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THE DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE
PARTNER IN NATIONAL SECURITY

BY

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The Diplomatic Security Service - Partner in National Security

The Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) is the United States Department of State's security operational arm. Its activities influence and support national security. Due to its low profile, it may be relatively unknown to the senior leadership of other US government agencies. This paper describes the organization and its purpose. DSS history shows the evolution from quiet beginnings to today's partner in national policy. DSS involvement in national security situations is illustrated using several past headline events such as the 1989-90 Liberian Civil War, Nelson Mandela's visit to the US in 1990, 1989 USA-USSR Presidential Summit in Malta, Assistance to Columbia in the Drug War, Beirut, 1977 Return of the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary, and selected espionage cases. An analysis of DSS actions in Desert Shield/Storm highlights global DSS activity taken in the protection of American interests world wide. Lessons were learned from this crisis environment and applied to further refinement of operational capabilities. The paper concludes by suggesting ways DSS can assist other agencies having national security missions, including Federal law enforcement agencies and the Department of Defense.
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THE DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE - PARTNER IN NATIONAL SECURITY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

National security may be described as protection of the nation’s people and territories against physical assault. In that narrow sense, national security is roughly equivalent to the traditionally used term, defense. It also has a more extensive meaning than protection from physical harm; it implies protection, through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of the state.¹

American national security involves most US Government agencies. Participation in security affairs varies from policy formulation, to policy execution, to the provision of service such as the protection of national interest. The United States Department of State (DOS) plays a key role in national security, specifically in the international arena. Within DOS, the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) has the mission of providing a secure environment for the conduct of American diplomacy and the promotion of American interests world-wide. Its activities effect not only national security interests, but also other US government (USG) agencies involved in the process.

DSS does the job quietly. It performs the mission by operating in over 140 international locations and in 22 American cities.
The Service neither has nor seeks the public profile of some of its colleague organizations such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Secret Service (USSS), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), United States Customs Service, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), etc. It therefore enjoys the advantage of being able to carry out its many responsibilities without fanfare. This anonymity may make DSS relatively unknown to some key decision makers. Mission accomplishments have not been without costs, as DSS personnel have been killed and injured in the line of duty.

The comments of Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, made on the occasion of DSS’ 75th Anniversary, describe well the DSS role:

The success of American foreign policy in the 20th century, beginning in World War I and culminating in our recent cold-war victory, has been fully mirrored by the success of our Diplomatic Security Services. The secret of DSS’ success has resided mostly in its adaptability to changing threats and missions, ranging from passport fraud to counter-espionage, and from protecting information and communications to counterterrorism.

It is an unfair fact of life in the security field that failures gain the widest possible attention. Success, on the other hand, is almost impossible to measure because it is to be found in threats which never materialized, and in events which never took place. Ultimately, however, we can measure the success of Diplomatic Security in the very fact that our overseas profile remains as vigorous and as robust as ever, in spite of the formidable dangers which continue to confront the Service.

We will, however, face new kinds of threats to our personnel and to the integrity of the work we do overseas in the form of growing instability, weapons proliferation, continuing terrorism and ever fierce economic competition. In other words, we will continue to depend on a Diplomatic Security function which is as innovative and successful as it has proven this past 75 years.2
The purpose of this paper is to inform senior leadership about DSS. The history of the Service is presented to provide an explanation of influences which led to today’s organization. DSS involvement in some past headline events will serve to illustrate its contributions to the national security. An examination of DSS actions in Operation Desert Shield/Storm is presented from both the Washington (Headquarters) and field perspectives. This analysis will show the wide range of DSS capabilities, its interaction with other government agencies and the private sector, its accomplishments, areas which required improvement, and lessons learned. The paper concludes by offering suggestions on how DSS can be of assistance to the national security leadership in carrying out policy objectives. A detailed organization description is provided in Appendix I to explain the DSS spectrum of operations.
Looking Back - 75 Years of Security

To understand an organization comprised of Special Agents, Security Engineers, Couriers, US Marines, US Navy Seabees, and specialized support staff, and to appreciate its extensive responsibilities, from physical security to counterintelligence and counterterrorist programs, it is necessary to be acquainted with its history. DSS was established 75 years ago with a small group of agents and today is a pro-active team of over 2800 professionals.

Quiet Beginnings

The security function within the Department of State was formally established in 1916 by Secretary of State Robert Lansing and was called the Office of the Chief Special Agent, Secret Intelligence. Mr. Joseph Nye was the first Chief Special Agent (CSA), and headed the organization. The office consisted of the CSA, eight Special Agents, and several "dollar-a-year" men (businessmen, lawyers, and other professionals) who volunteered their services. Nye, who also had the title of Special Assistant to the Secretary, reported directly to Lansing on special matters and conducted sensitive operations, especially on foreign agent activities in the US.

The Office of the Chief Special Agent was such a hush-hush organization that the CSA drew his operating funds from a confidential account and paid his agents by personal check. For years, there was
no office listing in the State Department or in the phonebook. Working out of Washington, D.C. and New York City, the agents conducted activities throughout the US and overseas.³

Prior to America's entry into World War I in April 1917, Secretary Lansing directed Nye to tap the German Embassy telephones. One important result of the tap was early knowledge of the Zimmerman telegram. The telegram indicated German intentions to begin unrestricted submarine warfare on neutral shipping on February 1, 1917, and proposals to invite Mexico and Japan to join Germany in a wartime pact against the its enemies. Nye informed the Secretary, in advance, that the German Ambassador, during an official call on January 31, 1917, would announce his government's policy to launch unrestricted submarine warfare on neutral shipping, which included the US, the next day. Lansing notified President Wilson. History suggests this information was a key factor in Wilson's decision to ask Congress for a Declaration of War, after opposing it as a matter of policy.⁴

The CSA's information was the first US Government knowledge of Germany's intentions. The message had earlier been intercepted by the Office of British Naval Intelligence in London on January 17, 1917. Upon decoding, Rear Admiral Sir William Reginald Hall, Office Director, decided, for political reasons, not to inform anyone in his government until the telegram was publicly known on February 1, 1917.⁵

During World War I, the CSA's office was responsible for interning and exchanging diplomatic officials of enemy powers, and assisting in screening people repatriated from enemy-controlled areas.

