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THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE;
A FOCUS ON TOMORROW'S ARMY

BY

Lieutenant Colonel C. V. Christianson
United States Army

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USAWC CLASS OF 1992

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

92-12124
As our nation entered the 20th Century, its new Secretary of War, Elihu Root, was reviewing the nearly disastrous military performance during the just ended War with Spain. He concluded that the War Secretariat was not equipped to effectively direct a unified war effort, and there did not exist a body of officers educated and trained to plan and solve problems from the perspective of the Army as a whole. His conclusions caused him to request and receive permission to establish a War Department staff and an Army War College.

In defining the direction for the War College, Secretary Root asked three questions: What shall be taught?; How shall it be taught?; and Who shall be taught? This paper is based on a belief that those three questions are equally valid today, especially considering the dramatic change in world events. The world environment is evolving and with it senior military leadership requirements are taking on an evolution of their own. The Army War College, the ultimate educational institution for tomorrow's senior leaders, must also evolve to...
meet the needs of a new, different Army. Secretary Root's three questions can provide direction as the Army War College looks to the future. This study is an attempt to answer those questions with a focus on the next century. Conclusions are drawn and recommendations presented in an attempt to link the educational process at the College with the needs of the 21st century Army.
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The United States Army War College; A Focus on Tomorrow's Army

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel C. V. Christianson
United States Army

Dr. Glenda Nogami
Project Adviser

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U. S. Army War College
Carlisle Barrack, Pennsylvania 17013
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PREFACE

The future of the United States Army is being shaped by forces beyond the control of the Army's senior leadership. Political revolution across the globe, a world-wide explosion of long-suppressed nationalism, economic interdependency, a resurgence of isolationism, and domestic economic issues have joined in a powerful synergy to chart the future. The long-term effects of such dramatic developments are certain to prominently alter the course of history in our lifetime. In the short term, we are facing an unstable world with an uncertain future. The communist threat, as we have known it, no longer exists. In its place is a world looking for its center; a common ground where fundamental rights and desires can exist in harmony with political and social responsibilities.

The dissolution of a large, easily recognizable threat has, in the eyes of most people, reduced the need for large, ready military forces. The immediate impact on the U.S. Army is a severe reduction in both personnel strength and budget authorization. The Army is responding to its future by basing force reductions on reshaping the Army. Army senior leadership has stressed its corporate commitment to a different Army, not to a smaller version of the same Army.

The Army's corporate rallying cry, "No more Task Force Smiths," is a call to remember a similar period in time, shortly after World War II, when the results of Army force reductions
were disastrous. That cry reminds us to avoid making the training and equipping mistakes that resulted in an ill-equipped, ill-trained force on a battlefield in Korea. More importantly, however, that rallying cry must also commit our Army to educate its senior leaders so that the American soldier is not sent into that kind of a fight.

Tomorrow’s senior leaders, those responsible for the corporate decisions 8 to 10 years from now, are here today. The U.S. Army War College (College) is the home, for 10 months each year, of the Army’s best. In its position as the Army’s senior educational institution, the College is responsible to shape Army leadership, preparing it for the future. In view of world and domestic events, that role is significantly more critical to the future of the Army today than ever before. The pressure for change and increased efficiency through cost savings are impacting every corner of the Army, and the College will not be immune. How should the USAWC reflect the new environment, and what should be its focus for the future?
INTRODUCTION

Purpose

Global and internal events are driving massive Army personnel reductions. Recent program information indicates that the Army can expect a 30% cut in personnel over the next four years. Officer cuts probably will approach 30%, with some year groups certain to exceed even that level. Army General officer strengths will fall 25%, from 408 as of 1 October 1990, to 302 by 1 October 1995.

This smaller Army is adjusting its focus to meet the redirected security strategy of the United States. The new focus is on power projection and crisis response. Because of its reduced capacity to overwhelm an opponent, this smaller Army will be more dependent on strategic and operational flexibility, and joint and coalition warfare for success. The unique challenges of a smaller, more flexible Army operating in an uncertain world can only be addressed by senior leaders who can work effectively in ambiguous situations.

The challenges faced by today’s Army leadership are similar to those faced at the turn of this century by the new Secretary of War, Elihu Root, as he tried to determine what purposes the College should serve. He condensed his dilemma into three questions, the answers to which formed the cornerstone of what is today the Army War College. Secretary Root asked, "What shall be taught, how shall it be taught, and how shall the teaching be extended to the greatest numbers?" Although Secretary Root’s
questions are nearly 100 years old, they remain particularly appropriate today, especially as Army leadership faces such an uncertain future.

This paper is an effort to help evaluate the College by addressing Secretary Root's three questions with a view toward the next century. There is probably no institution that has had to endure the number of studies and reviews as has the College. This is not another study, but more a compilation of historical thoughts, present day views and future ideas. The evaluation process at the College is a continuing evolution and this paper tries to assist and, in the process, help set the framework for College roles and missions into the next century.

Assumptions

One assumption is that the USAWC will continue to maintain a student load similar to what it currently enjoys, and that procedures for selecting officers for attendance will remain much the same as today. Points may be raised in this paper regarding the appropriateness of who is selected to attend, however, the institutional workload is not envisioned to change.

Two, the overall structure of the Senior Service Colleges within the Department of Defense is not expected to change. This paper accepts that each service has a valid need for, and will maintain its own "War College," and that these Colleges will operate within the framework of the existing system design.

Three, the Army War College exists to do a real job and is a
valid part of the Army's professional military educational (PME) process. This paper will not address the education of officers in total, but will look solely at the College and its part in the overall PME system for Army officers. Next, this paper proceeds under the assumption that the current General Officer "Capstone" course at Ft. McNair will remain in place in its existing format and maintain its current focus.

Last, as the Army draws down, the "system" within which officers live will become more and more unforgiving. The harsh unforgiveness within the system will dampen initiative at the lower levels and limit innovation at the highest echelons of leadership.

Methodology

This paper looks at the College with the express purpose of answering the three questions asked by its founder. Each question is addressed in a chronological review of the background of the College leading up to today's environment. Sections I, II and III serve as the foundation by reviewing the history of the College in three timeframes correlating to the time periods used by Harry P. Ball in his definitive history of the War College entitled, "Of Responsible Command" (1983). Section I reviews "The Beginning," and encompasses the years 1903-1917. Section II is titled, "The Interwar Years," and includes the years 1919-1940. "The Cold War" period, Section III, covers post World War II through the mid-1980s. The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols
Act in 1986 serves to separate the background of this paper from today’s perspective.

Section IV addresses Secretary Root’s three questions in today’s environment. This section reflects what today’s College provides its students and closes with a synopsis of the health of the institution. Section V looks toward tomorrow by offering some recommendations to assist the College as it prepares senior leaders for the next century. Today’s view and tomorrow’s outlook are developed in part from responses to a student survey found at Appendix 1.

The student survey was extracted from an Army War College survey sent to General Officers, and is designed to solicit input on how well the College does its job and what the College can do to improve. In late January 1992, the survey was sent to the 200 Army officers (both Active and Reserve Components) in the Academic Year 1992 resident class. A demographic profile of the student respondents and an analysis of their responses is at Appendix 2. Verbatim written comments from the respondents are at Appendix 3.

**Army War College Mission**

The mission of the AWC is to: (1) prepare selected military officers and civilians for senior leadership responsibilities in a strategic security environment during peace and war, and (2) study the role of landpower, as a part of a joint/unified or combined force, in support of the U.S. national military
strategy. This is the original and only mission the College has had, driving its academic focus and providing substance to the curriculum. The mission has endured because our nation has always needed prepared senior military leaders. The College mission will continue to endure because our nation can ill-afford not to have prepared leadership in the future.

The mission of the College into the next century will remain viable, however, dramatic world changes will pressure the College to change. The world is changing and the place of landpower in the new world could well be redefined. Any redefinition would directly affect the College in its study of the role of landpower in support of National military strategy. Therefore, the answers to the questions of what should be taught, how should it be taught, and who should be taught are key to refining the mission of the College into the next century.
The College based its first course of instruction on weaknesses articulated by the new Secretary of War, Elihu Root. His review of the nearly disastrous events during the War with Spain led him to conclude that: (1) the Secretary of War wasn’t equipped to effectively direct a unified war effort, and (2) the Army lacked a body of officers educated and trained to plan and solve problems from the perspective of the Army as a whole. As a result of his effort to address these problems, the War Department established its own General Staff and the Army War College was begun in Washington in 1903. Secretary Root’s definition of the Nation’s security shortcomings were the foundation of the pre-World War I course content for the College.

What Shall Be Taught?

The College was established to work as an institution of the War Department General Staff (today’s Army Staff), and was to find solutions to practical military problems. The overall focus, then, was on real-world issues that related directly to planning military operations.

The focus shifted slightly in 1908, as the emphasis turned more toward the conduct of military operations as opposed to planning. Still, during the period 1903-1917, students worked on operations strictly from a military point of view; the study of
military science. Subject material taught during this period duplicated much of what was being taught at Leavenworth. The military art was not addressed, because, as Tasker Bliss said in outlining characteristics for the College in 1903,

"... the War College student already should have learned all that he needed to know of the theory of the Art of War."

During this period, students were not involved in military, economic or political analysis of their plans or operations. Their emphasis was on practical, real-world military issues. This exclusive focus was a weakness clearly demonstrated at the outbreak of World War I.

How Shall It Be Taught?

The Process

The teaching philosophy during this period was primarily driven by the view that the College would work as an institution of the General Staff to find solutions to practical military problems. Students during this period studied war by planning and conducting campaigns, using maps as the primary educational vehicle. Students faced over 90 map problems and/or maneuvers during their year at the College. Learning was only incidental to doing during those years.4 Students were organized into committee groups to facilitate interaction, and to help learn and gain understanding from each other.

Army-Navy cooperation was a part of many of the map
exercises, giving the curriculum a joint flavor (the Air Force did not become a separate service until 1947).

The Faculty

Faculty composition during this period also reflected "jointness," with continuous Navy faculty representation at the College through 1913. Continuity was a guiding principle for both the Army and Navy. The addition of selected students to remain at the College as faculty for an additional year maintained a fresh perspective. Overall, the faculty was excellent during this period. Thirty-four went on to become General Officers, with 3 of those serving as Chief of Staff of the Army. This clearly indicated that, as professional military officers, faculty members were of high quality and possessed great potential.

Who Shall Be Taught?

Students chosen for attendance at the first College came from two sources: From those distinguished graduates of the school at Leavenworth, and from field officers designated by the War Department. The College was almost exclusively for Infantry and Cavalry officers (officers of the Line), and the student body was very young, originally limited to officers at the grade of Major and below.

By 1908, the Director of the College was concerned about the qualifications of the students. The Army wanted students to be
graduates of either the School of the Line or the Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth, because non-Leavenworth graduates were not proficient in many of the basic military skills.

Very few officers were able to fit the requirement of being both a field grade officer and graduate of the Staff College (in those days, Staff College graduates were Captains and remained so for many years). This issue led to the development of a preparatory course for field officers, which grew into a 10-week course by 1911. This was followed in 1914 by the development of an entrance examination, first given to the Class of 1915. All of these actions were focused on improving the quality of the students entering the College.

During this period, class sizes varied between 9 in the initial class, to 30 officers in the largest class, the Class of 1912. Throughout this period, Navy and Marine officers were represented in the student population.
SECTION II. THE INTER-WAR YEARS

This period saw the College split from the War Department Staff as a result of the National Defense Act of 1916. Further, it was a very stable time during which few demands were placed upon the Army by the Nation. A notable exception was the Civilian Conservation Corps, a Depression-era public works program administered by the Army.

What Shall Be Taught?

Prior to the start of the World War I, no one at the College had addressed the development of military requirements. General Pershing first began the process from his wartime headquarters in France. As a result, there was an Army-wide lack of appreciation for what total mobilization and total war really involved. The course content of the College during the period 1919-1940 was focused on correcting this unpreparedness.

The curriculum during this time contained two phases, reflecting an attempt to balance the need to prepare students for an early General Staff assignment and the need to prepare them for some unknown, post-mobilization assignment. The first phase targeted the preparation for war by teaching those skills needed to serve on a General Staff in Washington or at a MACOM Headquarters -- basically focusing on the "next job." The second phase dealt with the conduct of war by training students to perform as Commanders and/or staff of a mobilized Army, not the
small, demobilized Army of the day. The emphasis on the mobilized Army reflected the effort to correct the pre-War shortcomings.

The overall curriculum was strictly Army. However, there continued a strong cooperative joint program with the Naval War College as a result of the many map and tactical exercises conducted together. Joint cooperation remained strong until Army-Navy Pacific strategy diverged just prior to the start of World War II. There was no consideration given to coalition warfare during this period, a shortcoming that surfaced quickly during World War II.

How Shall It Be Taught?

The Process

After World War I, the College continued to follow an educational philosophy based on learning by doing. Continued were collective problem solving exercises and the focus on existing policies. This focus did not encourage students to recommend changes or improvements to policy, but served to reinforce policies already in existence. Lectures were a tertiary part of the process, serving as introductions or supplements to problem solving exercises.

The collective problem solving method had some shortcomings. It was very time consuming, led to solutions often reflecting the
lowest common denominator and resulted in solutions that were not very innovative. However, collective problem solving also encouraged cooperation among students, allowed for a much deeper study of issues, and tended to blur the distinction between faculty and student. These advantages met the prevailing view of the College's role:

They [students] were not necessarily expected to think alike, but their thinking was expected to be guided by mission rather than ambition. Whatever motivation to greater individual scholarly effort grades or class standings might have provided, the War College willingly sacrificed that to accommodate what it believed to be a higher goal.

The Faculty

The quality of the faculty continued to be excellent. As an example, of the 13 members of the 1924-25 faculty, 11 went on to serve as General officers. Great care was taken to select the highest quality faculty, however, their role was not one of teaching. They were to develop and present problems to the students, then monitor and guide the groups as needed, from research through final product. This coordinator's role was to continue until the mid-1970s.

Who Shall Be Taught?

Some of the gates mandated for attendance at the College included graduation from Command and General Staff School (CGS), two years of service since CGS graduation, and availability of 50% of College graduates for duty with the War Department. Several officers couldn't meet these requirements, prominent
among them Generals Marshall and MacArthur.

Class size grew to 90 Regular Army officers by the late 1920s and remained generally in that range until the beginning of World War II. Reserve Component officers were a part of every class until reduced budgets in the early 1930s ended their billets.

Age became a bigger concern during this period. By 1930 the maximum age for attendance was 54 years. That was reduced the next year to 52 years with a desire that graduates not be over 44 (the age at which they would have half their service ahead). The concern for age resulted in the development of a plan in 1938 to reduce the age of graduates to 44 years by 1946.⁹
SECTION III. THE COLD WAR

During World War II and for the first five years immediately following, classes at the College were suspended. There were two fundamental reasons for not reopening the College until 1950: The view of senior Army leadership and the changing world situation.

At the end of the War, key senior Army leaders were convinced that our Nation's military future would be based solely on joint force operations. Generals Eisenhower and Marshall firmly believed that joint education was the key to insuring success in combat. The strength of their conviction resulted in the suspension of College activity until 1950. General Eisenhower summarized his feelings best when he stated:

Separate ground, sea and air warfare are gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services as one single concentrated effort. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands. Singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service.

The other services didn't share Eisenhower's vision, and the concept of joint education and joint warfare didn't emerge whole. Additionally, other forces were playing that further complicated the issue.

The five years immediately following the War brought a significant change in the world environment. The beginning of the confrontational atmosphere which grew into the Cold War, the U.S. policy of containment, the growing importance of the Air
Force, and the "revolt of the Admirals" left the Army searching for its place in a new national policy—the Army role in the nuclear age was unclear. This left those who would reopen the College with the challenge of envisioning a post-War curriculum. These post-War factors directly impacted the new direction the College was to follow when it reopened in 1950.

What Shall Be Taught?

The Curriculum

In 1950 the College reopened its doors. This was a new start, and the curriculum reflected a new direction. The curriculum was designed in three phases: (1) The Army’s role in National Security, (2) Army Problems, and (3) War Planning. The biggest change from the past was the addition of National Policy as a part of the curriculum. This was the first non-military subject in the College curriculum.

The world was changing rapidly during the early 1950s. The evolution of U.S. security policy toward one of massive retaliation further confused the Army’s role in the Nation’s Security Strategy seeming to minimize the need for ground forces in a confrontation. This moved Army leadership to focus more toward the development of National Strategy, and altered the College’s curriculum focus.

By 1958, the curriculum had evolved into two distinct parts. The first dealt with U.S. National Strategy, and required students to draft a National Military Strategy. This focused on
the "Ways" in which the military would accomplish its objectives. The second part dealt with military science, and required students to draft a National Military Program. This was a study of the "Means" by which the military would get the job done.

In 1960, primarily in response to the National Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the curriculum shifted its focus from strictly National Military Strategy toward viewing strategy from the perspective of the JCS and the Unified Commanders. This swing in curriculum focus continued to move away from military strategy until, in 1966, more than half of the students' time was spent on economic, political and societal considerations.

During the early 1960s, the debate between whether an officer should become a "generalist" or a "specialist" impacted course offerings at the College. In an attempt to accommodate both sides of the debate, the College began to offer elective courses as part of the curriculum in 1967. All students were required to complete core courses, i.e., generalist approach, as well as electives, i.e., specialist approach. The elective program grew in number of course offerings each year, providing greater opportunities for students to tailor or specialize their educational experience at the College. By 1975 the elective program had grown to over 50 course offerings.

During the mid-1970s data gathered from graduates indicated that the majority of assignments given to graduates were to other-than-JCS, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense positions. The graduates also indicated that the College had not
adequately prepared them for these types of assignments." This information served to highlight a critical gap in the educational process between Leavenworth and the College. Leavenworth was teaching up to the Corps level in its curriculum, while the College, since 1958, had been concentrating on the National perspective. The void existing between the Corps and National levels resulted from a failure to teach the operational art of warfare.

The recognition of this gap led to another shift in the focus of the curriculum in 1976 with a return to the study of the "Conduct of War," known today as "warfighting." The importance of this change is best symbolized by the inclusion of "operations" in the title of one Department, and the addition of courses on the historical evolution of military strategy, capabilities planning, military operations and war gaming. Additionally, six elective courses were added to reinforce the shift to warfighting in the curriculum.

Curriculum Studies

A series of in-depth studies have analyzed the College and its curriculum during the past 20 years. A short review of the results of some those studies provides important background to an assessment of what today's College is teaching.

The 1975 Clements Committee recommended that all Senior Service Colleges (SSCs) share a common curriculum. The recommendation was based on the principle that every U.S.
military officer attending any Senior Service College should come out with the same foundation.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 contained educational provisions which further served to emphasize congressional concern with the SSCs, specifically with regard to preparing officers to work in the joint service arena. The Act required the Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish career educational guidelines for Joint Specialty Officers. The Act also required periodic review of senior Professional Military Education (PME) school curricula.¹²

Immediately following passage of, and in response to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Senior Military Schools Review Board Report (Dougherty Report) recommended that the Chairman, JCS establish a standard for joint education. This standard directly impacted the curricula at all of the Nation's senior military schools.¹³

The most significant non-military involvement in PME was the Panel on Military Education within the Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives. The Panel's purpose was to ensure that the SSCs complied with the educational provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Bill. The panel conducted its review of the College between December 1987 and September 1988. The panel addressed the entire range of educational issues and provided a series of recommendations.¹⁴ The recommendations included guidance regarding student and faculty mix, educational
objectives (focus on national military strategy), and a feedback system composed of frequent essay tests and graded work.

