In the latter half of the 19th century, the army fought almost 1,000 engagements against the Indians, most of which were fought conventionally against an unconventional foe. But as it had for the previous century, the army failed to elaborate an unconventional warfare doctrine and as a consequence, entered the 20th century with only a conventional concept of war. This study examines the army environment in the period 1865-1890, as well as George Crook, perhaps the greatest Indian-fighter of all time, and the unconventional strategy that made him successful. By placing both the army and Crook within the context of the time, factors which could have reasonably resulted in their failure to produce an unconventional warfare doctrine are identified. The study suggests that during the period the military had an incomplete and immature concept of war as a consequence of its view of the world and its war experience.
GENERAL GEORGE CROOK, THE INDIAN-FIGHTING ARMY, AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DOCTRINE: A CASE FOR DEVELOPMENTAL IMMATURE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

In the latter half of the 19th century, the army fought almost 1,000 engagements against the Indians, most of which were fought conventionally against an unconventional foe. But as it had for the previous century, the army failed to elaborate an unconventional warfare doctrine and as a consequence, entered the 20th century with only a conventional concept of war.

This study examines the army environment in the period 1865-1890, as well as George Crook, perhaps the greatest Indian-fighter of all time, and the unconventional strategy that made him successful. By placing both the army and Crook within the context of the time, factors which could have reasonably resulted in their failure to produce an unconventional warfare doctrine are identified.

The study suggests that during the period the military had an incomplete and immature concept of war as a consequence of its view of the world and its war experience. Following the Civil War and the return of the army to the frontier, it became evident that the Indian wars would soon be over, and the army began the search for a mission which would ensure its continued existence in society.
INTRODUCTION

A number of historians have alleged that America's conflicts with the Indians during the latter part of the 19th century failed to produce a useful doctrine of unconventional warfare; yet during the period several military leaders were quite successful in waging just such a war.\(^1\) Major General George Crook was one of them, but even he, considered by many historians to have been the most successful Indian-fighter of the era, did not formally articulate a useful doctrine in lasting form. Crook thereby leaves modern day strategists and students of military history to question why. This study will examine the army and the environment in which it existed during the period 1865-1890, as well as George Crook and the strategy that made him successful. Then, by placing both within the context of the time, factors which could have reasonably contributed to their failure to produce an unconventional warfare doctrine will be identified. In doing so the study will illustrate that neither Crook, the army, nor the government were mature enough in their intellectual and professional development to produce such a coherent body of knowledge.\(^2\)

AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE INDIAN WARS

To understand why a useful doctrine for unconventional warfare did not evolve from the nation's wars with the Indians during the latter part of the 19th century, one must understand the general perceptions that army leaders, and indeed many Americans, had concerning the wars with the Indians. This understanding is important because perceptions determine how individuals and institutions view the world and consequently, how they organize and behave in response to it. The
perception of many Americans concerning the campaigns against the Indians was that they were something short of what real war was supposed to be. They were regarded more like temporary inconveniences in which each engagement was expected to be the last, and as such they were not perceived to pose a particular threat to the nation as a whole.\(^3\) It seems that as an institution, this perception was certainly true for the army.

Russell F. Weigley has noted that a nation's concept of war is derived from its own experience with war, and as such its doctrine of war should reflect that experience. In the case of the United States, its war experience had varied between major conventional conflicts with England and Mexico, and internally with its own Civil War and its campaigns against the Indians. Of these, the latter constituted the majority of the experience, but even so, the army seemed not to consider it war in the true sense.\(^4\) General Emory Upton, one of the leading military intellectuals and reformers during the latter half of the 19th century, went so far as to say that the army was never ready for what he believed to be real war because it existed at the time mainly to fight Indians.\(^5\) There appear to be several reasons why Upton and others held this view concerning war.

First, most of the army leaders during the latter half of the period had participated in the Civil War, and it seems to have left an indelible impression on them because of its violent nature and tremendous logistical demands. It was, in many ways, total war fought for the survival of a society, and as such they recognized it as different from even the traditional European balance of power wars which seldom reduced whole nations to ruins. Coupled with this impression was an awareness that the Franco-Prussian War was bringing about changes in military organization, command and control techniques, and weapons that seemed to far overshadow the army they were in or the campaigns associated with the Indians.\(^6\) Perhaps
Secretary of War William C. Endicott said it best when he remarked in the late 1880's as follows:

the Army has but little opportunity for active service and what it has is not the most agreeable or inspiring kind. The control and pursuit of Indians, difficult and hazardous as it often is, is yet war on a very limited scale and bears but slight resemblance to the great contests which follow the collision between nations.\(^7\)

In essence the mind-set of many army leaders, and particularly reform-minded officers such as Upton, was that real war was conventional war, best represented by the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War: more lethal, more complex, more demanding, and fought by professionals schooled in the art and science of the military. Coupled with this perception was the growing realization among the professional military that the constabulary duty on the frontier would not last forever, nor did it contribute much, as Upton noted, to the preparation of the army for what a growing number of them saw as the true nature of war in the future.\(^8\)

Secondly, perceptions concerning what constituted real war were reinforced by the army's own experience in fighting the Indians. Wars were by nature, after all, supposed to be violent, consist of frequent battles, and as a consequence result in a high number of casualties. In spite of what Hollywood has portrayed, that was not the case in the conflicts with the Indians. Don Russell, in his article *How Many Indians were Killed?*, relates that between 1789 and 1898 there were probably no more than 1,535 and perhaps as few as 1,067 engagements between the army and the Indians where the army suffered casualties, including those fights which occurred during the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Civil War. That averages to at most only about 14 casualty producing engagements per year. Since there were 295 engagements during the period of the Civil War alone, it is therefore likely that there were years when there were far fewer than 14 such encounters. Russell's research further indicates that in all this time army casualties numbered only approximately 2,125 killed and 2,156 wounded. Expressed another way, the
casualties to the army were only about three per fight, and the average cavalry trooper or infantry soldier could have expected to see action only once in a five year enlistment.9

Russell's study also indicates that the Indians were not exactly decimated by the army either. Though records are understandably incomplete concerning Indian casualties, Russell found it improbable that the army ever killed more than 3,000 Indians in all of its fights with them. Even in what are now considered to have been large battles, casualties were light compared to those of the Civil War. To illustrate, it is estimated that no more than 26 Indians were killed at the Little Big Horn, to include those killed by Major Reno’s forces; and during the Battle of the Rosebud no more than 11 were killed10 in a fight which lasted over five hours and in which over 25,000 rounds of ammunition were expended by Crook’s troops.11

The perception of many in the military that the conflicts with the Indians constituted something other than real war seems to have been shared by Congress and reflected in their actions as well. Legally and constitutionally, the campaigns against the Indians were never recognized as wars, and as such the United States was officially at peace from the time the Civil War ended until war was declared against Spain in 1898.12 Also, Congress and the general public seem to have had a common disregard for the army and its mission. While events such as Custer’s defeat at the Little Big Horn stirred momentary concern for the safety of soldiers, it was only temporary. So unconcerned were the Congress and the American public about the army and the Indian conflicts in 1877, only a year after the episodes at the Rosebud and the Little Big Horn, that Congress did not even pass a military appropriation until the end of November. It had higher priorities; the appropriation bill was being used as a political bargaining chip by the Southern congressional delegation to force the removal of the last of the federal reconstruction troops from the south.13
Additionally, Congressional actions concerning the size of the army following the end of the Civil War were not those of a concerned body engaged in a real war with an enemy by which they felt threatened. From a peak strength during the Civil War of over a million, the army had shrunk to around 200,000 by late 1865. In 1866 Congress established army strength at 54,000, an increase of 36,000 from the pre-war authorization. While this seems like a sizable increase, it must be remembered that the post-Civil War army assumed a new mission in its occupation of the South to support reconstruction efforts, in addition to expanded duties on the frontier as the pace of westward expansion accelerated. It should also be noted that the army was never brought up to strength during this period, and by 1874 authorizations were reduced again to 25,000 enlisted men and 2,000 officers. In the view of Congress, because of the withdrawal of French forces from Mexico and the reduced need for occupation forces in the South, there was no serious threat to national security. Congress, therefore, was most concerned with reducing the tremendous war debt that had accumulated during the Civil War. Congress also understood the only people likely to object to reductions in the military were those few on the frontier who sometimes felt threatened by bandits or Indians, or the few urban dwellers who occasionally felt threatened by labor strife.

Thomas Dunlay also notes that the post-Civil War period marks the historic low point of concern of American society for its army or its army's mission. As Dunlay points out in his work *Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the U.S. Army in the Trans-Mississippi West, 1860-1890*, Americans of the period did not feel compelled to feed and pay soldiers when there was no fighting or perceived significant threat. Congressional actions concerning the size and funding of the army illustrate the perception of many congressmen and their constituents that the conflicts with the Indians were not a major threat to the nation and indeed were only war in the broadest sense of the term. As a consequence, there was no lasting external
pressure on the military to institutionalize an effective unconventional warfare doctrine.

Armed with the perception that the campaigns against the Indians represented something short of real war, seeing the end of those conflicts coming into view, and believing the national interests were secure, it should not be unexpected that an institutional doctrine failed to evolve. There was simply no need. Such a perception, however, illustrates an immature understanding of what constitutes war, as well as a still undeveloped vision of the future for the nation and the continuum of conflict which lay ahead. Seeing its Indian-fighting role coming to an end, the army began an introspective search for a continued reason to exist.

