TRANSCOM: A LOOK AT THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION

BY

Colonel Donald W. Lamb
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1992
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

92-12844
TRANSCOM: A Look at the Process of Organizational Evolution

Colonel Donald W. Lamb

The creation of the United States Transportation Command in 1987 was a major milestone. The unified command, as part of the new Goldwater-Nichols era of strengthened joint activities, was set up as a wartime command. The initial implementation plan for TRANSCOM left open key issues on command relationships and peacetime authority. The development of emerging roles and missions for USTRANSCOM is presented, along with insights into the process and the opposing points of view. Observations on organizational strengths, obstacles to total restructuring, service concerns and a recounting of the methods chosen to implement change are detailed. The future roles and relationships are examined as force structure and service doctrine evolve. A look forward suggests that further refinement may be necessary to overcome obstacles and to achieve assured force deployment capabilities.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

TRANSCOM: A LOOK AT THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Donald W. Lamb
United States Army

Colonel Donald W. Bruce
United States Air Force
Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

UNCLASSIFIED
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Donald W. Lamb, Colonel, United States Army

TITLE: TRANSCOM: A Look at the Process of Organizational Evolution

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 10 April 1992 PAGES: 46 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The creation of the United States Transportation Command in 1987 was a major milestone. The unified command, as part of the new Goldwater-Nichols era of strengthened joint activities, was set up as a wartime command. The initial implementation plan for TRANSCOM left open key issues on command relationships and peacetime authority. The development of emerging roles and missions for USTRANSCOM is presented, along with insights into the process and the opposing points of view. Observations on organizational strengths, obstacles to total restructuring, service concerns and a recounting of the methods chosen to implement change are detailed. The future roles and relationships are examined as force structure and service doctrine evolve. A look forward suggests that further refinement may be necessary to overcome obstacles and to achieve assured force deployment capabilities.
ACRONYMS USED IN THIS STUDY

AFB  Air Force Base
ASD (P&L)  Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics)
CINC  Commander-In-Chief
CINCUSTRANSCOM  Commander-In-Chief United States Transportation Command
COM  Combatant Command
CONUS  Continental United States
DCSLOG  Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
DEPSEPS  Deputy Operations Deputies
DMR  Defense Management Review
DOD  Department of Defense
DOD IG  Department of Defense Inspector General
IP  Implementation Plan
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDA  Joint Deployment Agency
JOPES  Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
MAC  Military Airlift Command
MSC  Military Sealift Command
MTMC  Military Traffic Management Command
OJCS  Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OPSSEPS  Operations Deputies
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense
PL  Public Law
PPBS  Planning, Programming, and Budget System
SAAM  Special Assignment Airlift Mission
TDA  Table of Distribution and Allowance
TOA  Transportation Operating Agency
USTRANSCOM  United States Transportation Command
A new unified command was created as the President directed the Secretary of Defense to establish the United States Transportation Command in 1987. The United States Transportation Command was formed to coordinate and ensure adequate wartime transportation support to defend our nation and to support our defense forces. The structure of the defense transportation system and its independent component parts is complex. This attempt to create a unified structure is the latest effort to bring uniformity to the transportation operations of the Department of Defense.

The experiences of the United States Transportation Command in its first formative years, the evolution of its structure, the growth of its missions, and insights on its performance in Desert Shield/Desert Storm will be covered in this survey. A critical view to the future will be presented based on the dynamics of the current structures, evolving issues, and external variables that will impact on the command and all of the defense establishment.

Analysis will be presented on key mission areas, organizational strengths, disputed functions, organizational frictions and personalities that will impact future operations. The larger part of this effort will examine the ongoing reorganization initiatives and the perspectives of the various participants.
OVERVIEW

With the stroke of a pen the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) was created on April 18, 1987. The command's purpose was stated succinctly.

To provide global air, land and sea transportation to meet national security objectives.

The command became a reality on 1 October 1988, at Scott Air Force Base (AFB), Illinois. The command consisted of a relatively small headquarters, the former Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) and three component commands. The Service components are the Army's Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Air Force's Military Airlift Command (MAC), and the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC). USTRANSCOM exercises combatant command (COCOM) over the common user transportation forces of its components. Operational control of each component's forces has been redelegated to each component commander.

The new organization's roles and early guidelines were somewhat restrictive in nature. Contingency planning, systems automation and enhancement, and support of exercises were the main missions highlighted for USTRANSCOM. The day-to-day support operations of the armed forces continued to be individual service responsibilities. The inner workings of support arrangements and functional decisions were beyond the
scope of the new command.

Negotiations with carriers, contract activities, movement of commodities, rates and routings, sealift scheduling, port operations, passenger movement by commercial carriers and a host of other activities were managed as they always had been, independently of USTRANSCOM's sphere of influence. In reality, the true power and money flowed from the services. The only area of immediate control for USTRANSCOM was MAC as the Commander-in-Chief of USTRANSCOM was also dual hatted as the commander of MAC. This key relationship was built into the command structure, subject to further review. This relationship facilitated the birth of the headquarters staff, facilities, support and a more rapid operational capability. It also led to some perceptions and issues that will be covered in depth later in this paper.

Planning, coordination, readiness for contingency operations and expansion of its sphere of influence were early activities undertaken by the command. The initial implementation plan for USTRANSCOM called for a phased approach to its growth and mission expansion. The initial startup at Scott AFB was done on a small scale, building to a great extent on the existing structure supporting the Military Airlift Command. Role revisions, manpower requirements, mission expansion and relationships were downplayed to facilitate the process. Any voids or new issues were to be opened for discussion and
resolution after the command gained some practical experience 6
An imperfect launch, but a start that had eluded the Department
of Defense (DOD) for its first 40 years.

