The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

ASEAN COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

BY

Colonel Edmun D. Bimo Prakoso
Indonesian Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1992

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

92-12840
ASEAN was born in July 1967. At that time, the ASEAN partners were almost strangers to each other, if not adversaries. But after 25 years, the region has undergone a true transformation. East and Southeast Asia are economically the most dynamic and the fastest-growing regions in the world today. The stability in the region is a consequence of the stability, coordination and team work of ASEAN.

With a reduction of U.S. forces presence in the area, the key to securing regional stability is to increase the cooperation between ASEAN nations. This would include cooperation, not only in economic and political sectors, but also in the military sector. ASEAN can support and increase multilateral military cooperation between the countries.

The vast development of advanced arms technology has produced shorter warning times of any possible threat and less reaction times available for the defender. So it is very
19. continued:

important that at least a pre-planned combined forces command is already built up and able to exercise command and control over combined ASEAN forces. To build it, we need to pay very close attention to the political effects of each developing step of the military cooperation. ASEAN has already succeeded in economic development, and therefore I believe that there will be no problem in the development of stronger military cooperation. It is a long hard way to go but it is important for the survival and stability of the region, and for the stability of the world.
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

ASEAN COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Edmund D. Bimo Prakoso
Tentara Nasional Indonesia

Colonel Donald W. Boose, Jr.
Project Adviser

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
ASEAN was born in July 1967. At that time, the ASEAN partners were almost strangers to each other, if not adversaries. But after 25 years, the region has undergone a true transformation. East and Southeast Asia are economically the most dynamic and the fastest-growing regions in the world today. The stability in the region is a consequence of the stability, coordination and team work of ASEAN.

With a reduction of U.S. forces presence in the area, the key to securing regional stability is to increase the cooperation between ASEAN nations. This would include cooperation, not only in economic and political sectors, but also in the military sector. ASEAN can support and increase multi-lateral military cooperation between the countries.

The vast development of advanced arms technology has produced shorter warning times of any possible threat and less reaction times available for the defender. So it is very important that at least a pre-planned combined forces command is already built up and able to exercise command and control over combined ASEAN forces. To build it, we need to pay very close attention to the political effects of each developing step of the military cooperation. ASEAN has already succeeded in economic development, and therefore I believe that there will be no problem in the development of stronger military cooperation. It is a long hard way to go but it is important for the survival and stability of the region, and for the stability of the world.
ASEAN COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

INTRODUCTION

Security and prosperity have to be in balance, each depends on the other as a coin with two faces which builds one meaning. ASEAN has developed very close economic, political and cultural cooperation between its member nations. Although there are some problems among the ASEAN nations, I believe that those problems can be solved as before. Each nation looks to have ASEAN as a family system for problem solving. ASEAN nations looked for integrity not diversity, with no winner or loser, where everything is in the spirit of unity. Now, it needs to strengthen its military cooperation to protect ASEAN nations from instability caused by internal or outside threats which can influence the economic development. In developing closer and wider military cooperation, ASEAN needs to pay great attention to the neighboring countries to prevent misunderstanding and the beginning of an arms race, which can lead to instability. Is such a system useful and feasible? What kind of plans are needed to realize it? These issues will be discussed in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to examine the usefulness and feasibility of a combined multinational military command to protect the ASEAN countries and to maintain peace and security in the area.

This paper is based on the assumption that the ASEAN Governments will politically agree to strengthen their military ties.
VOCABULARY.¹

Center of gravity. That characteristic, capability, or locality from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. It exists at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

Combined warfare. Warfare conducted by forces of two or more allied nations in coordinated action toward common objectives.

Command, control, and communication systems. Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications that support command and control. Also called C3 systems.

Crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to a nation, its territory, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.

Conflict. An armed struggle or clash between organized parties within or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. While regular forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict is often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other elements of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused,
and direct application of force.

**Host nation.** A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or ASEAN organizations to be located on, or operate in, or to transit through its territory.

**Insurgency.** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

**Joint operation.** A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, training, or administrative military mission by forces from two or more Services; also, the conduct of combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers, by forces of two or more Services needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

**Joint Force Commander.** A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise Combatant Command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC.

**Operational continuum.** The general states of peacetime competition, conflict, and war within which various types of military operations and activities are conducted.

**Unified operations.** A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions taking place within unified commands under overall direction of the commanders of those commands.

**Full interoperability.** The achievement of effective and tested interfaces across the entire spectrum of battlefield operating systems.2
Interoperability. The ability of one Army to support or provide a service to another Army/Armies without the need for full standardization.

Operational effectiveness. The achievement of compatible doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures to enable a force to operate.

Program strategy. The plan to achieve operational effectiveness and full interoperability.

Standardization. The process of developing common concepts, doctrines, procedures and equipment.

THE ASEAN COUNTRIES

ASEAN was formed as the result of many similarities of objectives in the post colonial era, especially in nation building and economic development, which needed regional stability. The regional situation was not stable because of the effects of past European colonialists and Japanese invaders, who were unwilling to leave their colonies. This unstable situation was worsened as the result of the struggle for domination and influence over the area by major super powers (i.e., the U.S., Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China). It became a test of power between Democracy and Totalitarianism or Communism.

Many proposals were introduced to form ASEAN, but they were not successful until after Indonesia stopped its confrontation against the Malaysia Federation in 1966. The development of ASEAN
was so difficult because there were so many problems in and between the member countries. Only a strong common will and belief in its usefulness has overcome the difficulties. ASEAN has grown better and stronger in economic, cultural and political cooperation.

In the last two years, three events have enabled ASEAN to reach stronger economic, political and security cooperation. At the Annual Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM) in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991, which was followed by ASEAN dialogue with its major external collaborators in what has become known as the Post Ministerial Conference (PMC), one of the more notable items on the agenda was the call from Japan for discussion on the evolving and future security context of Southeast Asia and the larger Asia Pacific region.3

ASEAN leaders concluded their fourth summit on 27-28 January in Singapore with a plan to establish an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) within 15 years with a beginning date of 1 January 1993. They also issued a firm statement on security by using the PMC forum to intensify external political and security dialogues.

Formation of ASEAN

To put ASEAN issues into perspective, it may be useful to trace when and why ASEAN was formed and the difficulties the ASEAN members faced at the formation and the development of cooperation. In early August 1967, the foreign ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, met in Thailand to discuss the formation of a new Southeast Asian regional organization. After three days
talks at the seaside resort of Bangsaen Bangkok, on 8 August 1967, they issued a Declaration establishing the "Association of Southeast Asian Nations" (ASEAN).

