The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESS-MILITARY "CRUNCH" IN THE PERSIAN GULF: "WUZ THE PUBLIC ROBBED?"

BY

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Rasmussen
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1992

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the American Public reflects with satisfaction on the performance of coalition forces, mostly as reported by a favorable media. Similarly, the American military is for the most part not unhappy with the media's presentation of the conflict. The media, however, shares little sympathy with these emotions. One media commentator calls the coverage a "disaster," and another claims "the public wuz robbed." This dichotomy is only the latest in a 150-year-old story of media-military relations, in which both should be fighting common enemies, but usually end up fighting each other. In spite of repeated inter-war efforts to arrive at solutions, the latest war occurred with yet another media-military conflict.

This paper briefly traces the history of media-military relations insofar as that history illustrates ongoing problems, traces recent efforts to establish guidelines for the relationship, and searches out the main causes.
19. ABSTRACT (continued)

of friction between the media and the military in the recent Gulf War. In conclusion, it makes recommendations for easing the friction in future conflicts. These recommendations depart from past suggestions in that they recommend methods to enforce cooperation.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESS-MILITARY "CRUNCH" IN THE PERSIAN GULF: "WUZ THE PUBLIC ROBBED?"

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Rasmussen
United States Army

Lieutenant Colonel Larry F. Icenogle
Project Advisor

U. S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Stephen Rasmussen, LTC, USA

TITLE: The Development of the Press-Military "Crunch" In the Persian Gulf: "Wuz the Public Robbed?"

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

Date: 15 April 1992 Pages: 51, Unclassified

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the American Public reflects with satisfaction on the performance of coalition forces, mostly as reported by a favorable media. Similarly, the American military is for the most part not unhappy with the media's presentation of the conflict. The media, however, shares little sympathy with these emotions. One media commentator calls the coverage a "disaster," and another claims "the public wuz robbed." This dichotomy is only the latest in a 150 year-old story of media-military relations, in which both should be fighting common enemies, but usually end up fighting each other. In spite of repeated inter-war efforts to arrive at solutions, the latest war occurred with yet another media-military conflict.

This paper briefly traces the history of media-military relations insofar as that history illustrates ongoing problems, traces recent efforts to establish guidelines for the relationship, and searches out the main causes of friction between the media and the military in the recent Gulf War. In conclusion, it makes recommendations for easing the friction in future conflicts. These recommendations depart from past suggestions in that they recommend methods to enforce cooperation.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESS-MILITARY "CRUNCH" IN THE PERSIAN GULF: "WUZ THE PUBLIC ROBBED?"

I. An Introduction to the Problem.

In a short side-bar article in the publication of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, John Driscoll, editor of the Boston Globe, relates the Persian Gulf experience of Colin Nickerson, one of his reporters covering the Second Marine Division during the Liberation of Kuwait. Nickerson lived with the unit, moved with it, and when it attacked he wrote his story in a foxhole by the light of a penlight. But two of his stories got back to the media pools too late to be of use, and the third never made it back at all. Driscoll says that the press agreed to the pool system in part because of assurances that the military would expedite pool reports. "But when the chips were down," complains Driscoll, "it did not happen. Globe reporter Colin Nickerson and the public wuz robbed."

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, this vignette seems to characterize the media's attitude toward their whole Persian Gulf experience. Charles Lewis, the Washington Bureau Chief for Hearst Newspapers said "what happened in the Persian Gulf was a disaster that should never be allowed to happen again." On the other hand, Pete Williams, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, said "partly because of the thorough job the press did, the
military gained respect. Thanks to reporters, the American people could see what our troops, our commanders, and our weapons were doing. "And, he went on to say, "a *Newsweek* poll found that 59 percent of Americans think better of the news media now than they did before the war." Nonetheless, reporters, editors, and publishers complain vigorously. In response, Senator Alan Simpson of Wyoming said that if people did not like the coverage of the war they should write their editors. This welter of conflicting testimony leads one to ask "Hey, are we talking about the same war?"

Of course we are, but we are talking about the same war from vastly different perspectives. Military commanders have complained about the press almost since the invention of movable type, but the conflict between the press and the military became deadly earnest in the last 140 years. It has not noticeably improved, though it has had its ups and downs. In the last twenty years, however, it has been mostly down. These twenty years have also witnessed a remarkable change in both the way modern war is waged and how modern news is reported. People, though, have not changed very much. And their efforts to handle these changing circumstances are a constant source of frustration. Four conflicts during this period--Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf--illustrate the frustrations of the media and the military. The resulting media-military conflicts have been largely a manifestation of frustration caused by these rapid changes. The media-military relationship has
simply been unable to accommodate both this rapidly changing warfare and equally rapid changes in news technology.

The efforts of both the media and the military to reconcile this conflict have been largely ineffective because they have failed to accept and deal with change. We want to believe that reasonable men can talk themselves into accommodation and so we resist binding ourselves to the kind of controls that would make accommodation possible. But a workable solution must be found and enforced so that the media, the military, and the public can do the things that each must do in a functioning democracy. The media and the military must not devolve into street-fighting with each other every time the country is called to hostile action--one enemy at a time is enough for both. This paper will suggest such an accommodation. It will do so by briefly reviewing the history of media-military relations to identify constants, and by reviewing the Gulf situation in some detail to identify its lessons. Then it will propose a system of conducting media-military operations that is workable, that is enforceable, and that takes into account the rights and needs of all, as well as the dictates of changing historical circumstances.
II. The Nature of the Press and the Military.

In our democracy, there is, perhaps, an inevitable tension between the media and the military—between the practitioners of the First Amendment and the protectors of it. In an interesting scenario about a hypothetical Central American War, William A. Rusher correctly points out the dilemma:

It is certainly not enough merely to quote the First Amendment... There is another rule of law as old as Rome: "Saulius populi suprema lex"—the safety of the people is the supreme law. What shall we do, if and when these two great principles collide?

The answer, of course, is that we must work out systems ahead of time to cushion the collision and allow the two to work together. But why they must collide, and why the nature of the collisions in the last twenty years has caused the conflict to escalate, deserves comment. Four factors are involved: the basic nature of journalism, the traditional role of the military, the age of the mini-war, and the era of instant news.

