A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE US CUSTOMS SERVICE/US COAST GUARD/DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN JOINT COUNTERNARCOTICS AIR INTERD ICTION

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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19 June 1992

Paper directed by Captain H.W. Clark, USN
Chairman, Department of Operations
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**DATE OF REPORT**
June 1992

**ABSTRACT**
This document examines Counternarcotics (CN) Air Interdiction (AI) coordination between the United States Customs Service (USCS), United States Coast Guard (USCG) and Department of Defense (DOD). USCS cooperation with the USCG and DOD has improved since the USCG and DOD became AI partners with Customs in 1987 and 1989 respectively. However, counterproductive CN agency practices continue, reducing AI effectiveness. Conclusions and recommendations spotlight the need to have one Operational Commander (OC), answerable to the Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) commonly known as the 'Drug Czar'. The OC would manage the actions of forces provided by the USCS, USCG and DOD. The OC would act as the the Drug Czar's chief of staff for Air Operations. The OC would have no ties to his/her parent or former agency. The paradigm to use as the alternative to present CN agency organization, is the DOD

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**SUBJECT TERMS**
Joint CounterNarcotics Air Interdiction; Customs, Coast Guard, DOD interagency coordination.
Abstract continued (Block 19):

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this document is to critically assess the effectiveness of joint counternarcotics (CN) Air Interdiction efforts of the coalition forces made up of the United States Customs Service (USCS) and the Armed Forces (AF). The AFs consist of the Department of Defense (DOD) and United States Coast Guard (USCG). Although numerous Air Interdiction (AI) narcotics seizures have occurred as a result of the determined commitment of the USCS, USCG and DOD, often these agencies have acted autonomously. Independent operations, agency reporting requirements and personality conflicts have caused interservice rivalry and antagonism, some duplication of effort, safety problems, and a general reduction in efficiency. My desire is to expose the need to repair a flawed organizational chain of command amongst the USCS, USCG and DOD participants in counternarcotics Air Interdiction.

In 1985, Senator Goldwater and Congressman Nichols envisioned the need for legislation reorganizing the war fighting authority of the military Commanders in Chief (CINCs). The mission was to greatly reduce interservice rivalry and better prepare our forces for war. Similar reorganization of the USCS, USCG and DOD should be considered in fighting the 'War on Drugs,' because similar chain of command obstacles exist.
The DOD will continue to be an active participant in counternarcotics operations into the next century, so why not learn from their organizational successes? The author does not intend to reformulate existing knowledge of the drug dilemma, nor give Vietnam-like 'body count' seizure figures to deceive readers to believe all is well. However, some historical review will be necessary to amplify reader understanding.

USCS/USCG/DOD Air Interdiction organization needs considerable reshaping to correct the often well-intended, yet confusing directions given to drug fighters. These confusing directions are a result of not having one Air Interdiction commander as the responsible authority. Other causes of disorder are independent and uncoordinated USCS Air Interdiction operations and USCS/USCG/DOD Air Interdiction standard operating procedures that are jointly agreed upon but often selectively ignored.

Admiral William F. 'Bull' Halsey's comments after the Battle of Leyte Gulf indicate that there are serious lessons to be learned when no central authority 'has the helm':

"Although our naval power in the Western Pacific was such that we could have challenged the combined fleets of the world, the fact that it was not coordinated under any single authority, was an invitation which disaster nearly accepted."¹ Today, in the drug war, the primary reason why 'turf battles' continue is the lack of ONE operational commander to DICTATE his desires to the USCS/USCG/DOD forces involved, thereby more
effectively managing resources to combat drug trafficking.

Scope

This document deals primarily with cocaine and marijuana smuggling via aircraft. Intelligence and actual seizure results indicate that these are the primary narcotics seized via Air Interdiction. The author is very familiar (four years of operational experience from 1987-91) with most aspects of the U.S. Eastern region Air Interdiction Arena (Caribbean Sea, Eastern Seaboard, Gulf of Mexico, Canadian Maritimes) and will focus on that area.
The objective of counternarcotics Air Interdiction is to deter potential drug smugglers from using aviation as a means of delivering their poison. "In fiscal year (FY) 1990, there was a decrease in the amount of cocaine seized in the United States. The decline is attributed to effective multi-national enforcement efforts which prevented, in part, multi-ton quantities of cocaine from reaching the United States. Marijuana remained the most commonly used illicit drug in the United States in 1990. Mexico accounted for most of the marijuana consumed in the United States in 1990."¹

Source countries that are the primary contraband suppliers are located in Central and South America. They export and/or tranship cocaine and marijuana to the United States. Cocaine producers are Peru, Bolivia and Columbia. The major marijuana producers in the Eastern Region are Jamaica, Mexico, Belize (formerly British Honduras) and Columbia.