The most difficult initial task facing prospective members of ASEAN was to decide just what ASEAN aims, principles and purposes were to be. A largely unstated but important underlying objective was clearly to establish a framework for peaceful intra-regional relationships between member states. In doing so, they wanted to contain those disruptive disputes that had in the past distracted attention away from individual nations' internal tasks. Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman's draft, which contained a proposal to establish a "Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation" was used as a basis for the ASEAN Declaration signed at the conclusion of ASEAN's inaugural meeting. This draft drew heavily in its preambular statement of principles from the Manila Agreements of July/August 1963. It also included a revised concept of Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia (Maphilindo). The original Maphilindo concept attracted the most controversy during negotiations, especially this formulation:

Foreign bases are temporary in nature and should not be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of Asian countries, and arrangements of collective defence should not be used to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers.4

It was revised for the ASEAN Declaration as follows:

Foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of states in the area.5
The ASEAN Declaration, which had a list of ASEAN’s aims and purposes, was apparently much less controversial. In this respect ASEAN assigned top priority to cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields. Economic cooperation was clearly considered to be the most important. Economic cooperation not only paved the way for cooperation in another areas, but was, indeed, an essential precondition for the achievement of objectives in these other areas.

It was axiomatic that economic co-operation is often the most durable foundation upon which political and cultural co-operation can be built.6

The ambition of ASEAN members in the field of economic cooperation and even more so in the social and cultural fields, was relatively uncontroversial compared to cooperation in political or security matters. Although political considerations were down played in the ASEAN Declaration, there is evidence that they were of primary importance in the minds of most of the delegations attending ASEAN’s inaugural meeting. They suggested at least the rudiments of a common political program for the organization. In this context it is worth citing remarks made in October 1974 by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik. Adam Malik recalled the basic motivations that had led to the establishment of ASEAN as follows:

Although from the outset ASEAN was conceived as an organization for economic, social, and cultural co-operation and although considerations in these fields were no doubt central, it was the fact that there was a convergence in the political outlook of the five prospective member nations, which provided the main stimulus to join together in ASEAN. There was early recognition that meaningful progress could only be achieved by giving first priority to the task of
overall and rapid economic development. It was also realized that, to this end, policies should be consciously geared towards safeguarding this priority objective, not only in purely economic terms, but simultaneously also to secure the essential conditions of peace and stability, both domestically and internationally in the surrounding region.

All of those points indicated some of the problems they had to encounter at the beginning of the formation of ASEAN. The only heavy support for this formation was the "will" to develop the economy of the nations in the areas together, sharing with each other as neighbors. But as I believe that prosperity is always balanced with security, it is important now to study the possibility of cooperation in security matters.

ASEAN's initial economic progress was not so good, but it proved to be very useful and important in solving problems between member countries in peaceful ways. Just a little over one year from its establishment, the organization's activities were suspended for a period of nearly eight months due to the deterioration of relations between Malaysia and the Philippines over the "Corregidor Affair" and a revival of the Sabah dispute. The Corregidor incident happened in March 1968. It is unclear what happened, but it appears that the incident involved a special military force of Muslim recruits that was infiltrated into the Malaysian state of Sabah after training on Corregidor Island, near Manila. The Malaysian Government lodged a formal protest. Senior officials from Malaysia and the Philippines met in Bangkok in June and July 1968 to discuss the Sabah claim. The discussions were fruitless. But in the second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the
Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Razak, and the Philippine Foreign Secretary, Narciso Ramos, agreed upon a "cooling off period."

In September 1968 a resolution delineating Philippine territorial water was passed in the Philippine Congress. The resolution included the provision that this legislation would be "without prejudice to the delineation of base lines of territorial sea around the territory of Sabah over which the Philippines had acquired dominion and sovereignty." This resolution made the situation worst. In late November, to protest the resolution, Malaysia withdrew its diplomatic representatives from Manila followed by Philippine diplomatic representatives withdrew from Kuala Lumpur. Indonesia and Thailand played an important role in holding ASEAN together and prevented the Sabah dispute from further escalation. This problem was not solved until the Third Ministerial Meeting in December 1969, where the Malaysian Prime Minister announced the normalisation of diplomatic relations with the Philippines.

Another major incident in inter-ASEAN relations was sparked in October 1968. Two Indonesian marines, who had been found guilty by Singapore British Law of acts of sabotage and murder during the Confrontation period, were executed. This led to an angry public reaction in Indonesia. Even today, the two marines are still heroes in Indonesia and the people still remember what the Singaporean government did to them. The reason is that the Indonesian Government had already agreed to cease the Confrontation before the two Marines were executed. They hoped by ceasing the
confrontation, everything would be solved and they could be friendly neighbors forever. The execution of the two Marines after the agreement hurt the feelings of the Indonesian people. The Indonesian Government, however, expressed its desire to maintain good relations with Singapore and in the following months bilateral relations resumed their previous steadily improving course.

The Third Ministerial Meeting was postponed from August to December 1969 to prevent disruption during campaigning for the November 1969 Philippine elections. The Malaysian Prime Minister announced the normalization of diplomatic relations with the Philippines, stating that this showed "the great value we place on ASEAN." After this meeting, there were a number of meetings of ASEAN committees resulting in ninety-eight recommendations proposing co-operation between ASEAN countries in various fields which were approved by the Ministerial Meeting. The ministers also signed an agreement on the establishment of an ASEAN Fund to finance joint projects and an agreement for the promotion of cooperation in the mass media and in cultural activities. As part of efforts to promote tourism, 1971 was designated "Visit ASEAN Year." This was followed by a joint ASEAN Pavilion at the Jakarta International Trade Fair. Through these and other individual actions, cooperation between ASEAN nations increased. Foreign Minister of Singapore Rajaratnam commented at the Fourth Ministerial Meeting:

I for one feel reassured that ASEAN has not attempted any great leap forward. I know that such an attempt at this juncture of ASEAN's history would also prove to be the last leap forward. Instead, ASEAN has quite correctly chosen to
move forward through a series of small steps. This no doubt is a tedious way of moving forward but it is a surer and more reliable way of promoting regional co-operation. ¹⁰

And Tun Ismail, Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister, commented as follows:

The constant contact and communication between our officials has helped to develop a habit of co-operation and a sense of solidarity which will in turn help us when we move forward towards wider areas of co-operation. ¹¹

President Marcos in his opening address to the Fourth Ministerial Meeting proposed as an ultimate goal the establishment of an ASEAN Common Market and urged that steps be taken at an early stage to set up a limited free trade area on a selective commodity basis and to establish a payment union within the ASEAN region. Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman urged that ASEAN had "passed its organizational stage" and that it should proceed to consider and implement concrete measures and projects that would bring direct and tangible benefits.