INTROSPECTION, REFORM, AND THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATION AND THE ARMY

Following the Civil War and throughout the latter half of the 19th century, the majority of the army was again posted on the frontier. An 1889 article in the United Service lamented that “The army to-day is seldom brought to the attention of the people, and a soldier of the United States has become almost as rare a sight in the great centers of population as a wild Indian. The national uniform is unknown.” Indeed, the army was remote both geographically and in the minds of most Americans. This remoteness of the regular army, when combined with the traditional American distrust of a large standing army and a strong belief in the Jacksonian philosophy of reliance on the citizen soldier and native military genius, caused a great number of mainstream Americans to harbor feelings of indifference or outright hostility toward it. In this, most civilians failed to see the need for a clearly articulated military program because they generally believed they were secure from external threats in the foreseeable future. In fact, most saw no connection between an army raised in the Jacksonian tradition to conduct a specific war and an army maintained during peacetime. Their belief was that the role of a
peacetime army was to act as a “repository of military knowledge” and that it should serve to meet minimum peacetime security needs. Wars were to be waged by citizen armies and open to all comers, because as Ulysses Grant remarked, citizen soldier volunteers were “men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency, when the safety of the nation was involved.” More importantly, there was a growing number of influential, wealthy, and educated Americans who questioned the need for a military at all. This group viewed war as anachronistic, an outmoded form of competition between countries, the future outcome of which would be decided by economic rather than military means. Geographically and intellectually distanced from society, held in low regard by many Americans, and seeing its primary raison d'être coming to an end, the army entered a period of introspection and reform. As will be shown, the army was incapable of producing an unconventional warfare doctrine because not only was it consumed in trying to justify its role in American society, it and the nation also had a limited, developing, uncertain strategic vision of the future, as well as a still evolving intellectual understanding of warfare and national defense.

The Civil War left many lasting impressions on military professionals concerning the changing nature of warfare and what warfare would become in the future. As noted earlier, many recognized it as total war fought for the first time, war in which the very being of a society could be decided. When coupled with the realization that the campaigns against the Indians were coming to an end and an awareness of still other changes to warfare being brought about by the Franco-Prussian War, army leaders became preoccupied with conventional warfare. General Winfield Scott Hancock expressed the army's continued concern for conventional warfare to a congressional committee in 1876 when he remarked that the army's mission against the Indians did not even merit consideration as a factor in determining its strength, composition, or organization. Robert Utley notes in his article The Contribution of
the Frontier to the American Military Tradition that the army leadership's commitment to conventional warfare was based not only on their legitimate concern for the nation's defense, but also on their desire to find a more lasting mission for the army than that afforded by the campaigns against the Indians. To further illustrate the commitment away from Indian-fighting, the Commanding General of the Army, in a report to the Secretary of War in 1890 remarked:

The past year, like the two or three preceding, has been marked by an almost total absence of hostilities with any of the Indians, or any indication on their part of a determination to again go on the war-path....This improved condition in the vast interior of the country has enabled the military authorities during the past few years to give greater attention to the need of the country, respecting its relations to foreign powers.

As a consequence, the force they structured, equipped, and organized was not for the unconventional type of warfare with which they were engaged, but for the next conventional war they seemed somehow to believe lay ahead. The problem for the army, however, was that it could produce no plausible threat. In 1884 General Sheridan, then Commanding General of the Army, reported the following to the Secretary of War:

I do not think we should be much alarmed about the probability of war with foreign powers, since it would require more than a million and a half of men to make a campaign on land against us. To transport from beyond the ocean that number of soldiers, with all their munitions of war, their cavalry, artillery, and infantry, even if not molested by us in transit, would demand a large part of the shipping of Europe.

Ten years later, the army could still not produce an external threat to justify its commitment to conventional warfare. As Captain John Bigelow wrote in his Principles of Strategy in 1894, only Great Britain and perhaps France had sufficient ships to transport even a 50,000 man invasion force across the Atlantic and that only Britain, by using all of its shipping had enough bottoms to carry a force sufficient to attack the American continent. Believing it improbable that Britain could afford
such an endeavor, he concluded that the United States was safe from attack by any European power.\textsuperscript{25}

Thus, in its desperate search for a mission the army found itself trapped in what Robert Utley identifies as a paradox. Utley notes that the army rejected the mission it had for one it could not reasonably project, and as a consequence of its frontier employment, it was unsuited for conventional war at the same time that the preoccupation of its leaders with orthodox warfare made it unsuited for its unconventional mission against the Indians. As noted earlier, reformers and intellectuals like Upton saw the army’s frontier mission as a reason it was not ready to fight a real war.\textsuperscript{26} The problem again was that the reformers and intellectuals, like their more conservative leaders, could not demonstrate a plausible conventional threat.\textsuperscript{27}

The paradox illustrates the confusion and perhaps desperation which existed in the army at the time, each a condition which made it unlikely that an unconventional warfare doctrine would evolve. An understanding of the intellectual strategic development of the army at the time, when coupled with its concept of war and its desperation to find a mission, reasonably suggests that the army would not produce such a doctrine during the period. One must understand that the United States was not yet a world power and as a country, was isolated behind its ocean barriers. It felt safe. Having little if any experience in global politics, its concepts of national defense and threats to its national interest were still limited. As late as the second decade of the 20th century, even after the United States had assumed global responsibilities, army leaders were referring to continental defense as the new mission of the army at a time when the threat of foreign invasion remained as remote as when Sheridan spoke in 1884.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, it is improbable that army leaders in the latter half of the 19th century could have envisioned a future conflict in which U.S. national security interests would be threatened. They were simply equipped
with an incomplete vision of the United States as a world power and with a still undeveloped concept of what that means in terms of strategic defense and the continuum of conflict that evolves from it. As a consequence, in their desperation army leaders continued to try to build a mission based upon the worst case, and disregarded the fact that they could not articulate it.

Two other factors contributed to the army's failure to produce a workable unconventional warfare doctrine during the period. These were the reform movement which swept through the army during the latter half of the century and the movement toward professionalism. While both these movements ultimately resulted in positive effects on the military, their short term effect was to direct the intellectual energy of the army away from the development of a mission and doctrine which was politically feasible, forward looking, and in support of an overall national strategy. Timothy K. Nenninger notes that the rise in professionalism within the military did not suddenly spring up in the latter three decades of the 19th century, but was an evolutionary process which began in the period between the War of 1812 and the Civil War. Weigley notes that the experiences of a number of professionals with amateur officers during the Mexican War led to a growing disdain for them among the regular officer corps and accelerated the move toward professionalism. This distrust for amateurs at war made it relatively easy for some of the army leadership, chiefly reformers led by Upton, to extend their distrust of the citizen soldier to distrust and resentment of civilian leadership to whom command of the military was directed by the constitution. The introspection that resulted from the events of the Civil War, and later by observation of the Franco-Prussian conflict, led many to conclude that war was too demanding, too lethal, and too complex to be left to amateurs. War required the direction and leadership of true professionals studied in the science of war. Reformers like Upton believed that the grinding tragedy of the Civil War was the result of political interference in the conduct of the
war and the fact that amateurs were allowed not only to fill the ranks, but to lead men into combat. Upton's observations of the Franco-Prussian War only served to reinforce his disdain for the amateur volunteer, and helped serve as a basis for a number of his proposals to improve the efficiency of the military establishment.

Because Sherman was enough of an intellect to believe there was something to be learned from visiting other armies, he dispatched Upton and several other observers to Asia and Europe in 1876. Though Sherman was particularly interested in the British campaigns in India, Upton became infatuated with the German general staff and military system. As a consequence, he became an enthusiastic and vocal advocate for the establishment of a similar system in the American army. Additionally, Upton's observations reinforced his fixation on the grand, orthodox war, as can be seen in the following:

I shall devote most of my attention to the subject of officers, and to showing our reckless extravagance in making war. When Germany fought France she put her army on a war-footing in eight days, and in eight days more she had four hundred thousand men on French territory. It took us from April, 1861, to March, 1862, to form an army of the same size at an expense of nearly eight hundred millions of dollars. We cannot maintain a great army in peace, but we can provide a scheme for officering a large force in time of war, and such a scheme is deserving of study.

Thus, with a disdain for amateur leaders and civilian interference in the affairs of the military, Upton recommended that the regular army be structured in peacetime so that it could be rapidly expanded in wartime to absorb large numbers of recruits. He also called for a reserve system sponsored by the federal government which would be recruited, trained, and equipped during peacetime so that it would be more ready to fight when war came. More importantly, he recommended a general staff system, staffed by officers trained in a postgraduate, professional education system, who would write and coordinate war plans, oversee the training of the national volunteer reserve service, and who would prepare legislation to ensure the perpetuation of a strong and fundamentally sound military system. Believing the
civilian political leadership to be generally ignorant in military matters, Upton's proposals also sought to remove the direction of war from the direct involvement of either the Secretary of War or the President by insisting that "a professional soldier is the best judge of what constitutes a good military system." He also sought to limit the role of Congress in the direction of the military by limiting it to merely approving or disapproving legislative programs involving the military, rather than getting into the details of the reforms.33

Reformers also called for changes in the personnel system which they believed contributed to inefficiency and bungling in wartime by not ensuring that the best and brightest filled the critical leadership positions. In this, a number of young officers who rose rapidly through the ranks during the Civil War saw the system as archaic and stifling. Promotion below the grade of brigadier general was based primarily on seniority rather than merit and performance, and when coupled with post-war reductions in the size of the army, destined many who had enjoyed a taste of senior leadership to painfully slow promotion. Men like Wesley Merritt, Ranald Mackenzie, and George Custer, who were generals in their mid-to-late twenties, could expect to spend fifteen or twenty more years of service before again ascending to their former rank.34 In addressing this problem, Upton went as far as recommending compulsory examinations as a condition for promotion.35

To many officers who read the manuscripts of Upton and other reformers, the proposals seemed to offer the efficiencies they had long wanted--a well-trained and professional officer corps, freed from the interference of amateurs and political involvement.36 But the reforms proposed by Upton and others were not generally well received by either congress, the general public, or the upper levels of the army leadership. As such, most of the reform proposals were rejected, not because they were without merit, but because Upton and his fellow reformers did not understand the need to reconcile their theories with the political realities of the time, i.e., that
most Americans felt secure behind their borders, the strong American tradition of
civilian control of the military, and the volunteer tradition of the American military
and the significant role the state national guards had traditionally played in the
nation's defense.\textsuperscript{37} As Elihu Root spoke during the cornerstone laying ceremony of
the Army War College building in Washington, D.C., on 21 February 1903, Upton was
"as a voice of one crying in the wilderness" at the time his proposals were made
because his work addressed reform of the military establishment from a purely
military perspective. As such, Root noted that in some ways Upton's proposals
reflected a "failure to appreciate difficulties arising from our form of government and
the habits and opinions of our people with which civil government has necessarily to
deal in its direction of the military arm."\textsuperscript{38}

