The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

JOINT PUB 5-00.2 JOINT TASK FORCE PLANNING GUIDANCE AND PROCEDURES: A CRITICAL REVIEW

BY

Lieutenant Colonel William A. Saunders
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures: A Critical Review

The Goldwater - Nichols, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to develop joint doctrine. To fulfill the CJCS's joint doctrine responsibility, a joint doctrine master plan was developed. One of the most pressing joint doctrine voids identified in the joint doctrine master plan was joint task force employment doctrine. This paper traces the history of joint doctrine development, examines the development of Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, and identifies the strengths and weaknesses of this publication.

The author concludes that Joint Pub 5-00.2 does a good job addressing many of the doctrinal and procedural voids gleaned from lessons learned in past joint operations executed by a joint task force. However, this manual does not adequately discuss functional command organizations and relationships. Additionally, Joint Pub 5-00.2 should be evaluated in an exercise employing a short notice contingency scenario before its contents can be validated. Finally, Combatant Commands and Services should develop effective distribution systems for
joint doctrine test publications to insure they are received by organizations requiring them.
Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures:
A Critical Review

by

Lieutenant Colonel William A. Saunders
United States Army

Colonel Douglas B. Campbell
Project Adviser

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
The Goldwater - Nichols, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to develop joint doctrine. To fulfill the CJCS's joint doctrine responsibility, a joint doctrine master plan was developed. One of the most pressing joint doctrine voids identified in the joint doctrine master plan was joint task force employment doctrine. This paper traces the history of joint doctrine development, examines the development of Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, and identifies the strengths and weaknesses of this publication. The author concludes that Joint Pub 5-00.2 does a good job addressing many of the doctrinal and procedural voids gleaned from lessons learned in past joint operations executed by a joint task force. However, this manual does not adequately discuss functional command organizations and relationships. Additionally, Joint Pub 5-00.2 should be evaluated in an exercise employing a short notice contingency scenario before its contents can be validated. Finally, Combatant Commands and Services should develop effective distribution systems for joint doctrine test publications to insure they are received by organizations requiring them.
Joint Pub 0-2 defines a joint task force (JTF) as "a force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force or two or more of these Services, that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, by a CINC, or by the commander of a subordinate unified command or an existing task force." The United States has a rich history of successful joint operations executed by a joint task force. The battle of Vicksburg in the Civil War is an early example of a successful joint task force operation. The Normandy Invasion, the Inchon Landing and Operation Just Cause (invasion of Panama) provide modern examples of successful operations using a joint task force command arrangement. Unfortunately, not all of our nation's battles involving the employment of two or more services have been as successful.

The dismal performance of the Armed Forces during the Spanish American War was an early alert that problems existed in joint operations. As a result, the Army-Navy Board was formed to improve joint capabilities. More recently, the American interventions in Lebanon (1958), the Congo (1964), and the Dominican Republic (1965), the Mayaguez Operation (1975), the Iranian Hostage Rescue (1980), and Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada (1984) demonstrated severe shortcomings in the
Services' ability to coordinate and operate jointly, particularly in short notice contingency operations. Military critics pointed to a lack of joint doctrine as a primary cause of joint operational failures. Operational ineffectiveness provided impetus for Congress to mandate in the Goldwater-Nichols, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) develop joint doctrine. 4

To fulfill the CJCS's joint doctrine responsibility, a joint doctrine master plan was developed by the Joint Staff in cooperation with the Services and Unified and Specified Commands. The joint doctrine master plan identified joint doctrinal voids, established a joint publication system (Figure 1), and produced procedures for joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTTP) development. The joint doctrine master plan was formalized in Joint Pub 1-01, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures Development Program. One of the most pressing voids identified in the joint doctrine master plan was JTF employment doctrine. As a result, the first new project initiated under the new development system was Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

Work on Joint Pub 5-00.2 began in August 1987 with the Joint Staff Program Directive. It stated that the desired result of the publication was "to enhance the capability of JTF commanders to effectively plan, organize and employ a JTF" and further stated that the scope of the project was limited to
JTFs formed for "short notice contingency operations". The project was completed and published as an approved joint publication in September 1991.