Exercise coordination support, preparation for possible
contingency operations, automation initiatives and a joint
perspective on support were early results. Communications were
facilitated and positive steps begun to link systems for the
common good. However, many in the community remained skeptical
and obstacles were frequently encountered in the bureaucracies
of the services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and DOD.

BACKGROUND

The new command faced built in opposition on multiple
fronts. The fact that this battle had been fought for decades
did not escape both proponents and opponents. The efforts to
orchestrate and reorganize the Department of Defense's
transportation functions are littered with failed ideas, ignored
study group reports, and included elaborate end runs to Congress
and other power sources as indicated:

Six transportation command studies,
beginning with the Hoover Commission
in 1949 and ending with the Packard
Commission, were required before the
DOD Reorganization Act of 1986
established USTRANSCOM with JDA
incorporated into it. 7

The principal players in this process have been the Army and
the Navy. Each has had its own power bases, differing views on the roles, controls, and resources devoted to other than pure combat missions, and indeed basic philosophy. The Army has typically displayed little true interest in its longterm transportation assets, facilities, equipment or doctrine. The Navy also would have preferred to ignore this aspect of its mission area. Battleships and carriers seem to have more appeal than cargo vessels. This benign neglect is only disturbed when either service is threatened by an outside force, typically viewed as a raid on resources.

The Navy's Military Sealift Command is an organization with widely diversified missions. Headquartered in Washington, D.C., its worldwide mission includes fleet support, refueling operations, and common user over ocean vessel support to the Army and the other services. The command is predominantly staffed with civilian employees and heavily dependent on contract support for its common user missions. The lack of deep Navy emphasis, orientation and support is somewhat portrayed by the composition of the initial MSC fact finding liaison team sent to Saudi Arabia for Desert Shield. The team consisted of an Army Colonel and an Air Force Captain assigned to Headquarters, MSC.

The Army's Military Traffic Management Command, located in Northern Virginia, also predominantly civilian in nature, has long been the mainstay of its transportation operations. As a major command of the Army it is deployed worldwide, yet numbers
fewer than 4,000. Even this austere structure was challenged by the VANGUARD Study Group. The VANGUARD Study of 1990 sought to reduce Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) strength spaces in the Army. Headquarters, field operating activities, and staff functions were all reviewed for consolidation or elimination. MTMC was targeted for elimination as a separate command and was saved only by a coordinated staff effort and the successful operations of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The command's day-to-day functions include negotiations with rail and truck operators, passenger bookings, controlling household good movements, maintaining guaranteed traffic agreements and cargo movements. Port operations, traffic management and documentation systems are also key mission areas.

The systems of the Military Sealift Command and the Military Traffic Management Command, by necessity and practice, must function together in the international segments of their missions. Generally located together or near each other in port facilities worldwide, the two complimented each other. The ocean cargo system required that movement requirements be reported to the MSC office for scheduling on a ship. The cargo would be scheduled or booked for a sailing on a particular ship. The actual physical handling of the cargo, its loading and documentation in the worldwide system would be accomplished by the MTMC port operator. Negotiated rate agreements and container cargo rate guides were setup to reduce the administrative processing required to arrange movements. The MSC Container
Agreements and cargo booking process became central to the transportation pipeline worldwide, operated by the Army principally through MTMC.

The Air Force participated in the process as a user and customer. Air Force Water Port Liaison Offices (WPLOs) were operated at each large port to provide direct coordination with the air elements of the theater.

Air shipments were a smaller percentage of the normal business and were accommodated in the specialized systems of MAC. The common user systems interfaced for high priority cargo and international passenger movements, but generally air specialist and surface specialist had little interaction. The cargo specialist skills and commercial orientation of the ocean break bulk and container service movements were not easily transferable into the air side of the business. MAC was seen as controlling a specialized, higher cost mode that for sustainment shipments was not normally accessible.

This commonality of MSC and MTMC was noted and challenged on multiple fronts over the years. At one point in the late 70’s, a merger of MSC and MTMC was nearly a reality. At the last moment it was blocked by an end run to Congress.

The now often cited Nifty Nugget exercise of 1978 did highlight numerous logistical, organizational, industrial, and mobilization issues for the Department of Defense.
Transportation readiness and capabilities were included in this look at how well we could respond to a mobilization requirement. Follow-on DOD studies, the Packard Commission, the DOD Inspector General (DOD IG), and internal reviews generated various consolidation mandates, proposals and options that were all stalled or not adopted.

The net effect of all these proposals and controversy was that as the era of Goldwater-Nichols arrived and USTRANSCOM was ready to be created an atmosphere of firm opposition, dug in heels, and long standing hard feelings faced any attempt to do anything.

The new world of TRANSCOM opened and much of the world continued as always. The Service components took care of the business and responded to the new Commander-In-Chief (CINC) only for a small portion of their responsibility. Normal daily missions, budgets, manpower, DOD executive functions and interface with industry were all in the purview of the components. USTRANSCOM could only exercise informal coordination over its vast mission areas except for specific responsibilities spelled out in its initial implementation instructions. These included wartime mission support, automated system development, exercise support, and planning for future expansion of its roles.

The true measure of any organization is said to center on its control of assets and resources. The true bottom line is who controls the checkbook? USTRANSCOM had no direct control
over the expenditures or budget or industrial funds of its components. The Navy Industrial Fund remained at the center of much of the tough battle over final authority of the TRANSCOM organization. The split out of MSC between its fleet support missions and its common user support roles, and how the money is tracked are key issues. The Navy's Industrial Fund is large and is viewed as a source for opportune activity with limited oversight by some in the Navy. The debate and fine tuning of financial controls will be covered in greater detail in the development of the emerging command. It should be noted that the Army Industrial Fund and the Airlift Industrial Fund are small in comparison with that of the Navy.

This short tour through the previous efforts at consolidation and some of the residual and emotional issues sets the stage for the organization's transition to the future.

