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Newport, R.I.

U.S. ARMY PARTICIPATION IN NATO MULTINATIONAL CORPS

by
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: Jonathan H. Miller

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U.S. Army Participation in NATO Multinational Corps (Unclassified)

Jonathan H. Miller, Major, U.S. Army

Current US military strategy calls for a forward presence in Europe. NATO senior leaders envision formation of multinational forces in the NATO force structure. This paper examines the framework for future forces as established by developing national and military strategies and doctrines; emerging multinational trends in NATO and possible force structures; and examines challenges for the operational commander at the strategic and operational level. Finally, some measures of effectiveness suggest that while a US commitment to European multinational corps formations may be politically expedient, it may not reflect the optimum use of diminishing resources nor provide the right mix of forces needed to address the most likely threats.
ABSTRACT

Current U.S. military strategy calls for a forward presence in Europe. NATO senior leaders envision formation of multinational forces in the NATO force structure. This paper examines the framework for future forces as established by developing national and military strategies and doctrines; emerging multinational trends in NATO and possible force structures; and examines challenges for the operational commander at the strategic and operational level. Finally, some measures of effectiveness suggest that while a U.S. commitment to European multinational corps formations may be politically expedient, it may not reflect the optimum use of diminishing resources nor provide the right mix of forces needed to address the most likely threats.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The 1990's promise to be a decade of incredible change for our nation's military forces. The collapse of the Soviet empire, and with it the raison d'être of our national military strategy of communist containment, portend sweeping changes in the way our forces will be funded, structured, and employed into the next century.

The European continent was for many years the centerpiece of U.S. military strategy and despite our victory in the Cold War it will probably remain our focal point for years to come. The demise of the Warsaw Pact has, paradoxically, created instability and new potential for conflict in Europe. Emerging democracies and fragile economics teeter on the brink of collapse. Regional ethnonationalism, suppressed by Soviet hegemony for 45 years, may fuel new fires of conflict as currently seen in Yugoslavia.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is at present the only continental organization with the capabilities and resolve to deal with the myriad of political and military problems facing the new Europe. While this may change with the increasing influence of pan-European political
and military structures such as the Western European Union and the Council of Europe, among others, NATO remains the lynchpin of stability and peace in Europe for the foreseeable future.

This paper examines the framework of U.S. and NATO military force structures that are rapidly taking place. Indeed, many changes may make statements of fact obsolete before publication of the paper in final form. Nevertheless, the trends and concepts for the development of multinational forces, and U.S. participation therein, should remain valid.

The senior U.S. Army commander in Europe, regardless of final composition or size of forces, will face many operational challenges unique to the multinational force concept. Given the reduced threat for war on a global scale, coupled with a concomitant reduction in military budgets, multinational, combined, and joint operations will increasingly dominate military thinking at the operational level. This paper is just a starting point for an examination of the challenges multinational formations present.
CHAPTER II

A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE FORCES

The Threat and Strategic Landscape. The development of forces in the Atlantic region must be planned and developed according to the perceived threat and the strategic landscape on which they may be employed. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enumerated elements of the environment in his draft National Military Strategy. They include:

- Instability arising from emerging states of the former Soviet Union.
- Rapid political change in former Warsaw Pact East European states.
- Increased political, economic, and military cooperation in Europe.
- Intensification of intractable regional conflicts.
- Democratic movements not only in Eastern Europe but throughout the world.
- The struggle to improve the human condition and resultant conflicts: nationalism, insurgencies, and terrorism.

This new environment demands a military strategy far different from the tradition of massed corps arrayed in forward positions to meet the expected Soviet invasion of Central Europe. Future conflicts are more likely to be localized and do not necessarily involve trans-border or multi-state issues.
New U.S. National and Military Strategies. Faced with a changing new world order, U.S. national objectives were reassessed for adequacy in meeting the new challenges. President Bush specified those objectives as national survival; a healthy economy; a stable and secure world; and healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with our allies and friendly nations. These objectives were formulated into national strategy and a comprehensive assessment of planned forces, and outlined in the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment:

"US military strategy is founded on the premise that America will continue to serve a unique leadership responsibility for preserving global peace and stability. It is derived from US defense strategy, which formerly focused primarily on containing Soviet aggression on a global scale. This defense strategy is now shifting to added focus on forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution as its major themes, while maintaining our long-term reliance on nuclear deterrence. This shift represents an essential adaptation to the new realities already described - a receding Soviet threat and a declining defense budget."

Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a statement before the Committee on Armed Services, stated:

"We are in the process of working with our NATO partners to refine the composition, location, and future command relationships of those forces. As we shift from an atmosphere of tension and confrontation to one of prudent watchfulness and engagement, multinational formations (will) become the command arrangement of choice, particularly for ground forces."
Strategic concepts provide a framework supporting national security strategy and assist the theater commander in formulating theater strategy. They are: deterrence, readiness, collective security, security assistance, arms control, strategic agility, power projection, technological superiority, maritime and aerospace superiority, overwhelming force, and force reconstitution. The creation, or integration of, US forces in multinational corps must be able to reflect these strategic concepts.

Developing Doctrines. While all the services are acting to bring existing doctrines and strategies in line with emerging national and military strategies, this paper will be concerned primarily with the Army’s position and the US Army theater commander in Europe. The Army’s vaunted AirLand Battle Doctrine is being modified to reflect new world conditions through adjustments to AirLand Operations doctrine. The focus of AirLand Operations is the ability to rapidly transition to a power projection posture; to operate across the operational spectrum; to exploit advanced technologies; and achieve decisive operational maneuver.

A new Army publication, still in draft form, describes AirLand Operations as follows: "In AirLand Operations, the tenets and imperatives of AirLand Battle continue as fundamental, but the environment has changed. The fielded capabilities and changing threats of recent times present the opportunity to avoid the high density mutual-attrition linear battlefield environment that
has characterized Central Europe - and restate the inherent potential of AirLand Battle in terms of the new strategic environment. AirLand Operations focuses on seeking opportunities to dictate how we will fight - in nonlinear conditions, with the advantage of operational fires and manuever and with the emergent superiority of our applied technologies. The world is different; battlefields are different; the relative national might of the US has grown; - it is prudent that we capitalize on these for the conduct of AirLand Operations.

The world’s strategic environment is changing, as is the nature of the threats facing the US. National military strategy, doctrine, and force structure are undergoing adjustments accordingly. Chapter III discusses the US commitment to the multinational corps concept as a means of addressing these changes in NATO. Chapter IV will examine more closely the implications of emerging doctrine on the Army commander in a multinational corps environment.
NATO's New Role. Has the fall of the Soviet empire really changed anything? The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, released 15 November 1991, states that "NATO's established purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. This Alliance objective remains unchanged." Gary L. Guertner, in his *NATO Strategy in a New World Order*, neatly identifies and compares the old strategy with the new:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OLD</th>
<th>NEW</th>
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<tr>
<td>Specific threat</td>
<td>General defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward defense</td>
<td>Reduced forward presence</td>
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<td>Fixed defensive positions</td>
<td>Mobility &amp; flexibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flexible response</td>
<td>Last resort</td>
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<tr>
<td>National formations</td>
<td>Multinational formations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small reserves/rapid</td>
<td>Greater reserve reliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mobilization</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Short warning</td>
<td>Longer warning time</td>
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What has really changed is not the fundamental precepts of the Alliance, but the conceptual way in which the Alliance plans to use military forces to achieve its time-tested objective.

Where will the threat come from? Some analysts argue that NATO must be prepared for major contingencies in the flanks where the Alliance is increasingly vulnerable to regional and intra-regional instabilities, and that future challenges are more likely to come from the South as opposed to the East. At least one analyst has argued that "unless troops are stationed directly in the Balkans, NATO is unlikely to have much impact on Serbian nationalism or any other force of instability." He goes on to question the mission of an American armored division in Germany and its utility for an intra-regional conflict. These and other valid concerns are certain to be fleshed out as NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) validate future missions.

