CSCE AS THE CENTRAL FORUM OF THE FUTURE EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY STRUCTURE

BY

Lieutenant Colonel Petr Luzny
Czechoslovakian Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1992

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

92-12841
1a. Report Security Classification  
UNCLASSIFIED

2a. Security Classification Authority  
US Army War College

2b. Declassification/DOWNGRADING Schedule  
Root Hall, Bldg 122  
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

3a. Security Classification Authority  
(If applicable)

3b. Distribution/Availability of Report  
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

4a. Security Classification Authority  
US Army War College

4b. Declassification/DOWNGRADING Schedule  
Root Hall, Bldg 122  
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

4c. Security Classification Authority  
(If applicable)

5a. Distribution/Availability of Report  
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

5b. Monitoring Organization Report Number(s)

6a. Name of Performing Organization  
US Army War College

6b. Office Symbol  
(If applicable)

7a. Name of Monitoring Organization  
US Army War College

7b. Address (City, State, and ZIP Code)

8a. Name of Funding/Sponsoring Organization  
US Army War College

8b. Office Symbol  
(If applicable)

9. Procurement Instrument Identification Number

11. Title (Include Security Classification)  
(Unclassified) CSCE as the Central Forum of the Future European Collective Security Structure (Unclassified)

12. Personal Author(s)  
LTC Peter Luzny

13a. Type of Report  
Study Project

13b. Time Covered  
From _____ TO _____  
(Year, Month, Day)  
920413

16. Supplementary Notation

17. COSATI Codes

18. Subject Terms (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

19. Abstract (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

20. Distribution/Availability of Abstract  
UNCLASSIFIED

21. Abstract Security Classification  
UNCLASSIFIED

22a. Name of Responsible Individual  
LTC William T. Johnsen

22b. Telephone (Include Area Code)  
(717) 245-3376

22c. Office Symbol  
AWCT
Post-Cold War Europe seeks a new security structure to replace the old, and no longer sufficient, system of collective self-defense based on alliances. One part of the system of the system of collective self-defense, the Warsaw Pact, has ceased to exist, which has left a significant security gap for its former members. The other element of the old security system, NATO, still works, but has shown itself unable to expand its commitments to cover Europe as a whole.

The current situation in Europe offers a unique opportunity to establish a collective security system based on the cooperation of interlocking and mutually complementary institutions. This study examines alternatives for the establishment of such a system, considers the shortfalls of existing institutions, and argues that, despite its current shortfalls, CSCE--because of its agenda and broad membership—is the most serious candidate for providing an adequate framework for the coordination of the future collective security system in Europe. The essay then proposes steps that should be taken to recast the current CSCE into a central forum of the new pan-European collective security structure.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

CSCE AS THE CENTRAL FORUM OF THE FUTURE EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY STRUCTURE.

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Petr Luzny
International Fellow

Lieutenant Colonel William T. Johnsen
Project Adviser

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Post-Cold War Europe seeks a new security structure to replace the old, and no longer sufficient, system of collective self-defense based on alliances. One part of the system of the system of collective self-defense, the Warsaw Pact, has ceased to exist, which has left a significant security gap for its former members. The other element of the old security system, NATO, still works, but has shown itself unable to expand its commitments to cover Europe as a whole.

The current situation in Europe offers a unique opportunity to establish a collective security system based on the cooperation of interlocking and mutually complementary institutions. This study examines alternatives for the establishment of such a system, considers the shortfalls of existing institutions, and argues that, despite its current shortfalls, CSCE--because of its agenda and broad membership--is the most serious candidate for providing an adequate framework for the coordination of the future collective security system in Europe. The essay then proposes steps that should be taken to recast the current CSCE into a central forum of the new pan-European collective security structure.
INTRODUCTION

In the past five years, the European continent has undergone fundamental political changes, and, apparently, the transformation is not yet complete. The Cold War is definitely over, but peace in Europe has yet to be fully established. Too many hurdles remain on which the European peace may founder and, as the civil war in Yugoslavia clearly indicates, the possibility of armed conflict in Europe still remains high.

A key question, then, is how to achieve lasting peace in Europe? Such a complex issue obviously evokes a number of subsidiary questions, such as: Are the remnants of the existing security system, that has been based traditionally on collective self-defense, sufficient for today's conditions? Does the old security system reflect new political realities? Does it provide adequate security for all Europeans?