How Shall It Be Taught?

The Process

The educational methods employed during this period reflected the College's search for identity and the Army's changing role in the Nation. The College moved away from the historical approach of the study of operations and logistics to focus almost exclusively on contemporary and future problems. The student committee problem solving structure, a fixture at the College since its beginning, remained in place.

Over time, the emphasis changed from solving individual military problems to addressing national strategic concepts. By 1956, all courses and study culminated in the development of a recommended National Strategy for the approaching decade. Students were expected to recommend a direction for U.S. policy toward other nations as part of their final product.

By 1960 war gaming was no longer a part of the learning process. War gaming had been abandoned as too time consuming and of little use as the focus shifted away from solving singular military issues—a task ideally suited for war gaming. In 1976 war gaming came back to the College, coinciding with the return of "warfighting" into the curriculum. The fact that computer-supported war games were being used extensively throughout the Army by this time must have contributed heavily to the decision.
There was also the feeling that few senior officers understood the impact of war gaming and the College was obligated to address this shortfall.\textsuperscript{16}

The Faculty

The faculty throughout the 1950s and 1960s remained much like it had been in the past, a homogenous body of carefully selected Army officers.\textsuperscript{17} The first faculty after World War II couldn’t have been more distinguished. Of 31 faculty officers, 23 would go on to serve as General officers, three of whom wore 4 stars.

Until 1972, the faculty could still be accurately described as coordinators, not teachers. But, by the mid-1970s the focus on faculty responsibilities began to change: Senior College officials concluded that the primary role of faculty should be as teachers. It was recognized that the most promotable officers were not always the best educators. Selection on the basis of subject matter expertise and teaching ability became of greater importance. Two actions were taken that helped increase faculty quality: First, the College accepted officers on the faculty who were on their terminal assignments; and second, the College was willing to accept officers on the faculty who were not SSC graduates and/or who were less senior in grade. These actions certainly broadened the field of possible faculty members and, as a result, by 1980 the College had a greater variety and expertise in its faculty than ever before.\textsuperscript{18} Additionally, faculty
stability had improved, with the longer tenures leading to a greater continuity in the curriculum.

Who Shall Be Taught?

The 1950 class, the first after a 10-year hiatus brought on by World War II, included 96 carefully selected Army officers, 47 of whom would go on to serve as General Officers. The class was no longer the province of the combat arms as every branch of the Army was represented, with the exception of the Chaplain and Medical Service Corps. There were no Air Force officers in the first class, but the class did include one National Guardsman, one Navy officer and two Marines for a total of 100 students. The composition of this first class clearly indicated a new view of who should attend the College. For the first time, students from every branch of the Army, except Chaplains and Medical Service Corps officers were included.

Several studies were conducted to determine the true Army requirement for College graduates. The results indicated a larger need for College graduates than could be met by class sizes of 100 officers. Based on these findings, class size grew to 224 Army students by 1969. In 1977 the Reserve Component attendance increased to 16 officers and the International Fellow (IF) program brought 6 foreign officers to the College. The composition of the student body continued to evolve to include more "other-than-Army" services. By 1987, the class included 181 Army, 8 Navy, 17 Air Force and 9 Marine officers, along with
international officers and civilian students from Defense Agencies.

The civilian education and military experience levels of College students began changing during this period. From 1953 to 1966, the percentage of students with graduate degrees increased from 14% to 49%. During the same period, the average student age remained about the same (41 and 43 years, respectively), as did the percentage of those who had commanded at Battalion level (69% and 67%). One striking change was the percentage of students who had served on very high level staffs; increasing from 26% to 86%.
SECTION IV. TODAY

What Shall Be Taught?

The Curriculum

The current College curriculum has been adjusted to reflect the findings of the various study groups, and executes its mission through a core curriculum composed of six courses, a national security seminar and five electives.19

The central focus of the academic program is, "... to provide an understanding of the U.S. national military strategy and the linkages between it and geopolitical factors at the higher level and with the planning and conduct of theater-level warfare at the lower level."20 The course titles reflect and describe the curricular content:

Course 1: Strategic Leadership
Course 2: War, National Policy and Strategy
Course 3: National Military Requirements and Capabilities
Course 4: Implementing National Military Strategy
Course 5: Regional Strategic Appraisals
Course 6: Global and Theater Strategy Application

During the 1990-91 academic year AWC students spent 22% of their time studying National Military Strategy and 78% of their time studying other topics. Viewed from another perspective, students spent 53% of their time studying joint matters and 47% of their time on other, service specific and non-joint subjects.21
Student Views

Approximately 2/3 of the students responding to the survey indicate that the College is teaching the right subjects. If the purpose of the College is to prepare students for future Army assignments, the College is on the mark: 74% of the students felt that the College was preparing them well. However, only 43% of the respondents felt that the College was doing well in preparing them for future joint assignments. These feelings do not correlate to the apportionment of time described earlier. Why, if students are spending 53% of their time on joint topics, do less than half of them feel they're getting adequate joint preparation?

Survey responses also indicate a failure of the College to adequately prepare the student for duty in combined or coalition organizations. More than 57% of the respondents felt that the College was doing fair or poorly in this area. The importance of coalition warfare is a critical lesson learned from the Gulf War. The importance of coalition skills was clearly identified in March 1991, and would have been a very positive factor if added to the Academic Year 1991-92 curriculum.

In two very important areas the College has hit the mark perfectly. Over 2/3 of the respondents felt the College was doing well in preparing students to provide advice to the National Command Authorities regarding the use of military forces to achieve National objectives. Second, over 82% of the respondents felt the College was doing well in providing an
understanding of the role of the military in a democratic society.

**How Shall It Be Taught?**

**The Process**

The basis of the AWC academic environment is still the student seminar, consisting of approximately 16 students under the direction of a four-person faculty team. In the notional week, students spend 3-4 hours per day in seminar during the core curriculum, with several afternoons scheduled each week to conduct research and study. During the two advanced course notional terms, students spend 9-15 hours per week in class on three elective courses (see Figure below).

![Figure 1. Notional War College Week](image)

The core curriculum gives students an overview on a wide range of topics, but provides little depth. It is heavily reliant on a compilation of selected readings chosen by the
faculty. The normal educational process is to assign readings to students and then discuss the topic during the next day's seminar. By definition, seminar sessions should be active learning experiences for the students. In reality, however, the seminar environment is passive, with structured, time-sensitive, task-oriented sessions the norm. Written and oral requirements supplement seminar discussions and complete formal course requirements. Lectures are incorporated to introduce and expand curriculum topics. Students must complete a Military Studies Project on a topic of their choosing (generally from a list of recommended topics provided by the faculty). Five elective courses and a regional strategic appraisal are also required. The elective courses are selected from a list of over 70 course offerings and afford students the ability to "tailor" their educational program to fit their professional needs.

The large number of contact hours reflect a passive learning environment and the shortcomings of this educational process are clearly shown in survey responses. In two critical senior leadership skill areas, conceptual thinking and innovative problem solving, the College is not doing as well as it should. More than half (58%) of the students responding to the survey thought the College was doing fair or poorly in helping them be innovators/initiators of policies and solutions. Slightly more than half of the respondents felt the same about the College's performance in helping them think conceptually.

The fact that more than half of the respondents feel the
College is not doing well to help them think conceptually is probably linked directly to the educational process. The same feeling exists about innovation, and it makes a lot of sense: Leaders cannot be innovative if they are unable to conceptualize.

The AWC addresses conceptual learning in this way, "This quality of conceptual thinking can only result from close, detailed, reflective study of a wide spectrum (emphasis added) of military disciplines, and it can only be done by imaginative people . . . " I feel that, "close, detailed reflective study" contradicts, in many cases, "a wide spectrum of military disciplines." This is particularly true when working within a constrained timeframe, such as in the College. In part, conceptual and innovative thought is the result of a developmental process that challenges students to think and act in ways beyond the requirements of their current level in an organization. The time to pursue, reflect and articulate new ways of doing business is the secret to this kind of development.

The Faculty.

Faculty quality and composition have as much to do with how material is presented as does the material itself. Findings of various committees and study groups recognize the importance of faculty to the educational process, and have tried to quantify "goodness" by recommending a certain diversity in the faculty. The 1986 Dougherty Report asked the Chairman, JCS to designate an appropriate service mix of both students and faculty. JCS
guidance for academic year (AY) 90-91 was, "... a combined total of military faculty from non-host departments should be no less than 25% of the total military faculty." By AY 95-96, the SSCs are to have at least 25% faculty representation from each non-host department. These guidelines correspond to those recommended by the House Panel. Additionally, the House Panel recommendations suggested that civilian faculty should comprise 33% of the total faculty. JCS guidance regarding civilian faculty and student diversity differ dramatically. The Military Education Policy Decision from JCS allows the SSCs to decide on civilian faculty ratios as opposed to the fixed percentage set by the panel, and the percentages given to military faculty.

This relatively narrow focus can lead to a belief that composition, or diversity in itself is the only indicator of quality. Faculty composition, or mix, should be used as only one of several indicators of excellence. Certainly faculty background, i.e., teaching, work and educational experience, combined with a desire to teach play significantly in the process of determining quality.

Who Shall Be Taught?

Today’s "modal" Army War College student is a 44 year old LTC/LTC(P) with approximately 21 years of service. The student was selected by a centrally managed board at Department of the Army level. Each year approximately 350 officers are selected to attend resident MEL-1 educational programs from an eligible
population of about 5000. Criteria for selection does not consider availability, but requires a minimum of 16 and a maximum of 23 years of service, completion of an intermediate PME school (e.g., CGSC), and the rank of LTC or COL.

The makeup of the class for Academic Year 91/92 is as shown below:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army (Active)</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army (Reserve Comp)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF (Reserve Comp)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy/MC/USCG</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (IF)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>288</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Today, the seminar group remains in place. The Class of 1992 consists of eighteen seminars with sixteen students in each. Seminar composition is as diverse as the student body makeup, with representation from every group present at the AWC; other services, government agencies and international fellows. Each seminar consists of 10 Active Army, 2 International Fellows, and 1 each from the Army Reserve Components, USAF, Sea Services and Government Agencies.

The May 1990 Military Education Policy Decision released by the Chairman, JCS asks the SSCs to maintain a student mix that equates to at least one student from each non-host service in each seminar. The College meets that requirement today, but falls short of addressing the recommendations of the House Panel on Military Education, which recommended that approximately 10%
of the military attendees be from each of the other two departments by Academic Year (AY) 89-90. Further, the Panel recommends that by AY 95-96 the mix be raised to 25% from the other two departments. If met, those guidelines would create a military student body composed of 50% Army, 25% Air Force and 25% Navy/Marine.

Student Views

Today's Army students felt that they came to the College well trained in tactical operations. Although the numbers were not as high as I had anticipated, 58% agreed that they were fully trained at the tactical level of war. However, less than 1/4 felt the same about their level of training at the operational level. This accurately reflects the Army's philosophy of training up to Corps level operations at CGSC (the last PME opportunity prior to College attendance).

Synopsis

The Curriculum

- The College is completely successful preparing its students to understand the role of the military in our society and to provide timely, accurate advice to National leaders.
- The College is not adequately addressing coalition and combined operational leadership skills in its educational program.
The joint education portion of the curriculum is not meeting the needs of the students. There is not enough joint subject education to provide students a feeling of preparedness for future joint assignments.

- The College must focus its military education at the Operational level of war to meet the needs of its students.

The Process

- Providing a compilation of recent articles as readings presents a "USA Today" outlook on issues. As a result, students may forget many important issues soon after the seminar session ends, or are unable to find the critical underlying principle that is being taught. Additionally, the broad focus of the core curriculum does not allow time for students to learn enough about the truly important topics. In his article "Grading the War Colleges" (The National Interest, Winter 1986-87), Professor Williamson Murray wrote,

"An ideal war college curriculum would concentrate on two or three subject areas in order to give officers sufficient depth and understanding to continue their professional education in those areas after they return to their careers."

The AWC curriculum, requiring three to four hours at daily seminar sessions, leaves students little time to complete detailed studies of important issues. The curriculum is more closely aligned with the command and staff college than a first-rate graduate school.

- The College is not adequately meeting the requirement to
develop senior leaders with the ability to conceptualize solutions to ambiguous future issues.

- Failure to bring coalition warfare into this year’s curriculum may indicate a curricular inflexibility harmful to the educational process. The process must be able to address the changing strategic environment.

The Faculty

- Many hours directing seminar learning, i.e., "contact" hours, minimizes faculty time for the development and research so necessary to a quality teaching program.

- Faculty composition is important, but more critical are the experiences excellent faculty bring to the classroom. Excellent faculty is the key to an effective educational process, and requires an ambitious program to attract and retain the very best.

The Students

- The process used to identify College students meets the needs of the Army and selects the right type of officer for attendance.

- Although not a focus of this paper, the number of students fully trained at the tactical level of war may be too low to give the Army the skilled, capable, mid-level leadership it needs.
SECTION V. TOMORROW

Throughout its history, the College has shifted its curricular content to meet the needs of the Army as perceived by the Army’s most senior leaders. Developing the proper curriculum for the College is essential if it is to reach its goal: To be the pinnacle of Army strategic thought and learning, and to educate selected senior leaders to be the Nation's strategic leaders. The subject matter, then, must reflect our best estimate of the senior leadership needs of our Army into the next century. Our Army needs senior officers who are competent resource managers, imaginative thinkers, and confident leaders. These qualities are not much different than what is needed today, however, what will dramatically change in the next 5-7 years is the environment within which our leaders will have to operate.

What Shall Be Taught?

One usually emerges from an intimate understanding of the past, with its lessons and its wisdom, with convictions which put fire in the soul. I doubt seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding certain of the basic international issues of today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the fall of Athens.

General George C. Marshall
Princeton, 22 February 1947

The future environment will bring greater involvement in traditionally non-military areas. DOD involvement in the drug war is an example of a non-standard mission given to a military force. This type of mission forces military leaders to form and
work in coalition with governmental agencies. In the 1930s, the Army administered the Civilian Conservation Corps program. It is possible that a similar function or task could appear in the future, again requiring intense Army involvement. The future Army can expect to have other, similar roles in protecting and promoting the Nation’s interests.

An in-depth understanding of the political decision-making process will be critically important to senior leaders in view of the type of non-standard military policies established by government. In response, the professional military educational system must address the Army’s changing needs with a long-term vision. That vision should be based on both military and non-military requirements, and consider the old way of doing business as only one of many alternatives.

Student Views

Only 39% of the survey respondents felt that the College focus should be on land warfare. On the other hand, more than half of the respondents felt that, to a great extent, the College should focus its curriculum in four basic areas. Those areas and the corresponding percentage of respondents who felt that area
should be the curricular focus are:

- Strategic Thinking 88%
- Combined/Coalition Warfare 78%
- Joint Warfighting 75%
- Political/Diplomatic Skills 61%

When asked what skills tomorrow's senior leader will need, survey responses fell generally into eight groupings:

- Joint/combined warfighting
- Communications
- Conceptual ability
- Understanding political/economic environments
- Innovative resource management
- Understand history
- The role of the military in society

Two survey comments best summarize what tomorrow's College should provide its students.

"Innovative resource managers, and flexible, savvy decision makers. Well rooted in U.S. National Interests and well versed in our National Military Strategy. Understanding the interests, problems and goals of our Allies and others . . ."

"Greater understanding . . . of the interrelationship of political, economic, social and military elements of U.S. and international strategy development and implementation."

How Shall It Be Taught?

The Process

It is not the subject matter that is inappropriate for this level of education, it is the educational process that is flawed.
The process reflects some confusion about what constitutes training as opposed to education. At this level of education, covering the subject is not good enough. The many contact hours spent in a passive learning environment represents lock-step training, a training methodology used to insure that everyone comes out of the experience with the same base level of skill. The College is not in the training business and must change its approach to education by fostering learning by good students; showering them with trust and expecting good things. Will there be some disappointments? Sure, but the benefits will far outweigh the disadvantages of the few who will take a year off.

College students must be challenged to expand their cognitive abilities and develop their executive communications skills. The College can best assist by providing a less structured environment that is not completely reliant on faculty skills to be successful. The key is to create a true learning environment by placing the responsibility for learning where it belongs, on the student. There is no doubt that officers graduating from AWC will face difficult decisions in the future. Senior Army officers are going to be asked to anticipate future security requirements in an era of growing uncertainty and complexity. The ability to conceptualize is critical for quality decisions in that kind of environment.
The Faculty

There are two key components to addressing the military faculty issue. How can the Army identify officers with the talents needed to become good educators, and will the system ever allow those talented officers to survive so that they can contribute at the College level?

There can be little discussion over the fact that leadership requirements differ as an officer progresses through a career. At the top, critical, analytical thought is imperative. Theater campaign planning, for example, requires an intimate knowledge of the international political environment, an in-depth understanding of national security strategy, and an appreciation for the principles articulated by Clausewitz. The ability to grasp the writings of Clausewitz, on the other hand, is not so critical to commanding a company. Very few of us like having true academics and/or strategists around when we want action. Often their inquiring minds and search for underlying rationale get in the way of immediate job accomplishment. This, then, is the true dilemma: In the operational environment, how to foster the professional growth of specially talented officers to give the Army the academic infrastructure required to properly educate its senior leaders.

Student Views

Survey respondents felt strongly about the generalist versus specialist issue. 93% felt the College should provide a broad
education as opposed to a more narrow focus. Response to this question carried the highest degree of agreement, reflecting more consensus than any other question in the survey.

Similar strong response was received when students were asked about the College's role in evaluating performance and potential. Nearly 40% of those providing written comments strongly questioned whether the College should have this task at all. Most of those felt that commanders in the field are evaluating officers effectively, and the respondents believe they are here based on more than 20 years of evaluation.

Respondents favoring evaluation indicated that the College should evaluate students through more oral and written requirements. These types of requirements would more clearly indicate potential for conceptual thought and communications ability. Additionally, respondents felt that retaining the best faculty possible was essential to an effective evaluation system.

Survey respondents outlined several areas in which the College could improve. With regard to the educational process, the majority of their comments fell into four general areas.

1. Focus on more real-world issues. Many felt the College should become a valuable problem solving resource for the Army. Others felt the College students should be used as an Army "think tank."

2. More exercises. The process must critically focus on the operational art, specifically, campaign planning. There was
also a strong feeling that increased use of simulations is critical to success in this area.

3. Less structured time. Respondents felt they spend too much time in lectures and classes (passive environment).

4. More student presentations. This feedback corresponds directly to the critical communications skill identified earlier in the survey. Increased use of both written and oral presentations will move students into an active learning environment.

Who Should Be Taught?

No matter how well or imaginatively conceived the program of an educational institution might be, the degree of success rests ultimately with the quality of the faculty members who conduct the program and with the quality of the students selected to participate.39

There are basically two types of students who come to the College: Those who see it as a great opportunity to learn, and those who come with a closed mind.30 The former will learn almost in spite of the process, the latter will not learn despite the process. This is not to imply that the process is irrelevant, but that the process should not be driven by the poor student. The College should refuse to accept responsibility for those who won't learn. Students selected to attend the College are all successful officers and must be treated that way.
Student Views

The survey asked students to identify whom they thought should attend tomorrow's College. The responses indicate that students feel current procedures are selecting the right officers: 92% felt LTC or LTC(P) were the appropriate grades, and over 80% of the incoming students of the Class of 92 met that criteria. Many respondents linked College attendance with successful Battalion (or equivalent) command. Others saw the College as a transition point; a break from the tactical level. Some respondents were more pragmatic, seeing the College as a Colonel's prep school and looking for a good return on the Army's investment.