The first factor is the basic nature of journalism, best characterized by one word: competition. In isolation, there is nothing wrong with this. Not only is America a free democracy, but it is an open market democracy. The media stays in business by selling its product. Both institutions and individuals in the industry stay in business by producing results—copy—for the business to market. There is a saying in the business that "old news is no news."
Thus, a simple fact of life in the media is that he who gets the most first, wins. Charles Lewis complains that in Panama "primitive communications delayed stories and photos for hours." If, as the media claim, their guiding impetus is the public's right to know, "hours" is not bad. But what comes through Lewis's complaint, unfortunately, is that if a reporter cannot shorten his filing lag time to--hopefully--minutes, the competition will beat him out.

The competition motive among the media is intense. Profit and survival drive the journalist to extreme efforts. Witness the case of Bob Simons's CBS crew that went on a unilateral reporting trip which resulted in their being captured behind enemy lines in the Gulf War. This was in spite of directions to them directly to the contrary from military authorities. Again, this is simply the nature of the business. But the media will cloak this competitiveness in the First Amendment, freedom of the press, and the public's right to know.

On the other hand is the second factor, the military's "excessive concern for security," as Fred S. Hoffman reports in his critique of the Press Pool system in Panama. Just as the media wraps itself in the First Amendment, so does the military throw the red blanket of "operational security" over all it does. But one cannot argue with Dick Cheney's response to the Hoffman Report:

In the final analysis, the choice for me comes down to the proposition of how much emphasis I want to place on accommodating the legitimate
needs of the press to cover a significant military operation and my obligation to provide and guarantee, as long as I can, the security of an operation to protect the lives of the men I send into combat. And given a choice or trade-off between those two obligations, you can be absolutely certain I will always come down on the side of protecting security as long as I can in order to safeguard those lives. No one would seriously debate this. At issue is where the line between the two comes and who enforces it. The military, as well as the media, is competitively dedicated to doing its job well. If giving the media some information stands any chance of risking the mission, the military will always opt to not take the chance. Each side feels it needs complete freedom to do its job. Regrettably, their positions often remain far apart. In moments of doubt or confusion, each falls back on its base argument. Unfortunately, neither is always right.

The third factor in this tug-of-war is the advent of the Age of the Mini-War. Korea and Vietnam made the US public vow "never again" to drawn-out inconclusive wars. This public pressure forced the military to plan for the short, violent war of overwhelming force. The combination of having weapons of great sophistication and the good fortune of dramatically inferior enemies has made the Mini-War possible. Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf demonstrate this. As an illustration, the average length of the nine major wars in American history, through Vietnam, was 3.7 years. Since then, Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf War have averaged only 16 days.
The fourth factor in the modern media-military conflict is the advent of instant communications—at least in the civilian sector. Reporters can now not only broadcast around the world on a real-time basis, but print media can file stories electronically almost as fast. They can, that is, if the facilities which exist in fact are available in practice. Since they are available to news media in the US and most locations overseas, the media assumes they should always be available. This makes for "timely reporting," to use the media term. But the military counters that the use of real-time reporting reports to the enemy as well. Further, its very use from on-site locations is a source of signal emissions that can themselves immediately identify locations.

Thus are assembled the four primary elements of the confrontation: 1) a intensely competitive media world in which the reporter is driven to produce, 2) an equally competitive military dedicated to accomplishing its mission without unnecessary risk of life, 3) a new requirement for the military to now produce almost instant victory, measured in hours and days instead of months and years, and 4) a new ability for the media to report news immediately, virtually as it happens from where it happens. In the compressed time and intensity of the modern battlefield, however, these factors seem almost mutually exclusive.
III. A Review of Media-Military Relations.

One of the first modern clashes between the media and the military occurred during the Crimean War. It is an instructive example because it clearly displayed a fact of life for the next century and a half: simple war reporting can alter government policy. In 1857, The Times of London sent William Howard Russell to the Crimea to report on French and British operations. Prior to that time, correspondents romanticised battles and military heroes. This catered to a popular taste. Russell, on the other hand, dug into instances of military incompetence and questioned the need for the taxpayer to fund the venture at all. Russell's reporting dramatically increased the Times circulation and caused other papers to rush out similar correspondents. Soon, these reporters were laying before the British taxpayer dramatic portrayals of serious problems and questioning the ability of senior commanders. This in no small way helped bring about a swing in public opinion that influenced a government change of policy and an early withdrawal from the ill-fated Crimean adventure. It was, almost, a nineteenth century British equivalent of America's Vietnam experience. The lesson of this was two-fold. First, the press could dramatically effect public opinion and hence, in a democracy at least, government. The potential of this powerful tool became ingrained in the corporate
memories of western armies. Second, war copy sells well on the home front—and the more lurid and controversial, the better.

With the advent of the American Civil War four years later, neither lesson was lost on Britain's younger cousin. In his recent study "Ethics and Responsibility in Broadcasting," Frederick J. Chiaventone reports that U. S. Grant at one point considered resigning because the "proclivity of the press for speculation on or revealing the plans of [the] armies seriously threatens the success of those plans and thus endangers the struggle for the preservation of the union." Chiaventone goes on to tell how the South was also not without the same kind of difficulty. Robert E. Lee wrote to his Secretary of War that "such publications are injurious to us. We have difficulty enough interposed by our enemies without having their efforts augmented by our friends." As a result, censorship was imposed by both North and South as official policy.

The rules governing reporting varied from command to command but General Sherman's are illustrative. Peter Gabriel writes that Sherman established two tenets of correspondent operations: 1) that reporters must be accredited, and 2) that reporters must be acceptable to the local military commander. These principles were in response to what has been acknowledged as much irresponsible reporting during the Civil War. Sherman at one point, in
response to information leaks, had a reporter arrested and held as a spy.\textsuperscript{14}

The media-military relations in the Civil War set the tone for much of what was to follow in the next century and a half. In the Civil War, American readers could read about what had just happened, thanks to the development of the telegraph. Journalists were so quick to take advantage of this ability to get the news out quickly that it began to erode editors' ability to analyze their data and make proper determinations on what should or should not be printed or what was or was not in the best interests of the nation. The people's "right" to know became the people's "want" to know. Editors began to sell \textit{entertainment}, not democracy. The results of such "entertainment" became secondary to the providing of it. The government's reaction to this was to limit the possible damage by seizing control of the means of instant filing--the telegraph. This was perhaps an over-reaction, but it was the only thing the government could control. What it needed to influence, and what was extremely difficult to influence in the face of a hostile press, was public reaction. In a democracy, the people should be able to discriminate. But this presupposes responsible, or at least neutral, reporting. The public's "want" for instant news makes this difficult. The Civil War was thus America's first modern war in media-military
relations as well as in tactical and strategic terms and it foreshadowed much of what was to follow.