While the reform movement led by Upton eventually resulted in having some
positive effects on the army, it must also bear a major portion of the blame for the
army's failure to articulate an unconventional warfare doctrine in the latter part of
the 19th century. In this Weigley asserts that Upton, perhaps the leading military
intellect in the army at the time, did lasting damage to the development of military
thought by channeling the army's intellectual power into the "futile task of
demanding that the national institutions be adjusted to purely military expediency,"
rather than to the task of shaping the military institution, and with it doctrine and
strategy development, to support both military and national objectives.\textsuperscript{39} In failing
to reconcile his proposals with both the political realities of the time and the
American military tradition, Upton's actions demonstrate a flawed or, at best, an
immature concept of a national strategy where the military element of power is only
meaningful when used in conjunction with the political and economic elements to
secure national objectives.\textsuperscript{40} In this context, by proposing a military system which
was unacceptable to the country, Upton's proposals helped ensure that the nation
would continue to wander along with practically no military policy at all, let alone a
doctrine for unconventional warfare,\textsuperscript{41} and that it would remain trapped in a paradox which ensured it was prepared for neither conventional nor unconventional warfare. The results were inevitable. Commenting in 1898 on the performance of the American army in the Philippines, British strategist G. F. R. Henderson remarked that "because its army was unready, deficient in numbers, in equipment, and in organization; because transport was wanting, the enemy has received a gratuity of much time and much encouragement."\textsuperscript{42}

That Upton and others of his era had an incomplete understanding of the necessity to correlate the political, economic, and military elements of power should not be surprising, neither should their limited concepts of war and national defense nor their restricted vision of the future. The mechanisms to produce such intellectual and visionary development simply were not in place, and as such help further explain why an unconventional warfare doctrine did not formally evolve from the period. As noted earlier, the move toward professionalism did not just spring up during the period between the Civil War and the turn of the century. It was an evolutionary process. It was not until the period between the Civil War and World War I, however, that the members of the officer corps really began to acquire the characteristics that society attributes to being a professional, and in turn begin to consider themselves as such.

Nenninger notes that the growth of professionalism in the military mirrored the general growth of professionalism in the country during the 19th century because officers, being products of society, were both conscientiously and unconsciously influenced by the trend toward professionalism which was taking place in the country at large. As such, Nenninger notes it should not be surprising that the importance of postgraduate level education was recognized within the military during the period, or that professional military associations and journals came into being. Nenninger is quick to point out, however, that despite the importance of
societal influences on the trend toward professionalism in the army, most of the emphasis on professionalism in the military was derived from the unique conditions within the army itself and the experiences of its leaders. In this, it seems it was the Civil War experience of many officers, combined with their observations of the Franco-Prussian War, which convinced them that the complexity and lethality of war could no longer be left to amateurs and academically unprepared career soldiers. Life-long study, practice, and application were required. Historical analysis of past conflicts, studied in a postgraduate level academic environment came to be seen as the best method of perpetuating true professionalism.

It was not, however, until Sherman became Commanding General that the army formally began to evolve a system capable of producing doctrine and developing strategies. Until then, the military academy at West Point was the principal source of military education in the army. There the curriculum concentrated almost exclusively on engineering, math, and technical approaches to war. It stressed tactics, military engineering, and weaponry to the exclusion of liberal arts, military policy, and strategy which accompany an historical approach to the study of the military profession. Though cadets were exposed to the basics of Jomini, what they received did not constitute a body of doctrine that could be coherently applied in an infinite number of battle situations or conditions. Russell Weigley has commented that given the fragments of doctrine which could be found in the curriculum at West Point and in army manuals and regulations, it is doubtful that even had it tried could the pre-Civil War army have developed a doctrine applicable to even the orthodox conditions of the Civil War. In this he notes that what doctrine which did exist often proved deficient in practical application.

The removal of the academy from engineer control in 1866 did little to enhance the likelihood that its graduates would be capable of one day producing a workable doctrine. Though its engineer curriculum was amended by expanding instruction
beyond purely military subjects, the results were not all positive. The questionable
guality of its instructors detailed from the ranks of the army and its technical
approach to instruction caused the school to lose its standing as the premier
engineering school in the country without producing a corresponding improvement
in the quality of professional military knowledge imparted. As a consequence, West
Point produced relatively competent junior officers, but failed to equip its graduates
with an adequate foundation to become visionary leaders capable of one day
producing any doctrine, much less one for unconventional warfare.46

Sherman’s vision was to establish a hierarchical pyramid of schools through
which officers would first master the special skills of their branches, and then later
the principles and attitudes required of higher level commanders. To this end, the
Artillery School at Fort Monroe was reopened in 1868, soon followed by the
Engineering School, and in 1881 by the School of Application for Infantry and
Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth. The latter school, which at first only provided
elementary instruction in infantry and cavalry tactics, gradually developed into the
type of institution of higher learning originally envisioned by Sherman by including
instruction in the “science and practice” of war.47

Sherman also encouraged the growth of professional associations, such as the
Essayons Club, as well as professional journals to supplement the instruction
received at the schools. The result was that the schools and the literature cross-
fertilized each other and, for the first time, provided the outlets for intellectual
exchange necessary for the development and maturation of visionary and strategic
thinking in the global sense. As the system developed throughout the last quarter of
the century, army officers gradually began to visualize the possibility of the United
States as a world power and finally began to think about what the implications of
that might mean for the army.48 The efforts of Sherman and others during this
period laid the academic and intellectual foundation of a professional military
education system capable of developing and producing doctrine. Unfortunately for
the army, this system and its graduates were far from mature when the days of the
Indian-fighting army officially expired. As a consequence, there is little wonder why
a doctrine of unconventional warfare did not evolve. The system was not yet
capable of producing it.

The physical disposition and strength of the army during the latter part of the 19th
century also did little to create the type of environment likely to stimulate the kind of
thought or intellectual exchange which might eventually evolve into a doctrine.
Perhaps best summed up by General Richard S. Ewell, an officer on the frontier
“learned all there was to know about commanding forty dragoons, and forgot
everything else.” Dispersed across the frontier on 255 posts, the enlisted strength
of the army was reduced dramatically immediately following the Civil War. In 1876
the total authorizations were limited to 27,000 officers and men, where they
remained essentially unchanged until the Spanish-American War. Throughout the
period, however, the army’s strength seldom reached authorized levels, generally
remaining at 25,000 and below. Commenting on the army’s lack of numbers and
dispersion, Merritt noted in the mid-1870s that the “whole force employed and
scattered over the enormous region . . . never numbered 14,000 men, and nearly
one-third of this force has been confined to the line of the Rio Grande to protect the
Mexican frontier.” Under such conditions, units seldom trained or even operated in
more than battalion strength. The company became the unit around which life
revolved, and as such “defined the social and professional horizons of most line
officers.”

The generally unpleasant conditions of the army, when combined with the
dispersion, and physical and intellectual isolation, further detracted from an
environment already ill-suited for intellectual stimulation and doctrine development.
Low pay, a scant and monotonous diet, sparse living conditions, and a harsh
disciplinary system administered all too often by dull and authoritative officers, themselves often prone to drunkenness and lack of ambition, resulted in high rates of indiscipline, desertion, and drunkenness among the troops. These factors also contributed to the army's inability to attract a more educated and motivated recruit. Conditions were so bad that in 1871 fully one-third of the army deserted, and in 1882 the rate still stood at about sixteen percent, despite a heavy influx of immigrants seeking opportunities in their new country. Under such conditions, good officers, those who might have been capable of contributing to the intellectual process associated with doctrine development, were in all likelihood focused on just trying to hold things together in their little portion of the world.

The mind-numbing boredom of routine duty and daily life made it even less likely that any intellectual stimulation or exchange capable of resulting in doctrine development would occur. Cooper notes that routine garrison duties for most officers rarely occupied more than two hours per day, and lacking interest, ambition, or imagination, many occupied their time in drinking and playing cards or billiards. Endless inspections, reviews, and guard mounts, along with overseeing daily maintenance chores, contributed to the stagnation of innovative thought or intellectual exchange, and repetitive company drill did little to contribute to professional growth or development. Additionally, because of the isolation of most garrisons, what social life as there existed involved the same guests and the same small-talk function after function, and as such offered little respite from the intellectually asphyxiating environment of the frontier. Isolated and intellectually stifled, the Indian-fighting army on the frontier offered few opportunities for intellectual growth, stimulation, or maturity. As such, it was incapable of expanding the horizons of the majority of its officers to the requisite level for the development of an unconventional warfare doctrine or even conceptualizing a future need for it.
U.S. STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE INDIANS

Perhaps another reason that a workable doctrine for unconventional warfare did not evolve from the Indian wars of the late 1800's was that the national strategy concerning the Indians changed as the country pushed west. As a consequence, a military strategy to support the accomplishment of national objectives was difficult to develop, and as such reduced the likelihood that a coherent doctrine to implement an effective military strategy would evolve. What did evolve were military and political policies and actions which often worked at cross purposes, confused Indians and whites alike, and as a result probably prolonged the conflict with the Indians. When combined with the perception that the Indian wars would soon be over and that large-scale conventional wars would be the likely wars of the future, such conditions provided little fertile ground for the emergence of a useful and lasting doctrine on how to fight unconventional wars.