In 1918, Congress passed legislation requiring passports for
Americans traveling abroad and visas for aliens wishing to enter the US. The CSA's office began investigating passport and visa fraud. Special agents also began protecting important visitors to the US.6

The Inter-War Years

During the early 1920s, the CSA reported to the Office of the Under Secretary of State. The CSA's office was used not only for direct security work within the Department, but in aspects of immigration control and crime suppression on the high seas. It conducted fraudulent passport investigations under the direction of the Passport Office. In 1927, the CSA again became attached to the Secretary's office. At the end of World War I, there were 25 agents, but a decade later, only six remained.7

Shortly after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the US became concerned with communism and its stated purpose of overthrowing all existing governments, including that of the US. As a result, passports were refused to American communists who desired to go abroad for indoctrination, instruction, and revolutionary training. This policy continued until 1931, when Secretary Stimson reversed the previous rulings. Thereafter, until World War II, no one was refused a passport simply because of communist affiliation.8

Despite Stimson's ruling, fraud statutes still required anyone seeking a passport to properly identify himself and the purpose for travel. The result was that a large number of American Communists and Soviet Agents who obtained false or altered passports were brought to court or hindered in their activities through cooperative efforts of the CSA's office, the US Postal Inspectors, the FBI, the Department of Justice, and various police departments around the US.9
In addition, a ring of professional gamblers who operated on the Atlantic run of most steamship lines was broken up by the CSA, through prosecutions for passport fraud.\(^\text{10}\)

In the 1930s, it became clear that there were major world-wide passport fraud activities involving both communists and fascists. The CSA's office, working with the the Passport Office, exposed several of these subversive operations. In many of these cases, the passport aspect was incidental to a larger problem - Soviet and German espionage networks. In New York City, a passport fraud investigation led to the discovery of a Soviet Intelligence network that, in turn, revealed a number of Soviet agents and American Communist Party members engaged in espionage activities. This exposed, for the first time, the existence of such operations.\(^\text{11}\)

During the period 1936-1937, some 2,000 persons left the US to participate in the Spanish Civil War. Most were Americans who obtained passports through applications which stated they were going to other countries for other purposes. Investigations indicated the passports of these "volunteers" (except those of leading Communists) were collected upon arrival in Spain, allegedly for safekeeping at Loyalist Headquarters. Actually, they were sent to the Soviet Union for use by Soviet Agents.\(^\text{12}\) It should be noted that the Spanish Loyalist cause was very popular among anti-fascists in all the western democracies. Not all "volunteers", most of whom served in the George Washington and Abraham Lincoln Brigades, were communists.

Through investigations, the CSA's office had close relations with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Customs, Office
of Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence Service, and Civil Service Commission. Active liaison was also maintained with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and New York City Police Department.\textsuperscript{13}

The CSA continued to be responsible for protective security arrangements of visiting heads of state. As the 1930s closed, the CSA Office had 12 field offices and a staff of 40 employees.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{World War Two and Post-War Years}

When America entered World War II, the CSA Office expanded to 200 agents in order to manage the internment and exchange of Axis powers diplomatic officials and screening of Americans, or those claiming American citizenship, who were forced to leave occupied territories.\textsuperscript{15}

David Brinkley, in his book \textit{Washington goes to War}, mentions State Department agents' activities with regard to interning of German, Italian, and Hungarian diplomatic officials in West Virginia and North Carolina.\textsuperscript{16} Japanese diplomats were transported to a location in Arizona. For security reasons, their whereabouts were kept secret. Not even the FBI knew, despite their best efforts to find out. The entire operation was organized and conducted by the CSA.\textsuperscript{17}

Eventually exchanges of diplomatic personnel were negotiated between the US and Axis governments. The CSA organized every step of each exchange, from locating the diplomats requested by the Axis to transporting them to the exchange locations. Axis diplomats and American counterparts were exchanged in Lisbon, Portugal. Japanese officials and American counterparts were exchanged at Lourenzo Marques (now called Maputo), Mozambique (then a Portuguese colony).\textsuperscript{18}
During the war years, the CSA's main activities were investigations regarding communist and fascist subversive activity, including infiltration of legitimate organizations, establishment of questionable front organizations, and identification of hard-core organizers, interested contributors, or unwitting participants.

In 1945, five wartime agencies (approximately 3000 employees) were brought into the Department as permanent elements. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius undertook a complete reorganization of the Department which directly affected the CSA's office. The Secretary requested the FBI review and make recommendations in the areas of physical and personnel security. One result of the FBI report was the separation of security and investigative functions in the CSA's office. In 1946, the Office of Controls was created for overall command, and a designated Security Officer was appointed. The Security Office established a program for Regional Security staffs in the US and missions abroad. Within two years, 26 security officers were assigned to embassies in countries with hostile political environments. Most of these countries had communist governments.

In 1947, the Office of Security was merged with the CSA's Office as a separate branch and in 1948, was upgraded to form the Division of Security (SY) under the direction of the Office of Controls. During this time, the Foreign Correlations Office, an intelligence service, was added to SY and the Marine Security Guard (MSG) program was inaugurated at US Embassies. SY increased to approximately 250 agents, with a proportionate increase in security responsibilities. Most new personnel were former World War II military officers who
had counterintelligence backgrounds and spoke a foreign language.  

As the '40s ended, the FBI developed information about Soviet penetrations of the US Government during the period 1939 to 1946. The FBI reports contained the names of several State Department employees, including those of Whitaker Chambers and Alger Hiss. SY assisted the FBI in the subsequent investigations. These investigations, combined with Senator Joseph McCarthy's allegations that over 200 State Department employees were communists, created an environment of suspicion about the State Department.

In response to demands for investigations, SY grew in size and responsibility. Approximately 90% of SY activities were devoted to personnel security/evaluations because of the Hiss investigations, McCarthy hearings, and other allegations concerning the Department. It should be noted that McCarthy's allegations were found to be false, but due to his demagogic style and the Cold War hysteria of the times, the nation's interest and attention were "captured". These developments led the Secretary to declare all positions sensitive and to require every employee to have a full field investigation and a top secret clearance. SY continued dignitary protection and criminal investigation activities.

The advent of the post-World War II "Cold War", together with the addition of the new diplomatic posts and increase in the Foreign Service, created a need for an intensified world-wide security program. A Special Assignments Staff (SAS) was created to investigate possible employee personal misconduct and contact with foreign intelligence services. This Staff worked closely with CIA.
and FBI counterintelligence. SY discoveries of listening devices at the US Embassy in Moscow were the catalyst for developing electronic surveillance detection technology. One such episode, which received world attention, will be describe in the next chapter. By the end of the '50s, hundreds of such devices, planted by foreign intelligence services, were found in US embassies. Greater emphasis was placed on personnel, physical, and technical security.

By the late '50s, SY expanded domestically to 20 field offices and had added to its overseas presence at various strategic foreign diplomatic posts located in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

Reacting to the crisis in hostile electronic surveillance, SY upgraded its technical security program and hired engineers (electrical, mechanical, etc.). Assignment of US Navy Seabee teams to search for microphones in our Moscow and Warsaw Embassies led to the establishment of a regular program within the Department.22

In 1960, SY assumed security responsibility for State Department domestic facilities. This included information security, building passes, and physical security of buildings. In 1961, SY Agents discovered an American diplomat betraying secrets to the Polish Intelligence Service. SY actions led to his arrest, conviction, and imprisonment. This incident will be described in the next chapter.

