely unsatisfactory and indicative of a complete disregard for meeting the provisions of the GPW. Additionally, the Army needs to clarify who provides guards for prisoners while they are in the medical system. MP FMs indicate the theater commander is responsible for identifying the forces for the hospital security mission. This is different from the doctrine reflected in the 1985 edition of FM 100-16 which indicates that the MP force commander will provide hospital security for wounded or sick EPWs. If MP commanders intend to do this job in the future or are forced to do it by their commanders on a routine basis, then a conscious decision should be made to articulate that commitment in writing and let that requirement compete for the scarce MP resources just like the other major MP battlefield missions. The last issue that needs clarification is which organization is responsible for accounting for the wounded or sick prisoners while they are in the hospital. It really does not matter whether the MP or hospital staff personnel pick up the
responsibility, the important point is that everybody knows who has the responsibility to do the mission.

Additionally, there are other doctrinal, logistics and equipment related issues that surfaced during Desert Storm that really need to be addressed but because of the limited time, the author was not able to devote the attention they deserve. After the Persian Gulf War, MP leaders throughout the Corps took the time and made the effort to capture the lessons they learned during the desert victory. The author has attempted to capture many of those lessons submitted by the individuals who fought the war or were important observers to that spectacular event. Please see Appendix D for many of these contributions.

Lastly, it must be noted that the KSA paid over 80% of the costs for evacuating prisoners captured by the US and our non-Arab Allied forces, using contract commercial buses, and for building and operating the four 12,000 to 24,000 man US PW camps. We can not afford to plan on this same type of support in the future. We must have enough supplies on hand in the theater at the commencement of hostilities to handle between 2,000 and 5,000 EPW. The author believes that this could be accomplished by preparing an EPW support package that contains enough engineer materials to build a temporary EPW holding facility and a requisite amount of food, water, equipment, and medical supplies to properly care for and provide assistance to the 2,000 to 5,000 prisoners. This EPW support package could be stored in CONEX containers or MILVANs at Fort Bragg with the XVIII Airborne
Corps' 14th Military Police Brigade for contingency operations or stored at a depot available for requisition by any theater involved in combat operations. Regardless of where the EPW support package is stored, the materials and supplies contained in the package must be available as soon as possible to the MP units on the ground in the theater of war tasked with the responsibility to plan and conduct EPW operations. By having this type of support on the ground, the MP commanders could begin conducting EPW operations as soon as they hit the ground and received this package which would be delivered to the units with their organic equipment. This solution would also allow the logisticians to focus on supporting the combat commanders without having to immediately begin working EPW logistics requirements. Another very important point to keep in mind for future operations is the mentality of the Iraqi prisoner. The enemy prisoner of war that we had to contend with during Desert Storm was a prisoner whose will to resist and fight was broken and who was only concerned with food, water, rest, and cigarettes. Consequently, some prisoners were allowed to walk the battlefield until a follow-on unit could pick them up. We could never have done that in Korea or Vietnam where we had a hard core, mentally tough opponent who resisted us every step of the way. In future conflicts, we must not expect to have the HN pay for our operations nor a complacent enemy who will not threaten our rear areas. Let's not take the wrong lessons away from the Gulf War.

In conclusion, Desert Shield and Desert Storm proved to the
world that the US has the most powerful and professional military force in the world. It also demonstrated that, as the premier fighting force on the ground, we were totally committed and prepared to meet our obligations to the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of War Victims that as a capturing power we were prepared and committed to care for and protect those enemy soldiers that we captured during the course of the war. Our actions on the field of battle further demonstrated that we had a highly trained, well motivate and led professional Army. Over the next several years, the Army along with the other branches of the military will have to fight another more deadly battle. That battle will be fought in the halls of the Congress, against those Senators and individuals from the House of Representatives who are out to strip the Army and our sister services of their might. The outcome of that battle will be hard to judge, but it is for certain that we will have a much smaller Army in the future. In order for the smaller Army of the future to effectively conduct EPW operations anywhere in the world, leaders throughout the Army must resolve some of the key doctrinal issues that surfaced during Desert Storm, and the author has previously discussed. Some of those same issues were identified after the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and we repeated them again during Operations Just Cause and Urgent Fury. We must not continue to stumble down the same road that Task Force Smith took to its faithful battle at Osan. We must not strip our Army of all of the functional PW units. Ultimately, if we have to cut
the functional units out of the force structure, then the Army must reassign the EPW mission as an implied responsibility to every unit in the Army, regardless of the branch. EPW operations must be planned and included in our premier CPX/FTXs. In the meantime, we must fix our operational policies, techniques, and procedures. We also must provide our EPW units, whether they are functional or general support, with the best vehicles, communications equipment, and computer technology available that will enable them to meet the challenges of performing EPW operations in a smaller Army. The assets to do this monumental job are in place now. It can be done, if only the interest is there. Let us not repeat our experiences in the Civil War, the Korean War and in Desert Storm. Let’s take the lessons we learned from the Persian Gulf War and make a smaller but stronger Army. Let’s not have any more Koje-dos.
APPENDIX A - 89th MP BRIGADE OPLAN

During the initial stages of Operation Desert Shield, from 8 August 1990 thru 13 October 1990, the 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne), XVIII Airborne Corps, was the senior MP unit in Saudi Arabia. On 13 October, the HHC, 89th Military Police Brigade from Ft. Hood, Texas arrived at Dhahran. During the following week the 89th MP Bde began transitioning with the 16th MP Bde (ABN) to assume all EAC MP missions. Shortly thereafter, the brigade commander and his staff began developing OPLAN Theater EPW Camps, a concept for providing EPW support to the XVIII Airborne Corps and the lead elements of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, which were the only non-Arab coalition combat forces on the theater at the time. OPLAN Theater EPW Camps was designed to use the existing manpower and logistics support currently in the theater or projected to arrive in early November to handle 20,000 EPWs in the first 24 hours, 60,000 in 72 hours, and 100,000 within the first week. The 16th MP Bde (ABN), the 89th MP Bde, and the 400th MP Battalion (EPW), the 313th PWIC, and other unidentified units (UI) from the 800th MP Bde (PW) would provide the MP forces to execute this concept. The XVIII Airborne Corps' COSCOM and the 22nd SUPCOM would provide the materials to build the EPW camp(s) and the supplies
to operate them and care for the EPWs.

During the staff estimate portion of the planning process, the 89th and the ARCENT staff considered three courses of action (COA).  

a. **COA #1.** The 89th establishes an XVIII Airborne Corps, i.e., the 16th MP Bde (ABN) augments the 89th with MP forces to help guard the EPWs. Additionally, the XVIII Airborne Corps would provide the complete logistics package for operating the EPW camp.

b. **COA #2:** The 89th and the 16th MP Brigades both establish EPW camps in their respective AOs. The Corps would evacuate EPW from the brigades/divisions to the corps holding area, while the 89th, with augmentation, would evacuate the EPWs from the corps holding area to the theater EPW camp.

c. **COA #3.** MARCENT and XVIII Airborne Corps establish EPW cages to hold 4,000 and 8,000 EPWs, respectively, on the first day. The remaining 8,000 would be handled by EAC MP units at the theater EPW camps.

4. After much deliberation, it was decided that COA #3 was the best course of action because it shared the workload between the corps and theater MP assets, and it enabled the 89th to also perform limited battlefield circulation control (BCC) and area security missions in the 89th's AO. The disadvantages to this COA were: The inability of corps MP to provide BCC/area security support to the Corps; increased chances of errors in the
accountability and processing of EPWs at two separate camps, operated by different MP headquarters; the lack of in-theater augmentation; and the possibility that EPW would be held in the corps holding areas longer than usual, maybe up to 96 hours.

Despite the disadvantages to COA #3; the 89th developed an OPLAN that was divided into five phases. Phase I was the prior to hostilities phase during which the brigade would construct four 10,000 person EPWs in the vicinity of Ad Damman and MSRs Toyota and Audi. Phase II of the plan tasked the 400 MP Battalion (EPW) to establish four 10,000 person EPW camps also in the vicinity of Ad Damman and one camp adjacent to the 16th MP Bde's corps holding area and MARCENT’s corps holding area. During this phase the MP force structure would be augmented by four unidentified MP battalions. During Phase III, the 16th MP Bde would chop one MP Bn to the 89th MP Bde and that battalion with three companies would establish three additional 10,000 man EPW camps. Another MP battalion with six companies and three support packages would be required to execute this phase of the plan. The fourth phase of OPLAN Theater EPW Camps would require the 16th MP Bde to chop a second MP Battalion to the 89th MP Bde to assume the processing mission at one additional 10,000 man EPW camp. The final phase of the 89th’s concept called for the 400th MP Bn (EPW) and another UI MP Bn to operate five 10,000 man EPW camps each.116

The MP force structure the 89th MP Bde required to execute OPLAN Theater EPW Camps is found at enclosure 1.
The staff estimates for capturing, evacuating, and processing EPWs under the 89th's OPLAN Theater EPW Camps are found at enclosure 2.
SUBJECT: MP Forces Required to Execute 89th MP Bde OPLAN Theater EPW Camps (Enclosure 1)

1. Phase I (Pre-Hostilities)

89th MP Bde

| 313th PWIC Det | 716th MP Bn |
| 400th MP Bn | 977th MP Co |
| 200th MP Co | 978th MP Co |
| 290th MP Co | |
| 342nd MP Co | 720th MP Bn |
| 344th MP Co | 114th MP Co |
| 1138th MP Co | 401st MP Co |
| 400th MP Bn | |
| 200th MP Co | |
| 290th MP Co | |
| 342nd MP Co | |
| 344th MP Co | |
| 1138th MP Co | |
| 716th MP Bn | 190th MP Co |
| 977th MP Co | |
| 978th MP Co | |

2. Phase II (Up to 60,000 EPWs)

89th MP Bde

| 313th MP Det | 1st Augmentation UI Bn |
| 400th MP Bn | UI Co (Camp #1) |
| 200th MP Co | UI Co (Camp #1) |
| 290th MP Co | UI Co (Camp #2) |
| 342nd MP Co | UI Co (Camp #3) |
| 344th MP Co | UI Co (Camp #3) |
| 1138th MP Co | UI Co (Camp #4) |
| 716th MP Bn | UI Co (Camp #4) |
| 190th MP Co | |
| 977th MP Co | 3rd Augmentation UI Bn |
| 978th MP Co | UI Co (Camp #5) |
| 720th MP Bn | UI Co (Camp #5) |
| 114th MP Co | UI Co (Camp #6) |
| 401st MP Co | UI Co (Camp #6) |
| 411th MP Co | 4th Augmentation UI Bn |
| 1138th MP Co | UI Co (Escort) |
| 400th MP Bn | UI Co (Escort) |
3. Phase III (Up to 90,000 EPWs), IV and V (100,000 EPWs)

89th MP Bde

313th MP Det

1st Augmentation UI Bn
UI Co (Camp #1)
UI Co (Camp #1)
UI Co (Camp #2)
UI Co (Camp #2)

2nd Augmentation UI Bn
UI Co (Camp #3)
UI Co (Camp #3)
UI Co (Camp #4)
UI Co (Camp #4)

716th MP Bn
190th MP Co
977th MP Co
978th MP Co

3rd Augmentation UI Bn
UI Co (Camp #5)
UI Co (Camp #5)
UI Co (Camp #6)
UI Co (Camp #6)

720th MP Bn
114th MP Co
401st MP Co
411th MP Co

4th Augmentation UI Bn
UI Co (See Note)
UI Co (See Note)
UI Co (Camp #7)
UI Co (Camp #7)

UI MP Bn
372nd MP Co
UI MP Co
UI MP Co
UI MP Co (Phase IV)

5th Augmentation UI Bn
UI Co (Camp #8)
UI Co (Camp #8)
UI Co (Camp #9)
UI Co (Camp #9)

Note:
Two companies performing escort guard mission assume guard mission of Camp #10 during phases IV and V.
SUBJECT: Capture/Evacuation/Processing Estimates Used by the 89th MP Bde to Develop OPLAN Theater EPW Camps (Enclosure 2)

1. PHASE I (1st 72 hours)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capture Rates</th>
<th>DAY 1</th>
<th>DAY 2</th>
<th>DAY 3</th>
<th>DAY 4</th>
<th>DAY 5</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCENT</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative Totals: 10,000 25,000 40,000 50,000 60,000

Evacuation Rates

| Corps Cage     | 8,000 | 8,000 | 8,000 | 8,000 | 8,000 |
| Corps Holding  | 5,000 | 5,000 | 5,000 | 5,000 | 5,000 |

2. PHASE II (Theater camps to hold up to 60,000)

Theater Camps (Evacuation and processing rates)

| #1             | 0-    | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,500 |
| #2             | 0-    | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,500 |
| #3             | 0-    | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,500 |
| #4             | 0-    | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,500 |

(Processing rates for camps adjacent to holding areas)

| #5 (ADJ Corps) | 0-    | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,000 | 1,000 |
| #6 (ADJ MARCENT)| 0-    | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,000 | 2,000 |

Balance in Holding Areas

| Corps          | 0-    | 500   | 1,000 | 0-    | 0-    |
| MARCENT        | 5,000 | 2,500 | 0-    | 0-    | 0-    |

3. PHASE III and IV (Up to 100,000)

Theater Camps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#1--4 Full Day 5</th>
<th>Day 6</th>
<th>Day 7</th>
<th>Day 8</th>
<th>Day 9</th>
<th>Day 10</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#5 (Full Day 6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>#6 (Full Day 6)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7 (Full Day 10)</td>
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<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#8 (Full Day 10)</td>
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<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#9 (Full Day 10)</td>
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<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>#10 (Full Day 13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Balance in Holding Areas

| Corps          | 6,000 | 9,000 | 12,000| 12,500| 5,000  |
| MARCENT        | 4,000 | 6,500 | 7,500 | 5,000 | 2,500  |

(Balance at 0- by Day 13 and all camps full)
During planning for Desert Storm, the 82d Airborne Division Provost Marshal Office (PMO) identified a need to create a team capable of handling enemy prisoners of war captured by our lead brigades during the move to their respective sectors. A plan and team was developed to process and evacuate EPWs captured on the move. The team consisted of MPs to search, process, guard, and evacuate EPWs to the Corps Cage; a MP security element to provide local security during halts on the MSR while processing the captured soldiers; two five person CA teams with linguists, females, and loudspeaker system operators to handle civilians, refugees and dislocated civilians who might have been erroneously captured as EPWs; a field ambulance with medical specialists to treat injured EPWs; a Division Counter Intelligence/Military Intelligence (CI/MI) team with linguists to exploit EPWs for immediate intelligence value; and a command and control element to coordinate with the Division for external evacuation assets for EPWs and with the maneuver brigades to coordinate link-up and handover of EPWs to the EPW team.