When asked whether every Army Colonel should be MEL-1, students responded with less consensus than any other survey question: Nearly 48% agreed and nearly 35% disagreed. This question generated a lot of strong feelings on both sides. Those who thought all Colonels should be MEL-1 felt that all Colonel positions required knowledge gained only at the College. Those disagreeing felt that the selection itself should be viewed as a discriminator.

Recommendations

The Curriculum

- Design a smaller core curriculum around three programs firmly based in joint service doctrine and policy. The core curriculum should occupy no more than half the academic year, and
should use a building block approach so that course 3 becomes the culmination of the previous courses. By using each course to build upon the previous, the core will gain strength and meaning. Solutions from previous courses should form the foundation for the following course. Related to today's curriculum, for example, course 6 would not be required. The strategy, objectives and program force would not be regenerated, but as those blocks were developed in seminar, they would follow the students through the entire process. I believe this approach would gain 4-5 weeks in the academic year. The core would consist of:

National Strategy and Policy
DOD Planning and Programming
Joint Warfighting

- Use the time gained from a more effective core to expand the advanced course program in both time and offerings for the remaining half of the academic year. The new advanced course program should allow service-unique study, individual professional enhancement, contemporary military reflection and/or target specific Army issues for solution.

- Consider curriculum changes that will allow academic accreditation leading to the granting of an advanced degree in Strategic Studies or a related discipline. This recommendation is made with some hesitation, for an advanced degree should not
become mandatory for everyone. It may be possible, however, to
design a degree producing program that would fit into the College
curriculum and into the needs of the professional military
officer. As an example, a more robust advanced course program
would provide the opportunity for visiting professors to offer
courses at the College.

  o Concentrate on joint warfighting, at the expense of
  service-unique operations if necessary. No Army officer should
  leave the College uncomfortable with his level of joint
  operational skill.

The Process

  o Quickly move away from teaching subjects and toward
  educating thinkers. Use respected graduate institutions to
  assist in refining course work, and promote in-depth study as the
  alternative to subject breadth.

  o To meet the need to educate leaders who are able to
  conceptualize, the educational process must bring students into
  contact with alternate ways of doing business and multiple points
  of view through a less structured educational environment. The
  redesign of the curriculum must have as one of its primary
  objectives the reduction of passive learning.

  o Enhance the use of simulations in the educational
  process. Particularly in the area of campaign planning and
  execution. Simulations can also contribute significantly in the
  areas of resource management, budgeting and planning.
Use the student presentation as the primary learning vehicle in the College. Instead of trying to describe and define the myriad of acronyms associated with the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), as an example, ask students to research the process itself. What is critical to the senior leader is understanding how the system works, why we are using this system (its history), how it fits into the overall national strategy process, and why no one has found a better way. Once research is done, have students present their findings to the seminar. Copies of student papers should be given out to the seminar a couple of days ahead of presentation to stimulate discussion and encourage the conduct a professional seminar.

The Faculty

Investigate the possibility of "growing our own" military faculty by offering a second year of study to the very best educational minds out of both the Command and Staff College (CGSC) and War College classes. Identifying those officers with teaching ability early in their careers and nurturing their progress is critical. The program should involve work toward an advanced degree in an appropriate discipline. The program would be for the very select, and must result in tenure, or permanent status on the faculty to encourage retention.
Set a goal to meet the House Panel's recommendations regarding faculty mix:

- 15% of military faculty be from each non-host department/service.
- 33% of total faculty be civilian.

Civilian faculty is vitally important to the success of the College as a premier educational institution, particularly in view of the many non-military missions the Army will be facing in the future. The faculty must operate in a university environment, with the same sense of belonging and esprit found on the best college campuses. Every effort must be made to attract and maintain the very best in their fields.

- Institute a fellowship program at the Secretary of the Army level, similar to that in place at the Naval War College. Design the program to attract the best civilian faculty in specialized, non-military fields of study.
- Institute a faculty exchange program with the other SSCs to provide new approaches and different perspectives on educational issues. This type of exchange will not only enhance the quality of education for the students, but will promote a joint perspective on campus and offer a tremendous opportunity for faculty enrichment.
- Offer sabbaticals for faculty the College wants to attract and retain.
- Use civilian faculty to teach advanced courses, not the core program. The time available during the core curriculum
can be used to pursue research opportunities provided by the Army and other academic institutions. Time to do original research and publication must be provided and jealously guarded.

The Students

- A complete review of the Army's MEL-1 requirements must be conducted as a part of the overall downsizing effort. A part of that study should include a review of where (what kind of jobs) College graduates are being assigned. Strong consideration should be given to eliminating the MEL-1 requirements for positions below operational level, e.g., Division Staff. The results of the study will assist in fine tuning curricular focus and determining student input.

- With a smaller officer corps, the Army should review its policy for War College attendance. Discussions within the Army suggest that class sizes will remain the same, giving officers in the new Army a better chance (higher selection rates) of attending. Strong consideration should be given to reducing student load at the College by keeping selection rates at current levels (approximately 6.5%). The immediate impact would be lower student-to-faculty ratios. Lower ratios would improve educational quality by giving the faculty more time for research and development, and allowing for more attention to the individual student.

- Selection of officers to attend the College should be accomplished concurrent with selection to the rank of Colonel.
Efficiencies and fairness gained in reviewing officer records only once for promotion, schooling and early retirement will pay big dividends as our structure continues to decrease.

- The student population should gradually evolve to the point where it more closely resembles House panel recommendations: 25% of the military student representation from each non-host military service. A more diversified student body will provide fresh, challenging perspectives to the curriculum and put some real teeth into the quest for joint specialty officers. Because the AWC would retain its landpower focus, all non-Army military students should be given credit for meeting the joint educational requirement as articulated in Goldwater-Nichols.
SUMMARY

Tomorrow's senior leadership must be able to provide a corporate vision that will focus the Army's energy on what is truly important. As the force itself evolves, demands placed upon leadership will take on an evolution of their own. Broadened mission responsibilities, task-organized fighting forces, coalition warfare, and fewer modernization items will task tomorrow's leaders beyond our imagination. Additionally, dramatic technological innovations could very well require major revisions in both military doctrine and force structure design. Tomorrow's senior officers are the key to providing effective, inspirational and innovative leadership to meet these challenges, and give us a smaller, different and better Army at the turn of the century.

The importance of the Army War College in charting a course for our Army's senior leaders cannot be overstated. The future offers a significant opportunity for the College, its students and its faculty to set the educational standard for tomorrow's leaders. Developing tomorrow's senior leaders is the mantle of responsibility carried by the Army War College, where tomorrow's senior leaders are in session today.
APPENDIX 1: Student Officer Survey

AWCA

7 February 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STUDENT, BOX 

SUBJECT: USAWC 2000: ARMY SENIOR OFFICER EDUCATION

1. The U.S. Army War College has distributed a survey to Army
   General Officers asking about the effectiveness and future
   direction of the College. As part of my study project, I have
   extracted several questions from that survey for your input.
   Your feedback will provide a "view from the foxhole" regarding
   the educational process at Carlisle and, I hope, provide a
   valuable resource as the College approaches the year 2000.


3. I value your input, and appreciate your time and interest in
   completing this survey. Thank you.

C.V. Christianson
LTC USA
Class of 92

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT

TITLE OF FORM: USAWC Student Survey

AUTHORITY: 10 USC 4503

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: Data collected with the attached form are to
be used for research purposes only. When identifiers are
requested they are to be used for administrative and statistical
control purposes only. Full confidentiality of the responses
will be maintained in the processing of these data.

VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL: Your
participation in this research is strictly voluntary. Individuals
are encouraged to provide complete and accurate
information in the interests of the research, but there will be
no effect on any individuals for not providing all or any part of
the information.
PART I

Please use the scale below for questions 1 through 12

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<th>Very Poorly</th>
<th>Poorly</th>
<th>Fair</th>
<th>Well</th>
<th>Very Well</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HOW WELL DOES USAWC PREPARE SENIOR OFFICERS TO:

[____] 1. deal with problems which have no clear cut solutions?

[____] 2. be an innovator/initiator of policies and solutions?

[____] 3. succeed in jobs of broad scope and responsibility?

[____] 4. assess/plan for the future while executing in the present?

[____] 5. think strategically?

[____] 6. think conceptually?

[____] 7. think critically?

[____] 8. work in a strategic environment?

[____] 9. understand the role of the military in a democratic society?

[____] 10. advise the National Command Authorities on the use of military forces to achieve national objectives?

[____] 11. serve in an organization involving joint forces?

[____] 12. serve in an organization involving combined or coalition forces?
PART II

Using the scale below, indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with questions 13 - 20

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<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

13. I considered myself fully trained in the tactical art prior to my arrival at the USAWC.

14. I considered myself fully trained in the operational art prior to my arrival at the USAWC.

15. The USAWC curriculum covers the right subjects for senior officer development.

16. USAWC should produce officers with a wide breadth of knowledge.

17. USAWC should produce officers with depth of knowledge in specialized areas.

18. USAWC prepares officers well for a joint assignment.

19. USAWC prepares officers well for an Army assignment.

20. All Army Colonels should be MEL-1.
PART III

Use the following scale for this section

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Not At All</th>
<th>Slight Extent</th>
<th>Moderate Extent</th>
<th>Great Extent</th>
<th>Very Great Extent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD THE USAWC CURRICULUM FOCUS ON THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

[ ] 21. joint warfighting skills?

[ ] 22. land warfighting skills?

[ ] 23. political/diplomatic skills?

[ ] 24. combined/coalition warfighting skills?

[ ] 25. strategic thinking?

PART IV

Demographic Information

26. What is your current rank?
   1. LTC
   2. LTC(P)
   3. COL
   4. COL(P)

27. What is your branch?
   1. Combat Arms
   2. Combat Support
   3. Combat Service Support

28. What is your component?
   1. Active
   2. Army National Guard
   3. U.S. Army Reserves
PART V

FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND NEEDS

29. Which group of officers should attend the USAWC? (please select one)
   1. LTC
   2. LTC(P)
   3. COL
   4. COL(P)
   5. BG

30. Why did you select the response in question 29 above?

31. What will the Army and the Army senior leadership environment look like in the year 2000?

32. What skills/knowledge do you feel senior officers will need in the next five to fifteen years?

33. How can the USAWC best evaluate your performance and potential?
34. How do you think the USAWC could be improved to best prepare senior Army officers?

35. What characteristics identify an officer as someone who is a strategic thinker or who has "strategic vision"?

36. How should USAWC and the Army identify and cultivate strategic thinkers/strategic thinking?

37. Additional comments and/or suggestions.

PLEASE RETURN NLT 14 FEBRUARY
TO STUDENT BOX #77
THANK YOU!
APPENDIX 2: Analysis of Student Survey Responses

This appendix graphically summarizes student survey responses. Questions are addressed in order following a demographic sketch of the respondents.

Surveys were given to 200 Army officers attending the College Class of 92. 180 of these were on Active duty and 20 were from the Reserve Component of the Army. Of the 200 surveys, 121 were returned. Of those, 90.8% were Active and 9.2% were Reserve. Of those responding, 52.5% were LTC(P)s, 28.3% were COLs and 19.2% were LTCs. Combat Arms made up the largest percentage of respondents with 49.6% (total class = 55% Combat Arms). Combat Support officers (class = 17%) made up 19.8% of the respondents. Combat Service Support officers (class = 28%) made up the remaining 30.6% of the respondents.

QUESTION #1: How well does USAWC prepare senior officers to deal with problems which have no clear cut solutions?

![Graph showing survey responses to QUESTION #1](image-url)
QUESTION #2: How well does USAWC prepare senior officers to be innovators/initiators of policies and solutions?

MEAN = 3.3

QUESTION #3: How well does USAWC prepare senior officers to succeed in jobs of broad scope and responsibility?

MEAN = 3.5

QUESTION #4: How well does USAWC prepare senior officers to assess/plan for the future while executing in the present?

MEAN = 3.5
QUESTION #5: How well does USAWC prepare senior officers to think strategically?

MEAN = 3.9

Very well: 5
Well: 4
Fair: 3
Poor: 2
Very poorly: 1

QUESTION #6: How well does USAWC prepare senior officers to think conceptually?

MEAN = 3.5

Very well: 5
Well: 4
Fair: 3
Poor: 2
Very poorly: 1

QUESTION #7: How well does USAWC prepare senior officers to think critically?

MEAN = 3.6

Very well: 5
Well: 4
Fair: 3
Poor: 2
Very poorly: 1
QUESTION #8: How well does USAWC prepare senior officers to work in a strategic environment?

QUESTION #9: How well does USAWC prepare senior officers to understand the role of the military in a democratic society?

QUESTION #10: How well does USAWC prepare senior officers to advise the National Command Authorities on the use of military forces to achieve national objectives?
QUESTION #11: How well does USAWC prepare senior officers to serve in an organization involving joint forces?

QUESTION #12: How well does USAWC prepare senior officers to serve in an organization involving combined or coalition forces?

QUESTION #13: I considered myself fully trained in the tactical art prior to my arrival at the USAWC.
QUESTION #14: I considered myself fully trained in the operational art prior to my arrival at the USAWC.

QUESTION #15: The USAWC curriculum covers the right subjects for senior officer development.

QUESTION #16: USAWC should produce officers with a wide breadth of knowledge.
QUESTION #17: USAWC should produce officers with depth of knowledge in specialized areas.

MEAN = 2.8

QUESTION #18: USAWC prepares officers well for a joint assignment.

MEAN = 3.2

QUESTION #19: USAWC prepares officers well for an Army assignment.

MEAN = 3.8
QUESTION #20: All Army Colonels should be MEL-1.

Mean = 3.2

QUESTION #21: To what extent should the USAWC curriculum focus on joint warfighting skills?

Mean = 4.1

QUESTION #22: To what extent should the USAWC curriculum focus on land warfighting skills?

Mean = 3.4
QUESTION #23: To what extent should the USAWC curriculum focus on political/diplomatic skills?

**MEAN = 3.8**

- **V. GREAT EXTENT**: 5
- **GREAT EXTENT**: 4
- **MODERATE EXTENT**: 3
- **SLIGHT EXTENT**: 2
- **NOT AT ALL**: 1

QUESTION #24: To what extent should the USAWC curriculum focus on combined/coalition warfighting skills?

**MEAN = 4.0**

- **V. GREAT EXTENT**: 5
- **GREAT EXTENT**: 4
- **MODERATE EXTENT**: 3
- **SLIGHT EXTENT**: 2
- **NOT AT ALL**: 1

QUESTION #25: To what extent should the USAWC curriculum focus on strategic thinking?

**MEAN = 4.3**

- **V. GREAT EXTENT**: 5
- **GREAT EXTENT**: 4
- **MODERATE EXTENT**: 3
- **SLIGHT EXTENT**: 2
- **NOT AT ALL**: 1
APPENDIX 3: Written Survey Comments

This appendix contains the comments provided by respondents to the student survey. The comments are grouped by survey questions and are presented as worded by the respondents. Some spelling corrections have been made, and some responses have been expanded to provide continuity of thought where none existed. There is no interpretation of the comments in this appendix. Where appropriate, comments have been used in the main body of the text to reinforce or expand existing lines of thought.

30. Why did you select a particular grade for attendance at the USAWC?

- LTC. I believe LTC level is correct, it comes at the right time in a career’s experience level.
- LTC(P). I would want a senior LTC that is not about to retire. Someone that can apply the training to follow-on assignments. Colonels and higher need to already have the training.
- LTC. Because many LTCs are working in a capacity that requires this range of knowledge and understanding. Should be after Bn Cmd, mid-rank LTC.
- LTC. A LTC has the proper amount of experience to benefit from the training provided the USAWC.
- LTC(P). Good transition point from Battalion and tactical to strategic/joint, and that group (LTC(P)) was obviously successful at the LTC level and will soon be a COL.
- LTC(P). Those coming out of Battalion command "early," one year before COL primary zone should/could have one more job as a LTC prior to USAWC.
- LTC(P). COLs tend to be too set in their ways and have less time in service remaining to capitalize upon their War College experience.
- LTC. LTCs who have completed Battalion Command or the equivalent and are entering the zone for promotion to COL are the obvious choice. This is the rank that will fill key slots on the ARSTAFF, Joint Staff and CINC Staffs.
- LTC. AWC education should begin well before COL-level assignments.
- LTC(P). Coming out of Battalion Command is a transitional
point of major importance. Officers need to make an ending with small unit/direct leadership ways of judging ability and competence. The AWC should break that mold and re-mold for senior and executive skills, especially staff skills for high level commands. Need to learn to think like the 3-4 stars.

- LTC. LTCs who have completed command will be the Army's future senior leaders. Educating this group right after command prepares them to assume these positions.

- LTC. Too many subjects I needed to know about and encountered at Division/MACOM levels are only taught at AWC.

- LTC. I think LTC is the ideal grade for War College attendance. The problem with my suggestion is that by selecting LTCs alone, many others will be left out. May well be LTC(P) and COL.

- LTC. The sooner officers get this education, the quicker the military receives benefit of this education--broader perspectives, "joint" attitudes, strategic thinking, and consensus building.

- LTC. The LTC level is the proper time to attend and begin to expand. The LTC(P) category would limit the attendance to a very few. The class should consist of LTC, LTC(P) and COL.

- Because the question to select only one is too limited. Actually, the guidelines for selection as currently stated are adequate. What's important is the quality and potential for future service--and to make a difference in the Army.

- COL. AWC is COL prep course. Should be for LTC(P) and junior COLs before Brigade command.

- LTC(P). Focus on the LTC(P)s and COLs to get more return on the training investment. Don't assume all LTCs will make COL. Only send LTC(P)s and COLs to SSC.

- LTC. I think you should be, or becoming MEL-1 when selected for COL.

- COL. All COLs should be MEL-1.

- LTC. LTC represents the "last level" of technical expertise before assuming much broader responsibilities/command.

- LTC. Fits best for maximum benefit to the service--9 years if student attends at the 21-year mark.

- LTC(P). Selection for COL should be the main gate to enter SSC, because this is where senior leader potential is being evaluated. It would also be more effective to make the SSC selection concurrent with selection for promotion to COL.

- LTC. Better utilization of skills learned. COLs too often have already "peaked" and are likely to retire shortly.

- LTC. LTCs are at the point where they need to expand into strategic planning at the joint and combined levels. Most worker level jobs at joint, DOD, or service levels are LTCs. COLs work at the planner level, it's too late to train them at the strategic level.

- LTC(P). I agree that all Colonels should be MEL-1, and they should attend the AWC when they become LTC(P)s.

- LTC(P). AWC should be reserved for COL level.

- LTC(P). LTC(P) is in the center of the correct spectrum.
LTC(P). Can't afford MEL-i education for someone who isn't assured of advancement in rank. MEL-i resident schooling should happen early enough for the Army to reap benefit from it before an officer starts seriously thinking retirement at 26 years.