Peru and Bolivia, the greatest producers of raw coca leaf in the world, are economic disaster areas for their citizens. Only the criminal element succeeds. "The drug lords call Uchiza, Peru in the Huallaga Valley the 'gateway to heaven'. Having bought off or fought off all potential threats, traffickers are now running more than 30 flights a month to
Columbia from Uchiza's tiny airstrip. During the dry season, there can be as many as seven cocaine laden flights per day. The traffickers are virtually untouchable largely because they pay as much as $15,000.00 per flight in protection money."

The primary methods of air narcotics delivery/transhipment in the Atlantic and Caribbean theater is either by 'air-drop' to waiting 'fast-boats' or aircraft landings at delivery destinations. These air-drops occur off Puerto Rico, the U.S. and British Virgin Islands, Lesser Antilles, Hispaniola and within the Bahamas. Smugglers typically fly twin engine turbo propeller aircraft, having speeds up to 300 knots and ranges up to 2,000 nautical miles. Intelligence indicates that few smuggler aircraft deliveries from source countries continue to occur in South Florida. The number is declining due to enhanced law enforcement in the area and effective detection systems.

In the Pacific Ocean, the air threat is smuggler aircraft originating from Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador destined for Central America where it can be transhipped to the U.S. via human courier, maritime vessels or other aircraft. "Seventy percent of the cocaine used in the United States, produced in Columbia, comes through Mexico." USCIS, the Border Patrol and U.S. Forces Command (FORCOCOM) have the responsibility of attempting to seal the Mexican border with Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California.
Some believe there is a sincere lack of commitment by the US Government to combat narcotics abuse other than by throwing money at the drug supply problem. Others argue that the majority of government funds should be applied towards demand reduction. Funds devoted to counternarcotics from the Department of Defense for example, are used almost exclusively for supply reduction. "Assistance from the Armed Forces increased from 300 million in FY 89, 1.08 billion in FY 91 and is expected to be 1.16 billion for FY 92."

Verbal commitments to defeat the scourge of drugs have come from the top US leadership. President Reagan stated, in National Security Directive #221, that the threat to our economy and way of life created by US citizen narcotics abuse is a greater hazard than terrorism. Only war against a major power is a greater threat to our own national security. President Bush declared 'War on Drugs' during his address to the nation in the fall of 1989. He reminded viewers that drugs could be bought anywhere in the U.S.A. and that no one was immune from the havoc they create. To make the point, the President then displayed 'crack cocaine' seized the day before, across the street from the White House.

Senior government drug control managers continue to reaffirm President Bush's 'War on Drugs' position. Gary Crosby, CAPT USCG (Ret.), the Director, Office of Domestic
Supply Reduction of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) stated in a January 1992 address to the Naval War College that, "perhaps calling it a 'Drug Crusade' would be a better term, but in fact it is a war. In Peru, 957 have been killed or wounded, with 420 assassinations, paying the price in blood." The threat continues and will remain into the next century. The crisis will persist as long as there are people who are in emotional despair, needing to escape reality or who covet quick, yet dangerous profits.

**DOD Reorganization Successes**

**1986 Goldwater/Nichols Defense Reorganization Act**

The DOD has become a dedicated participant in the counternarcotics arena. Prior to detailing their involvement, I believe it is important to discuss how the DOD applied changes to its unified CINC organizational structure that could be employed in the 'Drug War'. Department of Defense organization allows the unified CINC to report directly to the National Command Authority (NCA), on strategic/operational matters. The NCA is the President of the United States and Secretary of Defense. This has resulted in noteworthy regional combat successes. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is not officially in the chain of command. He does remain however, the President's chief military advisor.