The PMO’s Team EPW also included a package of supplies to meet the sustainment needs of the members of the team and to enable the team to efficiently and effectively process up to 500
captured EPWs, at a time, while continuously moving forward with the 82d’s lead brigades. Supplies in the package included bottled water and a 600 gallon water buffalo, meals-ready-to-eat (MREs), Saudi rations, 1,000 blankets, capture tags, flexi-cuffs, surgical gloves, medical and field sanitation supplies, and concertina wire, pickets and sandbags. Additionally, coordination was made with the 503d MP Bn for buses to evacuate EPWs to the Corps Cage. At one point during the war, 18 buses were included in the Team EPW convoy and were well employed shuttling EPWs from the processing site to the Corps Cage.

A few weeks prior to G-Day, the team was assembled in the tactical assembly area (TAA) and conducted intensive training and rehearsals to prepare itself for the mission. This training period was extremely beneficial in solidifying the “team concept” and enabled Team EPW members to search, process, and evacuate large numbers of EPW in relatively short periods of time, with relatively few mistakes or problems. The training culminated with the actual processing of several Iraqi EPW captured during a Division deep attack prior to G-Day.

The initial plan called for the lead brigade to evacuate all EPWs captured on the move to pre-designated phase lines along the MSRs. The brigade’s direct support MP platoon would assume control of EPWs at the phase line and await Team EPW’s movement up the MSR for the transfer of EPWs to Division control for subsequent evacuation of EPWs to the Corps Cage. The team was task organized to handle EPWs at two successive phase lines, if
warranted. However, due to the tempo of the offensive, Team EPW assumed responsibility of all EPWs directly from the lead brigades at points of capture rather than at phase lines as previously planned.

On G-Day, Team EPW received orders to deploy with the lead battalion of the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division to relieve the 6th Light French Division and 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division responsibility for guarding EPWs captured during the initial assault up MSR TEXAS. At the first halt up MSR TEXAS, Team EPW relieved 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division of 135 EPWs at the escarpment. In a matter of hours, the EPWs at this site were searched, segregated, tagged, and evacuated to the Corps Cage in Rafah. At the second site on MSR TEXAS, the 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division was relieved of 557 EPWs. These EPWs were processed and evacuated in a record time of three hours during the middle of the night enabling combat forces to resume the offensive. The 450th CA Teams attached to Team EPW assisted in processing EPWs, and they took the lead in sorting out civilians and identifying soldiers trying to pass as civilians. The few civilians who had been rounded up and placed with the EPWs by mistake were set free. "The translator services of the Kuwaiti interpreter were critically important to Team EPW, as were the special skills of the other CA team members (MP, infantry and medical). The loudspeaker system proved invaluable in helping to control EPWs."107

On G+1, Team EPW established a Central Collecting Point
vicinity Objective ROCHAMBEAU and processed and evacuated an additional 584 EPWs from elements of the 6th Light French Division and 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. Team EPW resumed movement up MSR TEXAS with the 1st Brigade and closed on the preselected site for the Division EPW Collecting Point in AA CAREY alongside MSR Virginia. At approximately 1800 hours on G+2, Team EPW was ordered to link-up with 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division for movement north toward TALLIL Airbase to relieve the 24th ID (M) of approximately 2,000 EPWs. The move took two days and a link-up was made with the 24th ID at their Division Collecting Point at a Polish Work Camp in the vicinity of TALL AL LAHM.

At approximately 0800 hours the next day, Team EPW assumed control of over 1400 EPWs. Within 30 hours, all EPWs were searched, processed, and evacuated to the Corps facility in Rafha utilizing CH-47s and buses. A major concern was mounting over the number of dislocated civilians moving to the Division EPW collecting point from An Nasriyah, the scene of recent fighting between Saddam's forces and Shiite fundamentalists. Kuwaitis, Egyptians, Syrians, and Iraqi men, women, and children began congregating outside the site knowing food, water, and safety were available. A decision was made to split the site and establish a joint Dislocated Civilians (DC)/Refugee and EPW collecting point. The Civil Affairs (CA) element attached with Team EPW, CA elements from 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, and medical specialists worked jointly with MPs to handle the influx
of DCs from outlying areas. Food, water, blankets and medical care were provided to the DCs/refugees. As Team EPW left the compound, after all the EPWs were evacuated, over 1,000 Iraqi refugees moved into the Polish Labor Camp as this was the only "hard shelter" available to them.

The creation of a mobile and self-sufficient EPW Team paid big dividends for the 82d Airborne Division. This mobile and well-tailored team, consisting of CA, MI/CI, field medical specialists and MP, augmented with 82d Airborne Division Band personnel and linguists, was able to concurrently handle EPWs and Dislocated Civilians/Refugees on the move, relieving combat forces of their responsibility to guard EPWs and handle DCs/Refugees thus enabling them to resume offensive operations without any loss in tempo. Team EPW did not drain combat power from the combat commander on the move. With the built-in security force, Team EPW handled well in excess of 1,400 EPWs at any one time alleviating the need for combat forces to guard EPW. The mobility and self-sufficiency of the team enabled the team to process 2,730 EPW over a 350 mile route without incident or problems. Going to where EPWs were collected by combat forces saved time and precious transportation resources to haul them back to a fixed site. Team EPW was disbanded once all EPWs were evacuated. It was later learned that Team EPW, consisting of around 75 personnel, processed and evacuated over half the EPWs captured by the XVII Airborne Corps.
APPENDIX C - 503RD MP BN EPW SUPPORT TO XVII AIRBORNE CORPS

From the early days of August until the middle of October, the 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne), XVIII Airborne Corps, under the command of Colonel Larry Brede, was the senior MP unit in Saudi Arabia. Soon after arriving in country, Col Brede tasked LTC Mike Sullivan, the battalion commander of the 503d Military Police Battalion, with a verbal "be prepared" mission to perform the EPW operations in support of XVIII Airborne Corps operations during Phase I and II of Operation Desert Shield, the defense of Saudi Arabia. Col Brede could not have picked a more qualified, seasoned commander than Mike Sullivan to perform this extremely sensitive mission. Although the 16th MP Bde had several MP battalions CAPSTONE aligned under the brigade for CENTCOM missions, of all the battalion commanders of those units, Mike Sullivan was the most seasoned combat commander. As MP from the 16th MP Bde (Abn) were deploying to Saudi Arabia, Mike Sullivan was beginning his second year in command. His experiences during the three years prior to the Gulf War had prepared him well for combat and the EPW mission. Throughout his many years at Ft Bragg, Mike Sullivan had travelled all over the US and many parts of the world participating in myriad XVIII Airborne Corps FTXs and CPXs. As
the Provost Marshal of the 82d Airborne Division, prior to assuming command of the 503rd MP Battalion, he had deployed his division MP company to Honduras to participate with the 7th Infantry Division in Operation Golden Pheasant. During Golden Pheasant, the 82d MP Company performed all of the MP Corps' combat missions, to EPW operations. Later, during his first year in command of the 503d, Mike Sullivan once again deployed his forces to support the XVIII Airborne Corps, this time in combat, the invasion of Panama. During Operation Just Cause, the MP under LTC Sullivan's leadership took the lead in EPW operations by supporting all of the US forces engaged in the liberation of Panama.

During the early part of Phase I of Operation Desert Shield, the 16th MP Bde developed an OPLAN for supporting the XVIII Airborne Corps in its defense of Saudi Arabia. According to this OPLAN, the 503d MP Bn would perform the corps EPW mission. The unit would set up and operate the corps EPW holding facility, and evacuate EPWs from the divisions' central EPW collecting points back to the corps holding facility. LTC Sullivan had very little time to plan for this mission. The 503d MP Bn was the only corps MP battalion on the ground in Saudi up until the middle of October, and as such, LTC Sullivan's MP were responsible for performing all of the MP missions in the corps rear area (CRA). Specifically, the unit was totally committed to conducting area security and law enforcement operations throughout the CRA and around the Ad Damman and Dhahran enclave. Additionally, the
battalion performed Corps Main and TAC CP security missions. Because the battalion was stretched to the maximum extent possible, and because no one really believed that the XVIII Airborne Corps would have to execute its OPLAN for the defense of Saudi Arabia, planning for the EPW mission mainly consisted of requesting the logistical support the battalion would need to perform its EPW mission. As a result of the 16th MP Bde’s experiences in Just Cause, while at Ft Bragg, Col Brede had his S-4 Section requisition, obtain, and package the requisite Class IV materials and supplies to construct and operate an EPW holding area capable of holding 2,000 EPWs. When the 503d deployed to Saudi Arabia, the brigade had to leave this pre-palletized deployable EPW package at Ft Bragg because at the time there was insufficient aircraft available to transport the package to the theater. Consequently, the battalion spent a considerable amount of time trying to obtain an even larger amount of supplies to support up to 24,000 EPWs.

In early November, after President Bush announced his intent to double the forces in Saudi Arabia, Col Brede told LTC Sullivan that the Brigade would start to seriously plan for the EPW mission during Operation Desert Storm. Accordingly, the situation was a very fluid one as the projected in-country force structure and the concept for Desert Storm matured. Between the beginning of November and early December when LTC Sullivan and his staff really began to plan for his EPW mission in earnest, the EPW concept of operations (CONOPS) for the Corps changed.
several times. In the end, the 503d MP Bn was tasked with three main missions. First, during Phase II of Desert Shield, the 503d would assist the Bde in moving the Corps to its forward tactical assembly areas in the vicinity of Rafha. Second, the battalion would help train the French 6th Light Armored Division EPW Force on how to doctrinally conduct EPW operations and to operate an EPW cage. After completing this mission, the battalion would be chopped to the 6th Division, but it would still remain under the operational control of the 16th MP Bde, to perform its third mission, conduct EPW operations in support of the XVIII Airborne Corps.

Throughout the month of January, the 16th MP Bde coordinated with the 400th MP Bn, 800th MP Bde (PW), in an effort to ensure the smooth flow of captured soldiers from the Corps holding area to the theater camps. Rapid evacuation from one area to the other was the primary concern. The Brigade also accepted its first EPWs on 22 January when MP from the 759th MP Battalion went forward to assume one NCO and five enlisted soldiers from the 3d ACR. These prisoners were evacuated back to the 759th’s temporary EPW holding facility at KKMC. From KKMC, the prisoners were turned over to escort guard personnel from the 400th MP Bn who evacuated the captives to the 401st MP Camp.

Meanwhile, once it had been determined that the 503d had the Corps EPW mission and would assist the French in learning the US system for handling EPWs, the French Force Commander assigned an armor officer, LTC Pierre San-Pol, to act as the liaison officer.
between the French Army and LTC Sullivan. LTC San-Pol was quite an interesting individual. He was born in Vietnam to a French father and a Vietnamese mother, and he spoke fluent Arabic. This language capability was a tremendous asset to the relationship and soon paid big dividends. One day LTC Sullivan and LTC San-Pol were out flying around the countryside looking for a possible site for the French and XVIII Airborne Corps EPW holding facilities when they flew over an old Bedouin camp that LTC Sullivan believed would make a ideal EPW facility. It had the right shape, dimensions, and high walls to facilitate the confinement of a large number of prisoners. It also appeared to have a good source of potable water. LTC Sullivan signalled to the helicopter pilot that he wanted to investigate the situation further. The helicopter pilot landed the aircraft near the camp site, and the two LTCs jumped out and went over to speak to the inhabitants. To LTC Sullivan's great surprise, LTC San Paul began speaking in fluent Arabic, energetically negotiating with the local the inhabitants. To the officers' good fortune, LTC San-Pol determined that the Bedouins would be willing to lease the facility to the military. Later, the French military obtained permission to use the camp. On 5 February, the 503d MP Bn TOC collocated with the French EPW Force at this camp site which was several miles from the city of Rafha on MSR Dodge. There the battalion began one of its most exciting missions during the entire Gulf War, training the French EPW force and coordinating with the French leadership to establish combined
US/French EPW operating procedures.

The French EPW Force was an ad hoc organization that included officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers from all occupational specialties, from all over the French force, to perform this mission. LTC Sullivan's counterpart was a French artillery officer, Major Philipe Coulon. During the early days of February, it became obvious to the 503d that the leaders of this force as well as the senior French leadership were very concerned about the EPW operation. During the '60s, while fighting in Algeria, the French Government had been criticized openly by many countries for the manner in which it handled captured Algerian prisoners. The French Government did not want a repeat of those problems. The French were also concerned about transferring French captured prisoners to US forces or the Saudis without the explicit authorization of the French Government. After considerable debate between Paris, Washington and Riyadh, the French signed an agreement with the US and the KSA that stated the French military would turn over all of its prisoners to the US MP who in turn would transfer the prisoners to the Saudis MP running the KSA camps. The French were also concerned about the accountability of their prisoners from the time the prisoner was captured until the captive was repatriated to Iraq. According to the charter from his senior leaders, the French EPW Force/Camp Commander was directly responsible to his superiors for a 100% by name accountability for every French captured EPW. LTC Sullivan tried to explain that 100% accountability may not be
possible, especially after the EPWs left the responsibility of the Corps MP. He explained how the US Army system worked and the problems the 800th would experience if a large number of prisoners were taken in short periods of time. After some deliberation, the French Deputy Commander backed off on the 100% error free standard, and acknowledged that maintaining a 100% accountability was the French Army’s goal. He knew that it would be impossible to maintain that high a degree of performance, but that was the goal he wanted his soldiers to work to accomplish.

