MOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY'S INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE: 
A CRITICAL REVIEW

BY

COLONEL PETER R. O'CONNOR 
United States Army

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USAWC CLASS OF 1992

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

92-12836
**1. TITLE (Include Security Classification)**

Mobilization of the Army's Individual Ready Reserve: A Critical Review

**2. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)**

COL Peter R. O'Connor

**3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT**

Approved for public release

distribution unlimited

**4. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION**

UNCLASSIFIED

**5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)**

**6. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION**

USAMC

**7. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)**

Carlisle, PA 17013

**8. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION**

**9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER**

**10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS**

**12. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)**

30 March 1992

**14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)**

30 March 1992

**15. PAGE COUNT**

52

**16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION**

**18. SUBJECT TERMS**

Mobilization, IRR, RT-12, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, readiness, training

**19. ABSTRACT**

(Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

**20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT**

☑ UNCLASSIFIED / UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS

**21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION**

UNCLASSIFIED / UNLIMITED

**22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL**

Douglas V. Johnson II, LTC, U.S. Army 717-245-3010

**22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)**

AWCT

**22c. OFFICE SYMBOL**

AWCT
Operation Desert Storm prompted the largest mobilization of Reserve Component forces since World War II. Several Executive Orders were signed by the President to mobilize the Ready Reserve, but the most significant was Executive Order 12743 signed on 18 January 1991 to execute plans for Partial Mobilization. This authority permits the activation of 1 million National Guardsmen and Reservists for two years. Pursuant to this Executive Order, the Department of the Army authorized the activation of 20,277 soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Because the IRR is our most experienced and rapidly deployable manpower source of individual replacements, their activation deserves a critical review with the clarity of hindsight. This paper will examine historical precedent for the IRR; their composition and management; an operational analysis of this mobilization; the adequacy of Mobilization Station force structure; and the mobilization plans executed for Desert Shield/Storm. It will propose changes needed if the U.S. Army is to be better prepared to rapidly mobilize the IRR the next time.
Mobilization of the Army's Individual Ready Reserve: A Critical Review

An Individual Study Project

by

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Peter R. O'Connor, Colonel, U.S. Army

TITLE: Mobilization of the Army's Individual Ready Reserve: A Critical Review

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 15 April 1992 PAGES: 52 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope and Methodology</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Overview</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRR FORCE FOR DESERT STORM:</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The RT-12s</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization Asset Transfer Program</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Ready RT-12s&quot;</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANAGEMENT OF THE IRR TODAY:</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRR Personnel Management</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRR Muster</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOBILIZATION OF THE IRR:</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mobilization Order</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morale of the IRR</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yield Rates</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployability Rates</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposals for Improvement</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOBILIZATION STATION FORCE STRUCTURE</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine and Resources</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Structure in Desert Shield/Storm</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposals for Change</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOBILIZATION PLANS, POLICIES AND LAWS</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of Mobilization</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution of Mobilization Plans in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Shield/Storm</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons Not Well Learned in Previous Mobilizations</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESSONS LEARNED IN DESERT SHIELD/STORM</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX I</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: ORIGINS OF THE IRR</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Revitalization Act</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX II</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESERT STORM MOBILIZATION ORDER</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX III</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRR MOBILIZATION ACTION PLAN FOR DESERT SHIELD/STORM LESSONS LEARNED</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDMOTES</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERSONAL FOR:

GEN Burba, CDR FORSCOM
GEN FOSS, CDR TRADOC
CDRS of all IRR Mobilization Stations

SUBJECT: Individual Ready Reserves (IRR)

We are activating 20,000 Individual Ready Reservists, with more to follow. This call up is unprecedented, but necessary to augment and maintain our force in Operation Desert Storm. Our Reservists bring with them a wealth of military experience. They are not new recruits. Our training should take advantage of their knowledge and experience while reinstilling our standards of quality. Likewise the standards of reception and training we provide the soldiers must be equally high. This is a new chapter in our Army’s history from which we can learn for the future. Please take good notes and provide input for lessons learned.

GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, U.S. Army
Vice Chief of Staff
HQDA Message 040300Z FEB 91
INTRODUCTION

Background

Operation Desert Storm prompted the largest mobilization of Reserve Component forces since World War II. Over 228,000 Army and Air National Guardsmen and Reservists from all Services were brought on active duty, and approximately 106,000 served in the Kuwait Theater of Operations.¹

Several Executive Orders were signed by the President to mobilize the Ready Reserve. Executive Order 12727 dated 22 August 1990 implemented for the first time the Title 10, USC 673b authority to order the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces to active duty. This Order gave the Department of Defense (DOD) authority to activate up to 200,000 Selected Reservists for a period not to exceed 90 days, with authority to extend the call-up an additional 90 days. In response to this Executive Order, the Army was authorized an initial call-up of 25,000 Army Reservists. The actual number activated was 24,734, representing 54 USAR units.² This particular Title 10 authority allows only activation of units; soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve were activated by a subsequent Executive Order.

On 14 November 1990, DOD increased the Army authority to activate up to 80,000 soldiers in both Reserve and Guard units and on 1 December 1990, the authority increased again to 115,000.³

On 18 January 1991, the President signed Executive Order 12743 following a Congressional declaration of Partial Mobilization. The authority for this Order is Title 10, USC 673a,
and it extends the DOD 200,000-man limit to 1,000,000 and extends
the activation period from 180 days to two years. This second
Executive Order increased the Army's total call-up authority to
220,000 Army Reservists and National Guardsmen. For the first
time, 20,277 soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) were
called to active duty.

Purpose

This paper will examine the mobilization of the IRR to
support Operation Desert Storm. With the clarity of hindsight, it
will examine historical precedent; the composition and management
of today's IRR; an operational analysis of this mobilization;
the adequacy of force structure to support the mission of Mobili-
zation Stations; and the mobilization plans that were executed.

This paper will propose essential changes that are necessary
for the U.S. Army to be better prepared for the next mobilization
of the IRR. With the significant 30 percent reduction in Active
Component forces programed through Fiscal Year 1995, the prospect
for subsequent mobilizations of the IRR has never been greater.

The ultimate purpose of this paper is to motivate today's
mobilization planners and policy makers to proceed beyond merely
capturing lessons learned. The military history of past mobili-
zations is replete with lessons learned then, and learned again in
mobilizations that followed. The Total Force is certainly no
longer a concept; it is imperative that action be taken to improve
the reliability and efficiency of IRR mobilization.
Scope and Methodology

In his 1982 Report to President on the Status and Prospects of the All Volunteer Force, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger stated emphatically, "The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is the most important source of pre-trained manpower for an emergency." He concluded that the IRR are so vital because they rapidly bring Active Component and Selected Reserve units to full strength. Moreover, the IRR are also casualty replacements during the first few months of combat. Because of their importance to national defense and the unique personnel management challenge the IRR presents, the scope of this paper is limited to their issues.

