Best Available Copy
The Gulf War served notice that the world remains a dangerous place in spite of the end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet Union. The enduring legacy of the Cold War seems to be worldwide arms proliferation as both superpowers armed Third World client states to the teeth. As a result, more nations are armed with more lethal weapons than ever before to include weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missile technology to project them beyond their borders. Exacerbating this destructive potential is the convergence of emerging regional tensions previously suppressed by the Cold War superpowers with regional power vacuums created by the implosion of the Soviet Empire and the resulting United States military drawdown. The bottom line is that the Third World looms as a potential battleground where latent animosities and competitions for regional advantage threaten to increase the frequency of low and mid intensity conflict. These actions have the potential to impact United States vital interests in critical resources and access to those resources. United States strategic response is being driven by economic reality, read drawdown, which is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIELD</th>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>SUB-GROUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT

21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL

22b. TELEPHONE (include Area Code)

22c. OFFICE SYMBOL
replacing forward deployment with forward presence and power projection of contingency forces. The strategy is flawed in as much as a critical gap exists between strategic mobility means and force projection needs. An affordable forward presence is required to fill the gap. Techniques can be enhanced to meet mission. A potential solution lies in the Joint Task Force Bravo concept pioneered by United States Souther Command in response to a regional version of today's global economy of force requirements. Small, tailor able, and affordable, it is an option that easily transitions from a low intensity deterrent to a mid intensity advance element posture. With minor adjustments, it can easily be enhanced to produce maximum bang for the buck as a forward presence cutting edge that is effective and affordable. It is a case of back to the future - a good idea whose time has come.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Department of Defense or any of its agencies.
This document may not be released for open publication
until it has been cleared by the appropriate military
service or government agency.

JOINT TASK FORCE - BRAVO - A MODEL FOR FORWARD PRESENCE
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Wayne W. Boy
United States Army

Colonel John N. Sloan
Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public
release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Wayne W. Boy, LTC, USA

TITLE: Joint Task Force - Bravo - A Model for Forward Presence

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 15 April 1992 PAGES:25 CLASSIFICATION:Unclassified

The Gulf War served notice that the world remains a dangerous place in spite of the end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet Union. The enduring legacy of the Cold War seems to be worldwide arms proliferation as both superpowers armed Third World client states to the teeth. As a result, more nations are armed with more lethal weapons than ever before to include weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missile technology to project them beyond their borders. Exacerbating this destructive potential is the convergence of emerging regional tensions previously suppressed by the Cold War superpowers with regional power vacuums created by the implosion of the Soviet Empire and the resulting United States military drawdown. The bottom line is that the Third World looms as a potential battleground where latent animosities and competitions for regional advantage threaten to increase the frequency of low and mid intensity conflict. These actions have the potential to impact United States vital interests in critical resources and access to those resources. United States strategic response is being driven by economic reality, read drawdown, which is replacing forward deployment with forward presence and power projection of contingency forces. The strategy is flawed in as much as a critical gap exists between strategic mobility means and force projection needs. An affordable forward presence is required to fill the gap until strategic lift can be enhanced to meet mission. A potential solution lies in the Joint Task Force - Bravo concept pioneered by United States Southern Command in response to a regional version of today's global economy of force requirements. Small, tailorable, and affordable, it is an option that easily transitions from a low intensity deterrent to a mid intensity advance element posture. With minor adjustments, it can easily be enhanced to produce maximum bang for the buck as a forward presence cutting edge that is effective and affordable. It is a case of back to the future - a good idea whose time has come.
INTRODUCTION