To help facilitate the accountability and transfer process, members of the battalion staff worked with the French EPW camp staff to prepare a bilingual (US/French) transfer document and an EPW tag that closely resembled those used by US MP. While LTC Sullivan and his staff were working with the French leadership to resolve some of the operational issues, MP from the Battalion began constructing the corps holding facility. See Figure C-1 for a diagram of the XVIII Airborne Corps Main EPW Holding Facility and a description of how prisoners were processed into the holding area. In order to perform the EPW mission, LTC Sullivan had a task force in excess of 1500 soldiers, minus the French force. The 503d’s task force, Task Force Bastille, included the battalion HHD and four MP line companies, a NG CA Team from South Carolina, a NY NG escort guard company from the 800th MP Bde to escort prisoners from the corps holding area to the supporting theater PW camp, and a PSYOP Team. The Battalion was also provided, in DS, a medical clearing platoon, commanded
by LTC Roger Bruce. This platoon had two doctors and over a dozen medics, and a total strength of 24 people that could run a complete operating room with X-ray and surgery service.

The CA and PSYOP Teams were extremely beneficial throughout Desert Storm. The CA Team was used primarily as translators to help the MP communicate with the prisoners in the holding facility and to work CA issues with the local Bedouins who either owned the camp site or lived in the vicinity of the camp site. The PSYOP Team was also used as translators to assist with the in-processing of prisoners, to develop informational signs in Arabic that were positioned throughout the holding facility to
provide an explanation of the policies and procedures used in the holding facility, and to help the MP control the prisoner population during peak capture periods. The PSYOP Team was also used as a conduit of information and coordination with the Iraqi prisoners who were doctors or medics. Once these individuals were identified, they were used to help provide medical assistance to the other prisoners.

At the same time the battalion was constructing the holding area, it was also training the members of the French EPW force on US EPW doctrine. This training was right out of the Army's principle manual for EPW operations, FM 19-40. This training also included, in mid February, a dress rehearsal. The Battalion helped the French set up a mock PW camp and provided US MP as role players to conduct practical exercises in processing and evacuating EPWs from the point of capture to the international transfer between the French/US. This exercise proved to be very helpful in validating the training the French received and in working out any operational shortcomings noted during the exercise.

During the weeks prior to G-Day, LTC Sullivan developed his CONOPS for supporting the Corps. This CONOPS would enable him to operate the Corps main EPW facility near Rafha and at the same time provide support to the forward committed divisions. Under this CONOPS, the Battalion would attach one MP platoon to each of the three MASH units in the corps rear area that had been tasked to treat wounded EPWs. These platoons would provide security for
the EPWs and ensure 100% accountability of all EPWs in medical channels. The Battalion would also attach the 65th and 108th MP Companies to the 82d and 24th Divisions, respectively. As the 82d passed by As Salman on the way to its G+1 objectives, elements of the 65th MP Co would establish a temporary EPW holding area in the vicinity of Logbase Romeo to act as a way station and rest area for escort guards transporting prisoners back from the divisions. As the ground war continued to progress, the 800th MP Bde (PW) would send a unit forward to assume the responsibility for the main holding area at Rafha and the Battalion would then jump to Logbase Romeo and set up the new corps main holding facility. The 65th would then leapfrog forward again to assist the 82d. In order to accomplish the evacuation mission, LTC Sullivan would use 33 commercial buses, driven by MP drivers, to move prisoners from the divisions’ central EPW collecting points to the corps holding area. These buses would be driven in a continuous loop from the corps holding area to the divisions’ locations. As the buses arrived at a location, division MP would load prisoners on the buses and escort guards from the battalion would then take the buses back to the corps holding area. If a bus arrived at a location that did not have prisoners ready for transfer, it would continue on to the next division location. Additionally, LTC Sullivan anticipated the possibility that the committed divisions would outstrip their EPW transportation support; division and corps backhaul transportation would be non-existent; and the poor
mobility of the roads, the deeper the divisions went into Iraq, would prevent the use of the commercial buses. Consequently, he had two helicopter landing zones (LZs) marked off near the main corps EPW holding facility just in case the division PMs would be able to obtain helicopter support to evacuate their prisoners to the corps facility.

On G-Day, the 503d marshalled the Logbase Romeo force in preparation for the order to cross the LD. At G+2 this force crossed the LD, moved to As Salman, and began operating the temporary holding facility. Throughout the conduct of the ground campaign, the 503d MP Bn and the 16th MP Bde evacuated and processed 5,782 prisoners. The 5,782 EPWs included: 566 male officers, 1,675 male NCOs, 2,840 male enlisted soldiers, 53 civilian internees, 337 dislocated civilians, and 311 captives that were evacuated through medical channels.

During the process of receiving these prisoners from the committed divisions and processing and preparing them for rearward evacuation to the 800th's camps, the 503d experienced several problems. The most significant of these problem was the EPW backhaul transportation system. From the capturing units back to the theater camps, the system failed. From the early hours of G-Day through the middle of G+1, the use of commercial buses was an acceptable alternative for division and corps transportation assets. However, as the divisions moved forward over MSRs that were poor at best and the number of prisoners continued to increase, it was difficult for the capturing units
and forward deployed MP to get sufficient tactical backhaul assets to evacuate their captives back to the division. This same problem also existed in the divisions and at the corps holding facility where the division PMs and the MP battalion commander operating the corps EPW holding facility had to coordinate for corps and theater transportation assets, respectively. In the divisions, the large number of EPWs were slowing down the forward advance of the forces. As the units moved deeper into Iraq, aviation assets, CH-47s, were generally used to evacuate many prisoners from the division central collecting points straight to Rafha. "At no point during combat operations did the battalion receive any EPW from the forward divisions by vehicle (other than contract buses used by the battalion), due to the geographical distances involved. Army aircraft were the most efficient, expedient means of moving EPW to the Corps Holding Area." As a result of this action and the rapid tempo of the advance, LTC Sullivan, with approval from the brigade commander, decided not to relocate his unit to As Salman. In most instances this site was being bypassed by the divisions. At the corps holding facility, the theater had not dedicated any transportation assets to move EPWs from the corps to the theater. According to doctrine, the corps MP battalion commander is responsible for coordinating his transportation requirements. Consequently, LTC Sullivan requested assistance from the 16th MP Bde staff which in turn coordinated with the 330th Movement Control Center (MCC) for the requisite support.
Another problem that impacted on the ability of the 503d to successfully accomplish its mission was the insufficient number of translators available. The limited number of linguists provided to the Battalion were stretched thin to handle the large number of prisoners. Although they did an absolutely superb job, strength wise they were totally inadequate to handle all of the in-processing requirements at the corps holding facility and the myriad missions at each of the three EVAC hospitals that were treating wounded EPWs. The final issue that was a source of some concern for LTC Sullivan and his staff was the long time it took the French to process and turn over their captives to the corps MP. Although there was no established time limit for transferring French prisoners to the Corps, it was generally understood that the transfer would occur ASAP, but not later than 24 hours after a prisoner arrived at the French cage. In many instances this requirement was not met, and the French held their prisoners for as long as a week before turning them over to the 503d. Despite these sources of irritation, the French EPW force, the MP assigned to the 82d and 24th Divisions, and the 503d MP Bn did a super job in providing the Iraqi prisoners with rapid and effective care and protection throughout the conflict.

During the remainder of February and the middle of March, the 503d continued to operate the corps main EPW holding area and a temporary facility at As Salman. On 17 March, 1992, the 503d MP Bn was relieved of its EPW mission and it began to retrograde to its rear assembly area (RAA) for redeployment to CONUS.
APPENDIX D - LESSONS LEARNED

The MP Lessons Learned from Operation Desert Storm are contained in this appendix. Many of these observations have been forwarded to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas through either CINCCENT; HQDA ODCSOPS; HQ FORSCOM; or directly from the myriad units, MACOMs, or Army Schools and Centers whose soldiers participated in or supported Operation Desert Storm. Some of these observations were converted to the Joint Uniform Lessons Learned (JULLS) format, while others were not in any official format. In order to ensure that all units that submitted observations are formally recognized and that we cover as many of the most pressing issues as possible, many of these observations are identified herein by their title, JULLS number (if applicable), and submitting individual and/or organization.

STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT TO SOUTHWEST ASIA

1. ISSUE: The Army's success in rapidly deploying sixty (60) Army National Guard (ARNG) COL/LTC Level Commands to the CENTCOM AOR (ODS-ARNG-PH V-RI) (Julls No. 60333-85244(00026)).
a. **Discussion:** When given the mission to deploy to CENTCOM, the Army National Guard demonstrated its ability to alert, federalize, and rapidly deploy 60 colonel/lieutenant colonel level commands to the TOA. Of those 60 commands, 11 brigade/group headquarters, 12 ARNG hospitals, and seven Rear Area Operations Centers (RAOC) deployed under the command of Colonels, while 30 battalions deployed under the command of Lieutenant Colonels. Of the 30 battalions that deployed to SWA, five were military police battalions. The following is a list of those units, in order of call up.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Home Station Locations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>112th Military Police Battalion</td>
<td>Jackson, Ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118th Military Police Battalion</td>
<td>Providence, RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185th Military Police Battalion</td>
<td>Pittsburg, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210th Military Police Battalion</td>
<td>Detroit, MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>372nd Military Police Battalion</td>
<td>Anacostia, D.C.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. **Lessons Learned:**

(1) The NGB conducted debriefing sessions with unit commanders returning from Operation Desert Storm on 20-21 May 1991. During these debriefing sessions, they attributed the Army's success in rapidly deploying their commands to the following programs.

(a) **Total Force Policy:** The Army's implementation of the OSD Total Force Policy and the equipment and manning levels provided by the Army, OSD, and Congress contributed to the high
degree of success in the deployment of the ARNG commands.

(b) CAPSTONE: The commanders gave high marks to the Army's CAPSTONE Program. The commanders were especially complementary of the VII Corps and the integration which had been achieved by CAPSTONE Battle Book preparation, training with VII Corps wartime commands both in Europe and in CONUS, VII Corps CAPSTONE Conferences, and during JCS Exercises such as REFORGER. The commanders said that even though the mission changed from Europe to SWA, the working relationships endured and were valuable for a smooth operation in the new theater of operations.

(c) Overseas Deployment Training (ODT): This program was unanimously supported by the commanders. They said their units had gained invaluable training through the Mobilization Deployment Exercises (MODRE) which preceded deployment, exercising deployment and redeployment, and training with their wartime commands in overseas theaters.

(d) Key Personnel Upgrade Program (KPUP): The commanders stated that sending key personnel to train with Active Component units in the field provided them with NCOs and officers who had enhanced tactical/technical experience.

(e) FM 25-100 and the Army Training Management System: Those commanders who deployed stated that mission guidance with decentralized execution was invaluable for rapidly training up and deploying.

(2) The commanders stated that the mobilization system worked very well when it was used. They did encounter some
delays when mobilization stations deviated from the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment System (FORMDEPS) and repeated many of the administrative tasks the unit had accomplished at home station.

c. **Recommendations:** That the Army continue placing emphasis and resources on the CAPSTONE Program, ODT, KPUP, and Mobilization Exercises. That JCS continue to promote the Total Force by conducting JCS Exercises with participation of all Services and Components.

d. **Submitted by:** NGB-AAR (COL HOLLENBECK) based on the Army Operations Center Report "ARNG Units Federalized for ODS"; LTC BOWEN, 400th MP Bn (EFW)

2. **ISSUE:** Reserve Component (RC) units came to their mobilization stations (MOBSTAs) with lower Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) than expected by the FORSCOM PM.

   a. Not all RC units came to the mobilization station with ALO as expected, Active Component assets in theater were used to fix the problem once the deploying RC units arrived in theater.

      (1) Two significant factors impact the personnel readiness of RC units while at the home station. First is the ALO versus the assigned strength based on recruitment and retention. Second is enlisted personnel electing split option training and officers who receive early commissioning and have not completed Initial Active Duty Training (IADT), BT/AIT and OBC, are nondeployable. To a lesser degree, mobilization no shows and personnel reporting previously unidentified medical
conditions reduce the personnel available for deployment. The unit is required to identify personnel shortages, by MOS and grade, to the MOBSTA. The MOBSTA attempts to coordinate fill of personnel shortages.

(2) There are numerous factors that impact equipment readiness. RC units store a large portion of their equipment at Equipment Concentration Sites (ECS) and do not have direct access/control of the equipment. The ECS will fill units as they mobilize regardless of which unit "owns" the equipment. Due to Army wide shortages and RC units with lower priorities, numerous units lack authorized quantities. The units are required to identify ERC A shortages, by LIN, to the MOBSTA. The MOBSTA attempts to coordinate fill of equipment shortages.

(3) Units deploying with less than ALO personnel and equipment are "acceptable" to the Army. Personnel and equipment shortages are then "filled" after the unit arrives in theater.

d. **Submitted by:** COL POMAGER, Commander, 14th Military Police Brigade

3. ISSUE: Military Police Capstone Alignments

a. **Discussion:** Some AC/RC MP units deployed to SWA and were augmented or rounded out with MP units that were not aligned under their headquarter's current CAPSTONE plans. There is a need for a tighter linkup between CAPSTONE units during both mobilization and subsequent deployment to the theater of operations in order to maintain unit cohesiveness.

b. **Lessons Learned:**
(1) Commanders believe that when they go to war they should deploy with the same subordinate units that are aligned with their organizations under the current CAPSTONE alignment configurations. To take other units undermines the cohesiveness developed during long periods of training and previous deployments. Additionally, the extended time periods between the arrival of the headquarters elements and subordinate units, in theater, adversely affects a timely employment of units.

(2) A clear cut AC/RC go to war affiliation (CAPSTONE) program is the optimum situation. However, many times OPLAN resourcing priorities and CINC OPLAN TPFDL unit resourcing priorities are the driving forces which determine "battlefield affiliations." In light of current and projected force reductions, changing national strategy, operational deployments and contingency operations, all general support reinforcing units must be prepared for worldwide deployment. Dual and sometimes triple alignments many be the "rule" rather than the exception. Flexibility and agility will be the keys to success. All brigade and battalion commanders must be prepared to deploy with nonaffiliated units to conduct "come as you are" operations. Developing workable procedures to overcome AC installation/MACOM boundaries and RC peacetime C² relationships appear to be the means to ensure combat ready units, regardless of peacetime/CAPSTONE alignments.

c. **Recommendations:**

(1) FORSCOM PM establish and coordinate an AC peacetime
affiliation for all MP units. Affiliation, METL and subsequent training standards and requirements should be coordinated with HQ FORSCOM, HQ TRADOC (units on TRADOC installations), installation commanders, and gaining MP headquarters to ensure combat ready units arrive in theater when they are needed.