Did Joint Pub 5-00.2 accomplish its desired results? Is it consistent with other joint doctrine? Most importantly, is the manual of value to joint force commanders? This paper examines these questions.

In addressing these issues I will first provide a historical perspective by discussing past joint doctrine efforts. Next, I will examine how Joint Pub 5-00.2 was developed and tested to determine its quality and consistency. Finally, I will identify shortcomings and provide recommendations for improvement.

Historical Background

The earliest attempts of the United States military to develop joint doctrine came as result of poor performance in the Spanish American War. In 1903, "Rules for the Army and Navy Maneuvers" was prepared under the direction of the War and Navy Departments. It was written by an Army major and a Navy lieutenant and provided guidance for umpiring joint exercises involving Army and Navy forces. That same year, the Army-Navy Board was formed and charged with improving coordination between services.

The Army-Navy Board produced little joint doctrine of value prior to World War I. As a result, "joint operations of
World War I followed the classic pattern. Land warfare and naval warfare were related but not integrated. Each unit had its sphere of operation and coordination was effected by mutual cooperation." 7 In 1933, the Joint Board made its most significant contribution with the publication of Joint Overseas Expeditions. This document presented "a general set of principles for the planning and conduct of joint overseas expeditions to insure the most effective cooperation and coordination between Army and Navy forces participating therein." 8 Although some joint procedures were provided, this manual like others produced between the wars was a product of World War I experience. This experience "generally accepted that the Services had separate roles and when employed on a common mission coordination would be by mutual cooperation." 9

The United States' military experience in World War II yielded a wealth of knowledge on joint operations. However, interservice rivalries prevented the documentation of this experience in the form of joint doctrine. In 1946, a joint board of fifty officers produced a study of Joint Overseas Operations at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Members of the Joint board were chosen because of their extensive experience in overseas operations, and included ground, naval and air officers from all theaters." 10 It contained twenty four chapters in two volumes with doctrine for a fully integrated and unified command structure to conduct joint operations. The study even made provisions for a tactical air commander, the forerunner of today's joint force air
component commander. Unfortunately, this study never progressed beyond the final draft stage. The preface to the document sums up why:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that this draft study, prepared at The National War College by a group of officers of the Army, the Navy and the Army Air Forces represents an excellent start toward the preparation of a text covering the organization of theater commands. However, it contains statements concerning the employment of forces and their logistical support on which there exist certain unresolved differences in concept among the Ground, Naval, and Air Forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not, therefore, accepted the study as an expression of approved joint doctrine but have authorized merely its tentative use for instructional purposes in The National War College and the Armed Forces Staff College. In the use of the text, due cognizance will be taken of the fact that, in its present form, it does not meet with the complete approval of the Army, the Navy, or the Army Air Forces."

In failing to approve and publish the Joint Overseas
Operations Study, the Joint Chiefs of Staff squandered a magnificent opportunity to convert the military's World War II experience into a coherent body of joint doctrine. Although in 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did publish the "Joint Action Armed Forces (JAAF) Papers" which established the organization and service responsibilities for joint operations. 13 The JAAF was a good start, but not nearly as comprehensive or detailed as the Joint Overseas Operations Study. Very little progress was made in joint doctrine from this point until the passage of the Goldwater - Nichols Act. This failure occurred despite the joint operational experience gained in Korea, Vietnam and numerous contingency operations. Unfortunately, the little joint doctrine that was produced was so "watered down" that it was of little use to warfighters. 14 The Joint Doctrine Pilot Program which was instituted by the Joint Staff in the early 1980s was an attempt to generate relevant joint doctrine. Four projects were initiated under this program, but it was too little too late. The paucity of usable joint doctrine hampered effective joint operations and created a vacuum that desperately needed filling.