The methodology for this paper includes historical research, interviews with senior mobilization planners and operators, and revealing after action reports from Department of Defense and Department of the Army. The mobilization of the IRR will be examined from the Pentagon policy maker's macro view and from the on-the-ground micro view of mobilization managers at Fort Benning, one of the Army's busiest Mobilization Stations during the Gulf conflict.

Historical Overview

The IRR mobilized for Desert Storm have their roots in the Regular Army Reserve of 1916. It was composed then of former Regular Army enlisted men who volunteered to serve, on call, for a period of three years beyond their initial four-year active duty enlistment. A force of 8,355 Regular Army Reservists was mobilized for deployment to Europe in World War I.
On 7 December 1941, the United States entered World War II. Total mobilization of U.S. forces occurred and 28,099 members of the Regular Army Reserve were ordered to active duty.\textsuperscript{9} The Korean Conflict saw many of these same Reservists recalled again.

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 changed the name of the Regular Army Reserve to the Ready Reserve Manpower Reinforcement Pool. A partial mobilization of 15,234 of these pretrained Reservists occurred on 1 August 1961 for the Berlin Crisis.\textsuperscript{10}

The 1968 Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Revitalization Act designated today's Individual Ready Reserve for soldiers serving out the remainder of their eight-year military service obligation, having already fulfilled an enlistment contract on active duty or in a National Guard or Reserve Troop Program Unit.\textsuperscript{11} A total of 2,752 IRRs were activated during the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{12}

From World War I to Vietnam, experienced soldiers from the Regular Army Reserve, the Ready Reserve Manpower Reinforcement Pool, and the Individual Ready Reserve answered the call to return to active duty in time of crisis. The soldiers in today's IRR continued this proud tradition in Operation Desert Storm.

See Appendix I for a more thorough discussion of historical perspectives on the IRR.

THE IRR FORCE FOR DESERT STORM

The RT-12s

The active duty report date for 20,277 IRRs mobilized for Desert Storm was 31 January 1991. From that population, 17,306 reported to the Mobilization Stations indicated in their
activation orders. \(^{13}\) (This yield or show rate of 85 percent will be discussed in detail in a later section of this paper.) The total IRR forces available for recall that day were 317,370. \(^{14}\)

These 20,277 IRRs were identified for activation because they were categorized as RT-12s. An RT-12 is an IRR recently trained on active duty or in a Reserve Component Troop Program Unit within the past 12 months. This is the highest priority of IRR for activation because their soldiering skills are still considered current and, therefore, they are considered to be readily deployable.

The 17,306 IRRs who reported for mobilization were pretrained on active duty in 160 Military Occupational Specialties. The largest Career Management Fields were Infantry (3,869), Mechanical Maintenance (2,701), Field Artillery (1,991), Medical (1,676), Supply and Services (1,497) and Transportation (1,007). \(^{15}\) A further demographic review indicates the following characteristics of the IRR who were mobilized: \(^{16}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IRR Characteristics</th>
<th>Percent of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ages 18 to 24</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ages 25 to 30</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade E4 and below</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending college</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported drop in income due to mobilization</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mobilization Asset Transfer Program**

Entry criteria into the IRR has not changed since the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Revitalization Act was passed in 1968.
Once a soldier enlists in the Regular Army, Army Reserve or Army National Guard, he or she incurs an eight-year military service obligation. Of the 17,306 IRR mobilized for Desert Storm, 80 percent were former Regular Army soldiers completing their military service obligation in the IRR and 20 percent were Guardsmen and Reservists no longer assigned to a Troop Program Unit in the Selected Reserve.

Not all soldiers satisfactorily complete their enlistment in the Regular Army or Selected Reserve before they are transferred into the IRR. Commanders may initiate such a transfer action for soldiers who fail to meet weight standards, are pregnant, cannot manage parenthood, are unsatisfactory performers, or fail to attend Guard or Reserve unit drills, to name a few. Until recently, this was called the Transfer in Lieu of Discharge Program (TLDP). The Army implemented the TLDP in 1978 based on Congressional urgings to increase the strength of the IRR.17

Soldiers transferred in lieu of discharge comprise approximately 30 percent of the IRR. This program primarily transfers personnel to the IRR who have been judged unsuitable for active duty. "The TLDP has a negative connotation," states U.S. Representative G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery, "but the reality is that a high percentage of the personnel in this program would probably be deployable in productive slots during full mobilization."18

To help counter this negative connotation, the Army recently changed the name of the Transfer in Lieu of Discharge Program to the Mobilization Asset Transfer Program (MATP). The name may have changed, but results are the same: soldiers unsuitable for active
duty or continued assignment in a Troop Program Unit are transferred into our highest priority source of individual replacements in time of national crisis. This paradox demands further analysis.

The stated purpose of the MATP "is to retain in the IRR all soldiers who have some potential for useful service under considerations of full mobilization." Only those soldiers with no potential to meet full mobilization requirements will be discharged. Soldiers separated because of alcohol or drug abuse, misconduct, homosexuality, or with an other than honorable discharge will not be transferred to the IRR.

This exclusion policy may keep undesirable social misfits out of the IRR, but the quality and rapid deployability of many transferred into the IRR is still questionable. For example, of 4,013 Active Component transfers to the IRR in October 1991, 1,073 or 27 percent were Mobilization Asset Transfers for the following reasons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Entry Level Performance (for new soldiers with less than 180 days on active duty who are usually immature and who fail to adapt to the military environment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Expeditious Discharge Program (for soldiers with more than 180 days on active duty who fail to complete their first enlistment for patterns of poor performance, immaturity, minor misconduct and demonstrated unsuitability for military service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>Physical disqualification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Parenthood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>Hardship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Number | Reason
--- | ---
44 | Dependency
127 | Pregnancy
475 | Secretarial Authority (a variety of miscellaneous separations determined to be in the best interests of the Army)
1,073 | Total

Army Regulations governing the MATP make it mandatory to transfer these soldiers into the IRR. Soldiers so separated within the past 12 months are considered RT-12s; the most recallable and deployable IRRs in the population.