In 1962, the security function was transferred to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration and was headed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security. His function was to administer the Department's physical, technical and personnel security programs; provide investigative services in support of passports, visa,
munitions control, and other activities of the Department; maintain liaison with domestic security and law enforcement agencies; and protect the Secretary, visiting Chiefs of State (until 1970), and other high-level foreign government officials, as directed.23

In 1968, during the Tet offensive in Saigon, SY Agents repulsed Viet Cong (VC) attacks on the residences of Ambassadors Bunker and Komer and helped in counterattacks against the VC at the US Embassy.

In the late 1960s, SY field offices, which had grown to 40, were realigned into seven field offices and 15 resident agent offices. The first female special agents were hired during this period.

The Terrorist Era

Beginning in the late '60s, several US ambassadors and Department officials were kidnapped or assassinated. These actions highlighted the exploitation of US diplomats for political purposes. SY initiated in-depth security programs at overseas missions in high risk locations and increased its protective capabilities.

In 1969, while then Secretary of State William Rodgers was visiting Japan, an attempt was made on his life by a man wielding a sharp instrument. The man was foiled by alert SY agents.

In the early 1970s, anti-US terrorism and hostile intelligence activities increased, resulting in the growth in size and complexity of the Department security programs. In 1972, the US Ambassador to the Sudan and his Deputy Chief of Mission were assassinated in Khartoum by Black September, a Palestinian terrorist group. That event and later acts of terrorism created increasingly dangerous
situations for US citizens and missions abroad, as well as for foreign VIPs in the US. Internal and external demands mounted for the Department to improve SY anti- and counterterrorist capabilities.

The Department, recognizing this need, requested congressional funding to expand SY. This request was known as the "Eagleburger Plan". The plan was approved and SY increased its capabilities, the number of agents, and equipment (special protective equipment, vehicles, radios, etc.). By 1975, 400 agents were on duty.

There was an increase in the number of foreign dignitary protection details. One example was Archbishop Makarios, who sought refuge in the US after being deposed as President of Cyprus. During the '70s, SY agents successfully thwarted two assassination attempts on visiting VIPs. One, in 1970, involved Chiang Ching Kuo (son of Chiang Kai-Shek), then Vice President of Taiwan, who later became the President of that country; the other, in 1976, involved Bulent Ecevit, then Foreign Minister of Turkey, who later became Prime Minister. The latter incident is described in the next chapter.

In 1976, Ambassador Francis E. Meloy, Jr., US Ambassador to Lebanon, the Embassy Economic Minister, and embassy chauffeur were assassinated in Beirut by terrorists. In 1979, Ambassador Adolph Dubs, US Ambassador to Afghanistan, was kidnapped and killed by his abductors during a rescue attempt. In Islamabad, American diplomatic personnel were killed and the US Embassy ransacked. Hostages were taken at the US Embassy in Tehran. As a result of these incidents, SY's overseas role expanded and the organization grew to 500 agents. Agents received more complex training in order to counter the
terrorist threat. SY inspected diplomatic facilities for security vulnerabilities and instituted appropriate countermeasures.

The intensity and scope of terrorist attacks continued. Between 1979 and 1984, numerous attacks occurred against Americans. The US Embassy in Beirut was blown up twice, and the US Embassy in Kuwait was bombed. A truck bomb attack at the US Marine Barracks in Beirut killed 241 American Military personnel. The US Embassies in Madrid, Jakarta, and Rome were targets of terrorists acts. The US Consulate in Barcelona was blown up. Several US commercial aircraft were hijacked and/or blown up. US citizens and interests became lucrative targets for terrorist acts.

In light of the dramatic increases in threats and incidents targeting US diplomatic missions and personnel, Secretary of State George Shultz formed a commission in 1984 to make recommendations to further enhance security. It was headed by retired Admiral Bobby Inman, former Deputy CIA Director, and was known as the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, or the Inman Commission.

The commission examined the Department's security, and in a June 1985 report made its recommendations to the Secretary. The report urged that a Bureau of Diplomatic Security be created with a Diplomatic Security Service within the Bureau. The main purpose for the Bureau was to meet the diverse challenges of terrorism. On November 4, 1985, Congress established the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS).

The legislation, known as the Omnibus Diplomatic and Antiterrorism Act, was signed into law by President Reagan on August
27, 1986. The new Bureau had a mandate to manage all aspects of Department security and was structured along the lines of other Federal law enforcement, intelligence, and security agencies.24

The new Bureau was directed by an Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security. A director was designated to head the DSS. The Inman Commission emphasized the need to improve coordination between the Department and other federal, state, and local agencies, as well as foreign governments.25 Protection of foreign officials and their facilities in the US was the subject of 17 panel recommendations, which suggested improving the training, competence, and professionalism of protective details and increased cooperation between the Department and the US Secret Service.

In 1985, DSS established a rapid-response group known as the Security Support Team whose purpose was to deploy anywhere world-wide to provide additional security to US diplomatic interests in high-threat and/or emergency situations. This led to pro-active relationships with the Department of Defense (DOD), including working contacts with Joint Special Operations Command and unified geographical commands and the assignment in 1987 of a DSS Agent to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) for the purpose of liaison and coordination on terrorism issues and policy.

The Bracy-Longtree affair, involving co-optation of US Marine Security Guards at the US Embassy Moscow by the KGB, led to reorganized and enhanced counterintelligence functions by DSS. DSS was also active in the investigation of Felix Bloc, a former senior
Department employee, who was allegedly recruited by the KGB and thought to have provided them sensitive information.

In recognition of expanded security responsibilities, the Diplomatic Courier Service joined DSS. Couriers, in addition to escorting pouches containing official correspondence, began protecting vast amounts of supplies, equipment, and construction materials bound for sensitive overseas posts. DSS Special Agents were now assigned to carry out these duties.\(^{26}\) By the end of the 1980s, DSS had established an office to interact with the American private sector on overseas security problems of mutual interest. The Bureau further expanded responsibilities to include providing state-of-the-art security to the Department’s communications information systems.

**DSS Today**

DSS’ programs now encompass all security aspects of diplomatic life overseas including home, work, and school environments. Security improvements developed and implemented in the 1980s helped Americans withstand the heightened terrorist threat during the 1991 Gulf War. DSS was a major, albeit quiet, participant in Desert Shield/Storm activities, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.\(^ {27} \)

DSS continues to conduct criminal, counterintelligence, and personnel investigations. Its relationship with its fellow law enforcement agencies remains strong and active. Additionally, there are now DSS agents stationed at INTERPOL Headquarters in Lyon, France, US National Central INTERPOL Bureau in Washington, D.C., and
the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), El Paso, Texas.

