The Cadre Division

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Five times in this century the United States has mobilized to fight wars for which they were initially not prepared. After each of these wars, the military was "down-sized" to meet austere budgets. Given the inability of the country and her leaders to adequately learn the lessons of history, what lessons can we apply to the current restructuring within the U.S. Army? How can we economically maintain structures which have the capability to rapidly expand should the national interests be threatened? How can we keep highly trained professionals within the Army, active and reserve, who can rapidly regenerate fighting forces? The cadre division is the concept which will allow the Army to regenerate fighting divisions in the shortest possible time with the smallest feasible cost to the American taxpayer. This concept puts a cadre of active and reserve soldiers in divisional units to plan and train for expansion of the cadre division to a heavy division which is a combat ready and capable unit. In comparison to an active or reserve component heavy division, the cadre division...

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division is relatively cheap, but it is not without cost. To be successful the cadre division must have a relatively large contingent of active duty soldiers. The division must have the latest training aids and modern equipment. What does the country get for this investment in security? A properly supported cadre division will be capable of employment within 12 months of mobilization. Although this may seem like a long time, the relatively unsophisticated Infantry divisions of World War II took an average of 16 months from activation to be prepared for employment. Currently the estimates for a newly activated heavy division to be prepared for employment are as high as 24 months. There is a saying that you can't buy time. This may be incorrect in the case of the cadre division since it appears you can buy 12 months.
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THE CADRE DIVISION

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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Five times in this century the United States has mobilized to fight wars for which they were initially not prepared. After each of these wars the military was "down-sized" to meet austere budgets. Given the inability of the country and her leaders to adequately learn the lessons of history, what lessons can we apply to the current restructuring within the U.S. Army? How can we economically maintain structures which have the capability to rapidly expand should the national interests be threatened? How can we keep highly trained professionals within the Army, active and reserve, who can rapidly regenerate fighting forces? The cadre division is the concept which will allow the Army to regenerate fighting divisions in the shortest possible time with the smallest feasible cost to the American taxpayer. This concept puts a cadre of active and reserve soldiers in divisional units to plan and train for expansion of the cadre division to a heavy division which is a combat ready and capable unit. In comparison to an active or reserve component heavy division, the cadre division is relatively cheap, but it is not without cost. To be successful the cadre division must have a relatively large contingent of active duty soldiers. The division must have the latest training aids and modern equipment. What does the country get for this investment in security? A properly supported cadre division will be capable of employment within 12 months of mobilization. Although this may seem like a long time, the relatively unsophisticated Infantry divisions of World War II took an average of 16 months from activation to be prepared for employment. Currently the estimates for a newly activated heavy division to be prepared for employment are as high as 24 months. There is a saying that you can’t buy time. This may be incorrect in the case of the cadre division since it appears you can buy 12 months.
The purpose of this study is to explore the feasibility of establishing cadre division(s) to provide a base force to rapidly expand the U.S. Army during mobilization. As the Army downsizes it will reduce throughout the ranks. This may leave a leadership void if the requirement to mobilize for another operation on the magnitude of Desert Storm arises. Cadre divisions may be a way to retain some of that leadership while meeting manpower goals.

What do we mean when we say "cadre?" Webster defines cadre as a nucleus, especially of trained personnel, capable of assuming control and of training others.  

The concept of a cadre division generally implies that a small nucleus of the personnel required to fill a division would be assigned to the division for the purpose of managing that division on a day-to-day basis. Their mission would include operations, training, and supply functions, as well as planning for the expansion and training of the unit into a full combat division. Theoretically, the cadre for this division could come from the active Army, National Guard (NG), or United States Army Reserve (USAR), or a combination of these. This paper will focus on the historical lessons of cadres used to form the divisions of World War II, the various cadre concepts used in other countries today, and considerations for a modern cadre division.
HISTORICAL LESSONS

In early 1939, the U.S. Army War Plans Division conducted a study which indicated that Germany had 90 divisions, Italy 45, and Japan 50 (on the Chinese mainland alone). At that point in time the U.S. Army did not have one complete division. The Army was organized into nine Infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions, along with other miscellaneous units. All of the divisions were at a partial strength of between 1200 and 11,500 soldiers, under their "peacetime" authorizations. What few weapons were available were obsolete. For example, there was one 37mm anti-tank gun in the Army and 50 caliber machine guns were considered anti-tank weapons. The total strength of the Army was 187,893 with some 50,002 overseas.