"Ready RT-12s"

The whole concept of the MATP is built on the outdated premise of Full Mobilization, and a purely quantitative approach to manning the force. During a global crisis requiring Full Mobilization, all Guard and Reserve units in the force structure would activate along with all individual Reservists and retired military personnel still subject to recall. Of course, in this scenario, the quality of the IRR force would be an insignificant issue.

The potential confrontations facing the United States today are no longer global; they are regional like Desert Storm and limited mobilizations short of Full Mobilization will be the more appropriate response. The policies regarding the composition of the IRR need to change with the times.

Soldiers unsuitable for active duty should continue to be transferred into the IRR to fulfill their military service obligation; but, they should not be assigned priority RT-12 status based
simply on their separation date. Only those soldiers who successfully complete their full enlistment in the Regular Army or who disaffiliate with honor from their Troop Program Unit should be considered suitable to become RT-12s.

On 31 January 1991, the IRR population could have supported this change in RT-12 policy. The 20,277 RT-12s activated represented only 51 percent of the RT-12s in the population. The exclusion of Mobilization Asset Transfers could have been offset by a corresponding number of higher quality IRRs who met the more demanding criteria for RT-12 status. This exclusion policy would reduce the total RT-12 force by 25-30 percent; but, the maturity and reliability of RT-12s to be gained is a significant offset.

This highly select population of RT-12s will be referred to as "Ready RT-12s" in the following sections of this paper.

MANAGEMENT OF THE IRR TODAY

IRR Personnel Management

On 31 January 1991, the total strength of the IRR was 317,370. One year later in January 1992, the IRR strength had grown to over 380,000; 312,000 enlisted personnel and 58,000 officers—a reflection of the post-Gulf war reductions in Active Component force structure. With military service obligations in the IRR beginning and ending continuously, five to seven thousand soldiers enter and exit the IRR each month.

This unique personnel management challenge is the responsibility of Career Managers assigned to the U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) in St. Louis, Missouri. Based on the
significant IRR strength and ARPERCEN's limited authorization for Career Managers, each is responsible for the personnel management of an average of 3,500 IRRs. Depending on specific Military Occupational Specialties, ratios range from 1:6,500 for high density Combat Arms IRRs to 1:1,200 for lower density Military Intelligence Specialists. 25

The personnel management of the IRR is a high volume process focused on promotions, skill training, professional development schooling, reenlistment career counselling, and a variety of information exchanges to keep personnel files current. One study estimated that ARPERCEN can effectively manage only 20 percent of the enlisted IRR because of budget and personnel constraints. Those members who receive effective management do so primarily because of the personal interest of the members. 26

Personnel management of the IRR has been a continuing concern. In 1982, the Report to the President on the Status and Prospects of the All Volunteer Force concluded that it was possible to raise the yield or show rate for mobilized IRRs through improved management of IRR members. 27 A graphic example of the need to do so comes from Operation Desert Storm: of the 20,277 IRRs recalled to active duty, approximately 1,400 failed to receive their initial mailgram orders due to address errors. 28 A 7 percent address error rate for today's total IRR population of 380,000 would be a sizeable force of 26,600 who would fail to receive their time-urgent call to active duty. The reliability of the IRR in times of national emergency is directly affected by the quality of personnel management this force receives.
Today, the personnel management of the IRR is accomplished without regard to priority for recall to active duty. The Full Mobilization mind-set is evident here. The Ready RT-12 force should receive top priority for individualized personnel management. Their training, professional development, and personnel files should receive priority commensurate with their priority for mobilization. How well the IRR is managed contributes directly to their readiness. More intensive management efforts are fundamental if the IRR is to make significant progress achieving status as a viable manpower pool; one capable of filling deploying units with trained personnel and providing casualty replacements on short notice.29

Providing more intensive personnel management to a narrowed population of Ready RT-12s is not enough to assure the deployable state this rapidly recallable force requires. Lessons learned from the Korean War indicate the Army ran into delays getting the Reserves and volunteers deployed because the men had not been screened prior to the outbreak of hostilities.30 Minimal progress has been made since 1951.

During Desert Shield/Storm, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center through the agency of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, served as the Army's central repository for after action reports. The following observations concerning RT-12s were recorded:

We recalled RT-12s without screening their personnel records. The lack of personnel records screening (automated or manual) created a situation of recalling/mobilizing individuals that did not meet Army standards. The Mobilization Asset Transfer Program,
for example, contains personnel who are untrained, or otherwise unsuitable for military service. These personnel are erroneously considered mobilization assets and are counted in the IRR end strength. Activating these personnel without screening their records, and discharging them within a few days, cost the government thousands of dollars in travel expenses, active duty pay and allowances, and administrative costs. We must screen personnel records prior to activating RT-12s/IRRs.

IRR Muster

The 1986 Defense Authorization Act prompted ARPERCEN to conduct the first muster of the IRR. This was a voluntary muster that brought in only 6,778 soldiers from a population of 29,673 notified by mail. Congress authorized $2 million for this muster, but only $1 million was committed. 32

As a logical follow-up to this unsuccessful voluntary muster, the Pentagon planned an involuntary muster the next year. This one-day recall to active duty was intended to screen and update IRR files but, more importantly, it was also designed to impress upon IRR members their legal obligation to inform ARPERCEN about changes in their physical status, their addresses, and any other pertinent information effecting their ability to mobilize and deploy in time of crisis. A second major benefit of the IRR screen was the Enlisted Skill Refresher Training Program conducted by the Training and Doctrine Command to determine skill degradation and the refresher training needs of IRR soldiers. 33

The Department of Defense requested $61 million for this second muster of the IRR. Citing other pressing budget priorities, Congress only provided $15 million to support another limited muster. 34
Continued lack of Congressional funding has caused the muster to decline in scope to a mere sampling of the IRR force. In Fiscal Year 1992, ARPERCEN is funded to muster 14,000 IRRs or 4 percent from a population of 380,000. The remaining IRRs will receive a questionnaire in the mail that satisfies the Congressional and Department of Defense requirement for an annual screen. In selecting the 14,000 IRRs for muster, ARPERCEN excludes the RT-12 population, assuming their deployability for mobilization. Desert Storm proved this assumption wrong.

MOBILIZATION OF THE IRR

The Mobilization Order

In 1935, Ethiopia mobilized its armed forces to defend against the incursion of Italy's Fascist Army under Benito Mussolini. To accomplish this rapid expansion of his forces, Emperor Haille Sellasie issued the following mobilization order:

Everyone will now be mobilized and all boys old enough to carry a spear will be sent to Addis Ababa. Married men will take their wives to carry food and cook. Those without wives will take any woman without a husband. Women with small babies need not go. The blind, those who cannot carry a spear, are exempted. Anyone found at home after receipt of this order will be hanged.