Another important issue requiring assessment is determining which organization would be best suited for managing European security affairs in the new political environment. Several current bodies are potential candidates for the key role of the security organization: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Community (EC), the Western European Union
WEU, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). On the other hand, it is clear that the long-term security of Europe requires an integration of economic, political and military factors, and that each of these bodies, as currently structured, may not suffice. The requirement to integrate fully all dimensions of security raises, therefore, many questions about future roles of the EC, NATO, WEU, and CSCE in a European security system, as well as how each will fit within the framework of this structure.

This essay examines the various institutions currently available and concludes that the CSCE—properly institutionalized and with effective leadership—should serve as the backbone of a future pan-European security system. Because integrating the political and military factors of such a security organization will likely be the most complicated issue, the essay will examine in some detail how the politico-military component of the CSCE security structure might look, as well as the more specific functions of particular organizations within this structure. Finally, the essay will outline a possible structure for the future CSCE security system.

SECURITY IN POST-COLD WAR EUROPE

The Cold War meant ideological competition, military confrontation, a concomitant arms race, and a mix of a mutual
distrust, suspicion and fear. As a result, the security of Europe depended on competitive systems of collective self-defence represented by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But, now, new conditions reign in Europe and we must admit that the Cold War period meant a sort of stability in comparison with current conditions. The Warsaw Pact has disintegrated and the probability that East and Central European states would join their former Soviet ally in any war is unimaginable. Moreover, the possibility of a short-warning, surprise attack against the rest of Europe from the territory of the former Soviet Union is very improbable for several years to come. For NATO and the United States, the USSR’s successor states, with their current domestic problems are more an unpredictable risk than a threat.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or Russia may no longer be a world superpower, but on a European scale the CIS or Russia (or even a republic such as Ukraine) will remain a formidable military power. Moreover, the considerable instability within the former Soviet Union, aggravated by continuing economic collapse, old national and ethnic quarrels, and the prospect of wide-spread hunger, represents an explosive blend. The possibility of violent conflicts in the former Soviet Union that could spread beyond its borders presents serious concerns for Europe.
In this situation, Europe, in general, but, particularly the other former members of the Warsaw Pact, cannot be content with the security vacuum that currently exists in Central Europe. At present, the Central and East European states have no tangible guarantee for their security. Nor do they want to play the role of a buffer between NATO and the successors of the Soviet Union.1 Also the painful economic reforms and reemergent nationalism in Eastern Europe do not contribute to a stable environment.2 The possibility of civil wars in this region clearly exists, as the case of Yugoslavia shows. Because of fears of national or regional ethnic conflict, the Eastern European states may even hesitate to reduce their armed forces.

Contrary to the instability in Eastern Europe is the stability of the western European states. The EC successfully manages the economy and security is guaranteed by two alliances—NATO and WEU. But, despite the existence of the Western Europe security community and the presence of the United States as a counterpoise against any possibly resurgent military threat, we cannot speak about a stable Europe as a whole. As importantly, despite NATO and the WEU, no comprehensive pan-European security body exists nowadays.

Additionally, other, primarily non-military risks, may threaten Europe, such as climate changes, environmental disasters, disaster relief, differences in economies and
migration of people from poorer countries must be taken into account. Such challenges hardly can be countered just by the military means of the old security system of collective self-defense.

Current discussions of European security consistently conclude that military forces will no longer be the dominant factor in European security. The challenges that Europe will have to face, require more than just military concepts and instruments, but rather a conceptual approach that provides effective political and economic tools. And, as importantly, the bulk of these challenges can be countered only through common cooperative efforts of all existing European institutions. The end of the Cold War demands, therefore, the establishment of a new, pan-European security system which should be based not on collective self-defense but on cooperative collective security.

THE SEARCH FOR A COLLECTIVE SECURITY STRUCTURE IN EUROPE

One part of the old bipolar system of collective self-defense, NATO, still works, but it guarantees security for less than one half of Europe. How then to provide for the security of all of Europe? One option could be to expand NATO to cover the whole territory of Europe. NATO was established for collective self-defense of Western Europe against the threat from the east.
and derives its legitimacy from Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.5

NATO proved its reliability and continues to be valuable forum for western European security cooperation. But, NATO has to look for a new rationale. The threat from the East is no longer justifiable enough to sustain its existence. On the other hand, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union remain the most likely source of conflicts in Europe. But NATO has no authority nor legitimacy in these states, and for several years to come, NATO cannot extend its guarantees by providing full membership to the successor states of the Soviet Union and to countries of Central and Eastern Europe.6 Moreover, NATO's mandate does not allow use of its armed forces in "out of area" conflicts and NATO, therefore, cannot provide security commitments for the rest of Europe. This condition does not imply that NATO should be dissolved and replaced by a new security system. To the contrary, NATO can play a vital role in ensuring continued stability in Europe.