International euphoria over the implosion of the Soviet Union and the demise of the associated communist threat was subjected to a severe reality check by the Gulf War. It served as a "forceful reminder that there are still autonomous sources of turbulence in the world". The bottom line is that the world remains a dangerous place. Instability with all its root causes is inherent even after the Cold War ideological overlay has been stripped away. In the midst of evolution to a new world order, the United States finds itself as the lone remaining superpower in a world spinning toward a multipolar orientation where political and economic elements of power appear to be taking priority over the military dimension. Given the decline of a defined superpower threat abroad and economic troubles at home, we are being driven to a drawdown and restructuring of our military forces to a minimally acceptable level. We intend to trade forward deployment of large forces for a yet to be defined forward presence reinforced by power projection from the continental United States. During the current unipolar interlude, America cannot retreat from its leadership role and the worlds' problems. However, as the Gulf War so clearly demonstrated, power projection to implement this change is at risk pending an increase in strategic mobility assets. At the same time, the economics fueling the drawdown will not allow us to be strong everywhere. The question becomes how do we fill the gap that exists between proposed ends and actual means? How do we structure a forward presence to meet the mission?
This paper will offer a possible solution. It is not new or innovative. In fact, a model already exists. It is Joint Task Force - Bravo (JTF-B) in Southern Command. Small, temporary, tailorable, and affordable, it constitutes an economical cutting edge when an on-the-ground deterrence is key. In the following paragraphs, I will outline United States vital interests, define future threats to these interests, describe the JTF-B model, evaluate model "fit" as an effective threat counter, and, finally, offer recommendations for improvement and stationing.

VITAL INTERESTS - WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO DO?

Harry Summers advocates a very simple approach to strategy based on the principles of war. He poses fundamental questions that I will use in succeeding paragraphs to examine United States interests and the Joint Task Force - Bravo (JTF-B) role in achieving them. The questions are "What are we trying to do (i.e., objective)?" as listed above, and "How are we going to do it (initiative/mass versus economy of force)?". First, let's distill current strategy and outline what we are trying to do.

United States vital interests beyond survival are rooted in Western Europe and Japan. Europe contains the world's largest industrial plant, and Japan is second nationally only to the United States in economic power in the Free World. No matter how remote the prospect of war in Europe, loss or control of the continent by a hegemonic power would be catastrophic to the United States in an
age where economic and political power are in the ascendancy and the emergence of transnational industries drives the world towards a truly global economy. The same rationale applies to Japan with the added proviso that Japan/Korea affords "the United States the only significant concentration of (American) military power opposite the rim of the former Soviet Empire" and, in the eyes of the Japanese, opposite an emerging Chinese threat. Thus Europe and Japan are critical links in our economy and serve as bases for our only significant military forward presence.

United States security interests in the Third World, on the other hand, derive from indirect linkage with security of the homeland, Europe, and Japan. "Few areas of the Third World possess great intrinsic value to the United States, notwithstanding the fact that virtually no area of the world has escaped being declared vital by one U.S. president or another in the last forty years", usually in the context of containment and homeland defense. Three prominent exceptions exist. The first two are the oil reserves of the "Arabian Peninsula and adjacent oil-bearing regions of the Persian Gulf" and the rich mineral deposits of South Africa without which the economies of Europe and Japan would collapse. Thus access to resources is our primary concern. It is a natural corollary that any threat to the economic lines of communication to these resources becomes our next concern. The final concern strikes closer to home and is the maintenance of friendly regimes in what Huntington calls Middle America which could be used to stage assaults on the homeland."
As a result, since few nations possess the power to confront the United States directly, the likelihood of an attack on the United States or its major trading partners seems remote. More probable is an indirect approach threatening United States citizens, lines of communications, and resources in the Third World. Given this indirect vulnerability, let's narrow our focus to examine the Third World.