Before the Civil War the strategy of the United States in dealing with the various Indian nations was not to annihilate them, but to move them away from territory considered desirable by the white man and into areas where whites were either not ready to settle or to areas considered so undesirable that white men would never be likely to go there. As a consequence of reports by army explorers in the early 1800's, lands west of the ninety-fifth meridian were considered generally unsuited for farming by most Americans, and in fact were known as the “Great American Desert.” As early as 1825, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun proposed the area be permanently designated as Indian Country, and that the Indians who remained east of the Mississippi River be moved there. In 1830, President Andrew Jackson, with congressional support, began to aggressively negotiate with eastern Indians to exchange their land for land in the West. With rare exceptions the eastern Indians, most of whom no longer had the power to resist, were on their way westward by the end of the decade.56
In 1834, the passage of the Indian Intercourse Act lent support for the concept of a permanent country for the Indians by forbidding the unauthorized intrusion of whites into the area, while at the same time it assisted the Indians by establishing schools and agencies. As a result of these actions, by 1840 the border of the Indian Country was quite distinguishable, and in effect, essentially marked the western boundary of the United States. The major strategic problem for the army at the time with regard to Indians was that of guarding the border.57

The idea of a permanent Indian Country, however, began to lose ground in the late 1840's and early 1850's as westward migration increased as a consequence of the war with Mexico, the Oregon settlement, and discovery of gold in California. Indian Country no longer lay west of the United States, but between two portions of it. Trails cut through the Indian Country in numerous places, altering both the ecology of the region and the economy of the Indians as the buffalo began to avoid the trails. Whites saw much of the land to be not as bad as advertised, and in fact quite fertile. Thus, in the 1850's the U.S. shifted policies and began efforts to use treaties to restrict Indians to smaller and smaller areas and to renegotiate earlier agreements as whites came westward in increasing numbers.58

During the Civil War, armed conflicts between Indians and whites increased as less sympathetic, western volunteers assumed the regular army's mission in the West. Concurrently, the Indians became increasingly resentful of the restrictive nature of some of their treaties, as well as to understand more fully the fatal implications of white migration, i.e., that once whites came, they never left. Throughout the Civil War Indians became increasingly hostile to whites, suspicious of their motives, and not the least, combative. Encouraged by the Homestead Act of 1862 and the westward push of the railroads in 1865, whites came west in ever increasing numbers, and Indians became more militant in their resistance to white encroachment. By the end of the decade, the national strategy of removal of the
Indians to an Indian Country was dead forever. In its place the government intensified efforts to restrict Indians to defined reservations, to break down their tribal integrity, and to encourage them to take up the white man's way. Thus, in the space of forty years the U.S. strategy for dealing with the Indians evolved from one that called for their simple removal to a recognized Indian Country to one which centered on a treaty and reservation system which permanently altered not only their economy but their society. In response, the army's main missions became the elimination of the Indians' military strength and will to resist, the armed enforcement of treaty stipulations, and the provision of security along the routes of westward expansion. The problem for the army and the nation was that the political and military strategies regarding the Indians often seemed uncoordinated, for as the army got smaller and more dispersed, its responsibilities grew. As a consequence, the ways and means of the military strategy were often inadequate or inappropriate for the achievement of the desired end.

One incongruity between the political and military strategies of the period can be seen in governmental support for the army. Simply put, while Congress and the general public wanted the Indians subdued, they were unwilling to pay for it in terms of manpower and a standing force. Following the Civil War, military strength reductions were based on cost and reduction of the war debt rather than a rational, long-term strategy for settling the West and maintaining peace in the process; at the same time, largely uncontrolled westward expansion increased the likelihood of conflict with the Indians. With no more than 20,000 combat effective soldiers to cover an area stretching from Mexico to Canada, and from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean, the army was hard-pressed to effectively carry out its mission. Army leaders were frustrated by the lack of congressional support and were convinced that undermanning in the face of an expanding mission needlessly
prolonged the conflicts with the Indians. Referring to the Indian campaigns which occurred between 1876 and 1878, Sherman commented in his annual report:

> These wars might have been regarded as inevitable, and therefore a sufficient number of soldiers provided to meet them; but it was not done, and hence the fatal results which followed. . . . The consequence was that every engagement was a forlorn hope, and was attended with a loss of life unparalleled in warfare. No quarter was given by the savages, and the officers and men had to enter upon their duties with the most barbarous cruelties staring them in the face in case of defeat. . . . It would have been less expensive if an army of 60,000 or 70,000 men had been maintained; and moreover, the blood of gallant officers, soldiers, and citizens would not have rested on our hands.  

Following the battle of the Rosebud, included in the campaigns referred to by Sherman, General Crook's aide-de-camp, John G. Bourke expressed a similar view as he considered the liabilities imposed by an penny-pinching Congress on the army. Blaming Congress for the depleted condition of the army, Bourke remarked:

> a regiment doesn't equal a Battalion, a company cannot muster more than a squad. Our men are so occupied with the extraneous duties of building posts and cantonments, no time is left for learning military evolutions. They are all willing and brave enough, but are deficient in experience and military intelligence.

Divided control of Indian policy made it even more difficult to recognize a coherent national strategy because military and political programs were often at cross purposes. This further reduced the likelihood that an unconventional warfare doctrine would evolve. The effect of divided control on the army is best illustrated in the implementation of the reservation system which was established when it became no longer feasible to give Indians large tracts of land far removed from white settlement. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Department of the Interior, developed a policy whereby annuities would be paid to Indians who agreed to settle on reservations, and in doing so give up their traditional nomadic way of life. The underlying theory of the program was that the Indians would eventually learn to farm and become self-sustaining on the reservations. The problem was that neither the
Indians, whites, nor the army fully supported the idea. This led to conditions in which settlers continued to encroach upon land reserved for Indians, while a significant number of Indians simply ignored the reservation system and refused to give up their traditional way of life.

One negative effect of the reservation system on the army was that it added confusion to its mission and clouded its purpose in the eyes of whites and Indians alike. This occurred because in the course of enforcing the provisions of the treaties, the army was often forced into conflicts with whites to keep them off the lands reserved for Indians, and thus drew criticism from Westerners who had little sympathy for the Indians. If the army moved decisively against the Indians to keep them on or return them to the reservations, it was criticized by eastern humanitarian interests. As such, in carrying out the government's policies, the army could never do the right thing. Indeed, the national will was sometimes difficult to discern.\textsuperscript{64}

The policies of the BIA and its manner of doing business also created problems for the army by creating conditions which sometimes put it in harm's way, and at other times forced the army into an "honest broker" role between the Indians and the BIA itself. First, some of the treaties in the late 1860's did not permit soldiers to enter the reservations, even in pursuit of Indians known to be hostile, unless invited by BIA agents. Additionally, many in the military were also of the belief that BIA reservation policies simply provided a winter haven where hostiles could rest and refit prior to resuming hostilities off the reservation in the spring, or a sanctuary to which they could return when they needed respite from the army. In either instance, the army was often forced to do battle with a strengthened enemy who drew sustenance and shelter from another government agency.\textsuperscript{65}

Sherman, Crook, and others also believed that the BIA agents themselves were often responsible for creating conditions which either provided opportunities for Indians to leave the reservations or forced them to do so. Many of the agents were
church nominees who had been selected for their moral character rather than their competence or experience. As a consequence, they normally failed to keep the Indians peaceful and had difficulty keeping disgruntled Indians on the reservations.66 Sherman saw many of the agents as misguided and believed their inconsistent application of policy led to "pampering" the Indians, which he believed served to confuse them about government intentions and what they could and could not get away with.67

Crook and a number of other military men of the era also believed that many of the agents were not only incompetent but corrupt, and that by cheating the Indians to increase their profits they created conditions whereby the Indians had no alternative but to leave the reservation in order to survive.68 As a consequence, soldiers were sometimes placed in the position of having to campaign against Indians they believed to have been cheated out of what the government had promised them, and as such, sympathized with the Indians while having to enforce government policy to return them.69

Doubtless this had a confusing effect on the army. As an example, in General Crook's first Apache campaign Indians were complaining of not getting enough to eat and were threatening an uprising. Crook had his men reweigh what the Indians had been issued by the agency and found that, in the case of beef, families were being given fifteen pounds rather than the ninety-five pounds to which they were entitled. Over a protest to the Department of the Interior by the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Arizona Territory, Crook forced a court of inquiry. During the course of the hearing it was discovered that the agent had adjusted his scales to weigh heavy in order to fool the Indians, and that he was selling the remainder of the food, allocated by the government to feed the Indians, to miners working in the area.70
Over ten years later Crook's feelings about corruption in the agencies and its effect on maintaining peace with the Indians had not changed. When asked by a reporter if he believed victory over the Apache would bring peace to the region, he responded with a smile and answered as follows: "You know a great many people made money out of the Indian troubles. These same people exercise considerable influence in the control of Indians."\textsuperscript{71} It must be noted here that in 1875 the Secretary of War, W.W. Belknap, resigned from office rather than face impeachment when it was learned that he had sold sutlerships for private gain.\textsuperscript{72}

Other evidence of an incoherent national policy regarding the Indians can be found in the lack of intra-governmental coordination for treating with the Indians. To illustrate, General Crook was ordered to Arizona by the personal involvement of the President in August 1871 to deal with Apache depredations. While on his initial reconnaissance of the area in preparation for an imminent campaign, he read in a newspaper included in his mail, not in official dispatches, that the Permanent Board of Peace Commissioners had dispatched a commissioner to Arizona to make peace with the Apaches. In support of this, Congress had appropriated seventy thousand dollars to "collect the Apache Indians of Arizona and New Mexico on reservations, furnish them with subsistence and other necessary articles, and to promote peace and civilization among them."\textsuperscript{73}

As a result of the peace process, Crook had to delay his military operation throughout the winter of 1871. When the peace mission failed, Crook again readied his command to take the field only to be held up again by a peace mission led by General O. O. Howard. Again, not much was accomplished except for an agreement with Cochise which exempted the area of the Chiricahua Apaches from Crook's jurisdiction, gave the Chiricahua a reservation on the border, and prohibited Crook's operations against them.\textsuperscript{74} Other than these details, Crook, the Commander of the Military Department of Arizona, was given very little information; he was not given a
copy of the treaty nor was he told more of its stipulations. The lack of coordination shown here illustrates an incomplete understanding of the relationship which must exist between the elements of national power in order to forge an effective strategy. It also helps explain the incoherent nature of the national strategy for dealing with the Indians. Without a clear national strategy, it was improbable that a lasting doctrine would be institutionally inculcated into the army.

The organization of the military establishment, partially imposed by lack of congressional funding and partially by institutional inertia generated by the Civil War, was not appropriate for conducting unconventional warfare and as such, made it even less probably that a doctrine to fight such wars would evolve from the period. Dispersion of the undermanned army delayed the concentration of forces large enough to deal with major uprisings. Once such a force was assembled, the mobility of the Indians, their unconventional techniques, and the great logistical difficulties inherent in operating in the vastness of the west, led only to partial success at best. With two-thirds of the regular force comprised of foot infantry and the U.S. cavalry not developed to the point that it could match the Indians in horsemanship, the results were often not surprising.