The Multinational Concept. The North Atlantic Council made it clear that multinational forces are the wave of the future. "(They) demonstrate the Alliances resolve to maintain a credible collective defense; enhance Alliance cohesion; reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the European pillar. Multinational forces, and in particular reaction forces, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defense resources."
Creation of multinational forces would solve practical problems in Europe as well. Sensitivity to American presence on European soil has become increasingly pronounced, especially in Germany where a rapidly growing society finds itself competing with foreign troops for dwindling urban space. This competition has taken on a political sensitivity, and "Germany will soon become the only country in Europe with foreign ground combat troops on its soil, except for a single U.S. airborne battalion stationed in Italy. That gives some political parties an opportunity to claim that when the Russians leave, the Americans will only be here to keep us down."  

A major debate among European defense analysts is the role any NATO multinational force would have for what is termed "out-of-area" operations - that is, the employment of troops in a country outside the Alliance Charter. There is considerable pressure from France for these operations to be reserved exclusively for a non-NATO rapid reaction force. The problem may be moot, however, as "Washington may insist that its post-CFE forces remain in a single corps, reinforced by units of other allies. Dispersing limited U.S. resources would make strategic planning and out-of-theater operations more difficult."
**Force Structure and U.S. Commitment.** At the time of this paper, the size of future U.S. forces in Europe remains unclear as senior leaders respond to ever-growing requirements to further reduce force structure and spending. Current estimates anticipate U.S. ground force components remaining in Europe will consist of one armored and one mechanized division, an armored cavalry regiment, and traditional corps support units such as a corps artillery brigade, among others. Together these forces form the heart of a U.S. corps.

A general plan to organize NATO forces into multinational corps-sized units was drafted in May 1991 by the defense ministers of NATO, and was recently outlined in *Jane's Defence Weekly* as follows: The new corps will be multinational formations with one nation providing the corps commander and the major elements of the corps headquarters. Six of these corps will be part of the main defence forces, many being comprised of reserve forces:

* One Netherlands-led corps with two Netherlands and one German division.
* One Belgian-led corps of four Belgian brigades, one German and one US brigade.
* One US-led corps with one/two US divisions, one German division and one Canadian brigade.
Two German corps with three divisions; Netherlands, UK and US divisions have deployment options with the German corps.

The LandJut corps with one Danish and one German division.

Another new element is the Allied Command Europe Rapid-Reaction Corps (ARRC), probably under NATO's European commander, for use anywhere in Europe. This new corps would include a British armored division stationed in Germany, a light division stationed in Britain itself, and at least two multinational divisions. It will be commanded by a British lieutenant general. One of the multinational divisions will be drawn from NATO's southern countries (Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal). The other will be an airmobile division, composed of forces from Germany, Holland, the UK, and Belgium. The participation of any U.S. units in the ARRC is the subject of on-going debate.

In an effort to eliminate redundant headquarters, the headquarters of the Northern Army Group and the Central Army Group will merge to form Land Forces Central Region (LANDCENT). This consolidation would also direct planning efforts towards the northern flanks of NATO, long considered a weak spot in NATO capabilities.
Any U.S. presence in a multinational corps will pose a number of challenges for the senior U.S. commander concerned, and these will be addressed in Chapter IV. The ultimate shape of that presence must be formulated with sensitivity to the host nation and the European community at large, and acknowledge a greater degree of European influence in the formulation process. "The Alliance needs to be careful not to singularize the Federal Republic and produce the very domestic political backlash in that country the West needs to avoid. In other words, allied forces need to be seen as comparable to Bundeswehr units, in addition to being significantly reduced in large metropolitan areas."

NATO will continue to provide the cornerstone of collective defense for Europe, at least for the foreseeable future. It is clear that multinational corps formations will form the framework of NATO's defensive posture and that the US is committed to participate in these new formations. The motivating factors for their development appear to be economy of resource measures and sensitivity to public opinion regarding foreign troop presence.