THIRD WORLD - FUTURE THREAT/FUTURE BATTLEGROUN

The Third World has been the world's battleground throughout the Cold War. In the last forty-five years, in fact, "war has been distinctly a Third World affair" as evidenced by 125 wars and twenty-two million related deaths. It claimed its identity and title in the mid 1950s when developing country heads of state such as Tito, Nehru, Nasser, and Sukarno planted their national colors on an ideological middle ground between the capitalist (and generally democratic) West led by the United States, the First World, and the socialist states of the expanding Soviet Empire, the Second World. As East and West locked horns in an undeclared Cold War, the Third World grew into a nonaligned roll call of emerging nations carved predominantly from the colonial empires of the southern hemisphere. Any attempt by the First and Second Worlds to draw a nation into its respective fold was viewed as an ideological challenge by the other. Generally, Eastern encroachment was opposed by a Western, read United States, policy of containment. As a
result, the Third World became the playing field whether the warfare was ideological, political, economic, or military. While military confrontations were usually disciplined by the two superpowers to avoid escalation into a fight between the principals, it occasionally reached maximum intensity between a principal and opposing proxy in places like Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. In 1989, this running battle abruptly subsided with the implosion of the Soviet Empire signaled by the destruction of the Berlin Wall and ending with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

As a result, we’ve inherited a Third World with at least the Soviet ideological overlay stripped away. Does the potential for conflict still remain? History responds unequivocally in the affirmative. Human passions, frustrations, and aspirations did not begin and end with the Cold War. They are endemic to the human condition - always have been, always will be. The Cold War simply exploited them where possible, resourced them when advantageous, and constrained them when counterproductive to the interests of the superpowers. Open warfare in Yugoslavia, Angola, Cambodia, to name but a few places, stands as brutal testimony that the pace of conflict has not abated with the demise of the Cold War.

Dissatisfaction is still the root of conflict. Within nations, it usually breeds in economic disadvantage, racial/ethnic/religious discord, and political repression. Between nations, competition has focused on acquisition of resources, resistance to importation of drugs and insurgency, disputes over the legacy of colonial
boundaries, and aggressive religious fundamentalism which is rapidly displacing ideological struggle as a primary cause for conflict.

These root causes of internal insurgency and interstate conflict are being fueled by four modern trends. The first is deprivation. Simply stated, the gulf between haves and have nots is growing rather than diminishing. By the year 2000, eighty per cent of the world's 6.2 billion people will live in poverty in the Third World. Increased urbanization, the second trend, will concentrate the disadvantaged to the point that frustrations may reach critical mass. Once concentrated, increased access to education and modern communications, the third and fourth trends, will serve to alert these masses to just what they are missing. This will create a sense of "perceived relative deprivation" which is an academic way of describing anger born out of being caught on the short end of the stick. The end result is that modernization has intensified the difference between rich and poor, concentrated the poor, and fueled their anger by allowing them to glimpse what they are missing.¹⁰

This snapshot describes the context in which the end of the Cold War has occurred. The world has received a reprieve from the threat of nuclear war and superpower confrontation, the high end of the operational continuum. At the same time, however, Soviet withdrawal has exacerbated the potential for low to mid intensity (high to medium probability) conflict since its departure has created a selective regional vacuum the United States cannot and will not fill. President Bush, in his August 2, 1990 address at the
Aspen Institute, indicated a shift in United States focus from a global to a selective regional orientation with emphasis on Eastern Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northeast Asia. Even within these areas, troop strength will decline as forward presence and power projection supplant forward deployment as matter of pure economics. This signals relative "Africanization" of the residual Third World meaning it will be relegated to the "margins of the worlds finance and trade flows". Disadvantage, dissatisfaction, and resultant instability will increase unless regional economic powers step in to fill the void. This has not been the case to date as the two new economic powers in the world, Japan and Germany, have shown little propensity to assume leadership in the burden sharing arena as evidenced by the Gulf War. Both sent monetary assistance but no significant participation as Germany focused on reunification and Japan on expanding its new economic sphere. This reluctance may prove costly as superpower control and influence abates.

