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THE SECURITY IN EUROPE IN THE NEW ORDER: ERA - THE FUTURE OF THE NATO

BY

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This paper is a study of the security of Europe and the future of NATO, after the tremendous changes which have recently occurred in Europe. The changes were very rapid and covered all of Europe. The collapse of the Communist world and the demise of Soviet Union dominate the Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the unification of Germany and the integration of EC dominate in Western Europe. Perhaps most importantly, for the first time of all its history, Europe is not divided and there is not considerable enmity among European states. So the security of the new Europe must be changed in order to cope with the new challenges, but, at the same time, a new security equation must recognize that US interests in Europe continue to be vital. This paper notes the changes, the current conditions and the trends in Europe, and suggests some ideas about the security framework in Europe, and the Transatlantic link.
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THE SECURITY IN EUROPE IN THE NEW ORDER ERA
THE FUTURE OF THE NATO

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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INTRODUCTION

The past two years have seen extraordinary, historic changes in Europe. The revolutionary change in the nations of Eastern Europe have been more wide-ranging and sweeping than anything we have seen in the last 40 years. Noncommunists now lead each of the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states. The Soviet Union has been dismantled and new countries have emerged from the territories of the former Soviet Union. On the other hand, Germany has been unified, and the European Community (EC) is increasingly integrated, self-reliant and prosperous. In addition the process of mutual understanding between the West and East has led from the first Conference on Security and Cooperations in Europe (CSCE) held in Helsinki in 1973, to the institution of the CSCE of 48 states (1992). Under mandate of the CSCE the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) was signed in November 1990 in Paris.

"The Cold War is over" but the numerous changes in so many areas and the rapidness of these changes have resulted in ambiguity and risks. Risks have resulted from not only the collapse of the Soviet Union but over-population, movement of refugees, religious fanaticism, territorial disputes and serious economic, political and social difficulties. Change often brings fear and uncertainty; rapid change, unpredictability and injustice. History teaches that fear, uncertainty, unpredictability and injustice are often the roots of war. It will take time for individual nations and collective institutions to cope with these changes and develop correct responses.
As the world is changing so is the concept of security. Security had been understood primarily in the military sense and was based upon a group of sovereign states, protecting their territory from the aggressive intent of an opposing power block.

Since 1949 Europe was dependent on collective security through the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) for its defense. In the future a different type of collective security arrangement will likely be necessary with the demise of the Soviet Union.

There are many institutions in Europe to resolve problems. Europeans will have to learn to make the best of these institutions. The three main security institutions are the CSCE, the WEU and the NATO.

In the writer's opinion the best for the changing future remain so far NATO. NATO has four advantages; it links European countries, the USA and Canada, it is accepted by all European countries, it has been highly successful and NATO has proven it possesses the unique capability to consult and to act.

This paper will discuss the changing security arrangements in Europe and determine how NATO can fulfill these in the future.
CHAPTER I

Collapse of the Communist World

Since 1989, profound political changes have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe. The failure of reform which President Gorbachev started in 1985, not only brought Soviet society to a virtual economic collapse but the attempted coup of last August (1991) acted as a catalyst for the total collapse of the communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, the pace of changes in the Soviet Union have accelerated in recent months to the point that the USSR no longer exists. Even the ephemeral concept of a Soviet USS or Union of Sovereign States appears to be quickly passing into oblivion. The resultant centrifugal forces of independence-minded republics have led to the dismemberment of the Soviet Union probably shattering hopes of maintaining any kind of future federation of republics.

The disintegration of the Soviet empire threatens the world with the danger of regional war. History warns us that the international systems deals poorly with the collapse of great empires and often their demise sparks war. Thus the slow collapse of the Turkish empire during 1832-1914 was the catalyst for four great crises (European crises of 1832-33, 1839-40, 1875-78 and 1908, the Crimean War, the Balkan Wars of 1885 and 1912-13 and the First World War). The disintegration of the Austrian empire likewise helped spark the First World War, by spurring Austria to lash out against Serbia for its subversion in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The dismantling of the European empires in Asia and Africa were followed by great violence among the newly independent peoples.

The demise of the Soviet empire has brought the end of the Cold War and freedom for millions who have suffered Moscow's subjugation and, consequently should be celebrated for these reasons. Conversely, it also conjures up dangers like those that accompanied the demise of other empires and has the potential to trigger war. These dangers arise from three specific sources: the unsettled nature of borders in Eastern Europe; or the emergence of a new nationalism in this region; and the intense conflict from nationality conflicts.

Many borders in the region lack any type of legitimacy, especially those in the former USSR, where some were arbitrarily established by Stalin. This sets the stage for border wars in the region as Moscow's authority continues to evaporate.