Historians did not record the yield rate or show rate produced by this mobilization order, but they did record that Haille Sellasie was defeated and forced into exile by the Italians in 1936.

The mobilization order at Appendix II, issued 54 years later for Desert Storm, was certainly less life-threatening; but its purpose and direct approach were similar. Mobilization orders
were sent by Western Union Mailgram to 20,277 IRRs on 22 January 1991 with a report date of 31 January. Most of the IRRs mobilized at Fort Benning indicated they received their Mailgram on 24 or 25 January, allowing only five or six days preparation prior to departure. Since Desert Shield had begun almost six months earlier on 8 August 1990, many of these IRRs were bitter about their short-notice activation. This is not a new issue. In the Berlin Crisis of 1961, many members of the Ready Reserve Manpower Reinforcement Pool resented the brief period given them to put their personal affairs in order.\textsuperscript{37}

During Desert Shield/Storm, the Department of the Army Inspector General dispatched teams to assess the Army's ability to mobilize and to make recommendations to improve the process.\textsuperscript{38} One prominent observation concerned the activation of the IRR. The Inspector General observed that more time was required between notification and report date.\textsuperscript{39}

In addition to adequate notification, there were other substantive issues with the Desert Storm mobilization order. Problems developed with the instruction that read: "A determination to delay or exempt one from serving on active duty will be made after you report as directed." IRRs reported to Mobilization Stations with broken arms and legs in casts; with small children because no family care plan was possible in less than a week's notice; and some reported with severe family hardship to contend with at home. These instructions did include an 800 phone number to assist family members during the period of separation, but the IRR needed an 800 phone number and the option to call in situa-
tions where activation was clearly not in the best interests of the individual and/or the Army.

The mobilization order did not provide specific enough instructions for IRRs to make the most cost-effective travel arrangements. Even though the Military Traffic Management Command coordinated the procedure, several travel agents and airline carriers refused to accept the travel warrant. With an 800 number travel reservation system in place prior to mobilization, IRRs could have booked less expensive air fares. 40

Furthermore, many IRRs interviewed stated that the Western Union Mailgram looked like "junk mail" or an advertisement. Many initially disregarded the envelope because of its commercial appearance. An envelope with an official Department of the Army logo should be used to order members of the IRR to active duty. 41

The mobilization order employed in Desert Storm is certainly a more humane and instructional greeting than the one Haile Sellasie issued in 1935, but improvements are still necessary.

Morale of the IRR

With Western Union Mailgrams in hand, 17,306 IRRs reported to 20 Mobilization Stations on or about 31 January 1991. Although the 85 percent yield rate far surpassed the expected 70 percent, this was not necessarily an indicator of high morale.

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) surveyed IRRs at the seven largest Mobilization Stations. Although their principal purpose was to determine the extent of skill decay since the IRRs separated from active duty or the Selected Reserve, questions of attitude were also
built into the survey. Note the following IRR survey questions and their responses:

How did you feel about being called-up when you first received your notice?

very positive .......................... 6 percent
positive .................................. 12 percent
neutral .................................. 20 percent
negative .................................. 17 percent
very negative ............................ 43 percent

How do you feel now about being called-up?

very positive .......................... 5 percent
positive .................................. 11 percent
neutral .................................. 22 percent
negative .................................. 18 percent
very negative ............................ 42 percent

How motivated are you to perform your Army duties?

not at all .................................. 31 percent
somewhat .................................. 25 percent
moderately .................................. 28 percent
I am highly motivated .................. 14 percent

The reasons for low IRR morale and motivation were evident in their written comments provided in the survey questionnaire. Over half of the 3,051 respondents submitted the following comments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IN-PROCESSING PROBLEMS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disorganization, long lines, lack of information</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improper treatment by others</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inappropriate training, lack of MOS proficiency</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorrect or missing records/files/orders</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improper medical treatment</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting to mobilization center</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other in-processing problems</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Much of the dissatisfaction with in-processing was caused by the 31 January 1991 report date given to 20,277 IRRs. Although Fort Benning, for example, activated a Reserve Reception Battalion for augmentation, the In-Processing Center was overwhelmed when 1,378 IRRs reported on 31 January. A significant 74 percent of the survey respondents who complained about improper treatment were in grade Specialist/E4 or above, and 14 percent were non-commissioned officers. Regrettably, these experienced soldiers and leaders become lost in the IRR surge that swept them through in-processing along with hundreds of junior troops who never completed their first enlistment. Multiple report dates to Mobilization Stations would alleviate in-processing problems caused by an IRR surge. Establishing report dates based on grade would also permit Mobilization Stations to better treat the more senior IRRs with the respect and dignity they deserve.

**Yield Rates**

The 85 percent yield rate appears remarkable because it exceeds the 70 percent projected for planning estimates in the current Army Mobilization and Deployment Planning Guidance. The patriotic fervor in America during Desert Shield certainly contributed to this higher than expected yield rate. The 70 percent...
Yield rate was first established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Consolidated Guidance, dated March 7, 1978.\textsuperscript{47} It was again validated for Service planning estimates by a Department of Defense Study in 1984.\textsuperscript{48}

The yield rate has become the principal planning tool to estimate the number of IRRs who will report when ordered to active duty. This is certainly a valid planning tool, but it fails to consider the more important planning estimates for IRR deployability.

**Deployability Rates**

The IRR deployability rate for Desert Storm was 71 percent; 14,470 were deployable from 20,277 ordered to active duty. Fifteen percent failed to report as ordered, and fourteen percent, or 2,836, were adjudged nondeployable for the following reasons:\textsuperscript{49}

**RELEASE FROM ACTIVE DUTY AFTER CALL-UP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REASON CODE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medical Separation</td>
<td>1,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compassionate/dependency/hardship</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical temp hold, nondeployable</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't meet weight control standard</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, not categorized</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug abuse</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reclassification</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit recall</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erroneous enrollment</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel action pending undefined</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehension/academic</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainee discharge program</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivational</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplinary/misconduct</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical fitness (Remedial Training, APFT)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave, emergency</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erroneous enlistment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,836</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For historical comparison, 28,099 Regular Army Reserves were activated in 1941 and 12,260 or 44 percent were deployable. In the mobilization for the Korean War, 10 percent of all Reservists were physically unfit for active duty and another 10 percent were ineligible for a variety of other reasons.