THE FUTURE COURSE

By the early months of 1990, USTRANSCOM was more settled and began looking forward to a more robust future. The initial startup had gone well and the command's identity was becoming more familiar. The Exercise Proud Eagle 90 had been a milestone event for the command. The exercise was the first test of the new centralized command apparatus to measure deployment operations and exercise controls on a large scale exercise. This
experience, coupled with a new commander, led to the development of a larger mission quest for USTRANSCOM. The initial implementation plan had been restrictive in nature. The authorities and key roles of TRANSCOM had been for wartime roles, exercises, and contingencies. A new vision was emerging that the command must be able to exercise peacetime directive authority over the components to ensure wartime standards and readiness could be assured.

The Proud Eagle 90 evaluation team of retired general officers and other distinguished dignitaries is quoted as the point of origin for expanded command authority.

CINCUSTRANSCOM should consolidate certain peacetime and crisis management tasks at USTRANSCOM headquarters, beginning with traffic management and contracting, to improve the coordination between transportation modes and to provide the basis for improved reporting and tracking of actual movements. Such steps would be invaluable also in better aligning the transition from peacetime to wartime operations.

This recommendation served as the springboard for a lively debate, interservice negotiations and as the continuing vehicle to determine the roles, and relationships of CINCUSTRANSCOM and his component commanders. As of early 1992, the complete agreements and discussions between the service headquarters, service secretariats, the JCS, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) had not been reconciled. Agreements and compromise positions were subjected to extreme degrees of delay, wordsmithing, obscuration, and review at every level.
The trail of this evolving organization is instructive and provides insight. Both tough issues and organizational biases can get crossed and prevent optimum solutions from emerging for considerable periods of time. This is not yet a complete action and strong emotions still rage and range widely on this topic. The basic proposals, counterpoints, chronology of the key events and analysis and insights gained as a firsthand observer of some of the process will be presented.

USTRANSCOM began to lay the groundwork for expansion of roles and missions in early 1990. Conferences took on a distinctive feel of preparing the way for a new way of doing business. Essentially these meetings were introductory, somewhat instructive, and could legitimately be viewed as teambuilding sessions. Roles and missions, understanding each organization's activities and points of interconnectivity and discussing the future predominated. Throughout the spring, key elements from the CINC to component commanders, to staff sections, to selected "councils of colonels" met repeatedly and laid out various options and counterproposals for the command groundrules. Each service and component organization had a going in position and viewpoint, but the teambuilding and spirit of compromise offered promise.

In the meantime, a series of pressure points was building to push forward more aggressively for significant change. The
Deputy Inspector General, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Vander Schaaf, had done a study in February 1988 that advocated elimination of the component commands. The study asserted that 1,015 manpower spaces could be saved in a restructured USTRANSCOM. On 3 July 1990, the OSD Comptroller had by memorandum asked the Services for an update status of the Vander Schaaf recommendations. The answer was due back to OSD not later than 25 July 1990.

The other key external impetus was the Defense Management Review (DMR) Initiative, Transportation Management. The Defense Management Review had been a vigorous program to reform DOD business practices. Notable changes had been initiated as a direct result of the Packard Commission study and its call for enhanced efficiency in the management of the Department of Defense. The transportation community was now being challenged by the same process that had taken on the defense procurement structure and that had forced the consolidation of the commissary and depot systems of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The DMR proposal for transportation would require that the services deactivate the transportation component commands: the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Military Airlift Command (MAC), the Military Sealift Command (MSC), and transfer virtually all functions to the United States Transportation Command. This proposal was unacceptable to all the services, but drove the timetable as OSD had asked for a response not later than 15 August 1990.
Coupled with the above external factors was a strong leadership element at the head of USTRANSCOM. The new Commander-In-Chief (CINC) was General H. T. Johnson, an Air Force Academy graduate with a reputation for academic and operational brilliance. General Johnson had been the previous Director of the Joint Staff. The Deputy CINC of USTRANSCOM was Vice Admiral Paul D. Butcher, formerly commander of the Military Sealift Command. The emphasis was to make things happen and to sustain the initiative for more control and authority to be vested in the unified command.

A vision for a single strong advocate for defense transportation was emerging. The control of all modes, with requisite resources, authorities, and contracting dollars was thought to be not only desirable but attainable by USTRANSCOM. The stage had been set, the services were primed, and with OSD and Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) agreement, the U.S. Transportation Command was eager to take on a bigger role. That vision has yet to be attained for a variety of reasons. Obstacles, miscalculations, and timing have each played a role in the evolution. The Desert Shield and Desert Storm experiences played favorably for the command, yet agreement could not be reached on the future.

FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE

The TRANSCOM effort for reorganization was set in motion on multiple fronts. A large effort was exerted to get the service
vice chiefs of staff briefed on the command in late June and early July of 1990. USTRANSCOM was still new and the need to establish its identity and mission areas was important. These briefings and discussions were preliminary to the key effort to be undertaken in the OJCS for reorganization authority.

A meeting was set in the JCS tank for 26 July 1990, and the TRANSCOM reorganization was on the agenda. The briefing was to feature a complete laydown of the TRANSCOM vision for the future. Phases, roles, organizational relationships, missions, and new directive authority were to be presented. As the read ahead packages came out, it became clear that the new proposals differed significantly from the positions developed with the service representatives earlier in the spring and summer. The key players on the service staffs, the component commands, and OJCS were dismayed to see the working level efforts of the better part of a year displaced by a new set of variables. This approach by CINCUSTRANSCOM planted a bitter taste that would become a major obstacle in the way of hopes for swift transformation and empowerment of the command.

The actual JCS session was postponed until 31 July 1990. The service staffs were busy preparing the leadership for the "tank" sessions. The TRANSCOM advance packages had changed from day-to-day and from hour-to-hour. This complicated the work of action officers. Each presentation required point papers and
supplemental materials to be assembled, staffed, revised, and approved by each level. Coordination with every key participant, the other services, the component command, the secretariat staffs, and the service planner was mandatory and time sensitive.