Smaller regional conflicts are already in process. These conflicts are made more dangerous became Eastern Europe is a virtual patchwork of Nationalities which will be extremely difficult to untangle in the coming years. As an example, one part of the former Soviet Union consisting of the Baltic States Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia - are independent. The Ukraine and Byelorussia have declared their independence. In central Asia Georgia, Armenia, Kazakstan and Azerbaijan are heading in the same direction. Minorities (like the Volgar Germans) which under communist control had been stripped of the "rights" now demand "rights" if not some type of autonomy.
These problems are becoming increasingly evident because the dissolution of the former Soviet Union has been accelerating. Even the proposed Federation of the former Soviet Republics has had difficult times and few citizens now support the concept. It seems likely that the dissolution of the Soviet Union will occur and many new fully independent countries will develop.

Simultaneously, the military establishment of the communist world followed its fortune. From the early 1950s the Soviets had used the Warsaw Pact to coordinate military planning doctrine, to create a conditional combined arms capability based upon a politically reliable Eastern European officer corps and to develop combined military training and exercise.¹

In addition Soviet doctrine in the 1980s created the high commands in the western and south-western TVDs to control coalition forces during the threat of war or in wartime. This concept was strengthened by the adoption of the so-called "Statute" which provided the Soviets with a mechanism to "chop (or alert) non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces to Soviet control. In effect, the creation of new TVD commands, plus changes in procedures to NSWP forces, defined the subordination of those forces to the Soviet Supreme High Command in Moscow and satisfied the Soviet requirement that war be fought with coalition armies acting as a single unified force.²

The revolutions of 1989 effectively discharge these Warsaw Pact institutions and practices. Removing the communist party from East European armed forces together with the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact on April 1991 allowed these countries to reassume command and control of their armed forces. After the Pacts abolition there is not any official contact or influence on security affairs among the former USSR and East European countries. Furthermore, the withdrawal of all the Soviet forces from the former satellites will be complete in 1994.

The disappearance of the WP has left a vacuum of national security in the East Europe. As a consequence, some of the East Europeans have begun the process of developing liaison with NATO and even discussing the possibility of NATO membership.
CHAPTER II

Threats in Eastern Europe
Nationalities Issues in Russia

It is important to remember that the period of stability since World War II is the exception rather than the rule. The 50 years of peace enjoyed in Europe is one of the longest periods of peace since the height of the Roman empire - the most formative period of its early history.

The map in Europe is once again in transition, due to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. As the former Soviet Union has disintegrated long-suppressed ethnic tensions have flared up in its former satellites. To further complicate matters, the list of new candidates for nationhood grows longer every week, threatening to upset the peaceful trends of the last 50 years.

Nationalism and the religious feelings which the Bolsheviks fought fanatically for almost a century are now stronger than in the Tsarist era. In the long term, communist suppression may have helped the people to understand the necessity of "National Identity" and "religion" and now better appreciate freedom and human rights. The victory of these ideas over communist theory now seems complete.

States such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, White Russia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan some of which briefly emerged as independent states in the early 20th century, are now re-emerging. The Lithuanian move toward independence in 1990 was followed by Estonia and Latvia which declared their independence
last September (1991), and immediately sought diplomatic recognition in the West. In Central Europe, the Ukraine, Russia and Byelorussia have declared their independence. In Central Asia, Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are heading in the same direction. Even the Cossacks many thought had lost their special identity have re-emerged. The future of other "Soviet Republics" is unknown yet.

The old disputes among these "Nationalities" both within their states and with their neighbors is an opportunity for bitter national conflicts.¹ The potential for future conflict becomes evident when you look at the statistics. The "Soviet population" totals some 262 million people, comprising at least 104 nationalities. Of these a total of 64 million (24 percent) either live outside their home republic, or are among the 89 small nationalities with no titular republic. These people will thus be minorities in the successor states to the dismantled Soviet Union (assuming that all 14 non-Russian republics secede but are not further sub-divided). Of these 64 million some 39 million (15 percent of total Soviet population) are members of nationalities that have a titular republic, but live outside of it; these include 24 million Russians (17 percent of all Russians) and 15 million members of other nationalities (15 percent of all such nationalities). Another 25 million people (9 percent of the total Soviet population) are members of the 89 smaller nationalities without titular home republics, who will be minorities wherever they live.⁴

As is obvious from these statistics the Soviet Union like
Tsarist Russia will thus be riddled with national conflicts. These conflicts will arise from demands by the nationalities to annex territory from other republics which have ethnic enclaves inhabited by their Nationality. Conflicts could also result from complaints against the oppression of national kin who live across accepted borders and from demands by the small stateless nationalities for autonomy or secession from the republics where they reside. If large numbers of people are expelled from their homes, these expellees may call for revenge or the recovery of lost land and property.

By mid-1990 the Soviet Union already had over 600,000 internal refugees who had fled from oppression by other nationalities and hundreds had died in communal violence. By late 1991 that toll had risen to 3,000-4,000 deaths and nearly 2,000,000 refugees, according to US State Department officials. Border disputes may also arise among the republics because some republics and nationalities may claim larger borders dating from the period prior to the communist revolution of 1917.

Furthermore, in the former Soviet Union there are many muslims who mainly live in central Asia. Not only is this a rapidly growing element but the influence of the fundamental muslims can cause severe problems. Could these disputes result in a regional or even a larger war that spreads into central or western Europe? Certainly the risk of a general war in the west Europe is less likely than in the past. The threat of Nuclear war has made most countries more hesitant to go to war and, furthermore the death of
the Warsaw Pact has dissolved the two opposing power blocks. Still the instability in the former USSR region is very dangerous.