Major developments also occurred in the international and regional environment that considerably enhanced the value of political cooperation among ASEAN members. Several changes in major power relationships affecting the region occurred as follows:


2. The TET offensive staged by North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam later that month.

3. President Nixon’s announcement of the "Guam Doctrine" in July 1969, which signalled that the U.S. would place much greater
reliance on indigenous forces to cope with security problems.

4. The Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party's decision in April 1969 to change the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) which ended the turmoil period and xenophobia during the Cultural Revolution and started the "ping-pong diplomacy."

5. The Soviet Union establishment of diplomatic relations with Malaysia in March 1967 and with Singapore in June 1968. A Soviet Naval vessel was deployed for the first time to the Indian Ocean in March 1968.

In response to these events, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia Tun Ismail proposed a concept of neutralization of Southeast Asia to prevent influence and dangers posed by different and opposite interests of the four major powers: the U.S., the USSR, China and Japan. The proposal was supported by the Non-aligned Conference in Lusaka, the U.N., the Commonwealth and ASEAN. Tun Ismail presented it in the following terms:

It is with Vietnam in mind together with the withdrawal of the Americans and British from Southeast Asia that my Government is advocating a policy of neutralization of Southeast Asia to be guaranteed by the big powers, viz. the U.S., the USSR, and the People's Republic of China. The policy is meant to be a proclamation that this region of ours is no longer to be regarded as an area to be divided into spheres of influence of the big powers.\textsuperscript{12}

In October 1971, Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tan Sri Ghazali, gave the steps that Malaysia envisaged for the implementation of the proposal:

1. Individual countries in the region must respect one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and not participate in activities likely to directly or
indirectly threaten the security of another. This is an essential requirement. Non-interference and non-aggression are the basic principles which Southeast Asian countries must unequivocally accept before any further steps can be taken.

2. All foreign powers should be excluded from the region.

3. The region should not be allowed to be used as a theater of conflict in the international power struggle.

4. They should devise ways and means of, and undertake the responsibility for, ensuring peace among member states.

5. They should present a collective view before the major powers on vital issues of security.

6. They should promote regional co-operation.

On the next level, the major powers (U.S., USSR, China) must agree on the following:

1. Southeast Asia should be an area of neutrality.

2. The powers undertake to exclude countries in the region from the power struggle amongst themselves.

3. The powers should devise the supervisory means of guaranteeing Southeast Asia's neutrality in the international power struggle.¹³

Sudjatmoko of Indonesia during a lecture in Australia in July/August 1967 spoke of:

The widely held vision in Indonesia of a neutral Southeast Asia working together in freedom and equality with an increasing degree of regional co-operation towards greater stability and prosperity for each of its members and for the region as a whole, guaranteed in its external security and supported its economic growth by the Soviet Union as well as the Western powers.¹⁴

In summary, ASEAN had evolved from an organization for solving problems between the countries into a broader organization seeking to create a stable region and vast economic developments. To prevent outside intervention, ASEAN issued a declaration that the
nations constituted a Zone Of Peace, Freedom, And Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Now there is a will for further, stronger economic, political, and security cooperation.

Security analysis

There are border problems, overlapping claims, nation building, insurgency, and separatist movements among and inside the ASEAN countries. Those are all old problems which were caused by the colonialist systems and as a result of the Cold War. Until today, ASEAN has worked together to solve those problems successfully. But to understand more about the security situation, let us make a general check and analysis from Thailand to Indonesia.

Thailand. The northern and eastern borders face an unstable Cambodia. The ASEAN countries initiated a solution to stabilize the country with a Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) and after the 23 October 1991 Paris agreement the conflicting parties were ready to stop the fighting and to form a government. ASEAN countries sent a peace keeping force, but it will take time after the formation of a Cambodian government to settle the situation.

In the western border region, Thailand has problems with the flow of narcotics and refugees from Burma (Myanmar) which sometimes leads to clashes between the two countries' armed forces. Diplomatic relations between the two countries are used to address the problems.

In its southern border with Malaysia, the situation is more stable although there is still possible conflict against Communist
guerrillas and Islamic Fundamentalists in this area. Diplomatic and military cooperation is exercised to counter the problems. It is claimed that there is no longer a Communist threat in the region, but as the Communist movement is latent, we must be careful in the near future.

These internal problems were dominated by the 23 February 1991 military coup which toppled former prime minister Chatichai Choonhavan. This situation has reduced the relationship between the U.S. and Thai Governments, but I believe this situation will be solved soon through Thai nation building and the restoration of the democratic system through the general election which took place in March 1992.

Malaysia.

In West Malaysia’s northern border region with Thailand, there are problems with Communist guerrillas. On 2 December 1989, the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), which had waged a guerilla insurgency for four decades under the British trained leader Chin Peng, signed a peace accord with Malaysia and Thailand, to end its armed struggle. Malaysia claimed it had destroyed them successfully. However, because of the nature of Communist revolutionary warfare, we have to keep attention on this movement, which may return in other ways. After signing the peace accord, Chin Peng stated during an interview that he still regarded himself as a Marxist-Leninist. Also he requested to the Malaysian government to change the CPM’s name to the Malayan People’s Party, a move he hoped would make the party legal and thus allow it to
engage in Malaysian politics. He wanted to return to Malaysia to head the Labour Socialist Party of Malaysia, which would include other ex-CPM members. There will also be a problem with Thailand if Malaysia supports the Islamic movement in southern Thailand.

Along Malaysia's southern border, relations with Singapore are not so good because neither trusts the other. The prediction that Malaysia will someday force Singapore to reunite with Malaysia is the threat for most Singaporeans. The Malaysian distrust of Singapore stems from historical incidences. Many Malaysians still think that the decision to release Singapore from the Malaysia confederation was a wrong decision made by Tunku Abdurachman as the Malaysia Prime Minister. The reasons are territorial disunity and economic background. A territorial dispute over the ownership of Batu Putih island by both Malaysia and Singapore increases the distrust. Another major reason stems from a joint Malaysia-Indonesia military exercise in August 1991, which was held in Malaysia's Southern Johore state. Johore is separated from Singapore by only a narrow strait. The Singapore press accused Malaysia of not informing Singapore when the exercise would be held and of staging it close to Singapore's national day. But this problem was solved because Singapore also had military exercises with Indonesia. The Indonesian-Singapore exercises, however, have not yet reached the "Combined Armed Forces Field Exercise" stage that Indonesia has with Malaysia because the cooperation with Malaysia started earlier than with Singapore. Indonesia's position would be difficult if the two countries start to hate each other.
To avoid this, Indonesia always brings them to informal talks to solve the problems.