(2) FORSCOM PM, within CAPSTONE and Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) resourcing constraints, align AC and RC units to establish a reasonable go to war affiliation.

d. Submitted by: COL POMAGER, Commander, 14th Military Police Brigade

4. ISSUE: TPFDL Priority for RC EPW Units.

a. Discussion: Several key RC EPW units did not deploy to SWA on sufficient time to enable them to effectively and efficiently coordinate the tremendous logistical support required to care for a large number of U.S. captured EPW. As a result of these delays, MP EPW units experienced major problems in obtaining adequate medical support at the EPW camps and transportation assets to evacuate EPW from the combat zone to the COMMZ EPW camps.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) Deployment of the RC EPW force structure required to process and intern EPW must occur early on in the build up phase of our operations. Otherwise, when large numbers of EPW are captured, or surrender, limited MP EPW assets would soon be overwhelmed which could lead to the diversion of combat forces or critical CS/CSS units to perform this mission and the possibility
of violations of the GPW. The deployment of MP EPW forces early to set up EPW facilities, coordinate the requisite logistical support, and work with the HN will facilitate the proper care and treatment of EPW, mandated by the Geneva Convention.

(2) Ideally, the theater CINCs would deploy the EPW units early in anticipation of their needs. However, politics, lift capability and the limits of the RC call up are all factors which will affect a CINC's decision on who to deploy and when. The MP Corps should always opt to deploy EPW units into the theater as soon as possible, but when that is neither feasible nor possible, the MP Corps' most flexible units, the TOE 19-77 MP combat support companies, should be deployed first. They can perform the EPW mission in theater pending the arrival of the functional EPW units.

d. Submitted by: ARCENT PM

5. ISSUE: Reserve Component EPW Force Structure, (JULLS No. 16744-16900(0001))

a. Discussion: The EPW mission is one of four primary missions of the MP. The 800th Military Police Brigade (PW), the senior MP headquarters on the SWA TO, was made up of Army Reserve and National Guard units who were given a low TPFDL priority and arrived in the theater just before the beginning of the ground war, and had to be educated into the mainstream of the active Army concerning policies and procedures. Although this organization experienced some difficulties soon after arriving in country, the total dedication, superior expertise, and
willingness to get the job done exhibited by the organization's top notch personnel enabled the 800th MP Bde and its subordinate units to learn fast and rapidly integrate into the theater force.

b. Lessons Learned: If the U.S. and coalition forces had to begin the ground campaign or we had to take a large number of EPW any sooner than we did, there would not have been sufficient EPW units in the theater to handle the mission. Scarce corps and TA MP assets would have had to be diverted from other critical missions to handle the EPWs. The current active duty MP force structure needs to be expanded to include an MP Bn (EPW Camp) that would be included in our rapid deployment force package to handle the EPW mission in the early stages of a conflict.

c. Recommendations: That an MP Bn (EPW Camp) be included in the rapid deployment force structure to ensure that at least one MP Bn (EPW Camp) is readily available and can perform the EPW mission in the early stages of a conflict, thereby preventing the diversion of limited corps and TA MP units from other critical missions.

d. Submitted by: ARCENT PMO

6. ISSUE: EPW Capture Rate.

a. Discussion: The EPW force structure used during Desert Storm was totally inadequate to handle the large number of U.S. and allied captured EPW. This force was centered around the EPW camp. In the future, this force structure will be replaced by an MP battalion. The new battalion structure is based on the current EPW capture rates. This will give us a 36,000 prisoner
capacity in the battalion versus a 60,000 prisoner capacity in the camps. This conversion to a battalion force structure actually reduces the handling capacity that existed under the old camp-based force structure; consequently, it is imperative that the Army develop a realistic EPW capture rate.

b. **Recommendations:** That the USAMPS and TRADOC execute an EPW capture rate study that will validate the new EPW capture rate planning factors. Furthermore, it is recommended that the RC scheduled conversion from MP EPW camps to battalions be delayed until the completion of the TRADOC/USAMPS EPW Capture Rate Study.

c. **Submitted by:** MOBPLANS, FORSCOM PM.

7. **ISSUE:** U.S. and Allied Forces EPW Transfer Agreements (JULLS No. 61049-30300(00001)).

   a. **Discussion:**

      (1) The United State Government entered an agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) to transfer all U.S. captured EPW and civilian internees to Saudi Arabian forces. Separate agreements were made between the United States, Great Britain, and France for the U.S. military to secure EPW captured by British and French forces.

      (2) During the early stages of Operation Desert Shield, the State Department began discussions with the Saudi Government to transfer U.S. captured EPWs to their forces in the event of hostilities in the theater of operations. On 16 Jan 91, the American Embassy, Riyadh announced the approval of the agreement
between the governments. In part, the agreement stated that "The Armed Forces of Saudi Arabia shall accept PWs and CIs captured by the Armed Forces of the United States and shall be ultimately responsible for maintaining and safeguarding all such individuals whose custody has been transferred." The U.S. Central Command passed the responsibility for coordinating the military to military implementation agreement between U.S. Forces and KSA Forces to the Commander, 800th Military Police Brigade. On 15 Jan 91, the Cdr, 800th MP Bde and the Director, EPW Affairs, Saudi Arabian Forces signed the administrative procedures for the transfer of EPWs between the forces. CENTCOM retained the authority to enter EPW/CI transfer agreements with British and French forces. The CENTCOM PM concluded these agreements on 31 Jan 91 and 24 Feb 91, respectively. The agreements, entered at different command levels divided areas of responsibilities and interrupted the flow of information between signing parties. This contributed to the confusion concerning EPW transfer operations.

b. **Lessons Learned:**

(1) Military agreements which implement agreements between countries must be entered at the same level within the concerned forces. USCENTCOM should have represented U.S. forces in the agreement with the Saudi Arabia forces.

(2) A combined committee should be formed to ensure the implementation of said agreements and to work out problem areas within the boundaries established by the agreements.
c. **Recommendations:**

(1) Future agreements between forces must be entered at the same level of authority within the concerned forces.

(2) Future agreements include provisions for a steering committee to oversee the EPW program and resolve problem areas at the working level.

d. **Submitted by:** MAJ DUNCAN, ARCENT PMO

**EMPLOYMENT**

Planning

8. **ISSUE:** Diversion of EPW Units to Perform Other MP Missions.

a. **Discussion:** MP EPW units were initially diverted from their EPW operations and tasked to perform a multitude of missions such as port security, ammunition supply point security, noncombatant evacuation operations, customs duties, and law and order missions. This diversion of MP EPW units to other missions initially kept the units from focusing their planning efforts on their primary mission - EPW operations. As a result of these diversions, much of the coordination required to obtain the critical logistical support needed to evacuate EPW from the combat zone and temporarily intern them in the COMMZ had not been completed before the EPW units began taking custody of EPWs.

b. **Lessons Learned:**

(1) The longer EPW units are kept away from planning for their primary mission, the greater chance you have that you will experience problems executing that mission.

(2) MP requirements always exceed available MP resources.
MP assets will be assigned missions based on the factors of METT-T, the supported commander's needs and desires, the intensity and duration of combat, and the MP resources available. EPW units cannot afford to remain idle while waiting for combat operations to commence or EPW to be captured. Senior MP commanders must put their resources to work supporting the echelon commander. Additionally, EPW and all special purpose MP units must train to the maximum extent possible to perform all four battlefield missions within personnel and equipment constraints.

c. Recommendations:

(1) All EPW units validate their CAPSTONE alignments with the FORSCOM PM and their supported CINC's Provost Marshal to confirm unit affiliations.

(2) Supported CINC's Provost Marshal review their current OPLANs and based on their requisite MP force structure and assigned missions send their supporting affiliation units copies of their unit's METL and annual and quarterly training guidance.

(3) EPW units readjust their METL based on input from their supported Provost Marshal and train according to the unit's revised METL.

(4) All MP EPW units complete this cycle of events at least one annually for AC units and once every 18 months for RC units.

d. Submitted by: COL STOVALL, Commander, 401st EPW Camp.

of War, August 12, 1949 and other international laws/agreements.

a. Discussion:

(1) The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, (GPW), provides for the humane treatment of EPW by the capturing/detaining powers. It specifically regulates, in detail, the treatment of PW, including care, food, clothing and housing; discipline and punishment; labor and pay; external relations; representation; international exchange of information; and termination of captivity.

(2) During the early planning phases of EPW operations, it became apparent that the legal requirements for EPW handling were not fully understood with regard to transportation for evacuation, medical attention, and the need for food and water. Ongoing education of support staffs and agencies by both JAG and MP was necessary.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) The Army's current doctrinal manual on EPW responsibilities, organizations, missions, procedures, and planning factors, FM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons, was published in 1976 and is outdated.

(2) EPW doctrine, organizations, planning factors and critical issues are not being adequately taught in TRADOC schools.

(3) EPW scenarios are routinely left out of our myriad wargames, command post exercises, local and JCS level field
training exercises, and BCTP evaluations.

c. **Recommendations:**

(1) The USAMPS and TRADOC:

(a) Revise FM 19-40, to include many of the lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm, as soon as possible.

(b) Devote more training time in senior NCO and officer professional development courses to study EPW doctrine; organizations; planning factors; and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

(c) Ensure that the capability to play EPW scenarios exist in any wargames, simulations, or exercises developed in the future.

(2) Battalion, Brigade, and Senior Level Commanders make every effort to include realistic EPW scenarios in all local and JCS level CPXs and FTXs, unit exercise evaluations (EXEVALs), and BCTP evaluations.

d. **Submitted by:** 22nd Support Command, 800th Military Police Brigade (PW).

10. **ISSUE:** Logistical Support for EPW Operations in the Early Stages of Desert Storm.

a. **Discussion:**

(1) Planning and providing logistical support for EPW operations in the early stages of Desert Storm were totally inadequate. Because of a lack of in-theater U.S. assets and no previously established HN agreements, U.S. forces encountered significant difficulties in obtaining logistical support for EPW
operations. There were minimal supplies available to support EPWs at the beginning of Desert Shield and the possibility of such a large EPW population was not foreseen. Requirements to support EPW were not identified until the MP unit given the mission arrived in Jan 91. In addition, the unit had some initial difficulty in processing its requisitions. Lack of prepositioned stocks necessitated intensive negotiations for HN support. In some cases, requisitions were passed to CONUS telephonically. Once identified the logistics system was successful in providing the necessary supplies or substitutes; however, the late identification and requisitioning of requirements resulted in the use of precious airlift and fast sealift assets to meet theater demands.

(2) It cannot be assumed that there will always be a "host nation" in the sense that U.S. forces will be inserted into a militarily and politically friendly environment. As such, it's essential that we make our EPW units more logistically robust by setting aside the material required for initial operations, enabling them to become quickly operational and giving the supply system time to respond to a growing requirement.

b. Lessons Learned:

c. Recommendations: That prepackaged, non-theater specific, operational stocks (similar to POMCUS) be established and assigned to EPW units so that the logistical requirements can be satisfied. Also, OPLANS must address the logistical requirements of EPW operations.
Division Operations

11. ISSUE: The Team EPW Concept.

a. Discussion: The Provost Marshal, 82nd Airborne Division used a Team EPW concept within his division area of operation (AO) to expedite the evacuation of EPW from the capturing units to the division central collecting point. The Team EPW force consisted of MP, MI, CA, PSYOPS, and medical personnel and members of the division band. The task force moved with the lead brigades and assisted the brigades in maintaining tactical momentum by relieving them of their EPW responsibilities as quickly as possible. Helicopter airlift support, provided by CH-47s, helped significantly with the movement of EPW to the rear.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) The task organization of combat support elements into Team EPW enhanced combat operations and greatly assisted the maneuver commander. To maximize this concept, the task organization of the combat support forces should be included in the Division and subordinate units' SOPs and routinely practiced in exercises.

(2) The use of Army aviation assets to expedite the evacuation of EPW from the main battle area is an outstanding way to use available backhaul to keep EPW from degrading combat operations and other requisite MP mission support.

c. Recommendations:

(1) The USAMPS include the Team EPW Task Force Concept in
the next revisions to FM 19-4 and FM 19-40.

(2) MP staff planners should request and echelon operational planners should allocate air assets as a portion of the backhaul available for EPW evacuation to use airframes when they are available to logically and expeditiously move EPW through the system.

d. Submitted by: LTC PATTON, PM, 82nd Airborne Division.

12. ISSUE: The Division Military Police (MP) Company and Evacuation of EPW.

a. Discussion: A division military police company was required to transport its EPWs to the corps holding area. This requirement was extremely difficult because MP companies are not equipped with vehicles to do this mission. Doctrinally, the DISCOM is responsible for providing backhaul transportation; however, the DISCOM's limited transportation assets were committed to moving Class I, III, IV, and V supplies forward. EPW backhaul had to compete with these critical classes of supply and special missions for evacuation of EPW from division collecting points.

b. Lessons Learned: Allocation of CSS assets will always be subject to requirements of the main battle and may temporarily exclude the allocation of transportation for EPW evacuation. In such cases, non-standard modes of transportation must be explored by the appropriate MP commander or PM.

c. Recommendations: EPW doctrine should be stressed throughout the Army, and imaginative and effective and efficient
Corps Operations

13. ISSUE: Transportation for EPW Evacuation (JULLS No. 14446-71500(00001))

a. Discussion:

(1) By doctrine, EPW are to be evacuated from the combat zone as quickly as possible. There were two distinct problems associated with EPW evacuation during Desert Storm: Intra-Corps evacuation and evacuation from Corps to the EAC EPW camps. Intra-Corps assets for EPW evacuation were not adequate to backhaul large numbers of EPW given the short duration of ground operations. In fact, coalition forces were simultaneously operating up to 12 temporary EPW and three permanent EPW holding areas during the 100 hours of the ground offensive by coalition forces. The thrust within the Corps was to push as much combat power and combat support forward as fast as possible. This minimized the opportunity for early backhaul within the Corps area. With regards to backhaul from Corps to EAC camps, a similar situation existed. Initially, the backhaul capability from the Corps to EAC camps was hindered by the limited amount of transport moving from the Corps to EAC that was suitable for backhauling EPW. However, later in the operation, this situation improved somewhat as vehicles moved from the Corps area to the theater area and coordination with MCCs and transporters provided
some backhaul.