These new force structures will present many challenges for participating US Army commanders, ranging from the strategic and political level down to operational and functional considerations. Chapter IV provides a broad review of some of these challenges.
CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES

Strategic/Political Considerations. Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., in his July 1991 Military Review article "Building a NATO Corps", addressed many of the implications discussed in the remainder of this paper. His concept of building a NATO multinational corps, however, appears to be based on the threat presented by residual Soviet capabilities and envisaged a battlefield scenario typical of traditional NATO planning. A reassessment of the threat and concomitant plans for multinational corps force requirements is in order. Given recent events in Yugoslavia, where light forces in urban terrain dominated the fighting, and the likelihood of similar conflicts within Europe, a "heavy" US contribution may not be in line with anticipated requirements. General Franks acknowledged that a multinational corps' "ability to integrate not only non-US forces but also a combination of light and heavy forces is obviously imperfect."

The traditional NATO layer-cake defense in sector against a common threat presents a different set of circumstances to
the operational commander than out-of-area operations against an ambiguous threat, not necessarily vital to US interests, in which US forces are an integral and vital element of the multinational force to be deployed. Operational objectives must be in line with both European and US strategic interests, and the two may not always be in line with one another. Thus, the multinational approach may present some potentially embarrassing situations if the US is reluctant to participate in any and all missions. This problem may not present itself however, if US forces are not integrated in the ARRC, envisioned by General Galvin as NATO's "fire brigade." The US operational commander in a multinational corps may also find himself incapable of performing US-only missions because he is structurally bound to that corps without extensive augmentation from CONUS forces. Multinational corps may prove equally restrictive to US and European national strategic options.

Restrictions imposed by arms control regimes and confidence building measures (CFE, CSCE) will certainly have an effect on all European forces. Most European countries view collective security arrangements as a means of providing stability and reducing nationalist tendencies. The possible integration of former Warsaw Pact states under the NATO security umbrella would also introduce a host of new
challenges such as the sharing of national intelligence assets and emerging high-technology weapons systems.

Another political consideration is funding. The Europeans have clearly accepted the responsibility inherent with increased burdensharing and the proposed force structures reflect that commitment. The US operational commander however, will be faced with the dilemma of not only US funding constraints, but increasingly limited European resources with which to meet requirements for putting together the multinational corps packages. These new requirements will be addressed later, but the question of funding from a purely national or shared purse must first be thoroughly examined by all participating nations.

Operational/Functional Considerations. The creation of multinational corps present many unique operational challenges, such as "differences in training, equipment capabilities, organizational structure, operational procedures, communication patterns and supplies, not to mention such basic matters as troop diet and social and legal standards." Rather than try to cover every operational aspect unique to a particular force structure in this paper, I will examine some of the problems likely to be encountered in generic multinational Battlefield Functional Mission Areas, such as Command and Control, Intelligence, Logistics, and Fire Support. I will also briefly discuss some training concerns.
Command and Control (C2) Considerations. As with any command, there can be only one commander, and multinational corps must deal with the delicate issue of who's in charge. It is clear that there is a difference between national command and operational control, and multinational corps do not entail the transfer of national command to a foreign power. US forces in NATO have long been subject to foreign operational control under the NATO command structure. Yet, "the attachment of a unit of one nationality to a larger organization of another is not the same as the formation of an integrated, multinational force. The latter case generally requires many more internal adjustments and compromises for the various parts to be welded firmly into a cohesive body, particularly at the level of the controlling headquarters." US commanders must be sensitive to national differences in command characteristics and methods and the resultant impact on C2 issues.

General Franks' article covers the VII US Corps' experience in multinational C2 operations: differences in doctrine, terms, procedures, map symbols and graphics, movement norms, planning cycles and language problems - all of which can be overcome with patience, training, and time. Yet he notes that C2 issues are especially sensitive in operations in which multinational forces support each other or temporarily occupy the same terrain. "Small errors in
understanding can easily generate fatally flawed decisions and unacceptable time delays." He goes on to note that because of the many differences, it is especially critical that corps planners enforce the "one-third/two-thirds" rule to allow subordinate planners the maximum time possible to work out problems. "Unfortunately, a fluid situation often forces a shorter planning cycle unsuited to forming multinational divisions and brigades."