In eastern Malaysia, there are problems with the Philippines' claim over Sabah, and with Indonesia over Sepadan and Legitan islands. The problem between the Philippines and Malaysia is more difficult to solve because of social, cultural and religious implications. The problem will be more difficult if each supports the insurgency movement in the other's territory.

The Malaysian problem with Indonesia is over the indirect Malaysian support to the Islamic Fundamentalist Movement in Aceh, in the northern part of Sumatra. Indirectly, the Malaysian government, which adopted the Islamic "Quran" as the state base for its legislative, executive and judicative decisions, has thrice supported an insurgency in Indonesia. First, in 1951, Malaysia gave indirect support to the Islamic Fundamentalist Movement, which wanted to change the fundament of the Indonesian Constitution to an Islamic fundament. Second, in 1979 Hasan Tiro, the leader of the Islamic Fundamentalist Movement, escaped from Aceh, Indonesia and was given asylum in Malaysia. Third, since 1990 there are approximately 200 persons in Malaysia who are wanted by the Indonesian government for extradition. This can be a big problem, because Malaysia can be used as a transit area to develop and support an Islamic Fundamentalist Movement in Indonesia. This will counter the ASEAN declarations, and Indonesia will oppose it strongly.

There are also internal problems in Malaysia. There are
racial problems in western and eastern Malaysia between the Malays and the Chinese and with the Kadazans. The other problem is a political problem in Sabah as a result of the arrests of Datuk Jeffrey Kitingan, the Sabah chief minister's younger brother, and Benedict Topin, executive secretary of the Kadazan Dusun Cultural Association (KDCA), on 9 July 1991 just one week before the Sabah state voting. In addition, there are internal Malaysian political party rivalries. This problem is a result of different concepts for building the nation's democratic system. I believe they will eventually solve it.

Singapore.

Singapore's only problem is its relationship with Malaysia, which is based on trust in the willingness of Malaysia to be a good neighbor. Singapore for this reason has created what they call the "poisoned shrimp" approach to defense: a military build up and an infrastructure which is large enough to cause excessive pain to any would be invader. Even though Singapore could not prevent a determined attack, it can make such an attack very difficult and distasteful. This is also the reason why Singapore offers its facilities to U.S. Forces. It provides a security umbrella, even though it is against the ASEAN declaration that "foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned."

Singapore's internal problem is a racial problem between the Chinese and the Malays. The Government indirectly limits the ability of the Malays to attain higher positions. In July 1989,
the Singapore Government decision to take in what it estimates could be up to 100,000 Chinese Hong Kong immigrants has increased the tension.\textsuperscript{20} The main reason for this decision is that Singaporeans, especially the Chinese, are afraid that an overwhelming Malay population could result in the handover of Singapore to Malaysia.

\textbf{Brunei Darussalam.}

There is no problem in this wealthy, high income country except that of distribution of wealth. The disparity between the Royal House and the People must be watched to prevent social problems.

\textbf{The Philippines.}

The Philippines has problems with Malaysia because of the Philippine claim on Sabah (Northern tip of Borneo) and with other countries because of competing claims on some of the Spratly islands. Indonesia has twice held conferences to help to settle the Spratly islands conflicts by inviting most of the conflicting parties to negotiate. For the next meeting the Philippines will invite all the claiming parties including Taiwan.

The Philippines relationship with the U.S. is not as good as before due to the acrimonious negotiations ending with withdrawal of U.S. bases from the Philippines. The U.S. has already made a counter movement by preparing to make sharp cuts in aid to Manila.\textsuperscript{21}

Internal problems include political institution building, the Communist insurgency, the Reform of Armed Forces Movement (RAM),
and the Islamic Separatist Movement. The Philippines has many problems compared with other states. The Moro and Communist insurgencies are still a potential threat to the existing government. In 1989 after the failed coup, the R.A.M. has changed its approach. To get more popular support, it changed the meaning of RAM to Revolutionaria Allianca Macabayan or patriotic alliance revolution, which covers all the people, not only the armed forces. This organization is once more threatening to the democratic system of the country. By the next election, it is hoped a strong leader will be chosen who will strengthen the democratic government of the Philippines.

**Indonesia.**

There are problems in international relationships as an effect of domestic problems and because of overlapping territorial claims. There are problems with Malaysia on two main issues. One is the unwillingness of the Malaysian government to extradite the convicted Islamic fundamentalists back to Indonesia. The other problem is the overlapping claims on Sepadan and Legitan islands which arose when Malaysia sent troops to occupy the islands. To prevent escalation, Indonesia responded peacefully by lobbying and asking to discuss the problem through a Joint Border Committee meeting.

The problem with Papua New Guinea (PNG) is that members of the "Irian Jaya Separatist Movement" take sanctuary in PNG territory. The two countries have worked hard to solve this problem including the extradition of some Irian Jaya refugees from Vanimo, PNG.\textsuperscript{2} A
better relationship and coordination has been developed between the two countries with a decision to open consulates in Vanimo, PNG and in Jaya Pura, Indonesia. On Tuesday, January 14, 1992, during a visit by PNG Prime Minister Rabbie L. Namaliu to Jakarta, the two countries agreed to develop more cooperation on the border, and in economic and political developments.23

Internal problems include separatism in Irian Jaya, an idea which was planted by the Dutch around 1960 before they left the area. The situation right now is militarily and politically stable. Only one reinforced battalion from another Military Area Command is stationed there to help the territorial military command in developing the region.

The Socialist Democratic Party (SDP) or Frente Revolutionaria Independence (Fretelin) in East Timor is still Communist, although its face has changed. Its strength has been reduced from around 25,000 weapons in 1976 to only around fifty rifles. In 1983 the Fretelin evaluated its past revolutionary struggle actions and decided to change its approach by introducing a concept of reconciliation of all ex members of the Uniao Democratia Timorense (UDT) party and Apodeti party to build a united front against the government. Both parties are pro integration with Indonesia and against the Fretelin and on July 1976 after East Timor’s declaration of integration to the Republic of Indonesia, most of ex Apodeti party members joined the Golkar party, while the ex UDT party members joined the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or PDI.

Also Fretelin consolidated its intelligence, especially the
clandestine networks in East Timor and its connections with supporters in the cities of Indonesia and in the outside world, especially Portugal. This reconciliation failed because most of the people didn’t like the Fretelin propaganda. In 1987 they started to concentrate on clandestine movements. In 1989, the clandestine movements were discovered and destroyed, except those within the church and among the youths.