In this century, World War II and Vietnam provide examples of the media-military relationship's evolution in its two most opposite forms. The relationship in World War II is most nostalgically remembered in General Eisenhower's comment in *Crusade in Europe*: "I found that correspondents habitually respond to candor, frankness, and understanding." But World War II was a time of great villains and great heroes, and by and large the world took sides. The reputation of an Eisenhower, for example, was so immense that reporters were emotionally forced to respond "to candor [and] frankness." The reporters knew that the public position was for Ike and against Hitler before they put pen to paper. Any other position would receive no audience. This situation made it easy for the military to treat the media as a member of its team.

Such is not at all the case when the media has another position and that position finds an audience at home, such as in the Civil War, and most recently, Vietnam. Among the many difficulties of that troubling conflict were the ingredients for a deteriorating media-military relationship with none of the ingredients for an improving relationship. First, Vietnam was a long and inconclusive conflict with a growing audience at home for the rhetoric of discontent. There was also, through the miracle of modern television
technology, the ability to provide immediate photographic news. There was no censorship and reporters were essentially able to go where they wanted and write about what they saw as they saw it. In people terms, there were no military heroes. And Ho Chi Minh--privately a ruthless opportunist--was at best a dubious public villain. By and large, the reserve components were not mobilized and therefore home-town USA did not have any local military units participating. The result was an increasingly critical press, a public increasingly receptive to criticism of the government, and a correspondingly reactionary government.

Relations between the media and the military emerged from Vietnam seriously damaged. As Richard Halloran comments in "Soldiers and Scribblers Revisited," the "relations between the military and the press have come a long way since [Eisenhower's] thoughtful and temperate words, and most of it has been downhill." There were, to be sure, instances of irresponsibility of which the media cannot be proud. Witness the celebrated General Loan incident. Reporters also admit to ignoring atrocities by Viet Cong "preferring to seek out and report on . . . rarer instances of American misdeeds." Now generally recognized also was the misleading reportage of the Tet offensive. But by and large, the media felt that its duty to inform the people had been done. The final outcome of the war, it felt, had vindicated its efforts.
The American military, however, emerged from the Vietnam conflict with what amounted to an institutional distaste for the media. In many military minds, the media was the enemy. A generation of young officers grew up in an environment, the credo of which was, as Bernard Trainor writes, "Duty, Honor, Country, and hate the media." These were far from the best circumstances with which to begin the post-Vietnam era of media-military relations. Even more significantly, perhaps, is that both institutions began the era with diametrically opposed conclusions: the media was convinced it had properly served the public's right to know in Vietnam; the military was equally convinced the media had misserved the country by irresponsible conduct and vowed not to let it happen again.
IV. Grenada and Panama.

It is with this memory of the Vietnam experience as part of its corporate baggage that the media and the military began the intervention in Grenada. Grenada poses an interesting chapter in media-military relationships. In an effort to not allow a repetition of the Vietnam experience, the military simply excluded the media from the initial phases of the Grenada intervention. Admiral Joseph Metcalf, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Command, was the overall commander. He followed the British example from the Falkland Islands War. In the Falklands, the British Government was in total control of the press because the only way into the operational area was aboard task force transportation. This produced what Phillip Knightly, in *The First Casualty*, calls a "model" for controlling the news. In complete fairness, however, Major General J.H. Thompson, HMRM Retired, who commanded the ground forces in the Falklands, said that the media operations in that conflict should not be looked to for any lessons learned because of the truly unique nature of the war. Nevertheless, Admiral Metcalf persisted. His decision caused the press apoplexy. The press charged the military with censorship and arrogance—probably true—and in response the military referenced the media's previous irresponsibility—also probably true.
The military had seemingly made good on its oft-implied if seldom spoken threat to not let happen again what had happened in Vietnam. The outcry from the press was predictable, however, and the Secretary of Defense was forced to convene a commission in 1984 to review the whole episode and recommend a workable procedure for such situations in the future. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Media-Military Relations Panel, chaired by retired Major General Winant Sidle was the result. The so-called "Sidle Panel" made a number of recommendations that had far-reaching implications (see appendix I for a full listing). The most notable was the recommendation to use media "pools" which were to figure so prominently in both Panama and the Gulf War. The Panel fell well short, however, in two important ways: first it did not include current media representatives on the Panel, and, second, it did not put any enforcement provisions in its recommendations.

In the Panel's report back to General Vessey, Sidle explains the panel membership:

The initial plan, concurred in by CJCS and ASD(PA), was to invite major umbrella media organizations and the Department of Defense organizations to provide members of this panel. The umbrella organizations, such as the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA), the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE), the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), and the Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA), and their individual member news organizations decided that they would cooperate fully with the panel but would not provide members. The general reason given was that it was
inappropriate for media members to serve on a government panel."

Thus media leadership was excluded from active participation, and as a result, they were able later to say, with some justification, that they--personally--never agreed to "pools," as the military claimed.

The second major problem with the Panel's report, that it contained no enforcement measures, is clear from an examination of its eight recommendations. The language includes no way to mandate such actions. This caused significant problems later.

The first test of the recommendations was Panama. There the military--to be fair--used the "pool" almost as a weapon against the media. This was the primary cause of friction in the relationship during "Just Cause" and shows a misapplication of a Sidle Panel Recommendation. The pool concept was envisioned for use when access to an operational area is nearly impossible without military assistance. Panama was not such a place. A local media establishment was already present. The Sidle Panel also envisioned the pool being taken to cover the events. In Panama, the pool was kept largely at Howard Air Force Base due to lack of transportation, an overconcern for reporter safety, and that ever-present bugaboo--security. It seemed to most of the media that the pool was used more as a means of controlling the press than of assisting it. The press cried "foul" again, and not without reason.
The military, of course, was quick to point out that though the Sidle Report recommended that military planners "should" provide transportation and communications for the media pools, there is nowhere a budgetary provision that they "will." The Public Affairs Office in a division, for example, has one vehicle allocated to it. In combat, commanders must give up transportation and communications assets if the PAO is to have them. The Sidle Panel caveated its recommendation by saying that provisions "must not interfere with combat and combat support operations." Because transportation and communications are so important, giving up any of these assets will almost always interfere with operations. This Sidle Recommendation is therefore nice, but has little practical utility.