Another C2 issue is the proliferation of multinational C3I equipment and the danger presented in combat targeting situations. The recent Gulf War experience and the unfortunate fratricidal occurrences demonstrate all too clearly the need for unequivocal identification means among allied operators of weapon systems. While technological advances may reduce this hazard to some extent, strict NATO Rules Of Engagement and extensive training experience remain the short term solution.

General Franks offers additional experience in managing C2 issues. "War planning and support participation can be successfully managed through the exchange of permanent liaison officers and the use of tactical seminars, study days, staff college visits and terrain walks." VII Corps also has experience in development of interoperability documents such as Field Operating Standard Operating Procedures to ensure understanding, predictable responses, and a common approach to combat situations.
* Intelligence Considerations. Aside from the obvious security considerations of sharing national intelligence products with non-US forces, there are additional problems unique to multinational units. One of these is the combination of language and technical equipment which together produce distinctive signatures for the operating multinational force. This distinctive signature can work to your disadvantage as well as your advantage, as the VII Corps experience bears out. Commanders noted that while these distinctive signatures made it harder to deny hostile collection efforts, it could equally be used as an opportunity to exploit deception operations.

Collection and analysis is an area where caution must be exercised when sharing data among multinational forces. VII Corps analysts noted during exercises that "simple differences in threat data bases, communications, and analysis doctrine can disrupt the continuity of the threat picture between units and up and down the operational chain of command."

Sensitivity to host and subordinate allied unit intelligence needs must also be exercised to develop a sense of trust and partnership. General Franks noted that intelligence task forces "must adhere to the principle that non-US subordinate units must receive the equivalent support provided to US units whenever possible. Implementing this
principle is neither easy nor cheap. The price includes equipment systems, data links, technically skilled personnel and liaison parties. Bi-lingual personnel are invaluable assets."

* Logistics Considerations. This may well be the proverbial straw that breaks the multinational camel's back. Under the present NATO framework, logistics has long been thought of as a purely national responsibility. The single nation corps concept favored such a setup, but it had its drawbacks. One major disadvantage was that it discouraged interoperability of equipment, supplies, and spares among allied units since each corps was expected to operate independently. While NATO has made great strides in standardization in recent years, national defense industries geared production of major items with their own products in mind and not necessarily those of their allies. Major differences still exist in nearly every category of combat, support, and service support equipment among NATO forces. Compared to US forces, many of our NATO allies operate in an austere logistical support environment, and on-going major cutbacks in funding in those countries will certainly not alleviate this situation.

One of the greatest challenges to multinational corps will be the ability of the operational commander to address three critical, but fundamental sustainment imperatives: integration, continuity, and responsiveness. General Franks voiced his concern over the present NATO framework:
"Since allied units arrive in the corps sector with a host of unique needs, dismissing the problem with the catch phrase -logistics is a national responsibility - poorly serves the needs of a multinational corps. Relegating logistics to national responsibility will clearly not survive wartime demands and will too easily create animosities between allied formations when a cooperative effort is critical."

The ability to integrate combat service support among allied units; ensuring sustainment efforts keep pace with the tempo of operations; and ensuring support units are able to respond to surge requirements - these imperatives require more than integrated training of multinational support units. They will require major changes in the way units are equipped, and such a commitment inherent in a multinational force may be more costly than some countries may be willing to accept.

The demands of operational doctrine affect logistical support as well. "Tactical units (division and below) are expected to be relieved of much of their logistical responsibilities in order to enhance their operational agility. In this regard, the corps echelon is expected to shoulder much of the support work currently done at lower levels." Cor:ps-level multinational support systems must therefore be developed and prepared to accept this challenge before integrated corps operations are contemplated.