- LTC(P). Has you already over the hump -- one less list to "sweat out" while you are here.
- LTC. Proven potential . . . yet young enough for 2 or 3 follow-on assignments.
- LTC(P). Attendees need to be the high speed, low drag LTC with potential for G.O.
- LTC. The sooner we get officers here the better. A LTC should know what is being developed in our education here. I would say prior to command but that's just not practical. But as a LTC going to be a COL, this is a good training year.
- LTC(P). Up and coming LTCs who have demonstrated excellence, competitiveness and potential should be selected for AWC. The current policies are about right. Nix the BG and the COL(P) unless they have not attended AWC.
- LTC(P). Ready to work at higher staff and ready for COL level assignment.
- LTC(P). Because they are validated for positions of senior leadership once selected for promotion. It is these individuals who need an attitude adjustment (i.e., broadening of perspective).
- LTC. Need to develop and field officers that can think and function strategically as early in careers as possible.
- LTC(P). There are a number of LTC jobs still in the weeds. When you leave here, you should be headed for a strategic environment.
- LTC. Prepare them for service as COL.
- LTC(P). AWC subject matter is appropriate for senior LTCs and COLs.
- LTC(P). Question is poorly written. The group that attends should be best qualified, regardless of rank.
- LTC(P). To prepare these officers for future command and staff assignments. To allow those officerss an opportunity at the '0-year mark to make mid-course corrections in their personal and professional lives.
- LTC(P).
- LTC(P). I see LTC(P) and COL as very similar. I picked LTC(?) as this is coming later in the career due to stretched out promotions.
- LTC. LTC will be a reasonable expectation for a successful career.
- LTC(P). Needs to be groomed for senior level positions at DOD, JCS, or Army. They are in a transition stage to COL and higher.
- COL. Most LTCs only have one assignment as an LTC prior to AWC. Really a toss up between LTC(P) and COL, but the COL is at a pivotal point in military. Should be stepping stone to at least 10 more years of service.
- LTC.
- LTC(P). Preparation for service on high-level staff (DA, JCS, Combatant Command) at the COL level.
- LTC.
- LTC(P). Far too many, but by no means all, really are ready to make the transition from a tactical leader to a strategic leader.
- LTC(P). Prepare future Colonels for their assignments.
- LTC(P). I feel the answer should be LTC/LTC(P). There may be assignments prior to Brigade Command where War College skills are necessary. Should be open to both to accommodate time differences in assignments, especially joint.
- LTC(P). Should be selected after Battalion command with demonstrated potential for higher assignment.
- LTC(P). I think LTC(P) and COL should attend to get maximum utility from their remaining 10 years of service.
- LTC. After command. Need to be forced to the strategic level prior to being put into a high level staff. COLs learned through experience.
- LTC(P). Represents a transition point.
- LTC(P). Utilization should be at COL, therefore, preparation at LTC(P).
- LTC(P).
- LTC. Even though LTCs assigned to strategic level headquarters do little more than make coffee, they need a strategic perspective. Battalion and especially Brigade Commanders need the same perspective during combat operations to better understand the necessity of politically driven objectives.
- LTC. Really, the rank is not that important--not as important as experience and performance, and these two should count more than just youth!
- LTC. Allows time to place officers in a variety of positions to use AWC knowledge. Eliminates those less competitive earlier.
- LTC(P). Should have completed Battalion Command and be ready to go on to COL level jobs.
- LTC(P). Because LTCs don’t need this level of training.
- LTC(P). Promotable LTCs will go to jobs that the War College prepares them for. It is soon enough to come at this level.
- LTC(P). Graduates should all be going into key COL’s positions.
- LTC(P). CGSC should prepare an officer for Major and LTC assignments. AWC should prepare officers to serve at the COL/BG level. Don’t waste precious training resources (school spaces) training officers too early in their career.
- LTC. The earlier the better--right after Battalion command or equivalent senior officers need to attend.
- COL. When and if the course direction is adjusted to reflect what the Congressional Committee wants to see to keep it open, and what the CSA wants to see to get his requirements completed and questions answered, the COL level is the experience you will need.
- LTC(P). Because that is the level where their tactical expertise is as developed as it will become, and the rank that will place them in policy and plans assignments.
- LTC(P). Attendees should be senior LTCs going into Colonels' jobs at Brigade level or senior staff positions.
- LTC. If only those who are LTC(P) or COL are allowed to attend, we've wasted several years of experience (training) on those who must wait to be promotable before they can contribute and benefit from the MEL-1 training.
- COL(P). Officers should attend after Brigade (or equivalent) command. The focus of the AWC is ostensibly operations and strategy. Normally it is not until after Brigade Command--concerned with tactics--that officers reach a position involving operational and strategic decision making.
- LTC(P). Timing-- SSC between Battalion and Brigade commands/equivalents, however, should remain in the LTC(P) and COL range.
- LTC. Application of skills and knowledge gained at the USAWC at the senior LTC level coupled with experience will produce fully functional, better prepared COLs for key assignments.
- LTC(P). Too many COLs do not have much longevity upon leaving USAWC. It's a waste to train COLs who retire in two years and provides limited return for the system.
- LTC. I feel all officers should attend as LTC to be prepared for promotion to COL.
- LTC(P). War College should be targeted at those selected for COL.
- LTC. LTC(P) delays the entrance of officers who can put this education to work. If you attend as a LTC, you are most likely a senior LTC, having completed command, so will get selected for COL during the course or soon after. This means you will get an average of two years utilization after graduation. That translates to applying/reinforcing the education on the job at DA, MACOM, or joint duty.
- LTC. Attendance at USAWC should be early on as a LTC so as to have more years to serve as a MEL-1 officer. Develops officer sooner and Army gets better utilization.
- LTC. LTC after Battalion command--best utilization of his remaining years in the military.
- LTC(P). Marketable skill, business oriented and customer keyed.
- LTC(P). MEL-1 should be achieved prior to Brigade Command.
- LTC. Because you can get more use out of them. Why not send MAJ(P)s?
- LTC(P). Senior officer, good quality, already had Battalion command, next assignment needs AWC knowledge, plus
officer has time left in service.

- LTC(P). This is a make or break position. For assignments of national importance. Conversely, MEL-1 should be assigned to positions making use of USAWC.
- LTC. People after that rank have insufficient time remaining in service to put the "training" to work.
- LTC. Think current mix of LTC, LTC(P), and COL is OK.
- LTC(P). I’d say get them at the LTC to COL range, but if only given one choice, bring them in as LTC(P)s.
- LTC(P). Need to ensure majority of officers will spend at least two tours on active duty following graduation.
- LTC. Because LTC (after Battalion Command, in most cases) is the appropriate rank to start looking forward to more senior level assignments in joint and strategic arenas.
- LTC. To prepare them ASAP to accept duties and responsibilities of a MEL-1 officer.
- LTC(P). I think the senior service level training should come prior to being promoted to COL.
- LTC. Insure return on investment--retainability.
- LTC. Selection as LTC gives sufficient maturity and experience, yet allows ample time to apply what’s learned at the school.
- LTC. Because the Army waits too long in sending its officers here. Most officers will only have one assignment before retirement eligibility. If they don’t get selected for COL command, folks that are motivated will leave to pursue a civilian career, knowing they have no further potential in the Army. If officers are selected earlier, the Army could get two or more assignments before retirement.
- LTC. Comes at the right point in an officer’s career. He is making the transition from being the tactical expert to working the big picture. What we learn then gives the services 2-10 years to use us.
- LTC. I believe LTCs just coming out of successful Battalion command will get more and give more from the course. But I also recommend that the course be geared less to grand/national strategy--that should be a 2-star level course.
- LTC(P). People who are already promoted to Colonel do not have enough time left in the system to support the cost of attending the school. Use the CGSC rule; not eligible after year 20 or 21.
- LTC(P). Attendees should have completed Battalion command. LTCs are next moving into operational level assignments and need an operational and strategic training school.

31. What will the Army and the Army senior leader environment look like in the year 2000?

- It will be a smaller Army; senior leaders will probably have greater responsibilities for correspondingly less rank.
Senior leaders will have to be more politically and internationally attuned
- Army will be smaller, and leader environment will be more constrained.
- More high tech, versatile and mobile. World will be perceived as smaller - more space oriented - economically beginning to stabilize.
- Large number of regional disputes, some challenging vital interests. At the same time, U.S. will move toward being isolationist.
- Smaller, well-educated.
- Smaller, more flexible, better resource managers.
- Small, lean and capable. Leader environment will be ultra-competitive and possibly stagnant.
- If you know, lets write a joint article and sell it.
- Much smaller and demanding greater sophistication. Senior officers will have to be well-rounded in order to be effective. There will be a much greater emphasis on joint and combined warfighting skills. We will likely see the appearance of some sort of joint-related General Staff course for COLs who are very capable but not selected for Brigade-level command.
- Downsized, dollar constrained and oriented more to the domestic side, to perhaps include police type actions now disallowed by law. Regionally focused on Mideast and South America.
- Well trained, smaller in size, extremely professional, more stable in family life, CONUS based, quick response and very intense.
- Confused and fighting for turf. SERB and build-down will have demoralized the force sufficiently to prevent a short recovery. Seems that SOF is the only positive place to be--real mission, streamlined chain of command and acquisition--no cry babies.
- I fear it will be a very confusing one. There may well be a world with numerous regional conflicts important to the U.S. and there will be the demand to offer assistance to each with too few resources to do it. We may find ourselves spread too thin to be effective. This in turn will hurt the U.S.'s image and pressure for a decisive show of force somewhere. On the other hand all may be quiet and we may be comfortable in our delusion we can handle anything that comes up. This will be fine in they come up one at a time.
- The senior leader of the year 2000 will be more involved in representing the military to the political leadership and the American public. The need to maintain a ready force will continue to be threatened by limited, constrained resources. The senior leader will need to struggle to maintain a professional force when all the tugs will be toward an occupational model and the military culture will more closely approximate civilian society.
- More joint. CINCs all powerful. Much smaller Army stationed mainly in CONUS and prepared for contingency
deployment.
- Army will be small (8 Divisions), but well equipped. OPTEMPO will be high, but not nearly the current frenetic level. Army senior leaders will do what all peacetime senior military leaders do--compete for scarce resources.
- Foolish if we don't slow down the train. Units with 10% monthly turnover going to NTC every 18-24 months is wasted effort. We need trained units--slow down turnover ASAP.
- The Army in year 2000 will be smaller, the specific size will be resolved through the political process. It will be redesigned by aligning more appropriate mix of AC/RC units. Senior leaders in the Army will have a better understanding of the term "Total Army." Those leaders that remain will have a keen sense of roles and missions within the components of the Army. Leaders in year 2000 will be every bit as competent as we have ever had. The environment will no doubt accomodate a smaller force and driven by the the $$ alone.
- Perhaps less chaotic than today. Perhaps be faced with challenge of minimizing/undoing effects of decisions made in the early 1990s (especially with weapon systems). Technology in general.
- Much smaller, more challenging.
- More emphasis on bing able to work in the joint arena. Army will be smaller--leadership will be younger.
- A shell.
- Smaller.
- Small and highly political. Little mobility in terms of positions/promotions (less opportunity, but hopefully not stagnant).
- Small group that is "rowing" harder to keep the Army headed in the right direction. Very well educated and capable.
- A smaller, more versatile group, more politically aware and economically sensitive.
- Small, highly mobile and high tech.
- Senior leaders will be able to converse with leaders of industry and politics.
- Too many Generals, top heavy.
- Don't really know, but it doesn't look good. I'm afraid budget and personnel will continue to be cut to the point that great frustration and lack of a future will cause mass migration out of the military.
- Very small headquarters with COLs being the power element. Personal relationships ruling the day.
- I'd like to meet the senior officer that can answer this (8 years in the future) question with some accuracy.
- Smaller; limited advancement; less heavy forces; CONUS based only.
- Fewer leaders, therefore, all must carry their own load (unlike today). They will have to delegate in order to maintain momentum. Theis means the quality of junior leader will also have to carry their own. The year 2000 will be mo more challenging than today, or yesterday. It will just be different.
It will be very, very good, but headed downhill. The cream of a very large crop will be retiring, and the winnowing process will be starting on another, but smaller cross-section of America.

Small, compact contingency force focused on execution skills -- reduced emphasis on procurement and development. Lots of demands on leaders to do more with less. Skills required of senior leaders in many developing nations overseas, e.g., Eastern Europe and Soviet republics.

Not sure. So much depends on what happens in the world threat-wise and what Congress does in regard to downsizing. I would hope we go slow and maintain well trained folks and manned units. What I really think will happen is "do more with less, row harder, guys."

Obviously smaller -- more technically oriented. I have concerns that it will return to an era of unhealthy competition similar to the early 70s when RIFs encouraged officers to become less open and more self-serving.

Smaller with more inward focus. Reserves will be the area of greatest concern.

Very much as today. Unfortunately I don't believe that we'll make the appropriate changes in our structure during the downsizing. I think we'll change the tactical and operational environments but will fail to recognize the need to change the strategic.

Austere -- undermanned and underfunded -- a 2d rate power at best. The erosion has already started. We are going to eat the seed corn to keep afloat. There will be no "deferred dollars" for capital investment and R&D.

Smaller and more efficient.

It will be smaller, more integrated with the reserves, and vulnerable to large casualties caused by a political leadership failure in acceptance of responsibility and tough decision making.

Army will continue small and faced with a multitude of diverse missions. Will almost be overwhelmed by that. Leadership will need to focus more than ever on maintaining and enforcing high standards (personal, professional and training). Definitely need to be forward looking.

Small standing Army with a large reserve component. Training and sustaining RC will be #2 priority behind contingency force.

Complex, rapidly changing, with much smaller force.

Alot like it does right now--changed only by technology and resources.

Obviously, much smaller. Leaders will be those with combat experience (perhaps erroneously) who have excellent communication skills, management ability, and are politically astute.

There will be more joint interdependence of the armed forces. The JCS Staff will be more prominent and important. The Army Staff will be less important.
- Quality officers. Too many females; a welfare organization for single black females. Will be too much emphasis on minority numbers (statistics). The good, well-educated soldiers will not stay. We will be too technology oriented and will not be mentally and physically tough (same as we are now).

  - Aging equipment. Somewhat lower prestige as a profession. Defense perceived as a drain on national wealth. National priorities will be economic warfare with Europe and Japan (unless major conflict erupts involving U.S.).

  - Smaller Army and extended pin on points for promotion. LTC reasonable expectation for successful career.

  - The Army will be small. I submit in the neighborhood of 450,000. Environment will be one of competing resources. Our senior leaders must be politically smart, yet militarily loyal.

  - Even more competitive--hopefully not political, but I'm not sure that's possible.

  - The Army leadership will be oversized in comparison to the force structure.

  - Larger concentration at the top. OSD, JCS will grow at the expense of fighting forces.

  - Probably 8 to 10 Divisions and 2 Corps, all in CONUS. Environment will be quick reaction, brush fire operations.

  - Senior leader environment: younger, much more attuned to domestic determinants of U.S. ability to project power.

  - Unclear.

  - Very similar to now, however, should be more joint oriented.

  - Army will likely be smaller in numbers and size of component organizations. Although many of the world changes will have become obvious, still other changes will be pending and the environment will be as complex and changeable as it is now.

  - Smaller, versatile, high tech dependent. More international contact, regional conflicts, proliferation of lethal weapons.

  - Much like today's Army except considerably smaller and highly dependent upon technology in the combat arms.

  - Very competitive environment for officers. Small, overworked and under resourced TOE units. Units working the same requirements of a 750,000 man Army.

  - Cut throat.

  - It will be a small, tightly knit organization. The focus will be proficiency and professionalism. The organization will be extremely competitive.

  - Reacting to domestic political and world events. Trying to maintain a balanced, trained and ready force where quality of life is not totally gone.

  - Obviously much smaller. Greater reliance on RC. More homogenous.

  - Smaller, but hopefully better quality.

  - Smaller, focused on efficiency of available resources.

Additional involvement in building political consensus to compete for resources.
- About the same as now, however, there will be less
tradition (almost none). The Army will be more like a police
force or fire department of today and less a unique lifestyle
(less dedication and selflessness).
- I have no clue, but if we don’t treat people fairly and
equitably, it will either be too old or too young. If we are not
careful, we will also have too much bureaucracy.
- Smaller—with less experienced officers having greater
responsibilities. More professional and hopefully more
dedicated. More service functions changed to joint functions,
i.e., health care, legal, etc.
- Small, elite, competent, but under continuous stress to
perform many missions with ever decreasing resources. Beginning
to feel the negative effects of old weapon systems and a brain
drain associated with losing a disproportionate number of top 5%
junior officers and NCOs in the early to mid-90s.
- Very political. Automated in many functions, and
hopefully under the influence of a quality management process.
- Complex and uncertain world. Small military force
involved in many small operations (in the peacetime engagement
mode). Aging equipment at end of technological useful life.
Proliferation of nuclear weapons and means of delivery.
- Smaller, more focused, fewer U.S. commands and combined
with the Air Force. Environment will be more competitive (both
positively and negatively), and it will be proactive vice
reactive.
- Hopefully, we will be able to apply computers and other
automated systems to make planning and coordination less time
consuming and frustrating. This will result in smaller staffs
and less organizational layering, and facilitate better and more
timely decisions. We can’t afford the staff redundancy we how
have.
- More responsive to JCS and CSA because we will be smaller
but still have the same number of problems and concerns.
- Tough question. It really depends on how willing and able
the senior Army officers are to drop old ways of looking at the
world, drop current roles, and then shape the Army to fit and
lead the nation into a world that is constantly changing.
- Obviously a much smaller Army, and I expect overworked
senior leaders. Environment will be more "management and
businesslike," working around scarce resources and a continued
quest for information. Command climate will be essentially the
same.
- Younger, but perhaps with less experience.
- Unsure. It is likely that the active Army will be less
than 535K and equipped (by then) with aging weapons. It is
likely that the RC will become ever more important.
- A lot like it is now if we do not alter something. Need
to get away from cookie-cutter approach.
- Same, but smaller.
- The successful senior leader of 2000 will be younger with
less "troop" time than today, but with the requisite skills and
knowledge to operate in a dynamic, ever-changing political environment.
- Ask Congress.

- Small Active and Reserve. Reserve will have some present AC missions. Active leaders must fully understand RC environment to be able to effectively employ those units. Army needs to be more ready to use its resources in "domestic" humanitarian and drug war missions.

- Army; unknown. Environment; probably similar to present.

- Complex. More bureaucracy and fewer troops. Greater demand for politically smart Generals to handle our international links, given we are going to focus on coalitions. Younger senior leaders. More up-or-out pressure causing good Colonels to leave. Tremendous budgetary pressures affecting modernization. Cry for innovative force structure changes to justify lower manpower ceilings, so we can continue to develop and procure good equipment. Excellent training opportunities.

- The Army will be smaller on the active side and larger on the RC side. Senior leader environment will have to be integrated to make it work. By this I mean senior leaders must have had both AC and RC assignments to know how to deal with the total Army in this environment.

- A younger group of officers oriented toward strategic thinking along political and diplomatic levels. I fear a loss of warfighting skills through reductions of personnel and funding for training.

- Lean, competent, trained and resourceful. Focus must be more business oriented. Competition will be very keen.

- Fewer Colonels and above, but more quality in officers. I fear the Army will have units short personnel to keep flags. I fear the OPTEMPO for divisional units will continue at too high a pace.

- Probably the same but here are the concerns: *Leaders too smart technically, out of touch with "people;" *Smaller Army, more competitive, get ahead at any price, lowered integrity, honor, standards; *Need for Army senior leaders who must be joint.

- Certainly smaller, more involved with national leadership and internationally.

- Obviously there will be fewer billets, but the population will be smaller also. I think there will be great opportunities to lead in new areas short of conflict. The challenges to stay equipped, trained and ready with fewer resources will present leaders with significant challenges; not overwhelming, but challenging. We will be required to be not only excellent leaders but also managers.