Department of the Army Public Affairs statistics show that by the 48th hour of "Just Cause," 275 correspondents were on hand at Howard Air Force Base. This is not an overwhelming number of people if they are light infantrymen. This is less than three companies to feed, arm, and start marching to the sound of the guns. To give them transportation and communications, as would be the case with that many reporters, is another matter. Numbers illustrate the problem. The three light infantry companies in our example have no vehicles, no helicopters, and only eighteen radios of limited range. A 2,000-man light infantry brigade has only 104 vehicles. An entire light infantry division has
only 30 lift helicopters. These 30 helicopters must support a 10,000-man division. The division also has only 12 long-range radios capable of the hemispheric communications the media has in mind. The point of this illustration is to demonstrate that in order to support the 275 correspondents with transportation and minimal communications would require the assets of an entire division. There were the equivalent of about two light infantry divisions conducting the operation in Panama. The recommendation of the Panel and its interpretation by the media are inconsistent with physical reality. This is not to suggest that providing some dedicated resources is impossible; it is to suggest that at the time of the Panama operation, such resourcing had not been envisioned. Stricter definitions of the Panel’s recommendations are required.

As a result of the "Just Cause" experience, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs asked for a report on the Panama press pool. In March of 1990, that report was prepared by Mr. Fred Hoffman, a retired former Assistant Secretary. His report had 17 recommendations (see appendix 2). Mr. Hoffman’s most serious indictment is that there was no Public Affairs Plan for "Just Cause." This is truly inexcusable. The military knows the media will flock to cover American Armed Forces engaged in combat. As Major General Roosma, XVIIIth Airborne Corps Deputy Commander,
said, "the time to prepare such a plan is not during great crisis, but beforehand."

Hoffman discusses his recommendations in detail, but two deserve special note as they impact on the development of the media-military relationship in the Gulf War. Hoffman suggests in his twelfth recommendation that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs should consider creating a pool slot for an editor to come to the Pentagon to lend professional journalistic help to the staff handling the pool reports. This is very near the mark. Such a position, however, should entail duties not only for the pool reports but also in mediating disputes as well. Second, Hoffman also recommends that participating news organizations share the burden of purchasing and pre-positioning at Andrews Air Force Base the necessary communications equipment to be immediately available to deploy with a pool. Again, this is a good idea but one not fully developed. But something very like it would have prevented considerable problems in the Gulf War.
V. Aftermath of the Gulf War.

In spite of repeated efforts to work out better arrangements in the media-military relationship, America went into the Gulf War with the two institutions essentially still at odds. Peter Braestrup writes in the introduction to *Newsmen and National Defense* that the military culture accents "conformity, candor, discipline, accountability, group loyalty, and cohesion," and in wartime finds itself confronted by a press that is "individualistic, competitive, word conscious, impatient, lacking for the most part internal rules . . . suspicious of authority, and hard pressed by deadlines."25 Add that both groups entered the Gulf War with Grenada and Panama fresh in their minds and the resulting confrontation was bound to be difficult. The experiences of both bear this out. Department of the Army Public Affairs says—not surprisingly—that "media coverage of US forces in the Persian Gulf was overwhelmingly favorable." But it goes on to admit that news media commentary on the performance of US forces in handling the news media was not.26 That this is clearly an understatement is illustrated by the opening paragraph of an unpublished letter to Assistant Secretary Pete Williams from Charles Lewis, Washington Bureau Chief of Hearst Newspapers. Lewis writes "I believe my dire analysis in January was far too optimistic. From the perspective of news coverage, the otherwise-successful military operation was a disaster."27
What Lewis, and other media commentators complain most loudly about centers on four major issues: the pool system, transportation problems, communications shortages, and censorship. Each of these deserves analysis because out of them come considerations on how future conflicts might be covered better.

The pool system used in the Gulf is the cause of tremendous rancor for all who served in them. By placing a small number of reporters in a so-called "pool," or group effort, and taking it to the action, limited transportation, communication, and escort resources can be maximized. The media's understanding of the pool system they thought they agreed to stems from the Sidle Report. The Sidle Panel saw the pool as a method for "furnishing the media with early access to an operation, but it also said that the military should "minimize the length of time the pool will be necessary before full coverage is feasible." The military seems guilty of using the pool system as a method for controlling rather than assisting the media even after full coverage became possible.

To the military's defense, however, is that there were about 1,000 media personnel in the theater. As detailed above, this number exceeds anything military Public Affairs is equipped to handle. In a private interview, Colonel Bill Mulvey, commander of the Joint Information Bureau at Dhahran at the time, said that "there was no management strategy. PAO's were driving reporters down commanders' throats."
The numbers of reporters simply worked to their own disadvantage. An article in the ASNE Bulletin claims the number of people with some role in providing news coverage was at most 1,259. "In a country almost the size of the United States east of the Mississippi," it says, "that's hardly gridlock." On the contrary, given that a division PAO has only one vehicle with which to assist journalists, that number is precisely gridlock. The comment shows little real understanding of the situation and a lot of wishful thinking. Pools did not work in the Gulf to be sure, but not for the reasons the media claim. Pools could provide real assistance and good access for a limited number of reporters. The Defense Department, however, is neither funded nor resourced to provide for all the media personnel that an aggressive and competitive press industry would like to send. This is not to say that the Defense Department should not be so resourced, but only to say that it was not in the Gulf.

But the real question should not be "was the media properly served," but "was the American Public properly served." Army Public Affairs says this:

There were often significant delays (on the order of a day or two) in the ability of pool reporters to file dispatches from the field. This didn't have any effect on the People's Right To Know, or upon the Verdict Of History, but it did have some impact on the competitive positions of news organizations, and upon the careers and egos of journalists, which are often more meaningful to journalists than the People's Right To Know or the Verdict Of History."
This opinion is generally reflected by the American public. But, ironically, it is that same public that creates the need for journalistic competition. The military must recognize this and its responsibility to assist the media in serving this public need. Consequently, the media and the military must, as Lloyd Matthews writes, "fulfill their obligations to each other by achieving maximum mutual understanding." And that accommodation must work within the realities of the situation, which means that both sides must be prepared to compromise. Such a compromise would provide more dedicated resources from the military. In return, the media would limit their numbers to what could be well supported. Aside from these "officially accredited" media representatives, both sides would agree to unilateral (free-lance) reporting consistent with the media's ability to support them, the host nation's desire to allow them entry, and the local commander's desire to allow them access. But they would understand that they were operating strictly on their own and the military would be under no obligation to help them—just as if they were operating in a foreign country where the US military was not present.