Cold War termination now appears to be a mixed blessing. Although the doomsday clock has been turned back, so has superpower ability to constrain regional conflict. Moreover, while the intensity of future conflict will be lower on the continuum in a global perspective, it will remain high to those who fall victim owing to the Cold War's most disturbing legacy, arms proliferation. Militarizing regional powers are approaching parity with disarming superpowers. To illustrate the impact of this weapons proliferation, from 1984-1988 three quarters of the weapons sold on the world market were acquired by fourteen countries - all in
the Third World. Their regional location should come as no surprise with nine in Southwest Asia, four in Northeast Asia, and one in South America. Ten more nations developed a significant heavy weapons infrastructure. Since six of these producers are included in the original fourteen importers, adding the remaining four producers to the original list of fourteen yields a roster of eighteen nations that have recently militarized as shown at Figure 1. Obviously, the recent example of the power of Soviet arms in an otherwise Third World state has not been lost on Third World regimes struggling for power, recognition, and influence in the post Cold War world.\textsuperscript{14}

The picture is made more ominous by the fact that this list includes "all the nuclear armed powers of the Third World plus the great majority of nations possessing chemical weapons or ballistic missiles. Even more disturbing is the fact that most of these new powers are rivals\textsuperscript{15} - hence the very reason they armed. In the roster of eighteen, one can identify at least twelve pairs of competitors. To use the current jargon, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to recognize that "the U.S.-Soviet arms race is being replicated in several volatile regions of the Third World ... Hence, the prospect is for greater instability in the years ahead, not less".\textsuperscript{16} "This spread of advanced weaponry in the hands of long standing adversaries could accelerate conventional conflict and bring a sudden end to fifty years of restraint in the use of nuclear weapons. As a result, "the United States (has) a strong interest in trying to build firebreaks between local conflicts in
FIGURE 1 - THIRD WORLD WEAPONS PROLIFERATION 1984-88

MILITARIZED NATIONS (18) IMPORTERS (14) PRODUCERS (+4)

ANGOLA ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
CHINA EGYPT
INDIA IRAN IRAQ
ISRAEL LIBYA
NORTH KOREA PAKISTAN
SAUDIA ARABIA SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH KOREA SYRIA
TAIWAN TURKEY

1. ○ - COMPETITIVE RIVALRY
2. □ - COMPETITIVE FOCAL POINT
3. AGRESSOR STATES ARMED PRIOR TO 1984 (X7)
   AFGHANISTAN
   CAMBODIA
   CUBA
   ETHIOPIA
   NICARAGUA
   SOUTH YEMEN
   VIETNAM

the Third World". Simply stated, containment and deterrence requirements haven't ended. In fact, they've increased. As actors increase possessing arsenals approaching parity with First and former Second World powers, the United States, as the sole remaining superpower, will be asked to broaden its announced focus and do more with less from a military perspective even if under a United Nations banner.

FORWARD PRESENCE - WHAT IS IT?

Forward presence is not formally defined. Common sense tells us it lies somewhere between a military liaison group to advise foreign forces and coordinate foreign military sales and full blown forward deployment as typified by current forces in Korea and Germany. Is the key men, material, and equipment in country or the ability to project power in sufficient time to counter a specific threat using an out of area force? I personally favor the latter which is a capability based definition (as opposed to a positioning or physical presence based definition) keyed to ensuring the United States has interior lines of communication in a temporal sense, i.e. "we can get there firstest with the mostest". This interpretation is grounded on dual principles of force, read budget, austerity, and strict adherence to selective engagement based on vital interests. Referencing the President again, we can't be the world's policeman since to do so in the face of the impending drawdown will ensure that trying to be strong everywhere
will guarantee that we won't be ready anywhere. As a result, presence entails careful husbanding of resources and discriminating application. In this context, presence should be defined as capability to project minimum essential force to a specific location in time to deter a specific threat and build overwhelming force in time to defeat this same threat should deterrence fail. It must be noted that this implies assured access rights, reception facilities, and operating rights to support deploying forces. ("United States" is used to denote a stand alone capability in a military sense should coalition initiatives lag military imperatives and to recognize realistic force capabilities of many potential allies.) Physical basing of forces is not always required. If the area of operations lies in a littoral area, forces afloat may provide sufficient presence from an offshore stance. Not all zones of potential conflict are accessible by sea, however. In this case, on-the-ground stationing may be required to ensure an adequate response - more on stationing later.