- Cassandra at Troy.

- Same as today, except less cautious. Will not have experienced the humbling experience of Vietnam. May not have the deep focus of today's leadership if no threat continues to prevail.

- Smaller, more conservative, less innovative, more
concerned with resources.

- Probably (hopefully) alot like our current version except we can probably expect it to be somewhat smaller than 535K, and we may see new technologies advancing or producing new weapon systems.
- Much smaller; approaching 360,000. Strong emphasis on nation building. Immersed in environmental/political/economic issues. Mostly CONUS based. Must train leaders how to train followers to be leaders.
- Probably similar to what it looks like today only smaller.
- It will probably be even more unsure/changing.
- Small Army (<500K), highly competitive with only the very finest officers being retained.
- Only ex-Brigade commanders will have a shot at BG. Most non-COL commanders will retire at 26 year mark.
- Small and very well trained. Questionable morale: too many deployments, too small and uncertain future may affect entire military population.
- A much smaller force with fewer General officers seems to be the trend. Retiring as a LTC or MAJ will be a successful career. Everything is subject to uncertainty because another major conflict involving nuclear weapons is very likely.
- Difficult to tell obviously. I think a whole lot closer to pre-"TF Smith" than we want. In all the discussion of what the cuts look like, I've not heard one General say we will have to cut back anything--loss of people and $\$, no loss of mission.
- Smaller Army doing more with less. Technology will make the Army highly efficient. Leadership will think regionally with a LIC focus. Probably younger as a group (this will not be to the Army's advantage), with fewer minorities (ethnic).
- Unless a world crisis occurs, Congressional pressure will tend to force the Army (all the services) to cut back too far. If we cannot persuade otherwise, we will again become a very professional but "hollow" force with excellent troops and leadership, but not structured or equipped for war.
- Same as today except fewer numbers.
- Smaller. One superpower; rival German and Japanese centers of economic power. CIS' collapse and fragmentation into national groupings. Rise of nationalism, rise of democracies, rise of capitalism and freedom.

32. What skills/knowledge do you feel senior officers will need in the next five to fifteen years?

- More political and international skills
- Understand the relationship between defense and domestic issues.
- Know how to operate in a constrained times.
- Ability to train subordinates.
- Skills to negotiate with key top leaders (military and
An overview of world events.
- An understanding of the directions that our National Defense Strategy is headed.
- An ability for free thought of conceptual levels.
- Near term depends on next assignment because they are influencing five years out. Officers will need a continued depth of knowledge to be able to think, put things in perspective and communicate goals, objectives and intent. CAUTION: Technical and tactical proficiency and direct leadership skills are and will remain an imperative for any military leader.
- Greater management skill, very political. Better understanding of conditions.
- Understand how to work in the joint environment. Know how to build concensus. Understand the limitations that logistics place on operations.
- Civilian personnel management, resources management, political acumen, coalition warfare.
- LIC, use of SOF, peacetime engagement, possible mid-intensity conflict.
- Broad conceptual skills--I think we'll be plowing some "new" old ground--maybe Civilian Conservation Corps, etc, maybe peacekeeping.
- Joint and combined skills. Political.
- Diplomatic/persuasive. Strategic leader attributes. Much greater knowledge of operational art/campaign planning. Long range planning and thinking skills.
- Basically the same as now with more emphasis on the domestic side.
- Legal, ethics, and communication and social skills.
- How to operate in a joint/coalition environments. Require regional focus--not a jack of all trades, fight anywhere mentality.
- They will need the ability to think critically. They will need the ability to communicate and inspire.
- Management and cultural development skills, strategic planning skills, negotiation skills, military professional analytic skills (military ethics, military sociology, organizational design), human resource development skills, blending real time and simulation training design skills, skills at cultivating marginal people in an institutional environment which will more and more seek conformity.
- Better people skills. Get rid of the hyper guys who rule by fear and intimidation. Too many of them make it to the top. Being results oriented does not mean you "walk on" you people.
- Joint and combined warfighting skills. Oral and written communication skills. How to train, equip and organize the force in the absence of a distinct threat. How to quickly deploy and then sustain an expeditionary force in an undeveloped theater.
- Automation and simulation.
- Combined and joint knowledge, understand the realities of coalition warfare. Must be able to think strategically, must
understand the political realities that Congress has in raising our military. Must understand the presidential call-up authority issue in detail—relative to activation of RC units (this is key).

- Knowledge that there is more to successful warfighting than combat or maneuver forces—logistics continue to be overlooked by not being given the recognition deserved.
- Enhanced conceptual skill. Increased abilities to function in ambiguous environment. Increased understanding of political/economic environment and implications.
- A working knowledge of the domestic and political environments.
- Skills/knowledge in the budget/resource arena will be essential. Low budgets and constrained personnel will dictate a judicious and innovative use of what we have. Also must learn to be master trainers and force developers (in every sense of the word)—No more Task Force Smiths.
- Management.
- Political/diplomatic implications of military power.
Senior officers must remain current on regional military situations worldwide.
- Moral courage, ethical character, operational/strategic thinking skills, and broad base understanding of DOD activities.
- Heavy emphasis on management and technical skills. Leveraging at strategic and regional specific basis.
- Strategic thought and political knowledge. Knowledge of Army roles in our society. Advanced warfighting skills (joint and combined).
- Coalition warfare, joint arena experience, and hands-on experience with an RC unit.
- Leadership in complex organizations—visioning and goal setting.
- They need to be warriors and managers—to combine the two creates weaknesses in both classes of leaders.
- Joint management skills—there needs to be a General Officer School at the 25-year mark. All new or 2-star generals of all services attend together to study joint management of resources, joint/strategic leadership and joint warfare. At each level of our military careers we attend school (OBC, OAC, CAS3, CGSC, SSC), then we go for 10-15 years with no school. We seem to have the attitude that when we pin on stars, some new form of IQ is attached to them. Send the generals to school.
- Greatly enhanced knowledge about sister service structure and capabilities. Ability to communicate effectively. Ability to link national purpose to military objectives (intimate knowledge of military role in our society).
- Same as before with additional training in management; use of simulators, and environmental protection. Budget aspects will also be more important.
- Broad knowledge in the strategic and operational levels of war. Leadership and management at the strategic level. Detailed knowledge of joint planning and operations. Oral and written
communications.
- Knowledge of joint/combined operations. A strategic thinker. A master of persuasion.
- Joint operational skills.
- The same as they should have today, with increases for technology.
- Working in joint and coalition environments on fast-breaking crisis worldwide.
- More emphasis on regional studies, less on PPBS -- both systems changing rapidly, but regional is more beneficial in long term.
- Strategic thinking skills and skills to communicate to Congress and the American people our ideas and concerns from a strategic point of view.
- More personnel skills. Must learn to lead without being overbearing.
- Smart -- innovators shaped by military culture.
- Vision and the will to see it accomplished. Forward thinking which allows new ideas, systems to be developed. A better, broader understanding of TQM -- not just using the three words.
- Survival skills -- innovative in training, R&D and acquisition, and political skills (we need friends in the media and Congress or we are going down the tube).
- Know political and military interfaces. Know coalition and joint operations.
- They need to understand (expertly) our doctrine, how to train and how to develop junior leadership combat skills.
- Again, ability to see the future of the Army (vision, I guess). Also integrity -- especially when enforcing standards that the Army needs to stay ready.
- Leadership and ethics, and a strong historical perspective. Weapons systems, and the integration and synchronization of those systems. World economics and geopolitics.
- Innovative resource managers. Flexible, politically savvy decision makers. Well rooted in national interests of the U.S. Well versed in national military strategy. Understanding the interests, problems, and goals of our allies and others in our CINCdoms.
- Time management skills! Information management skills. Skills that provide the knowledge and background to implement and foster management techniques and programs like TQM.
- Better understanding of leadership doctrine. Better understanding of the global, political realm in which we operate.
- Consensus building, management, senior and strategic leadership.
- Management skills, ever more so than now. All officers must be computer smart. Be better versed in budgeting and financial management. Have a good sense of humor--be flexible--need a change in mentality. Will not need to work soldiers around the clock to get a weapon system up. It can probably wait
until the next day. If the standard is 90%, then 90% is OK. Don’t have to achieve 95% or 98% at the expense of abusing your soldiers and their families.

- Interpersonal skills, management as well as leadership. Communicative skill, oral and written, and computer capable.
- More in depth knowledge of force development. More in depth knowledge of logistics. Greater understanding at earlier points in their careers of the interrelationship of political, economic, social and military elements of U.S. and international strategy development and implementation.
- Resourceful, business smart, innovative, flexible, mentally tough (moral courage), and articulate and personable.
- Diplomatic and strategic thinkers--visionaries. Joint and combined talents.
- Coalition warfare will be the focus of the future. Nothing at the AWC is preparing future leaders for operating in coalitions.
- Primarily, they must be warfighters, but they must be aware of political realities.
- Joint and coalition warfighting skills. Language capability. Budgetary skills to do the same with less. Creativity and original thinking.
- Total computer literacy. Ability to effectively communicate to the media and congressional staffers. Interagency process.
- Joint training, in both tactical and logistical support.
- Knowledge of how the entire defense system works (not only the Army), and political skills to deal effectively with civilian leaders and the public.
- Thinking and problem solving. Consensus building and shared decision making. Foreign cultures and viewpoints. Information processing and accessing.
- Astute political and diplomatic skills. Like it or not, the military is a special interest group.
- Automation, specialization in their fields, familiarization with allied armies and language skills.
- How to implement strategic policy.
- Leadership and managerial skills. Functional area proficiency. Resource management skills and knowledge. Communication skills, especially writing!
- To fully know interrelationships with defense/domestic political/world scenarios.
- Joint contingency operations; greater world political knowledge; political acumen (domestic).
- We need a very wide range of skills. In general, we will become more technical, but overall we need to continue to emphasize warfighting.
- Strategic vision, and political and diplomatic skills.
- Leadership! The Army’s officer corps is fairly well populated with effective managers, but I have always been amazed
when officers with absolutely no leadership ability are promoted to senior command positions. Management skills are absolutely necessary for an officer, however, when the blood-letting starts, an Army without leaders will fail.

- Skills will be no different than now or yesterday. The trick will be to operate efficiently based on the new regional conflict scenario. We will also need to be more sensitive to environmental issues.
- How to do more with less. LIC, and political roles and interaction in 3d world countries.
- Joint operations, rapid deployment and coalition warfare.
- Anticipate the threat, force structure needed to meet it (them), how to manage Congress.
- Computer skills to communicate quickly using automated means. Speaking and writing skills that will enable them to sell new ideas. Diplomatic skills to work with coalitions.
- Management skills based on quality. TQM.
- Joint/combined operations. Working with Department of State, Embassy and country teams.
- Planning skills, diplomacy and knowledge of technology.
- We have to continue to review warfighting tactics, techniques and procedures, or future generations of officers will not be tactically and technically proficient. This will also help to prevent future "Tack Force Smiths." We need to focus on communication skills--written and oral. We must expose officers to state of the art automated decision tools and communication systems.
- Business and management skills, budgetary skills, and global focus.
- More foreign language (Spanish, German, Serbo-Croatian). Greater understanding of big picture, earlier, but greater depth in specialty.
- Conceptual thinking beyond current paradigms/models. Leadership skills under scored with exceptional management skills. Communication skills with civilian decision makers and public/media.
- The tactical and operational arts. Force integration processes, PPBS, and the environmental and political realities. World awareness and the strategic level of war.
- Computers, resource management expertise, language, and political and diplomatic skills.
- Wide knowledge of RC. Extensive knowledge of USAF, USN and USMC systems and doctrine.
- Broad experience in a variety of assignments.
- Perhaps more skill as resource managers.
- Senior officers must come to grips with a smaller "total force" of the future. They will have to be able to demonstrate to Congress their ability to marshall all assets to form a creditable force capable of accomplishing strategic military objectives.
- Budgeting, plus the ability to coordinate in a multi-national defense environment.
- Need to better understand domestic political arena and be more sensitive to it. Become better users of media to sell Army story.
- Basically the same as now, but with an increased "literacy" in automated information management systems.
- PPBS, history, political science, coalition warfare, theory, ethics and strategic warfighting.
- More RC exposure plus the ability to deal in the political and international relations arenas.
- The ability to see and shape the future. What we do now will determine peace in the year 2000.
- Accept that it is a time of transition, not merely a percentage drill in force structure. An uncanny ability to deal with the unknown. New thinking, being adaptive and innovative.
- Budget and joint planning.
- Guts to stand up for what’s right. Perspectives out beyond 30 years. More scientific skills
- Speaking, writing, analytical, depth of experience, and foreign language.
- Financial management and procurement, personnel management, joint operations, and combined and coalition warfare.
- Capability to protect Army from 20s/30s disintegration.
- Number one is "how the systems work," particularly the budget process. The inch deep and a mile wide approach used by the AWC won’t cut it with respect to preparing senior leaders who can help the field Army.
- Become more political, defend role of effective defense, combat isolationist tendencies.
- Both warfighting and management to enable them to fight war and deal with change in an environment of declining resources and international political change.
- Clear understanding of overriding links between political, economic and military elements of power.
- Coalition experience and joint experience.
- More joint and coalition skills.
- Detailed understanding of how the military fits into a democratic society. Sound understanding of how our government works. Appreciation of domestic priorities.
- Personnel and interpersonal skills. Management of decreasing/diminished resources. Joint and coalition doctrine.
- Army officers need to be better trained in dealing with the Congress. It seems as if the USAF and Navy are taking fewer cutbacks than the Army. In fact, USAF and Navy budgets are increasing with the Army as the billpayer in the near term. The Army will lose 1/3 of its fighting divisions, yet the Navy will only lose 2 carriers out of 16.
- Stand up and say you can’t get there from here, the security of our nation is in danger, I quit; or, I’m OK, you’re OK, we can do it all.
- Clearly the leadership will have to be visionary and innovative. Leaders should, at all levels, receive more training
in international relations.
- Joint and combined operations, with a special emphasis on logistics and strategic mobility. Knowledge of history and historical trends related to current events. Political awareness. A clear understanding of the role of the military and the importance of professional competence at all levels, but especially at the highest.
- More working knowledge of the world, economics, politics and technology.
- Joint doctrine and training experience. Coalition warfare expertise. Operational and strategic warfighting skills.

33. How can the USAWC best evaluate your performance and potential?
- Same as now.
- Why is it presumed that the objective of the AWC is to evaluate me? I feel that the school's purpose is to provide a service... that is to lay a basis for continuing my education. My potential is already evaluated, or I would not be here. What each person leaves here with will be something different based upon many factors. I believe it would impede free thought if we were evaluated against each other.
- From comments FIs have made during instruction and from observations--one perspective due to comparison with other War College classes. Next best would probably be opinion of peers--by seminar, by branch, by some interest group, although range of opinion would have small standard deviation.
- Given the graduate level of the school, I think it does well. However, there could be more individual assessment and assistance.
- The way they are now--through written and oral communications, and actions as a member of a work group.
- As it now does.
- Seminar peer evaluation/rating. Seminar faculty instructor evaluations.
- Leave it to supervisors in real jobs. The faculty's experience isn't that much more and in some cases less than the students.
- Current system is OK. On the job performance is key, not what happens in a school environment. We are here to learn, not compete for future jobs!
- Can't be done honestly in a non-threatening way. Is this an appropriate task for USAWC? It seems to go against the grain of the school's current approach.
- Not the War College's responsibility--that's done in the unit. The AWC assists in equipping the officer in the unit with the skills to be utilized, and then the officer can be evaluated!
- Good grief! Everyone here has leaped through hoops--had a
couple of dozen OERs, a dozen or more assignments, has been screened 5 or 6 times for promotion, Battalion command, etc. Most of the faculty have been closeted in academia and have little credibility to evaluate potential. Evaluate what performance--academic? Forget it!

- Excellent question--someone ought to write an MSP on this. Right now I'd say they can do it best through the written documentys students produce and to a degree instructors' reports from the classroom. These are the only insights they have to our ability to think and communicate.

- USAWC has a good curriculum and instructional design. It does not take its task seriously. Group tasks are not performed as group tasks, and evaluation and integration does not take place. Groups need to function as senior command staffs. Honest feedback and utilization of skills and talents would be a start.

- No change required to current system.

- The current system appears to work just fine.

- In seminar or small groups just as it is done now. Small group work assignments should be rotated--it works fine. Grading with a numbered score would be counter productive, i.e., team effort and interest will quickly turn to what's best for me! Potential in this environment (academic) should be measured with some caution. Remember the mission here--evaluation of the AWC effectiveness is evidenced best through the performance of graduates following attendance.

- I'm not sure I feel it's appropriate for the AWC to make those evaluations. I'm here to learn, and need to feel safe showing my ignorance and taking whatever classes I want. Some people really need to devote time to family or other personal concerns.

- They have no business doing this. We are here to reflect and learn, not to compete for potential and performance.

- Can't--too many quirks in the system after one leaves here.

- Cannot and should not. My performance and potential have been demonstrated--that's why I'm here. Future should be measured by future job performance, not school performance.

- Evaluating potential is not a AWC mission. Performance can be evaluated through writing and speaking requirements, plus seminar participation as is done today.

- Through contribution: Task students to review and comment on things like the BOLDSHIFT Program, the Army Training Plan, FM 100-5 rewrite, FM 25-100/101, etc.; after all, all future focus is supposed to be a trained and ready Army.

- Better seminar participation. Thought provocative exercises/discussions.

- Writings and oral presentations.

- Need much more personal (one on one) time with faculty advisors and instructors.

- Faculty and peer comments.

- Let us graduate and see how the Army utilizes us.

- Not necessary. Why is it necessary to evaluate my
performance in school as an individual effort? All military schools need to focus on teamwork--like CAS3. I get evaluated, measured and tested enough in everyday of my life when I'm not in school.

- Forcing the student to research specific topics and evaluating both the written and oral presentations of the findings.
- I'm not sure they need to do that. The selection process picks good guys/gals. Their (USAWC) emphasis should be on motivation and training, not evaluating. If they do want to evaluate, the course needs to be tougher. Students are not taxed.
- Not their job. Schools should not be in the business of judging potential.
- I don't know of a way to do it better! We are graded on oral and written communications skills, as well as class/seminar participation. Of course, some of us are better operationally than academically.
- Observation by Faculty Instructors. Limited written requirements.
- Considering the paradigm of no grades, the current method is more than adequate.
- By keeping the best faculty it possibly can, and continuing a strong faculty adviser program that links "tenured" faculty with individual students. ("tenured" for this purpose is someone who has at least a year under his "belt")
- Get off this writing kick. Once you know I can write, say so and let me spend time studying areas in more detail.
- This is an academic world at the War College. Often there are no right answers, therefore, your current system seems about right to me.
- Is evaluation necessary?
- That is not a function for USAWC. Senior raters are in the better environment to assess. This academic environment should foster learning and sharing.
- I don't believe a schoolhouse can evaluate potential. An academic environment does not require the same skills as the job. Our performance I think is measured adequately now. To add graded tests, papers and research projects would deny, or at least hinder the education process. I've learned a great deal without killing myself.
- It can't. Leave that to the rating system.
- Do away with the MSP, but require research paper for each course (5-8 pages).
- It can't, it is a training and learning institution. While it may be an interesting intellectual effort, a school is a school, it does not have the right nor the mission to use an academic setting to evaluate future performance or potential.
- I think asking for papers with original thought on key issues facing the Army, or on our visions for the Army, national security, or the global environment of the future. Papers on history or current issues are nice, but leaders need to be
forward-looking.