The military strategy, such as it was, was largely carried over from the Civil War and employed by the army to help compensate for its structural limitations. First used in 1868-1869 in the Southern Plains War by Sheridan, the strategy relied on converging columns to keep the hostiles off balance by surprising them concerning the direction of attack, by keeping them on the move, and by allowing them no time to refit and rest. This strategy was most effective in winter when the Indians were less mobile and less fit for cold weather fighting. When it worked, regulars could destroy villages, foodstuffs, and horse herds, thus leaving the Indians with the choices of either starving in the cold or surrendering and moving to a reservation.
Weigley implies that this strategy as one of annihilation because it was nothing short of total war.77

Weigley further asserts that the experience of the Civil War prepared the army to implement such a strategy against the Indians and that its employment is also illustrative of the change in U.S. policy concerning the Indians which evolved during the war and in the post-war years. Not only were villages destroyed, but it was not uncommon for Indian women and children to die in the violent attacks. In expressing his proposal for a long-range policy for dealing with the Sioux, Sherman stated in 1866 that "We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women, and children." The attitude expressed in Sherman's words illustrates a frustration many in the military felt concerning the ineffectiveness of the BIA in controlling the Indians, the conflicting nature of government policies concerning the Indians, and the absence of a clear national strategy. Sherman's words also appear illustrative of an institutional commitment of the army to apply purely conventional military means to solve its problem with little regard for the special nature of the conflict.78

Institutionally, the army was not organized to support other than a conventional war, nor was its organization conducive to stimulating an innovative thought process likely to produce an unconventional warfare doctrine. In this, the Commanding General of the Army commanded the military departments but not the staffs or bureaus within the War Department, all of which worked for the Secretary of War. Squabbling over control of the bureaus during much of the latter half of the century diverted a great deal of intellectual energy which might have been better applied toward the development of more effective methods of support of the army's Indian campaigns.

Bureau chiefs essentially went their own way, and there was little exchange between the line and staff. Bureau chiefs also tended to remain ensconced for long
periods and were not particularly receptive to change. In an extreme, but yet important case for doctrine development, M.C. Meigs served as the Quartermaster General from 1861 until his retirement in 1882. Though Meigs was considered to be one of the more progressive bureau chiefs of the era, he believed that the methods which produced victory in the Civil War represented the perfected art of logistics which could not, therefore, be improved upon. His attitude was not atypical of other bureau chiefs. Under such conditions, it would be surprising if any innovative, forward thinking of the kind needed to develop a doctrine of unconventional warfare occurred. Logistical support of U.S. operations in the Spanish-American War suggests that it did not.\textsuperscript{79}

The combined effect of slight congressional support for the army, the dispersion of the army across the West, and the disjointed nature of the military structure meant that the army, despite its efforts to improve its mobility, remained tied to a heavy, slow-moving logistical tail with cavalry in the vanguard and infantry in the main column. With the tremendous logistical problems associated with operations in the West and the mobility of the Indians, the strategy of using large conventional converging columns most often lead to only partial success or stalemates. It also sometimes resulted in defeat in detail as evidenced with General Custer at the Little Big Horn. While it is true that some military leaders of the time, notably George Crook, did find ways to improve mobility and fight in an unconventional mode by making use of Indian scouts, there seems to have been an institutional bias against these methods, which in the end precipitated Crook’s relief from command in Arizona. Sheridan, Nelson Miles, and others insisted on the almost exclusive use of regular soldiers despite Crook’s successes in using less conventional methods.\textsuperscript{80} As Utley notes, it was almost as if the nation’s military and political leaders did not recognize that there were different types of warfare, that they were trying to use
conventional methods to deal with an unconventional foe, or that there was more to the military element of power than just the sheer weight of the sword.81

Thus, faced with a shifting, uncoordinated, and sometimes incoherent national strategy toward the Indians, and possessing a structure, organization, and institutional mind-set largely geared toward conventional conflicts and techniques for fighting, the army failed to articulate an unconventional warfare doctrine. Indeed, without a clear, consistent national strategy concerning the Indians and westward expansion, it would have been extremely remarkable if an unconventional warfare doctrine had evolved.

GENERAL GEORGE CROOK: DIFFERENT BUT THE SAME

Robert Utley has noted that even though the army failed to elaborate an unconventional warfare doctrine following its years of conflict with the Indians, it did contain some officers who were capable of fighting unconventionally. George Crook was among them, and if not the most highly acclaimed, he was certainly the most original in his thinking.82 Yet Crook, who devoted almost thirty years of his life to campaigning against the Indians and whose record of success would have lent at least some degree of credibility to his concepts, also failed to publish a doctrine in a lasting and meaningful form. That he failed to do so is understandable because even though his methods were different from others in the army's leadership, he was a product of the army system which was itself not yet capable of producing the intellectual stimulation and visionary thought required for doctrine development and institutionalization. An examination of George Crook and his strategy for fighting Indians will show that while he was an innovator, he was in many ways not all that different from his contemporaries.

There was little in George Crook's upbringing that prepared him to be a visionary leader, nor was there even much to indicate he had the potential to become a
successful soldier. Born to Thomas and Elizabeth Crook on a farm near Taylorsville, Ohio on 8 September 1828, Crook was the ninth of ten children. Reared in a rural setting, young Crook showed little inclination for books during his youth. Had he not been nominated to attend West Point, almost as a last resort by a member of the Ohio congressional delegation, he probably would have become a farmer like his father. Young George was once described by an acquaintance as a “farmers boy, slow to learn, but when he did learn, it was surely his.” As such, his credentials for nomination appear to have been marginal at best. During his interview with the representative who nominated him, the best that can be said for Crook was that he did not muck it up badly enough to be rejected. The representative noted that “The boy was exceedingly non-communicative. He hadn’t a stupid look, but was quiet to reticence. He didn’t seem to have the slightest interest or anxiety about my proposal.” In this description is the first clue to Crook’s personality and style which followed him throughout his career—quiet, reticent and non-communicative.

As he matured, his propensity to communicate did not improve. A subordinate once remarked that Crook had “a faculty for silence that is absolutely astonishing.” When planning his next move in the field, Crook often became less communicative than normal. In this, he would sometimes withdraw a distance from the camp, sit against a tree or rock, and ponder alone what he would do next. At other times he would leave the field headquarters entirely to go hunting, often alone, and sometimes remain gone for several days, as he did following his battle at the Rosebud. He was also uncommunicative with higher and adjacent commands, sometimes to the exasperation of his contemporaries. Sheridan grew to understand this, although there is no indication he liked it. He once remarked that “Crook never sends a courier unless he has something important to say or wants something,” again reflecting Crook’s stolid and introverted approach to the world.
Bourke notes that probably no general officer in the army issued fewer orders or letters of instruction than did George Crook. His leadership style was example, which he considered the “best general order.” His was not, therefore, the personality of one likely to publish an unconventional warfare doctrine in an army committed to a conventional future, and which only considered the conflicts with the Indians war in the broadest sense. Given his reticent, taciturn nature, his formal elaboration of a doctrine of unconventional warfare would have been out of character for him.86

Crook’s performance at West Point was academically and socially unremarkable and again provides little to indicate that he had the potential to be a strategic, visionary thinker. He finished thirty-eighth in a class of forty-three. He excelled in no particular discipline and consistently ranked near the bottom academically, his only claim to fame being that he received very few demerits. Because of his personality, Crook seems to have had only minimal interaction with other cadets and as a result, developed few lasting friendships at the academy. He did, however, become friends with Philip H. Sheridan, who in future years strongly affected Crook’s career as well as his attitude concerning the army.87 Additionally, never in his four years at the academy was Crook ever appointed a cadet sergeant, or even a cadet corporal. As a consequence of his West Point experience, when he graduated in 1852, he was the lowest-ranking cadet ever to be promoted to the rank of major general in the regular army.88 Thus, from a scholarly perspective, Crook seems not to have had the intellectual and academic vigor to take the lead in doctrine development. Additionally, it is doubtful that the technical nature of the West Point instruction in the mid-1800’s did much to stimulate his visionary potential.

Crook’s first posting following graduation was with the Fourth Infantry in California. The impressions he developed during this period concerning leadership, the fairness of the army’s reward system, and the nature of the conflict between whites and Indians were strong and lasting. As a consequence, they influenced his thought
process and attitudes for the remainder of his career. Indeed, many of his early impressions on these subjects were negative. As such, Crook began to develop attitudes which in later years caused him to focus on himself, on his reputation, and on the plight of the Indians rather than on doctrine development.\(^8\)

As Robert Utley has noted, Crook was “well endowed with the characteristics prevalent throughout the officer corps—vanity, pettiness, disdain for peers, hunger for applause, and obsession with rank and precedence.”\(^9\) As will be shown, though Crook had different ideas about how to fight Indians, the characteristics Utley ascribes to the officer corps were so deeply ingrained in him that he was incapable of rising above the intellectual and professional maturity level of the institution to write an unconventional warfare doctrine.

With regard to leadership, Crook seems to have developed early-on a sense of morality about what leaders ought to be and the image they ought to portray. As intimated by Utley, image and reputation were important to Crook, and he constantly strived to meet his own expectations. In this vein, Crook formed an early disdain for drunkards and gamblers. In his autobiography, which was mostly written after 1885 and influenced by impressions gathered from thirty-three years of service, Crook notes that not a day went by during his initial assignment at Benicia Barracks, California, that most of the officers were not drunk at least once. He added that he had never, before or since, been exposed to so much “gambling and carousing.” In addition to their being drunk in garrison, Crook also recalls of once being actually engaged in a fight with Indians when his commander was so drunk he could not even mount a horse, much less command.\(^9\)

Near the end of his career, Crook’s views had not changed. The words of his diary reflect not only a disdain for those who drank or gambled, but also a certain vain righteousness concerning himself. Of those who drank, Crook noted that it was easy for people to convince themselves that there was no harm in drinking, or even in
having an occasional spree, but that it was also not difficult for others to view the occasional spree as that of a drunkard, and as a consequence lose confidence in him. In Crook's comments one again sees that he believed image was important.

With regard to gambling, his comments reveal more of the moral streak which outwardly seemed to permeate Crook's leadership style:

A gambler, like a libertine who loses confidence in the virtue of women in prostitution as he is successful in his intrigues, when he reaches the point where he believes in the virtue of no one, his life is a misery to himself and he is an object of disgust to those who know him.