The government policy is to respect and work closely with the church to solve the problem and to support the church and keep it an institution which people will respect. During the visit of the Holy Pope John Paul VI to four provinces of Indonesia (including East Timor on 12 October 1989), the Fretelin tried to use the church and the students to catch the world’s attention and hoped that there would be many martyrs in front of the Pope. But this failed, because the security force was prepared to deal with it peacefully.

Other attempts were conducted to attract world attention and at last, on 12 November 1991, they succeed to attract the anger of the security forces, which resulted in some people being killed. First, they stabbed the vice battalion commander of the 700th Airborne Battalion with a knife, which resulted in an increase of the security force’s anger. Second, on their way to the cemetery, they destroyed the Summa Bank, which had helped to develop the region. They exploited the situation by spreading rumors about other killings which were not true, but as usual, the press picked it up. Fretelin prepared this moment better than during the Pope’s
visit. They coordinated internally and with the outside world. They gave indirect invitations to journalists through their clandestine cell to witness and cover the accident to ensure journalists would be in the right place: the cemetery. Two days after the accident, the situation was back to normal.

The only time that problems develop in East Timor is when a special foreigner with a vested interest visits the province. For normal tourist visits there is no problem. An important aspect of the East Timor issue is the attitude of Portugal. The relationship between Indonesia and Portugal must be normalized and the Portuguese Government must support Indonesia in settling the problem. This will benefit both countries. The people already live peacefully, and they don’t want more trouble. They suffered enough during Portuguese colonialism and the civil war before integration.

The problem in Aceh is an old one and is part of the Islamic Fundamentalist Movement, which tried to build an Islamic Indonesian State or Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) by changing the Indonesian Constitution, and which formed the Darul Islam (DI) and Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII) organizations to carry on the struggle. After the Dutch gave Indonesia independence on 15 August 1950, DI/TII launched a campaign of armed struggle in West Java, Central Java, Aceh, South Kalimantan/Borneo, and South and Central Sulawesi/Celebes. In 1962, the Indonesian government succeeded in countering the movement but did not destroy it completely due to lack of resources. These resources were redirected to fight
against the Dutch to liberate West Irian. After 1962, the DI/TII tried many times constitutionally and unconstitutionally to reach their objectives. In 1984, there was an incident in Tanjong Priok, Jakarta. On 7 February 1989, another incident took place in Lampung, South Sumatra and the last movement was in Aceh. We believe that we can solve all these problems as we solved the problem of the Communist movements.

THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICTS

Regarding other, non ASEAN countries' interests, Asian countries are always trying to concentrate on economic development and education to reach the same level with Europe. Most Asian countries are busy with economic development and nation building. Some still have problems with insurgency and separatist movements as a result of the previous colonialist "time bomb" which the former colonial powers left in order to keep the new nations under their power or influence. Some of them are so bad that we call it "politic divide et impera" and "politics to keep the people's education very low." The reason was that if the people had education, then they would ask for independence. The colonialists always said that we were stupid, lazy and inferior people who could do nothing, which we have proven to be untrue.

The other problem was created by the superpowers during the Cold War. Now as the Cold War has passed away, we only need to concentrate on who has the capabilities to force their will on our
In my opinion, the ranks are as follows:

1. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC).
2. Japan.
3. India.

Why the PRC? The PRC is still a Communist country which has great influence in Asia through the overseas Chinese people in the region. It is a very strong Chinese tradition to love their motherland, and it is PRC policy to acknowledge all overseas Chinese as its citizens, even if they have already become citizens of another country. China still produces light and heavy military equipment and continues its nuclear programs, including Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). The PRC exports arms and equipment and it can export millions of boat people. I believe it can survive even under a blockade, but who can blockade China? To blockade Iraq, the Coalition used almost all the means they had. How could any coalition blockade China with its hundreds of miles of coastline and borders?

China also has the capabilities to insert insurgents all over the world especially into ASEAN countries. Historically China supported insurgents in ASEAN.

If there will be a civil war in China, many people will become refugees. Who will take care of or stop the millions of refugees? China intervened in the Korean War to support North Korea and, although it has improved ties with the South, it is still allied with North Korea. During the Vietnam War, between 1950 and 1978,
China provided over $20 billion worth of materiel to Vietnam and provided political-military support, especially in 1965-1967 which figured prominently in shaping Washington’s strategy of graduated escalation.\(^2\) China supported the Indonesian Communist Party with political-military assistance during the President Sukarno period and in return President Sukarno, under Communist influence, in 1962 conducted a confrontation strategy against the formation of the Malaysia Federation. In 1963-1965 China also provided small arms to Indonesia to build the Fifth Column created by the Indonesian Communist Party in preparation to take over Indonesia. In 1974 China took over the Paracel islands from Vietnam. What was Vietnam’s reaction? Nil. What was the Soviet reaction with its Pacific Fleet from Cam Ranh Bay? Nothing.

Does China have problems with some ASEAN countries? Yes, especially regarding overlapping claims on the Spratly islands.\(^2\) Also the PRC will protect all "Chinese citizens" all over the world, because these Chinese are money donors to their motherland. Will the PRC disturb ASEAN nations? Yes, if after studying the costs and benefits of its planned actions, it concludes that such activities will benefit China in the long run. The Chinese are always profit oriented: "if you have money you are my friend, if you don’t have money you are not my friend."

Historically, Japan used to invade other nations. Korea and China were invaded by Japan and during World War II almost all Asian countries were conquered by Japan. Why did Japan go to war? What is the reason for possible conflicts? One is to get access to
resources and the other is to protect investments overseas.

Does Japan have problems with other countries? Yes. Japan has a problem with Russia on the southern Kurile Islands, which are claimed by Japan. Japan can change its civilian industries to military industries in a short time, and has the capability to launch satellites, which is technically similar to launching ballistic missiles. Its technology is superior, and the will of the people is high.

In recent years, India has built up its Navy with aircraft carriers. It is also building a new navy base on Nicobar Island at the entry point to the Malacca Strait just north of Sumatra. India has manpower, technology and enough military equipment (much of it locally produced) to support its will. The only problem is the economic situation, which makes it very difficult for India to support power projection. But we know that India has used much money to develop its nuclear capability and can transfer funds from economic development to support of an invasion. Although India has a military capability and ambitions, it would still have a problem supporting the projection of power from the economic standpoint. I think it is still concentrating on economic development. Furthermore, historically India has never invaded another nation. Its only foreign excursions were when it took over Goa from the Portuguese colonialists in 1975 and sent a peace keeping force to Sri Lanka in 1987.