Requirement for Joint Task Force Doctrine

When the Joint Doctrine Master Plan was developed in 1987, it came as little surprise that the most pressing doctrinal void was for planning, forming, and employing a joint task force for short notice contingency operations. This form of
military operation had the highest probability of occurrence. Indeed, as General Gerald T. Bartlett, Commandant of the Army Command and General Staff College, pointed out in 1988:

"Since 1945, the United States has employed its armed forces in support of national objectives more than 270 times. Most of these operations were in underdeveloped areas of the world. Most were joint operations, and many were conducted in concert with the armed forces of other nations. Nearly all bore the hallmarks of contingency operations: they were emergencies in which the mission, the time and forces available, and the operational area were limited." 15

These facts were not lost on the joint community which realized that short notice contingencies happened frequently and would happen again. In fact, joint operations were already underway for the escort of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf.

It was a query from the U.S. Central Command Commander, General George Crist to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Herres in the summer of 1987 about the availability of joint doctrine for forming and employing a JTF that added urgency to addressing the JTF doctrinal void.

General Crist planned to form a JTF, which would include forces from all services, to execute the escort mission. When the answer came back that no specific doctrine other than that in
Joint Pub 02, Unified Action Armed Forces, existed, General Frederick Franks, the Director of the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J7), ordered the initiation of the JTF project.

Other factors were also at play during the summer of 1987 which provided impetus for the JTF manual. The United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) in response to Manual Noriega's increasingly anti-American stance, began to plan for a JTF in the event of a military confrontation in Panama. With no doctrine to provide specifics on how to form and employ a JTF, USSOUTHCOM pressed the case for JTF doctrine.

Joint Task Force Pub Development

The responsibility for writing the JTF manual was assigned to the Joint Doctrine Center (JDC), a field agency of the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J7. The publication was to be developed in accordance with Joint Pub 1-01, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program, which in August 1987 was in draft. The JDC began work on the document in late August. Research by the JDC focused on past contingency operations executed by a JTF to determine causes of success and shortcomings. Once causes were identified then appropriate procedures and techniques could be developed to plan, form and employ a JTF. The principal contingency operations studied were the Belgian Congo, Lebanon, Dominican Republic, evacuations of
Pnom Penh and Saigon, the Mayaguez Rescue, the failed hostage rescue in Iran, and Grenada. The following pattern emerged as causes of shortcomings:

- Ineffective command organization
- Inadequate communications
- Failure to involve subordinate commands in crisis action planning
- Poor organization and functioning of the JTF staff

The major causes of successes were shown to be early involvement of subordinates in crisis action planning and effective and extensive use of liaison officers.

Several problems faced the JDC as it began to develop the initial draft. First, the keystone publication, Joint Pub 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (see Figure 1) which was to form the doctrinal foundation for the JTF manual had not been written. In fact, the only applicable joint doctrine came from Joint Pub 02 Unified Action Armed Forces. As a result, the program directive limited the scope of the project to a procedural manual as opposed to a doctrinal manual. Therefore, it was classified as joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) which according to the approved definition limits the content to implementing joint doctrine. Since Joint Pub 02 provided the only relevant existing doctrine, the JTF manual could only provide information to implement it rather than expand it to meet the voids in JTF doctrine.
A second problem was limited time. Joint Task Force Middle East (JTFME) was formed to execute the escort mission in the Persian Gulf and there was pressure from the Joint Staff to get a draft copy of the JTF manual to JTFME to assist them and to help validate the content. Consequently, the program directive allowed only thirty five days for preparation of the initial draft.