He added that "A gambler, from customarily looking at all persons whom he gambles with through the same light, is likely to reach the conclusion that no one is honest, his doubt in his own honesty afterwhile will eventually end in his dishonesty." It is, therefore, not surprising that Crook very rarely drank liquor of any kind, and never gambled.

Crook also developed an early contempt for officers, particularly commanders, who had little concern for the enlisted men in their charge, and who at the same time did not share their hardships and dangers. In Crook's reflections on his career, his disdain for these officers is clear, as is his preoccupation with his own image. Commenting on an engagement during the Rogue River wars early in his career, Crook remarked that "I had marched in front with my company every foot of the way." He touted the fact that "I was the only officer in the command who did it. I always contended an infantry officer should march on foot when his men did." His example was not lost on his men. Of him, Captain John G. Bourke once remarked that "in our hour of danger Crook would be found in the skirmish line, not in the telegraph office." While the merit of his leadership example is undeniable, his own discussion of it in his autobiography appears self-serving and again illustrates that Crook often thought more highly of himself than he did of others.
By the late 1850's Crook had determined that the Indian trouble was not all the fault of the Indians. He observed instances where whites indiscriminately committed atrocities against peaceful Indians but went unpunished. Crook notes that in some cases the victimized Indians had even worked regularly for the army. They confided in the soldiers "as friends" in attempting to get redress, but because the army had no civil authority, soldiers could legally do nothing except stand by and watch. Then, when the injustices would continue and the Indians would retaliate, Crook laments that it was the soldiers, many of whom sympathized with the Indians, who had to go punish them.\textsuperscript{96} These early observations of unjust treatment of Indians had a profound and personal impact on Crook and seem to have caused him a great deal of internal stress as he attempted to reconcile duty to country with the principle of justice for all, to include the Indians.\textsuperscript{97} One result of his internal struggle seems to have been that throughout his career Crook sympathized in varying degrees with the plight of the Indians.

Despite his introverted nature and empathy for the Indians, Crook did develop an innovative Indian-fighting strategy that won him acclaim and promotion. Given his early impressions, however, it should not be surprising that his method for fighting Indians consisted of more than finding and killing them. As he gained experience, he became convinced that hostile actions by the Indians were often precipitated by injustice, dishonesty, and the changing of the truth by the white man.

He also believed that divided control of Indian policy and administration was good for neither the Indians nor the army, and that many civilians involved in the administration of Indian affairs were either corrupt or naive. As a consequence of his experience, Crook believed that Indians were human and that if treated right, the troubles with them could be brought swiftly to an end.\textsuperscript{98}

Crook also viewed the hostile reactions by Indians toward white intrusion as only natural. In a February 1887 speech at the Sanders Theater in Boston, Crook pointed
out that with the increased western migration of whites following the Civil War, the Indians had seen their lands taken from them "foot by foot," despite treaties with the government which guaranteed their possession. He noted also that when Congress had granted reservations, it was not unusual for renegotiations to occur which afterwards reduced the land allocated to the Indians even more.99

Once the Indians were on the reservation, Crook believed that the government’s corruption and failure to honor its obligations for subsistence precipitated even further trouble. In this, he felt that the Indians were forced to depredate just to survive, although they themselves knew it was in their best interests not to take to the warpath, but to “take up the peaceful pursuits of the white man.”100 Crook’s observations in the aftermath of the Sioux wars further illustrate this point:

I was up there last spring, and found them in a desperate condition... and the agent telegraphed for supplies, but word came that no appropriation had been made. They have never been half supplied.

The agent has sent them off for half a year to enable them to pick up something to live on, but there is nothing for them in that country. The buffalo is all gone, and an Indian can’t catch enough jack rabbits to subsist himself and his family,... What are they to do?

Starvation is staring them in the face, and if they wait much longer, they will not be able to fight. They understand the situation, and fully appreciate what is before them.

All the tribes tell the same story. They are surrounded on all sides, the game is destroyed or driven away; they are left to starve and there remains but one thing for them to do—fight while they can. Some people do not think the Indians understand, but they do, and fully appreciate the circumstances in which they are placed.101

Armed with these concepts, Crook’s approach to fighting Indians was indeed different from most others at the time. Two Crook axioms further illustrate his long-range strategy for settling the problem once the Indians had been brought under control; they bear vivid contrast to Sherman’s approach. Crook believed that “it costs less to feed Indians than to fight them,” and that “we must fight all the Indians we swindle. If they cannot get corn they will get cartridges.”102 Reflecting a more
conventional view, Sherman remarked in 1868: "The more we kill this year, the less will have to be killed next year, for the more I see of these Indians, the more convinced I am that they all have to be killed or maintained as a species of paupers. Their attempts at civilization are ridiculous."103

Not only was Crook's outlook on the problem different from those of his superiors, his methods for bringing them under control differed as well. Crook believed the Indians to be human; he also understood that they were uncivilized by white standards. As a consequence, Crook believed that the Indians had to first be subjugated and taught to fear the "results of disobedience." Once subjugated, i.e., defeated militarily, Crook advocated that absolute truth and honesty on the part of the white man was essential to shortening the conflict and maintaining subsequent peace. As a result, he made few promises to the Indians, and those he did make he held as sacred. His belief was if the Indians trusted his word, if they knew he always told the truth, then he could be more effective in dealing with them and perhaps avoid bloodshed.104

In line with this, and integral in Crook's philosophy, was his belief that once under control the Indians were wards of the state and as such, it was the government's duty to protect them and provide for their sustenance. Unless the Indians had faith that such would occur, Crook maintained they would continue to resist. To this point, Crook once remarked that "Indians are like children, but differ in this, that they are not so harmless."105

The credibility Crook sought first was military might and effectiveness, and despite his sympathetic, humanitarian instincts, Crook was a warrior. To subjugate the Indians he perfected the concept of relentless pursuit. First used against the Paiutes in the northwest immediately following the Civil War, he elevated the method to an entirely new level against the Apaches. Crook, to his credit, recognized he was pitted against an unconventional foe, and as such conventional
means to defeat them would not work. Because of the vastness of the country and the mobility of the Indians, regular forces could rarely close with them to fight, if they could find them at all. In describing what it was like to fight the Indian with regular forces, Crook remarked in Chicago shortly before his death that “... it’s almost like fighting mosquitoes with a sledge-hammer. Of course, if you get the Indian where you can hit him, you can everlastingly pulverize him. The only way to get at him is by surprises, and that is possible only once in a great while”\textsuperscript{106}

Crook believed the main problem he faced in increasing the mobility of his units was one of logistics. He maintained that conventional methods of supplying troops in the field by means of supply lines from established bases restricted not only the speed at which units could move, but also their independence of operation. To overcome these deficiencies, units needed to be free of fixed bases and supply lines, and as such carry everything with them needed to conduct continuous operations. To this end he organized mule pack trains which could move into the field as part of a mobile force. They could move at the same speed as the remainder of the unit, carry enough supplies for several weeks of sustained operations, and because there were no traditional supply trains to be tended, more men could be assigned to the operational mission.\textsuperscript{107}

Crook also understood that mobility was nothing unless the hostiles could be located. To accomplish this he made wide use of Indian scouts, not just to locate the hostiles, but to fight them as well. While Crook was certainly not the first to employ Indian scouts, his use was unique because it was based on his belief that their employment would contribute to the psychological defeat of those whom he was pursuing. He preferred to enlist scouts from the tribe being pursued because he felt their presence sparked dissention within the hostile tribe. The use of Indian scouts also had the added effect of reducing the number of possible hostiles being pursued.\textsuperscript{108} To the point of using Indians to fight Indians, Crook remarked as follows:
To polish a diamond there is nothing like its own dust. It is the same with these fellows. Nothing breaks them up like turning their own people against them. They don't fear white soldiers, whom they easily surpass in the peculiar style of warfare which they force upon us, but put upon their trail an enemy as tireless, as foxy, and as stealthy and familiar with the country as they themselves, and it breaks them all up. It is not merely a question of catching them with better Indians, but of a broader and more enduring aim--their disintegration.  

Crook integrated the firepower of regular troops and the mobility of the pack trains and Indian scouts with the concept of relentless pursuit. His aim was to instill in those being pursued that they could neither win nor escape. Crook called for his campaigns to be “short, sharp, and decisive,” and his orders were clear and simple: to never leave an Apache's trail; to pursue on foot if horses tired or faltered; to entice the hostiles to surrender if possible; to enlist the aid of local Indians if possible, and if they were not available, to use prisoners; and if hostiles still failed to surrender, to track them down and either kill or capture them. Though Crook's system faltered in 1876 against the heavily armed and unusually unified Sioux and Cheyenne, it was unquestionably successful against the Apache and Paiutes. Chalipun, leader of 2,300 Apaches attested to the effectiveness of Crook's methods when he surrendered as follows: “I have come to surrender my people. . . . I want my women and children to be able to sleep at night, and to make fires to cook their food without bringing your troops down upon us. We are not afraid of the Americans alone, but we cannot fight you and our own people together.”  