There are different kinds of possible conflicts: low intensity conflict, limited war and total war. Low intensity conflict will
be more likely to be used because of its limited effects and low cost, and because it can be escalated or deescalated as the situation needs. If China supports North Korea, it will be either limited or total war, because the U.S. will go to war with its coalition. Northeast Asia is one of the three main U.S. interests in the world. This also can be applied in the case of Japan (another close U.S. ally) in regaining back its islands from Russia.

These conflicts will affect ASEAN in the use of facilities to support the U.S. and its coalition. It will lead to a decline in economic progress in the ASEAN nations and increase refugee problems. Another big problem is the Spratly Islands. Three ASEAN countries have overlapping claims and the Philippines already occupies some of the islands. A limited war or total war will occur if the claimants will choose to use force in solving the problem.

Also a major unstable political change or a bloody democratization process in China which creates a civil war would inflict ASEAN and the world with refugee problems and an unstable economic situation.

USEFULNESS OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCES COMMAND

Will a Multinational Forces Command be useful for ASEAN countries? First, we must consider the political aspect. The ASEAN countries are concentrating on economic development, which needs a stable region free from internal and external problems.
How to make it stable? Each country must try hard to counter all internal problems and it will be very helpful if other neighboring countries, which may have more experience dealing with the same problems, provide support to solve the problems. It is the same system as when a family consisting of brothers and sisters help each other and share their knowledge and experiences. To solve problems between the countries in this system will be very useful, because everybody will solve problems as a family with the "take and give system" and without the use of force. Every problem will be solved by peaceful means as the result of understanding each other in the ASEAN Armed Forces, especially with a Combined Forces Command which works and lives together. There are already organizations within ASEAN, and between ASEAN and outside nations, which work together in settling problems between the countries such as the Joint Border Committees (JBC) between Malaysia-Indonesia, Philippines-Indonesia and PNG-Indonesia.

Indonesia has often been classified "invasionist," because of its use of military power to get its objectives. In our view, the use of military force to counter colonialism was the only way to get our territory back. In our struggle for independence, we had tried to use diplomatic means, but of course it was impossible, because the colonialists were like a snake who will turn around and bite you from another direction. They tried very hard using all of their means and ways to stay and occupy our territory. Indonesia right now and, I believe, forever, will not try to expand its territory in any way because its Constitution only covers and
protects the existing Indonesia from Sabang (northern tip of Sumatra) to Merauke (at the border with PNG). Border problems with Malaysia and Vietnam will be solved through mutual benefit and cooperation, the same system which was used between Australia and Indonesia in the case of the Timor gap.30

Between ASEAN countries, the solutions of all problems will be more easy because all nations will work together as a result of close military relations, which will limit the use of military force to solve problems. The overall results will strengthen the political force of the ASEAN countries in dealing with other countries, especially the ones that will try to disturb ASEAN countries and who will now have to think twice before trying to do it.

Regarding the economic aspect, this formation will support the economic interests of all the ASEAN countries, because it can reduce the military budget for research and development, training, purchase of equipment, and operations, and will provide possible cost benefits and efficiency in arms production in the ASEAN countries.

The most important advantage will be in stabilizing the region, which will support the growth of economic development. Other countries who want to invest in ASEAN countries will feel secure because of the close military cooperation among the ASEAN countries, which means protection for their investments. Also, as the result of this cooperation they will support each other in raw materials, resources and finished products before sending those
items to other countries, which will strengthen the economic ties among the countries.

All ASEAN countries have democratic government systems, which makes it easier to work together among the countries and in helping each other in solving problems. The different applications of the term "Democratic" are a result of different systems which the colonialists brought to the region. It is also due to the different cultures and social systems. In the future, when all the countries of Indochina join ASEAN, I believe that they will use the locally applied democratic systems. Vietnam at the beginning of the revolution against France for independence was not Communist. However, because the French did not prepare and support independence, there was no other way for Vietnam to get help against the French colonialists aside from asking for help from communist countries. The same problem almost happened to Indonesia during the struggle to regain Irian Jaya (West New Guinea). Indonesia was refused support from the U.S. and indirectly was forced to get support from the Soviet Union. This resulted in many Soviet advisors coming to Indonesia with their Communist ideology. Additionally, many young Indonesian soldiers from the Navy and Air Force were trained in Warsaw Pact countries. These events bolstered the Indonesian Communist Party's position among the people and in the armed forces. Originally, the U.S. did not support Indonesia because Indonesia was confronting the Dutch, an American Ally in NATO. Eventually, the U.S. helped to mediate a solution to the problems, and we thank them for it very much.
Regular and irregular or formal and informal meetings have already been held between the ASEAN countries to strengthen the neighborhood or family ties and to solve small misunderstandings. These close relationships are very useful and important, and I think preparations to deal with an uncertain world in supporting economic developments are the most important missions of the ASEAN armed forces. If we use an Indonesian philosophy, "united we will be strong, divided we will be weak," the Combined Armed Forces Command will not only be useful for military purposes from limited war to total war, but also can support the ASEAN nations in confronting natural disasters, refugees, terrorism, narcotic traffic and may assist rural development, which means development of the people's welfare. Also, it can be used to support nation building, not to promote war but to preserve peace, as in the motto of the United States Army War College (USAWC). To be ready and prepared are key to forming an ASEAN Combined Forces Command.

One activity that can be done for mutual benefit is increasing cooperation on C3 in a theater command, which will be the greatest challenge in the future. If we prepare, then the enemy will think twice before disturbing ASEAN, because the risks will be greater than any benefit.

FEASIBILITY OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCES COMMAND

The ASEAN nations are pursuing greater military contacts, greater cooperation in training ranges, and bilateral command post
and field exercises. Indonesia has had Air Force exercises with Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Some Malaysian and Singaporean pilots were trained in the Indonesian Air Force Academy. The Navy had exercises with Malaysia, the Philippines and Australia. The Army had exercises with Malaysia and Singapore. Also, Malaysia and Indonesia have exchange programs of officers and Non Commissioned Officers (NCO) who stay in the units for several weeks. In 1970, many Malaysians were trained in Indonesia together with Laotian and Cambodian soldiers in jungle warfare to prepare to defend their countries against Vietnam. There are also exchange students at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) level. This means that between the military forces there is already an understanding to provide a basis for greater cooperation.

We can portray the six ASEAN nations' armed forces in three groups in terms of structure and doctrine:

1. The "U.S. style" group includes the Philippines and Thailand.

2. The "British style" group includes Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei.

3. Indonesia uses elements of both the U.S. and British systems.

The armed forces of the two "U.S. style" and "British style" groups are more structured for conventional warfare. The Indonesian Armed Forces is divided into two major missions, counter insurgency and conventional warfare. The Indonesian Army has only one strategic reserve command consisting of two light infantry.
divisions and one Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) battalion in each Military Area Command for conventional warfare. The rest of the force is committed to territorial defense, especially counter insurgency, while the Navy and Air Force are structured more for conventional warfare.