DSS has an anti-terrorism assistance (ATA) program for foreign countries. The program provides help to those countries wanting to enhance their anti-terrorism capabilities and who meet US government human rights guidelines. Earlier programs such as the US Agency for International Development’s Public Assistance programs and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration programs did not have this mandate and were terminated by Congress in the early 1970s.

A direct ATA program benefit is the increased professional relationship between DSS and the recipient host-nation law enforcement and security agencies. This is particularly significant, as DSS is resident in over 140 locations abroad.

To carry out its mission abroad, DSS Special Agents, known as Regional Security Officers (RSO), are assigned to embassies and consulates. RSOs serve as the principal advisors to Chiefs of Mission and are responsible for protecting personnel, facilities, and classified information. RSOs design, implement, and manage programs for dealing with threats posed by terrorists, criminals, and hostile intelligence services. RSOs are the US liaison with host-nation law enforcement and security agencies. They are primary contacts for other US agencies needing security assistance.

Three-quarters of a century has brought forth the evolution of a unique law enforcement/security service that is an essential part of the Department of State and has a major role in the protection of America’s national security.
CHAPTER II

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

In carrying out its world-wide responsibilities, DSS is often a participant in national security events which make headlines. Some examples are presented to illustrate this involvement.

The Great Seal Microphone

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the "cold war" began to heat up. American diplomatic missions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were on the front lines. By virtue of their location, these facilities were the targets of the host governments' intelligence services' hostile intentions. From 1949 to 1960, more than 125 hidden microphones and similar listening devices were discovered in those diplomatic facilities by SY (the forerunner of DSS) personnel. One of these discoveries made headlines and was eventually shown in the United Nations as an example of Soviet Intelligence Service actions against the US. The discovery involved a hidden microphone in a replica of the Great Seal of the United States which was hung in the Ambassador's office at his residence in Moscow.

In 1945, the Soviet government officially presented American Ambassador Averell Harriman a large carved wooden replica of the Great Seal of the US. It was given "in appreciation" for American support of the Soviet Union during World War II. The gift was a handsome example of Russian artesan handicraft. It more than lived
up to that reputation because it was also an excellent example of Russian spy tradecraft. The Ambassador hung the seal in his study at Spaso House, his official residence. It stayed there for nearly seven years. On one of his visits to the Soviet Union, then Secretary of State George Marshall slept within a few feet of the Seal when he used the study as a bedroom.28

The Regional Security Officer (RSO) had periodic audio checks conducted in embassy offices and residences by SY Security Engineer Officers (SEOs). Many devices were discovered, but none in the Ambassador’s study. In mid-1952, a friendly foreign government advised that its Moscow-based personnel had heard then American Ambassador George Kennan’s voice on a certain radio frequency. SY tasked two SEOs with locating the source of the emanation. Thorough inspections ensued and in September 1952, signals were discovered emanating from the study. The source of the signals proved to be the Great Seal. Further examination of the seal, which was hinged and opened like a book, disclosed a tiny concealed metallic cylinder with a slender metallic antenna. The device was located in the beak of the eagle on the seal.29

In accordance with SY standard operating procedures, the seal was sent by diplomatic pouch to the US for further technical analysis. The device was a sophisticated air-powered metallic reflector for an electronic beacon focused from outside Spaso House. Further investigation indicated the seal had frequently been sent out for repair or cleaning by the Soviet housekeeping staff at Spaso House.30

In 1960, Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union
while piloting a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. The Soviets then began a very active and intense anti-US propaganda campaign focusing on US espionage activities. One forum actively used by the Soviets was the United Nations (UN). In June 1960, during a Soviet attempt, led by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, to pass a resolution condemning US spy actions, the US Ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, rebutted the Soviets by displaying the seal from the US Embassy in Moscow. He opened it, disclosed the device and its location, and explained it was a clandestine listening device used by the Russians to monitor ambassadorial conversations. With the display of the seal, Lodge effectively countered the Soviets' smear campaign by publicly revealing Soviet espionage techniques. SY had played a key role in the affair. \(^{31}\)

**A Diplomat Named Scarbeck**

In 1961, cold war tensions were running high. As part of SY's counterintelligence activities, an American diplomat was caught by SY agents betraying secrets to an Iron Curtain country. The diplomat, Irvin C. Scarbeck, was assigned as the Second Secretary to the American Embassy in Warsaw, Poland. His main duties were administrative as General Services Officer. By virtue of these duties, Scarbeck had little need to know classified matters, although he did have a top secret clearance, as required of all Foreign Service personnel. \(^{32}\) At 41, Scarbeck had a flawless record. After Army service, he worked in Germany as a staff officer for the High Commissioner of Germany until 1952 when he joined the State
Department. He had been in Warsaw with his family since 1958.

Warsaw in 1961 was a difficult post for Americans as life was "barren" and lacked most Western amenities. Diplomats and their families had to live in one apartment complex provided by the Polish Government. Polish intelligence agents kept the diplomats under constant human and electronic surveillance in all phases of their daily activities. This environment placed strains on Embassy personnel and they were encouraged to take "morale leave" to get away from the tension of Warsaw life. All foreign service personnel, including Scarbeck, were well-briefed to the hazards of such an assignment, and told to inform the Regional Security Officer (RSO) if they ever found themselves in a compromising situation.33

In April 1961, the American Consular Officer reported an unusual incident to the RSO regarding a request by Scarbeck for a German visa for a young Polish woman. At the time, West Germany did not have diplomatic relations with Poland, and the American Consul acted in West Germany's behalf in issuing visas. Furthermore, Poland consistently blocked any moves by their young people to travel to the West, while willingly letting their old and ailing people go.34

Thus began a series of curious coincidences which puzzled the RSO. For example, Scarbeck, who previously had little need to know classified matters, was now regularly showing an interest in the classified "read file". He also put in a leave request to go to Germany about the same time that the Polish woman would be there.35

The RSO advised the State Department of his concerns and was given approval to initiate an investigation. Because of Scarbeck's
intended travel to Germany, the RSO in Frankfurt was also involved. He arranged for West German police assistance in both surveillance and record-check activities. The investigation had the approval of the Secretary of State and the American Ambassador in Warsaw.

Through a series of investigative techniques, it soon became clear that Scarbeck was passing classified information to Polish Intelligence via the Polish woman. Scarbeck was confronted by this allegation in Frankfurt by the RSO on June 4, 1961. After lengthy questioning, Scarbeck finally broke down and admitted he had been co-opted by Polish Intelligence. In December 1960, Polish Intelligence Service Agents compromised Scarbeck in his relations with the woman. It was then the Poles made their pitch, and Scarbeck agreed to cooperate. Scarbeck admitted he had passed classified documents to the Poles. He was taken back to the US and on October 3, 1961, went to trial. He was convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. The Polish woman came from Frankfurt and testified against Scarbeck. After her testimony, she was offered asylum, but refused and returned to Poland.