The net effect of rapid changes and multiple versions of a presentation within a short span of time was confusion. The Service chiefs, their principal advisors, and indeed the Joint Staff did not have adequate time to absorb the changes. The variation between versions was disconcerting and was felt by some to be a deliberate tactic by TRANSCOM to overwhelm and get rapid approval of its concept.

The briefing took on several interesting aspects. The late changes, close hold of preliminary information, and the pressure for a quick decision were cumulatively causing concern. The decision brief was presented by General Johnson personally. As discussed earlier, the overview strongly emphasized the need for fast action due to impending action by OSD that would abolish the component commands entirely. In effect, a bold strike at a major reorganization was tried, without the prior coordination or cooperation of the services. The details of the proposal will next be covered point by point.

The initial component of the brief was the assertion that USTRANSCOM lacked appropriate peacetime authority. The script read:
Today, we are only a wartime command and, unlike other unified or specified commands, we have little to no authority in peacetime to influence our wartime mission. 15

The next portion of the text constituted the major point of contention and concern that lingers to this time. The upfront admission by the command that:

Our assessments are based on experience gained since establishment and prudent military judgment, rather than detailed analysis. 16

The briefing presented an overview of the command's formation, with emphasis on the external pressures leading to its activation. A simplified series of definition charts was used to explain the nature of the transportation operations covered by the command. Particularly important was the understanding that "common user military transportation" was the domain under discussion. The Joint Publication 4-01 defines it as follows:

Transportation services provided by the military TOA's on a common basis within the Department of Defense under an industrial fund system

This distinction is crucial to the roles and missions of the component commands. Service unique functions are not subject to controls of the CINC and the authority lines between the areas
are carefully preserved. The Navy felt and still feels vulnerable to misinterpretation in its common user and fleet support missions. 17

The command next laid out its six element plan for reorganization. An expansion of its mission statement to incorporate peacetime responsibilities and authority was first on the agenda. The second key element requested was an OSD charter specifically designating USTRANSCOM as the single manager for common user transportation functions. The next part of the proposal was the most sweeping and controversial. The command wanted to be assigned the role of policy manager of traffic management, contracting, and financial management. An early version of the script asserted:

...there is general agreement on the authority of USTRANSCOM to make traffic management, contract, and financial management policy. 18

The briefing continued with more information on the current structure of traffic management, contracting, and financial management. The thrust continued to emphasize the interconnectivity of the functions and how lacking the control of each aspect, USTRANSCOM could not influence the outcome of its mission elements.

The briefing then shifted to a discussion of a three phased implementation strategy for the reorganization. Phase I would
incorporate a 75 person cell at the command to work on transportation policy, contracting, execution of high visibility movements using the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) type procedures. Phase II would allow the command to expand by 342 personnel. Execution of traffic management functions and operation of all passenger movements would be centralized. Phase III was described as needing 603 personnel to accomplish traffic management, contract execution, movement visibility, cost estimates, and a consolidated defense transportation industrial fund. 19

USTRANSCOM personnel then presented their position that this concept would provide value added to the defense establishment. A more integrated system, mobilization enhancements, increased leverage with industry, and a single transportation billing system were highlighted. Manpower savings were also mentioned as an additional, but not primary effect of the shift. A strong appeal was made to override service concerns over the details and phasing and to even go directly to full Phase III implementation. The command then offered its fallback position that a robust Phase II would satisfy most of its immediate concerns. The major difference being that the responsibility for contracting execution would then remain a service function.

The primary concern and biggest impact of the sweeping changes proposed by the CINCUSTTRANSCOM would fall on the Army
and the Navy. Each service position will be examined and described as they reacted to the TRANSCOM presentation.

The Army was flexible in its approach to dealing with an emerging and strengthened unified command. The Army position was primarily developed in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. The responsible directorate was the Directorate for Transportation, Energy, and Troop Support. The Army expressed concern that insufficient analysis had been performed to make an informed decision. It further stressed that determination of the roles of Commanders-In-Chief was appropriate to the JCS, not that of the OSD staff via a Defense Management Review methodology. Concern was expressed that the timing for a major command realignment was poor due to the ongoing drawdown of conventional forces in Europe, the pending reductions and shifts due to Quicksilver, and the base closure and restructuring actions that were looming on the horizon. Further fault was expressed in that USTRANSCOM had not fully identified what was broken. The previous CINC’s statements of satisfaction with the command structure and lack of reported concerns by the system users were cited as counterweights to the proposal. The Army felt that the CINC had understated his role in the resource process and asserted that his authority was the same as all other unified commander’s in influencing the mobilization base and resources through the integrated priority list, the Defense Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), and Commanders-In-Chief assessments.
The Army's internal position was that it could support a larger peacetime role for USTRANSCOM, charter changes, and policy roles, but peacetime execution would still be outside the scope of authority. This position, coupled with removal of the action from consideration as a Defense Management Review item, and that JCS sponsor a study of the proper roles, missions, and organization of USTRANSCOM was to be the recommendation. In essence, support a gradual shift of policy roles, without execution authority, and require a full study of roles as well as detailed justification of any manpower shifts.20

The Headquarters, Department of the Navy staff was also actively involved in this process. The Navy component command, the Military Sealift Command, was also a key element in the preparation of positions, as had been the Military Traffic Management Command for the Army. An additional voice and supporter for the services and especially for the Navy was the Marine Corps. The Navy position essentially boiled down to hard line opposition of the reorganization as proposed by TRANSCOM. The cited lack of analysis and sweeping nature of the plan led to an inspired resistance. The MSC Office of Counsel prepared an extensive attack on the reorganization. Arguments ranged from the technical provisions of the federal code to the language of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law (PL) 433. The document made several points

20
that continue to appear in position papers on the topic.