- Don’t try! This is not the proper forum. You can only evaluate academic potential here. That does not translate to warfighting, or even good staffing!
- Current procedures are OK.
- It can’t and shouldn’t--that’s done prior to arrival at AWC. It should provide a base preparation for senior leaders, with elective courses which allow students to pursue their professional interests.
- Communication skills--both oral and written.
- Through the current evaluation system.
- Make the curriculum like the Naval War College where the work is graded--the end result is a more serious approach to what is being offered, plus every one graduates with a masters degree. I do not suggest class standings, but a pass/fail system. Make the faculty work a little by grading papers and performance in class.
- I don’t think they should unless its in consideration of faculty assignments. Performance and potential is best evaluated in the work environment, not the academic environment. USAWC should educate and train, not evaluate performance and potential.
- Evaluation of seminar participation, oral reports and papers written during each course of the curriculum. Forget MSP. Course papers are more beneficial in increasing/enhancing our understanding of a broad range of subjects, and making us think conceptually and at the strategic level.
- USAWC can’t evaluate my "performance and potential." It can, however, further enhance my military education. Strong consideration should be given to eliminating the AER at this level. It is unnecessary and serves no purpose. It’s beauracratic!!
- Sessions similar to configuration A. Discussions, written and oral presentations--short, not of such a high level. The essence of an issue is required for presentation.
- Why must the AWC evaluate performance and potential? OERs do that. Do away with any and all performance evaluations at AWC. Learning is an individual activity--why at this level use a cookie cutter to place people into categories?
- It can’t! This is not the environment in which to measure those skills needed to succeed.
- Participation.
- Keep it the way it is now.
- Probably through observation and class reputation.
- Very much like it is doing now. Papers and briefings.
- Recommend no changes to performance evaluations.

Potential can best be determined by looking at an individual’s career and accomplishments.
- Build in more thinking skills evaluations and followup on leadership development assessment instruments.
- I don’t think such is really possible in an academic environment unless the objective is to see who can score well on exams or write the best papers. Potential and performance can
only be determined on the job.
- I don’t think they can or should. Who, for example, could evaluate my potential as a medical officer, or QM, or Signal officer? No one. Best you can do is evaluate me on the school’s assignments.
- Two-page papers versus 4-40 page papers. There isn’t a CEO around that will accept a paper much longer than two pages. Simulations. Have students state a vision and establish a program to implement.
- Rather than have a written test, per se, use the medium of an end of course paper. The paper should in one form or another serve the purpose of expression of lessons learned.
- Through seminar contributions.
- Current methods fine, but there should be greater emphasis on decision making/analysis, vice research in the subjects for course papers and presentations.
- I’m not sure it can. I would evaluate academic performance, but not potential for service outside the school—the two do not equate.
- Difficult when the stated purpose is to build cooperation rather than competition. What skills are being evaluated?
- I really don’t think that any type of academic evaluation will indicate future performance levels in staff and especially command positions. Academic achievement can only be measured by examinations.
- Current methods are best; observation, writings, presentations, etc. Formal grading would be detrimental to the seminar format, though obviously it is a way.
- They con’t—it’s a sanitized, low pressure environment. Quality of MSP does not indicate strategic leadership potential.
- As they do it now. Concentrate on participation in a low threat environment.
- More meaningful debate and intellectual stimulation (perhaps through simulation); less through less precise pseudo-systemic approaches.
- I don’t think that can be done with the current mindset of students coming here. You can’t evaluate performance on the job in an educational environment. Potential could be evaluated, but the criteria must be selected and announced up from. All of the people here have potential!!!
- Present system is adequate. The concept, to encourage exchange, works very well!
- Written evaluations omitting the artificial grading (E/M/NI,etc.) by faculty. Peer evaluations. Evaluate knowledge, not ability to meet requirements.
- The current system, with a seminar peer rating. Health and physical fitness scores should carry a lot of weight since health is the major discriminator for General officer selection and performance.
- Oral presentations, debate panels, some written work, and group exercises.
- By challenging those skills required at the higher levels
and seeing how I react.
- Haven't the foggiest idea.
- I don't believe my performance and potential should be evaluated in an academic environment.
- Current method seems best, but if "needs improvement" is given on an assignment, don't let students blow it off . . . make students come up to your standard; they'll have to in the real world.
- Battalion command is not necessarily a necessary prerequisite. Institute a rigorous entrance exam. Grading should be rigorous.
- Graded work.
- Can't under present POI, and I don't advocate going to a formal evaluation system.
- By taking a less academic approach to written and oral reports. A critical review of the content would be more productive and provide a better evaluation of performance and potential, i.e., each student should brief his concepts and ideas contained in written reports to the seminar, and openly debate the merits of his "critical thinking skills" with the seminar.
- Performance on the job after graduation.
- I feel the present system is adequate. Present system promotes teamwork and idea sharing. To change to a competitive or threatening environment would not be useful.
- Personal observation, over time, by senior officers selectively looking for traits and characteristics denoting potential.
- As they do now, by observing performance in seminar and exercises. Peer ratings in certain exercises/presentations could be helpful. Conventional testing and order of merit lists would destroy some of the learning as we know it today, i.e., learning from your peers by sharing ideas and experiences in seminar.
- The War College can't--it can only determine how well I read, memorize, write, etc. Your evaluation comes from how well you perform in your job. I hope the USAWC will maintain its present evaluation system--an environment in which you feel comfortable to learn, grow, discuss and have a moment with the family when you need it.
- Should the school do this? We're here based on performance and potential--20+ years of assessment. The school should give us the tools (ideas, concepts, thoughts, diverse opinions, etc.), permit self reflection, and then release us to the next stage. Nine months here should be free to learn, not stressed for performance.
- Not required!! The War College should not evaluate! They cannot pick future leaders based on academics. The CGSC already tries it with the SAMS course!
- Not the job of USAWC. But, this is an educational institution, if someone needs help, give it.
- Same group dynamic participation. Probably about as good now as could be, with the possible exception of what process the faculty now uses or could use.
I don't think the USAWC is the place to evaluate senior leaders. The tendency might be to place too high a premium on academic prowess. We need to keep the evaluations outside the academic environment. Schoolhouses can be a factor in evaluating the "whole person," but contact with FIs is such that this would be very subjective. Many USAWC students have different objectives during the year.

- Peer evaluations at 2,3 year intervals.
- Go to a grading system that produces a degree. Potential: They can't.
- Think current system is fine . . . encourages individual initiative.
- Probably same as now; assessment of group participation and written requirements. I'm not sure an academic institution can assess on-the-job potential with complete validity. Some of our greatest Generals/leaders were relatively poor students.
- Written products. Need more situations where the students are challenged to arrive at decisions and defend their positions.
- Tough question. Giving grades will not necessarily identify the best people.
- As is, through writing and participation orally.
- As it is currently doing that.
- I don't think it should. This is an artificial environment which cannot obtain a true snapshot of potential. Keep it "boilerplate" as it is now.
- No need to. Leave that task to field commanders.
- There probably should be more standardization in the evaluation. The subjective forms used now aren't real helpful or detailed in discussing work done.
- Don't think USAWC should evaluate our performance other than what they do now. Do not need "white briefcase" mentality.
- Current system is sufficient.
- For command; very difficult to do. For staff; through writing and briefing, but also through more wargaming using past battles and potential battles. Obviously if you know exactly what you want and why, then comprehensive testing would determine who could do the best in taking tests.
- By instructor and peer review of my ability to learn, conceptualize and transfer principles from one subject to another, i.e., can I think and speak on issues from the macro to micro level with a broad base of knowledge demonstrating original, innovative analysis.
- Ask my commander at last or next assignment.

34. How do you think the USAWC could be improved to best prepare senior Army officers?

- More exercises like the Libyan Carrier Scenario.
- MSPs should focus more on questions that the Army needs answers for versus what someone wants to write about.
- More group MSPs.
- Add TQM.
- Develop programs that force use of E-Mail and DDN.
- More time spent on domestic issues of national importance.
- First of all, a lot of classmates will go on to Brigade Command—schoolhouse should have an elective for those folks to shorten PCC requirement.
- I think more travel would be beneficial to put us on someone else's turf for discussion, i.e., CINCSOUTH. The IFs have a great program. Each branch could visit proponent.
- More individual counseling.
- More exercises involving strategy formulation (ends, ways and means) in various scenarios. (peaceful engagement, LIC, war, etc.).
- No change.
- More speakers at the COL/BG level from the Pentagon who are working the key issues about where the Army is going and why. Strategic visioning and thinking at work. That way we leave here knowing what, why on the key issues so we can help spread the word and work together.
- I think the model works. When I left Norfolk after AFSC, I thought I had nearly wasted six months. I realized later that I had learned quite a bit. I suspect this is true here also.
- Do away with MSP! Substitute group work on timely issues provided by DA/JCS staff. This would keep the class up-to-date on what is really hot and provide an opportunity to give feedback/insight to DA and JCS.
- All officers should receive a Master's Degree as a result of the year’s studies (a Masters in Military Arts & Sciences if nothing else). Need more exercises to apply in a creative and dynamic way what we read—we spend too much time rehashing in class exactly what we read—we need lots of short application exercises. More emphasis on joint/combined warfighting skills—all should have the AWP course or a similar such course focusing on strategic and operational levels of war.
- Go to a graded system, place more emphasis on domestic issues and expand PPBS instruction.
- This is a very comprehensive program. At this level, senior officers need additional skills and knowledge, but especially social skills, for many senior officers have personalities of "pet rocks." At senior levels, they need to be able to work with the problem, not just the military approach where everyone says "yes sir."
- Get off the Civil War campaigning thing and into the modern age. Use more WWII and Korea case studies, and also LIC case studies. Look at Just Cause, Grenada, Desert Shield/Storm in detail. Bring in successful senior leadership and not just GOs. Bring in good Corps/Div Chiefs of Staff, good directors and department head from Pentagon, etc. More interaction is needed at the joint level.
- They need to focus more on process than product. They say that is their objective, but they don't do it. We need to
challenge each other’s thoughts and assumptions, as well as our own. Too often we just present results. There is not enough time on tasks. Maybe we have to be less broad and more deep. The content will change anyway. What remains is our ability to continue to confront uncertainty more effectively.

- The small group process is a powerful learning environment, but the power of the small group process is frustrated by the lack of group work, skilled processing of dynamics, and poor feedback and evaluation of ability to use oneself in a group process. All staffs need to be developed by a process of understanding the complexity of staff pluralism.

- More practical exercises or seminar learning about what really goes on inside the Army Staff, JCS and DOD. Many will go there for the first time when they leave AWC.

- More time on joint and combined warfighting skills.

- Make AWSP the 7th course in the curriculum. Eliminate one advanced course block.

- Cut out much of the human dynamics portion in Course 1 and expand Course 2 to get more specifics in strategic thinking.

- Many senior officers in the Army today do not understand what the term "total force" means--this is not just an AWC issue. The key here is understanding the Army’s components. If there is a destabilizing issue up on the front burner, this is one.

- AWSP should be a mandatory class. It emphasizes history, strategic and operational thought and lessons learned. Great course!

- Delete the writing requirements. Assign only one research project based on background, and allow a very short executive report with perhaps a brief to a flag officer.

- Leave more time to actually discuss current events and issues--plus past experiences in handling various scenarios. This year it seems we executed the curriculum despite what was taking place in the world.

- Less bullshit courses--more key guest speakers like the DCSOPS of the Army, CSA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, etc. Open dialogue between students and the key leaders. More field trips to places like Pentagon, White House, Major Command HQs, etc. Lastly, make more electives and less mandatory subjects--let students decide what they need to know and study.

- Drop academic format of MSP. Dramatically upgrade ADP support of AWC program. Hard to believe Course 2 does not have a sophisticated computer simulation that exercises decision makers reference the elements of power and competing demands on the NCA.

- More lecture/discussion of how (environment of senior leaders) to operate at the strategic level.

- More in-class reading. Guest lecturers and instructors to teach, not discuss.

- More depth, less breadth in several areas. More time for battle case studies. Exchanges with other War Colleges. Joint classes via teleconferencing (costs for this will drop with wide-band ISDN). Joint Army, Navy and AF seminar projects via computer modems.
- More leadership training and discussion.
- Bring the BGs and MGs to the seminar groups for 2 or 3 days, not for briefings, but for true exchange.
- Establish a General Officer School—all new BGs, from all services, attend a 1 year/6-month school on joint management. Teach strategic leadership to Generals, teach senior leadership to LTCS/COLs.
- Change the way in which the curriculum is presented—for the most part, the seminar sessions are reduced to lectures. Less structured time—students must study and present findings, lead discussions, etc.; need time to do that.
- Reduce number of lawyers, doctors, chaplains, finance, West Point PAPs and NG/RC officers. Who will provide major leadership and impact on the military? Not the above. Better utilization of skills/knowledge of attending students. Fewer lectures, more critical reasoning and seminar discussion. Less emphasis on "mile wide, 1/4 inch deep." Allow more electives in students’ area of expertise. Greater expectations from students.
- Teach operational art. Plan more campaigns. Fight plans on computer simulations.
- Spend more time on joint training and less time on advanced courses. Work on listening and communicative skills.
- Give us more courses and exercises on thinking strategically and critically.
- Study today’s problems -- don’t spent so much time on history lessons.
- Incorporate more simulation into the subjects. With advances in automation, every subject should be reinforced with simulation and/or graphics presentations. This would have the dual effect of enhancing the curriculum and of fighting computer illiteracy!
- Expand the ways graduates can "touch" USAWC -- generated reading summaries and other information through E-mail, message boards, etc.
- Need more travel to expose members to environment they or their contemporaries will be working in. A little more focus on this being a COL’s school for senior leadership rather than a General’s school. Focus a little more on what is expected at COL level rather than GO.
- Not sure.
- More time spent in seminars and time devoted to thinking, not just doing. Reduce paper requirements in favor of more open discussion. Shift focus of MSPs to a directed study of an area of concern to the military. Several students could work the same question -- but done individually -- no group MSPs.
- Give more practical training along the lines of the Force Integration Advanced Course. Roles and missions would help. We spent more time on strategic level in Course 1, and almost zero in senior level.
- More political involvement. Use students to study/solve Army problems instead of paying RAND Corp. et.al. Change the MSP system to one of action groups working on a specific problem as
above -- too much brain power being wasted on the "academic" effort of the MSP -- it has a very low payoff.

- Work to develop their military/political intellectual understanding. Improve their decision-making and reasoning skills, and hone their ability to use the written word, both for input and output.
- More open discussion in seminars on current and future issues.
- The school is on the right track. After assignments have been made, some effort for specialized work should be provided, e.g., pre-command course.
- More interaction with allies and area studies. More discussion and study of national interests and procedures to execute national military strategy.
- Implement TQM at AWC. Start with the faculty! TQM the course if you will and listen to student input.
- More reading and independent research. Perhaps more emphasis on strategic leaders of the past.
- Introduce a block of instruction on TQM to prepare line officers, most of whom have not been exposed to these concepts, but will by nature of their branches be the future senior leadership of the Army.
- Approach it more as a course in International Relations and Diplomacy, and Executive Management.
- More computer aided and new computer aided exercises which challenge the seminar or subgroups to develop solutions to strategic or operational issues using realistic parameters, and the diverse experience, background and knowledge of students.
- Reduce the course to 6 months. Focus on commandant lectures--have them two or three times a week (key is to insure excellent speakers/topics). Reduce faculty lecture time; increase student dialogue time. We learn more from each other than from faculty.
- End the "purely" academic requirements and bring in speakers who will present the right issues. As senior service college students we deserve more straight-forward presentations.
- Add civilian leaders/members to the class. Not civilian employees of the government or Reserve Officers, but members of business and civilian society. They must participate in seminars, not just guest lectures and not just during course 6.
- Better emphasis on the importance of courses 2 and 4. Somehow convince a bunch of people who are mostly concerned about commanding brigades that courses 2 and 4 are necessary and important.
- Too much time in unnecessary lectures and classes. If you want creativity and critical analysis you need to allow time for the student to read and think. We don’t have enough time to create our own interest and programs, and therefore, when we get to a job we won’t have the interest to continue to research and develop.
- Have more civilian faculty. Decrease the number of Army officers and increase the number of civilian, sea and air
officers. Don’t count the Navy and Marines as the same. Have more civilian speakers.
- Get a couple Pentagon COLs in to discuss their environment and challenges. Where is the JCS going/evolving?
- Discuss more about service and joint staff responsibilities, and how actions get accomplished at that level. Spend much more time on joint planning and support.
- Students need more time to think. Bill payer would be "less worthwhile" exercises and some speakers. A lot of the speakers do not hit the mark on what we need, but give a talk with which they are comfortable.
- Provide more instruction in development of higher order thinking skills.
- Include more courses in international relations and foreign policy, and case studies dealing with real issues graduates are likely to encounter after graduation. This institution is advertised as a "graduate school," yet many courses seem better suited for the advanced course or staff college curricula. No AWC graduate is going to be a platoon leader or company commander. Offer an expanded menu of advanced courses throughout the year and let the students choose. Reduce the "survey" offerings and give the students a chance and the time to really learn.
- Cancel the New York trip--save some money. The rest is about right.
- Less time spent in courses 1-3. It was repetitious. Increase advanced courses--learned more in these than I did in the 1st four months.
- Less bull shit discussions and more guided, objective commentary and responses. We need to stick to the course/class objectives!
- Spend more time on application exercises and reduce redundancy between lectures, readings and seminar discussions.
- Need more jointness.
- Use seminars to focus on specific challenges and make recommendations in the second half of the course.
- More history!! The AWSP should be the core of the AWC course. Less administrative procedures such as the POM cycle. Government administrative procedures change constantly; no two Army posts operate the same. However, an understanding of operational and strategic art will be learned at the AWC or not at all.
- Allow time for free thinking without the "penalty" of a written requirement. The advanced courses should be for the purpose of making "unsmart" guys smart, not to make smart guys smarter.
- Continue emphasis on high level planning and processes. Increase discussions at seminar level to capitalize on experience of others.
- Use simulations and role playing. Put the students in positions and give them practice in these simulations. Some of this is done now.
- Need to be a much greater (higher) mix of other services and Department of State civilians.
- Focus on development of the officers rather than accreditation of the problem. Tenure instructors as is done at West Point. Bring in successful GOs for interactive discussions—small groups.
- Be more flexible. For example, a crime is being committed by not having a formal program to collect Operation Just Cause experiences, observations and lessons learned. The Army will never have the opportunity that now exists at the AWC to collect this information in the future.
- Doing pretty well now. Debating forum would be useful.
- The Chairman and CSA should have a list of projects, questions, and actions that they require this (Eagles’ Nest) College to accomplish in the year we are here. These should be the MSPs, and we should have to brief our findings. Also, get the majority their assignments before we come so we can orient our additional studies to assist our new command.
- Establish a core curriculum that runs until Jan/Feb, then advanced courses that allow officers to get in depth knowledge in areas that are directly applicable to their next assignment.
- Should be shortened. Officers should be tasked as groups to study specific current problems and prepare recommendations for senior level decisions.
- Guest speakers who challenge the thinking of students in many different directions.
- Abandon MSP except as an elective. Require AWSP for all students. Ensure that instructors have in-depth knowledge of the subjects they are supposed to teach. Greater exchange of ideas with IFs.
- Write three times as many papers.
- More emphasis on unified and joint operations—specifically geared to CINC/MACOM/Pentagon staff assignments.
- Allow students more flexibility in selecting courses, i.e., reduce core subjects and expand advance courses. Spend less time on personality "feel good" courses (Course 1) and more time on critical thinking and concept presentation and debating skills.
- More emphasis on creative thinking!
- Need to make "warfighting courses" mandatory for combat arms officers. Allow tracking by permitting C, CS and CSS officers to take courses that better orient them to future assignments. Less "touch-feely."
- More war gaming and less detail-oriented activities like the week-long campaign plan ending Course 4.
- Work on faculty development: A one year apprenticeship, an expert in one course of instruction and an expert facilitator. Split focus between imparting knowledge and developing techniques for how to think. Challenge the student’s thinking process, not just what he thinks.
- Bring in officers as faculty members that are "fast burners" as opposed to those who retire from this institution.
General officers should level with us in their presentations and stop giving "Rotary Club" speeches where everything is going great and we’re working on the hard stuff. Their staffs don’t know everything and neither do we. We might have to work for these guys, so level with us if we are the "future leadership of the Army."