As the Army began to expand in the summer of 1940 it was discovered there were insufficient reception and training centers prepared to conduct basic combat training (BCT). As a result, some newly inducted men went directly to their units for BCT. In addition, the BCT system was so far behind that some Regular Army (RA) units were conducting BCT for some soldiers while conducting advanced individual training (AIT) for others. The National Guard units that received trainees for the purpose of providing them BCT were not adequately trained themselves to conduct this mission.

As a follow-on to this expansion, the training plan for
mobilizing divisions, which was originally called the Mobilization Training Plan (MTP), developed into a unit-specific Army Training Plan (ATP). The ATP created standards against which training would be measured. For Infantry Divisions, the ATP provided four major blocks of instruction: basic and individual training (17 weeks), unit training (13 weeks), combined arms training (14 weeks), and maneuvers (8 weeks). Each of these blocks allocated a week to standardized proficiency tests administered by a higher headquarters. Divisions could not advance from one block to the next without passing these sequential tests. Units that failed normally had to repeat the entire block of instruction, sometimes under a new commander. The administration of these tests at the conclusion of basic and advanced training were conducted by Corps and Army headquarters.

Unit training concluded with a physical training test administered by Corps, a platoon combat firing test administered by the division commander, and artillery battery and battalion firing tests conducted by Corps and Army. Combined arms training concluded with battalion field exercises and combat firing tests administered by Corps and Army. The division's final maneuvers were observed by the Army Ground Forces staff.4

From the outside the ATP seemed to be a somewhat disjointed, force-fed system. Given the magnitude of the expansion and the paucity of resources, the ATP was probably the only way to insure that adequately trained units were the product at the end of the mobilization pipeline.
Initially, the officer cadre of 172 per division was selected from throughout the Army. The officer cadre comprised 38 percent of the total officer authorization of 452. Of the 13,425 man enlisted authorization, the 1190-man enlisted cadre came from the training centers as per the original plan. This arrangement proved unworkable especially in the area of enlisted soldiers since the training centers were quickly depleted by this process. Beginning in 1942 a new plan went into effect where a "parent" division was required to provide the cadre for a new division from within its ranks. Obviously, the most senior officers were still appointed from throughout the Army.

Once the officer cadre had been selected, they were sent to various locations for a month-long training course to prepare them for their duties. The Commanding General (CG) and senior staff went to Ft. Leavenworth; the Assistant Division Commander and the Infantry officers went to Ft. Benning; and the Division Artillery (DIVARTY) Commander and his officers went to Ft. Sill. Smaller contingents of officers went to their respective branch schools. In most cases, the remainder of the officers and NCO’s (those not considered part of the cadre) arrived only weeks before the draftees they were to train.

Supplying the cadre of officers and enlisted soldiers caused a large personnel turbulence problem in the "parent" division. Personnel turbulence, in effect, became the largest cause of delays in the process of mobilizing, training, and deploying divisions.

Almost every division went through the process of having
personnel "stripped off" for one or more of the following reasons: cadre for a new division, Officer Candidate School (OCS) levy, reassignment to divisions in combat, or reassignment to a unit en route overseas. The latter two proved to be the most damaging cause of personnel turbulence once a division had begun training.

An example of the degree to which personnel turbulence delayed training and deployment of divisions is demonstrated by the memorandum written by LTG Leslie J. McNair, Chief of Staff of General Headquarters, on 20 December 1941 that identified 17 divisions as combat ready and 17 more to be ready by 1 April 1942. This would have placed 34 divisions overseas, or en route by the date stated. In fact the U.S. Army did not have 34 divisions overseas, or even en route until March 1944. The planned 12 months between activation and embarkation of the new divisions actually averaged 21 months.

Thus, the 20th century wars in which the United States engaged repeated some of the lessons of the earlier wars. As such, it can still be said that the United states has never adequately and fully planned for a mobilization before it occurred. One of the principal causes of this lack of planning has been the Nation's constant failure to coordinate military policy with foreign policy. Without such coordination, an adequate defense policy can never be determined.