Congress mandated the need to have one warfighting CINC
for a specific global area, independent of the Service Chiefs' (JCS) warfighting demands. The Pentagon had been hesitant to agree to any balance of power shift that limited the warfighting authority of the proud Service Chiefs. A powerful member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and an influential Congressman were intent to get their way.

In 1985, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) and Congressman William Nichols (D-Alabama) saw the need to sponsor legislation that consequently became the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols/Defense Reorganization Act. The act reorganized the Pentagon to reduce interservice rivalry and better prepare the US military for war. Goldwater said in a Senate address on joint military organization, "you will hear over and over again the old maxim, if it ain't broke don't fix it. Well I say to my colleagues, it is broke and we need to fix it." The failure of the Desert-One Iran hostage rescue operation in 1980, and problems encountered during the 1983 Marine Corps deployment to Lebanon and Grenada humanitarian recovery, were used as examples of why the system had to change.

"The Defense Reorganization Act (DRA) of 1986 stripped war-fighting power from the heads of the military services. No longer could the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force dictate how their services' assets would be used. Instead, a single commander in the field would have control of..."
all of the services' forces. The act established a short and simple chain of command: from the President, to the Secretary of Defense to the field commander.  

Recent examples where a CINC commanded forces and benefitted from changes caused by Goldwater/Nichols, resulting in military triumph, occurred in Panama (General THURMAN, US Southern Command (US SOUTHCOM) 1989) and Kuwait/Iraq (General SWHWARZKOPF, US Central Command (USCENTCOM 1991).

Much of the same logic that was applied to create a remodeled DOD unified command structure, fortified by Goldwater/Nichols, can be employed to repair the often disjointed USCS, USCG and DOD AI organization, procedures and methods.
CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATION

The United States Customs Service was the first federal agency to undertake an Air Interdiction role in the early 1970s. From facilities at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, they used both fixed wing (Citation C550/Customs High Endurance Tracker - CHET) and rotary wing (Blackhawk UH60) aircraft to intercept smugglers attempting to make landings in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas. They also used deployable radar systems and organized a Command Center called C3. C3 was located at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Miami, FL Air Route Traffic Control Center. It was networked with feeds from the FAA/DOD Joint Surveillance System (JSS) radars to detect air smugglers. The USCS became very proficient as the primary specialist in the Air Interdiction field.

When the U.S. Coast Guard under the direction of Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Paul YOST, volunteered to assist the Customs Service in the mid 1980s, numerous assets were offered in support of US Customs. They included personnel to man the newly formed Coast Guard Pre-Commissioning detachment Command Control Communications and Intelligence (C3I) East, Miami. Also included were two USCG E2Cs on loan from the US Navy and nine USCG HM25A (non-radar) interceptors being outfitted with USAF F-16 (APG-66) radars.
The nine HU25A aircraft were based in Miami, FL(5) and Mobile, AL(4), with the E2Cs based at Norfolk VA.

In early 1989, Congress mandated that the Department of Defense become the lead agency for detection and monitoring of air and surface smugglers. For the Eastern Region, DOD Commander Joint Task Force Four (CJTF4) was formed in Key West, FL under the Direction of US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM). Assets CJTF4 directed, given its dual air and maritime interdiction role, were DOD ships, aircraft, mobile radars and intelligence platforms.

The USCS was not very receptive to either the USCG in 1987, nor DOD in 1989, joining them as equal partners in Air Interdiction. Prior to 1989, DOD Air Interdiction assistance had been in a support role only. An example of this support, was the Air Force allowing USCS radar scope operators aboard Airborne Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft while on AWACS training flights. The objective was to detect and monitor low flying/non-transponder suspect aircraft in international airspace.

The aviation arm of USCS by now had a large infrastructure with major air branches in Miami, FL, Jacksonville, FL, Houston, TX, Corpus Christi, TX, New Orleans, LA, along the southwest border and in Southern California. Smaller USCS air units or detachments were located in New York, NY, Tampa, FL, Pensacola, FL and Guantanamo Bay, CU.