- USAWC does a great job and is on track. A well rounded education, a broad view of the military.
- Allow 1-2 weeks for officers to work in the Pentagon in offices they have not worked in. They could actually see the documents from the PPBES, etc.
- More wargaming at theater/national level. More role-playing (situational) theater/national level, on issues. Fix curriculum to allow more discussion time. Bring in controversial speakers to expose students to opposing views, i.e., something they are not routinely exposed to.
- More time for individual study and thought. More electives and more interface with the Pentagon. Fewer time killers like short papers and fruitless exercises.
- When students do research and write papers on current issues in the various courses, there should be time set aside to present their findings and discuss in the seminars.
- Select attendees on usefulness of curriculum to them, rather than as a ticket.
- Insure every officer leaving here understands in detail the costs associated with running an Army, and has an in depth understanding of the PPBS process. Teach both leadership and management.
- Could be a little more intense.
- Require greater in-depth individual historical study of the past. This would require moving away from some of the lectures and freeing up more study time for true study (expanded MSP, etc.). Also, more campaign planning exercises that take advantage of the new strategic leadership (wargaming) capability.
- Eliminate Course 1. Add logistics to Course 4.
- Provide a great deal of information on coalition operations and issues. Then work through different scenarios requiring people to think rather than react.
- Provide more training/education on joint operations and strategic thinking/visioning.
- More emphasis on war fighting!
- Visit selected foreign countries. More time in Advance Courses vice seminars. Offer regional studies during both advance course terms. Cut to 6 months and send in TDY status with full day classes.
- Doing fine now.
- I think the curriculum is challenging now, and if you put the effort into learning, it will adequately prepare you.
- Change the name from Army War College to Army Strategic Study Institute. What we study has little to do with war and a whole lot to do with pontificating.
- The current system works well.
- Two courses or more: (1) War fighting emphasis, senior leadership--LTC, COL. (2) Strategic leadership--MG, LTG.

- Demand more study and create more chances for group discussions. The school needs to provide more strawman positions to be reviewed by the students based on readings. We spend more time typing and getting a paper "published" then we do thinking about the subject matter. As an example, why are we creating 18 original regional appraisals on 6 different regions?

- Cut down on Course 2 and 3 subjects, they should be electives. Increase Course 5 subject materials; make AWSP a core course, add additional battles found in other electives. In addition to Libyan campaign, run Iran and Korea campaigns. Focus should be on identifying strategic objectives and translating them into campaigns and operations.

- Gain more time for important thinking courses by shortening Course 1 considerably, as well as Course 2 some. Add time to Course 3 and teach more detail. Spend all of Course 4 on the Libyan campaign and forget other discussions in seminar.

35. What characteristics identify an officer as someone who is a strategic thinker or who has "strategic vision"?

- Someone who has had early joint experience in their career.
- Someone who has had overseas assignments.
- Well read, open minded.
- Ability to build on little or no information.
- Understanding of world events, and relationships of domestic policy to overall policy.
- A knowledge of history, the past experiences; a well-rounded career that exposes an officer to the processes and needs of the military; the common sense and logic to look to the future.
- One who is willing to look beyond the easy and obvious, willing to break the paradigm.
- Someone who can look at the long range implications of a problem, see a solution, and convey that solution to others in a manner which focuses their attention toward that goal.
- The ability to quickly grasp the essence of the issue at hand versus the details or trivia.
- The ability to chart a course for the next 20 years.
- Someone who can see the whole forest rather than just a few trees at a time. Can visualize the big picture to include the political ramifications and the far-reaching effects--not just the short term results.
- Big issue focus, longer time line.
- One who can think in broad, creative terms about future conditions, situations, problems and solutions. One who does so continually. One who has the basic knowledge base to do so must be sophisticated, well-read and up on current affairs. One who
is good at brainstorming. One who is always on the lookout for opportunities amid problems and issues.

- Strong conceptual and analytical skills. A student of the operational art. A broad knowledge base.
- No longer just at the Army level. Is able to consider all aspects (finance, education, social, etc.) into the consideration. Can work with all services and the public.
- Reads a variety of literature, not just focused on a narrow view of history. Expresses bold, reflective opinions despite occasional wild shot. Nonconformist in views and thought. Recognizes current situation for what it is and believes that fundamental change is needed. Believes his view of the "world" is right and commits to it. Not terribly worried about career and self.
- The cogency of the questions they ask and of the justifications they can offer for their alternatives.
- An officer must have a disciplined mastery of the basics of the profession and the critical analytic skills to move from "eaches" to generalizations in order to create a strategic vision. Creativity is a disciplined process not a serendipitous one. Most officers here are not challenged to move beyond opinion to expert opinion, from a concrete level to more abstraction, and from detail to generalization.
- Can see the "big picture" while being able to focus on what needs to get done to keep the train moving in that direction.
- An officer who is able to conceptualize the application of military force to achieve national security objectives in a democratic society.
- Broad knowledge versus "technician."
- Has the big picture, looks beyond tomorrow and can talk the picture as well. Predicts the unknown and still be able to reflect on the realities of today. Stays out of the weeds. Can write about the vision (must be communicated). Recognizes the ends, ways and means realities.
- Looks "downrange." Quickly discerns 2nd, 3rd, etc. order effects. Creative thinker--discerns less than obvious potential. Proactive professional perspective.
- Always planning for the next iteration and anticipating 2d and 3d order effects--NOT down in the weeds on today’s problem.
- Intelligence, ability to write and speak (communicate), and common sense.
- See Clausewitz’s chapter on genius, Sun Tzu’s chapter on generalship and FM 22-103’s chapter on competencies.
- Breadth and depth of his intellectual and communicative skill regarding Army and U.S. interests, goals, policies and objectives.
- His position/job and his rank.
- One who is willing to break paradigms to seek appropriate ends.
- Flexible and creative, with good historical and social perspectives.
- There are some here who have the ability to think in these terms. But, just because they cannot at this time does not mean they will not progress towards higher level thinking in the future.

- A person who comes into a new assignment and clearly defines his immediate, intermediate and long-range goals (goals that exceed his expected time in the job) to his subordinates.

- Skilled at assessing and managing human and group dynamics. Intelligent, a student of history and a skilled communicator.

- Expertise in numerous areas. Politician, or political awareness. Adept managerial skills. Ability to motivate others to develop and evaluate numerous ideas. Luck.

- Bright, articulate and able to focus 5-7 years in the future.

- One who does not always talk about the past as if it was the greatest thing going.

- Strong knowledge base. Ability to recompose situation using different combinations of facts and situations. Ability to communicate ideas to others. Ability to have others feel that the "idea" is their own.

- Clear understanding of interplay between political, economic, and military elements of power. Ability/willingness to guide processes that will not necessarily bear fruit on his watch -- in other words, somebody whose leadership gets recognized long after the fact.

- Spend less time worrying about identifying those guys and more time provided to the guys selected for this school to do strategic thinking and visioning.

- Addresses issues from the broad, "National" view. Someone who understands what outside environmental issues impact most on strategic issues. Someone with a vision who also understands the day-to-day, step-by-step course of action to reach the vision. He must also be able to change his vision as the world situation changes.

- One who can separate the important aspects of a problem from the plethora of urgent aspects . . . then deal with what is truly important.

- Smart and intelligent. Experienced and well informed. Insightful. Common sense.

- Can picture the outcome. Can simplify the results into explainable, attainable goals. Sees the 2d and 3d order effects and anticipates corrective actions.

- Thoughtful and insightful. Defines his territory very broadly. Leaves minutia to others. Fault: probably gives vague guidance. This person is bold!

- A clear sense of where we are now, why change is necessary and of the Army, its component activities and its missions. The ability to stretch reality and possibility, and to see and articulate the end state desired.

- Concern with where the Nation/Army is headed. Ability to visualize different futures, not just the most probable. New
ideas of future forces and conflict. Innovative and aware.
- We are a product of our environment. If your responsibilities require strategic thought, "you are one--like it or not." Most heads of staff (COL level or higher) in EAC usually fit this bill.
- Well read and versed in issues open to discussion.
- I think "strategic vision" is a bunch of academic bullshit. Most of our leaders work at the senior level, and AWC ignores that level of thinking and vision entirely.
- Must have potential for complex intellectual activity. Must be creative and innovative, which is tough in our environment of conformity, rules, norms, and traditions. Must understand political arena. Flexibility.
- Intuition, innovation and desire for improvement. Willingness to question the usual way of doing business.
- Beats the heck out of me.
- High intellect, knowledge and a futuristic thinker.
- One that thinks and acts on the future, vice one who thinks but does not act. Innovator of sorts. Intelligence and common sense.
- Does not get bogged down in minutia but can give concise guidance to subordinates so they can focus more in depth. Is open minded and able to articulate the issues, and has an action plan to solve it.
- Tolerance, free thinking, and able to bend or break a paradigm. One who analyzes and thinks.
- I don't know.
- Ability to consider the political, economic, cultural and military factors which impact on the situation. Strategic vision is the above plus the ability to articulate the conflict resolution.
- An innovative thinker who does not merely accept the historically repeated party line or solution. What are the bigger issues, and 2d, 3d order effects.
- Thinker who has the general understanding of the results of the intended action. Strategic vision may not have thought of the results, just the act.
- Ability to predict and initiate actions based on second and third order effects. Ability to identify parallels in seemingly unrelated fields. Strong ethical base. Determination to achieve the best possible outcome.
- Able to see relationship of events and project their impact. Able to analyze trends and look ahead to anticipate how those trends will influence the future.
- The same characteristics that he possesses now, only the level of operation is different. If truth be known, military leaders, except maybe the Chairman, JCS, are not really in positions to be strategic leaders. They may think strategically, but have little influence to affect the course of events beyond their tenure in the military.
- Good question. I'm not convinced everyone can or should be a strategic thinker. Everyone can't implement his own
mission. Unless you’re the project designer, manager, or creator, you work to implement someone else’s vision. I’m not sure you could get "unity of effort" with individual visions.

- Patience; A cause/belief; Able to cause subordinates to believe in a position of power.
- Conceptualizer, open minded, in-depth thinker, broad perspective and long-term vision.
- Ability to project 2d and 3d order consequences.
- Looks to the future, identifies probable future possibilities, and identifies achievable and desirable goals to improve military position.
- The ability to not "micro-manage" his staff/unit. A thorough grounding in history as it relates to war.
- I haven’t a clue and I don’t think anyone else does either, but you know it when you see it. I don’t think this can be taught, must just recognize those who have it. Performance does not equate to vision.
- "Successful" completion of higher level command or staff jobs. "Successful" not being just survival, but obvious improvement of the organization and noted contribution to betterment of the service. Good military history background, and excellent command of all levels and forms of tactics, staff and joint operations. Risk taker.
- Willingness to let the "here and now" be done by others, while supervising discretely.
- Combination of knowledge and experience of operations, tactical through strategic, balanced with a sense of proportion and perception that understands the world and U.S. interests therein, and finally, our political process.
- One who thinks before he talks. An active listener, an avid reader and writer (one who writes for pleasure), witty, a good sense of humor, and evaluates ideas of others.
- I know what Course 1 tried to teach us--but I personally believe the idea of "strategic vision" is unadulterated B.S.
- Future oriented; innovative; able to see the big picture; broad spectrum of interests; willing to discuss unfamiliar topics and try new approaches.
- An officer with common sense who can identify, recognize 2d and 3d order effects of decisions, and select the "suite" of decisions or options that will most effectively and efficiently achieve the desired outcome.
- Ability to think 10-20 years out and see consequences of action or inaction.
- Knowing General Powell when he was a Lieutenant. Marrying the President’s daughter. It’s a tough one . . . Where is the similarity between Ike, Patton, Bradley and Marshall? Or Powell, Schwartzkopf and Abrams? Through a variety of weeding processes, along with other things that float, cream rises to the top.
- They think differently, they combine "models." Ability to see relationships between disparate subjects. Ability to visualize relationships between 2d and 3d order effects. They seem different, even odd.
- Broad base of knowledge of world affairs, and a firm expertise in military operations. Analytical, and respected for his ideas by other students sets the officer apart from others.
- Openness of one’s mind, creativeness, competence, courage, candor and commitment. Ability to think beyond the immediate . . 2d, 3d, 4th orders, and see the unseeable and think the unthinkable. Guts—a risk taker.
- Ability to digest large amounts of information, winnow it, and come to a workable solution to a problem. Adaptability. Ability to recognize and reward innovation.
- Ability to think problems through to their logical conclusions.
- Broad base of knowledge plus consistently good (feasible) ideas.
- The individual who can articulate and defend his view of a future end state.
- Broad knowledge and understanding of world events and how the U.S. military inter-relates.
- Able to look at the broad scope. Look at future and what it holds for nation as a whole. Able to look above Army/Service needs to better serve country as a whole.
- An ability to sustain a focus on long term goals while dealing with near term problems.
- Breadth, connectivity, orders of magnitude, and logic/reasoning.
- I don’t know, but if you come up with a good answer put a patent on it. A strategic thinker will form a vision. A person with a broad background/education. Knowledge is the foundation, it may not be just book knowledge, it may be just good common sense.
- Inquisitive, thoughtful and an insatiable curiosity.
- Smart and principled. Able to conceptualize and think out 30+ years, sometimes radically in current terms. Well read on a variety of issues, has a historical sense.
- Well rounded and well read. Not locked into "tactical" position, but able to understand relationships; big picture.
- It is very difficult to identify a "strategic" thinker unless he/she is in a position requiring those characteristics. There are very few "strategic" positions in the services. The strategic thinker must have: *A strong and independent intellect, *Be able to make decisions on their own cognizence, i.e., stand on their own, *Predict long term and 2d and 3d order effects.
- An ability to visualize something better than the status quo, and the path to get there.
- Has the ability to identify/understand requirements 10 years out.
- Ability to tie together many disparate elements into a cohesive plan. Understanding the synergy of events, and 2d and 3d order effects.
- This is a tough nut to define. Obviously, someone who can articulate intelligently a basis, truth or theme after having
studied and considered a complex issue. Someone who has the vision to see through the fog, smoke and clutter surrounding a broad issue.

- If he is able to look beyond the present budget cycle and address those issues that will stump the ODCSOPS, CSA, SECDEF, or President over the next 5-10 years. By addressing these issues, I mean that the implications of present or foreseeable trends are identified and recommended courses of action are provided.

- I am not sure you can identify someone early as a visionary thinker, especially at the LTC level.

- Not sure?

- One who understands the "big picture," our country's relationship with the world community, and a sound knowledge of our national interests and priorities.

- Sees big picture, not parochial, joint/combined focus, appreciates political dimension, long range.

- Can easily be identified as one who consistently plans for future operations/contingencies, yet is fully knowledgeable of current situation.

- Someone who is not afraid to challenge paradigms as we know them today, and is prepared to offer (suggest), backed up with reasonable criteria, how future events may unfold that can impact our Army and Nation's security.

- Hopefully the same characteristics we all possess; the ability to see past next week's training schedule, and to recognize and understand there is life above Battalion/Brigade.

- Well read, articulate, listener and innovative.

- Intuitive mind--no preconcieved or pat solutions. Objective thinker--takes in all the angles/options. Big picture oriented--ends, ways, means. Ability to communicate--no matter now good he is, if no one listens it's for naught.

- A person with a strong technical base who can attack his own ideas from other players' positions and therefore prepare a multifaceted approach as part of the commander's initial intent.

- Has studied operational level of war and geo-politics. Knows how to translate political objectives into military strategy.

- Probably an NP personality and a student of history or political science. Possesses high intellect probably in liberal arts, but not always. Able to communicate ideas and thoughts better than most.

36. How should USAWC and the Army identify and cultivate strategic thinkers/strategic thinking?

- Jointness needs to be stressed earlier in one's career (more emphasis at CGSC on this).

- Current system is good, selection process for AWC is correct and curriculum is generally right.

- Currency of readings and speakers are important.

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- Look for people who conceptualize, use logic and communicate ideas well--then you will find someone who has mastered the basics to envision new and futuristic possibilities, goals, and objectives.
- Closely monitor assignments, allow for civilian training.
- Beginning in CAS3, administer tests which evaluate long range planning skills and require the student to articulate their solutions for the problem and their methodologies for achieving those solutions. Recommend their subsequent assignment into operation/planning jobs (or command) to hone those skills.
- By exposure to someone who has it.
- More case studies on successful strategic analysis and not-so-successful strategic analysis and then spend some time on the whys and what could of.
- Cultivate--use problem solving drills.
- More short essay papers or in-class exercises to stimulate creative thought about solving tough issues in the current and future Army. Approach should be: What do you propose to do to handle this problem?
- Establish a second year program based upon standing in class during the first year--this would require a graded system. Second year devoted to studies, papers, and briefings to Army and DOD leadership based upon research of key strategic issues.
- Pick out the ones who can think in conceptual ways, the ones who have vision and look to the future (the big picture).
- Work up a psycho-evaluation similar to type A evaluation. Work up a program similar to AWS\P but instead focus on studying people with vision. Turn students loose to write their papers on their vision. Examine assignment history and interview former bosses. Did the officer practice conformity or innovation? Visiting think tanks would help as well.
- Teach the tenets and concepts of critical thinking and reinforce them. Unfortunately, these are the guys who make waves and who may do different things. These are not good ways to get ahead--this needs to change.
- Test past experience for level of cognitive capacity and ability to think about more complex issues along both parallel and divergent lines. How well does the officer decide what information is crucial, from what is extraneous or tangential?
- Expose as many as possible to the theory, practice and environment, and see who falls out. In reality you have very little influence on who makes it to the top, because of all of the various uncontrollable things that go into job selections and promotions ... unless of course you "hand pick" some officers at lower levels (2-year Leavenworth program) and groom them for GO--which I disagree with. It is unfair to the rest of the officer corps and many of those picked do not mature into the kind of officer you want for GO. Therefore, like children, all you can do is give them the best upbringing you can, teach them all you know, and hope for the best. The right ones will rise to the surface!
- Faculty instructors should identify those individuals from
their papers and classroom discussion. Consider adding an additional year to the War College for the further education of those demonstrating strategic thinking skills.
- Officer Professional Development: Mail out packages from AWC and Leavenworth to Majors and LTCs to stimulate them!
- More seminars for non-students, i.e., get a road show to visit AWC grads at the Pentagon, etc. for 3-4 day seminars.
- The Army should do it through the evaluation process in place. ID‘ing becomes more evident as one matures in their career; field grade assignments will isolate this talent. The AWC helps the Army cultivate—the exercises/work assignments must be designed to enhance strategic thinking.
- Writing requirements (thought, articulation, creativity). Job performance—innovation, creativity and ability to focus on longer term in spite of pressure to focus on short term.
- More emphasis on domestic and international issues which affect the national security of the country. Absolutely too much time is spent here on PPBS and campaign planning—much of which we will have to experience to really understand. Issues, trends, etc., and how to organize to meet them within the elements of national power is what stimulates the intellectual process—not 111 charts on how the strategic intelligence community works.
- Stimulate independent study/research. Encourage free thinking. Spend more time with students exchanging dialogue and ideas. Less time lecturing to students. Get away from structure toward more independent study!
- Exercises, exposure and contact with senior staffers and leaders.
- Start teaching the subjects during Advanced Courses and continue through AWC level.
- Perhaps written requirements on visions for the future—e.g., 20-25 years out. More encouragement for publishing papers.
- Writing assignments and comments from Flag/General officers.
- There should be a mix of tactical and strategic thinkers.
- Teach TQM—long term goals for the good of the Army over a period of time.
- Identify as early as possible in career (CGSC appears to be first academic opportunity). Reward with 2d year at Leavenworth (SAMS-type program). Rienforce at AWC with a 2d year program for those who continue to display excellence (possible PhD program). Identify as possible AWC faculty.
- Tough to do in a year. For many, it is there first time in this area/ Provide the exposure and assess their performance.
- Through academic training and progressive assignments at the strategic level. Working at the strategic level develops strategic thinkers more than schooling does.
- Refocus.
- At various points in an officer’s career, give diagnostic tests that measure those attributes required of a strategic thinker. Merge the results of the testing with the officer’s performance (from OERs). Those officers who are identified in
this manner should be advanced and nurtured.