Closely related to this basic cause for inadequate mobilization planning has been the reluctance of the Nation's leaders to confide in Congress and the people in sufficient time to
permit certain defense measures to be taken. It has never been proven that Congress and the people of the United States cannot be told bad news in advance of war itself. (Although the bearer of the bad news will probably not be reelected.) It has been proven, however, that Congress has on several occasions failed to enact mobilization legislation in adequate time because of the lack of sufficient information dictating that such legislation was necessary. In addition, it has been proven the Congress, when it is convinced that an emergency exists, usually exercises sound judgement; but the Congress has sometimes failed to look very closely into the total defense needs of the Nation. Too often the Congress has been content to follow the lead of the Chief Executive, although the Constitution places the responsibility for raising and maintaining armies on the Congress. It has been abundantly proven in all of the wars in which the United States has engaged that time cannot be bought at any price. This lesson requires no elaboration.10

What then are the most important lessons to be learned from the wars of the 20th century?

1. Individual basic training must be conducted in accordance with a well-formulated program, for a definite period of time, and under proper supervision. It can best be accomplished at training centers specifically entrusted with that mission.

2. Officer candidate selection should be on a standard basis of merit which can best be administered under Federal control. Officer standards and training should be set high enough to
eliminate the inept.

3. Volunteering will not produce sufficient military manpower for a large-scale, protracted war. A system of selective service is mandatory.

4. All military staffs in peacetime should function, as nearly as possible, as they are expected to function in wartime.

5. The quality of personnel on staffs must be maintained during mobilization and war.

6. Economic/industrial mobilization must be in accordance with a well-articulated, complete national plan.

7. Replacement systems for war must include provisions for both individual and unit replacement and rotation.

8. The Reserve program for the armed services must be improved so that Reserve military units can provide not only organizations and equipment but also men with usable military skills. When the training time of a Reserve unit is as long as that for a newly activated unit filled with recruits, it is obvious that the reserve system is not reasonably efficient. There was no efficient Reserve system which adequately met the mobilization requirements in WWII except the ROTC. 1

OTHER CADRE CONCEPTS

Exploring the concept of cadre divisions leads to the review of other countries throughout the world which use a cadre concept
to some extent and with some apparent degree of success. If the concept works for them, it may also work for the U.S. Army. The countries examined included the former German Democratic Republic, the Swiss, and the Israelis. Several other countries are considering changing to a cadre concept, the most notable is the "new" Unified Germany. It should be noted however, that none of these organizations function in the same environment as the U.S. Army and of these, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) is the only organization tested in combat. The IDF will therefore be the central focus of attention.

The IDF consists of three components. The first is the Sherut-Hova or compulsory service. This active service is required for all male and female Jews and Druze males beginning at age 18. Their length of service is three years, but may be as long as 5 years if the conscript volunteers for specialized training or officer candidate training. Various deferrals and exceptions bring the actual percentage of males and females actually entering the service to 92% and 60% respectively.12

The second component of the IDF is the Sherut-Keva or Permanent Service Corps. This component comprises approximately 50,000 (50K) of the 500K military force (AC and RC). The Sherut-Keva mans all of the headquarters elements and commands all organizations, active and reserve, at division level and above. At brigade level and below there is a mix of active and reserve officers. In all reserve units there is a large cadre of permanent officers and NCOs (as compared to U.S. Army, reserve units).13
The bulk of the IDF is in the third component which is known as the Miluimm or reserve service. Once compulsory service is completed, all men and women serve in the reserves until 55 and 34 years of age respectively. The obligation can be terminated earlier if a woman marries. By regulation, reserves will be called to active duty at least once a year for up to 35 days for enlisted and 42 days for officers (The actual active duty period usually runs between 45 and 60 days). This continues through age 39. After 39 the period of annual service is reduced. By age 40 most of the reserve soldiers are transferred out of combat units to support units unless they volunteer to remain in their combat unit. Monetary compensation during periods of active duty is provided by the reservist's employer, or the state if self-employed. Otherwise, the reservists only get some pocket money during the periods of active duty.14