(2) During the early phase of the air campaign, it was revealed that S&Ps would be used extensively to move Class V to log bases and ASPs in the corps areas. Trailers would be configured for quick turnaround by blocking and bracing the pallets without using trailer siding. As such, S&Ps could not be used to backhaul EPWs or casualties. Recognizing that trailers would not be available to backhaul EPW, the SUPCOM contracted 180 civilian buses to be used by escort guard companies to backhaul EPWs. These contracted buses came without drivers, maintenance personnel, or training for MP to drive buses. As a result, within four weeks only 80 buses were operational. Since the buses were only configured to carry 48 EPW, MP had to make major unauthorized modifications to the buses. Seats were removed and improperly thrown throughout the logistical support areas for the four camps. First echelon maintenance was routinely not performed. Many engines and transmissions locked up on MSRs and buses often ran hot due to no water.

b. Lessons Learned: A transportation company must be in direct support of each MP camp or a transportation platoon in support of each EPW/CI battalion. Training must be conducted for drivers who will operate new equipment.

c. Recommendations: That a transportation company or platoon be in direct support of an MP camp or EPW/CI battalion, respectively. PMCS must be performed on equipment. That conditions of the contract be adhered to by all personnel using
the equipment.

d. **Submitted by:** 14th Military Police Brigade; MAJ DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATC CALL Desert Storm Collection Team.

14. **ISSUE:** Theater EPW Brigade Support to Corps.

a. **Discussion:** EPW evacuation from Corps to theater was an ongoing program during Desert Storm EPW operations. Despite considerable planning and support agreements, support was not forthcoming. Corps MP had to effect coordination with corps and EAC MCCs to make backhaul work. EAC camps provided escort guards, but they were instructed to go no further forward than the Corps cage. This resulted in a shortage of escort guards when the two forward holding areas also performed processing actions. Furthermore, upon forward movement of the Corps cage, only the squad of escort guards was available to move forward. The company of escort guards which was to have moved forward with the Corps cage never arrived. EAC escort guard assets that did support the Corps were ill equipped in both mission and life support equipment. The Corps MP Brigade had to provide much of the equipment needed to accomplish the mission.

b. **Lessons Learned:**

c. **Recommendations:** EAC assets must come prepared to conduct required missions. MCC linkage from Corps to EAC must be established to ensure a system is on line to facilitate EPW backhaul. EAC escort guards must be prepared to obtain transport support to accomplish evacuation of the Corps cage.

d. **Submitted by:** 14th Military Police Brigade
15. **ISSUE:** EPW Accountability

a. **Discussion:**

(1) Issuance of capture numbers is not a requirement for Corps. However, we did this in order to enhance control of EPW accountability. Once the EPWs were located at the Corps cage, and the corps capture numbers were issued, accountability was easily maintained. However, trying to track EPW from capturing units to forward holding areas was more of a challenge. Efforts to monitor EPW capture and evacuation within the Corps were hindered when evacuation was accomplished by units outside the 14th MP Brigade but not coordinated with the Brigade. The lack of accurate information concerning numbers and locations of EPW enroute to the corps cage also hindered accountability.

(2) Accountability of EPW at EAC was a problem. Accountability by capturing unit was not readily available, even down to capturing Corps level. When EPW were transported directly to theater, this appeared to make capturing unit data even more difficult to retain. Also, British captures were in some cases identified as United Kingdom captures but assigned U.S. capture numbers. Other United Kingdom captures were not identified as such and processed as U.S. captures.

b. **Lessons Learned:**

(1) The current method of accounting for and tracking EPW from capturing unit to EAC EPW camps is not very effective when capturing large numbers of EPW in short periods of time.

(2) Accountability procedures between U.S. capturing
units, division and corps MP units, the EAC EPW MP units, and U.S. and coalition allied forces must be published in theater level SOPs or OPORDs and rehearsed before combat, if at all possible.

c. **Recommendations:** Information concerning the number of EPW captured by Corps must be maintained by the EAC camps to ensure a complete audit trail is available between the Corps and EAC EPW camps. When coalition forces are operating in a corps, correct capture data must be retained to ensure capturing nation linkage is maintained.

d. **Submitted by:** 14th Military Police Brigade

16. **ISSUE:** Excessive Inquiries Concerning EPW Operations.

a. **Discussion:** Excessive inquiries from various staff agencies and LNOs hindered EPW mission accomplishment. Senior staff agencies contacted the Brigade sometimes several times a day requesting various bits and pieces of information concerning EPW. Examples include:

* Number of EPW currently in the cage
* Number of EPW processed to date
* Number of EPW processed in last 24 hours
* Number of EPW in medical channels
* Number of EPW in MI channels
* Number of rations on hand for EPW

Communications problems prevented us from having real time access to much of the information requested, especially considering that we had three EPW processing locations (corps cages) operating
simultaneously.

b. Lessons Learned:

c. Recommendations: The G1 has staff proponency for EPW operations. We submitted several mandatory reports to the G1 on a daily basis. These reports contained the "most requested" information concerning EPWs. All EPW inquiries external to the MP Brigade should be directed to the G1. The G1 could disseminate information and exercise appropriate staff control concerning "need to know."

17. ISSUE: Lack of Support for EPW Operations.

a. Discussion: In preparation for the EPW operation this brigade tried to get all necessary equipment, i.e., generators, lightsets, tents, concertina, fence posts, latrines, showers, etc. In many cases it took 3-4 weeks to receive the equipment and then only after the company or brigade went out and searched equipment yards to locate and request items. Many times the brigade would go to pick up equipment only to find it wasn't there and this caused COSCOM and G-4 to go back again and try to find out where the items were. When the brigade tried to coordinate bus transportation, a backhaul for movement of EPWs, COSCOM stated that this was not a priority for them in backhaul. Only after the war started and the divisions were overwhelmed with EPWs to where their progress was impeded did COSCOM and G-4 put a higher priority on supporting EPW. While G-4 and COSCOM did support the EPW operation, it was with constant visits and phone calls-slow-incoming as the MPs were only 8th on most
priority lists, well below the divisions. This did not allow the brigade to be ready to handle the influx of EPWs which occurred.

b. **Lessons Learned:** MP units must be as self-sufficient as possible and organized to meet any contingency. Prior to the commencement of hostilities, while training at home station, MP units tasked to operate collecting points or holding area should develop an EPW mobilization package that the unit can take to the field anytime it deploys. This EPW mobilization package should include all of the supplies, equipment, clothing, tents, stoves, etc. required to operate a doctrinally correct collecting point or holding area. Since the majority of this equipment will be over and above the unit's authorizations, memoranda of agreement will have to be signed with the applicable echelon commander responsible for providing the logistical support.

c. **Recommendations:** That Corps put a higher priority on acquiring what the Military Police Brigade needs to operate. The divisions cannot maneuver without evacuating EPWs. The Brigade cannot evacuate EPWs without equipment and supplies.

d. **Submitted by:** CAP MARJORIE M. GILL, S-4, 14th Military Police Brigade

18. **ISSUE:** EPW Camp Dump Trucks Were not Taken to the Theater (JULLS No. 23339-17500 (00004)).

a. **Discussion:**

(1) According to MTOE 19-256 (Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Military Police PW Camp) MP PW camps are authorized two dump trucks for conducting myriad support missions.
inside the EPW camps. Only one of five EPW camps, the 400th EPW/C1 Camp, took its dump trucks to the theater. The other four camps were told at their MOBSTA that they could not ship their dump trucks into the theater because their MOBTAADS were not current, reflecting the authorization of the dump trucks. Consequently, EPW camps arrived in theater expecting to be given dump trucks for their mission; however, none were available.

(2) The amount of work generated to support the EPW camps, each with eight separate enclosures, is unbelievable and beyond the capacity of light organizational vehicles. The amount of trash alone generated by each enclosure was beyond the lift capability of unit pick-up trucks, and the unit’s 2-1/2 and 5 ton trucks were constantly being used to draw and deliver rations, equipment, etc. Some units used large contracted circus trucks to upload and transport trash to burn pits. Another major problem occurred at the burn pits when soldiers had to get up in the truck beds and dump the trash into the burn pits by hand. Dump trucks would have been quicker and safer.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) There is a need to use the most current document available to get reserve component units on the active component systems like MOBTAADS. Units should follow FORMDEPS and bring a copy of the document to the MOBSTA. HQDA and FORSCOM should update and use MOBTAADS or else scrap the system.

(2) Dump trucks are essential to the efficient and effective operation of EPW camps. Unit commanders must ensure
that their unit’s TOE documentation is current, on hand at the
MOBSTA, and that load plans match the current documentation.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That HQDA, DAMO-FD, make the RC portion of VTAAD’s
Master File available in the Regional Data Centers so that CONUSA
and MOB stations can make use of the data.

(2) That EPW camp commanders validate their TOE
documentation and supporting movement plans quarterly, and within
30 days of a TOE documentation change.

d. Submitted by:

(1) MSP(P) WAWRGTKO, AFZC-GA, Fort Carson, CA (JULLS No.
01646-40671 (00017)) and reviewed by NGB-AAR in coordination with
NGB-ARF.

(2) MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL Desert Storm
Collection Team (JULLS No. 23339-17500 (00004)).

19. ISSUE: Military Policy (MP) and Military Intelligence (MI)
Relationships - Division/Corps.

a. Discussion: MP and MI personnel at division and corps
must work closer together to ensure effective use of manpower
during EPW interrogation. MI interrogators need quick access to
EPWs to ensure timely acquisition and dissemination of
information to commanders. MP are doctrinally responsible for,
but not manned, to guard EPW during the interrogation process
during periods when large numbers of EPW are received from
capturing units. Consequently, MP must release selected EPWs
quickly to MI, and the MI force must provide their own guards

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throughout the interrogation process.

b. **Lessons Learned:**

(1) Division and corps MP cannot provide local security for MI interrogators when under conditions involving mass captures or surrenders.

(2) MP are responsible for safeguarding EPW at brigade and division collecting points, corps holding areas, and theater EPW camps, and while intransit to and from the previously mentioned facilities. MI interrogators who insist on removing EPW from these secure environs should assume responsibility for safeguarding the prisoners when they are outside of MP control.

c. **Recommendations:** USAMPS must continue to work with the Intelligence Center to incorporate lessons learned from Desert Storm concerning receiving, processing, and evacuating mass EPWs into Army, MP, and MI doctrinal literature.

d. **Submitted by:** LTC MIKE SULLIVAN, Commander, 503rd Military Police Battalion.

20. **ISSUE:** Length of the MI Interrogation Process.

a. **Discussion:** The MI interrogation process, at division level, was too lengthy and required the division MP company to retain EPW longer than practical and feasible. After the air war commenced, a division MP unit was the first unit to receive EPWs. Interrogators from the supporting MI unit held the prisoners for extended periods of time trying to collect intelligence. While intelligence collection at the division is important, it must be weighed against the need to expeditiously move EPWs to the rear.
A shortage of interpreters in the division complicated what was already a slow process.

b. **Lessons Learned:** EPWs that are retained at the brigade and division collecting points for considerable lengths of time put a tremendous manpower and logistical burden on the division MP unit. Every effort should be made to evacuate EPWs from the divisions within 24 hours of capture. Not every EPW is of intelligence value to our forces. MP and MI personnel must expeditiously identify, exploit, and evacuate those EPWs that do have intelligence value. If the combat commander determines that the collection of intelligence is the priority, then a delay in the evacuation of EPWs is the trade off.

c. **Recommendations:** USAMPS and the Intelligence Center continue to integrate joint tactics, techniques and procedures in the appropriate Army, MP, and MI doctrinal publications.

d. **Submitted by:** LTC LUPO, Provost Marshal, 1st Cavalry Division.

21. **ISSUE:** Military Police (MP) and Military Intelligence Relationships - PW Brigade Operations (JULLS No. 14560-76200 (00008)).

a. **Discussion:** Numerous logistical, operational and security problems arose from a lack of doctrine on MP support of MI interrogation operations. The 800th Military Police Brigade (PW) was tasked with the mission of handling the EPWs. FM 19-40 insufficiently addresses the numerous MP/MI interface issues. Because MP and MI doctrine is sketchy and not integrated, each
interrogation facility had to individually coordinate logistical, procedural, and security support with each camp commander. At the East Camp, the interrogation facility was forced to locate outside of the wire because the MP commander said that he didn’t have room for the interrogation operation. At the West Camp, we located inside the wire but the MP commander said that he could not dedicate any guards to us. Extensive coordination had been done with the 800th prior to deployment and upon arrival in country, but ultimately, each site commander had the final "say so" on each issue.

b. Lessons Learned: In the absence of doctrinal guidance, each JIF site commander had to coordinate with the two camp commanders at his site.

c. Recommendations: The MP and MI schools must revise their doctrinal manuals to thoroughly discuss MP EPW/MI interface and operational issues. Specifics that must be addressed include location of the interrogation facility, methods of screening prisoners, security both inside and around the interrogation facility, transfer of prisoners to and from the camp and the logistics of feeding and caring for the prisoners while in the JIF.

d. Submitted by: CPT LEIBOVITCH, 202d Military Intelligence Battalion, ATTN: IAM-C-O.

22. ISSUE: Planning for the Construction of the Theater EPW Camps.

a. Discussion: Planning for the construction of the 800th
Military Police Brigade’s EPW camps was conducted piecemeal and without overall coordination. Designs for the construction of the 24,000 man theater EPW camps was conducted in disjointed segments with design for wire enclosures, electricity, water, showers, latrine sewage disposal, and force protection, all being given to the contracting unit separately. This lack of an overall plan caused many changes during construction which hindered completion in a timely manner. Plans for each part of the camp required site adaptation in order to fit with previously constructed portions of the camp.

b. Lessons Learned: Haphazard planning results in unnecessary modifications at the time of execution and inordinate delays in the completion of the project.

c. Recommendations: That ENCOM assume responsibility for overall coordination, design, and planning for the construction of Theater EPW camps. The TA Military Police Brigade should define requirements and serve as technical advisors during design and construction.