Key points included a concern on the transfer of powers from the services to the unified command. The issue of absorption of the components by the unified command was the biggest fear of the services. The residual service forces and authorities not in the common user pool were of significant concern to the Navy. A large portion of its fleet support structure is operated by MSC, outside the purview of USTRANSCOM. The authority and roles of the respective service secretaries were also postulated as being incompatible with this portion of the projected reorganization. The legal brief also included a key element on the mission limits for the command:

The mission of USTRANSCOM is to provide global air, land and sea transportation to meet national security needs. In the performance of this mission, USTRANSCOM is responsible for the transportation-oriented elements of strategic mobility planning, operating and maintaining the Joint Deployment System, deployment-related ADP systems integration, and centralized wartime traffic management. These functional responsibilities are clearly combatant in nature. It was with these responsibilities in mind that SECDEF bifurcated the operational command of service component assets, which was vested in USTRANSCOM as necessary for it to perform its wartime mission. From operational control in establishing USTRANSCOM, SECDEF deliberately reserved to the component commands: operational control of the forces assigned to USTRANSCOM; responsibility for service
unique missions; control of industrial funds; responsibility for Service-oriented procurement and maintenance scheduling; and Department of Defense charters for peacetime single manager transportation operations...21

The Navy summed up its points with an argument that the current structure provided appropriate balance. The services take care of the daily operations and administrative functions. This arrangement left the unified command free to focus on the wartime requirements and responsibilities. Said another way:

...Moreover, the USTRANSCOM resources necessary to manage those administrative elements would result in misdirecting the focus of USTRANSCOM from ensuring warfighting transportation readiness to the administration of the business and commercial operating of the service components. Accordingly, the single responsibilities of the various service components for peace-time transportation complement the responsibilities of USTRANSCOM. 22

Other arguments included concern over the acquisition authority in technical terms. The Navy felt that such authority could not be given to a unified commander, as it was reserved to the services or specific defense agencies:

...thus, absent specific legislation, the acquisition functions currently performed by the service components could not be performed by USTRANSCOM. Only the head of an agency is authorized under Chapter 137 of Title 10, United States Code, to conduct procurements for property or services. Unlike the Director of Defense Agencies, CINCTRANS is not the "head of an agency" as that...
term is defined in 10 U.S.C. 2302(I) and implemented in FAR 2.101, and DFARS 202.101. 23

The 31 July 1990 meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was marked by differing levels of expectation and the results are still unclear. It seems that the attendees had widely disparate views of what the desired outcome was to be and in the end what, if any, agreement had been reached.

The OJCS action officers in the Strategic Mobility Directorate were faced with a challenge in getting a record of the meeting published. As late as 20 September 1990, the record was still under review and staff comment. 24

The Army response, prepared by the author, and signed out by General Reimer illustrates some measure of the concern on the USTRANSCOM issue:

1. I have reviewed your proposed memorandum of 20 Sep 90 concerning the transmittal of decisions of the JCS made on 31 Jul, SAB.
2. The Army's concerns as expressed in Army Planner Memorandums 345-90, dated 8 Aug 90 and 374-90, dated 30 Aug 90 continue to apply. Our understanding remains that no components of TRANSCOM will be assigned in peacetime until after a JCS study is conducted to determine what reorganization action will or should take place. Further, we believe that the Phase I proposal from TRANSCOM was only agreed to in concept, less execution. This latter point is critical and merits clarification. 25

The depth of disagreement and volatility of the TRANSCOM
issue is further illustrated by excerpts from a memorandum by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) on 16 October 1990:

1. I remain concerned that key issues dating to the 31 July JCS session on the USTRANSCOM transition plan have yet to be closed out. The staffing of the JCS memorandum has not produced agreement. Now, CINCUSTRANSCOM has forwarded to the Director, Joint Staff, a draft implementation document and a charter that presumes Phase III (fully operable) responsibilities.

2. Our position has been proactive and consistent during this iterative process. However, the JCS and now TRANSCOM documents have not accurately portrayed the decisions of the 31 Jul meeting or clarified the crucial JCS study that must precede major role changes. Further compounding this issue, the key agreement on the deferral of the DMR II initiative, Transportation Management, has yet to be forwarded to OSD.

The debate over USTRANSCOM had now been ongoing since the 31 July meeting and agreement was apparently not any closer. The Operations Deputies of the JCS met again on 17 October. The agenda addressal purpose was:

- to clarify decisions and implementation actions stemming from 31 July CINCTRANSCOM briefing to JCS on missions and organization.

The TRANSCOM briefing was more subdued in this presentation and detailed a less comprehensive restructuring. The key elements continued to be peacetime and wartime missions, assignment of components, a new charter, and establishment of
policy offices at the command for traffic management, contracts, and financial activities. The command emphasized that it only sought initial authority equating to Phase I of the original plan. 28

The debate over the roles and missions of USTRANSCOM was framed by a number of external factors. Primary during this time was the ongoing Desert Shield operations. The component commands and USTRANSCOM had been operating since the very outset of the Kuwait invasion. Professionalism and a spirit of cooperation had prevailed. Obviously differences of opinion and style had occurred, but these were background items and mission accomplishment had been the hallmark. The concern most often expressed was the time and attention devoted to this reorganization issue during a time of crisis. The other often expressed sentiment was that the Gulf crisis had proven that the current structure was fully capable, thus leading to the question of what value added the reorganization would bring to the department. 29 The overall reduction of the military had been put on hold during this crisis period but it was not far from anyone's mind.

The external factors and the deep seated concerns of the services resulted in a lack of trust in accepting the TRANSCOM proposals at face value. The compromise agreed upon at the 17 October 1990 session was that a series of descriptive scenarios would be developed to better explain and describe the
relationships of the organizations. These would help the relative "laymen" understand the complexities of the transportation operations. The goal was that well-developed examples would serve as guideposts and as a framework for discussion if interpretation of roles and mission areas later became an issue of contention.