Under the proposed German concept one out of the five battalions in each of the army's 32 armored and infantry brigades is a cadre battalion. During peacetime, cadre battalions are assigned an active-army commander, a noncommissioned officer, five junior enlisted troops and a full complement of equipment. Upon mobilization, the battalion expands to four companies. Three of these companies would be drawn from regular army battalions in the same brigade, while a fourth company of 160 members would be staffed by a combination of 60 percent reservists and 40 percent regulars. Soldiers assigned to the fourth company would perform command and control and combat support duties. Regular army
battalions are purposely over-structured with an additional company during peacetime to accommodate mobilization.

One German Army test model believed by the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) to have potential application to the U.S. Army involves the pairing of two battalions, either infantry or armor. During peacetime one of the battalions would be staffed to nearly 100 percent of its wartime requirements while the second - a cadre battalion - would be kept at 12-16 percent strength. Upon mobilization, active component soldiers would be redistributed, so each battalion would be half regulars and half reservists.

The Germans are also testing a command arrangement that places one active component officer in command of both battalions during peacetime. When the units are mobilized, the officer would assume command of the cadre battalion, while his deputy would move up to command the paired battalion.15
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A U.S. CADRE DIVISION

Based upon historical lessons and the study of other cadre concepts, what are the considerations for the U.S. Army as it moves toward the possible formation of cadre divisions?

Numerous personnel and organizations have provided their ideas concerning cadre divisions over the past several years. These include active and reserve officers providing their concepts in the form of U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Military Studies Projects (MSP) or professional journal articles, various speakers at the USAWC, Government Account Office (GAO) studies, and specific Department of the Army studies.

Some Army officers lean toward giving the mission of forming a cadre division to one or more of the 12 reserve divisions which have a BCT, AIT, or OSUT (one-station unit training) mobilization mission. LTC Paul Walker believed that all of the 12 reserve divisions should be given the additional mission upon mobilization of taking the soldiers they train and forming Light Infantry Divisions that could be ready for combat in weeks.16 There are several problems with Colonel Walker's supposition. First, his failure to recognize that these reserve divisions have a mission beyond training their first batch of initial entry training (IET) soldiers. Second, all of these units are not preparing for the training of Infantrymen. In fact the majority train BCT, AIT, or
OSUT in some specialty other than Infantry. Third, the units that do have the mission to train Infantrymen are not staffed to do more than IET training and their annual training time barely provides them time to meet their current mobilization mission. The last problem with this suggestion is that the U.S. Army does not need twelve additional Light Infantry Divisions given the global threats that we must be prepared to face in the future.

Senior leaders speaking at the USAWC say there will be cadre divisions but are not sure of the composition or component. Only one of these speakers indicated that he believed the National Guard was the place to organize a cadre division.17

The GAO has also looked to other countries to see if they have a system which the U.S. Army could use. The concepts they espouse look for the maximum money savings by shifting soldiers from one unit to another at mobilization plus having reserves fill the planned vacancies. As we learned during the mobilization for World War II, personnel turbulence is the one key factor which hurts unit preparation for combat more than any other. It is improbable to build an organization with the esprit and cohesiveness needed to be combat-ready if its members know they will be moved from that organization before they go to war. Additionally, the command and control structure which is so difficult to build would be totally subverted by such a system. The only value in such a system is the trained and homogeneous battalion would be used "as trained" while the mobilization (concept) battalion would only be used if time was available to reorganize, and the need for the additional unit was
forecast. In either case, this concept does nothing to provide the additional division structures which would be needed in a regional or protracted war. As we saw in World War II, it takes at least 16 months to build and train a relatively unsophisticated Infantry division to the point that it is ready to deploy. Thus, whatever cadre concept the Army employs must provide combat-ready divisions in less than 12 months. Any period longer than this will cause the cadre divisions to be of little or no value in anything but an extremely protracted conflict or a conflict where sufficient warning time is provided and a declaration of national emergency can begin the mobilization process.