The efforts of two RSOs and the SY office of Special Assignment Staff thus led to the first apprehension of an American Foreign Service Officer who was actively engaged in espionage activities.

Gunman Threatens Turkish Official at Waldorf

The above headline appeared in the July 26, 1976 edition of the New York Times. An assassination attempt had been foiled by SY Special Agents thus averting damaging consequences for the US.
The story began when then Foreign Minister Bulent Ecevit made an official visit to the US on July 24, 1976. Prior to his visit, the Turkish government and the State Department Turkish Desk requested a protective detail from the SY's Office of Protection. The SY threat assessment mentioned the unrest and terrorism then taking place in Turkey and the problems experienced by Turkey over its 1974 invasion and subsequent occupation of part of Cyprus. After review of the threat assessment, it was decided a detail was justified.

Upon arrival in the US, Ecevit was given 24-hour protection by a SY Special Agent detail. The detail coordinated this protection with the New York Police Department (NYPD). The SY New York Field Office (NYFO) facilitated this liaison and did protective-advance activities.

On the evening of July 26, Ecevit went to the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel to address a Turkish-American audience. The detail was advised by NYFO and NYPD that demonstrations would occur by persons protesting Turkish occupation of Cyprus. Upon arrival at the Waldorf, Ecevit's party was harassed as they entered the hotel.39

After his formal speech, Ecevit departed the room and began to speak to an overflow crowd in the lobby who had been unable to hear the formal speech. As he was speaking, an assailant pointed a gun directly at him. A pre-positioned SY Agent immediately noticed this, deflected the weapon, and subdued the gunman. During the struggle, a "body cover" agent shielded Ecevit and removed him to safety. The assailant was taken into custody.40

For their actions, three agents were cited for valor by the State Department. All three were subsequently flown to Turkey and honored...
by the Turkish Government. Their actions prevented an embarrassing international incident between the US and a valued NATO ally.41

Return of An Ancient Symbol

In January 1978, the 1000 year-old Crown of St. Stephen, the legendary symbol of Hungarian nationhood, was returned to Hungary from the US. The US had come into possession after it was handed over to US troops at the end of World War II by a Hungarian colonel charged with its custody. The colonel did not want the crown and some related artifacts to fall into the hands of advancing Soviet Troops. The items were stored for many years at Ft. Knox, Ky.42

The Crown's possession became an issue between the Communist Government of Hungary and the US. The Hungarians had insisted on its return, while the US maintained delivery would be based on improved diplomatic relations. The Carter Administration decided to return the artifacts in November 1977, based on slightly liberalized rule in Hungary; and the State Department was directed to arrange delivery.43

SY's Office of Protection was tasked with making appropriate arrangements. It contacted DOD and arranged for a team of Special Agents to move the Crown from Ft. Knox and to Budapest aboard a US Air Force transport plane. Special precautions were taken in moving the crown due to opposition by Hungarian emigre groups in the US. SY also worked with Hungarian authorities to ensure security of the Crown upon its arrival in Hungary.

The Carter Administration attached much importance to this event and had Secretary of State Cyrus Vance lead a delegation to Budapest
to make the formal presentation. In mid-January, the return was completed without incident via SY planning and DOD cooperation.

The Hungarian government's gratitude was only made public after the fall of the Soviet Empire in 1989. SY is proud of its role in the decision to return a national treasure to its people.

Beirut

Lebanon has been the locale of many tragic anti-American terrorist incidents. The American Embassy, its assigned personnel, US military personnel, and unofficial Americans have been the target of assassins, kidnappers, rocket attacks and bombings.

Incidents included: the 1976 kidnappings and assassinations of US Ambassador Francis Meloy, the Embassy Economic Counselor and the Ambassador's Lebanese driver; the 1983 car bombing of the Embassy in West Beirut, resulting in deaths and injuries; the 1983 truck bombing of the Marine Barracks at Beirut Airport, killing 241 and injuring many others; the 1984 truck bombing of the temporary Embassy in East Beirut, again resulting in deaths and injuries.

From 1984 to 1988, fifteen Americans, thirteen unofficial and two official, were taken hostage. The two official Americans, William Buckley (CIA Station Chief) and USMC Lt. Col. William Higgins, and one unofficial American were murdered. One escaped after being held for eleven months. The rest were held in captivity for periods of time ranging from two months to nearly seven years.

In the hostage incidents involving the unofficial Americans, repeated warnings by the Embassy to leave Lebanon went unheeded. The
warnings were based on assessments by the Embassy and national-level agencies. In the case of official Americans, including the 1984 tragedies, warnings and recommended security procedures were ignored.

The 1983 and 1984 Embassy bombings could have been avoided -- or at least their impact reduced -- if security recommendations for physical security measures had been acted upon expeditiously. In the 1983 bombing, a recommended barrier gate, which could prevent a bomb-laden vehicle from entering the compound, was sitting on a Beirut pier, awaiting appropriate customs clearances. It had been there for several weeks. In the 1984 incident, a similar situation occurred when a "drop-bar" barrier, which would have prevented vehicle access to the Embassy, had not yet been installed. In both cases, the RSO had repeatedly urged immediate installation, but actions were delayed due to bureaucratic obstacles.

After the 1984 bombing, the President agreed to let the Embassy remain open in Beirut, but he qualified his decision by stipulating the facility would be closed if another American was harmed. Each subsequent Ambassador has been sensitized to this mandate. DSS was directed to institute maximum security measures. Since then, Embassy security has improved.

The on-site RSO is a member of the Embassy Country Team and has the immense responsibility of ensuring the safety and welfare of assigned personnel. The RSO has many assets. He commands an armed battalion-sized local guard force, DSS-trained and equipped, that provides exterior perimeter security of the embassy compound, residential guards, roving patrols, vehicle convoy escorts, and rapid....
response teams. Specially-trained DSS Special Agents operate a protective detail for the Ambassador. Extensive security systems protect the embassy compound and employees' residences. Special communications allows immediate contact with the Department and other government agencies, as needed. A US Army Blackhawk helicopter unit based in Cyprus provides the only secure mode of travel and supply in and out of Beirut; while DSS armored-vehicles operate in Beirut.

Both DSS and the RSO have extensive contacts and contingency plans established with DOD. A successful application of this relationship was the 1989 evacuation of the Embassy and subsequent return in 1990. Both events were completed without incidents. The Embassy is currently open despite the hostile environment of Beirut.