The bottom line is that presence should be capability, not positioning, based and, of necessity, must be predicated on minimum essential force to establish realistic deterrence building without pause to overwhelming force levels to ensure victory if we must fight. Presence should be an interagency effort requiring negotiation for access and operating rights. It should also be a coalition venture requiring maximum utilization of any available host nation forces as a first option and host nation support facilities to support reception and buildup. As a segment of the
operational continuum, presence is also a continuum ranging from periodic exercises to permanent forward basing. In the final analysis, three attributes are critical to defining presence - threat orientation, capability response concept of operation, and economy of force design.

FORWARD PRESENCE - A DESIGN PROPOSAL ON HOW WE SHOULD DO IT

Given that presence constitutes a range of options, we know that introduction of forces from afar gives us the greatest flexibility in countering multiple threats with a central reserve of forces. Marine forces afloat and/or continental United States (CONUS) based Army/Marine units supported by prepositioning afloat obviously offers the most flexible and economic option if adequate deterrence can be provided. Our problem is that there simply is not enough sealift to support this strategy or adequate airlift to supplement assets at sea to meet required response times for many scenarios involving an aggressive opponent. Moreover, as General George B. Crist, USMC(Ret) has noted, "All potential crisis areas do not lie along coastal littorals." Thus, until lift capability aligns with operational requirements in either case, interests will demand a force prepositioned on the ground to fill the strategic lift gap. Cutting to the chase, I believe Joint Task Force - Bravo provides the perfect vehicle to establish presence and facilitate buildup, if required.

United States Southern Command (USOUTHCOM) has been laboring
for years under the same force constraints that the rest of the unified commands are just now experiencing. Asked to coordinate defense of American interests throughout a nineteen nation theater of operations with only a reinforced brigade, USSOUTHCOM has become a master in austerity management in order to obtain more bang for the buck. Interagency forward presence operations featuring periodic deployment of CONUS-based military forces in a supporting role to various country teams throughout the region have become their hallmark. Operations have ranged from unique, one time missions to enduring operations reaching a capstone in Honduras with the establishment of Joint Task Force - Bravo - a "temporary but indefinite" forward presence at Soto Cano Air Base.

"Joint Task Force - Bravo (JTF-B) began on 11 August 1983 with the formation of Joint Task Force 11. Its purpose was to provide command and control for U.S. forces operating in Honduras, to maintain a military presence, and to support regional stability. In 1984, it was redesignated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Joint Task Force - Bravo". Designed to function in a supporting role as a member of a country team striving to enhance the legitimacy of a newly created democratic regime, it has evolved into a continuing presence. It utilizes an indirect approach by basing on a Honduran installation and conducting all operations in support of and with the approval of the Honduran government. The bottom line is that JTF-B is guided by the principle of the primacy of political objectives in enhancing host government legitimacy without undermining national sovereignty.
At the same time, the task force is structured to plan for and support deployment of forces in response to a former mid to low intensity threat from Nicaragua. This ability to transition from deterrence to prolong the peace to an advance element of a defense in depth was forcefully demonstrated during Operation Golden Pheasant in 1988. This was a show of force operation in response to repeated Nicaraguan border incursions.

Analyzing this organization in terms of the seven battlefield operating systems, JTF-B is configured to fully exercise the three systems of intelligence, combat service support, and command, control, and communications, and is manned to perform force protection for these systems via the four remaining systems as required. During low intensity operations, the JTF Commander is one of the Commander-in-Chief’s representatives on the country team. Should the threat escalate, the JTF can easily move into a role as the advance element of the combatant command. In a nutshell, it is an austere, temporary forward presence element capable of receiving, staging, and controlling units in low intensity actions. As operations escalate, it can continue to receive and stage but will require the unified command to deploy an appropriate headquarters as any significant buildup will rapidly outstrip its organic command, control, and communications capability. An organizational diagram with associated missions and manning levels is shown at Figure 2.