The third problem was endemic to the joint doctrine development process. According to Joint Pub 1-01, the initial and final drafts were required to be staffed with representatives of the Services and Combatant Commands. Comments received from the staffing process were to be incorporated into each draft. After changes to the final draft were made, the publication was to be coordinated with the Services and the Joint Staff and then published as test procedures. The Combatant Commands were left out of coordination on the final draft. Intentionally or unintentionally, the coordination process that existed in 1983 made the Services the real power brokers in the process. If a Service identified an issue that was not addressed to its satisfaction, then that Service could either force a change during the final coordination or slow roll the process. Therefore, the JDC had to be very sensitive to the Services if it wanted to get the manual published. The potential victims in the process were the Combatant Commands who needed the manual as soon as possible to do their job. They would, however, find the manual of minimal value if it was "watered
"down" in the process of resolving service issues.

The initial draft was sent to the field for comment in October 1988. In mid-October a joint work group was convened to develop a final draft from the comments to the initial draft. The joint work group consisted of representatives from all the Services and Combatant Commands except for the United States Space Command which declined the invitation to participate. A representative from the 18th Airborne Corps was invited and participated. The work group approach was very effective for the following reasons:

- Several combatant commands had extensive experience with JTF operations and had developed standard operating procedures.
- Representatives from the combatant commands could insure their concerns and issues were addressed.
- Service representatives could hear first hand the combatant commands' concerns and issues.
- Service representatives could insure that relevant service doctrine was considered.

The work group was broken down into teams and given chapters and annexes to revise. When a team finished a chapter, each member of the entire workgroup was given a copy of the revision and time was allotted for each participant to express his individual or his organization's views of the
revised work. As a result of the discussions, additional changes were made. This method was effective in developing consensus on a document that reflected the best thought of an experienced group of officers representing the combatant commands and the Services. At the end of the week, each participant carried a copy of the revised document back to his organization. Two weeks later, an official copy was sent to each command to meet the requirements of Joint Pub 1-01.

Content of Joint Pub 5-00.2

The focus of Joint Pub 5-00.2 was on accomplishing the requirements established in the program directive and addressing the causes of success and failure identified during research. For the most part, the manual accomplishes those goals. However, some compromises were made during the manual's development to achieve consensus. One compromise led to a major shortcoming in the content of the publication.

The initial draft developed by the JDC contained wire diagrams showing command arrangements and relationships to include a functional command organization. Additionally, it also discussed the joint force air component commander (JFLCC) and joint force land component commander (JFACC). Failure to initially designate a JFLCC in operations in Lebanon 21, Dominican Republic 22, and Grenada 23 caused severe command and control problems for the JTF Commanders. Each operation had Army and Marine forces operating independently ashore.
Problems attendant with boundaries, maneuver control, fire support and communications that are common to all ground forces were exacerbated by the lack of a single land force commander. The Vietnam War, although not a contingency operation, clearly identified the need for a unified effort in the air war. Seven different air organizations commanded the various Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine air assets during most of the war. This led to a variety of command and control problems and a less than cohesive air war. Assigning a JFACC to integrate the efforts of each Service's aviation assets would have vastly improved the conduct of the war. Undoubtedly, the joint board that recommended the designation of a tactical air commander forty years earlier in the Joint Overseas Operations Study was also motivated by a desire to improve the effectiveness of air operations by providing a unified direction to the various air arms. Unfortunately, the interservice rivalries that scuttled JCS approval and promulgation of the Joint Overseas Operations Study threatened to do the same with Joint Pub 5.00-2.

The Navy and Marine Corps representatives disagreed with any discussion of the JFLCC and JFACC in the manual. They argued that the manual was JTTP and therefore could not create doctrine but only implement it. Since the JFLCC was not mentioned or defined in any approved joint publication, the manual could not address this issue. The argument on the JFACC was much more emotional. The Marines and Navy feared losing control over their air assets, because the JFACC is normally
selected from the service with the preponderance of forces and in most operations that would be the Air Force. However, the JFACC had a JCS approved definition and was discussed in Joint Pub 3-01.2, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations. Therefore, technically speaking it could be discussed in a JTTP manual.