The yield rate may predict the IRR flow into the Mobilization Stations, but it is the deployability rate that permits planners to project the flow of individual replacements into an overseas theater of operations. Deployability rates appear to be merely a statistic captured after the mobilization, but serve little purpose in the planning that occurs between conflicts. Deployability rates should become a key personnel estimate tool in today's Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS).

Proposals for Improvement

Both the yield rate and deployability rate could be significantly increased if the Ready RT-12 proposal were adopted. This vital source of pretrained individual replacements would be manned with more professionally mature soldiers who would better accept their continued military service obligation in a high priority recallable status with a greater degree of responsibility.

Another measure to increase yield and deployability rates would focus the annual muster on the Ready RT-12 population. This muster would recall Ready RT-12s six months after their separation from active duty or disaffiliation from their Reserve Component Troop Program Unit, at the mid-point of their 12-month recallable period.
With more individualized personnel management from ARPERCEN and an improved mobilization order process, the Ready RT-12 force should be more responsible to recall and more physically and mentally prepared to deploy than any other IRRs in our history.

MOBILIZATION STATION FORCE STRUCTURE

Doctrine and Resources

Headquarters, Forces Command (FORSCOM) is the Army's executive agent for mobilization planning and execution. The FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System identifies 51 Active and Reserve Component installations to serve as Mobilization Stations in the event of national emergency. Since Desert Storm was supported by a partial mobilization, only 20 Mobilization Stations were employed.

The mission of Mobilization Stations is to receive, house, support, train and validate Active, Guard and Reserve units for deployment. They also have the mission to receive, support and assign IRRs to deploying units or directly to overseas theater replacement detachments.\(^\text{52}\)

In the event of a military crisis requiring less than full mobilization, Mobilization Stations must accomplish this additional mission within existing resources. Their Mobilization Table of Distribution and Allowances (MOBTDA) is their principal source of manpower expansion, but it does not become effective until Full Mobilization is declared.\(^\text{53}\) To support Partial Mobilizations like Desert Storm, Army Mobilization and Deployment Planning Guidance indicates that mobilization services will be
accomplished by: deleting nonmission essential services; extending the workweek; executing option clauses in existing contracts; contracting for personnel and services; and by using early reporting/late deploying and uncommitted units to support the mission.  

This resource planning guidance is unrealistic for Mobilization Stations to plan and conduct a partial mobilization. Base operations are consistently the lowest priority for resourcing on the Department of the Army Master Priority List. In 1986, a Department of the Army Inspector General Special Investigation of Total Army Mobilization concluded that Mobilization Stations were not capable of fully supporting their mobilization mission.

Since 1986, several key military mobilization managers have been deleted from manpower authorization documents at major Army Mobilization Stations like Forts Benning, Knox, Sill and Jackson. First to go was the colonel-level Director of Personnel and Community Activities, followed by the installation Adjutant General (AG) and his cadre of officers. These more recent reductions follow the trend that began several years ago when the colonel-level Director of Industrial Operations was eliminated. Today installation personnel management has been civilianized, and many installations have a commercial contract for industrial operations/logistics management. These two space-saving alternatives are adequate for routine base operations support, but senior military leaders and managers are necessary to plan and execute a mobilization mission. Desert Storm proved this point.
Force Structure in Desert Shield/Storm

Prior to the 18 January 1991 Executive Order for partial mobilization, the only IRRs mobilized were volunteers. Host Nation Support in Saudi Arabia failed to provide enough vehicle drivers for coalition forces, so the call for volunteers was sent throughout the IRR force. Over 1,200 IRR soldiers answered this call, and they began arriving at Mobilization Stations on 8 January 1991. Installation AG Replacement Detachments were quickly overwhelmed by the surge of arrivals, and alternative command and control facilities had to be established. This early and unexpected rush of IRRs readily identified inadequate installation force structure to support mobilization. Although doctrine cites the installation AG as responsible agent for mobilizing the IRR, his structure is totally inadequate for the task. At Fort Benning, for example, the first one-day surge of 223 IRR volunteers quickly overwhelmed the 100-bed installation AG Replacement Detachment and sparsely manned unit cadre. Command and control was not the only readily apparent force structure deficiency. The installation AG Personnel Service Center was incapable of managing the volume of IRRs for in-processing. The Reception Battalion from the Infantry Training Center received short notice to plan and execute Fort Benning's Mobilization Station mission. This was a reasonable decision because the Jan-Feb-Mar period each year is traditionally a low point in the flow of initial entry trainees. Had Desert Shield/Storm occurred any other time during the year, Fort Benning's Reception Battalion would not have had the capacity to fully assume the installation's IRR mobilization mission.
The Fort Benning experience was common. The other Mobilization Stations experienced the same problem. Forts Dix and Leonard Wood relied on their Reception Battalions while Training Battalions at Forts Knox and Jackson were appointed base units to execute a partial mobilization. Again, these units could not have assumed their installation's mobilization mission during any other period of the year because of their full commitment to initial entry training.

Proposals for Change

These significant force structure deficiencies have been recorded in Department of the Army After Action Reports. The Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) observed that contingency operations executed at less than Full Mobilization generated immediate requirements for expanded base operations support. "Absent authority to execute Mobilization Tables of Distribution and Allowances (MOBTDAs)," PERSCOM proposes, "installations need authority to activate prearranged expansions of the installation TDAs to support [mobilization] operations."56

The Department of the Army Inspector General has recommended a small number of Mobilization Stations be selected and resourced to support regional contingency operations.57 Had this proposal been in practice during the Desert Storm activation of 17,306 IRRs, the following notional distribution plan might have been executed:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active Mobilization Stations</th>
<th>Career Management Fields (CMF)</th>
<th>IRRs Mobilized by CMF</th>
<th>Total Mobilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort Benning</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>3,869</td>
<td>3,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Knox</td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>1,334</td>
<td>3,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>340</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supply &amp; Services</td>
<td>1,497</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Sill</td>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>3,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>1,676</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Leonard Wood</td>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>3,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanical Maint.</td>
<td>2,701</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Jackson</td>
<td>All Others</td>
<td>3,445</td>
<td>3,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>17,306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These five Active Mobilization Stations should be permanently staffed with a cadre of officers and senior non-commissioned officers to plan and manage installation mobilization operations. The other Inactive Mobilization Stations should be augmented in time of crisis according to the PERSCOM proposal for preapproved TDA expansion.

The cadre from the five Active Mobilizations Stations would have a data link into ARPERCEN's IRR data base. Mobilization Stations would remain current on the population of potential IRRs to be mobilized at any time; a major advantage in planning and executing periodic mobilization exercises to evaluate their ability to perform the mission.