Joint Task Force - Bravo is a cutting edge operation. It is austere. It is built around a joint staff supported by Army and Air
Force component elements to receive units by sea and air, to requisition, receive, and store all classes of supply, and to coordinate staging for tactical deployment under joint staff control. Any remaining functions not available through host nation support are provided by tactical units placed under operational control of the joint staff. Total staff strength is 514 personnel. Augmentation is, of course, mission driven but averages 600 personnel. (Both staff and augmentation are situationally dependent and will vary with theater and mission.) It is temporary. Construction is built to a theater of operation standard which is designed for a five to seven year life cycle. Any significant investment is fed into reception and staging facilities which can remain in readiness given periodic maintenance should forces be withdrawn. It is superbly flexible since it can be tailored for virtually any mission beyond the base structure by tactical augmentation. Best of all, it is supremely affordable. Annual costs average $25 million dollars which amounts to less than one one-hundredth of one per cent (<.0001) of the projected 1992 Department of Defense authorization. By any measure, it is a superb tool. It is simple, lean, flexible enough to transition through the operational continuum, incredibly economical in terms of manpower, dollars, and force structure (i.e., none), and effective. It is a very realistic option in the face of a very uncertain future.
FIGURE 2 - JTF-B ORGANIZATION

COMMANDER

CSM

SJS— CHIEF OF STAFF

SOUTHCOM

J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 ENG PM

LIAISON

PROTOCOL FINANCE BUDGET CONTRACTING

SJA SAFETY CHAPLAIN BASE OPERATIONS

ARMY AIR FORCE MED

FORCES FORCES ELEM

4/228 AVN MI BN

REGT LOW INTEN

AUGMENTATION UNITS

JOINT STAFF = 122
ARFOR = 90
AFFOR = 209
MED ELEM = 93

514

The sage advice of "don't fix what ain't broke" certainly applies. The following proposals merely constitute fine tuning. The basic structure shown at Figure 2 is thoroughly field tested and proven. We don't need to reinvent the wheel. The structure contains a robust capability in intelligence (in combination with a Military Liaison Group), logistics, and command and control. These functions are critical as we attempt to keep "eyes on" as we pull back into a CONUS based force, coordinate plans in country, and maintain stocks, equipment, and a contracting surge capacity that can lead troop deployment rather than the reverse. The system works. Mere enhancements are listed below.

First, the country team concept is right on target but is totally ineffective. Very little of the potential interagency synergy is currently achieved due to a lack of organizational control at embassy level, and an intentional disregard for team play by various agencies. By way of example, the Agency for International Development (USAID) leadership would not attend country team meetings in Honduras during the 1989-90 time frame when the Joint Task Force - Bravo Commander was present. At the staff level, staffers of the same agency refused to consider offers by Joint Task Force engineers to combine task force engineering skills and agency dollars to produce a better product for the host country. The underlying motive was a fear that association with the military would compromise the perception of agency sincerity and
legitimacy held by the Honduran people. In my opinion, this attitude was grossly in error and smacked of the Vietnam era, a lack of interest in ensuring maximum return on United States investment, and bureaucratic pettiness. The Peace Corps, on the other hand, welcomed military assistance. Unfortunately, all efforts were ad hoc and coordinated in the field rather than being driven from the leadership level. The country team simply was not organized, controlled, or driven towards a common goal. This lack of focus led to lost opportunities and forfeited maximum return on United States efforts. It can be directly attributed to a lack of leadership, will, and vision at the ambassadorial level. Simply stated, the flesh was willing, but the spirit was weak.

Upon reflection, it must be noted that State Department officials are trained to observe, assess, recommend, and negotiate as opposed to managing / leading field operations. As a result, a departmental operations division staffed with experienced field hands needs to be formed to organize, lead, and drive the interagency effort for the ambassador. Only tough hombres need apply. The current system is broken, and we simply can’t afford business as usual in a time of budget austerity, retrenchment, and proliferating threats. Agencies must be made to toe the line and pull in harness as a team driving toward common goals which support our national strategy.