As a result of compromises, all discussion of the JFLCC was deleted and the discussion of the JFACC remained in the final draft. Additionally, the command and control diagram showing a functional component command arrangement was also eliminated. In its place a single composite wire diagram was displayed showing various command arrangements but without a JFACC or JFLCC. These compromises diluted the manual's effort to make the designation of a JFLCC and JFACC a viable option for a JTF formed for a contingency operation. These actions prevented the correction of a valuable lesson learned from previous contingencies.

Inadequate communications plagued the Dominican Republic 26. Mayaguez 27 and Grenada 28 operations. Problems included inability of units from different services to communicate with each other because of noninteroperable radios, lack of long range secure joint communications, and no joint communications and electronics operating instructions (JCEOI). In each of the above operations, the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) a JCS controlled unit which has the secure communications to support a JTF, was not used. The manual addresses these deficiencies. Discussion of the JCSE, its
capabilities, and how to request its support is in Chapter 4 and Appendix G. The manual also identifies the need for a JCEOI and refers to Joint Pub 6-05.1, Manual for Employing Joint Tactical Communications Systems for the detailed communications-electronics techniques and procedures necessary to deploy and sustain a JTF.

Failure to involve subordinate commands early in the planning process was a major problem in the Grenada Operation. When a combatant commander decides to form a JTF to execute an operation, it is necessary to bring the JTF commander and his staff and subordinate commanders into the planning process as soon as possible. The manual recommends that the JTF be identified before or during Phase III (Course of Action Development) of the Crisis Action Planning Process. This allows the JTF Commander's staff and subordinates to do parallel planning while participating in Phases 4. Course of Action Selection, and Phase 5, Course of Action Development. Overall, the manual does an excellent job in Chapters II and III tying in the identification and formation of a JTF to the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The key task checklist in Appendix A provides a list of questions arranged by Crisis Action Planning Phase which should greatly assist JTF planners in preparing for contingency operations.

The ad hoc organization of the JTF staffs that planned and executed the Iranian Rescue Mission and the Grenada Operation has been credited with causing many operational shortcomings. In a time sensitive contingency, the speed with which the
staff organizes and becomes functional is critical to the planning process and subsequent support and sustainment of the operation. To provide guidance for future JTFs, Chapter IV discusses how a typical JTF staff is organized and functions. It includes discussion on staff augmentation for communications support and for special capabilities such as civil affairs and psychological operations. Additionally, a separate appendix is devoted to each staff section which provides responsibilities and detailed checklists and descriptions of the joint boards, centers and offices necessary to support the staff's functions. It is an excellent "cook book" approach on how to organize a JTF staff that can quickly become functional.

History shows that liaison officers, who are properly trained, can contribute significantly to mission success. They can insure close coordination and cooperation throughout the planning and execution of the operation. One of the major success stories of Operation Desert Storm was the extensive use of liaison officers at all levels of the joint and combined commands. The manual recognizes the value of liaison officers and devotes a section in Chapter IV and Appendix H to liaison procedures. It describes where and when liaison should be established and the qualifications required of liaison officers. It also provides liaison officers with a checklist of responsibilities throughout his tour of duty. Specifically, it describes duties before departure to the gaining headquarters, on arrival at the headquarters, during the liaison tour at the gaining headquarters, and upon return to
home headquarters. Similar to the staff section checklists, the liaison checklist provides detailed procedures which if followed will help the liaison officer to effectively perform the assigned mission.

In summary Joint Pub 5-00.2 does a good job providing information, techniques and procedures for overcoming many of the deficiencies that plagued JTFs during past contingency operations. However, the manual fails to address functional command organization—particularly the roles and responsibilities of the JFACC and JFLCC. This is a grievous shortcoming of the manual because it was a known deficiency that could have been easily corrected.