DSS Assists Columbia in Drug War

In a nationally televised speech on September 5, 1989, President Bush stated the US was strongly committed to the fight against drugs, and would assist the Government of Columbia in cracking down on drug cartels in their country.

In light of those remarks and the increased incidents of narco-terrorism, the DS Bureau established a "Support Group on Columbia" and has taken an active role in the Department of Justice's Judicial Protection Program. DSS was tasked for this support.

Under the auspices of DSS' Anti-terrorism Training Assistance (ATA) program, Columbian security personnel have received training in protective security since September 1989. The training was conducted at various Federal law enforcement facilities throughout the US and
included a course administered by DSS agents. The training was jointly funded by DSS and the State Department's American Republics Area Bureau. In addition to training, ATA provided ballistic vests to Columbia. ATA has provided training to hundreds of Columbian law enforcement personnel in anti-terrorism skills such as bomb detection, hostage negotiation, airport and building security, maritime protection, and dignitary protection.

In addition to ATA training, DSS has reviewed the quality and suitability of local armoring for vehicles available in Columbia. Special Agents from the Physical Security Programs Division have assisted the US Justice Department by providing technical expertise regarding physical and procedural security for the Columbian courts. Communications equipment was also provided.

As a result of this assistance, the US Embassy has become a target for drug cartel terrorist attacks. As in the case of Beirut, DSS and the RSO have taken additional security measures to ensure the safety of facilities and personnel, including the withdrawal of dependents. To date, there have been no casualties despite sporadic rocket and bomb attacks.44

The Malta Presidential Summit

In October 1989, President Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev decided to hold a summit meeting at sea, near the Mediterranean island nation of Malta, on December 2-3, 1989. Since Malta is near Italy, the RSO at the US Embassy in Rome is also responsible for the security of American interests in Malta. The RSO was charged with
arranging the extensive security support required for the visit. Libya, due to its proximity to Malta and policy of state-supported terrorism, was of major concern.

The American Embassy in Malta is small, and the logistical support required for the summit was well beyond its capabilities. The RSO in Rome traveled to Malta in early November to meet with the US Ambassador to Malta and Presidential Pre-Advance Team. Among pre-advance activities were meetings with Soviet counterparts and Government of Malta officials. Possible sites where the Presidents would visit were reviewed. The RSO introduced the US Secret Service (USSS) advance teams to his high-level Maltese contacts in both the Police and Military, and protection planning began.

He then returned to Rome and was contacted by the Rome offices of the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) and USSS. Those offices requested assistance in making further necessary contacts and arrangements in Malta. The RSO, in coordination with the Secretary of State’s protective detail (SD), also began making arrangements for the Secretary and his entourage.

The RSO returned to Malta in mid-November, accompanied by two Rome-based USSS agents and one NIS agent. He surveyed a site suitable for the temporary White House and Secretary of State offices and selected the Holiday Inn Hotel. The RSO determined thirteen temporary duty Marine Security Guards were needed to secure designated classified areas in the hotel. He sent this request to DSS, and the Marines reported for duty a few days later. Since the US Embassy in Malta was too small to handle the visit, 600 American
personnel were assigned for support. Most resided at the Holiday Inn and in the nearby vicinity. Since the safety and welfare of the offices and personnel were also the RSO’s responsibility, he arranged for extensive Maltese protection of these sites.

Survey visits were made to the Soviet naval ship Slavia, the USS Forestal, and the USS Belknap, flagship of the US Sixth Fleet. The President and Secretary would stay on the Belknap during the summit.

As the US government buildup began, other agencies sought RSO assistance. They included USAF Office of Special Investigations, the USMC Presidential Helicopter Unit, the White House Military Office, and the White House Communications Agency. Each had security requirements. Daily meetings were held with Maltese and Soviet security officials. The Maltese requested that a combined security operation center be established at their military headquarters during the actual period of the summit. All agreed and coordination problems were kept to a minimum.

During this period, information indicated the US Embassy would be the focal point of anti-nuclear rallies during the summit. The RSO coordinated protective measures between the police and the embassy, including the assigned MSG Detachment. The RSO regularly advised Washington of developments, and these reports had broad interest and distribution. The RSO continued security planning for the Secretary of State until the arrival of the SD advance team. The RSO briefed them and then turned over further planning for the Secretary’s safety.

The summit occurred without incident. The gale-force weather forced changes in meeting locations, but contingency plans had
covered those possibilities. The RSO's actions supported a national policy decision and created a safe environment for the talks. He received a meritorious award for his performance of duty.

Nelson Mandela Visits the United States

In 1989, the South African Government released Nelson Mandela from prison. This long-awaited world event had emotional meaning for many people, including groups in the US. After his release, Mandela indicated his desire to visit America. In April 1990, the State Department declared Mandela an "official visitor" and tasked DSS with providing a protective detail for both he and his wife. The Mandelas would visit between June 20-30, 1990 and attend rallies, fund raisers, and political events in New York, Boston, Washington, Atlanta, Miami, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Oakland. Thus began the planning for the largest protective detail ever undertaken by DSS or the old SY. It would involve 120 Agents.

The DSS Office of Protection met with African National Congress (ANC) representatives in the US to organize security arrangements necessary for the Mandelas' schedule. The Office of Protection and the DSS Intelligence and Threat Analysis Section established liaison with the FBI and police departments of each city, via respective DSS Field Offices, for domestic intelligence matters.

Initially, the ANC staff provided information on the cities Mandela would visit and the dates he would be in them, but little else. Information regarding a daily itinerary, air transportation, lodging, and medical records for the Mandelas, as well as other
relevant data, was not available until shortly before their arrival.

The visit's magnitude soon exceeded the ANC's planning ability, and they hired several former employees of President Carter and past Democratic presidential campaigns to organize the trip.

In addition to this staff, each city formed its own "Mandela Welcoming Committee." Each committee, which was tasked with arranging a schedule for Mandela, usually consisted of that city's mayor, that state's governor, local celebrities, a local public relations firm, and any congressmen or senators from that city or state. It was inevitable that much conflict and confusion arose between groups and their differing agendas. As a result, DSS found it difficult to coordinate necessary arrangements for the trip.

Despite the confusion, DSS prepared for all contingencies, including the construction of a "Mandela Mobile", a bullet-proof glass enclosure on the back of a mid-sized truck, similar to the "Pope Mobile", for use in a tickertape parade in Manhattan.