Transportation problems aroused great complaint from the media in the Persian Gulf. These problems are simply another manifestation of the numbers of media personnel involved, however. In an open letter to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, 15 Washington Bureau Chiefs and Editors addressed this issue. They said "because the military did not dedicate
any transportation to the pools it organized, delays were commonplace. It took the military two days to transport a pool to the scene of the Persian Gulf oil spill, a 200-mile drive on paved roads... It is true that the military should dedicate adequate transportation to the pools it organizes. This should be required by the Public Affairs Annex to the Operations Order. One cannot, however, second-guess the commander's priorities in the incident above. One can be certain, however, that the transportation that was finally provided was probably done so at the cost of not providing it to something else—food, water, ammunition, or medical evacuation. Dedicated PAO assets would not put the commander in the position of having to make these choices. Similarly, however, the media must plan ahead to place in the pools only the number logistically provided for in the operations plan, and no more. It is well to remember that on D-Day, 6 June, 1944, only 27 US reporters went ashore with the first wave of forces. Only 461 total were signed on with the Supreme Allied Headquarters. A pool implies a limited, relatively fixed number. The Constitution guarantees freedom of the press, and this surely implies military assistance to the press in times of armed conflict. The Constitution does not guarantee, however, unlimited assistance. Both sides must agree ahead of time about the numbers. This goes against the press' desire to adjust their coverage as the situation develops. But the dedication of transportation requires
accurate numbers in advance. The provision of this or any logistical assets in a theater of war requires both sides to plan ahead.

Communications assets pose a similar but somewhat less difficult problem. As discussed above, the numbers of truly long distance communications systems available to a tactical unit (even up through the division) is very limited. Like transportation, these must be agreed upon, planned for, and provided in advance. The Bureau Chiefs’ letter cited earlier suggests “10 Principles” (see annex 3) to guide future operations. Principle 9 concerns communications:

9. The military will supply PAOs with timely, secure, compatible transmission facilities for pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available and will not be prevented from doing so. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news agencies.

The principle here is sound in theory but unworkable in practice. First, the principle says that the military will make the facilities available whenever possible. In combat that will be almost never, unless they are dedicated to the news services. Second, the military communication facilities that are available to a PAO are communications between the pool at the forward location and the users at a Joint Information Bureau. This communication is inadequate for the kind of filing the media envisions. Third, the military cannot let news organizations operate independent
communication systems in an area of operations. This is a valid security concern. Small, mobile communications systems carried with reporters covering units emit signals that allow an enemy to locate precisely the unit being covered. This is an aspect of the combat environment not normally encountered by reporters operating in the domestic arena. Technology may soon provide a way around this problem. But, given the current state of the art, News organizations' communications can only be operated from secure locations. Further, any copy transmitted must still be submitted first for a security review. Otherwise, the reporter has the ability to broadcast directly real-time tactical intelligence to enemy receivers. Such communications must be cleared by military professionals knowledgeable in ongoing operations. Responsible journalists understand and support this form of review. The alternative is needlessly risking American and allied lives.

The reporter's need to file quickly and accurately is a legitimate need. To that end, the Department of the Army Public Affairs Office supports a dedicated public affairs satellite system— but with access controlled by the theater commander. This would allow transmissions from approved locations and provide ready (quick) security reviews. It would also give reporters what they need most: rapid and accessible world-wide communications. The Hoffman report further suggests that media pool participants share the cost of such items as a portable darkroom, a negative transmitter
and satellite uplink gear and that they be stored at Andrews Air Force Base for immediate deployment with a pool. This is a workable plan that both sides could live with, but it means that planning and budgeting must be done in advance by all concerned, that "participants only" could use the equipment, and that the numbers of users be determined in advance.

These issues have so far addressed the media concerns. The military, however, also has concerns. The military had less problems with the Gulf War than did the media because the military essentially had the upper hand. As the Army's Command Information Branch reports: "the manner in which information was presented permitted US military spokesmen to go directly to the American (and world) public through the (electronic) media, rather than to permit the media to act as a filter, as it did in Vietnam . . . ." The military's primary problem, however, was with the overall military knowledge of reporters. There was simply a fundamental lack of knowledge by much of the media on what the military does and how it does it. This caused many misunderstandings. Much of this is because the volunteer Army has attracted a different kind of person than the media has attracted. Of the 131 reporters who went to the field with the ground forces when the ground war began, only two had ever worn a uniform. This prompted the Army to run a crash course for correspondents in the Pentagon to familiarize them with the rudiments of America's military organization so that they
could ask the right questions and get the basic data correct.

Many news organizations, unfortunately, do not have the personnel to dedicate someone to purely military matters. But as Molly Moore of the Washington Post said, "A smart reporter is a safer reporter." Accordingly, media organizations must plan ahead to have reporters prepared in advance for covering military operations and develop habitual relationships to the maximum degree possible. This encourages commanders to give reporters full access because it reduces the possibility of a reporter making a serious mistake. Putting a newcomer into military reporting is unfair to the reporter, creates problems for the military, and increases already unavoidable friction.

Many reporters, both old hands and new, complain of military censorship. Censorship to the media is anathema. But, to use the modern euphemism, "security review" will always be with reporters covering military operations. Though the military is quick to deny it, Charles Lewis claims that the commander of the Joint Information Bureau decided whether a story did or did not have merit. "If he did not like it," says Lewis, "it did not get done. It's clear, that the power to define coverage amounts to censorship." Whether or not the commander at the JIB had this power, or was simply trying to allocate resources is a matter of opinion. But Lewis's complaint against censorship represents a common media theme. A brief look at history,
however, shows that we have always had censorship. Both Eisenhower and MacArthur had official censorship. By comparison, the post-Vietnam wars have been remarkably uncensored. A security review, however, is only common sense, particularly given the lack of dedicated "military" reporters.

Assistant Secretary Williams reports that there was no system of official censorship in Desert Storm similar to that of World War II. The procedure followed in the Gulf War was to appeal to news organizations on stories that appeared to violate the ground rules. Ultimately, only five stories were submitted for final review in Washington, four were approved for publication, one was reviewed by the reporter's editor-in-chief who agreed to modify it to protect sensitive intelligence methods.4 The Department of Defense must acknowledge its responsibility to the American people to help insure they remain an informed electorate. This means helping the media get the news out, whether the military likes it or not. By the same token, the media must recognize the difference between inappropriate censorship and legitimate security reviews. And the media must acknowledge its responsibility to distinguish between its defense of the public's right to know and its own purely competitive business desires. Soldiers will fight to defend the former and commanders will risk lives in the effort; no soldier's life, however, is worth the latter.
This leads to what is probably the bottom line: "Wuz the public robbed?" The 15 Washington Bureau Chiefs think so. In their letter to Secretary Cheney, they say, "the combination of security review and the use of the pool system as a form of censorship made the Gulf War the most undercovered major conflict in modern American history."