At a USCS/USCG A1 familiarization meeting the author
attended in May 1987, comments were made by senior USCS AI managers about the Coast Guard. They said that USCG commissioned officer pilots and enlisted (E7-E5) ground radarmen did not have, nor would they ever have, the expertise or skill to participate in Air Interdiction operations. It was USCS's position that Coast Guard radarmen (USCG enlisted rating RD) did not have the expertise as DOD air traffic controllers that the USCS Detection System Radar Specialists (DSSs') possessed. The majority of USCS DSSs had previously been DOD personnel. Arguments were also made that the primary Coast Guard interceptor (HU25A Falcon) jet could not fly slow enough to covertly follow smugglers.

By mid-1988, both Coast Guard interceptor aircraft and personnel had fully and successfully integrated with the US Customs Service in Air Interdiction operations in the Eastern Region. However, USCS personnel continued to be ambivalent in allowing Coast Guardsmen to participate or ever take any lead role in most aspects of Air Interdiction operations. They were also wary of using USCG HU25C jets to intercept targets. For example, the Joint USCS/USCG C3 Command Center would launch a USCG HU25C jet to follow a target. At the same time, a USCS Air Branch supervisor at a nearby airfield would independently launch his interceptor on the same target without the command center's immediate knowledge and consent.

The significance of Customs' position is that often bureaucracies become too powerful with an entrenched
management philosophy, indifferent to the need to operate jointly. The bureaucracy closely guards its turf, becoming difficult to check. This is especially evident when a structured Armed Force is attempting to mesh with a civilian agency, and both are not working for the same operational superior. "If US Customs is not fighting with the US Coast Guard, it is fighting with the Justice Department, which is sparring with the State Department. Drugs may sap the life out of parts of the country, but the anti-drug effort has been a boon for those leading it. Bureaucratic empires have grown, congressional careers have blossomed - while drugs hit the streets faster and cheaper each day."

"Why doesn't Congress do something about all these destructive turf wars? That is like asking Jorge Ochoa of the Medellin, Colombia cartel to just say no. It is not in their interest. For every agency there is a congressional subcommittee whose power rises and falls along with it. Some eighty congressional panels now claim oversight."\(^1\)

DOD counternarcotics organizations, primarily Commander Joint Task Force Four (CJTF4), Key West that emerged in early 1989, would later appreciate these same frustrations.


The United States military has a well-recorded history of involvement in civilian law enforcement. "Prior to 1878 in the
U.S., the military had been used as a 'posse comitatus' to enforce civilian laws. Such use of military force was restricted in 1879 by Congress as the result of the alleged misuse of military forces during the Presidential election of 1877."³

"The fiscal year 1989 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA 89) gave the Department of Defense broader responsibilities in the conduct of counternarcotics operations. First, the department was assigned responsibility as the lead agency of the federal government for the detection and monitoring of illegal drugs transiting into the United States. This encompassed both aerial and maritime movement. Second, the department was tasked with integrating the command, control, communications and technical intelligence capabilities of the various United States agencies participating in the interdiction of illegal drugs."⁴ This was a mission with high visibility in the media and an elevated priority at the Pentagon because of heightened public opinion and a waning Warsaw Pact threat. "Until the execution of Operation Desert Shield requirements (pre-Aug 1990), the percentage of USAF airborne warning and control system (AWACS-E3) flying hours dedicated to counternarcotics had grown from thirty-eight percent of total AWACS flying hours, to a high at one point during the year of fifty-one percent of total AWACS flying hours worldwide."⁵ Since the war with Iraq has ceased, the level of attention at the Pentagon given to drug
operations has returned to its previous heights.

**Interagency Coordination**

It was my observation while at C3I East Miami for four years that coordination between civilian agencies and the Armed Forces had improved since 1987. Command and control problems continued however, often because of dissimilar civil/military levels of accountability, inherent civilian agency desires not to change prior practices and personality clashes.

Presently, the Customs Service, Coast Guard, and Department of Defense report to separate headquarters in the Eastern region on Air Interdiction operational matters. These agencies do not receive guidance from a single centralized source. The Customs Service Director of Air Operations East (AOCE) Miami and the Customs Director of Command Control Communications and Intelligence Center East (C3IE) Miami both report to the Customs National Aviation Center (CNAC), Oklahoma City. The Commanding Officer Coast Guard Unit C3I East Miami (CAPT) is presently C3IE Deputy Director until 01 July 1993, when he will assume directorship until 1995. Rotation will continue every two years between USCS and USCJ.