All ASEAN countries use the same caliber for small arms, although they have different types of factories. All other equipment is bought from Western countries, except for Indonesia which still has some ex-Soviet bloc equipment in the Army, Navy and Air Force. Training and doctrine for conventional warfare are very similar with NATO/U.S. doctrine, although the language is different among the various ASEAN countries. Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia can understand each other using their national languages. The Philippines and Singapore use English, while Thailand uses the Thai language. But most of the officers can understand English and speak a little bit, which will be useful when they work together in the theater command operations for coordination and Command Control and Communication (C3). The ASEAN countries can discuss later how they will communicate with each other and what language will be used for C3.

Although ASEAN Armed Forces have somewhat different structures and doctrines, they have generally adopted British and U.S. systems. Only Indonesia, having experience in using the Eastern Bloc system has combined both the Eastern and the Western systems. In their logistic systems, all ASEAN countries use similar small caliber weapons (NATO standard), U.S. artillery (except for some
Indonesian artillery), mostly U.S., British or French armored forces equipment (except Indonesia where some is ex-Soviet). The Air Force and Navy in all the countries use NATO standard equipment. The Indonesian Navy still has some ex-Warsaw Pact equipment. In the field of Petroleum Oil and Lubricants (POL), there is no problem. Training and doctrine are already done in bilateral military cooperation among ASEAN countries, especially in the Air Force and Navy. The ASEAN Armies only have bilateral military exercises among Malaysia-Indonesia, and Singapore-Indonesia.

The other thing to be considered is that each country has its own C3 system. Although it is similar to the U.S. theater command, there are significant differences. ASEAN countries divide their territorial defense systems in different ways. Some countries have one theater command, while others have two or more. This command structure is very important for future C3 in training and operations of the ASEAN Combined Armed Forces. Some issues to be decided include how to tie the Combined Command into various nations' C3, how many personnel and how much logistic stock will be maintained and where they will be based.

PROPOSED ASEAN COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

Lesson learned from the Gulf War

Many lessons can be learned from the Gulf War regarding command relations, coalition organization and structure, force
structure, forward deployment, training and doctrine, strategic mobility, weapons systems and communications technology.  

We also have learned the importance of early commitment of forces, that the integration of the services' capabilities is an element of power, and that services must be interoperable and must keep each other informed. We may also note the success of logistical support because of good management, good preparations, and good systems.

**ASEAN Combined Forces Command**

I propose the following approach to the organization and operation of an ASEAN Combined Forces Command:

In time of supporting an ASEAN member against a common enemy, a Combined Forces Headquarters will be established in the host nation Headquarters. In peace time, it will be rotated through member countries. The command system will be based on the following principles derived from the experience of the Gulf War:

1. Unity of effort has priority.
2. The political environment dominates.
3. Personal relationships provide strength.
4. Those involved in the planning process must think through the problems.
5. There are multiple correct solutions.
6. Many command levels will be affected.
7. Innovation and flexibility work if you understand underlying doctrine.

The structure of the Armed Forces Combined Command will follow
a theater command structure after the pattern of a U.S. theater command and NATO. All ASEAN countries have a theater command which is similar to the U.S. theater command. This will reduce money and time required to develop the structures. The proposed structure will include an ASEAN Military Committee, which works under the direction of the ASEAN ministers of defense and the highest political authorities in the ASEAN countries. The presidents and prime ministers will give policy and direction to the ministers of defense, who will establish military objectives to be carried out by the CINC or the highest military commands in each country. During conflict, operations will be conducted by the host nation, while the other nations provide support.

Training and doctrine for all ASEAN armed forces will be discussed and conducted in Phase 2 (Standardization). I recommend using Joint Pub-2 "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," Joint Pub 3-0 "Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations," and Joint Pub 5-0 "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations" as the starting point to unite the different approaches to training and doctrine and to integrate local objectives, ways and means.

The logistics system will be discussed further in Phase 2. It should incorporate lessons learned from the Gulf War Coalition logistics operation system. The ASEAN system will not be as complicated as the Coalition in the Gulf, because ASEAN theater operations will be conducted largely by light forces. The geopolitical and geostrategic imperatives of the Southeast Asia region dictate the use of light forces, small fast fighting ships.
with missiles and computerized systems and tactical air campaigns. Historically, there have been no use of heavy forces for land operations or use of heavy combat ships including aircraft carriers against enemy ships in Southeast Asia, in part because there are many land bases for aircraft to conduct operations against a Naval force.

**PLANNING FOR EXECUTION**

The most important consideration is the political will of the ASEAN governments to enhance multilateral military cooperation. The next step will be to consider the political situation which affects the formation, but this must not stop the progress of cooperation. The process will be in four phases, the reason being similar to building a strong house, which, to absorb earthquakes, needs a strong base to stand on. "Slowly but truly" is the best way. There is time for such an approach because there is currently no real threat against ASEAN today. Except for the problem of overlapping claims on the Spratly Islands (by the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, PRC, and Taiwan) there are no international issues which are likely to become an explosive conflict in the near future, because of the limited power projection capability and the economic development priority of the conflicting parties.

To build this ASEAN Combined Forces Command it will be better to plan in four phases: first, to get political will, and then to follow a step by step cooperation program:
1. Phase 1: Political agreement between ASEAN countries to enhance military cooperation from bilateral to multilateral within the scope of ASEAN.

2. Phase 2: Standardization program.


4. Phase 4: Facilities for building unity of command and management of all kinds of means to support the first phase of conflict.

I believe Phase 1 can be done in two or three ASEAN ministerial meetings and the agreement will be accelerated with the regional situation, especially the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from the Philippines and indications of some nations' military build up to replace the vacuum. Phase 2 can be initiated directly, although slowly, because it will be influenced by the member nations' constraints. Phase 3 will be conducted with in-depth study of the political effect on the region. Phase 4 will be done directly after phase 3 is agreed upon.

The standardization program will be very important to continue the process of interoperability. Its aims are to ensure the fullest cooperation and collaboration among ASEAN Armed Forces, to achieve the highest possible degree of interoperability through material and non material standardization; and to obtain the greatest possible economy by the use of combined resources and effort.

The objectives of the program will be to establish common or compatible procedures and techniques, as well as compatible
tactical doctrine and concepts, identical end items of equipment, standardization equipment including functional and/or physical interchangeability, interchangeable ammunition, fuel, and other common user items, interoperable communications, electronic and automatic data processing (ADP) equipment and systems, and identical engineering and quality assurance standards.