23. ISSUE: U.S. EPW Doctrine and Allied Forces

a. Discussion: In coalition warfare, the U.S. Army cannot rely on friendly forces to perform EPW operations based on their knowledge of Geneva Convention. A Military Police (MP) battalion was attached to the 6th Light Armored Division (French) for EPW operations, a mission that severely tasked the battalion’s
resources. The MP battalion not only secured EPW but was responsible for conducting training to teach the French forces how to perform EPW operations. U.S. Forces cannot assume that other coalition members are knowledgeable in the Geneva Convention and EPW hand-off procedures.

b. Lessons Learned:

c. Recommendations: A basic assumption of contingency planning should be that U.S. forces can expect to encounter coalition forces that will require training in EPW operations. This is a training issue for coalition forces. There are standardization agreements in place for allied nations to handle EPW operations. The French in this case were not trained to standards in EPW operations and could not perform their mission without assistance from U.S. Forces.

d. Submitted by: LTC MIKE SULLIVAN, Commander, 503rd MP Bn

24. ISSUE: Host Nation Support Agreements

a. Discussion: The development of host nation EPW agreements is a laborious process and does not guarantee that cosignatories can fulfill the terms of the agreement, especially in those countries with limited military resources. The assumption that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had sufficient forces to sustain EPW operations proved faulty. They did not have the manpower resources to meet the ever increasing workload generated by the massive influx of EPW. This created problems for the other coalition forces who had planned for an expeditious transfer of EPW to the Saudi Arabian military.

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b. Lessons Learned:

c. Recommendations: A basic assumption of contingency planning should be that the U.S. will assume responsibility for the care and custody of EPW captured by U.S. forces. Although transfer of custody to a third party nation is practical in some scenarios, there are too many obstacles for it to be a reliable means of addressing the EPW requirement. As such, the best approach is for the U.S. to assume that it will have responsibility for its EPW and effect a transfer of custody when circumstances support that course of action.

d. Submitted by: COL ROBERT WALTERS, CENTCOM Provost Marshal

25. ISSUE: Slow PWIS-2 Processing Time

a. Discussion: The processing of EPWs was slowed by the restrictive identification requirements dictated by the PWIS-2 software program. PWIS 2 would only take three names for the EPWs while many of them had four names. A decision was made to eliminate one of the names, but it was difficult to determine which three names should be used. Also complicating the issue was the fact that the order of the EPW's names did not parallel the order of an American name, thus making it difficult to access the software in PWIS 2.

b. Lessons Learned:

c. Recommendations: That the PWIS proponent (DAMO-ODL) change the design for PWIS to accommodate tactical requirements. NOTE: USAMPS has actions ongoing to determine and validate MP requirements for an automated MP command and control (MPC2)
The validation efforts may extend into battlefield requirements and will cause further developmental actions. USAMPS may receive a tasking to integrate information exchange requirements (IER) under the Army Battlefield Interface Concept (ABIC) Program for PWIS but future developments in the area will be proponent responsibility.

d. Submitted by: COL STOVALL, Commander, 401st EPW Camp

Operations: EAC

26. ISSUE: Prisoner of War Information System-2 (PWIS-2) Hardware (JULLS No. 42178-52000(00002))

a. Discussion:

(1) As the number of EPW increased, it became more apparent that the job to process, store, and retrieve data for the EPW information system could not be done effectively by microcomputers. The number of EPW captured or surrendered during the whole operation was overwhelming for these computers. The printers used were too slow for the job. These problems were compounded by poor computer site selection and preparation in some of the camps. Frequent power failures in the camps also resulted in data loss and/or computer damage. Computer downtime was intolerable.

(2) The storage capacity of the micros used during the operation was big enough to accommodate the data being processed, but the speed of the micros coupled with the software used were far from being adequate. The memory of the micros used was not big enough to process the EPW transfer routine when the camp data
base grew to more than 17,000 records. Environmental control was poor in the camps. Too much dust and sand got into the computers resulting in computer malfunction and downtime. Lack of coordination between the camp generator crew and data processing personnel was also a problem. Not enough care was taken for good site selection and preparation. This was clearly demonstrated by a computer site located in the dining facility and a trailer house intended for a computer site used as sleeping area.

b. **Lessons Learned:** Using micro computers for EPW operation of this magnitude was less than effective. There was a need for a computer system with faster speed, larger memory, and a reliable power source, which can easily be protected from the environment.

c. **Recommendations:** Explore the feasibility of incorporating the PWIS into the existing CTASC-II computer. This system belongs to the family of mini-computers, with speed, storage and memory better than that of the micros. This system is van mounted, mobile, has a reliable power source and environmentally controlled. This system is multiuser and can interface with the Defense Data Network (DDN). Use of high speed printers is also recommended.

d. **Submitted by:** SSG ANCOG, ARCENT PMO

27. **ISSUE:** PWIS-2 Software (JULLS No. 61050-82400 (00001))

a. **Discussion:**

(1) PWIS-2 Software used to process, account and manage EPWs during Operation Desert Storm did not meet the requirements
of the system users and commanders in the field. It did not function as an adequate tool for the purpose it was intended.

(2) During the peak of the EPW capture and surrender, it was clearly demonstrated that the Prisoner of War Information System (PWIS-2) could not handle large numbers of prisoners. Its design left too much room for errors for both the processing units and the camp system administrators. All the computers operated in a stand alone mode. The processing had to stop from time to time to consolidate the information from the laptops, computers used by the processing units, to the camp machine. As the data base grew, it took longer to query a single information. The transfer of EPW on the system did not work when the camp database grew to more than 17,000 records. The camp machines ran out of memory. This problem was common to all camps. The software created too many temporary files and no procedure to delete them. The PWIS.BAT file was revised to do the clean up. At one point, the Theater PWIC machine ran out of storage space and crashed because of those temporary files. It would take almost three days to archive 4,000 records and 10 hours to upload 700 new records. The processing time was intolerable. In some cases, DBASE III Plus was used to work around the problem.

b. Lessons Learned: The PWIS-2 software was far from being adequate to do the job it was intended for. The need of high speed, large memory and large storage system was clearly demonstrated. More sophisticated, advanced and user friendly software is required to process, account, administer and manage
large numbers of EPW during operations.

c. **Recommendations:** Explore the possibility of incorporating the PWIS into the existing CTASC-II computer system. This is a mobile system using UNISYS 5000 series computers and using UNIX as its operating system. If microcomputers are to be used, Local Area Network (LAN) in the camps should be installed to avoid delay in processing caused by data consolidation. PWIS-2 should be rewritten using faster programming language than the DBASE III Plus currently used. Explore the possibility of using ADA programming language to rewrite the PWIS-2 software.

d. **Submitted by:** SSG ANCOG, ARCENT PMO

28. **ISSUE:** PWIS-2 Personnel and Training (JULLS No. 42185-16500 (00003)).

a. **Discussion:**

(1) Personnel from the camp to the National PWIC level did not receive enough training to use, interact and manage the system. People were learning as they went along.

(2) Training personnel to use, interact and manage a fielded software cannot be over emphasized. Reserve and National Guard Units tasked to process and administer EPW were trained to do the job manually before their mobilization. There was not enough time to adequately train them before the EPW started coming by the thousands. Some of these people had not used computers before they deployed to Saudi Arabia. Even people from the National PWIC were not able to properly resolved problems
with the software. The book provided by the American Management System (AMS), the company that developed the software, was not helpful enough to resolve some of the problems. It became clear that the software did not go through extensive testing before it was fielded. The camps did not have computer experts to help them resolve simple and common computer malfunction in both software and hardware.

b. **Lessons Learned:** There was a need for more training for the PWIS users and managers.

c. **Recommendations:** Revise EPW unit TO&E to include 74F and 74D MOS. Develop unit training programs on automated EPW processing and administration in the MP School or Computer Science School. Develop textbooks and SOPs on operating an automated EPW system.

d. **Submitted by:** SSG ANCOG, ARCENT PMO

29. **ISSUE:** Communications Requirements to Support PWIS-2 Hardware (JULLS No. 41659-65600 (00001)).

a. **Discussion:**

(1) The Prisoner of War Information System (PWIS) design does not contain a tactical communications interface.

(2) PWIS, as an information system, was designed for use in CONUS or Europe, where abundant commercial communications are available. This system was employed for the first time in a combat theater of operations. When the system was deployed to Saudi Arabia in support of Desert Storm's EPW operations, commercial communications were not available at the remote EPW...
camp locations. This situation necessitated the use of tactical communications. The majority of tactical communications are 4-wire digital, while PWIS required 2-wire analog signals for use with a dial-up modem. As a quick fix, the camps used couriers to transfer data tapes from the camps to the Theater Prisoner of War Information Center (PWIC). This resulted in a delay of EPW personnel records being transmitted to the National PWIC and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) Timely flow of EPW information was hampered by PWIS' lack of a tactical communications interface. Information systems such as PWIS must be fielded with the capability to interface with tactical, as well as commercial, communications sources.

(2) Given the austerity of 2-wire analog loops available in the tactical world, a 4-wire digital interface is imperative.

(3) The quality of tactical, voice-grade lines must be considered when designing a system to operate in a combat environment.

c. Recommendations: Change the design of the PWIS so it can interface with the Army's current and future tactical communications systems.

d. Submitted by: SSG ANCOG, ARCENT PMO

30. ISSUE: EPW Financial Administration

a. Discussion:

(1) The plan for processing EPWs in theater called for the Army to serve as the USCENTCOM executive agent. The U.S.
would initially collect and hold EPWs in camps, then transfer prisoners as rapidly as possible to Saudi camps. The Provost Marshall projected that 24,000 EPWs would be captured in the first 24 hours of a land battle, 70,000 in the first 72 hours, and 100,000 in the first week. A sustained level of 6,000 per day was projected after this point. The CENTCOM Commander’s goal was to transfer EPWs to the Saudis within 72 hours; however, internal MP estimates ran as high as 25 days. In January, the 800th MP Bde (PW) requested finance support for both theater camps. Based on experiences in processing EPWs in Panama, the capacity of the camps (100,000 EPWs total), and the locations of the camps, arrangements were made for each of the Corps Finance Groups to provide a minimum of one detachment (19 personnel) to each camp. In accordance with the area support concept, the 502d FSU from the 18th CFG relocated with the east camp and the 17th FSU from the 7th FG relocated with the west camp. In developing Theater Army policy the first steps taken by ARCENT DCSRM were to obtain an exchange rate for Swiss Francs from the State Department, determine rates for work pay and CI allowances, and obtain DA approval to transfer funds from OMA to the 21X6015 deposit account. DFAS-I, at the request of ARCENT, obtained a rate of 1,2725 Swiss Francs to the Dollar from the State Department, established a work rate of $6.00 per day, and authorized use of the 21X6015 account with basic funding from the Desert Storm MDEP. Requested guidance on proration of advance pay for partial months and identification of a final fiscal
station to close accounts was not provided. CENTCOM and ARCENT jointly determined a CI allowance rate of $9.43 per month, the equivalent of an NCO EPW's monthly advance of pay. ARCENT established work pay hourly proration based on a ten hour day, the maximum authorized by the Geneva Convention. In the absence of guidance from DFAS, ARCENT DCSRM requested a legal determination of U.S. responsibilities for processing payrolls when prisoners are held for only a brief period before transfer. Simultaneously, the Saudi Government agreed with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to pay all EPWs from the initial date of capture at an inflation adjusted rate of approximately 3.6 times the basic Geneva Convention rate. The ICRC also agreed that the gratuitous issue of sundry bags to the EPWs (provided by the Saudis) could be used in lieu of establishing a canteen at the camps. Based on a positive ruling from the ARCENT and CENTCOM SJAs, the Saudi Agreement with the ICRC, and the decision not to open a canteen, CENTCOM determined that the U.S. camps would process advances of pay for prisoners held less than 30 days. CENTCOM also determined that the U.S. government would abide by the original Geneva Convention rate rather than meet the higher rate paid by the Saudis. Originally, DCSRM developed policy for impounded currency which was in compliance with AR 37-36; however, the 800th MP Bde (PW) Commander nonconcurred and established a policy of impounding currency only in excess of $300 U.S. or 1300 Iraqi Dinar. As this policy was not in violation of the Geneva Convention, ARCENT
allowed the 800th MP Bde (PW) Commander to determine an appropriate amount of currency which the EPW may retain. The policy on impounded currency also prohibited conversion of currencies since no protecting power was designated. Finally, the policy allowed for bulk transfer of impounded currencies to the Saudi Camp in lieu of individual processing. Related to the issue of impounded currency, was the processing of currency held for investigation and, in some cases, subsequently confiscated. ARCENT policy specified not to convert any currencies until they were actually considered confiscated as a result of an investigation. Allied currencies were then converted at the prevailing rate established by the Saudi American Bank. To preclude gains or losses, Allied currencies were brought directly into one of the two funding DSNs' accountability, simultaneously with exchange with the bank. Although not addressed in AR 37-36, some enemy currency was also confiscated from Iraqi funding agents. Because the Iraqi Dinar was not readily convertible, arrangements were made to turn over the funds to the American Embassy for use by the State Department once an embassy is reopened in Baghdad.

(2) The basic procedures and requirements for processing impounded currency, advances of pay, and work pay for both Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) and Civilian Internees (CI) are outlined in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, AR 37-36, and AR 190-8. These documents are vague and require extensive interpretation. AR 37-
36, in particular, is outdated and based on a concept of long-
term internments as experienced in World War II. Current Army
regulations and field manuals place the primary responsibility
for processing EPW/CI pay and impounded currency with the EPW
camp, which is a TOE unit within an MP Bde (PW). Finance units
have a responsibility to advise and assist the camp commander as
well as maintain appropriate accounting records and process
transactions at summary level. The EPW camps are authorized one
finance officer and two finance enlisted soldiers to perform
these functions. The new MP Bn (PW) which replaces the EPW Camp
has one finance officer and three enlisted soldiers. In either
case, there is an underlying assumption that much of the detailed
recordkeeping and pay account processing will be done by EPWs,
CIs, or local nationals. The Army has an automated system called
Prisoner of War Information System (PWIS) for processing EPW
information; however, it has no finance module. AR 37-36
requires all EPW currencies and negotiable instruments to be
impounded. It requires detailed pay records and subsidiary forms
to be established for each EPW. Payroll processing is based on
full months. The only proration rule is for the initial month of
internment which provides for half of the monthly advance for
EPWs captured after the 15th of the month. Actual rates of
advance pay for EPWs is based on Swiss Franc amounts established
in the 1949 Geneva Convention. An exchange rate to U.S. Dollars
is established by the State Department. The Theater Commander
determines CI allowances. Army regulations are silent on how or
who determines work pay rates. It should be noted that EPWs are never actually paid. Advances of pay and work pay are posted to an EPW’s account from which he may buy articles at a camp canteen. Upon transfer or repatriation of the EPW, the balance in the account is retained by the U.S. Government and the EPW is provided a credit receipt to be ultimately honored by his own government.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) Proponency for EPW payroll processing should clearly rest with the DCSPER, not DFAS. Camp responsibilities now contained in AR 37-36 should be transferred to AR 190-8.