Just as POMCUS stocks have long provided follow-on forces the in-theater capabilities they needed, a similar capability must be developed to provide European based commanders flexibility for conducting out-of-area operations. This
requirement is made more complex when the multinational dimension is added. Consideration must be given to developing the right mix of logistical packages capable of supporting multiple national requirements for a wide range of potential missions. These packages must provide the commander the ability to operate not only as part of the multinational force but independently as well. As if this were not enough, these packages must also be provided the strategic and operational lift resourcing to move them.

* Fire Support Considerations. Fire support requires a carefully orchestrated effort to put steel on the target, and of the battlefield functional systems, it is the one where mistakes are most easily counted in lives lost. Integration of fire support elements within a multinational command structure places demand on speed but above all, accuracy. "Standardized air support procedures and the universal acceptance of English as "the language of tactical air" have forged a smoothly functioning combat multiplier. The same degree of standardization, however, does not yet extend to other fire support arenas." This lack of standardization can be overcome with training and supporting interoperability documents, such as field SOP's. The common language barrier may prove more difficult given the relative educational levels of ground fire support operators versus that of pilots. Reduced levels of American and British forces on the continent
may also foreshadow a move towards a non-English common language base.

* **Training Considerations.** The US has trained extensively in a multinational environment for many years. The multinational corps concept, however, will present some new challenges to the commander. The inevitable introduction of new equipment and the cross-fertilization of new techniques and doctrine will place a sharper learning curve on soldiers operating in this environment. On the surface this may appear to be an age-old problem, but the reduced number of US troops overseas, and concommitant reduction of command and training opportunities, may force personnel managers to reduce overseas tour lengths in order to ensure a fair-sharing of these opportunities. This in turn would lead to higher turnover rates and an even steeper training curve for commanders to overcome. Time needed for language proficiency will also add to the curve.

Another major challenge for US commanders, which applies equally in or out of a multinational corps, will be to train to US and NATO standards while maintaining sensitivity to their public presence in the host nation. The Europeans, and especially the Germans, are increasingly less tolerant of training that is publicly visible and even less tolerant of public damage. Gone are the days of massed armored formations charging across the farm fields of the central plains. While
computer simulations have allowed commanders to train leaders effectively in this constricted environment, soldiers need hands-on training in order to develop proficiency as operators of increasingly sophisticated equipment.

* Measures of Effectiveness. While so far I have touched on only a few of the many operational challenges facing the operational commander, a discussion on the merits of US participation in a multinational corps would not be complete without evaluating these challenges against some measure of effectiveness (MOE). Guertner's *NATO Strategy in a New World Order* article offers seven MOE categories that deserve analysis. At Figure 1 is a summary of these MOE along with the "sum of my analysis". Here is a description of how I arrived at the sum.

- Demonstrability. While participation in a multinational corps certainly demonstrates forward presence, this positive aspect is offset by the limited ability of the planned two heavy divisions to conduct aggressive training maneuvers as well as its deployability limitations in a crisis. The long deployment timeframe in the Gulf War was a luxury we cannot count on. I rated this MOE as a neutral category.

- Flexibility. This calls for a force structure that has light to heavy combat power tailored to the level of threat. Two heavy divisions do not provide the flexibility to deal
with urban warfare. Given the proliferation of high-tech anti-tank weapons, tanks today are simply too expensive to risk in a regional urban conflict. A light or airmobile division would better meet this need. Again, this MOE is rated negative.

- Mobility. The lack of strategic and theater sea and air lift assets is a current weakness that may never be adequately resolved. While mech and armored units are certainly mobile, future conflicts may require crossing bordering neutral states that may deny the movement of ground forces through their territory. Heavy multinational corps will be difficult to move. This also rates a negative.

- Lethality. There is no question the multinational corps provides a lot of punch. Clearly a positive.

- Command and Control. While many C2 problems can be resolved through training, the hidden costs in fixing these issues are going to be far more expensive than meets the eye. This category is rated neutral.