The organization for standardization will include a Primary Standardization Office (PSO) in which each country will have a representative. An ASEAN Armed Forces Working Group (AAFWG) will include members from every country who will work on a part-time basis in their respective countries; and Liaison and Standardization Representatives (LSR) accredited under an ASEAN Armed Forces Cooperation Agreement.

The methods of achieving standardization will include participation in cooperative research and development programs; the purchase of one kind of military equipment by all the ASEAN armed forces, the modification of existing equipment to produce a measure of physical and functional interchange abilities among the ASEAN armed forces, and the adoption of one set of procedures, techniques or engineering quality assurance standards by ASEAN armed forces.

There are several obstacles to standardization. One is lack of awareness of the program. This varies from ignorance of the existence of the program, through uncertainty about its aims, to a lack of appreciation of the benefits it offers the participants. National policies, restrictions on weapons systems and
patent/license laws often impede the efforts of the armed forces to agree on standardization. Political and financial restraints, such as changes in national priorities brought about by political and industrial needs, can discourage the armed forces from entering into cooperative Research and Development programs, especially on projects having a large economic impact. Efforts to advance standardization can be delayed or discontinued due to inflexibility in national and armed forces positions. This prevents the compromise which is essential to the achievement of international agreements. The resistance of armed forces to adjusting their equipment requirements to match those of other armed forces can result from the desire for military forces to purchase national products. The armed forces may have different priorities and time schedules for phasing in replacement items of equipment and this can seriously reduce the opportunities of standardization. During the build up, if the security situation dictates against the formation of an ASEAN Combined Forces Command, I would recommend that at least the standardization program be completed, and that bilateral cooperation between ASEAN countries in all aspects of military cooperation continue, which can be exploited if the time later becomes right for a Combined Forces Command.

The existing theater command in each country will be valuable to be used as a basis for further developments. The execution can be flexible depending on time, management and the security situation.

The ASEAN Combined Forces Command could be in the form of a
"paper" Standing Operation Procedure (SOP) for an ASEAN theater command, which will be understood and trained for by all the member nations and executed when it is needed by full host country main forces and with other ASEAN nation supporting forces. But it could be a standing ASEAN Combined Forces Command which will be rotated among each ASEAN nation’s theater command headquarters every year or as decided by the ASEAN military committee. A standing formation would be more ready than the paper formation, although it would cost a little extra money to support the attachments from the supporting nations. I think it will not be a big problem once some or all of the standardization programs have been conducted. If we compare the results of this formation, I hope it will result in more self dependence and security of ASEAN countries, which also will support economic development, which in turn will enhance military cooperation.

There are several possible responses to a military threat against one or more ASEAN nations. The following is one approach which could be used as a preliminary action to counter possible conflicts.

1. After the political decision is made by all foreign ministers of ASEAN to conduct a combined forces operation, the host nation has to prepare a headquarters to accommodate the ASEAN Combined Forces Command, which would usually be an existing armed forces headquarters in the country.

2. ASEAN supporting nations prepare personnel and material as decided by the ASEAN armed forces committee.
3. Depending on the situation of the conflict (escalation or deescalation), the campaign will be conducted in three phases:

   a. The dispute phase. The host nation indigenous forces are defending against a potential aggressor or problem. The ASEAN countries use political and economic elements of power which will be communicated through public and diplomatic channels, to resolve the conflict without escalation. Should the above efforts fail, the ASEAN armed forces begin displaying the willingness to use military force in pursuit of ASEAN objectives through the use of an ASEAN military show of force, conduct of joint exercises, and deployment of forces. At the end of this phase an embargo of some type may be planned for, reinforced by ASEAN allies from outside of ASEAN and then enforced by the military.

   b. The hostilities phase includes the host nation indigenous defense reinforced by the first group of ASEAN contingents and a building up of ASEAN combat power through a second group of contingents for offensive operations. The offensive attacks are conducted against the opponent’s strategy and its political center of gravity translated onto the battlefield, to terminate the conflict through our strength.

   c. In the settlement phase, ASEAN Forces return to their countries, while the host country consolidates the situation, evaluates the warfare and conducts post war activities.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

1. The ASEAN countries' main interest is economic development. To support it, they need stability and security in the area. In order to fulfill these requirements, the ASEAN countries' will and decision to increase military cooperation are important.

2. Although there are many problems among the ASEAN countries and inside the member countries themselves, I am confident they will solve these problems peacefully. They are neighbors forever and they can refer to the lessons learned at the beginning of the formation of ASEAN when all problems were successfully solved. Military cooperation would provide a stabilizing influence in the ASEAN countries. This would especially be useful in solving problems between conflicting countries through indirect approaches and in preventing the use of violent actions to reach national objectives. It is also a basis for Confidence Building Measures (CBM) among the countries.

3. The formation of military cooperation would be through phases which will be dominated by the political situation within ASEAN and the Southeast Asia region. It could take the form of a "paper SOP" for a Combined ASEAN Armed Forces Command to serve as a basis for peacetime training or it could be a standing ASEAN Armed Forces Command located in each member nation, in rotation, using their own theater command structures. The standing ASEAN Armed Forces Command would be in a more ready posture and could

44
provide more cooperation than a paper SOP. However, the standing force would be more expensive and could exacerbate political issues among other nations or pressure groups who don't like it. To reduce the problem, it could consist of a very small group which could be expanded when it is needed.

4. The U.S. role in development and formation of such a command is important and vital for the region as well as for U.S. interests in the area. It is hoped that the U.S. will see it in its interests to share the regional defense role in a friendly and cooperative manner. The U.S. could support the ASEAN command with training and education as means of cooperation to maintain its influence.

Recommendations.

1. The ASEAN Combined Forces Command should constitute a standing formation, but if the political situation does not permit its existence as a standing formation, it should be a "paper SOP" to insure that all participants understand the combined forces command concept for which they should be trained.

2. The cooperation process should be conducted in four phases with evaluation of each phase. If at any time the situation is such that further process is not feasible, at least we must complete the standardization program.

3. The military leaders in each nation must convince their governments of the usefulness and feasibility of a Combined ASEAN Forces Command in direct and indirect ways. They must prepare to execute the process in an enthusiastic and energetic manner but in a
way full of friendliness, cooperation and neighborhood-brotherhood attitudes.

4. The U.S. should indirectly support the formation of the command with training, education and other forms of cooperation.
1. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02, (Washington D.C.: USGPO,1989). Except where otherwise noted, these definitions are taken from Joint PUB 1-02, modified to fit the unique ASEAN security environment.


30. Ibid. 20.