Value to Joint Force Commanders

Having discussed the content of Joint Pub 5-00.2, I will now turn to the question of its value to joint force commanders. When I began the research for this paper, I thought this would be a fairly easy question to answer because two major operations, Just Cause in 1989 and Desert Storm in 1991, had been conducted after the publication of the test version of Joint Pub 500.2. Although use of test publications in the field is at the discretion of the combatant commander, I felt certain that it would be used because of the critical void that the manual filled. Unfortunately the answer to the question I posed was not as cut and dry as I had initially thought.
After Just Cause and Desert Storm, representatives from the J7 Directorate of the Joint Staff debriefed key participants in the operations to determine the validity and effectiveness of joint doctrine written to date. In the case of Just Cause, the 18th Airborne Corps formed the nucleus of the JTF which executed the operation. During the debriefing, members of the 18th Airborne Corps Staff acknowledged that they were aware of Joint Pub 5-00.2. Since a representative of the Corps staff had participated in the work group that revised the initial draft of the manual, the content of the manual was incorporated in their JTF staff standing operating procedures. However, they had not directly used the manual in the planning and execution of the operation. One could conclude from this exchange that Joint Pub 5-00.2 was of use, albeit indirectly, in Just Cause.

This was not the case in Desert Storm. When representatives of the JDC visited the theater of war, members of General Schwartzkopf's staff were unable to find a copy of Joint Pub 5-00.2. Copies were provided to the staff by J7, but whether the doctrine was used or not was unable to be determined. Poor test publication distribution procedures may have contributed to the lack of availability of the manual in Saudi Arabia. The problem of test publication distribution is not new and is best summed in an article by Lieutenant Colonel William F. Furr, USAF in the fall 1991 issue of Airpower Journal in which he states "the distribution of test publications is at best a haphazard process that does not
ensure the widest possible exposure for these documents." 32
Only ten copies of test publications are sent to each combatant command and Service. 33 Combatant commands and Services are responsible for further distribution. As a result of the distribution process, Joint Pub 5-00.2 was not available for use during Desert Storm.

Based on feedback from Just Cause and Desert Storm, it is difficult to reach a definitive judgment on the value of Joint Pub 5-00.2 to joint force commanders. However, one can conclude that the distribution system for test publications requires improvement. The formal evaluation of the test publication provides some additional insights to its value to joint force commanders.

Evaluation

Joint Pub 1-01 requires all test publications to be evaluated before final approval as a joint publication. The purpose of the evaluation is to insure that the publication accomplishes its purpose and that the doctrine and techniques can be executed. 34 The evaluation can be accomplished by testing the publication in an appropriate exercise or series of exercises. Three joint exercises were used to evaluate Joint Pub 5-00.2 - Brim Frost 89, Cobra Gold 89, and Ocean Venture 90.

Brim Frost 89 was a joint readiness exercise sponsored by the United States Forces Command to exercise JTF Alaska and JTF
Aleutians. Cobra Gold 89 was a JCS directed joint combined command post and field training exercise designed to test interoperability of United States and Thailand forces in combined joint task force operations. This exercise was sponsored by the United States Pacific Command. Ocean Venture 90 was a JCS directed field training exercise that was sponsored by the United States Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) and executed by JTF 140, a standing JTF belonging to USLANTCOM.

The evaluation in each of the exercises was thorough and provided some useful feedback. However, the evaluation missed the mark by not thoroughly testing the manual's content. As previously mentioned, the purpose of the JTF publication was to establish joint planning guidance and procedures for forming, staffing, deploying, employing and redeploying a JTF for a short-notice contingency operation. None of the exercises selected provided an opportunity to fully test these procedures.

Brim Frost 89 did not require a short-notice formation of a JTF. JTF Alaska and JTF Aleutians are semi-standing JTF's. They each have a corps of personnel permanently assigned to do planning and are augmented when formed. The scenario for Cobra Gold 89 did not involve a short-notice contingency operation, although it did require the formation of a JTF to execute the mission. In that respect it provided some good albeit incomplete feedback. Ocean Venture 89 required a response to a short-notice contingency, but the operation was executed by JTF 140 which has been a standing JTF since 1979.
Throughout the exercise it used its own SOP, and did not refer to the manual. 38 Although though JTF 140 used their own SOP, several of the staff members reviewed the document and stated that it would be of use to a newly formed JTF inexperienced in JTF organization and operations. 39

The results of the evaluation in the three exercises produced generally positive feedback. Following is a summary of the observations.