However, it is not quite clear, to what extent NATO will expand its political role in European security. NATO recognizes the contribution of other institutions to the security of Europe (in its broadest sense), the need for a security architecture of interlocking and complementary institutions, and strongly supports the strengthening of the CSCE.7 Despite these
statements and recognition of NATO's existing shortfalls, some people in NATO states would like to see NATO as a pan-European security structure. For example, Gerhard Wettig argues that "Key security policy must be entrusted to an alliance such as NATO which is able to take action. The CSCE can only perform additional security functions." In my opinion, many in the United States also viewed NATO as a sort of panacea for the United States' policy implementation in Europe until recently.

Indeed, NATO is indispensable for the transition to a collective security system and could become a valuable component of the new pan-European security structure. NATO can contribute to the transition to collective security system by helping to stabilize post-communist states, supporting the further institutionalization of the CSCE, and promoting common security policy. NATO can foster common security by taking active part in negotiations and implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements, coordinating troop reductions and force restructuring, and helping to develop common procedures for verification, crisis control, peacekeeping and peacemaking. For example, the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 as a tool for fostering conceptual approaches to pan-European security issues and dialogue between NATO and former Warsaw Pact states could be a promising step forward. But in the meantime, the NACC's work plan is a little bit vague.
The Western European Union (WEU) is another potential contributor to a pan-European security architecture. The WEU is currently composed of 9 members, all Europeans, who are obligated to mutual assistance in the event of aggression. Similar to NATO, the WEU has primarily a military focus, but WEU has a wider mandate. The intent of the WEU is to prevent aggression, maintain international peace and security, and to support the integration and unity of Europe. WEU has also a mandate for the "out of area" actions.10 However, WEU remains in the shadow of NATO. NATO has been such a dominant structure that it discourages the emergence of a real military defense role for the WEU or the EC political union in Europe.

The WEU’s view of the future security of Europe is contained in a document entitled "WEU’s Role and Place in the New European Security Architecture," which envisages three complementary levels for organizing Europe's security in near future: " a European level, currently based on the WEU and the European Community evolving toward political union; an Atlantic level based on NATO, the only organization binding North America to the defense of Europe; and a Pan-European level based on the CSCE and bringing together all European countries, as well as the United States and Canada."11 Additionally, the WEU offers an alternative to NATO for a collective security organization under the assumption that WEU will become the military arm of the European Community.12 The WEU could become the core of such a
system by accepting all European NATO states and states of the former Warsaw Pact into the EC. Then, the WEU could be transformed from the collective self-defense to a collective security system. But the WEU alone, without coupling with the EC political union, can do little to become collective security organization for region.

A third element of a future security architecture can be found in the European Community. The EC has twelve members, all Europeans, and its primary goal is increased economic and political integration among its members. The EC cannot exclude the security and defense dimensions in the project of political union, a sort of "United States of Europe", and intends to have common security policy while retaining the individuality of each member.

For the time being, however, the EC cannot be in charge of a security regime that would include Eastern Europe for two basic reasons. First, the EC cannot accept post-communist states as members in the near future. Neither the dynamics of the EC integration nor the state of economies of most of the post-communist states will permit these countries to become full members soon. Second, the EC does not have adequate means to take on most of the roles required in dealing with the number of issues in Eastern Europe.
At present, the EC is not suitable for any kind of direct military role or for taking charge of the coordination and control of the armed forces of its members. The EC, therefore needs the military organization of the WEU to implement its security policy in the future. The EC cannot take on a direct role in military security, but it will play essential role in European security in a broad sense. The transition to European collective security is unthinkable without the EC's economic assistance. The EC can promote democratization and economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, which are necessary for a viable security in Europe, by using economic tools.