On the personnel side, two changes should be instituted. First, there are currently only five positions which are one year tours as opposed to six month temporary duty rotations. The
positions are those of commander, deputy, base civil engineer, and Army and Air Force commanders. These one year positions should be expanded to include staff principals and those billets which involve extensive coordination with host nation officials. The increase should be limited to approximately fifty positions. Under the current restrictions, rapid turnover dilutes expertise and frustrates host nation points of contact.

The second issue concerns all remaining temporary billets. Under the current manning system, personnel are stripped out of organizations which have a need for their services validated by Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs) or Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDAs). "Robbing Peter to pay Paul" creates the very phenomena we all disavow - the hollow Army (Air Force, etc.). Staffing should not come at the expense of CONUS units which are generally already at lower levels than overseas counterparts. Instead, it should come from overseas personnel earmarked for transfer back to the United States and should occur as a temporary duty enroute. Soldiers affected would be given housing priority to either allow families to remain in housing at the losing station or to move into housing at the gaining installation before the soldier reports to the joint task force. Moreover, all soldiers would be assigned to units troop listed for operations plans in the area where the task force is stationed. This system has several advantages. First, tasked units would no longer be penalized with the loss of personnel since tasking would be against an enroute asset and would, in turn, feed them country
qualified soldiers rather than stripping away members integrated into their operations. Second, the ability to fully exploit experience gained will enhance unit planning and training rather than thinning their rosters. Special forces and intelligence soldiers with linguistic skills critical for host nation coordination should be specially managed into billet rotations in order to maintain fluency and country qualification. Finally, maintaining temporary duty status avoids force structure impacts yet prevents financial impact on our most critical resource - soldiers and their families.

With respect to budget, we consistently violate the unity of command principle. Command runs directly from the USSOUTHCOM commander to the JTF-B commander. Funds, however, are channeled through service elements with joint staff funding under Army control. Commands(ends) and funds(means) should come through the same commander. Failure to do so leads to unnecessary friction, delay, and expenditure of effort to align the two.

Finally, the finance, budget, and contracting offices should be part of the joint staff to include the contracting officers. All are Army component provided with contracting officers currently rotating out of the Army service component office in Panama. Drawing them from any supporting organization has utility in the form of instant liaison with the parent organization, however, unity of command again dictates that they be controlled completely by the commander on whose staff they serve.

It should be noted that all issues surfaced fall directly or
indirectly under the command and control function. Current policies complicate JTF-B Commander authority by forcing subordinates to look in two directions for instructions. Command must come from one source - the Commander. These modifications simply comply with a basic tactical rule - reinforce success.

JOINT TASK FORCE BRAVO - STATIONING RECOMMENDATIONS

Selective engagement should be the watchword here. Looking back to our Third World threat assessment, we can now translate ways into means specifically targeted by region. We identified twelve sets of adversaries among the eighteen recently militarized nations. Seven rivalries are in Southwest Asia, four are in Northeast Asia, and the final competition is in South America. As a result, three of the unified combatant commands, Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM), Pacific Command (USPACOM), and European Command (USEUCOM), do not have a need for forward presence augmentation beyond currently assigned and deployed forces. Should a requirement materialize, sufficient assets are organic to each to constitute a response until a continuing need is determined and service generated replacements can be brought to bear. Of the remaining commands, Central Command (USCENTCOM) has a critical need, and Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) has a continuing requirement. Let’s examine each.