AGREEMENT IN COMPROMISE

The 17 October 1990 direction thus provided a breakthrough in the stalemate that had emerged from the 31 July JCS session. The issue had lost some momentum due to the required support of Desert Shield. The requirement to answer the Defense Management Review issue and the DOD IG still hung over the staffs. The reorganization now had positive momentum to move forward to the next stage of agreement.

The J4 staff and USTRANSCOM set about to draw up the requested example cases that would describe the current relationships and then portray the desired end state. The examples were to display activities of each service. The challenge was to provide adequate detail for clarification, yet not get so bogged down that the audience would lose the point. This initiative was worked at multiple levels for the next several weeks. The effort resulted in numerous strawman
presentations and exchanges among the staffs and action officers. Great discussion ranged on intent and the degree of control to be vested in each service and the unified command for each type function. The emerging activity examples were refined during the week of 5 November. Joint staff, TRANSCOM and service planners participated in the process. The services provided current operations examples and TRANSCOM described how those functions would be performed after the reorganization. Meetings were then held to reconcile differences and clear up ambiguities.

The process proceeded to a meeting on 9 November 1990 in the JCS conference area. Major General Mears, the JCS Deputy J4, and Major General Stanford, the USTRANSCOM J5, were the senior attendees. The Deputy Operations Deputies (DEPOPSDEPS), and component representatives from MTMC, MAC, and MSC also participated. This meeting led to agreed upon examples that would be used for the decision session of the JCS.

Again the pace and critical activities of Operation Desert Shield pushed the TRANSCOM reorganization issue to the back burner. The force buildup into Southwest Asia with additional Continental United States (CONUS) and Europe based troops pushed all other business to the background. Still the drive to get a decision and get on to other issues was strong. Obviously USTRANSCOM wanted a decision, but others were concerned that lacking action to the contrary, OSD would simply adopt the DMR position and force a radical solution on the services.
The USTRANSCOM reorganization was next placed on the JCS agenda on 30 November 1990. This presentation was the briefing of the example scenarios. The briefing covered twelve examples based on functions, missions, and activities that would explain basic relationships and would serve to define the scope of new authority to be granted to USTRANSCOM. A brief description will be made of the example areas, as these were key to agreement on the expanded role of the CINC.

The first subject was that of authority to activate civil lift programs. These had been a major element of Desert Shield and were ideal to portray the point of transition desired. Additionally, the services had no major heartburn in this area, as the language had been reworked numerous times to satisfy Navy concerns on the sealift issues. In essence, the procedure had been that the commanders of the Military Sealift Command and the Military Airlift Command, respectively, had requested through their departmental channels activation of the Sealift Readiness Program and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (Stage II or III). The new description provided that the Commander-In-Chief United States Transportation Command (CINCUSTRANSCOM) would request/recommend activation. Appropriate coordination with the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation was added to further clarify that no unilateral action would be taken. 32
A slide was then presented that showed the normal service responsibilities to organize, train and equip its forces. Training functions, procurement, and MAC's flying hour program were highlighted to display the normal service and service secretary roles. After reorganization all areas were displayed as "no change".

The single point of contact with ocean carriers was another described activity. MTMC and MSC had performed this function, except for the new contingency, wartime, and JCS exercise roles provided for by the creation of TRANSCOM. The relationship would remain the same under the realignment, except that TRANSCOM would also be involved in selected unit moves.

An interesting example was then presented on routine operational scheduling of airlift and airlift operations. This was an Air Force area that MAC and Headquarters Air Force controlled. The proposal retained Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) processing and execution at MAC, but gave USTRANSCOM visibility over the requirements. The establishment of air channels was now to be approved by the CINC, not Headquarters Air Force.

The establishment of transportation policy was an important area of concern. The briefing assured the services that they would still have multiple channels to propose or discuss policy issues. USTRANSCOM was added as a participant in proposing policies, co-equal with the component commands, the services or...
OSD. OSD would still be the approval body for policies.

The establishment of common user transportation contracting policy at USTRANSCOM had been an initial objective of the reorganization. The example slide used clearly showed that this area had been forgone in all substantive areas. The only change to existing practice was that USTRANSCOM was to be the coordination point for changes suggested by the component commands as they went forward to OSD. All contract authority, laws, and waiver requirements continued in force, reinforcing the earlier Navy stand that the services and not a unified command must provide this authority.

Another issue that USTRANSCOM had originally viewed as a major part of its organizational change was passenger movement. The Army, via MTMC, controls domestic charter movements of passengers. The example portrayed movements of different Army, Air Force and Marine Corps elements in CONUS. No procedural changes or mission adjustments were depicted. USTRANSCOM was to be granted visibility over requirements, but no execution authority.

Financial Management was the next activity described. This was an especially touchy area and again displayed the degree that TRANSCOM had backed off the original proposal. The slide made the point that the services individually managed their own funds with no input from TRANSCOM. The change proposal was that
the services continue to manage their own industrial funds. USTRANSCOM would analyze industrial fund data and recommend system improvements.

Overseas deployments and movements to JCS exercises, such as Team Spirit, were portrayed. In these areas no change in roles or relationships were noted. In these operations USTRANSCOM had already been operating in its established role. The point was made that where the component commands had previously recommended modes, that USTRANSCOM would now be in that decision cycle, but the customer could still override that recommendation and select the mode. This allowed the moving unit to assert mission essential requirements, not merely be subject to a cost driven transportation solution.