- The test publication provides adequate guidance for forming, organizing, and employing a joint task force.

- The test publication provides the basic guidance necessary to implement the doctrine in Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF.

- The test publication improved understanding and accomplishment of the warfighting mission for ad hoc JTF staffs inexperienced in JTF organization and operations. Reciprocally, it is of little use to experienced standing JTF.

- The checklists proved very useful in forming a JTF.

- The test publication requires discussion on
The approved JTF manual published in September 1991 added the definition of the JSOTF to correct the deficiency noted in the last observation.

Although the manual was evaluated in three different theaters of operations with favorable results, it was never fully tested. To more comprehensively evaluate the manual, an exercise with a short notice contingency scenario that drives the participant to form a JTF to execute the mission is required. No notice interoperability exercises (NIEX) conducted by JCS provide such a format. Joint Pub 5-00.2 should be evaluated in this type of exercise before anyone in the joint community can feel totally confident that its contents are valid.

Conclusions

Prior to the passage of the Goldwater - Nichols Act of 1986, the military history of the United States clearly indicated a need for joint doctrine. Failure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to approve and promulgate the joint doctrine written by the joint board of military officers after World War II exacerbated the problem. Military experience since World War II, demonstrated an urgent requirement for doctrine to form, deploy and employ a JTF to execute contingency operations. Joint Pub 5-00.2 does a credible job filling the
void and addressing many of the deficiencies noted in the past contingency operations.

Joint Pub 5-00.2 has two major shortcomings. First, it does not address functional command organizations and relationships. Specifically, the lack of discussion on the JFLCC and the JFACC seriously detracts from the manual. Second, the exercises selected for the evaluation of the test publication did not fully examine the manual's content. Additional evaluation in an exercise with a short notice contingency scenario is required.

Two major problems plagued the development of Joint Pub 5-00.2. The most significant obstacle was the primacy of the Services in the staffing and coordination process. Service rivalries prevented the manual from addressing the JFLCC and the JFACC. Revisions to the coordination process which now involve the combatant commands may have solved this problem. The other problem was the poor distribution system for test publications. As a result the JTF manual was not widely available in Operation Desert Storm.

Recommendations

I strongly recommend that the next revision of Joint Pub 5-00.2 discuss functional command organizations and relationships to include the JFLCC and JFACC. This will significantly strengthen the manual. The manual also should be evaluated as soon as possible in an exercise with a short notice contingency scenario.
notice contingency scenario. A JCS sponsored NIEX should be considered as an opportunity to conduct this evaluation. Shortcomings noted from the evaluation should be addressed in the next revision.

I also recommend that the combatant commands fully participate in the staffing and coordinating process for joint doctrine projects. This will help insure that service rivalries do not dominate the joint doctrine development process. Finally, each combatant command and Service must design a distribution system to insure that test publications reach organizations that need them.
Figure 1
Endnotes


6. Department of War and Department of Navy, Rules for Army and Navy Maneuver, 1903.


10. Ibid., Foreward.

11. Ibid., 13-7 - 13-8.

12. Ibid., Preface.


17. Program Directive for Joint Pub 5-00.2.


29. Ibid., 107 and 120.

30. Interview with Barry Costello, Cdr. USN. Joint Doctrine and Interoperability Directorate, J7, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 24 October 1991.


32. Furr, 41.


35. Ibid., 1-1 and 1-2.
36. Ibid., B-2.
37. Ibid., C-2.
38. Ibid., D-3 and D-4.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Department of War and Department of Navy, Rules for Army and Navy Maneuvers. Washington : 1903.