The EC/WEU alternative for creation of collective security structure was already mentioned above and counts on full membership of the rest of the EC states in NATO and of the former Warsaw Pact states in the WEU, simultaneous with either full or associated membership of these states in the EC. The EC/WEU could then become a collective security organization either under the political institution of CSCE or its own. However, the latter option would substantially delay the integration of Western Europe and exclude neutrals.15

The final element of existing European security organizations that could be incorporated into a future security structure is CSCE. The original "organization" of the CSCE process resulted from series of conferences, seminars and

The signature of the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) during the Paris Summit (1990), the Vienna 1990 Document on CSBMs, and the Charter of Paris, as well as numerous other declarations in 1990 such as Bonn Declaration on Economic Principles and Copenhagen Document on Human Rights have underscored the victory of the CSCE process over the Cold War. As importantly, and perhaps more so, the Charter of Paris created the first permanent organizations needed to support follow up conferences and to supervise the execution of CSCE decisions. These new institutions could significantly enhance the role of CSCE both as a post-Cold War security system in Europe, and as a
means for implementing emergency procedures in defusing international crises.

The Charter of Paris indicates guidelines for future of the CSCE process and the goal of the new CSCE institutions is to perform them. The biennial CSCE follow-up meetings remain to review the implementation of the last meeting’s decisions and to consider further steps. The CSCE Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs is to convene periodically (at least once a year) and provides the central forum for political consultations within the CSCE process. The Committee of Senior Officials will meet on a regular basis to prepare the work of the Council of Ministers and to oversee its decisions. The Committee of Senior Officials also has powers to convene emergency meetings of Council of Ministers.17

The signatories of the Charter of Paris agreed to establish a number of subsidiary institutions to support CSCE efforts. For example, the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna will assist the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs in reducing the risks of conflict by increasing the military transparency and developing procedures for conflict resolution. The Office for Free Elections in Warsaw will facilitate observation of elections and exchange of information on elections within CSCE countries. The CSCE Secretariat located in Prague will provide administrative support for the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and for
the Committee of Senior Officials, and coordinate the periodic meetings including the biennial review conferences and additional meetings of representatives of the CSCE member states which are to discuss urgent matters.18

The Charter of Paris also called for the creation of a CSCE parliament with representation from all CSCE countries and serving as a forum for dialogue, which would be able to minimize any disagreements. The constitutive session of the parliament will be held in Prague in June 1992.19 The institutionalization of CSCE is set out in Fig.1.
The CSCE, with its broad membership, and its charter to address all aspects of security (political, military, economic, human rights), has, therefore, the best chance to succeed as a pan-European security structure. CSCE should be able to address the concerns not only of Western Europe, but also those of Central and Eastern European countries, as well as give the Soviet Union's successor states a fair chance to enter into broader cooperation with Europe and the United States.

Even after the establishment of the first permanent organizations, however, the CSCE does not seem to be able to tackle the complexity of challenges. The reasons for this lack of effectiveness are severalfold. At present, CSCE quite understandably lacks the organizational experience and effectiveness of organizations such as NATO, WEU and the EC. The first institutionalization comprised only a small step forward. CSCE's current level of institutionalization can hardly succeed if CSCE remains a political, legally non-binding treaty. Another pre-condition for a more effective CSCE is the change of its decision-making. CSCE currently has 51 members and this number will undoubtedly grow. Until recently, the members functioned by unanimity and each member had a right of veto. Now, the states which fail to comply with CSCE rules will face the threat of being excluded from the consensus procedure and no longer will be able to veto or impede the entire process. However, this kind of decision-making consumes much energy and makes CSCE incapable of
instant action. And, the need for quick decision on such vital problems as CSCE faces, is apparent.

An obstacle blocking CSCE evolution is the rivalry among Europe's overabundance of political and military organizations. Another difficulty facing CSCE is that not every state member fully supports the growth of CSCE. The United States, especially, resists giving the CSCE real power; perhaps for fear that CSCE could weaken NATO, in turn leading to, together with the creation of a cohesive European bloc, reduced American influence in Europe.21

Considering its past shortfalls and the circumstances of the Cold War era, the CSCE has achieved significant results during its existence, and many countries participating in CSCE, especially East Europeans, look to CSCE as a valuable forum, not only for avoiding confrontation, but as the organization best suited to provide the political framework needed for the creation of a pan-European security structure.22 Given its current structure and procedures, lack of operational means to execute decisions and the other shortfalls mentioned above, it is apparent that CSCE needs improvements to meet the criteria for central forum of the new pan-European security structure.
PROPOSALS FOR A EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE.