This is a contention probably not shared by most Americans. "Media surveys of the American Public found that sympathy for the press was in acutely short supply," reports Chiaventone. "There is great room for improvement in the way the Department of Defense handled the media effort certainly, but the media in its zeal must take a broader view of the experience and not confuse what it needs with what the country needs. No one argues the service that either a free press or a strong military does a democracy. And that democracy was generally well-pleased with both how the recent war was conducted and how it was covered. A Newsweek poll of public reaction said that 59 percent of Americans felt better about the press after the war than before and a similar Washington Post poll showed that by a two-to-one margin people thought the press had gained respect." The public, it would seem, did not feel "they wuz robbed."
VI. Media-Military Relations in Future Operations.

General Siddle's cover letter to his panel's report says: "The Panel is unanimous in its strong belief that implementation of the recommendations, both in fact and in spirit, by the appropriate military authorities will set the stage for arriving at workable solutions for media-military relations in future military operations." But, these recommendations did not seem to have provided a workable solution for "Just Cause." They did not help in "Desert Storm" either--neither did the Hoffman Report's 17 recommendations. Recent past experiences have shown that voluntary efforts at accommodation fall apart when the shooting starts. The stakes for both sides are simply too high: literally, survival. Consequently, hard and enforceable rules are needed to control the relationship. This is not to say a natural antagonism between the two institutions is bad; it simply exists and must be handled. To that end, I offer Three Rules and Three Principles to add to those already proposed.

Rule #1. Establish the Position of Media-Military Appeal Authority

The appeal authority would be similar to Hoffman's senior editor working at the Pentagon, but he would further serve also as a kind of referee. The current system has no
Impartial authority. It is akin to conducting a Super Bowl with no officials, relying instead on the contestants to settle any disputes that arise by appealing to their better natures. Currently, the geographical commander-in-chief is ultimately in charge, but the media does not recognize him as being in charge of them. Even if he were put in charge of them, he is still suspect as a member of the "opposite side." A true appeal authority would be a nationally respected retired media figure--such as a Walter Cronkite--nominated by the media, appointed by the President, and confirmed by the Senate. He would rank as a civilian aide to the Secretary of Defense but would be paid jointly by the media and the Department of Defense. He would speak with the authority of the President in arbitrating media-military disputes. He would operate under the guidance of agreed upon principles and would control the assets of the national media pool. He would be appointed for a four-year term offset by two years from that of the President and would serve with pay for the full four years regardless of the deployment or non-deployment of the national media pool. Thus, neither side would ever have the upper hand. Disputes would be settled on-site and both sides could operate as one team. The creation of this appeal authority position would add the enforcement element to the many good recommendations put forth in the past.

Rule #2. Establish Pre-set Pool Numbers and Assets.
This agreement would identify in advance the numbers of media personnel to deploy with the National Department of Defense Media Pool. It would establish prestocked equipment sites to give the national pool adequate communication and Defense Department provided transportation and escorts. It would mandate complete sharing of all pool products with all other accredited media representatives. The number of persons in the pool would be limited to those the assets could support. Media organizations would be authorized positions in the pool in proportion to the share of the pool cost they bore. There would be no agonizing about whether to pool or not to pool, nor about how many or who should go or when. The pool would simply be a part of our national deployment capability.

Rule #3. Establish Habitual Relationship Positions.

This provision would establish the position of media pool member at the tactical unit, down to brigade level. Each brigade would know it must feed, house, transport, and provide communications (at least to the JIB) for a three-man media team. The brigade would plan for this and not worry about being overloaded or undercovered in case of a deployment. Commanders would not have the option of accepting or supporting the media teams; they would simply be a part of how we do business. Relationships would develop between certain media organizations and certain tactical
units. The media would not be required to fill every slot, but the units, however, would all be prepared to receive them. Mutual trust would develop and commanders and the media would habitually work together.

Additionally: the following three principles would guide how the media and the military would operate both within and without the pool system.

Principle #1 Unilateral Reporting Is The Norm.

This principle acknowledges that, as the Sidle Panel envisioned, full coverage would begin as soon as physically possible. Media personnel could free-lance as much as their expense accounts would allow, as much as host nations would permit, and as much as local commanders agreed. But these unilateral reporters would be on their own. They would receive no military support or assistance, either transportation or communications. These assets would be reserved for the reporters working habitually with a given unit, or those dedicated pool reporters. Further, commanders could allow or not allow unilateralis in their operational areas. Dedicated pool members could also operate unilaterally if they chose, but while doing so they would be authorized no military support. All unilateralis would still be obligated to follow the published ground rules that allowed them access to the theater. Violations would result
in credentials being voided and the reporter barred from the theater.


This principle is required only to protect the lives of American soldiers, not the reputations of commanders, units, or politicians. Personal criticisms would not be an area of concern to the security reviewer. The security review would be conducted by the staff of the commander in whose area of responsibility the report was made. It would be done in a timely manner (by the reporter's definition), it would not be used as a delay tactic, it would only be done once, and the reasons for requesting a change would be explained thoroughly. The decision to publish or not to publish would be, as now, an editor's responsibility. All reports, however, would follow the ground rules and differences of opinion would be referred to the Appeal Authority.

Principle #3. Pools and Habitual Relationships are Designed to Assist Reporters

Pooling and habitual relationships are not designed to be a kind of pocket censorship. They are, in fact, the best way to get the media to where the action is in the surest possible way. The pool's presence insures that the military gets its story told, that the public is informed, and that
the reporter is adequately supported in doing his job. The pool reporter and the abitual relationship reporter would owe their reports and the products of their efforts to the rest of the media at the JIB. The various media organizations at the JIB would then file the stories as necessary. The pool reporters and the local commanders would or would not help unilaterals in their areas as they saw fit. But they would not be required to support unknown numbers of unilaterals that might flock to the action in their area. They would be only required to support their dedicated media teams.
VII. Conclusion.