Selected unit moves to exercises was an area that all seemed to agree provided a good role to USTRANSCOM. This issue would mandate that selected unit moves (typically a battalion or squadron or larger) submit their movement requirements using JOPES like procedures. This would keep the JOPES skills current and would allow operation of the TRANSCOM systems for enhanced training. The same example was displayed to demonstrate how a deployment to the National Training Center would be handled. 33

The briefing was well received and facilitated the confidence and degree of consensus that had been so lacking in the earlier stages. The moment was seized and an agreeable
compromise resulted. The actual transmittal of the decision highlighted the following brief issues:

... On 30 November 1990, the Chairman approved proceeding with the USTRANSCOM Reorganization. It was agreed to:
- Give USTRANSCOM a peacetime as well as wartime mission.
- Assign all Components to USTRANSCOM.
- Task USTRANSCOM to submit a draft charter for common-user lift to include consolidating traffic management and contracting policy formulation at USTRANSCOM.
- Establish a financial management office at USTRANSCOM to give USCINCENTRANS visibility over component industrial fund operations.
- Centralize requirements using JOPES-like procedures at USTRANSCOM for selected unit movements (less execution).

After several revisions and debate about what really had been agreed upon in the meeting of 30 November, a Memorandum For Record, dated 30 November, was staffed. The major revision was that the development of the charter was not tasked specifically to the command, but would be led by the joint staff. Later on 8 and 9 January 1991, a memorandum was staffed to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics) (ASD(P&L)) advising that office of the JCS approval of action on the reorganization and attempting to close out the Defense Management Report issue that had been originally due on 15 August 1990. 35

Work soon began on the charter document. The plan devised by
the J4 staff officers was that each service would draft its own portion and then the Joint Staff could link it together and work out any discrepancies. This process led to working drafts and numerous informal meetings and working sessions in the Pentagon. The document was ready in early March, but the Navy was still concerned that resource decisions currently incorporated in the roles of the service could be directed by USTRANSCOM. The Marine Corps was also opposed to the designation of the command as the DOD single manager for common user transportation. The issue again led to a JCS tank session to iron out the differences. The Navy and Marine Corps concerns were smoothed over with minor changes and the draft charter tentatively approved for forwarding to OSD on 7 March 1991. 36

The long awaited framework for USTRANSCOM’s reorganization at long last seemed to be nearing reality. The draft charter document was formally approved by the Operations Deputies (OPSDEPS) in executive session on 15 March 1991. 37 The service staffs and the joint staff, as well as the TRANSCOM staff, were now forced to wait. The first official feedback finally came on 29 July 1991, when ASD (P&L) put out a draft TRANSCOM Charter as Department of Defense Directive 5160.XX for informal staffing. 38 This version by the OSD staff was universally attacked and the draft was quickly withdrawn. The draft directive was again revised and finally issued for comments by ASD (P&L) on 8 October 1991. 39 The issue was still not resolved late into
1991, and the threat of the DMR was once again specifically raised as a prod to force agreement. The October draft was very similar to the JCS approved version of March. The JCS position was to stand by the version already agreed upon with the services. The debate continued into the new year as the circle of involved policy makers and interested parties grew.

CONCLUSIONS

The charter proposal became deadlocked and hopes for any near term resolution seemed improbable. Then a new initiative changed the direction of the action. The larger issues of reorganization and the necessary increases in authority have just been resolved by a strongly constructed memorandum issued by the Secretary of Defense. This memorandum directs that the missions, forces and authority for transportation for the DOD be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Transportation Command.40 The issues of implementation and the details for each functional area will continue to be refined. The development of the implementing actions is now underway, with the first deadline 90 days after approval of the new Unified Command Plan. Thus a major milestone achieved, but with many voices and strong positions still to be accommodated. The final form of transportation management and related
financial systems will hopefully benefit from the developmental efforts of the last two years.

The USTRANSCOM reorganization effort is still an incomplete vision. This is not to minimize the progress in the decisions and milestones reached to this point. Certainly the accomplishments in the massive transportation efforts associated with Desert Shield and Desert Storm were significant. An optimistic version of the scenario could forecast that the USTRANSCOM will continue to mature, accept and use wisely the enhanced prestige and powers gained through this reorganization and the experiences of the deployments to Saudi Arabia. Additional powers and centralized authorities would then flow more naturally to the proven activity getting the job done to everyone's satisfaction. A longer view of organizational dynamics would recognize that the passage of time and demonstrated performance may achieve more than mandated change.

The contrary point of view can simply point to the years of obstruction to any organizational change highlighted earlier in this paper. Clearly some of the delay and lack of timeliness in the resolution of these most recent issues can be attributed to the war effort; however, some could well speculate that delay of the reorganization for over a year is certainly a victory of sorts to those most opposed to it.

The question then may be, is there a fatal flaw in the
design of USTRANSCOM and its component commands? What fixes are feasible or desirable? What can be done politically and realistically given the competing factions in OSD, JCS, the service staffs, the service secretariats, and the component command. The issue of the user communities, the commercial sectors, and the Congress are another story in themselves. Each activity has special interests and generally they have not produced consensus on any proposal.

The ultimate organizational solution will certainly be a product of compromise and politics. The powers one normally associated with the Goldwater-Nichols Act seem vastly overstated considering the bickering, wordsmithing, compromise and outright delay and obscuration observed in this process. When queried on the reluctance or apparent reluctance to invoke the powers in administrative actions, the prevailing answer has been that the threat of use may be and is implied, but that the network of leaders and the necessity for longterm consensus tends to preclude the use of absolute power. Even when finally used, the greater level of detail must still be worked out with those who were overruled.

An alternative solution may be worth consideration given the complexity of the problems. The multi-teared traditional commands as represented in TRANSCOM and its components may be unworkable, too expensive, and just too top heavy to get the job done. The creation of the command as part of the larger defense
reorganization may have set DOD on a course that will not yield
the desired end state. The protracted and intense struggles over
roles, missions, and control of these vital force projection
assets may be a true measure of valid concerns over what is best
for national defense. A supposition may be made that something
is fundamentally wrong when the same issue is debated repeatedly
and a solution is not reached by the highest level of our
military and civilian leadership.