The current Coast Guard Deputy Director reports to the Customs Director (C3IE), but must also answer to the Coast Guard Atlantic Commander, New York. DOD Commander Joint Task
Force Four, Key West, (RADM) answers to the US Atlantic Commander Norfolk, VA.

"In May of 1990, the Coast Guard's senior flag officer responsible for Law Enforcement and Defense operations commented on the lack of coordination in the 'Drug War'. Rear Admiral Leland did not think coordination was very good. He said that was probably the fundamental problem that we had to solve operationally. The links between the vast array of DOD detectors and monitors, the Command Control Communication and Intelligence Centers (C3I), and the apprehenders, seizers, and arresters were not smoothed out yet. RADM Leland likened the relationship to a new marriage in which the couple must combine households, and sell all duplicate items, except children. It's the children we are arguing over."6

A Government Accounting Office (GAO) report issued in June 1991 titled 'Drug Control, Status Report on DOD Support to Counternarcotics Activities' was revealing. It identified that, "the DOD was constrained in its ability to lead, because of its handicap of having no authority over civilian agencies. The report praised the Pentagon's commitment of resources to the anti-drug effort. The report said, however, that as the lead agency in stopping smugglers, DOD had failed to fully integrate its activities with such agencies as the Customs Service and Coast Guard. Part of the problem is a question of authority. It has been the Defense Department's conclusion that it does not have the necessary authority to issue orders.
to civilian agencies. In one example of failing to make the most of available forces, the report said that the military has resorted to what it calls 'de-conflicting', or simply making sure that military and civilian planes do not conduct patrols over the same territory. The justification was the military was unable to come up with joint operating plans for the heavy drug air traffic in the Caribbean."

The problem with obtaining joint interagency standard operating plans/procedures (SOPs), is there are too many USCS/USCG and DOD AI supervisors that need to agree on the final SOP drafts. The time delays and posturing that ensue, often border on the ridiculous. This assumes that unanimity is ever reached. Having one sanctioned AI leader that the USCS, USCG and DOD would be accountable to, could rectify this.

The issue of redundant Air Interdiction patrols in the same airspace, as noted above, must be resolved for safety, and economy of force reasons. This could be remedied if one central controlling authority was directing where ALL civilian law enforcement and Armed Forces AI patrols would occur. This would improve safety, by reducing the chances of mid-air collisions and would release aircraft to patrol greater geographic areas.

In addition, separate USCS, USCG and DOD Air Interdiction planning and intelligence staffs answer to autonomous supervisors. Although the staffs try to keep each other advised through the AI Joint Planning Group (JPG) and AI Joint
Intelligence Meeting (JIM) timetables, they do not always do so. Independent USCS air operations have been implemented outside the JPG/JIM process, neutralizing the blueprint of joint planning. Having one dedicated executive over the USCS, USCG and DOD to ensure that this practice would not be tolerated, could correct this situation.

There is of course the contrary argument that the Department of Defense should not be involved in counternarcotics. The contention is that DOD is not particularly knowledgeable of law enforcement agency doctrine or practices. "The dispute is about more than just turf: it is a question of basic doctrine. Is the 'War on Drugs' really a war in anything more than a metaphorical sense?, or is it a matter of police work for which the military is fundamentally ill suited?" My response is civilian law enforcement agencies need the tested leadership, technical support and wealth of resources that DOD has available.

Governor Robert Martinez, the ONDCP Director, reinforces the notion that the Armed Forces should be involved in counternarcotics by saying in Jan 1992 that, "the majority of US efforts against the 'War on Drugs' involve prevention, treatment and criminal justice programs, not military participation. But the important gains made through our military's efforts should not be underestimated. I am confident that progress will continue in the future."
Desert Storm/Desert Shield Success