**Nuclear Weapons Control**

The nationalities issue, however is not the only problem facing the former Soviet Union. A serious problem is the security of nuclear weapons. The security of nuclear weapons is not currently sufficient, and nuclear weapons are not under central control. Gorbachev warned (November 1990) "If we begin to split from each other . . . a terrible war will take place. We cannot divide the army, the nuclear weapons. All this may turn into a catastrophe not just for our country but for the whole world." On other occasions, Gorbachev has spoken darkly of the danger of "15 nuclear states". Now that the (Feb. 1992) USSR is dismantled, these dangers are becoming obvious. As an example, the Ukraine alone has 20 percent of all ICBMs and one-third of the bombers and 25 percent of all stored nuclear munitions. Sevastopol, under Ukrainian control remains the Crimean headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet.

More important than where these strategic weapons are deployed are the safeguards against their misuse. It is widely agreed that the Soviet government clearly intends to maintain tight central control over its strategic arsenal. Indeed, until the 1960s Soviet warheads were stored entirely separate from their missiles, under KGB control. Even today the general much lower readiness status of Soviet nuclear forces compared to that of US forces is widely
attributed to Moscow's greater concern with ensuring central control.  

Less is known about safeguards on Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). By comparison, US SLBMs have no PALs (Electronic locks, Permissive Action Locks) but launch procedures are set up to make life difficult for a mad missile-launcher. The missiles could not be launched unless virtually the entire sub's officer corps were enlisted in the project, and most of the crew convinced that genuine launch orders have been received. In the Soviet case, there is some suggestion that even SLBMs may carry PALs - though no one knows for sure. At a minimum, most US experts are convinced that Soviets sub's operate under some system of procedural safeguards similar to the US approach.

Unlike the US system, where the military controls both the weapons and the PALs, in the Soviet Union a whole separate political chain of command runs through the KGB to disseminate the PAL unlocking codes to the nuclear weapons operated by military-providing one extra line of central control. The KGB also reportedly maintains rigid control over the Soviet Union's large arsenal of tactical nuclear warheads, which typically are stored separately from their launchers in special depots.

Also, there is a personnel problem. Like the United States, the Soviet Union runs a Personnel Reliability Program to weed out unstable individuals with nuclear responsibilities. The "moral qualities" and "psychological condition" of officers and enlisted personnel are examined annually by a commission. The Soviet news
weekly "Argumentry i Fakty" reported, and every year four to six percent of nuclear weapons handlers "do not withstand this trial" and lose their clearance. The comparable figure for those washing out of the US reliability program typically runs about three percent annually - suggesting that either the Soviet military is afflicted with more screw-ups than that of the United States, or the Soviet reliability program is more rigorous.  

In any event, granted that food and housing shortages are almost as desperate for the Soviet military as they are for average Soviet citizens, a question remains: what would actually happen if hungry, mutinous or simply unreliable Soviet missileers did walk off the job or the worst are entangled to nationalistic dispute? "What will happen is that a lot of the very technical weapons will rot in their holes." Also, another troublesome possibility is that with the breakdown of central authority and emigration controls in the Soviet Union, an emigrant Soviet nuclear expert might emerge, eager to sell his services to the highest bidder.

The general question is: Is the situation as potentially dangerous as outsiders would have us believe? Does the danger exist of newly created independent states resorting to the use of nuclear weapons if internecine conflicts were to break out in that part of the world?

What can be stated with some certainty is that former Soviet strategic weapons seem to be in better shape than the tactical arsenal. It appears extremely unlikely that the former Soviet republics will become additional nuclear-armed semi-superpowers, or
even that a single strategic ballistic missile will be launched, fully armed, by accident or by renegades. While unlikely it could conceivably happen. Some other nightmare scenarios, however, such as the diversion of tactical warheads, appear more plausible.

The risks and uncertainties that accompany the process of change in the former Soviet Union, cannot be viewed in isolation from the fact that the conventional forces which made up the Soviet Army are significantly larger than those of any other European state. Even more serious, the large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States remain largely intact. These dangers create a western interest in helping to ensure that the former Soviet Union is dismantled peacefully.

Yugoslavia

A second area of concern in the wake of communism's collapse is Yugoslavia. In the Cold War period, with its periodic confrontations Yugoslavia was a country known for its stable internal system. This factor had an important impact on the stability and balance on the European and international scene.

Yugoslavia is a country which has seven borders, six republics, five nations, four languages, three religions, two alphabets. It was conceived by American President Woodrow Wilson who at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, considered as an optimum solution for the future of Serbia and Montenegro and the nationalities living in the territories of the two collapsed empires (Ottoman Empire and Austria Hungary).³
With the communism's collapse and the death of Tito in 1980, the old struggle between the Serbs and Croats for the upper hand in Yugoslavia have re-emerged and the centrifugal trends have become apparent not only among the Croats, but among all the nationalities which make up the country. In spite of all the efforts of those who think it desirable that Yugoslavia should be kept together by even a loose union of independent republics, the multiplicity of conflicting national groups and vast economic and social problems have brought the country to the edge of the abyss.