The USCENTCOM arena is obviously the most volatile in the world on a continuing basis. A headquarters in theater has been
sought since its inception without success. Prepositioning needs have been acknowledged since the command's creation and have received national recognition and support as a result of the Gulf War experience and the extended buildup which was required in order to create a credible force. Based on this experience, using the newly formed contingency corps as a guide and anticipating equipment availability as a result of standdown, two heavy division sets should be prepositioned ashore to support contingency forces. One set should be based in the Persian Gulf and one in the Sinai/Israel to maintain equity in the region and to ensure access to at least one set should an Arab - Israeli confrontation occur. Given current post-war Arab sensitivities, a second option for the first set would be basing in proximity to the Gulf until afloat prepositioning can be increased. Proximity in Oman, Diego Garcia, Kenya, Israel, or Italy would reduce vulnerability yet significantly reduce shipping time. The baseline recommendation is priority to USCENTCOM with two heavy division sets supplied from deactivating units as a possible start point - one set in Israel and the other in the closest possible proximity to the Gulf to deter/respond to Iranian or Iraqi threats. The joint task force involved would, of course, provide intelligence, logistics, and command and control with an emphasis on host nation liaison to assist in sensing the pulse of the region and provide validation of plans and all source intelligence.

Joint Task Force - Bravo in USSOUTHCOM should remain in being until Sandinista adventurism is definitely spent, the
infrastructure for war plans is complete, and the El Salvadoran peace initiatives are firmly in place. The task force could then transition to a position as USSOUTHCOM forward in Panama should Southern Command depart Panama as programmed. A need for a continuing presence to coordinate Department of Defense support of counternarcotics will undoubtedly be required. Beyond this, an in-theater presence is critical for each combatant command if the command is to really stay in touch with its region. Absence lends itself to a rapidly deteriorating appreciation of the personalities, threats, and trends which can have ominous downstream possibilities. There is simply no substitute for presence to ensure readiness.

Within ten years I believe two additional threats will require presence missions. The first will be a humanitarian assistance effort in the USEUCOM region of sub-Saharan Africa to combat disease and famine which appears headed for epidemic proportions. Sanitation, food distribution, and medical treatment will, of course, be the focus. This task force will be part of an international interagency effort formed around a military infrastructure simply because no readily available alternative exists with all required skills in a single organization outside the armed forces. For the first time in recent history, introduction of a task force by a superpower will not be a destabilizing act with respect to another superpower.

The second will be a more conventional mission oriented on prepositioning to deter what I believe is an emerging Chinese
threat. It will be prompted by continuing United States withdrawals in Korea, a contingency force structure that lacks the firepower to counter regional arsenals, and provocative actions by the Peoples Republic as it emerges from a period of inward focus.

The bottom line is that three joint task forces will be required in the near term and two more in the out years. Priority is to prepositioning in USCENTCOM and completion of the deterrence mission begun in 1983 in USSOUTHCOM. Notice is served for a massive humanitarian effort in Africa as part of an international effort within five years and creation of presence in USPACOM to counter a Chinese expansion within ten. The requirement to defend United States vital interests in the Third World is upon us. Only an economy of force presence mechanism makes sense in the context of downsizing and budget reduction.

**CONCLUSION**

In the preceding paper, I have attempted to link interests, a new world military strategy, a strategic lift flaw, a proposed solution, and specific implementation recommendations - ends, ways, and means in the classic sense. Joint Task Force - Bravo has been proposed as a means to transition from forward deployment to forward presence in the face of declining resources and still constitute a credible deterrent. For eight years, Joint Task Force - Bravo has been a regional dress rehearsal for what is evolving into a wider mission of selective regional engagement. The model
can fill the critical gap between ends and means until strategic mobility shortfalls are resolved or the threat diminishes. Equally at home in low and mid intensity environments, it is a military tool which can enhance interagency effectiveness if used correctly. While created for a forward presence role, it can easily spearhead combat deployment should deterrence fail. Simple and affordable, it is also effective and proven. History recommends it. National interests require it. Our strategy demands it in order to be viable as we come to grips with the prospect of a significant increase in frequency and lethality in war on the periphery. Joint Task Force - Bravo is literally the cutting edge of forward presence activities. It is very simply an old idea whose time has come.
ENDNOTES


4. Ibid., p. 165.

5. Ibid.


8. Ibid.


10. Ibid.

11. Campbell and Weis, p. 98.

12. Ibid., p. 99.


15. Ibid., p. 11.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 13.

18. Nathan Bedford Forrest,


BIBLIOGRAPHY


5. Forrest, Nathan Bedford.