The answer to the question of how best to manage all the challenges of the cooperative security system could be to recast CSCE into a more credible collective security structure with effective leadership and more real powers, particularly in the security sector. The new structure could also provide opportunities for cooperation in all aspects of security and provide better means to coordinate other relevant international organizations with CSCE activities. While it is generally agreed that a reliable and effective system that is acceptable from the point of view of common interests of Europe, the United States and the CIS is needed, at present, no consensus exists on how a new European security system should look like.

As a means of illuminating potential means of strengthening the CSCE structure, it may be appropriate to review a range of suggestions currently being proposed. The following authors, for example, support the idea of a strengthened CSCE as a collective security structure and propose ways how to further institutionalize CSCE and what goals should be set.

Harald Mueller

Director of International Programs at the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, Harald Mueller, argues that "the
objective should be to build CSCE into a United Nations of Europe and North America--a regional suborganization of the U.N.--with each member-state accepting far-reaching obligations and the central CSCE body given considerable authority. According to Mueller, this organization would establish norms for all aspects of international relations, including ecology, economy, human and minority rights, and security. Such a regime would extend the current bounds of the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area (ATTU) to include North America and the CIS east of the Urals. The United States and the CIS would accept limits on such activities as arms production, major weapon holdings and the like that could influence security in Europe. Ideally, each CSCE state would subscribe to rules taking into account all aspects of its defence policy such as: limits on all weapons holdings; restraints on military budgets and arms production; constraints on operations of all services in areas affecting Europe and North America; and transparency in defense issues such as planning, strategy, doctrine, and military research. For dealing with interstate conflicts, the organization would develop procedures for fact finding, mediation, dispute settlement, and, if necessary, adjudication.

A secretariat would have the authority to monitor compliance with the obligations and the power to take initiative for early identification of conflicts, fact finding, and bringing urgent issues immediately before a central political group. The
organization should have some multinational forces under its own control. The secretariat would have the power to deploy the multinational forces for a limited time in an emergency. Such a quick-reaction capability would increase confidence in the security system, and prevent a potential aggressor from creating a fait accompli. Mueller also proposes that NATO could, if necessary, reinforce multinational forces.

Mueller notes that such a security organization could not rely exclusively on consensus decision-making. Alternatives, such as relying on a qualified majority; requiring parties to a dispute to abstain from voting on that issue; or the establishment of a security council similar to the U.N. are potential means to ensure a more effective security mechanism.

In my assessment, Mueller's proposal outlines more what the security organization should do, but it is not so specific about the new structure needed to implement decisions. The idea of CSCE as a UN suborganization is well-founded because many activities of these organizations would overlap. Moreover, in principle, collective security is a prime task of the UN. But a regional collective security is needed, because the current UN lacks the operational means to deal with such a scale of issues as post-Cold War Europe represents. Considering the growing number of CSCE members, CSCE should also apply the use of a security council (à la the UN Security Council, but without the
right of veto) to facilitate the decision-making in security matters. Both the "subordination" of CSCE to the UN, and the acceptance of obligations and norms by states also presumes that CSCE agreements will become legally binding. However, because of differences among subregions and also among individual states, it may be necessary to take a differentiated approach in setting the obligations or limits. For example, the limits on military forces should be different for neutral states with small armed forces than for states with larger armed forces dictated by security.

Charles and Clifford Kupchan 25

An alternative security organization can be found in Charles and Clifford Kupchan's proposal that recognizes the need to reflect power realities, while preserving the concept of consensus among European states. The authors, political scientists, propose that the CSCE structure should consist of a security group and a full member body. The security group would consist of Europe's major powers (the USA, the [former] Soviet Union, Britain, France, Germany), and a limited number of other CSCE members representing the concerns of northern, eastern and southern Europe which would join the security group on a rotating basis.
The security group would handle core-level security issues, such as arms control, territorial boundaries, and peacekeeping. The security group would be able to act without the approval of each CSCE state, but it would consult with the full body in reaching decisions. The security group would also establish a permanent verification and monitoring center for Europe that would cover both nuclear and conventional reductions, as well as oversee the entire process of arms control. Another important task for the security group would be to strengthen mechanisms for preventing nuclear proliferation.

The powers would pledge to respect existing boundaries in Europe and allow alterations only through joint decision. The security group would establish joint criteria for diplomatic recognition of new states.