Thus, Yugoslavia today is confronted by a number of serious problems. The most serious of course that there can be no Yugoslavia without Serbia and Croatia, equal partners in the country's structure. This is complicated by the fact that other groups have achieved independence including the Albanians in Kosovo and the people of "Republic of Macedonia". All of this contributes to the upheaval with the results which cannot be forecast with accuracy. Behind the slogans of national autonomy each part of political leadership has its eye on power without, however, explaining how it would use it. Does Yugoslavia today have a chance of avoiding civil war and dissolution? The answer is unfortunately very little. Even the Yugoslavs themselves - from the Head of State to the ordinary citizen - cannot tell whether Yugoslavia exists or not.

The Yugoslav crisis, which is rather euphemic reference to the war going on in Yugoslavia, has already been considerably internationalized. The EC, the Council of Europe, the CSCE, the United
Nations, the Non Aligned Movement, the USA and Russia are "dealing" with Yugoslavia. From the initial discrete efforts to avoid the reputation of meddling in another nation's affairs, the community of nations has come to the stage of issuing ultimatums to Belgrade: stop the suicidal war or else economic sanctions and other repressive measures will follow.

The crisis and war in Yugoslavia have attracted international attention not only because of the dramatic and tragic nature of developments but also as they served as a warning of the course European relations may take. The legacies of both the Cold War period and of the more distant past have not only remained in the memory of the European people but have become the main concern of national policies. The mixed ethnic communities that make up the country and their attempts to base border on the implementation of the principle of right of a people to self-determination has resulted in today's instability. There is no doubt that the Yugoslavia crisis is now one of the main problems for the stability in Europe.

**Nationalism in East Europe**

In some respects what has occurred in Yugoslavia is an example of what could occur in other parts of Europe. With the virtual collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the unravelling of COMECON, and termination of Communist Party rule in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union's military economic and political instrument for controlling Eastern Europe have evaporated. Consequently, the Berlin Wall -
symbolizing a divided Europe - was torn down and German unification accelerated beyond most observers' wildest dreams (to include Germans themselves). In addition, historic forces of nationalism have significantly unravelled the strings which have held together two multinational states created at the end of World War I - the USSR and Yugoslavia. Their likely disintegration, either peacefully or violently will produce new European states, exacerbate ethnic tensions and irredentist claims, and create new European insecurities.

East Europe faces daunting tasks to create democratic political institutions and to create effective market economies. Although, East Europe will receive large amounts of Western aid (EC, USA) the challenges which East Europe will meet in the future will be difficult and arduous. More difficulties will face the new countries which will arise from the disintegration of USSR and Yugoslavia.

To understand the problems and prospects for building democracy and stability in post-Communist Europe, we must remember that the Cold War was not war on the battlefield, with the exception of the short, bloody battle to oust the director Nicolae Ceasescu and his "socialism in one family" in Romania, the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe came without the threat or use of force. This was a victory of ideas, not military hardware. There is no director of permanent cast of professional political actors. Those who remain must assume new roles.
The difference between Eastern Europe and post-Communist Europe must be kept in mind. The Eastern Europe we knew after World War II has disappeared. In geographic sense, it never existed. When scholars and policy makers talked about Eastern Europe, they used an ideological shorthand for political and economic boundaries that divided Europe into two blocks.

Eastern Europe included six members of the Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania) nonaligned Yugoslavia and isolated Albania. The eight states that make up this region ranged in size from tiny Albania, with a population of 3 million, to Poland, with 38 million people. The countries of the region had varying levels of economic developments, as well as different histories, nationalities, languages and religions.

The communist systems that came to power in Eastern Europe were thus superimposed on very different environments, and indigenous communist politicians operated under different restraints than in the Soviet Union. At the same time they had to function under the watchful eye of Moscow. For 40 years local political cultures eroded the ideological superstructures coming from Moscow. However, notwithstanding Yugoslavia's socialist self-management and Romania's national stalinism, the imperatives of the Communist sub-system, central economic planning, and the "leading role" of the party created a collective Eastern European identity from which even Yugoslavia was not immune.
The legacy of shared economic problems, high political expectations, and low political institutionalization flowing from that identity is the wellspring of Eastern Europe's multiparty political systems. Now the new governments face the problems of economic reform, ethnic hostility and territorial conflicts. Furthermore, they face a popular rejection of ideological, class-defined identity.

A look at any map of new or old Europe and the political implications of a return to historic national and ethnic identities are evident. The search for a new Yugoslavia could not withstand the June 1991 demands for Slovenia's and Croatia independence. These two republics' declarations of independence collided with the unwillingness of militant Serbs in Croatia to live in an independent Croate state. The determination of Serbian politicians to redraw Serbia's border before the dissident republics divorced themselves from a federal Yugoslavia was also evident.