The most comprehensive study of this concept is the "Cadre Division Concept Study (Final Draft)" done for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) in September 1990. The purpose of this study was to determine the strategic role and operational requirement for Cadre Divisions and to assess the feasibility of incorporating them into the Total Force. The major findings and conclusions of this study are:

a. Findings:

(1) The U.S. Army has used de facto cadre systems in the past and they have generally been unsuccessful due to inadequate leader development and equipment shortfall/obsolescence.

(2) Other nations are using cadre structures and they provide useful insights but because they operate in distinctive cultures and support different military
requirements they are not appropriate analogues for adoption by the U.S. Army.

b. Conclusions:

(1) Cadre divisions may be feasible if they can be adequately trained and adequately equipped.

(2) Although some lessons can be learned from reviewing cadre systems of other nations, differences in culture, landpower requirements, and military strategy preclude their wholesale adoption.

Additional, but lesser conclusions of the "Cadre Division Concept Study" are:

a. Cadre divisions could be employed to contribute to deterrence by providing expansibility options during crisis/transition to war.

b. Cadre divisions could be used to bridge the gap between Full and Total mobilization by providing deployable, replacement divisions well in advance of the fielding of new structure.

c. The quantitative requirement for Cadre divisions should be determined in Joint Strategy Review (JSR) 1994-1999 to reduce the strategic risk between the current force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Risk Evaluation Force.

d. Cadre divisions are feasible in all components. Preferred options are USAR, ARNG, and AC in that order.

e. Existing TOE's should be refined to achieve the purposes described in the study.
f. Cadre divisions should be manned with RC personnel supported by FTUS (Full-Time Unit Support).
g. The UMA (Unit Mobilization Augmentee) concept, within the IRR, limited to junior leaders should be employed for initial fill of Cadre Divisions.
h. Cadre division structure should focus on grades of Senior NCO's and Officers with an austere support base.
i. Different MOSs/units may need to be cadred at different levels to ensure adherence to mobilization time lines.
j. An evaluation matrix demonstrates that PURE (POMCUS Unit Residual Equipment) is the most efficient equipping strategy with redistribution of equipment from units coming out of the structure a little less desirable, and a distant third option is continuation of the current Army equipment distribution strategy.
k. Cadre divisions should have the capability to conduct IET.
l. Pre-mobilization training in a cadre division must focus on leader development, collective skills, and skills essential to performance of IET.
m. Accomplishment of the pre-mobilization training strategy will rely on the successful application of Army training doctrine and the maximum application of training aids, devices, and with special emphasis on simulation training.
n. Soldier fill should come from the recruiting base/reception station.
o. Post mobilization training must focus on the refinement of
leader skills, followed by execution of IET, SUT (Small Unit Training) and LUT (Large Unit Training).

p. Soldiers as UMAs (Unit Mobilization Augmentees) provide the most effective way for cadre divisions to leverage the IRR (Individual Ready Reserve).

q. Cadre divisions would be substantially less expensive in the RC.

This study was quite comprehensive and provided what I believe could be a constructive framework for our future cadre divisions. However, I think there are still several considerations which must be included in any cadre division concept.

First, the FTUS should be at 25 percent of RC manning, not 14 percent. This is critical to insure that there are sufficient AC trainers and staff to plan and conduct the myriad of training tasks that the division will have to accomplish to meet this expanded mission. The current USAR Training Division is hard-pressed to meet its mobilization mission to conduct IET. With an expanded mission of training these new soldiers and maintaining proficiency in armored or mechanized warfare, sufficient FTUS must be provided at the right levels to facilitate this level of readiness. Simply expecting the RC unit personnel to "get it done" by spending more of their personal time is not the answer. This FTUS should be an appropriate mix of technicians and AC experts. The level of support should be down to company level.

All of these company level trainers should be ex-drill
sergeants who are qualified with the weapon systems authorized and assigned to the unit. Every battalion should have a qualified "master gunner" for their primary weapon system. The battalion, brigade, and division staffs should have enough AC personnel to do the planning during the week for the training that these units will accomplish on the weekend. This means the primary assistants should be AC, from the ADC on down. As authorized by Title 10, USC, the Chief of Staff should also be AC. Even better would be to put an AC division commander in command. Just imagine, how long would an AC major general put up with obsolete equipment, lack of parts, or other problems that often plague RC units? This idea is probably too politically sensitive to even talk about, but worth considering. The most important point is that all of the AC/FTUS personnel will mobilize, deploy, and fight with this unit.