Our recent military victory in the Gulf demonstrated the value of having one joint coalition wartime commander, namely Gen. Schwartzkopf, in charge. The same rationality should apply to the Joint Low Intensity Coalition Conflict (JLLIC - my Acronym), commonly known as the 'Drug War'. Much of the success of Desert Shield/Desert Storm was a direct result of the 1986 National Defense Organization Act. "Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the clarity of the operational chain of command and the powers that the wartime Commander in Chief has at his disposal. Retired Air Force General Robert W. Herres, who served as the first Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says that in the past, there were never enough teeth in the operational chain of command." "General Bernard Rodgers had a problem in 1986 as NATO Supreme Allied Commander and chief of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). He had such a difficult time keeping the service chiefs out of his back pocket during the 1986 Libya bombing operations, that he had to put out a gag order prohibiting his staff from having any contact with Washington without his instruction." Retired Marine Corps General George B. Crist, the officer who preceded General Schwartzkopf as commander of USCENTCOM said, "Goldwater-Nichols made the big, big difference in Schwartzkopf's ability to operate." 

Presently, the USCS, USCG and DOD Eastern region Air
Interdiction tactical commanders have their own quasi-drug service chiefs to answer to. The Customs, Coast Guard and Department of Defense commanders report on major operational matters to bosses in Oklahoma City, OK, New York, NY, and Norfolk, VA, respectively. This is exactly what Goldwater-Nichols intended to abolish.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS

Primary:

The President has made a declaration of 'War on Drugs' that I agree with. If the nation is serious about attacking the drug supply problem, all government agencies involved in the fight need to be better organized. Presently, the US military is an active CN participant with civilian law enforcement agencies, and the practice should continue. The organizational paradigm for CN agencies to heed is the DOD unified CINC structure, that was enriched by Goldwater/Nichols.

Numerous civilian and military assets and personnel are absorbed in the drug fray, with confusion often prevailing. There needs to be one operational leader to reign in those agencies that do not want to jointly participate. In simplistic terms, having ONE Air Interdiction boss is preferable to THREE AI diplomatic negotiators trying to set policy and procedures.

There should be one counternarcotics Operational Commander (OC), with the authority of a CINC who answers to the Drug Czar. The present system of separate agency operational commanders is counterproductive. The unified CINC/Goldwater-Nichols process works for DOD and the same principle could be applied towards counternarcotics reorganization.

It is preferable that the counternarcotics Operational
Commander be an Armed Forces flag officer. This officer tends to be very experienced in managing complicated joint operations involving various agencies. He/She should have the absolute power to remove any uncooperative military or civil service Air Interdiction managers from USCS/USCG/DOD. Too often, present CN operations are conducted on an ad hoc 'management by committee' basis, where parochial interests affect the outcome.

Mr. Gary Crosby, Director, Office of Domestic Supply Reduction, ONDCP, was impressed with DOD's performance during Operation Desert Storm where USCENTCOM was in charge of the entire operation. Counter to that, he stated that there are four CINC's involved in U.S. counternarcotics (FORCECOM, USLANTCOM, USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM), the U.S. Coast Guard, as well as U.S. Customs Service with their own private air force. He mentioned that MAYBE this is the way to fight the problem.

I contend it is certainly not.

Secondary:

Mr. Crosby also stated that he knew of no current plan to allow the Department of Defense to control the operations of civilian agency law enforcement aircraft.

I assert that this may be an alternative to appraise, especially for civilian law enforcement aircraft on AI missions in international airspace.
CHAPTER V
RECOMMENDATIONS

The Operational Commander (OC), preferably an Armed Forces flag officer, should have the authority of a military Commander in Chief, reporting directly to the Drug Czar (currently former Florida Governor Robert Martinez) on strategic and operational matters. He would be the Drug Czar's air operations chief of staff.

I realize that making the operational commander an active duty Armed Forces officer may not be palatable to civilian agencies. My recommendation would be to name a retired senior flag officer as the operational commander/administrator to work directly for the Drug Czar. This retiree would therefore be a civilian, having experience in joint counternarcotics procedures. He/She would be totally detached from the Armed Force they used to represent.

The OC would have an experienced CN air operations staff made up of; Director USCS Air Operations Center East, Miami, Director/Deputy Director C3I East, Miami and Commander Joint Task Force Four, Key West. These units would form the Eastern Region troika reporting to the OC. The Customs National Aviation Center, Coast Guard Atlantic Area Commander and USCINCLANT would be removed from the operational chain of command.
Chapter I

1. Naval War College, Planning and Decision Making Syllabus, p.200

Chapter II


6. Ibid.


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Chapter IV

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