Romanians and Hungarians squabbled over the issue of Transylvania. In Czechoslovakia, Slovak has become the official language of Slovakia, while the roughly half million ethnic Hungarians living in that part of the republic may use Hungarian for official business in communities where they make up at least 20 percent of the population. This spring Slovaks hurled abuse at President Havel in Bratislava, and he has submitted a bill to parliament to hold a referendum on Czech-Slovak unity. Even in Poland, where 38 percent of the population is Polish, there are demographic and legal questions concerning the ethnic Germans who reside in
territory that became part of Poland after World War II. Among the political parties proliferating through the region (by October 1990 some 172 were registered in Yugoslavia). Some are based on historic background and others are based on the protection of the rights of national minorities such as the Macedonians in Bulgaria, Hungarians, in Romania, or Gypsies in Czechoslovakia.

The search for identity increases the potential for violence both within the countries of Eastern Europe and between them. The road which the countries of Eastern Europe must follow is long and difficult. The leadership and peoples must have patience and prudence, for there are many dangers. It is possible the transition to the democracy and free market system to be very long and with bloodshed not only for those countries but for the rest of Europe.
CHAPTER III
Changes in Western Europe

There is no doubt that important changes have also taken place in Western Europe. The CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty, the unification of Germany and a single unified market of the EC by 1992 have altered the political and economic environment in Europe. These changes together with those that which took place in Eastern Europe have changed both the political and military stage in Europe.

Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty

Perhaps the most significant change is the CFE Treaty. The CFE Treaty, signed on November 19, 1990 by the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, is a landmark agreement that will establish parity in major conventional armaments between East and West from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Treaty includes an unprecedented monitoring regimen including a detailed information exchange, on-site inspection, challenge inspection and monitoring of arms destruction. The Treaty sets equal ceilings, from the Atlantic to the Urals, for each alliance, referred to in the treaty as "groups of states" in five armament categories: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. Although, the changes in the Soviet Union have reduced the meaning of CFE Treaty, the Treaty has three important political meanings: the treaty is a path to deeper cooperation on security,
it emphasizes the role of the USA and it includes a self-limitation of the new unified Germany.

First, the Treaty is a path to more substantive changes. In the last two years the death of Communism and the dissolution of the "East block" in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have gone a long way toward ending the Cold War and enhancing US and European security. The CFE Treaty locks in and deepens the military effects on those changes, and opens up the possibility for further military disengagement in Europe.

Besides, the participants in the Joint Declaration of twenty-two states "They pledge to work together with other CSCE participating states to strengthen the CSCE process so that it can make an even greater contribution to security and stability in Europe. They recognize in particular the need to exchange political consultation among CSCE participants and to develop other CSCE mechanisms. The participants are convinced that the CFE and agreement on a substantial new set CSBMs (Confidence of Security Building Measures) together with new patterns of cooperation in the framework of the CSCE, will lead to increased security and thus to enduring peace and stability in Europe."[13]

A key element in the New Europe is the continued participation of the US. The United States has played a significant role in European security since the early 1940's. A precipitous withdrawal would not be in the interests of European security. The CFE Treaty recognizes this concept and was signed between "Groups of States Parties" i.e. between NATO and WP. As a result, the USA and Canada
will continue to have a voice in Europe and NATO will remain the military bedrock on which the western collective security is based.

An important concept in the New Europe is a unified Germany with self-imposed limitations. It is no doubt that the Unified Germany will become a new political power in Europe and the world. However, the European countries do not easily forget Germany's role in two world wars and particularly the Nazi era. So it was prudent for the German leadership, in connection with the signatories of the Treaty to impose some limitations. This is in keeping with a declaration made by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs on 30 August 1990 in the plenary session of the Negotiations of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe which, reads as follows.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes to reduce the personnel strength of the armed forces of the unified Germany to 370,000 (ground, air and naval forces) within three to four years. This reduction will commence on the entry into force of the first CFE agreement. Within the scope of this overall ceiling no more than 345,000 will belong to the ground and air forces which, pursuant to the agreed mandate, alone are the subject of the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The Federal Government regards its commitment to reduce ground and air forces as a significant German contribution to the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe. It assumes that in follow-up negotiations the other participants in the negotiations, too, will render their contribution to enhancing security and stability in Europe, including measures to limit strengths.

The impact of German unification deserves additional consideration.
The Unification of Germany

While the largely bloodless revolutions of 1989 were felt throughout Europe, their impact was most significant and dramatic in Germany. Before these upheavals two diametrically opposed Germanies existed side by side; now there exists for the first time since 1945 one Germany. The postwar dichotomy of Europe into two alliances centered around the division of Germany has ended. This occurred with the Germans celebrating the formal reunification of Germany on October 3, 1990. After 45 years of division a single state with a population of 78 million became the most powerful economy in Europe. In the short run, however, Germany will face serious economical problems. Among these problems is the pledge of aid to the Soviet Union, a pledge which assisted with the rapid unification of Germany within NATO. Additional aid was provided to Germany's eastern neighbors in an attempt to gain influence with them in a time of flux. Finally, in order to improve its own country, Germany will spend substantial funds for the rebuilding and integration of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) into the unified Republic. Once this is accomplished Germany, will likely dominate Europe politically and economically. So Germany will be the central element of the future European balance of power.