- Sustainability. This show-stopper is also a potential budget-buster. Lack of lift assets, the requirement to integrate logistics and other combat support and service support functions, and the requirement for prepositioned packages to support both integrated and independent operations rates this category as a negative.
Affordability. Do multinational corps provide a cost-effective combat capability based on an optimal mix of high to mid-level technology in weapons platforms and munitions? On the surface the answer appears to be yes, but I believe there are so many hidden costs associated with making a multinational corps work, that the question must be re-phrased in terms of political cost rather than defense dollars. I gave this category a negative.

The sum of these measures of effectiveness, with the exception of lethality, are decidedly negative. Since the US is firmly committed to the multinational corps concept in Europe, the question of whether it is a good idea is moot. The US commitment in terms of both force structure and integration, and the fiscal resolve to 'make it happen', requires further study by national planners to ensure it is in line with budgetary and threat realities.
### FIGURE 1

**MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>M.O.E.</th>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>SUM OF ANALYSIS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Demonstrability</td>
<td>Forward presence, exercises, deployment in a crisis.</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Flexibility</td>
<td>Force structure w/lite-heavy combat power tailored to threat.</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Mobility</td>
<td>Strategic lift to, w/in, out of European theater</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Lethality</td>
<td>Deep strike, lethal munitions, high accuracy, smaller force required.</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Cmd &amp; Control</td>
<td>Consolidated command structure, assets as force multipliers</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Sustainability</td>
<td>Lift, logistics, burden sharing, prepositioning</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Affordability</td>
<td>Cost-effective combat capababilities based on best mix of hi/mid-level technology in wpns platforms and munitions.</td>
<td>Negative</td>
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

US national and military strategies require more from our forces with fewer resources than ever before, and at least for the short term the downward trend in force size and structure is likely to continue. The new strategic environment presents a very different threat than that formerly posed by the Soviets. The NATO Alliance views the creation of multinational corps as a means of allowing member states to participate in the collective defense of Europe at a reduced cost.

The National Command Authority is committed to participation in the multinational corps concept and General Franks presents a convincing argument that the challenges inherent in participation can be overcome. He states that the VII Corps experience in REFORGER 88 demonstrated the fallacy behind assuming that multinational operations unduly limit possible force alignments. Integration of the German, Canadian, and French units demonstrated successful deception operations, coordinated attacks, integration of corps artillery and long-range reconnaissance. He maintains
that the Central Region needs a formation to link the tactical and operational levels of war, and the multinational corps fits the bill. He argues that national differences need to be set aside and that the challenges of multinational corps operations are not insurmountable.

I agree that most operational challenges can be overcome but I am not convinced that a major US commitment to, and participation in, multinational corps operations is in our best interest for two reasons. The fundamental reason lies in the nature of the threat and America’s ability to respond. I believe the US should provide an effective component to the ARRC as a means of demonstrating US commitment to the stability of Europe. I do not agree, however, that two heavy divisions in the central region have a valid mission. A more appropriate US contribution to NATO would be a single light or airborne division in one bi-national corps. This would further demonstrate US resolve to NATO, provide flexibility for independent or multinational out-of-area operations, and reduce many of the costs associated with going multinational.

The second reason for my reservation is that just like the seductive peace dividend offered by the reduction of defense spending, savings offered by participation in multinational corps may prove just as elusive. In fact, costs are likely to go up sharply in the short term as we meet new requirements for interoperable equipment and increased training needs.
The economic and political well-being of Europe is a vital interest of the US, and sharing in its collective defense will continue to be a key element of our national military strategy. We must ensure that our participation in NATO multinational corps optimizes scarce defense dollars in terms of operational agility and independent capability. Our force structure commitments must reflect both the new fiscal realities and a new world order, and current plans should be adjusted accordingly.
ENDNOTES

Chapter II


3. Ibid., p. 2.

4. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

5. Powell, pp. 5-8.


Chapter III


5. Woerner, pp. 15-16.


Chapter IV


3. *Ibid*.

4. Franks and Carver, pp. 33-34.


10. Atkeson, p. 16.

11. Franks and Carver, p. 35.


Chapter V

1. Franks and Carver, pp. 31-32.

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