(a) Payroll processing requirements should be delineated in greater detail to include provisions for prorating over partial months and requirements when EPWs are held less than a full payroll cycle before transfer/repatriation. When allowed by law, rates of pay and allowances should be set at simple, rounded amounts.

(b) Policy and procedures for impounded and confiscated currency require revision. Rules governing impoundment of currency should allow EPWs to retain nominal amounts. Responsibilities for setting investigation thresholds should be clearly delineated. Policy should be established governing confiscated allied and enemy currencies.

(2) Finance office responsibilities should be contained in AR 37-1, for accounting and AR 37-103, for disbursing. AR 37-36 should be abolished. Basic funding for EPW payrolls should
come from a special allotment rather than normal mission funds.

(3) EPW/CI payroll processing requirements should be automated as a part of PWIS. Ideally, PWIS should also contain an interface to the Standard Finance System - Redesign Module I (SRD I) tiered version.

(4) EPW camp assets required for payroll processing and canteen bookkeeping should be evaluated via a MARC study and increased appropriately.

c. Recommendations:

(1) DCSPER revise AR 190-8 to include all MP responsibilities now contained in AR 37-36. This revision should address current deficiencies noted in para. 7a.

(2) DFAS eliminate AR 37-36 and include appropriate finance responsibilities in AR 37-1 and AR 37-103.

(3) DCSPER add a payroll processing module to PWIS.

(4) TRADOC conduct a MARC study and develop realistic manpower requirements in the MP Bn (PW) TOE for EPW/CI payroll processing and canteen operations.

(5) The Theater Army Provost Marshall should include specific requirements and policy for EPW payroll processing and canteen operations in his operational plans.

(6) If the MP Camps do not have sufficient resources to perform their mission, they should request additional resources from the Theater Army Provost Marshall. It is not a finance responsibility to perform under-resourced MP Bn (PW) missions.

d. Submitted by: 800th MP Bde (PW)
31. **ISSUE:** Medical Support for EPW (JULLS No. 42302-89700 (00001)).

   a. **Discussion:**

      (1) Medical assets organic to EPW camps are insufficient to meet the needs of the camp and delayed inprocessing of EPWs, overtaxed attached medical personnel, and left EPW camps severely understaffed.

      (2) Due to manpower constraints, demands for medical support throughout the theater, and deficiencies in the unit MTOE, minimal medical support was provided at the EPW camps. AR 190-8, para 2-7 states that a medical examination will be given to EPWs upon arrival at EPW camps. The examination consists of weighing the EPW; detecting infestation and communicable diseases, especially tuberculosis, malaria and venereal disease; and determining the general state of health, nutrition and cleanliness of each EPW (AR 40-5). Medical assets organic to EPW camps had to be augmented by Echelon Above Corps medical assets to provide the initial physical screening required for all EPWs and to provide level I medical care at the camps.

   b. **Lessons Learned:**

      (1) Although the mission statement for the EPW camp structure includes the provision for medical care for both U.S. troops and the EPWs at that camp, the MTOE medical structure is inadequate to meet this need. One doctor with medic support cannot complete medical examinations on a 24 hour basis. Medics are not qualified to conduct medical examinations and therefore
cannot relieve the doctor at anytime without stopping the inprocessing.

(2) The right priority was not placed on the use of medical assets. The EPW unit S3 must get involved with having echelon priority shifts when necessary. Medical support for EPW operations should not have been a problem during Desert Storm. Enough medical assets were deployed to handle 10,000 allied casualties in the first 72 hours of combat. We had less than 400 casualties and not all of them were during the 100 hours of combat.

c. Recommendations: Change the MTOE of the EPW camps to include a clearing station with a minimum of four doctors, two patients assistants, and four dental teams per EPW camp with a population of 24,000 prisoners.

d. Submitted by: LIT EVERETT, ARCENT PMO; COL STOVALL, Commander, 401st EPW Camp.

32. ISSUE: Accountability of EPW.

a. Discussion:

(1) The large number of EPW, difficulties in tracking EPW in medical channels, and lack of information from Saudis on transferred EPW increased the difficulty in maintaining accountability of captured EPW.

(2) U.S. capabilities to account for EPW were severely challenged. The unexpected large number of EPW overburdened the existing EPW force structure, requiring non-EPW units to be assigned to the EPW mission. A second problem involved obtaining
information about EPW in medical channels and about those who had not been transferred to the HN. In many cases the EPW brigade was either not notified, or notified late concerning the EPW who had been admitted to military and civilian hospitals. Special teams had to be developed to seek out and process those EPW. Although procedures had been established to keep the U.S. informed of changes in status and location of U.S. transferred EPW, the HN failed to do so, limiting U.S. ability to maintain information on those prisoners.

b. **Lessons Learned:** The current system is not efficient or effective enough to handle large numbers of EPW in short periods of time.

c. **Recommendations:** Review current EPW force structure and design to provide adequate personnel to accurately account for EPW. Establish and enforce strict procedures to ensure accountability of EPW in medical channels and during transfer to HN.

d. **Submitted by:** 800th Military Police Brigade (PW).

33. **ISSUE:** Psychological Support for EPW Camps (JULLS No. 23343-55600 (00002)).

a. **Discussion:**

(1) The use of PYSOP teams for EPW operations was a combat multiplier in each EPW camp.

(2) PYSOP teams were used to conduct post and pretests of EPWs, and assist the commander in the pacification of the EPWs, and assist the camp S-2s in establishing an informant network.
U.S. force as interpreters. Students were trained on BRM, military organization, hand-to-hand combat and basic soldiers skills. Appropriately 65 students were further trained on EPW operations. Those students became the cornerstone of the interpreters used in the camps to inprocess EPWs and assist enclosure commanders in command and control. Since U.S. soldiers could not distinguish Arabic profanity and criticism being used by Kuwaiti interpreters, numerous incidents occurred. At one camp every interpreter was relieved and replaced by a Saudi interpreter. When the interpreters used profanity and rash criticism to 500 (+) EPWs, a small riot erupted. The camp reaction force quelled the incident.

b. **Lessons Learned:** If possible, use interpreters from the host nation.

c. **Recommendations:** If U.S. trained interpreters are not available, use interpreters from the host nation.

d. **Submitted by:** MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL

Desert Storm Collection Team.

35. **ISSUE:** Uniform Reporting Procedures.

a. **Discussion:** During Desert Storm, many requests were made for EPW information. Reports were produced on an ad hoc basis to serve many different needs at great cost in manhours. Reports produced from identical data for different purposes may lead to misinterpretation of the data. Frequent requests were made for coalition EPW data, which was not being collected by the NPWIC and had to be solicited from CENTCOM. Although the information
inside each compound. Because the teams performed unique functions inside each enclosure, they were called prisoner liaison teams. Prisoners relied on them constantly for information and assistance. During two riots at a camp, the PYSOP team communicated with the EPWs and compound representatives to quell the disturbances. Because the team had portable manpack loud speakers, it was able to communicate with the 600 plus prisoners in each component.

b. Lessons Learned: The PYSOP team is a combat multiplier in a EPW camp/EPW battalion. The team should be assigned to the camp/battalion commander, not OPCON or in direct support. The reporting chain of the PYSOP team chief and camp commander proved to be counter productive.

c. Recommendations: Assign a five man PYSOP team to each camp/battalion.

d. Submitted by: MAJ DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL

Desert Storm Collection Team.

34. ISSUE: Interpreters to Support EPW Operations (JULLS No. 14461-79300 (00001)).

a. Discussion:

(1) Kuwaiti students living in the United States at the time Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait were trained and used by the Army as interpreters.

(2) In early Feb 91 the Kuwaiti Government, in coordination with the JFKSOF, Ft. Bragg began training Kuwaiti students to perform duties as a paramilitary force to assist the
(2) The CH47 was the primary aircraft used. Initially, EPWs were transported without the use of seat belts inside of CH47s. Usually 55 to 60 EPWs were straddled seated on the floor of the CH47. In some cases, MP escort guard personnel accompanied the EPW to the camp. There were incidents where there were no MP escort onboard the aircraft. In every case, EPWs were not manifested and in 80 percent of the cases there were no capture tags on the EPWs. Since camps had no designated landing zones for aircraft, the CH47s landed in the first available place. In one instance, two CH47s with 57 EPWs landed inside the perimeter wire of the camp, thus blowing over several towers. Luckily, there were no MPs manning the towers. Neither the aircraft nor the camp could communicate with each other. Prior communications between the corps holding areas or division central points was nonexistent. Exchange of SOI information was never considered. The use of the aircraft emergency frequency couldn’t be used since camps did not have a UHF capability.

(3) Additionally, usually EPW internment facilities are designated "No Fly" areas. But the brigade never coordinated with the ARCENT G-3 to designate the location of the four camps as "No Fly Areas." Aircraft routinely overflew camps to observe EPWs.

b. Lessons Learned: When available, use Army aviation resources, preferably the CH47, to evacuate EPW. EPWs should only be transported in CH47s when seat belts and MP escort guard
was eventually available, it was not consistent and could not be verified.

b. **Lessons Learned:**

(1) Frequent requests for data on EPWs were redundant, time consuming, manpower intensive, and disruptive to the normal flow of EPW processing actions.

(2) Prior to the commencement of hostilities, joint EPW processing procedures to include accounting for and reporting the capture, evacuation, internment, and transfer of EPWs must be published and disseminated to all members of the allied coalition which transfer captured prisoners to the U.S.

c. **Recommendations:** USAMPS develop a uniform set of procedures and reports, similar to those found in NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs), that can be used in any theater, with the requisite modifications based on coalition force idiosyncrasies, and include it as an appendix in the revision of FM 19-40.

d. **Submitted by:** ARCENT PMO

### 36. ISSUE: Aircraft Support for EPW Operations (JULLS No. 14776-34600 (00001))

**a. Discussion:**

(1) Army helicopters were used extensively to transport EPW from division central collecting points to theater EPW internment facilities. This support proved to be the quickest and most efficient way to transport EPW; however, we did experience some significant problems using this method of EPW
personnel will be used. Camps must have designated landing areas. EPW camps must be designated as "No Fly" areas by the theater commander.

c. **Recommendations:**

(1) EPW doctrine be revised to include the proper procedures for transporting EPW by Army aviation assets.

(2) Comply with the Geneva Convention with regards to designating EPW camps as "No Fly" areas.

d. **Submitted by:** MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL

Desert Storm Collection Team.

37. **ISSUE:** Civilian Internees Mixed in with EPW (JULLS No. 14778-15400 (00002)).

a. **Discussion:**

(1) During the cease fire phase of Desert Storm, over 4,000 individuals, who had not been classified properly by the capturing units or division MP as either civilian internees or EPW, were transported as EPW to the theater EPW camps. In one case an 80 year old blind farmer with a cane was taken as a CI to the EPW camp. In another case, two 12 year old boys were taken to a EPW camp, thus creating disposition problems for the camp commander and his legal officer. Eventually, when the two camps in the west were forced to close due to overcrowded conditions and one camp in the east was reopened, displaced civilian camps were established and opened by the Saudi Government.

(2) During the planning phases of Operation Desert Storm, no provisions were made to establish basic policies and
procedures for the administration and internment of civilian internees, to include the designation of a CI camp. CI and EPW were mixed in the same camp.

b. Lessons Learned: Soldiers must be trained not to take every individual on the battlefield. Some may be refugees. MI personnel must work in conjunction with MPs at division central collecting points and corps holding areas to properly screen EPWs, CIs, and civilians.

c. Recommendations: Intensify the training of the capturing soldiers. Revise doctrine to ensure that MI screeners are employed at division central collecting points and corps holding areas. Ensure that displaced persons camps are planned and operated when conditions warrant them to be opened.

d. Submitted by: MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL
Desert Storm Collection Team.

EPW Camp Operations

38. ISSUE: Facility Construction Support Packages (JULLS No. 16758-09500 (00001)).

a. Discussion: The 800th Military Police Brigade’s construction and logistical requirements to support the large number of captured EPW placed a heavy burden on U.S. Army and HN support systems and seriously impacted on the build up of forces in the theater. Many theater personnel workdays were expended in pursuit of construction/logistical support for EPW operations. In a rapidly maturing theater, prioritization of limited resources and time restraints always impact on mission
preparedness. If the theater EPW brigade had been permitted to deploy with its required construction/logistical materials and supplies, EPW facilities may have been established more quickly and more efficiently.

b. Lessons Learned: The U.S. Army can enhance theater EPW operations by authorizing EPW camps to have "on the shelf" requisitions and/or prepackaged construction materials and other logistical support items in shipping containers for deployment in 8k prisoner capacity increments. Once in theater, shipment containers could be used for inventory control and security of consumable items. As construction materials are used, emptied containers could, with predeployment modifications, become operational facilities for deployed EPW units. When feasible, construction/logistical packages should be prepositioned in support of contingency plans.

c. Recommendations: When EPW operations are anticipated, logistical support packages should be deployed with the responsible MP operations for the initial 90 days of the contingency.

d. Submitted by: MAJOR DUNCAN, ARCENT PMO.

39. ISSUE: Material Handling Equipment (MHE) for EPW/CI Battalions (JULLS No. 23338-18700 (00003)).

a. Discussion:

(1) The lack of MHE equipment at each EPW camp made routine operations extremely hard.

(2) Since each camp was the equivalent of a light
division, the amount of supplies, food, and equipment was tremendous. Since a forklift is not authorized in a camp/EPW battalion, much of the labor was done by hand. S&Ps would arrive expecting to be downloaded quickly and return to their point of origin, but in most cases the drivers left the trailers for the camps to off load by hand. In every instance, the supplies were downloaded at logistical support centers and uploaded to be delivered to camps.

b. **Lessons Learned:** Forklifts are needed for each EPW/CI camp/battalion.

c. **Recommendations:** Add one 10,000 pound forklift with operator to the EPW/CI Camp/Battalion MTOE.

d. **Submitted by:** MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL Desert Storm Collection Team.