A peacekeeping mandate would enable the security group to undertake joint diplomatic and military actions. Like Mueller, the Kupchans advocate the establishment of a permanent multinational peacekeeping unit that could be rapidly deployed in the case of crisis. But the security group could also authorize one or more powers to act on behalf of all CSCE members. According to the Kupchans, the group should coexist with NATO during its initial phase. This coexistence would enable it to rely on NATO while nurturing a new pan-European security system.
The full body would have an input into security group matters by means of states representing subregions. Also the consultations of the security group with the full body would mean an input of the full range of core-level security issues. CSCE’s current mandate would remain fully intact in the sense that the full body would continue to have jurisdiction over a host of other security-relevant issues such as: CSBMs, hyper-nationalism, promotion of democracy and monitoring human rights. For example, the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) would strengthen CSBMs, develop procedures for conflict management and promote increased military transparency.

In my assessment, the Kupchans’ proposal smacks of Great Power politics, but this is a reflection of the de facto economic and military capabilities of the major nations. On the other hand, both the United States and Russia would have to give up a portion of their influence in favor of the European powers. The crash of the Soviet Union and the fact that Russia is not a major player in Europe at present could make Russia willing to accept this opportunity to share power. The problem may be the United States’ fear of losing its position in Europe or an unreadiness to shift from leadership position in old Europe to a fuller partnership in new Europe.

Although the Kupchans’ proposal introduces the security group, it is more oriented on a division of responsibilities
between the security group and the full body than on future organizational structure of the CSCE. I think that the proposed security group and the allocation of responsibilities should be adopted by a future security organization. Undoubtedly, the smaller security group could find an adequate solution of a pressing problem, that would be acceptable for all, much easier and faster than the full forum.

A key failing of both proposals is that they were written before the crash of the Soviet Union and therefore they do not reflect the full extent of the complex challenges ahead. For example, which nation or nations will substitute for the former Soviet Union in the proposed security council? Or, how to provide the most suitable division of the area covered by the security structure on subregions? Although these proposals offer new elements of a future security system, a possible composition of the security group, alternatives for decision-making processes within the structure, and of the structure of the overall security organization, they are too general and do not make clear the integration of proposed elements with current CSCE institutions.

The following chart (Figure 2, page 24) presents my own view of how to build a future European security architecture and strengthen the CSCE, as an institution, in order to provide a credible central body to the new pan-European security structure.
My proposed structure integrates the old institutions of CSCE and the new proposals, and links CSCE with the complementary organizations of the new security system. The purpose of the old institutions of CSCE remains unchanged. Undoubtedly, the biennial Summit of Chiefs of Governments will remain the overall supervisory body of the CSCE process, as well as providing impetus for further progress. The Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs will continue to be the central forum for political consultations, provide political guidance for all components of the CSCE process, and review the security agenda and propose further steps. The purpose of the Committee of Senior Officials, essentially, the executive agent of the Council of Foreign Ministers, remains the same.

The Secretariat would serve the Committee of Senior Officials, the meetings of the Chiefs of Governments, the Council of Ministers and the Security Council, and would have links to the CSCE Parliament, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, an arbitration body, and a Security Center.
Fig. 2. Proposed organization of the CSCE as a central body of the security system

SUMMIT OF CHIEFS OF GOVERNMENTS

- OSCE PARLIAMENT
- COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
- SECURITY COUNCIL
  - COMMITTEE OF SENIOR OFFICIALS
  - ARBITRATION BODY
  - OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
  - NEGOTIATIONS ON CBMs AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CBD)
  - OSBNE NEGOTIATIONS

SECURITY CENTER
  - REGIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEES
  - CRISIS CONTROL AND CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTER
  - VERIFICATION AND MONITORING CENTER
  - MILITARY COUNCIL
  - CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE FOR SECURITY STUDIES
  - ARMS PRODUCTION AND ARMS EXPORT MONITORING CENTER

CSCE MULTINATIONAL FORCES

POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SUPPORT EC

POLITICAL-MILITARY SUPPORT NATO+WEU

24
Under my proposal, the CSCE would establish an arbitration body dealing with interstate disputes, but also with the human rights issues, especially minorities and ethnic groups. At the same time, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, formerly the Office for Free Elections, would retain the agenda of its predecessor.

The CSCE Parliament would have representation of all CSCE member states, a close contact with other regional parliamentary institutions such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Assembly, the European Parliament, the Assembly of Western European Union, and with the organizations currently cooperating in the sphere of economy (EC, EFTA, ECE, G7, etc.), social sphere (European Court of Human Rights etc.), and ecology. The CSCE Parliament would supervise activities of the Council of Ministers and the Security Council, verify the fulfillment of CSCE goals, discuss issues of concern, and make recommendation to the Council of Ministers as well as the Security Council.