Once the Indians had been subjugated and placed on a reservation, Crook believed that their control was essential to acculturation in the white man's way. To this end he advocated military administration of reservations because he believed that only the military could be trusted to protect the Indians' interests while at the same time keep them from leaving. In 1883, in fact, he succeeded in ending divided control on the reservations in Arizona. In what he called the “regeneration” of the
Chiricahua, Crook believed "time" and "the most patient watchfulness and care" were essential to the acculturation process necessary to convert the Indian's from their traditional nomadic way of life to one more closely akin to that of the more civilized whites. To implement his vision, he appointed his most competent and trusted officers to oversee the Indians' daily life, reminded his officers that justice for all was a fundamental principle of the military character, and charged them to ensure that justice was meted out--to whites and Indians alike.\textsuperscript{113}

Also vital to the "regeneration" process was the Indians' ability to become self-supporting. To this end, he allowed Indians to relocate to fertile land away from the agencies, provided them with farming implements and helped them with irrigation. He further introduced them to limited self-government. An indigenous police force was established to maintain order, and the Indians were allowed to conduct their own trials for minor offenses. Crook also banned the making of tiswin, a form of beer, as well as the old Apache custom of wife mutilation. Within a year the results were mostly positive. There had been no depredations, order had generally been maintained without the involvement of white soldiers, tiswin production was down, and the practice of wife mutilation was beginning to die out. Additionally, at the White Mountain Reservation alone, the Indians produced over 2,500,000 pounds of corn, 180,000 pounds of beans, and equally impressive amounts of potatoes and barley, wheat, and melons.\textsuperscript{114}

During Crook's second tour in Arizona, his unified system of Indian control worked well for almost two years, but it still did not prevent an outbreak by Geronimo, Natchez, Chihuahua, and a band of their followers in May 1885. As a consequence, Crook spent the next eleven months running them down, only to have Geronimo bolt again. Even though Crook was successful in returning all but approximately thirty-three of the hostiles to the reservation, the outbreak, the length of time required to bring the hostiles back under control, and the subsequent escape by Geronimo was
enough to draw Crook a censure from Lieutenant General Sheridan. In this, Sheridan, who had long opposed the use of Indian scouts, accused them of complicity both during the campaign to recapture the renegades and in the escape of Geronimo.\textsuperscript{115} Events surrounding the surrender of the Indians, Geronimo's subsequent escape, and Crook's response to censure reveal a great deal about George Crook and serve as a reminder that he was "well endowed with characteristics prevalent throughout the officer corps."\textsuperscript{116} As such, Crook's behavior again indicates that he was too heavily influenced by his environment and his experiences to have been capable of producing a doctrine on unconventional warfare.

Crook was convinced after eleven hard months of campaigning, much of it in Mexico, that certain assurances would have to be made to the Indians to secure their surrender. He also believed the Indians trusted him and the military more than they did civilians. He therefore obtained authority to promise them they would remain under military control as prisoners of war, rather than be turned over to civilian authorities as criminals. Crook's guidance from the Secretary of War further directed him to inform the Chiricahuas that following their surrender, they would immediately be sent under guard for confinement at Fort Marion, Florida. Then, just prior to negotiations getting under way, he received guidance from the President via Sheridan that he should make no promises to the Chiricahuas "unless it is necessary to secure their surrender." Thus, when he met with the hostiles in the spring of 1886, Crook thought he had all the guidance and flexibility he needed to effect the surrender and restore peace in the territory. He also felt that the current opportunity afforded the best chance to end the hostilities, and that if conditions acceptable to the Indians could not be agreed to, the conflict might continue for years.\textsuperscript{117}

When at last he met with the Indians, however, they would only agree to a two year banishment to Florida. Additionally, they stipulated that they be accompanied
by their families during their imprisonment and that they be allowed to return to Arizona after their confinement. Given the negotiation latitude he believed he had, the strength of the Indians, and a certainty they would return to the warpath if their proposals were not accepted, Crook agreed to the terms. The problem for Crook was that the President did not agree. Given Crook's commitment to his word, and his desire to end the hostilities with as little bloodshed as possible, the following response from Sheridan concerning the President's reaction to the agreement created both a personal and moral dilemma for Crook:

The President cannot assent to the surrender of the hostiles on the terms of their imprisonment in the East for two years with the understanding of their return to the reservation. He instructs you to enter again into negotiations on the terms of their unconditional surrender, only sparing their lives. In the meantime and on the receipt of this order you are directed to take every precaution against the escape of the hostiles, which must not be allowed under any circumstances. You must make at once such disposition of your troops as will insure against further hostilities by completing the destruction of the hostiles, unless these terms are acceded to.

Crook regarded the response as both a lack of confidence in him, as well as a complete lack of understanding by leaders in Washington concerning conditions in the West and the Indians in general. Wedded to his word, Crook was convinced it was too late to honorably renegotiate the terms of the surrender; to try to do so would only invite trouble. His response reflected not only his frustration, but his reluctance to go back on his word. To this point Crook remarked that "To inform the Indians that the terms on which they surrendered are disapproved would, in my judgement, not only make it impossible for me to negotiate with them, but result in their scattering to the mountains, and I can't at present see any way to prevent it."

Despite his orders, Crook believed the Indians had agreed to the terms of the surrender in good faith and he refused to disavow the agreement. To have done so would have impugned his honor and destroyed his credibility with the Indians.
Though Crook seems to have felt personally betrayed by his superiors, he could not bring himself to tell the Indians that he could not honor his word. Crook's refusal to reenter negotiations illustrates not only his concern that the Chiricahuas might resume the warpath, but also his concern that his reputation, long so important to him and a great source of self-esteem, might suffer in the eyes of the Indians if he failed to keep his promises. The fact that he never informed them the accords had not been accepted seems to further strengthen the argument. As Martin F. Schmidt, editor of Crook's autobiography notes, "the General could not bring himself to tell the Indians that his word was not good, that his promise to them could not be kept. He had always been known to them as a straight talker and would not be known in any other way."

Another jolt to Crook's pride came following Geronimo's escape into Mexico shortly after his surrender. In a telegram dated 31 March 1886, Sheridan remarked that "It seems strange that Geronimo and party could have escaped without the knowledge of the scouts." In other words, Sheridan accused Crook's trusted scouts of complicity in the escape. On 1 April, the next day, Sheridan fired another salvo into Crook's ego. In a telegram Sheridan sent the following:

I do not see what you can now do except to concentrate your troops at the best points and give protection to the people. Geronimo will undoubtedly enter upon other raids of murder and robbery and, as the offensive campaign against him with scouts has failed, would it not be best to take up defensive and give protection to the people and business interests of Arizona and New Mexico. The Infantry might be stationed by companies on certain points requiring protection and the Cavalry patrol between them. You have in your Department 46 companies of Infantry and 40 companies of Cavalry, and ought to be able to do a good deal with such a force. Please send me a statement of what you contemplate for the future.

To Crook, Sheridan's suggestions seemed a repudiation of the system for which he claimed ownership and of which he was proud. He resented the fact that after almost thirty years of experience as an Indian-fighter, he was now being told how to
do his job. His pride and vanity could take it no longer. His response to Sheridan, while not disrespectful, shows a disdain for his superior's suggestions as well as for his ability as an Indian-fighter. As such, it provides yet another reminder that Crook's professional characteristics, indicative of his attitudes, were probably not so unlike those of many other officers in the army at the time—vain, petty, disdainful of peers, and hungry for applause. In his response, Crook reminded Sheridan that "Troops cannot protect property beyond a radius of one-half mile from their camp." He then added that persons, meaning the President and Sheridan, who were not thoroughly conversant with the elusive nature of the Chiricahua and the ruggedness of the terrain could have no conception of the difficulties inherent in conducting operations in his department. Crook ended his response somewhat defiantly, but yet in it can be seen the disappointment of one whose efforts have gone unappreciated:

I believe that the plan upon which I have conducted operations is the one most likely to prove successful in the end. It may be, however, that I am too much wedded to my own views in this matter, and as I have spent nearly eight years of the hardest work of my life in the Department, I respectfully request that I may be now relieved from its command.

Crook's feelings of rejection and disappointment at not being appreciated were not new to him in 1886. They had been part of his make-up since early in his career. As a consequence, there seems to have long been a subtle, but seething resentment burning within him of people who either did not appreciate and reward his efforts and of those who, in Crook's eyes, were unjustly rewarded. To illustrate, Crook notes in his autobiography that during the Rogue River wars he had served under Major Bob Garrett, who Crook categorized as the best commander under whom he had ever served. Crook admired him not only because he was strict, but also because he rewarded those who did their duty and made those who did not bear the consequences of their failure. In this way, Crook notes, "the hard work was not all put on the willing officer." Crook's words unmistakably imply that he was the
"willing officer" who, under other commanders, had to take up the slack of others and that he resented it.  

Further indications of Crook's resentful nature and his longing to be appreciated are evident in his autobiography, most of which was written following his relief in Arizona. Reflecting on his departure from the west coast to participate in the Civil War, Crook remarked that his replacement was ordered to Fort Ter-Waw "to reap the fruits of my sowing, and, strange to say, it has been ever thus in my life. I have had to do the rough work for others afterwards to get the benefits of it." Not only do these remarks provide a good commentary concerning Crook's outlook on life, but they relate a great deal about how he felt concerning the justice of the system of which he was a part.  

The resentment Crook felt for Sheridan in 1886 was not new either, for it was not the first time that Crook believed that he had been wronged by his former friend. He had, in fact, harbored animosity toward Sheridan since the battle of Winchester, Virginia, during the Civil War, over twenty years earlier. In his autobiography, Crook claims to have turned the enemy's flank in that engagement on his own initiative, and thereby saved the day for Sheridan's command. As a result of this action, Crook further maintains that over a thousand prisoners were taken by his division, but that the cavalry had later conducted a charge into his area and "gobbled up all the prisoners and afterwards was allowed credit for them." Crook adds that he complained to Sheridan, who assured him he had seen what had transpired, and that Crook would receive the credit in Sheridan's report. When the report was finally published following the war, Sheridan took credit himself for having thought of the flanking movement, and Crook was still not given credit for having taken the prisoners. Besides reinforcing Crook's distrust of the army's reward system, the event marked a turning point in their personal relationship for Crook believed that Sheridan had lied to him for his own personal gain. Needless to say, Crook was
bitter; having done the work, someone else got the glory. Crook's immediate complaint to Sheridan about getting credit, and the fact that he made an issue of it in his autobiography, demonstrates his hunger for applause and appreciation referred to earlier.

The intensity of Crook's dislike for his old friend Sheridan are evident in his remarks following Sheridan's death. Of Sheridan, Crook wrote: "The adulations heaped on him by a grateful nation for his supposed genius turned his head, which, added to his natural disposition, caused him to bloat his little carcass with debauchery and dissipation, which carried him off prematurely."

Crook's extreme concern for getting credit and being appreciated can also be seen in his comments concerning the rank he received following the Civil War. During the war Crook was eventually brevetted as a major general in the volunteer service, but when he reverted to the regular army, he was only appointed as a lieutenant colonel. In his writings he notes with tones of disappointment and resentment that two officers who had been subordinate commanders under him were made colonels. Feeling again that he had not been dealt with fairly by the system, Crook remarked in his autobiography that "I regret to say that I learned too late that it was not what a person did, but it was what he got the credit of doing that gave him a reputation and at the close of the war gave him position."