The prepositioned data tape listing of IRRs to be activated at each Mobilization Station failed to accomplish its purpose during Desert Storm. The tape was ordered by geographical region, not by Career Management Field. All IRRs were expected to report to their nearest Mobilization Station, regardless of their Career.
Management Field. The decision to provide refresher training to the IRR at specific Mobilization Stations altered the plan and negated the value of the prepositioned tape.

This proposal for five Active Mobilization Stations with data links to ARPERCEN eliminates the need for a prepositional tape. Moreover, this proposal also provides options and flexibility to mobilization planners regarding refresher training for the IRR. Since each of these Mobilization Stations is an Army Training Center, the capacity exists to provide refresher training there as required by the crisis situation. In Desert Storm, hundreds of IRRs were mobilized at one installation and then transferred to another for refresher training. This was a costly and time consuming approach that need not occur the next time the IRR are mobilized.

These few force structure proposals are essential to the rapid and efficient mobilization of the IRR. Essential, too, are needed changes to current mobilization plans, policies and laws that became obvious in Desert Shield/Storm.

MOBILIZATION PLANS, POLICIES AND LAWS

Levels of Mobilization

The magnitude of the national emergency will govern the level of mobilization. As authorized by law or Congressional resolution, and when directed by the President, the Department of Defense activates all or part of the Armed Forces according to the following graduated levels of mobilization:
Presidential Call-up of 200,000 Selected Reservists. The President may augment the active forces by an order to active duty of units and Individual Mobilization Augmentees of the Selected Reserve; up to 200,000 members from all Services for up to 90 days (with authority to extend an additional 90 days if required) to meet the requirements of an operational mission.

Selective Mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve Component units, Individual Ready Reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack.

Partial Mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to Full Mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1 million for 24 months) to mobilize Reserve Component units, Individual Ready Reservists, retirees, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

Full Mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress to mobilize all Reserve Component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual Reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

Total Mobilization. Expansion of the Armed Forces resulting from action of Congress to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support to meet the total requirement of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

Execution of Mobilization Plans in Desert Shield/Storm

The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) provides basic guidance for Full Mobilization. Planners assumed a rapid transition through the Presidential 200K Call-up and partial
mobilization to reach Full Mobilization. Consequently, AMOPS assumes circumstances and conditions that did not exist in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. This major planning deficiency was evident in all mobilization plans of subordinate headquarters that derive policy guidance from AMOPS.

In their recorded history of Desert Shield, the Fourth U.S. Army reported:

The single most critical issue was the lack of guidance in FORMDEPS [FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System] or the 4AMP [Fourth Army Mobilization Plan] concerning management of a 200K incremental call-up. In almost every instance, both FORMDEPS and the 4AMP had been written on the premise that a 200K call-up would be immediately followed by partial mobilization and Full Mobilization. The entire thrust of FORMDEPS is on a global war scenario based on a major conflict in Western Europe.

Critical of the lack of planning and policy guidance for executing the Presidential 200K Call-up, the Total Army Personnel Command After Action Report observed:

The procedures in AMOPS did not satisfy the operational requirements for personnel operations for a "No Plan" contingency operation such as Operation Desert Shield/Storm. AMOPS is based on deliberate planning for war in mature theaters and supports execution using resources provided under Partial and Full Mobilization. It does not provide adequate guidance for "No Plan" contingency operations requiring deployments and possible hostilities under conditions less than partial mobilization.

With over 50 years of experience in mobilization planning since World War II, the limited value of AMOPS in Desert Shield/Storm is an overwhelming indictment of Army leaders at all levels.
Lessons Not Well Learned in Previous Mobilizations

The inapplicability of AMOPS to the Desert Shield/Storm situation frustrated mobilization planners and operators much like the pre-World War II build-up frustrated the Army General Staff. The Protective Mobilization Plan, their 1940 version of AMOPS, whose whole basic concept had been predicated on the belief that mobilization meant all-out war, was continuously modified by the events of the partial mobilization in the summer of 1940.62

Mobilization planners were confronted with the same problem in the Korean War. Mobilization plans in 1950 were based on war comparable to World War II. There were no plans for limited war and partial mobilization. Regulations setting forth the sequence to be followed on mobilization were inadequate for a partial or gradual mobilization. Because of the lack of plans, the mobilization process was improvised.63

During the Berlin Crisis, there was considerable difficulty activating the Ready Reserve Manpower Reinforcement Pool and, despite the Korean War experience, there was no plan for partial mobilization.64

From lessons learned in 1961, the Department of the Army did develop a detailed partial mobilization Plan prior to the Vietnam escalation. The decision in 1965 to expand the Army to support operations in Vietnam without mobilizing the Ready Reserve resulted in the Plan not being kept current. As Partial Mobilization was announced on 11 April 1968, no serious mobilization planning had been done since 1965.65
An outdated partial mobilization Plan was poorly executed in 1968. The selection of units to be mobilized was difficult because of a lack of current readiness data. Short suspense dates and security restrictions precluded proper coordination at all planning levels and resulted in some erroneous designation of units and certain changes in Mobilization Stations.

From our recent mobilization for Desert Shield/Storm, it is apparent there are lessons to learn again and unique lessons to learn for the first time.

LESSONS LEARNED IN DESERT SHIELD/STORM

Mobilization plans and exercises must focus on regional contingency operations requiring a U.S. level of response short of Full Mobilization. AMOPS must be expanded to provide sufficient planning guidance for a Presidential 200K Call-up and a partial mobilization.

Currently, Title 10 USC 673b restricts the activation of the IRR prior to partial mobilization. This law must be changed to authorize the President to mobilize the IRR in a 200K Call-up. The Commander-in-Chief must be capable of tailoring the force for any contingency operation, having full access to all elements in both the Active and Reserve Components. This capability is especially essential today with such significant reductions programmed in our current Active and Reserve force structure.

The vital importance of the IRR is just cause for a thorough scrub of their composition and management. The Ready RT-12 concept should be adopted, and this select manpower pool of
experienced soldiers given the necessary individualized personnel management to assure their rapid recall and their physical and mental readiness for deployment.

Five Active Mobilization Stations should be designated as priority installations for resourcing. To build a team of experienced mobilization planners and operators, restoration of authorized positions for military Director of Personnel and Community Activities, Director of Industrial Operations/Logistics, and the Installation Adjutant General and their staff chiefs should be approved at these five posts. Other Inactive Mobilization Stations need authority to activate preapproved expansions of their installation TDA, or gain approval to execute their MOBTDA at any level of mobilization.