Because of the number of stops and length of the trip, it was decided to use two jump teams for the entire visit. They "leap frogged" each other from one city to another. Each team consisted of approximately 45 agents who were transported from city to city in a Federal Aviation Administration DC-9 or USAF C-141 transport plane. While two teams were assigned to this trip, various changes in the schedule required many other agents to work each city. DSS Mobile Security Support Division (MSD) teams were used domestically for the first time to assist local police with surveillance of event sites.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) assisted DSS in visit
preparations by processing press credentials for over 8,000 journalists who had requested them. Processing these requests was a formidable task which required National Crime Information Center name checks on each applicant, preparation and distribution of the credentials, and coordination with DSS when reasons were found to deny credentials. A last-minute decision by the State Department to reopen the application deadline for each city made credentialing more difficult for DS. Once processed, DS personnel were sent to each city to issue the credentials. Despite the last-minute schedule changes and the unanticipated demands made by the organizing committees, DSS provided an exceptional level of protection for the Mandelas during their entire visit.

There were harrowing moments. In Brooklyn, the crowds converged on the 65-car motorcade (average motorcade size during the trip was 35-40 vehicles) as it departed a high school. Thousands of exuberant Mandela supporters ran through the streets, stopped the motorcade, and pounded on vehicles. In Harlem, a crowd of over 500,000 gathered to hear Mandela speak. Problems were expected, but fortunately the crowd was orderly and no incidents occurred.

The most intense situations occurred in Miami and Detroit. While taping a national television interview in New York, Mandela stated that Cuba’s Fidel Castro was his friend. This remark caused many anti-Mandela riots to occur among the large Cuban-American anti-Castro population in Miami, prior to his visit. The city of Miami cancelled various welcoming ceremonies for the Mandelas, including a presentation of the key to the city; however, all was
relatively calm in Miami when the Mandela entourage arrived.

In Detroit, there was concern. One week earlier, eight people had been killed during the celebration of the local team winning the NBA championship; however, the large crowds that saw Mandela were high-spirited, but generally well-behaved and posed few problems.

Despite the complexities of this historical visit, including the close scrutiny by 8,000 journalists, DSS successfully conducted one of the largest and most sophisticated protective details, including those of the USSS, in recent memory. The detail was successful because of the meticulous planning by the Office of Protection and the professional team work of the agents, threat analysts, field offices, and DS staff.46

Revolution in Liberia

In 1990, a bloody and violent civil war broke out in the West African nation of Liberia. The Regional Security Officer (RSO) at the American Embassy in Monrovia, the largest US diplomatic post in sub-Sahara Africa, displayed an uncanny foresight in anticipating potential problem areas in the unstable country. This enabled him to undertake a pro-active security program which saved lives and later proved invaluable in protecting US interests.

Prior to the outbreak of fighting in July 1990, the RSO sensed the situation in Liberia was more serious than the usual African coup d'état. To prepare for what eventually would occur, he began taking additional security measures well before the fighting started. One step was the augmentation of the contract guard radio network, which
proved essential to Embassy security, as well as a principal source of intelligence about the various antagonists in the conflict when the battle for Monrovia began. The RSO further took steps to enhance the Embassy’s perimeter defenses, and made further modifications to residential security protective measures to allow for even faster securing of employee residences in emergency situations.

Additionally, he conducted internal defense classes for the assigned US Marine Security Guard Detachment and provided regular briefings to the Embassy’s Emergency Action Committee on the mission’s security situation. He worked closely with off-site US government agencies to upgrade the security of their compounds.

As the security situation worsened, the RSO’s activity shifted from preparation to action. He arranged the smooth evacuation of dependents and nonessential personnel from Liberia, ensuring their unimpeded passage through the potentially hostile check points.

The RSO was cited for personal bravery. For example, he was the first to go to an outlying American compound which had been overwhelmed by more than 7,000 refugees. Upon arrival, he was confronted by a disorganized group of hostile soldiers who had already massacred other refugees in another location. The soldiers demanded access to the compound but the RSO refused to allow them to enter. The soldiers threatened the RSO and insisted on entering, but he stood his ground. Eventually the soldiers left without incident. The RSO then made arrangements to ensure the compound was secure against future such activity.

In the meantime, the State Department, through DSS
representatives, coordinated with DOD and arranged for a six-vessel US Navy-Marine joint task force, designated "Sharp Edge", to be present off-shore. Upon arrival, "Sharp Edge" provided assistance in the evacuation of more than 2500 persons, including both American citizens and other nationals, and in giving additional protection to the Embassy. At this point, the RSO instituted active liaison with Marine commanders in order to further improve the Embassy's defensive posture. Since the Marines, for political reasons, could not be deployed beyond the Embassy grounds, DSS agents, dispatched by Washington and under the RSO's direction, manned outlaying observation posts and passed daily situation reports required for the Embassy defense. Frequently, these positions came under hostile fire.

Throughout the conflict, the Embassy remained opened. It was the only foreign mission in Liberia to function the entire time. Eventually, the Liberian Civil War reached its conclusion. The task force was withdrawn after successfully completing its mission. As a result of the RSO efforts, there were no casualties among official Americans. For his outstanding performance of duty, the RSO was selected as the 1990 Regional Security Officer of the Year.47

The above cited instances of DSS actions are but a few examples of the never-ending activity which is performed in support of national interests. There are many others, too numerous to mention. The next chapter will provide an in-depth analysis of DSS activities during Desert Storm/Shield to show how DSS works in time of national crisis.
CHAPTER III

DEsert SHIELD/STORM - AN ANALYSIS

Operation Desert Shield/Storm was a successful action in support of US national policy. The success was due to excellent working relationships among the agencies charged with carrying out the various interrelated responsibilities. Department of Defense (DOD) activities, which won the Gulf War, are well known.

There was another aspect of Desert Shield/Storm that was not as publicized but reflected equally high-level concerns and direction. While DOD was charged with liberating Kuwait and the defense of the Saudi oil fields, DSS was charged with the safety and welfare of US citizens and interests, world-wide.

The White House directive to DSS came shortly after the President announced in early August 1990 that the US was sending troops to Saudi Arabia in response to Iraqi actions in Kuwait. After that decision, Saddam Hussein stated terrorist attacks against US interests would commence if the US took military action against Iraq. As the January 16, 1991, UN deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait approached, Hussein called for a world wide "Jihad" (Holy War) against the interests of the Allied Coalition Countries.

DSS, in response to the President's directive, undertook actions which enhanced security for non-combatant Americans overseas. This activity included coordination with other countries, US national-level intelligence, and DOD. The net result was no loss.
of life during a heightened period of potential terrorist threat. One can only speculate what changes in national strategy might have occurred if non-combatant Americans had been victims of terrorist actions. DSS' accomplishment is notable, especially when size, available assets, and magnitude of responsibilities are considered.

What led to success? This analysis will attempt to answer that question, show what worked, what didn't work, and note solutions to areas which needed improvement. In reviewing the analysis, it is important to keep in mind DSS's mandated mission: provide a secure environment for the conduct of American diplomacy and the promotion of American interests worldwide. In more succinct terms, it is to protect and save lives. This responsibility covers over 200 diplomatic and consular missions as well as numerous foreign diplomatic locations in the US. The analysis includes Headquarters (Washington) and field (Riyadh and Amman) perspectives.