The history of the media-military relationship has been one of love-hate since war correspondent first put pen to paper. It will probably always be so because the public is drawn to the spectacle of war, and news organizations are business enterprises that survive by catering to this public taste. The media also serves the interest of democracy, and thus its investigations and publications are rightly protected by the First Amendment. The military, however, is a non-profit organization dedicated to winning wars, where secrecy and non-publication are often critical to success. And, as the military will point out, the country will survive a war without the First Amendment; it will not survive a war without a successful military.

The natural conflict these competing objectives generate is not bad. It mirrors the American tradition of checks and balances in which ambition is set against ambition. But the forces within these institutions that are set in motion by armed conflict are now so powerful that the government must control their conduct more decisively than anyone has heretofore cared to propose. In this age of rapid war and instant communications, the need for a firmer control of the media-military relationship is demanded with increasing urgency.
APPENDIX 1: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SIDLE PANEL

RECOMMENDATION 1:

That public affairs planning for military operations be conducted concurrently with operational planning. This can be assured in the great majority of cases by implementing the following:

a. Review all joint planning documents to assure that JCS guidance in public affairs matters is adequate.

b. When sending implementing orders to Commanders-in-Chiefs in the field, direct CINC planners to include considerations of public information aspects.

c. Inform the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) of an impending military operation at the earliest possible time. This information should appropriately come from the Secretary of Defense.

d. Complete the plan, currently being studied, to include a public affairs planning cell in the OJCS to help ensure adequate public affairs review of CINC plans.

e. Insofar as possible and appropriate, institutionalize these steps in written guidance or policy.

RECOMMENDATION 2:

When it becomes necessary during military operational planning that news media pooling provides the only feasible means of furnishing the media with early access to an operation, planning should provide for the largest possible press pool that is practical and minimize the length of time the pool will be necessary before "full coverage" is feasible.

RECOMMENDATION 3:

That, in connection with the use of pools, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the Secretary of Defense that he study whether to use a pre-established and constantly updated accreditation or notification list of correspondents in case of a military operation for which a pool is required or the establishment of a news agency list for use in the same circumstances.

RECOMMENDATION 4:
That a basic tenet governing media access to military operations should be voluntary compliance by the media with security guidelines or ground rules established and issued by the military. These rules should be as few as possible and should be worked out during the planning process for each operation. Violations would mean exclusion of the correspondent(s) concerned from further coverage of the operation.

RECOMMENDATION 5:

Public Affairs planning for military operations should include sufficient equipment and qualified military personnel whose function is to assist correspondents in covering the operation adequately.

RECOMMENDATION 6:

Planners should carefully consider media communications requirements to insure the earliest feasible availability. However, these communications must not interfere with combat and combat support operations. If necessary and feasible, plans should include communications facilities dedicated to the news media.

RECOMMENDATION 7:

Planning factors should include provision for intra- and inter-theater transportation support of the media.

RECOMMENDATION 8:

To improve media-military understanding and cooperation:

a. CJCS should recommend to the Secretary of Defense that a program be undertaken by ASD(PA) for top military public affairs representatives to meet with news organization leadership, to include meetings with individual news organizations, on a reasonably regular basis to discuss mutual problems, including relationships with the media during military operations and exercises. This program should begin as soon as possible.

b. Enlarge programs already underway to improve military understanding of the media via public affairs instruction in service schools, to include media participation when possible.

c. Seek improved media understanding of the military through more visits by commanders and line officers to news organizations.
d. CJCS should recommend that the Secretary of Defense host at an early date a working meeting with representatives of the broadcast news media to explore the special problems of ensuring military security when and if there is a real-time or near real-time news media audiovisual coverage of a battlefield and, if special problems exist, how they can best be dealt with consistent with the basic principle set forth at the beginning of this section of the report.

The panel members fully support the statement of principle and the supporting recommendations listed above and so indicate by their signatures below:

/s/
Winant Sidle, Major General, USA, Retired
Chairman

/s/
Brent Baker, Captain, USN

/s/
Fred C. Lash, Major, USMC

/s/
Keyes Beech

/s/
James Major, Captain, USN

/s/
Scott M. Cutlip

/s/
Wendell S. Merick

/s/
John T. Halbert

/s/
Robert O'Brien, Colonel, USAF, Dep Assist Secretary of Defense (Public Aff)

/s/
Billy Hunt

/s/
Richard S. Salant

/s/
George Kirschenbauer
Colonel, USA

/s/
Barry Zorthian

/s/
A.J. Langguth
APPENDIX 2: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HOFFMAN REPORT

1. The Secretary of Defense should issue a policy directive, to be circulated throughout the Department and the Armed Services, stating explicitly his official sponsorship of the media pool and requiring full support for it. That policy statement should make it clear to all that the pool must be given every assistance to report combat by US troops from the start of operations.

2. All operational plans drafted by the Joint Staff must have an annex spelling out measures to assure that the pool will move with the lead elements of US forces and cover the earliest stages of operations. This principle should be incorporated in overall public affairs plans.

3. A Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs should closely monitor development of operation-related public affairs plans to assure they fulfill all requirements for pool coverage. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public affairs (ASD-PA) should review all such plans. In advance of military action, those plans should be briefed to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with the operation plans.

   Public affairs staff officers and key staff personnel representing policy offices, such as International Security Affairs, should be brought into the planning process at the very earliest stage. The practice of keeping key staff officers with high security clearances out of the planning process in order to limit access to sensitive information should be followed only sparingly and eliminated where possible.

4. In the run-up to a military operation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should send out a message ordering all commanders to give full cooperation to the media pool and its escorts. This requirement should be spelled out unambiguously and should reach down through all echelons in the chain of command. Such a message should make clear that necessary resources, such as helicopters, ground vehicles, communications equipment, etc., must be earmarked specifically for pool use, that the pool must have ready access to the earliest action, and that the safety of the pool reporters must not be used as a reason to keep the pool from the action.

5. The ASD-PA must be prepared to weigh in aggressively with the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman where necessary to overcome any secrecy or other obstacles blocking prompt deployment of a pool to the scene of action.
6. After a pool has been deployed the ASD-PA must be kept informed in a timely fashion of any hitches that may arise. He must be prepared to act immediately, to contact the JCS Chairman, the Joint Staff Director of Operations, and other senior officers who can serve to break through any obstacles to the pool. The ASD-PA should call on the Defense Secretary for help as needed.

7. The ASD-PA should study a proposal by several of the Panama poolers that further pools deploy in two sections. The first section would be very small and would include only reporters and photographers. The second section, coming later, would bring in supporting gear, such as satellite uplink equipment.