German Potential For the Future

Germany is member of a number of European institutions, as well as NATO. In those institutions Germany has a foremost role
particularly, due to its economic power. So far, new Germany has acted with prudence although in the Yugoslavia's case, in contrast to his French and British counterparts, Kohl was among the first to raise the possibility of recognizing an independent Slovenia and Croatia.

German policy toward its immediate neighbors have exhibited a high level of altruism and a certain amount of self-interest. At the same time, German leaders have tried to reassure their closest major neighbors that the united Germany is unambiguously trustworthy. For example, the Franco-German defense cooperation has been at the heart of Germany's European policy since Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's tenure, and will remain so. Every emerging security problem has been faced both by Germany and France in a cooperative fashion.

Turning eastward, however, the Germans have adopted more unilateral approaches, with a heavy stress on mark diplomacy to include some emphasis on developing new economic markets. Germany has provided steady economic and diplomatic support for Soviet leadership as the best way to stabilize the situation and to acquire new markets for German goods.

In dealing with neighboring Poland the Germans seemed to show some flexibility. Germany provided economic aid, removed visa restrictions, and signed a controversial treaty recognizing the borders established at the end of World War II.

Once the Baltic republics gained their freedom, the Germans were quick to extend economic assistance and to establish Coethe
Institutes as a means of establishing a firm market and cultural position in these small countries.

On the other hand, new Germany plays a growing role in the EC and it is no longer a part of the European Club on a probationary status. It now belongs in its own right as the most efficient and largest European economy with just under 30 percent of Gross National Product of the European Community. Also, as EC considers shifting a role to Eastern countries and the former Soviet Union, Germany will play a more central role.

Perhaps of greatest significance the new Germany will have a more decisive role in the political and defense affairs in Europe and the world. Current German policy dictates that this role will be through NATO, WEU and CSCE.

The Europe of 1992

From almost any perspective Europe in the 1990s is and will be different. In 1985, the Commission of the European Communities issued a white paper entitled "Completing the Internal Market". That document provided a road map for the integration of the economies of the 12 member-states, through the unanimous ratification of the Single European Act in 1987, and provided the political authority necessary to get the process of economic integration underway.

Three major types of barriers to intro-European trade will be eliminated: physical (or frontier) barriers, technical barriers, and fiscal (tax) barriers. Those barriers affect the intra-
European movement of goods, services, people and capital. In February 1988 an agreement was reached at the European Community (EC) summit meeting in Brussels to reform community finances. This agreement may have resolved a major barrier to increased economic integration by providing the EC Commission with a budget that is large enough to carry the 1992 program.

Since the beginning of the decade EC has expanded its organization. On October 3, 1990 what was formerly East Germany and now a part of Germany became part of the community. To further expand European cooperation on October 22, 1991 the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) consisting of Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Switzerland, Austria and Liechtenstein, established an integrated trade area with the EC. Finally, on November 21, 1991 EC signed association agreements with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, giving those countries access to the free trade area by the end of the century though stopping short of full membership. These economic innovations were followed on 9th-10th December, 1991 by the Maastricht summit. This summit gave birth to landmark treaties on monetary and political union that will in time, be seen as one of the most important events in postwar European history.

Interpretations of the summit vary considerably. Some skeptics forecast its premature demise while starry-eyed idealists, hyped it as the beginning of the United States in Europe. A more realistic verdict is that Maastricht marked the first stop in an irreversible process of transforming the EC from a sophisticated trade block into a clearly identifiable political grouping.
Unquestionably, Maastricht's most solid achievement was the firm commitment to proceed to economic and monetary union (EMU) involving a single currency governed by a European Central Bank, this will be accomplished by 1999 at the very latest. The summit also agreed that as many as seven countries can move to a single currency by 1996 if they meet pre-set economic criteria.

While there are some doubts about the long-term political impact of Maastricht it seems obvious that EC is now on course for monetary union. EMU is the logical end goal for the EC's planned single market. Europe will never fully capitalize on the free flow of labors, capital, services and goods, across the community until business is able to trade with a single currency.

Compared to the EMU package the political union treaty is a slightly nebulous document reflecting the untidy compromises needed to bridge member states widely differing views on European integration. The political union treaty will be reviewed in 1996 to see whether the inter-government cooperation agreed at Maastricht can be brought under the EC umbrella. This will provide a useful four-year learning curve that will prove whether the EC can ever evolve into a politically homogeneous entity.

The governments decided for the first time to work toward "the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense." That will be done by strengthening a long-moribund military pact known as the Western European Union - to which 9 of the 12 member states already belong - and authorizing it to "elaborate and implement" community decisions of defense.
issues. According to current EC policy, all activities, however, must be compatible with existing commitments to the NATO.
CHAPTER IV

Need for Collective Security

Due to the enormous changes in Europe and the World, a new security order needs to be constructed for Europe. The task of organizing for tomorrow's peace may prove more complicated than ever before. Prior to the changes in Europe, political and military stalemate substituted for agreement. While this allowed some old wounds to heal, others continued to fester (Yugoslavia). The new order in Europe must mend these wounds while making sure old ones are not reopened. Prior to World War II, Europe had seldom been peaceful and had never been united.