In the exhaustive 700-page *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945*, the authors conclude with the following timeless lesson:

The most important lesson to be learned is that the United States must do better the next time it mobilizes. A great deal of progress has been made since the first mobilization in 1775, but the perfect solution has not yet been reached. The problems of military mobilization remain a challenge to the statesmen and soldiers of the future.

**CONCLUSION**

A familiar axiom cautions the military planner: either study history or be doomed to repeat it. The history of mobilization in the U.S. Army is replete with examples where important lessons were either not learned or were not pursued through to completed corrective action.
Today's after action reports from Desert Shield/Storm have followed General Sullivan's guidance; lessons learned have been captured. Pursuit of these lessons to completed corrective action is not so certain. The priority for Army planners has refocused on the significant force structure downsizing to meet new threats worldwide and Congressional mandates at home; and, it is doubtful the projected Army budget will cover an investment in mobilization preparedness for the next crisis.

This paper discussed but a few lessons to be learned, and the corrective actions necessary to improve the mobilization of the IRR are recapped at Appendix III. If the trends in the history of mobilization continue, necessary corrective action will not be taken and these lessons, too, will have to be learned again.
APPENDIX I

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MOBILIZATION:
ORIGINS OF THE IRR

World War I

Noted historian and essayist, Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer, wrote in 1930:

When war was declared against Germany on April 6, 1917, we were totally unprepared to give any immediate military aid to our allies in Europe. At least a year must elapse before any considerable American Army could be formed even in America.

The legislative basis for the mobilization of forces at that time was the National Defense Act of 1916. It stated that the Army of the United States would consist of the Regular Army, the Regular Army Reserve, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps and the National Guard while in the federalized service of the United States.

The Individual Ready Reserves mobilized for Desert Storm have their roots in the Regular Army Reserve of 1916. It was composed of former Regular Army enlisted men who volunteered to serve on call for a period of three years beyond their initial four-year active duty enlistment. On 30 June 1917, the Adjutant General reported 8,355 members of the Regular Army Reserve had been mobilized for deployment to Europe.

The Regular Army Reserves of 1916 and today's Individual Ready Reserves offered common value during mobilization. Both provided experienced, pretrained military manpower to rapidly reinforce deploying units. Service in the IRR today does differ
significantly since it is not voluntary for soldiers fulfilling their statutory eight-year military service obligation.

On 6 April 1917, the Regular Army strength was 133,111 and the total Reserve Forces were estimated to be 122,000. The failure of the War Department to promptly implement the provisions of the National Defense Act of 1916 for the Officers' Reserve Corps and Enlisted Reserve Corps was one of the more serious errors in the prewar period. Imposition of a draft was necessary.

The Selective Service Act of 18 May 1917 represented a major departure from the traditional values of volunteerism, localism and decentralization which guided military manning principles in the past. The national government achieved control over military manpower for the first time. The draft supplied 2,801,373 men to the Army, 67 percent of its wartime personnel requirement. The record of Selective Service in World War I assured its place in the mobilization plans of the future.

World War II

The manning for U.S. Army forces in World War II was accomplished with Regular Army and National Guard units, with individual filler replacements from the Army Reserve and the Selective Service. On 30 June 1939, the strength of the Army Reserve was 119,733, including only 3,000 enlisted personnel in the Enlisted Reserve Corps first authorized by Congress in the National Defense Act of 1916. The National Defense Act of 1920 again contained provisions authorizing an Enlisted Reserve Corps, but this potential manpower source met continued disinterest in the War Department with a resultant lack of funding by Congress. This lesson
from World War I was not well learned by mobilization planners prior to World War II.

Again in 1937, Congress authorized both the Enlisted Reserve Corps and the Regular Army Reserve. The Regular Army Reservist was given a small monthly stipend. Because of the Depression, this Reserve option attracted over 20,000 men during the first year. The 3,000 members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps received no stipend. On 7 December 1941, total mobilization of U.S. forces occurred and 28,099 members of the Regular Army Reserve were ordered to active duty.75

Korean War

On 30 June 1950, the assigned strength of the U.S. Army Reserve was 600,417,76 a formidable force owing its manning success in large part to the Selective Service Act of 1948.

The Selective Service Act of 1948 provided that men from age 19 to 26, who either volunteered for active duty or were inducted, would serve thereafter in the Inactive Army Reserves for a period of five years.77 Other options were also offered to attract enlistees with varied combinations of active duty, duty in National Guard or Reserve units, or obligatory service in the Inactive Reserve.

Unlike World Wars I and II, adequate Reserve forces did exist to augment the Regular Army, and most were World War II veterans. The problem was inadequate mobilization plans. The existing plans were intended for a global World War II scenario. There were no plans for a partial mobilization to support a limited war in Korea.78
In order to provide an organized and efficient approach to Reserve mobilization after the ill-prepared and chaotic call-up for the Korean War, the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 became law. This Act assigned all National Guardsmen and Reservists into one of the three general categories we know today: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve consisted then of Army National Guard and Army Reserve units and the Ready Reserve Manpower Reinforcement Pool, an offspring of the earlier Regular Army Reserve and precursor of today's IRR. A partial mobilization of 15,234 soldiers in the Ready Reserve Manpower Reinforcement Pool occurred on 1 August 1961 for the Berlin Crisis.

1968 Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act

This Act of Congress mandated the following Reserve Component structure in force today:

THE READY RESERVE: Composed of the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve, and the Inactive Army National Guard.

-- Selected Reserve: Consists of Army National Guard units, Army Reserve units, and Individual Mobilization Augmentees preassigned to wartime positions in the Active Component force structure.

-- Individual Ready Reserve: Consists of soldiers serving out the remainder of their eight-year military service obligation, having already fulfilled an enlistment contact on active duty or in a National Guard or Reserve Troop Program Unit.

-- Inactive Army National Guard: Consists of Guardsmen who are unable to participate actively in their Guard unit. These soldiers normally remain attached to their former unit in an inactive status, but are subject to immediate mobilization with their unit in time of Federal or State emergency.

THE STANDBY RESERVE: Consists primarily of soldiers who have completed their statutory eight-year service obligation and have
requested transfer to the Standby Reserve. Members of the Standby Reserve may also be key civilians responsible for industrial mobilization, management of government, or maintenance of law and order. Reservists with temporary hardship or disability may also be counted in the Standby Reserve.

**THE RETIRED RESERVE:** Consists of soldiers retired from either the Active or Reserve Components who are subject to recall in an emergency.

**Vietnam**

Soon after the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Revitalization Act was passed in 1968, its provisions were tested in a partial mobilization for Vietnam. Of the 2,752 enlisted Reservists recalled from the IRR, 1,692 were assigned to mobilized National Guard and Reserve units and 1,060 were assigned as replacement to Active Army units.  