The manning of these cadre divisions will have to be planned in detail. When initially established, the divisions should have sufficient experienced personnel available to form the RC cadre. After a period of time the pool of trained personnel with some AC experience will begin to shrink unless there are positive incentives to join the cadre divisions. The current procedure in many training divisions is to "grow" a NCO over the period of three years to the rank of SGT/E5. This process has many shortcomings and is generally less than satisfactory. Good soldiers must be recruited from the AC and other (non-cadre) units where they have had the leadership and tactical experience that can be used as a basis to perfect their training abilities. Failure to establish
good personnel policies may result in a high percentage of unskilled junior soldiers who are not capable of executing their mission.

Using UMAs to fill the junior NCO and officer positions is a great idea, but it will require more management of the IRR pool than is currently exercised. Ideally, departing first-term soldiers in the grade of CPL/E4 or above would be given the opportunity to be designated an UMA for a specific Para/Line # in a cadre division in fairly close proximity to their home, if possible. If this alternative was properly presented as a way to know where you would serve if the country mobilizes, it could be an added selling point. The alternative would be assignment as an IRR filler, with no input on where you will be assigned.

Assuming that any form of mobilization requiring cadre division mobilization would freeze all ETSs (Expiration of Term of Service), the low-density MOSs coming out of the training base would be directed/redirected to the cadre divisions. Meanwhile, the basic MOSs of the divisions (infantry/armor/field artillery) would be filled on a priority basis with the priorities going AC, RC, and then Cadre divisions. Recruits/draftees from reception centers would provide the fillers, if required, to bring the Cadre divisions to wartime strength. This plan only works on the supposition that the AC units are filled to a reasonable strength and that the support MOSs/units are maintained at ALO 1. If the support MOSs/units are manned at ALO 3 as is the case with a number of units, the training base and IRRs combined may be required to
fill only the AC units. The resulting shortage will become more acute in the future as the pool of RT-12 IRR soldiers begins to shrink.

Networking systems and computers for computer-driven command post exercises will have to be purchased and installed so that all of the battalion, brigade, and division level staffs will be able to train and exercise the command and control system they will use in combat. Extensive time will be wasted if the commanders wait until the large-unit training phase to train their staffs on new or unfamiliar command and control systems.

The biggest obstacle to overcome will be training simulations and training areas. Since most of the RC units are in battalion or smaller armories, and these are far from any livefire ranges, it will be necessary to put expensive gunnery simulators, indoor ranges, etc. at each of these locations for use during those precious hours each month that are available for training. Until these facilities can be built, money must be available to transport the men and equipment to the locations affording these opportunities. The only other option is to base the cadre divisions at AC or RC installations where the facilities are available. This option may not be feasible due to a shortage of RC manpower available in the proximity of the installations and attempting to close these smaller armories may not be wise from a political or community support position.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the evidence that is available, the cadre division is feasible in a number of configurations. The possible configurations run from ALO 3 AC division headquarters and some specialized units with RC cadre at brigade and below, to all RC cadre with 14 percent FTUS. For speed of mobilization and lowest total time to prepare for deployment, the more AC, the better. Unfortunately, this also comes with the highest price tag. The most cost effective position would be a RC cadre with 25 percent FTUS, which would be my recommendation. A RC cadre division with less support than this will not be able to maintain the training tempo and expertise required to meet the M+12 readiness criteria.

The bottom line is, because the United States is faced with an uncertain future in a global scenario, the United States Army must be prepared to respond to various crises world-wide. We must be able to generate and regenerate forces for that unexpected but protracted war that we don’t expect to fight. The cadre divisions appear to be the best solution to long-term deterrence and force generation, provided they receive adequate resources. Otherwise they will be a waste of the taxpayers’ money.

ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., 604-5.


6. Draftee Division, 37-38.


8. Draftee Division, 17.


17. Due to the USAWC Non-attribution Policy, the individual who made these comments cannot be identified, but based upon his assignment, he can be deemed a knowledgeable source of information.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