The heart of the problem lies in the uncertainties about the transformations underway in the former communist world and particularly in the countries which have emerged from the former Soviet Union. These revolutionary changes may very well succeed in producing states that can be fully integrated into the mainstream modern Europe. The obstacles, however, are formidable. As always, the revolutions are in many respects the easy part. It is what comes afterward that is tough.

Since the industrial revolution set loose the forces of modern western society and the great empires of Europe began to crumble, Europe has lacked adequate political homogeneity to sustain any cooperative security arrangement, even one based on a balance of power. Such homogeneity does not yet exist and no one knows if it will be tomorrow. The East's fledgling democracies are fragile and, above all, the difficulties of creating democratic countries
from communist world seem staggering. Above all, a European security system must be created that is based on cooperation not confrontation, nuclear retaliation or on the balance of power. It must be a collective system based on democratic countries which share a domestic commitment to the dispute-settlement mechanism. Otherwise, the system will always risk falling prey to authoritarian regimes that not only reject the established rules of conflict resolution, but sometimes, create the proper circumstances for disputes and crisis.

The Western European countries have deep rooted democracies but the countries of the old communist world are struggling to obtain democratic regimes. So, the first task of the Western World is to help those countries to establish and to sustain both democracy and the free market system. What today's Europe needs is a hybrid system as it begins to build a new security order. Europe requires some elements of collective security to deal with a range of new issues that the collapse of the communist world is unleashing. At the same time Europe needs some elements of the former alliance structure adopted to the new conditions on the Continent. Such a security arrangement must be strong enough to help shape Europe but flexible enough to change with a Europe that will continue to involve.

Considering the events of this century, it is a challenge for Europeans to achieve security without organizing one-half of the Continent against the other. As Europeans look to the future, they share a fundamental desire to achieve security within a cooperative
framework. The meeting of Alliance Heads of State and Government in Rome on 7 and 8 November 1991 as well as the summit meeting of the leaders of EC countries in Maastricht on 9 and 10 December 1991, defined the security framework of the Europe in the future.

The security framework could be based on three security institutions; CSCE, WEU and NATO.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

The first institution is based on the CSCE which originated in the early 1970's. The first Conference took place in 1973, in Helsinki with 33 countries (31 European countries, the USA and Canada) attending. Its result was the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. Before November 1990, the main focus had been on three earlier conferences, Belgrade (1977), Madrid (1982-83) and Vienna (1986). The Vienna conference is notable because it resulted in a mandate for the conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and confidence Security Building Measures (CSBMs) negotiations.

The successful conclusion of those historic treaties and the changes in Europe, transformed the relations between the CSCE states. In November 1990, at the Paris conference, the CSCE was formally established as an institution with a secretariat in Prague, an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw, and a crisis prevention center in Vienna. Presently, the CSCE is hampered by the requirement for consensus which is unwieldy, given the number of participants. Furthermore, its institutions are new and have
not yet gained acceptance as a legitimate forum for problem resolution.

On the other hand CSCE has two serious advantages; CSCE is the only organization (except for the UN) which includes both the Western and Eastern states on an equal basis. Also, CSCE is the only security European organization (except for the NATO) which include the USA and Canada. As new states in Europe declare their independence CSCE will include a large number of new states, now (January 1992) it has 48 members.

The CSCE is expected to gain influence as a key forum for dialogue as its institutions mature. Because Europe's new security issues - reemerged nationalism, ethnic unrest, border disputes and ecological devastation - cannot be met through alliance arrangements alone and cannot wait for grand designs to be realized, new concepts will need to be used. Europeans need new forums in these spheres to which they can turn for cooperation, conflict avoidance, crisis management, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and Government in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 7-8 November 1991, points out that needs, paragraphs 13 and 14 are devoted to CSCE and clearly state

"We remain deeply committed to strengthening the CSCE process, which has a vital role to play in promoting stability and democracy in Europe in a period of historic change . . . consequently, we will actively support the development of the CSCE to enhance its capacity as the organ for consultation and cooperation among all participating states, capable of effective action in line with its new
increased responsibilities in particular on the questions of human rights and security including arms control and disarmament, and for effective crisis management and peaceful settlements of disputes . . .".]

The next meeting of the CSCE will open on 24 March, 1992, in Helsinki. This meeting will be decisive for the future, for the international prestige and the capability of the CSCE to play an effective role on the security of Europe.

**Western European Union (WEU)**

The WEU is originated from the Brussels Treaty in 1948 which was signed by Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom. The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy acceded to the Treaty on October 23, 1954. Portugal and Spain signed the protocol of accession on November 14, 1988. Greece will become a member in 1992 and Turkey will join as observer.