Under my proposal the CSCE would gradually establish these new elements with following goals:

- A Security Council consisting of ministers for foreign affairs and ministers of defence of powers (the United States, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia), and CSCE.
members representing the subregions which would rotate after two years, to provide an input from smaller countries. The Security Council would have the exclusive right of taking decisions in key politico-military matters with regard to security such as arms control, solving of conflicts, and border disputes. Its decisions would be legally binding. For the approval of decisions about different issues a different majority of votes would be required and no member would have veto power. The Security Council would consult with the Council of Ministers, with the EC, NATO and WEU, and with regional security committees in reaching decisions.

The Security Council would be empowered to use the CSCE multinational forces - in emergency cases and for limited time only. The Security Council could use also NATO or WEU, if necessary, to reinforce these forces. The Security Council would have the power to deploy military forces prior to an armed conflict as a response to developing crisis reported by the Crisis Control and Conflict Prevention Center.

CSCE Multinational Forces under direct control of Security Council; consisting of an international command structure and national subunits for peacekeeping and for peacemaking
within Europe and for missions organized by the United Nations.

- a Security Center would be established as an instrument of the Security Council and of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs that would be responsible for managing and coordinating implementation of security policy. The Security Center would also provide a forum for dealing with the politico-military aspects of security, including further arms control and disarmament negotiations. The Security Center would comprise:

  . **regional security committees** concentrating on regional security issues.

  . **a Crisis Control and Conflict Prevention Center** with a broader agenda and powers than the current Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna. The Center would have teams of experts for fact-finding, mediation, crisis aversion, and crisis management to keep a crisis under control.

  . **a permanent Verification and Monitoring Center** for enforcing all arms control and CSBMs treaties. A possible structure and goals of each element could be as follows:
a Military Council offering professional consultations and assistance with implementation of seminars concerning military forces, doctrines, defense plans and budgets; coordinating the training of professionals for tasks of disarmament, for cases of natural and environmental disasters, and the like; establishing, coordinating and supervising training principles, cooperation and use of national subunits of CSCE multinational forces; and coordinating with NATO, WEU and other institutions.

a Consultative Committee for Security Studies comprising groups of experts for dealing with specific security issues ordered by the Security Council or the
Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. The groups of experts would prepare further reductions, new joint non-offensive military doctrine and measures for military force restructuring that would coincide with that doctrine. A group of experts should also consider measures increasing transparency in the development of military technology that would eventually bring the technological arms race under control. Although it seems unrealistic nowadays, a future structure consisting of friendly nations could establish a regional Military Technology Monitoring Center which would deal as a part of world monitoring system, with research for military purposes.

an Arms Production and Arms Export Monitoring Center tasked to prevent proliferation of weaponry. This body would also assert in conversion of defense industry.

The creation of a viable security structure requires the adaption of the existing organizations while building on their strong points. Under my proposal, the EC, NATO and WEU would keep their autonomy in the security system. They and CSCE would interact and coordinate their activities through their parliaments and central political bodies. The Security Council would consult with the EC on political and economic issues, and
political and military issues with NATO and WEU on reaching decisions. The activities of individual organizations would interlock through an allocation of specific responsibilities for particular activities. The purpose and responsibilities of individual organizations could overlap, to a degree, but redundancy should be avoided.

Fig.3. Contribution of individual organizations to the future security structure

Figure 3., above, represents a conceptual view of the key components of the future security structure. The UN would provide a global forum for collective security consultations, but with its current, primary operational mechanism - peace-keeping,
it would provide only limited response capability. The CSCE traditionally promotes openness and transparency in military matters, provides regional forum for consultations, prevention of conflicts, and, in the event of the creation of the multinational forces, also limited response capability. But, more importantly, the CSCE provides a solid framework for the establishment of the future structure of European security, as well as for the coordination of efforts of all organizations within this structure.

NATO would provide a consultation forum for its members and through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council for other states in Europe, as well. NATO would serve as a safety net, providing a strategic balance of power, deterrence of aggression and rapid and credible response in the case of a failure of deterrence. NATO would also provide a core for the CSCE multinational forces and source of military expertise: offering training and education facilities for multinational forces, providing common training, and exercising coordination of armed forces for reinforcement tasks.