8. The national media pool should never again be herded as a single unwieldy unit. It should be broken up after arriving at the scene of action to cover a wider spectrum of the story and then be reassembled periodically to share the reporting results.

9. The pool should be exercised at least once during each quarterly rotation with airborne and other types of military units most likely to be sent on emergency combat missions.

10. During deployments, there should be regular briefings for pool news people by senior operations officers so the poolers will have an up-to-date and complete overview of the progress of an operation they are covering.

11. There is an urgent need for restructuring of the organization which has the responsibility for handling pool reports sent to the Pentagon for processing and distribution. The ASD-PA must assure that there is adequate staffing and enough essential equipment to handle the task. The Director of Plans, so long as he has this responsibility, should clearly assign contingency duties among his staff to ensure timely handling of reports from the pool. Staffers from the Administration Office, Community Relations, and other divisions of Office of the ASD-PA should be mobilized to help in such a task as needed.

12. The ASD-PA should give serious consideration to a suggestion by some of the pool members to create a new pool slot for an editor who would come to the Pentagon during a deployment to lend professional journalism help to the staff officers handling pool reports. Such a pool editor could edit copy, question content where indicated, and help expedite distribution of the reports.
13. The pool escorting system needs overhauling as well. There is no logical reason for the Washington-based escorts to be drawn from the top of the Office of the ASD-PA Plans Division. The head of that division should remain in Washington to oversee getting out the pool products.

Pool escorts should be drawn from the most appropriate service, rather than limiting escort duty to officers of the Plans Division. The individual armed service public affairs offices should be required to assign military officers to the pool on a contingency basis. For example, if it's an Army operation, the escorts should be primarily Army officers. In the Panama deployment the three Washington-based escorts wore Air Force and Navy uniforms in what was an overwhelmingly Army operation.

Escorts should deploy in field uniforms or draw them from field commands soon after arriving. The Panama pool escorts wore uniforms befitting a day behind the desk at the Pentagon; this, I found, had a jarring effect on the Army people with whom it dealt.

14. The ASD-PA should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations—whether print, still photo, TV, or radio—to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry.

Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requesters should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time-honored pool practices.

15. There is merit in a suggestion by one of the pool photographers that participating news organizations share the cost of equipment such as a portable darkroom and a negative transmitter, which could be stored at Andrews AFB for ready access in a deployment. Other equipment essential for smooth transmission of pool products, such as satellite uplink gear, might also be acquired and stored in the same manner.

16. All pool-assigned reporters and photographers, not just bureau chiefs, should attend quarterly Pentagon sessions where problems can be discussed and rules and responsibilities understood.

17. Public Affairs Officers from Unified Commands should meet periodically with pool-assigned reporters and photographers with whom they might have to work in some future crisis.
APPENDIX 3: WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEFS PRINCIPLES

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

We believe these are the principles that should govern future arrangements for news coverage of the United States military in combat:

1. Independent reporting will be the principle means of coverage of US military operations.

2. The use of pools should be limited to the kind envisioned by the Sible Commission. Pools are meant to bring a representative group of journalists along with the first elements of any major US military operation. These pools should last no longer than the very first stages of a deployment—the initial 24 hours to 36 hours—and should be disbanded rapidly in favor of independent coverage. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering US forces.

3. Some pools may be appropriate for events or in places where open coverage is physically impossible. But the existence of such special-purpose pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage. If news organizations are able to cover pooled events independently, they may do so.

4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the US military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security guidelines that protect US forces and their operations. Violation of the guidelines can result in suspension of credentials or revocation of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone.

5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units.

6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

7. News material—words and pictures—will be not subject to prior military review.

8. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools. Field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible.

9. The military will supply PAOs with timely, secure, compatible transmission facilities for pool material and
will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available and will not be prevented from doing so. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations.

10. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DOD National Media Pool system.

/s/
Roone Arledge  
President  
ABC News

/s/
James K. Batten  
Chairman of the Board and  
Chief Executive Officer  
Knight-Ridder, Inc.

/s/
Louis D. Boccardi  
President and Chief  
Executive Officer  
The Associated Press

/s/
Max Frankel  
Executive Editor  
The New York Times

/s/
Peter S. Prichard  
Editor  
USA Today

/s/
Michael G. Gartner  
President  
NBC News

/s/
Katherine Graham  
Chairman of the Board  
The Washington Post Co.

/s/
Tom Johnson  
President  
CNN

/s/
Peter Kann  
Publisher and President  
The Wall Street Journal

/s/
David Laventhol  
Publisher  
The Los Angeles Times
Jason McManus  Donald Newhouse
Editor-in-Chief  President
Time Warner, Inc.  Star-Ledger

Eric Ober  Burl Osborne
President  Publisher and Editor
CBS News  The Dallas Morning News

Arnold Rosenfeld  Al Rossiter Jr.
Editor-in-Chief  Senior Vice President
Cox Newspapers  Executive Editor

Richard M. Smith
Editor-in-Chief and President
Newsweek Inc.
ENDNOTES

(NOTE: The manuscript form of the text, endnotes, and bibliography of this paper conform to the rules of the MLA (Modern Language Association of America) Style Sheet.)


4 Lewis, p. 17.


6 Lewis, p. 17.


8 Hoffman, p. 108.


10 Chiaventone, p. 68.


12 Gabriel, p. 7.


14 Halloran, p. 10.

15 Chiaventone, p. 72.

17 Gabriel, p. 27.


19 Lecture given by J. H. Thompson, Major General, Her Majesty's Royal Marines (Ret), The Army War College, 6 February 1992.

20 Chiaventone, p. 74.


22 Sidle, p. 5.


24 Hoffman, p. 96.


26 Kiernan, p. 28.

27 Letter from Charles Lewis to Assistant Secretary Williams, dated 13 March 1991. Copy given to this writer by Mr. Lewis on 8 November 1991.

28 Sidle, p.4.


30 Lewis, p.19.

31 Kiernan, p. 29.


34 Williams, p. 7.
35 Letter from Roone Arledge, p. 1.
36 Kiernan, p. 30.
37 Hoffman, p. 107.
38 Kiernan, p. 28
39 Kiernan, p. 29.
41 Letter from Charles Lewis, p. 2.
42 Williams, p. 6.
43 Letter from Roone Arledge, p. 10.
44 Chiaventone, p. 74.
45 Williams, p. 2.
46 Sidle, p. 1.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Mulvey, William, Colonel, US Army. Telephone Interview. 50