Crook's concern for his reputation, for being appreciated and getting credit, and his hunger for applause imply that his attitudes and professional behavior were characteristic of the officer corps of the Indian-fighting army. Given his taciturnity, it is reasonable to conclude that Crook's intellectual energies were focused inwardly on himself and on his relationship with is peers, superiors, and professional rivals, and not on doctrine development. His activities between his relief from command in 1886 and his death in 1890 seem to support this conclusion.
Crook's ego was stung by the rejection of his system, by the accusation that his trusted scouts had been disloyal, and by the subsequent removal of his scouts, along with the surrendered Chiricahuas, to Florida. He feared his reputation had suffered, and as a consequence, during his final years he devoted a great deal of energy toward its defense. Within months of his relief, he published two works, each explaining his methods for dealing with the Indians and what he had achieved in Arizona. His Resume of Operations Against Apache Indians, 1882-1886, the second of the two pieces, was primarily a conduit though which Crook aired his animosity for Sheridan and publicly defended the validity of his methods. In it, Crook also defended the loyalty of the scouts. Since the Indian scouts were central to his warfighting methods, Crook maintained that the army's success in defeating the Apaches depended directly on their employment. Crook concluded the Resume with an "I told you so" tone by deriding General Nelson Miles' efforts in bringing Geronimo to heel. By asserting that Miles had to revert to his methods to finally capture the last of the Chiricahuas, Crook reveals the pettiness which was by then part of his nature and which now detracts from his stature.\textsuperscript{132}

In 1886 Crook also went public in defense of his actions at the Rosebud. Responding to several articles in two Omaha newspapers in which one of his former subordinate commanders was quoted as saying that Crook had made a bad fight of it, Crook laid the blame for the failure of his plans squarely at the feet of others. Again, Crook's public wrangling in defense of his reputation reveals a pettiness which seems to have been consuming him intellectually.\textsuperscript{133}

Crook also became more deeply involved in the Indian rights movement in the years just prior to his death. His involvement was partially the result of his long-standing empathy for the plight of the Indians, but also because of his concern for the Apache prisoners and scouts whom he believed had been victimized by the government as a consequence of the actions surrounding his relief. Believing he
still had an obligation to his former scouts and the Indians who had surrendered to him, Crook regularly corresponded with leaders in the Indian rights movement and used his connections with the Indian Rights Association to bring political pressure on Congress to improve the conditions of the imprisoned Indians. His efforts to relocate the Apaches to an area and climate less damaging to their health than Florida, however, were resisted by Westerners who feared the return of the former hostiles. Additionally, General Miles, whom Crook believed had been deeply involved in the imprisonment of the scouts, also resisted Crook's efforts to help his former charges. As a consequence, Crook and Miles exchanged public barbs until the time of Crook’s death in March 1890.134

Crook’s actions in regard to the plight of the Indians, while noble, also reflect his continuing focus on his reputation. His efforts to publicly vindicate himself reflect the anger, resentment, and disappointment which Utley maintains boiled beneath Crook’s calm exterior. Because his naturally reticent personality normally kept these passions suppressed, they were all the more intense135 and as a consequence, left little room for the visionary thinking required to produce a doctrine. Indeed, Crook seems to have been so inwardly focused and so engrossed in efforts to vindicate himself that it never even occurred to him to leave a legacy in unconventional warfare doctrine. In an 1883 interview, a newspaper reporter suggested that it might be appropriate for Crook to “write a book on Indians and Indian warfare, and thereby not only make a valuable addition to American literature, but also render a great service to the rising generation, whose mind is filled with the wildest ideas of frontier life.”136

Given the intensity of Crook’s feelings on the subject, such a work would today seem to be a natural follow-on to almost thirty years of one’s lifework. It must be remembered, however, that Crook was a product of the army system, and the army as an institution lacked the intellectual and professional maturity to elaborate an
unconventional warfare doctrine. Crook was imbued with the attitudes common to the officer corps of the Indian-fighting army and was a prisoner of his experience. In responding to the reporters question, Crook replied that “it never occurred to me to write the subject up.”

CONCLUSION

America's army of the latter half of the 19th century, like the nation, had a limited vision of the world and limited concepts of what constituted real war. Most Americans felt secure behind the country's ocean barriers and could conceive of no significant threat to the nation from any source. Indeed, many questioned the need for the military at all. In response, army professionals began a search for a mission to justify the continued existence of the institution.

The impressions of violence and lethality left by the Civil War on the minds of most military leaders was significant, as were the advancements in military organization and war-related technology they observed in the Franco-Prussian War. They considered the conflicts with the Indians to be transient in nature, and war only in the broadest sense. Indeed, by late in the 19th century the inevitability of victory over the Indians seemed assured, and there was nothing in the experience of either the country or the army to suggest that unconventional warfare lay in the future. As a consequence, large scale conventional wars came to be considered the wars of the future. In this, neither the army nor the nation demonstrated a fully developed, mature understanding of the operational continuum of conflict and how the country would be affected by it in future years. That such a condition existed should not be surprising because governments, organizations, and people are products of their experiences and react to the world in terms of their perception of it.

Thus, unable to envision a future conflict wherein unconventional warfare would be involved, and without the intellectual and professional development mechanisms
in place to suggest otherwise, the army sought to secure its future by focusing on the only kind of war it recognized--conventional war. More time and more experience with the world and with the continuum of conflict would be required before the army would develop the intellectual and professional maturity to develop an unconventional warfare doctrine.

George Crook was a product of the army system, which itself lacked the intellectual and professional maturity to envision war across the spectrum of conflict. As such, he was in many ways a reflection of the army's stage of intellectual and professional development, and for all his outward differences, inwardly Crook was all army. He spent almost two-thirds of his life in the army, and as such, was thoroughly immersed in its attitudes and values. As a consequence, he was too imbued with the characteristics common to the officer corps, and too absorbed in himself to rise above the system which produced him; his introverted personality and limited scholarly qualities made it even less likely that he would do so. Crook's vision did not extend beyond his own reputation, and as a consequence, his ultimate contribution was a defense of his life's work, not a visionary projection of it.
ENDNOTES


2. Doctrine has been variously defined as the guiding set of principles the army follows to accomplish its warfighting mission in support of national objectives. It is both formally and informally inculcated into the fabric of the institution so that it becomes the accepted way the army plans to fight. As Gordon R. Sullivan notes in “Doctrine: A Guide to the Future,” Military Review 2, (February 1992) 2-9, doctrine describes the “how” the army expects to conduct its missions. Sullivan appears to agree with Utley, “Contribution to the Frontier,” 7-12, that doctrine is influenced by the American military tradition, which Utley describes as the “accumulated body of military usage, belief, custom, and practice” which constitutes the army’s past. Sullivan notes, however, that a major challenge in doctrine development is to incorporate the lessons from the past into future doctrine. He cautions that history is filled with examples of armies that learned their lessons only in defeat and that good armies must learn the correct lessons in victory as well.


8. Cooper, 81.

10. Ibid., 47.


16. Ibid.


24. Ibid., 169.

25. Ibid., 170.


27. Cooper, 84.


30. Weigley, *History*, 244-245.

31. Cooper, 84-85.


33. Cooper, 83-86.

34. Ibid., 79-81.


37. Cooper, 70-86.

38. Upton, III-V.


43. Nenninger, 6-9.

44. Cooper, 79-85.


46. Weigley, *History*, 266-274.

47. Ibid., 273-274.

48. Ibid.


51. Merritt, 17.
53. Cooper, 79.
54. Weigley, History, 270.
55. Cooper, 78-79.
57. Ibid., 154-155.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., 156-163.
61. Cooper, 74-79.
63. King, 120.
64. Cooper, 74-78.
65. Ibid., 75.
67. Cooper, 75.
68. Harte, 28.
70. Ibid. 183-186.
71. "The Indian Fighter: Movements of General Crook and His Prisoners," in "Scrapbook of Miscellaneous Clippings Relating to General George Crook." Crook's
comments concerning corruption in the administration of Indian affairs were extracted from a newspaper clipping contained in a scrapbook presented by Mrs. W. S. Schuyler in 1939. The scrapbook is contained in the Crook-Kennon Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 22.

72. Weigley, History, 287.


74. Ibid.

75. Crook, Autobiography, 167-177.

76. Cooper, 77.

77. Cooper, 75-79; and Weigley, American Way of War, 159-162.

78. Weigley, American Way of War, 153-158.


80. Cooper, 77.


82. Ibid.

83. Crook, Autobiography, XVIII-XIX.


85. John G. Bourke, "General Crook in the Indian Country," The Century Magazine XLI, (March 1891), 647-653; and King, 118-123.

86. Ibid.


88. Crook, Autobiography, XIX.

89. Ibid., 1-12.

90. Utley, "Crook and Miles," 91.

92. George Crook, personal diary in his own hand. Pages dated 31 January 1873-15 February, 1873, contain Crook’s comments concerning drinking and gambling. Crook-Kennon Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.


95. Ibid., 11.

96. Ibid., 16-17.


99. “General George Crook in Cambridge,” in “Gen. Crook Scrapbook.” Crook’s comments made at the Sanders Theater in Cambridge, Massachusetts, were extracted from a newspaper clipping contained in a scrapbook presented by Mrs. W. S. Schuyler in March 1939. This scrapbook also contains maps, diaries, photos, and a record of General Crook’s cadet store account from when he was attending the Military Academy at West Point. The scrapbook is contained in the Crook-Kennon Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 27.


108. Greene, 120-121.


112. Greene, 127.


114. Crook, Autobiography, 244-246.

115. Greene, 127; and Crook, Autobiography, 262-266.


117. Crook, Autobiography, 262-266; and Resume, 7-11.

118. Crook, Autobiography, 262-266.

119. Crook, Resume, 12.

120. Crook, Autobiography, 263.

121. Greene, 127-128; and Crook, Resume, 22.

122. Crook, Autobiography, 16.

123. Crook, Resume, 12.

124. Ibid., 15.

125. Utley, "Crook and Miles," 91.

126. Crook, Resume, 16.


128. Ibid., 82.

129. Ibid., 127.
130. Utley, “Crook and Miles,” 82.


135. Utley, “Crook and Miles,” 82.


137. Ibid.
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