The WEU would provide an additional consultation forum, supplement NATO as Europe's security net, and provide an independent response capability without geographical restrictions. A European pillar of NATO established on the basis of the WEU could become indispensable in the case that the United
States, always willing to resort to isolationism, would not help to settle a major conflict threatening Europe.

Because of length constraints I cannot address in detail all issues connected with the establishment of the future European security structure. That said, my proposal would strengthen the existing CSCE structure and operational effectiveness of that body by adding proposed institutions and by delegating more real power. This improved version of CSCE would have more effective leadership with the advantage of rapid and legally binding resolution, a bigger capacity for prevention of conflict and for crisis control, and its own peacekeeping and peacemaking forces. Moreover, a CSCE coordination commission would enable CSCE to strengthen these capabilities by effective cooperation with the EC, NATO and WEU. All these changes would increase the credibility of CSCE and could allow the CSCE to provide necessary security guarantees to all members.

Such a structure would likely mean more bureaucracy and expense. On the other hand, this structure could create conditions under which states would favor maintenance of a collective security system instead of their own armed forces. It might consequently enable nations to reduce their armed forces and reallocate resources. The proposed security structure would have the means for successful prevention of regional conflict such as timely information, adequate leverage, mediation
capability, and deterrence means, and necessary tools for peaceful settlement of disputes such as political sanctions, incentive economic tools and an arbitration body.

My proposal counts upon a willingness and readiness of CSCE member states to give up a part of their sovereignty in favor of CSCE. I believe that the opportunity to achieve lasting peace is here, and that the strengthening of the supranational character of CSCE by investing this organization with collective powers is in the best interest of Europe. I am aware of that my proposal may seem too idealistic. But, the changes we witness in Europe today would have been quite unthinkable few years ago, too.

CONCLUSION

Europe has a tremendous chance to achieve lasting peace. To fulfil this goal, Europe needs stability in the sense of the word that will allow Europe to manage successfully continuing change. The old security system of the Cold War is no longer sufficient for this complex task. What the new reality requires is a pan-European collective security structure of interlocking and mutually complementary organizations which are able to address all aspects of security.

It is quite possible that the next security structure will be far from fully coordinated and that the comprehensive security
system is only the music of a distant future. Time will tell.
The Helsinki Follow-up meeting in March 1992 will likely mark out
the next steps, as well as the pace of the organization of the
new European security system. This essay argues that CSCE should
become the backbone of such a structure and that this security
structure could realistically reflect current power realities,
would fully involve the Soviet Union’s successor states in
European security affairs, and could manage peace, manage (but
preferably prevent) crisis, and, when necessary, respond to any
aggression.
Notes


4 One must understand the difference between the terms "collective self-defense" and "collective security." "A system of collective self-defense is based in the first place on national armies, on the level of armaments of each country, on the determination to defend oneself against all aggressors and on alliances." John P.Renninger [ED.], The Future Role of the United Nations in an Interdependent World, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, p.47. On the other hand, "A system of collective security is based on the agreement of all or most states to take common action against any nation that illegally breaks the peace. To be effective, a collective security system requires agreement to defend status quo against violent change, a definite assurance from member states that action will be undertaken against law-breaking states, and a willingness of states not directly threatened to participate in sanctions against an aggressor. A collective security system should not be confused with an alliance or balance-of-power system in which states on either side are kept in check and peace is maintained by the tendency toward a power equilibrium." Jack C.Plano and Roy Olton, eds., The International Relations Dictionary, 4th ed., Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1988, pp.334-335. To complete the definition, I would use the following extract from Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A.Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Summer 1991, Vol.16, No.1, p.118: "The underlying logic of collective security is two-fold. First, the balancing mechanisms that operate under collective security should prevent war and stop aggression far more effectively than the balancing mechanisms that operate in an anarchic setting. Second, a collective security organization, by institutionalizing the notion of all against one, contributes to the creation of an international setting in which stability emerges through


10 Article VIII, Paragraph 3, of the treaty gives the WEU very broad competence outside Europe. For more information see Willem van Eekelen, "Developing the WEU," Defense'92, pp.35-38.


18 Ibid., p.28


22 President Havel's address to the NATO Council, NATO Review, April 1991, p.35.


26 The chart used in a presentation of Mr.Clarence Juhl, (Director, NATO Policy, Department of Defense of the United States) for U.S.Army War College, February 28, 1992.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