The WEU was mildly active in 1950s and entered a period of inactivity from 1973 to 1985 when the members decided to reactivate the union. The WEU played a key role in coordinating members activities in the 1988-89 Persian Gulf mine clearing operation and was active in coordinating member’s activities in the Persian Gulf War. WEU has noted that it does not have any restrictions concerning "out-of-area" activities. At the EC summit on 9 and 10 December, 1991 in Maastricht the WEU was designated as the defense arm of the EC.

WEU is a full institution with a number of active organs to include the WEU Council, the WEU Assembly, and six permanent
committees. However, there are many difficulties due to the disparity of its organs in many different countries, and to the lack of experience and procedures in the international arena. The will of the EC to move to a "Common Foreign and Security Policy" (CFSP) it seems likely that the WEU will cope with the bureaucratic problems which it faces but the key problem remain will WEU be compatible with the NATO alliance? Or more clearly in what ways will WEU be compatible with the American presence in Europe?

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO, signed in Washington on 4th April 1949, created an Alliance for collective defense as defined in Article 51 of the United Nations Chapter. The Alliance links fourteen European countries with the United States and Canada. NATO is the organization which serves the Alliance. It is an intergovernmental organization in which member countries retain their full sovereignty and independence.

In order to cope with the threat from the communist world since 1949 NATO has built on unique and exemplary network of infrastructures, installations, logistics, procedures and a command and control structure. For the last 40 years the NATO/Warsaw Pact confrontation was both militarily threatening and intellectual comfortable. Throughout this period, NATO was able to innovate in strategy and respond to new opportunities. But this was always within a constant political framework. Even up to August 1991
there was a continuity of concern in working out a "modus vivendi" with the Soviet Union.

Now there is no Soviet threat. Since there is no Soviet Union, NATO confronts not only a new agenda but a completely new set of interlocutors. The Warsaw Pact is dead and the Soviet Union—along with its military machine has fallen apart. But NATO does not need a clear or singular threat to justify its continued existence. For now, stability and cooperation is what Europe needs. Thus the Alliance can fulfill its security mission, but that mission has changed fundamentally. Its center of gravity has moved from the military role to the political role, from confrontation to cooperation, from peace keeping to peace building, from the staving off of a clear and present danger to the more long term and prudent provision against future risks.

In addition to providing for stability in Europe and furnishing the trans-Atlantic link, NATO’s vision is of a Europe whole and free based on a system of interlocking institutions above and beyond the previous military role. Furthermore, the former East Bloc wants the existence of NATO and foresees the need for a NATO which provides for the stability of a new Europe. In order to accomplish this task, NATO has had to create another organization the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) for cooperation among the countries of a larger and more peaceful Europe. The inaugural meeting of NACC took place on 20th December 1991 in Brussels.

NATO must reshape some of its functions in order to further peace and cooperation in a new Europe. Its first priority should
be to resolve the "out-of-area" problem in order to be more flexible and more global.

The new NATO will remain first and foremost a means of common defense through collective arrangements. Of all the world's security organizations, only NATO has the binding treaty commitments among its members and common military assets as well as infrastructure and experience to act as well as consult. It is thus unique in its ability to guarantee its members' security. This is something that all Allies are naturally determined to preserve.

A further, and indeed indispensable role of the Alliance is in maintaining and reinforcing the transatlantic security community and thus ensuring the continuing commitment by the US and Canada to Europe.

We can see clearly how useful is NATO we compare the main three security institutions in Europe. CSCE can only to consult. WEU can consult and act but its ability to act is very limited, as is its actual experience is in resolving situations. Only NATO can consult and to act with a unique background of infrastructure and experience.

In Europe there are many security institutions, and a few of them very successful (CSCE, WEU, NATO). The main problem is which way the three main security institutions will cooperate and link each other. It will take time and it will need prudence patience and coolness in order the three main institutions become completely compatible.
CONCLUSION

The bitter struggle that divided the Europe for over two generations has come to an end. The collapse of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact means that the Cold War is over. All across the Continent, the barriers that once confined people and ideas are collapsing.

East Europeans are determining their own destinies, choosing freedom and economic liberty. The unification of Germany quickened the pace to a new, more prominent era and a continent truly whole and free while, Europe is being transformed politically.

In Europe, however, instabilities have emerged that result from the serious economic, social and political difficulties including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes. These could have adverse consequences as Europe is reducing military forces and focusing on peace. To counter these problems, security in Europe must be collective and based on cooperation not on confrontation. Indeed Europe today needs to develop a hybrid system as it begins to build a new security order. It must use the successful elements of the old security order and integrate new realities.

Three main security institutions can contribute to security framework of Europe security; the CSCE, the WEU and the NATO. Of three NATO is of key importance. All of Europe, not just the West, needs to maintain NATO as a stabilizing force during the period ahead. NATO has served as the bedrock of european security for some time and must remain therefore in the future.
The endeavor for more and better linkage and cooperation among those institutions is the key solution of the security's problem in Europe.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid.

3. Istvan Deak, "Uncovering Eastern Europe's Dark History".


7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.


11. Ibid., p. 381.


14. Ibid.

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