From World War I to Vietnam, experienced soldiers from the Regular Army Reserve, the Ready Reserve Manpower Reinforcement Pool, and the Individual Ready Reserve answered the call in time of crisis. Today's IRR continued this proud tradition in Operation Desert Storm.
APPENDIX II

MOBILIZATION ORDER

ARPERCEN, DARPMOP
9700 PAGE BLVD
ST. LOUIS, MO 63132-5200

DARP-MOP-P PERSCOM MOB ASSET A
JOHN DOE
123 ELM STREET
CARLISLE, PA 17013

PURSUANT TO PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER OF JANUARY 18, 1991: YOU
ARE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY FOR THE PERIOD INDICATED BELOW. YOU ARE
RELIEVED FROM YOUR PRESENT RESERVE COMPONENT STATUS. PROCEED FROM
YOUR CURRENT LOCATION IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO REPORT ON THE DATE
SPECIFIED.

REPORT TO: USAIC-AG
FT BENNING
FORT BENNING GA 31905

ACTIVE DUTY COMMITMENT: NOT TO EXCEED 12 MONTHS
ORDER NUMBER: M-12-030837 ORDER DATE: 20 JAN 91
REPORTING DATE: 31 JAN 91 FOR ARMY USE:
PURPOSE: MOBILIZATION COMP: INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE
AUTH: 10USC673
FORMAT: 172 MOS/SSI: 11C1 0
SSAN: 123-45-6789 GRADE: SP4 PEBD: 871124 MDC: 1AE1
DOR: 890801

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS: REPORT ON DATE INDICATED. A DETERMINA-
TION TO DELAY OR EXEMPT ONE FROM SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY WILL BE
MADE AFTER YOU REPORT AS DIRECTED. FAILURE TO REPORT WILL BE
CONSIDERED ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE (AWOL) AND MAY SUBJECT YOU TO
ACTION UNDER TITLE 10USC886. BRING WITH YOU: ALL SERVICEABLE
UNIFORMS; PROOF OF MARRIAGE; BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF CHILDREN;
STATEMENT FROM DOCTOR FOR CHILDREN OVER 21 WHO ARE INCAPABLE OF
SELF SUPPORT; COURT ORDERS GOVERNING LEGAL CUSTODY; ILLEGITIMATE
CHILDREN OR CHILD SUPPORT; YOUR IMMUNIZATION RECORD; DD214; AND
IDENTIFICATION TAGS. TRANSPORTATION OF DEPENDS & HOUSEHOLD GOODS
IS NOT AUTHORIZED. THE ENCLOSED TRAVEL WARRANT SHOULD BE USED TO
OBTAIN TRANSPORTATION. TRAVEL BY PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLE IS NOT
AUTHORIZED. LEAVE COPIES OF THIS ORDER WITH YOUR DEPENDENTS/NEXT
OF KIN. FAMILY ASST. HOTLINE 1-800-874-8451.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

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* ARPERCEN *
* OFFICIAL *
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THOMAS J. KILMARTIN
BRIGADIER GENERAL, USA
COMMANDING

2. Change laws to authorize the President to mobilize the IRR in a 200K Call-up.

3. Adopt the Ready RT-12 concept that only includes soldiers who successfully complete their full enlistment in the Regular Army or who disaffiliate with honor from their Troop Program Unit.

4. Provide priority personnel management to the select Ready RT-12 force commensurate with their priority for recall.

5. Focus limited funds for an annual muster on the Ready RT-12s.

6. Revise the mobilization order process considering preparatory public announcements, official notification and report dates, deletion/deferment procedures, travel instructions, and the commercial appearance of the mailgram.

7. Establish multiple report dates to permit Mobilization Stations to better lead and manage the flow of recalled IRRs.

8. Include deployability rates as a key manpower planning tool in AMOPS.

9. Designate and resource five Active Mobilization Stations with an installation staff of senior military leaders.

10. Change policy to permit the Inactive Mobilization Stations to execute their MOBTDA at any level of mobilization.
ENDNOTES


10. I. Heymont and E. W. McGregor, Review and Analysis of Recent Mobilizations and Deployments of U.S. Army Reserve Components (McLean, VA: Research Analysis Corporation, October 1972), pp. 4-4 - 4-5.


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20. Ibid.


22. AR 635-200, p. 16.


24. MAJ Randy Lister, Chief, Assessments Division, U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center, St. Louis, MO, telephone interview by author, 11 February 1992, Carlisle, PA.


27. All Volunteer Force Report, p. VI-12.


31. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, Memorandum for Desert Shield/Storm Lessons Learned General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC), Subject: GOSC 9 Jul 91, dated 28 June 1991, p. 2 (hereafter referred to as "Lessons Learned").

32. Montgomery, pp. 385-386.


34. Montgomery, p. 386.

35. LTC Robert Burkey, Chief, Mobilization Readiness Division, U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center, St. Louis, MO, telephone interview by author, 18 February 1992, Carlisle, PA.


37. Heymont and McGregor, p. 4-5.


39. Ibid., slide 13.

40. Lessons Learned, p. 3.

41. Ibid.


44. Ibid., p. 2.

45. Ibid., p. 1.


47. U.S. Department of the Army, Feasibility of Predicting Reserve Show Rate at Mobilization (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 18 July 1979), p. 2.


50. Kreidberg and Henry, p. 487.


53. Ibid., p. 112.

54. AMOPS Volume I, p. 8-1.

55. LTC Pat Phelps, Assistant Inspector General, Inspections Division, Office of the Inspector General, Headquarters, Department of the Army, interview by author, 10 February 1992, Washington, DC.


57. DAIG Briefing, Slide 25.

58. AMOPS Volume I, pp. 2-1 - 2-2.


63. Heymont and McGregor, pp. 3-2 - 3-4.

64. Ibid., p. 4-11.

65. Ibid., pp. 5-2 - 5-4.

66. Ibid., p. 5-16.
68. Ibid., p. 241.
69. Ibid., p. 193.
70. Ibid., pp. 224-225.
71. Ibid., p. 227.
74. Kreidberg and Henry, p. 487.
75. Ibid.
76. Heymont and McGregor, p. 3-3.
77. Ibid., p. 3-1.
78. Ibid., p. 3-2.
80. Heymont and McGregor, p. 4-1.
81. Ibid., pp. 4-4 - 4-5.
82. Bandow, p. 156.
84. Heymont and McGregor, p. 5-5.
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