- Can identify by looking in course papers, MSPs, and student seminar participation for someone with self-direction, innovative thought and maturity beyond the norm. Cultivate by getting them into key staff positions (CINC and J-Staff planners, etc.) where their skills can have direct effect; then hire them back to USAWC for key academic chairs.

- Exercises and travel.

- I'm not sure you can identify a strategic thinker. To me a strategic thinker is developed by placing him in an environment where strategic thinking is needed. Most of us will grow there. The Army grows tactical leaders and thinkers for 15 years, then moves them to a strategic level assignment. In this assignment, at DA, or Joint level, most do well. Experience is still the best teacher.

- More time to think and exchange ideas -- less time spent demonstrating our writing abilities.

- Get officers with potential immersed in jobs requiring strategic thought earlier. Starting at 20 years service is too late.

- I think they are fairly on track. I'm still not sure a leader and thinker can be trained as much as an individual who already possesses the qualities and is just refining skills.

- Very difficult. Perhaps identify the smart kids in joint and higher level staffs who show a propensity for strategic thinking in their staff work, then groom them. This is probably not possible in the Division/TO&E field environment. Not all General officers have vision!

- By developing curriculum opportunities that facilitate the above listed senses and abilities.

- Again, through papers and discussions that center on those topics/functions.

- Not USAWC's job! This is not necessarily a great idea--smells like "great skillers" all over again. The cream will rise to the top in time.

- More papers on issues (point papers with presentation to seminar, with follow on discussion and debate). Ungraded -- issue is to develop thought, debate, discussion, and interchange of ideas on our national interests.

- This question implies, "how should USAWC/Army identify its future senior leaders." We ought to first identify those jobs (Joint/Army) which require "strategic leaders," then orient or find senior leaders who possess the necessary skills to fill those jobs.

- Push analytical thinking. "School solutions" should be thrown out (if they even exist today). We must think "external," not Army or even DOD.

- The AWC should identify those students who seem to have the characteristics noted in question 35, and should specifically emphasize those points in the academic OER.

- The USAWC should be the place to identify strategic thinkers or people with the most potential. The College program
should be set up to cultivate the strategic thinker as stated in question 33, 34. Every graduate should have to go to an assignment at Corps or above, preferably a joint assignment, DA Staff, OSD, State Department, NATO, etc. Division staff officers should not be MEL-1. After the College graduates need to get out of the warfighter mode for awhile and develop strategically.

- Tough to identify in an academic environment--maybe not an AWC function. Cultivate--expose students to strategic issues.
- The Army can identify strategic thinkers via OERs. Again, USAWC has no business attempting the same. Let field commanders sort out the visionaries of the world; USAWC should merely educate.
- Bring in the hard issues and use the "student body" as a think tank. Tune us in to the issues being worked in the Army--we do have "a need to know."
- There is currently no system to cultivate strategic thinkers.
- Through the writing requirements--realizing that this may be an incomplete method. Some strategic thinkers may not be able to put their thoughts on paper.
- Teach the factors in question 35. Develop wargaming which first causes military officers to think through the strategic issues before applying military resources. We're responsible for the application of military power--we must have a say in the appropriateness of the decision. If you want to cause strategic thinkers to question the use of military power, how about, "No More Iraqs!"
- Continuously refining the current program.
- Set up problems and work the results with all aspects of economic, military and political input. Discuss more of the political and military processes in problem solving.
- AWC may not be able to identify effectively. Cultivation should be pursued.
- Provide exercises which supply data, and require USAWC students to use data to project a probable future scenario. Use instrument of evaluation to determine level of strategic thinking development.
- Our profession is politically constrained to allow military leaders to operate at a strategic level. Therefore, the term "strategic thinker" as it applies to the military must be viewed with limitations. Bottom line; Unless the military strategic thinker can elevate his ideas beyond the military and translate them into long term policy, the military can offer no strategic thinkers in the true sense. Unless one can be a cogent force in the development of both political and economical policies as well as military doctrine, the military thinker will remain within the esoteric boundaries of his profession.
- Probably by OER evaluations.
- These leaders are known amongst their peers. Focus course as stated above.
- On-the-job evaluation. Calculated, not haphazard position assignments.
- Don't. Produce graduates and don't attempt to identify any sub-set of strategic thinkers. The overall program should be focused in this direction.
  - Schools, SSI, etc.
  - Expand exchange of ideas in seminars.
  - Terminate the SAMS program. Majors need to accrue troop unit experience. Establish a SAMS-type program for senior LTCs. Division and Corps G3s and assistant G3s strategic level thinking cannot be developed without at least 20 years of military experience.
  - I think those that become strategic thinkers do so in spite of the "system." We don't allow time for strategic thinking. We catch some guy thinking and we say he's goofing off! I don't believe you can produce a strategic thinker, but after you find one, let him think.
  - I doubt that "strategic leaders" can be identified at the USAWC--they will actually develop and rise to the top through assignments and interaction with peers.
  - Expose students to creative thinkers on a personal basis.
  - Ask their peers!
  - Must start process in ROTC, etc, and continue at Basic, Advanced Course, and CGSC. The best way to develop strategic thinking is by sending people to school! Need to continue pushing the reading program.
  - Revise OER and promotion systems. Battalion and Brigade commanders are not necessarily strategic thinkers. Need another track for those who fall into this category.
  - Give us realistic projects that demand strategic thought, i.e., actions that are real life today and required. Actions that demand expertise, systematic analysis and integration of many complex issues. They are out there, we need to find them, get them assigned to the War College for action and produce products we know we are capable of. Instead, what we find here is what has been characterized as "CAS3 for Colonels." We need to put all this expertise to work for the Army, not for the Dickinson English Department.
  - Encourage and subsidize "free spirits." Add a box in OERs where the rater and senior rater place the individual on a scale from strongly traditional to highly innovative. Encourage study and reading of classics in all the liberal fields (history, philosophy, politics, etc.).
  - Concentrate more on analytical thinking and decision making models.
  - Break the paradigms of conservative, structured thinking.
  - Develop a psychological test to identify potential students. Reward the schoolhouse--don't penalize theorists. How many USAWC faculty go on to General Officer decision maker positions? It appears that in normal circumstances, assignment to AWC faculty is a sign that that person will not make G.O.
  - Add more rigor to the course.
  - Can't answer for USAWC. Don't think the strategic expertise is here in enough quantity to identify (can cultivate
through the POI). Army’s only way is through selection boards (promotion, schools and, potentially, joint planner/JSO boards).

- USAWC faculty should identify strategic thinkers.
- Instructors track class performance and identify those who excel.
- Absolutely.
- Focus on forcing the student to come to closure on complex issues and laying out why he has taken that position—how did he reach the position he articulates?
- I don’t think strategic thinkers can be readily identified by a set of characteristics. They are identified by performance called for by the situation—you can identify them after the fact. Instead of trying to build a profile to be matched by individuals, USAWC should maintain an environment that fosters strategic thinking to allow these individuals to develop. George Marshall was not identified as a strategic thinker early on. He was recognized as a highly motivated and reliable officer who could perform in the environment called for by his assignment.
- Through a well rounded education, not through tested pressure that produces knowledge of only the information to be tested.
- USAWC can evaluate from papers and class participation, but those officers that are good at strategic vision and enjoy that type of work will identify themselves.
- Don’t ID, it’s too speculative and perhaps open to bias. Cultivate by challenging officers to think long-term, think radically in a benign environment. By that I mean don’t criticize someone for an apparent hair-brained idea, e.g., if someone had suggested there would be manned space flights to/from earth to the moon/planets just 50 years ago?? Get divergent views into the War College! Get far thinkers to lecture here; folks who are focusing, for example, on space, environmental, population issues, etc., out 50 years (scientists, scholars, etc.). Cut out the B.S. and time-wasting classes. Give students a reading list, “here it is, read it if you want, be prepared to discuss it if you want.” Give students more library time to just read this stuff. More strategic level exercises.
- Schools coupled with the OER system. Emphasis on CAS3, CGSC, AMSP and AWC.
- Perhaps selection to the USAWC is an indication of this potential. The environment here does expose those who clearly have a larger capacity for independent thought than others, but does not provide an environment to identify easily those strategic level thinkers.
- Find _NTPs at the CTP/MAJ levels.
- A good question—it’s beyond me.
- Present options, give examples—don’t think you can effectively "identify" it.
- If this is our sole objective (which I don’t believe it to be), we should focus more on individual reading, study and group discussion here.
- Im many cases, strategic thinking occurs only when the job
at hand demands/requires it. That is to say, many strategic thinkers will not be known unless stressed. The Army does a good job of sending the right people to the War College. What must be done at the College and other SSCs is to require strategic thinking and problem solving (on either real-world or imagined/hypothetical issues), followed by thoughtful critique by peers and instructors where learning can take place without people's lives or nations futures depending on the outcome.

- The classroom is a good place to learn the concepts, but not so good to apply them. Working in the environment is the only way.
- Work with psychologists to come up with some sort of testing device to identify those personnel who possess strategic visioning talents. Once identified, they should receive additional training in this area.
- Maintain the status quo.
- Army doing a good job now. AWC should not play a part--too easy to make a mistake when judging academic ability alone.
- To cultivate this would require research and a required paper with creative thought on a topic of interest/expertise that may unfold to surprise us. For example, how to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of irrational leaders.
- I think the Army has done pretty well over the past 200+ years in looking out. If we all aren't thinking strategically at this point, it will show shortly. Don't think we need a "strategic pontificator" skill identifier tacked on to our specialty.
- When you think you've got one make sure its in his/her record. The mentor, superior, FI, etc. must communicate this up the ladder so the appropriate boards, etc. will carry 'em up.
- Isn't that what they are supposed to be doing now? Reduce class size and eliminate the civilians and FIs who take away or hold down the discussion more than they raise it up.
- Teach strategy instead of domestic politics and economic themes. Cultivate "warfighting" skills required of CINCs and their staffs.
- Not sure it can be done in the time allowed in a career, given all the things one must do to succeed. Early testing for various character traits could be a way to identify potential. Assignment at higher levels early could help, but requires institutional thinking change.

37. Additional comments and/or suggestions.

- Don't forget the basics--we must never lose sight of the importance of taking care of soldiers.
- Need more readings on how the Army sees the future (Army 2010, etc). We need to read and discuss implications in seminars.
- Need senior Army leaders to talk more candidly to class about their views of the long-term future—vision, projected conditions/issues, problems, solutions and challenges. Help us think creatively by suggesting an array of questions or issues to be articulated.

- All students at the AWC know their profession, now we need a wide variety of information as we are receiving. But now we need social and communication skills—we have too many senior officers who know nothing except work and have the personality of a "pet rock." With that kind of leadership, the public will put us out of business for they will not understand us.

- AWC is mired in a lockstep, six-course system. There is little room for original thought or debate. When you spend weeks examining a PPBS line and block chart that departs from memory the day after, what is the objective? Same with ethics; why? A 45 year old senior officer is either ethical or not. AWC is not going to change that. There ought to be more Navy, Marine, USAF faculty, plus foreign officer faculty. They should teach courses along the lines of regional appraisals, except that every student would rotate through each service course.

- I am amazed that there is so little analyses of the military from the perspective of other disciplines. Little appreciation for the differences from, and similarities to other professions. The conformist is rewarded, not the original thinker. Still have officers looking for the school solution. More than one solution seems just unacceptable. School places too much emphasis on procedures like PPBES rather than rationale for why it was built that way and for what purpose. School and Army rely on threat too much, need more examination of national interests.

- DA should give students assignments before arrival at AWC—then students could concentrate on areas relevant to their follow-on jobs/specialties.

- Modify/simplify the core curriculum and expand the advanced course program. Task students in advanced courses to work issues that SSI is working!

- Provide curriculum outline, by number of hours, for each student to review and comment upon.

- The War College and its curriculum is only a starting point. The Army leadership that exists must decide to shape the future by placing graduates in positions of authority.

- Need to break the mold and make faculty assignments rewarding!

- Good survey! Some would think it too long/too hard to complete— they would be the ones who wouldn’t do well on the identification method described in question 36.

- I don’t believe the higher levels of the officer corps are selected because they are "strategic thinkers." In part, I feel that most General officers are not. They’re just successful officers. But, they move into strategic positions— their bright staffs save them, generally. You will not be able to change this because of the Army culture!
Successful senior leaders in our Army possess vision, and the ability to analyze and deal with complexity. Of course, some do it better than others--some are very visionary and they need to be placed into positions that require that kind of vision. I'm not sure you teach strategic vision/strategic thinking--I do think that you can work on being open minded, creative, etc. But creating a course of instruction which takes former Battalion Commanders and makes them strategic thinkers is academic nonsense.

- All efforts should be made to raise the standards for the USAWC to a masters degree.
- We've got to learn how to work better with the Congress.
- More time for students to think is really an important item to me. AWC might consider a post-graduate writing program.
- Don't reinvent the wheel. Don't necessarily try to get more out of us. Simply follow the established objectives closer.
- Expand and make mandatory the AWSP. Use it as the core of the AWC course. Measurably increase computer simulations. Professor Jay Luvaas is one of the AWC's major assets! He contributes on a par with any two or three other instructors that I have had during the course.
- I believe the school, with few exceptions, is doing a great job. You certainly are for me. However, I think you are trying too hard on this strategic thinking business. Our system does not support it and perhaps that's because it can't.
- Enforce weight standards--AWC is supposed to be the best of the best.
- Basically the AWC experience is good. Writing for the sake of writing should be avoided. Students should be encouraged to write, but not be forced to write.
- The CG should meet (have breakfast/lunch) with selected students weekly/monthly to get the pulse of the class. He should do same with selected faculty members.
- If the Army want strategic thinkers, it will have to, as a corporate body, protect those who do not fit the "professional officer" model. It must encourage free thinking.
- Publish the results of this survey and other product improvements in the form of feedback to all students. This will perhaps provide additional insight into our "strategic vision" of where the USAWC should be going.
- USAWC needs mandatory instruction on RC.
- USAWC is a great place to learn and grow. It's no vacation--you get out of it what you put in. Not only do I have my required courses, but I also have the flexibility to obtain an MBA, take computer courses, attend lectures, and audit AWSP and other electives like the writing program. I also feel free to contribute time to Scouts, children's sports, EFMP and support my seminar sports program. Yes, even see the family now and then. I leave the USAWC feeling good, educated. I could not have done all of this in a tested environment. I would have spent all (100%) of my time trying to be #1. I would have accomplished none of the other. Who then is the winner?
- I would like to see the War College require work on real
world problems; evaluate Army plans, or attack actual problems in
the Army.
- I'm unsure as to whether you can cultivate strategic
thinking or whether some are born with it as a gift. The broader
the education, the broader the vision in many cases. A true
strategic thinker can think through situations that are foreign.
He doesn't need a pattern or an historical example to copy.
Those things are points of departure from which a "new"
conclusion/plan is born. Milton Hershey is a good example of a
non-historian, non-USAWC graduate who had great strategic vision
for the chocolate industry. He is said to not have had a formal
education or even read a book other than the bible, yet he had
vision.
- Post-USAWC refresher program, training or briefings.
- Highly recommend that students be placed in 4-6 man study
teams with a faculty instructor or SSI person to act as
facilitator/group leader. These teams should tackle a real world
issue and provide conclusions/recommendations within 30 days.
That would develop concrete approaches to over 400
issues/problems per year. The end product should be a background
paper (unspecified length, not to exceed 20 pages), a fact sheet
or position paper (not to exceed 3 pages), and a briefing with
charts and script.
- Good luck. Overall, I think the course here is fairly
challenging and does a good job of broadening our thought
processes.
- As much as we've written, studied, etc., we should earn a
Master's Degree in "Politico-Military" studies or some such
title. USAWC needs to make this happen and make it retroactive
to our class!
- A hard challenging course is better than a "best year of
your life" approach. Example, most officers will say they
learned more in CAS3 than they did at their advanced course. Why
can't the War College be more than it is?
- We don't have a General Staff academy. This school should
be our senior Army school, and the best joint school it can be.
It should not be political science 101 and 102.
- Stop being afraid of school solutions. As an example,
show us what a strategic appraisal should look like. We're smart
enough to take a critical view of it and form our own ideas.
Sometimes a start point helps.
ENDNOTES


3Harry P. Ball, Of Responsible Command (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC Alumni Association, 1983), 52. Bell’s work serves as the primary resource for this paper’s background. An excellent historical record, this work is the result of a thorough compilation of information gathered from letters, memos, orders, lectures, etc., most of which are on file at the Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA.

4Ball, 107.

5Ibid., 115.

6Ibid., 116, Wotherspoon’s experience with the Class of 1908 impressed upon him that the qualifications posed a greater problem that the composition of the class by grade and arm of service.

7Ibid., 162.

8Ibid., 249.

9Ibid., 251.

10Ibid., 371.

11Ibid., 463.


13The culmination of these studies is best summarized in the Dougherty Report. In all, the Report recommended 11 different actions. With regard to curriculum, the report recommended a core curriculum addressing four areas: (1) An understanding of the decision-making process within the DOD, (2) The formulation of national security policy, (3) Management skills and selected analytical techniques, and (4) The study of the national and international environment. Dougherty Commission Report, Recommendations . . . regarding Professional Military Education in

14 U.S. Congress, 1-3.

15 Ball, 333.

16 Ibid., 465.

17 Ibid., 361.

18 Ibid., 479.

19 Curriculum Pam, 4-7.

20 Curriculum Pam, 2.


22 Curriculum Pam, 2.

23 George B. Forsythe, "The Preparation of Strategic Leaders," PARAMETERS, VOL XXII, No. 1 (Spring 1992), 44.


25 USGAO, 5.

26 Panel, 6.


29 Ball, 114.

30 Donald F. Bletz, COL, USA (Ret), Wilson College, to MG William Stofft, Commandant, USAWC, 9 January 1992, USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

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