40. **ISSUE:** Food Distribution Specialists for EPW/CI Battalions/Camps (JULLS No. 23336-88900 (00002)).

a. **Discussion:**

(1) The volume of food and supplies that must be distributed to enclosures and compounds requires the assistance of a food distribution specialist.

(2) Each camp had a different method of feeding EPWs. Only two out of the four camps fed "A" rations to EPWs. Since the average camp population was in excess of 11,000 EPWs, food service managers had a difficult time distributing food to each enclosure and then to each compound. Food distribution specialists were needed at each camp. Future planners need to
consider that a camp is the equivalent to a light division, and
in the future the EPW/CI battalion will be equivalent to a
brigade.

b. **Lessons Learned:** One of the most important ways to raise
the morale of enemy troops which directly assists the EPW and
PSYOP forces in the EPW camps to attain the cooperation of the
EPW and identify malcontents, rabble rousers, etc., is to provide
the EPW camp population timely, adequate and acceptable rations.
In order to do this, you must have a sufficient number of food
distribution specialists to support the camp population.

c. **Recommendations:** Add a food distribution section to the
EPW/CI Camp/Battalion MTOE.

d. **Submitted by:** MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL
Desert storm Collection Team.

41. **ISSUE:** Safeguarding Personal Effects - Money (JULLS No.
14449-53900 (00002)).

a. **Discussion:**

(1) 

(2) Routinely, during the inprocessing of EPW, money was
not confiscated from EPW for safekeeping.

(3) Initially, one camp began confiscating money from
EPWs for safekeeping. Other camps did not even set up a finance
station in its inprocessing lines. A decision was made by the
brigade commander to allow EPWs to keep the equivalent of $300.
However, many EPWs arrived with much more money, and it was not
confiscated. As a result, EPWs were buying cigarettes from other
EPWs; rumors of guards selling cigarettes to EPWs; and money being used to bribe prisoners to do work or other activities.

b. Lessons Learned: Money must be confiscated from EPWs when they are inprocessed into the internment facilities. At least five finance specialists must be assigned to MP camps or EPW/CI battalions to properly account for money and maintain financial guards of work performed.

c. Recommendations: Ensure AR 37-36 and AR 190-8 and FM 19-40 are complied with during inprocessing of EPWs in internment facilities. Relook the number of finance specialists authorized in MP camps/EPW battalions for 24 hour sustainment operations.

d. Submitted by: MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL Desert Storm Collection Team.

42. ISSUE: Safeguarding Personal Effects - Personal Property (JULLS No. 14463-42300 (00003)).

a. Discussion:

(1) In accordance with AR 190-8, para 2-11, e., "the commanding officer of the camp where the EPW is interned will be responsible for storing and safekeeping impounded personal effects. Such property will be marked or otherwise identified. When necessary, the property will be bound or packaged."

(2) During the ground campaign, capturing soldiers and sometimes MP confiscated wallets, rings, watches, and numerous personal items (to include rank insignia from officers) from EPWs without proper documentation. Items were placed in huge garbage bags in total disregard for separation and shipped to internment
facilities in the COMMZ. It is physically impossible to return personal property to EPWs at this point. The problem was further complicated since EPW camps in the west were being turned over to the Saudi Arabia National Guard Army.

b. **Lessons Learned:** Don't confiscate property from EPW without property documentation. When faced with large numbers of EPW, consider searching the EPW for weapons and items of intelligence value and leave the confiscation of personal effects to the theater MP. If this is not feasible, consider using sand bags, with the property portion of the capture tag, to secure the EPW's property.

c. **Recommendations:** Train soldiers on the proper procedures for safeguarding EPW personal effects. Reexamine the feasibility of having the TA escort guards or processing company personnel be responsible for the initial safeguarding of personal effects, minus weapons and items of intelligence value, in lieu of the capturing units and division and corps MP, especially when evacuating and processing large numbers of MP in short periods of time.

d. **Submitted by:** MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL Desert Storm Collection Team.

43. **ISSUE:** Using MP Guard Companies to Assist in Inprocessing EPW (JULLS No. 14450-91000 (00003)).

a. **Discussion:**

(1) MP PW Processing Companies (MTOE 19-237) are assigned to the MP PW brigade on the basis of one per corps to receive,
search, and process EPW/CI. These units are capable of processing approximately 90 PW per hour.

(2) Due to the number of EPWs arriving at MP camps needing to be processed, a guard company was used at each camp to inprocess EPWs. Guard company personnel were used at strip search, property, shower and delousing, and fingerprint stations. MPs also escorted EPWs through the inprocessing line and guarded holding areas.

b. **Lessons Learned:** A guard company is needed to assist the processing company during inprocessing. When the new EPW/CI battalion is on board, a guard company would be absolutely essential for the success of the processing mission.

c. **Recommendations:** Expand the doctrinal mission of the MP guard companies to include a secondary mission of being prepared to conduct PW processing operations. Additionally, allocate a guard company to each camp/battalion to assist with the PW processing mission, especially when the projected EPW capture rate exceeds the capability of the EPW processing company to efficiently, effectively, and rapidly handle the large numbers of EPW.

d. **Submitted by:** MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL, Desert Storm Collection Team.

44. **ISSUE:** Standardize the Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) for EPW Camps (JULLS No. 14451-84400 (00004)).

a. **Discussion:**

(1) The quick reaction forces for each camp were
different, improperly equipped, and in some instances not tactically located to respond in a timely manner.

(2) In order for a quick reaction force to be effective and responsive to disturbances in camps, it must be tactically located in the general vicinity of the enclosures. Two out of four camps had their QRFs within the berm of the camp. One camp did not have a dedicated QRF due to employing two MPs per tower in the camp and using guard companies to guard ASPs and POL facilities. This camp’s QRF were off duty MPs. Body armor vests, face and body shields, LBE and protective masks were not standard equipment in each camp. In the absence of a good brigade SOP for the QRF, there was no standardization of QRFs. In one instance, the QRF was called out twice to quell disturbances in one camp. Since the QRF was a company sized element that was within minutes of the enclosures, they were able to respond quickly. However, many MPs were injured when EPWs began throwing rocks at the QRF. The QRF did not have face shields and body shields thus causing 12 MPs to sustain rock injuries. Rocks also damaged their vehicles when rocks smashed windshields.

b. Lessons Learned: At least a company sized unit must be the QRF for a 12,000 EPW internment facility. The QRF must be equipped with face and body shields, body armor vests, protective masks, kelvar, LBE, CS dispensers, manportable loud speaker systems, and dedicated vehicles. An interpreter must also accompany the QRF to communicate with EPWs. Configure vehicles
to withstand rocks by covering windshields with wire mesh or other forms of covering to protect occupants.

c. **Recommendations:** Include more guidance for QRF elements in doctrine. Ensure a good SOP is in place at the highest level to ensure standardization of QRFs in the brigade.

d. **Submitted by:** MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL Desert Storm Collection Team.

45. **ISSUE:** Female MP Used Inside the Wire at EPW Camps (JULLS No. 23345-65300 (00004)).

   a. **Discussion:** There was no consistent policy for using females inside enclosures. At one camp, a female MP guard was used to guard EPW in a compound. In one instance, she entered the compound to respond to a call for assistance. At another camp, female MP could only work in the enclosure TOC. Since there was no guidance from the brigade, female MP were employed differently. In numerous instances, they worked around EPW with only their T-shirt on, especially the female medics.

   b. **Lessons Learned:** In view of the Arab outlook and treatment of women, females should not be assigned to camp/battalion compound teams. Female medics should not enter the wire to treat EPWs on sick call. Female MP in guard companies worked well in towers where they were not in direct contact with EPWs.

   c. **Recommendations:** That female MPs be assigned to guard company only. That all female MP remain in the proper uniform at all times. That the battalion/brigade publish guidance as soon
as possible before operations begin.

d. **Submitted by:** MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL Desert Storm Collection Team.

46. **ISSUE:** Recreation Areas Inside Enclosures in EPW Camps (JULLS No. 14454-13800 (00001)).

   a. **Discussion:** Recreation areas were constructed in enclosures but never used. By doctrine, each enclosure in a MP camp has a recreation area that is the same size as a compound. This area was never used for recreation by EPW. Due to space constraints, two camps did not build recreation areas, but enlarged compounds to hold a projected 1000 EPW, conduct formations, and for sporting activities. The two camps that did have recreation areas did not use them due to control problems, the amount of weapons in the corridor used by guards personnel, and the amount of traffic in the corridor used to transport supplies, guards, water, and EPWs.

   c. **Recommendations:** Delete recreation compounds from doctrinal literature. Emphasize the construction of compounds in sufficient size so EPWs can play sporting events and hold formations.

   d. **Submitted by:** MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL Desert Storm Collection Team.

47. **ISSUE:** Air Attack Trenches (JULLS No. 14455-56300 (00002)).

   a. **Discussion:** Two camps had engineers dig air attack trenches in the middle of compounds. Some guard believed that the trenches were there for EPW to be placed in the event of a
disturbance. The trenches in each compound were three by four by 50 feet; hardly big enough to hold the compound's capacity for 500 or 600 EPWs. The trench was used as a trash pit in most compounds.

b. **Lessons Learned:** Don't construct trenches inside compounds. Since compounds were poorly lighted, the trenches became a safety hazard at night.

c. **Recommendations:** Don't construct air attack/"put down trenches" inside compounds. Standardize the construction of EPW camps/enclosures/compounds in the Brigade Tactical SOP.

d. **Submitted by:** MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL

Desert Storm Collection Team.

48. **ISSUE:** Berms Between Compounds (JULLS No. 23344-96600 (00003)).

a. **Discussion:** When building compounds, try to build them so prisoners in each compound are screened from each other for control purposes. Many of the control problems experienced were a direct result of EPWs between compounds being able to talk or pass objects to each other. In one instance, a riot started in one compound and spread to four others. As a result, 400 military policemen were used as a QRF to quell the incident. Had berms been constructed between each compound and in front control, problem would have been minimal.

b. **Lessons Learned:** Berms should be used around the entire compound. If chain length fencing is going to be used, then blinders should be used to shield one compound from another.
c. **Recommendations:** Construct berms around each compound for control.

d. **Submitted by:** MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL Desert Storm Collection Team.

49. **ISSUE:** Access Rosters at Sally Ports (JULLS No. 23334-92000 (00001)).

a. **Discussion:** Sally port operations at each EPW camp were different and at some enclosures totally disorganized and confusing. Each camp/enclosure had guard companies guarding sally ports. One camp had an effective sally port operation where visitors were required to sign a sign-in/out log which were maintained by sally port personnel. They had communication with the enclosure commanders, and EPWs were searched when they entered the sally port gate. The two gate concept was employed where only one gate was open at one time. Usually an NCO with two MP guards were employed at the sally port. The sergeant of the guard usually established a TOC in close proximity to the sally port. One enclosure constructed its sally port where an EPW holding area was used. This holding area prevented the searching of PWs from interfering with vehicular traffic. This holding areas was adjacent to the vehicular gate with two small openings on the inside of gate one and one just prior to gate two.

b. **Lessons Learned:** A small holding area needs to be constructed adjacent to the vehicular port operations. An NCO and two guards with communications is necessary for an effective
operation.

c. **Recommendations:** That doctrine be modified for sally port operations for EPW enclosures. An NCO with two MP guards and some form of communications with the enclosure commander is required. Sally ports must be constructed with EPW holding area to prevent interference with vehicular traffic. That the sergeant of the guard establish operations near the sally port to command and control the sally port guard, tower guards and escort personnel. That a visitor's sign in/out log system be used.

d. **Submitted by:** MAJOR DAVID ZEIGLER, MP SME, CATA CALL Desert Storm Collection Team.


30. Ibid.

31. Ibid, G-3 Section of the Briefing, p. 7.

32. Ibid, Commander of the 403rd MP Camp, p. 2.

33. Ibid, Commander of the 402nd MP Camp, p. 12.


36. Ibid, p. 43.


41. Ibid.


47. Ibid, p.15.


49. Briefing Packet, 89th MP Brigade, no date, but the cover chart is initialed indicating that the Bde Cdr had seen the briefing on 21 Feb 91, subject: Desert Shield/Desert Storm Azimuth Check, p. 5-6.


57. Ibid.


60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.


65. LTC David W. Marlin, Commander of the 4/37 Armor Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st ID (M), "EPW Vignette for 24th (G-Day), no date.


71. Appendix 1 (EPW Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to the 14th Military Police Brigade Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm Command Report, unknown date, p. 5.


74. Appendix 1 (EPW Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to the 14th Military Police Brigade Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm Command Report, Unknown Date, p. 5.


79. Ibid. p.2


82. Ibid.


85. Appendix 1 (EPW Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to the 14th Military Police Brigade Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm Command Report, unknown date, p. 4.

86. Ibid.


103. This information was extracted from page 6-7 of the enclosure to Memorandum, Headquarters, 89th MP Bde, ATTN: AFVP-S3, (4AID), 7 Nov 90, subject: OPLAN (Theater EPW Camps) - Draft.


105. This description of the 82d Airborne Division’s Team Concept for receiving, processing, and evacuating EPWs in the Division’s AO was written and provided to the author by the Deputy Provost Marshal of the 82d Airborne Division, Major John Della Jacono. Major Della Jacono was one of the driving forces behind the development of this very effective concept. Major Della Jacono’s input was modified slightly to ensure standardization of terminology, i.e., the term displaced persons was replaced by the doctrinally correct term dislocated civilians and for clarification of the role played by the CA teams in assisting with the division MP’s EPW operations.


108. Much of the information contained in this appendix was provided to the author by LTC Mike Sullivan, the commander of the 503d Military Police Battalion during the Gulf War. This information was provided to the author during two interviews held on 5 and 28 March 1992 at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

109. 16th MP Bde (ABN) Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Review, 16th MP Bde (ABN), Ft Bragg, no date, p. 20.

110. Ibid, p. 23.

111. Ibid, p. 72.
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Sullivan, Micheal L., LTC, USA, Student at the US Army War College (Former Commander of the 503rd Military Police Battalion During Desert Storm), Interview by author, 5/26 March 1992, Carlisle Barracks.


Telephone Conversation Between LTC Hock Spenser, USMC, Commander, 1st FSSG (FWD), and LTC Jon F. Bilbo, U.S. Army War College, Class of 1992, 19 March 1992, subject: MARCENT EPW
Operations During Operation Desert Storm.