The TRANSCOM assertion that its military judgment and
experience could be cited as the basis for a massive
reorganization, without detailed analysis or data, seems to have
set the stage for the dilemma and lack of agreement. The larger
issues of successful execution of the command's initial
missions and value added to the overall system go unanswered.
Automation and inter-operability initiatives still are not in
the hands of users. The need for enhanced intransit
visibility of cargo was a major issue during Desert Shield and
Desert Storm. All parts of the transportation system were
severely strained. The nature of the flow of information and
very location of TRANSCOM, away from the decision makers in the
national capital region, seem to place it at a disadvantage. A
key supporting element cannot afford to be placed at length from
the decision point, especially when its activities and
subordinates are always present in the inner circle. The
critical strategic mobility needed for force projection and sustainment continues as a recognized weakness.

...Military analysts outside the Pentagon have universally complained that the handful of fast sealift ships, roughly 75 C-5 and 240 C-141 aircraft and other lift assets would not allow the US military to fulfill its global responsibilities... Desert Storm .... It took the United States seven months to get sufficient forces into the theater to conduct offensive operation, and many weeks to deploy even a credible defensive capability. 41

The consideration of an alternative transportation structure may now be warranted. The drive for a reduced force structure coupled with the ever increasing necessity for contingency force power projection could serve as the nucleus of the concept. The consideration of the lessons learned from Desert Shield and Desert Storm, in combination with the emerging mobility studies could be seen as a window of opportunity for positive change.

The Army's Military Traffic Management Command is ideally situated to streamline the command lines and to provide the peacetime and wartime management of deployments. The command is already the DOD executive agent for many critical operations such as transportation engineering, management of the highways and railways for national defense, operation of the military ports and all commercial contracts with the land transportation industry. MTMC also has sophisticated automation initiatives
working across the transportation spectrum. The command is also located in the national capital region, giving it access and visibility into the key governmental and commercial sectors.

The replacement of USTRANSCOM by a smaller and more functionally oriented structure is proposed. In effect, the newly created TRANSOM's roles would be returned to the one service that has an existing organization that could deal with the missions and operations. A strengthened mission and perspective would be reinforced by MTMC's redesignation as the Army Deployment Command (ADC). Command would be vested in a lieutenant general. All ocean terminals, port operating units, reserve forces involved in deploying units, and the automation assets associated with deployment activities would fall under the command. A realignment, to the predominant user concept, would place strategic sealift vessels directly under the control of the command. This would allow placing the fast sealift ships, reserve fleet roll-on roll-off vessels and other key assets at strategic ports such as Savannah, Jacksonville, and Beaumont.

Planning and training could be strengthened as the Army Deployment Command operated a total system from origin to ultimate destination. The planning functions done by separate installation transportation officers, mobilization activities and multiple commands would be tied together as integral parts of the command. This new link between the major deployers would
see enhanced wartime readiness focus, closer command ties between the units, and enhanced training for the operators of the system. Essentially the deployers would all work for the same boss to the same standard.

The Military Airlift Command would continue to operate the airlift system in its specified command role. The Navy and the Military Sealift Command would continue to function in its fleet support primary missions. Vessel procurement and administrative relationships for sealift vessels would be handled by way of supplemental agreements with the Deployment Command. Funds transfers and users fees would reimburse the cost of vessel procurement and ship construction funds provided by the Navy. These alignments would essentially split out responsibilities between surface and air modes. The common user support and key deployment of forces could then be accomplished with two headquarters instead of the current four.

The Army is the service that is most affected by the changing world. Forces are being reduced and forward presence is diminishing across the spectrum. The Army must ensure that sufficient forces with adequate firepower and sustainment can be employed, if called upon by our nation's leadership. The Army must take a strong stand and speak out for the deployment capabilities it has long needed. A six month timeout to build forces may not be granted in the next war. An Army Deployment
Command would be a solid demonstration of our commitment to the future. This proposal should at least be considered in view of the promise expressed in the current ARMY FOCUS:

...With the unified commanders, Joint Staff, and other services, the Army is exploring improvements in every leg of the worldwide mobility triad (airlift, sealift, and prepositioning). Concurrently, the Army is also refining its doctrine, organizations, training, equipment, force structure, and deployment procedures to meet the requirements of rapid power projection and to further enhance its deployability and versatility. 42
ENDNOTES

1United States Transportation Command, Briefing-USTRANSCOM Reorganization (Scott AFB, Illinois: 26 July 1990), 4. (hereafter referred to as "Reorganization Briefing, 26 July 1990").

2Ibid.


4" Going the Distance", Cover Story, St. Louis Commerce (August 1991), 9.

5Ibid.

6Reorganization Briefing, 26 July 1990, 4.

7Ibid, 4.

8JCS Implementation Plan (IP), 9.

9Reorganization Briefing, 26 July 1990, 4.

10Ibid, 4.

11Ibid, 3.

12Ibid, 2.

13Ibid.

14Ibid.

15Ibid, 1.

16Ibid.


18Reorganization Briefing, 26 July 1990, 15. (This statement was revised after adverse service reaction to advance copy).


MSC Council, 3.

Ibid, 4

Ibid, 8


Headquarters, Department of the Army (DALO-TS), 16 Oct.


Ibid, 1.

United States Transportation Command, Briefing- USTRANSCOM Reorganization (Scott AFB, Illinois: 30 November 1990), 1

Ibid, 1-12


40The Secretary of Defense, Memorandum-Strengthening Department of Defense Transportation Functions (Washington, D.C.: 11 February 1992) (Informally known as the Addington Memorandum for Mr. David S. Addington, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, its principal author.).


BIBLIOGRAPHY