**DSS Headquarters**

Immediately after the August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, DSS Headquarters commenced world-wide assessments of possible threat actions and reviews of emergency action plans (EAP) from all overseas posts. Instructions were sent to Regional Security Officers (RSOs) to review all security plans. The review included security of selected foreign diplomatic missions in the US.

Two major considerations emerged. Threat assessments were formulated which included reviewing current RSO-provided security post profiles and lessons learned from past experiences, such as the
sacking of the US Embassy in Islamabad in 1979. It was determined that ambassadors and consulate principal officers, known as chiefs of mission (COM), should be given the highest level guidance that the protection of life was more important than mission operations. DSS forwarded this recommendation to senior State Department management. It was endorsed by the Undersecretary for Management and the Secretary and forwarded to the White House. It was approved by the National Security Advisor, General Brent Scowcroft, and the President. This guidance was immediately disseminated to COMs.

At the same time, the Director of DSS, took the recommendation to Overseas Security Policy Group, whose members include the security directors of the foreign affairs and intelligence agencies represented at diplomatic missions abroad. After discussing impact considerations, the life-over-operations or "lock and leave" policy was accepted by the group and their respective agencies were advised.

Second, a DSS Review of EAPs indicated no provision for evacuation from diplomatic missions to other locations in the event that mission locations came under life-threatening situations such as mob violence. In such circumstances, plans only directed personnel to wait in a mission facility safehaven area for the host government to bring the situation under control. The Islamabad case showed there were times when the host government was unable -- or unwilling -- to offer such assistance. Overseas posts were directed to revise EAPs accordingly.

The DSS Overseas Operations (OP) and Intelligence and Threat Analysis (ITA) Offices undertook comprehensive threat assessments of
all posts located in countries thought to be at particular risk, to determine threat levels to US interests. In doing the assessments, two factors were considered:

1. The capability of the host government law enforcement and security organizations to protect US interests against life threatening situations.
2. The political commitment of the host government to respond to life threatening situations against US interests.

The analysis identified 15 countries where indicators reflected US interests were at greatest risk. This critical terrorist threat country list assessment was reviewed with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Both concurred with the findings. The list, with National Security Council (NSC) approval, became the priority for safety and welfare activities.

In August 1990, US citizens, both official and unofficial, remained in Kuwait and Iraq; and their safety was of utmost concern. DSS began active interface with DOD to devise and coordinate evacuation plans if diplomatic initiatives failed. Eventually all citizens were able to leave and the plans were not used.

Another critical policy issue was the evacuation of US citizens, both official and non-official. For official Americans, US government employees and their dependents assigned overseas, there are two types of evacuation: permissive evacuation which is authorized when the security situation is deteriorating, but has not reached a life-threatening stage and official Americans can leave voluntarily, and non-permissive evacuation which is directed and is not voluntary. The Secretary of State, with Presidential approval, makes the decision when these types of evacuation are authorized.
DSS, using the critical threat countries' list and the life-over-operations policy, coordinated with senior Department management and established criteria to determine when non-permissive evacuation should be ordered for official Americans. Secretary Baker, using this criteria, met with Secretary of Defense Cheney and National Security Advisor Scowcroft to finalize the policy. COMs in the critical threat countries were then advised of the criteria.

The policy formalized DSS' role in the decision-making process for non-permissive evacuation: DSS would make an evacuation recommendation for Americans in a critical threat country, and the Secretary of State would make the action decision based on the DSS recommendation. Once a non-permissive evacuation decision was made, DOD would provide assets to effect such evacuation when commercial means could not be used. DSS would serve as DOD's point of contact.

Domestically, a terrorist task force was formed. DSS joined its colleagues -- the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Secret Service (USSS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and other appropriate federal agencies -- in monitoring potential threats on US soil.

A major domestic concern to DSS was the safety of certain foreign missions and their officials in the US. The Office of Protection took action as these countries became targets of terrorism. Plans were made to place dignitary protection details with the Ambassadors of these countries in the event of war. Coordination was made with the Uniformed Division (UD) of the USSS, to ensure targeted embassies in Washington received adequate protection. UD is responsible for
providing perimeter guard protection to certain foreign missions located in Washington, D.C. In other US cities, where targeted countries' missions were located, the DSS Field Offices coordinated increased security arrangements with local law enforcement agencies. As an example, DSS assigned a protective detail to the UN Secretary General because of terrorist threats. Operation of this detail was conducted with the help and assistance of the DSS New York Field Office, New York City Police, and the UN Security Office.48

Protective details were also placed with several senior State Department officials who were involved in the Gulf crisis as well as foreign ministers of Coalition countries who visited Washington to meet with American officials.

The DSS Investigations Division was also busy, particularly the Counterterrorism Investigations Section (CT). As the Gulf crisis developed, there was a dramatic increase in the threats to US interests worldwide, as well as threats and suspicious incidents in the US involving State Department officials, foreign missions and resident foreign officials. All threats were investigated either by domestic-based special agents or overseas RSOs. Investigative results were reviewed and pertinent protective actions coordinated with appropriate law enforcement/intelligence agencies at the federal, state and local levels. CT, which oversees the State Department Rewards and Terrorism Information program, received a large increase in terrorism information submissions.49

The DSS Procedural Security Division made plans for additional security measures for the Main State Department building and the
annexes located in both Washington and Northern Virginia. A two-phased approach, pre- and post-hostility, was used. It involved federal and local police jurisdictions, all State Department employees and visitors. Security increased among employees and resulted in more reports of suspicious people, packages, and events.

The Diplomatic Courier Service made scheduling adjustments to ensure pouch service continued to posts directly affected by the Gulf crisis. These adjustments were caused because of airlines cancelling or reducing service to some locations due to terrorist threats. Service continued by using available scheduled airlines still flying to effected locations, charters, and DOD assets. In all cases, material got through to those posts which remained open.

The DSS Office of Physical Security Programs (PSP) concentrated on problems associated with assisting installations needing additional physical security and reopening diplomatic facilities which had closed. Plans were developed to respond to requests within the parameters of limited funds, and to determine resources and procedures needed to reopen closed embassies and consulates.

PSP identified and stockpiled equipment in advance, i.e., fully- and light-armored vehicles, special protective equipment, public access hardware, reinforced doors, etc. Guidance was provided to effected posts on ways to securely close facilities, including which vaults to weld shut and methods to detect hostile intelligence penetration attempts of closed buildings. Procedures were drawn up for reopening closed posts. This included the use of DOD Explosive Ordinance Disposal units, reestablishment of Marine Security Guard
detachments and local guard support, and reinstallation or reuse of security equipment for the perimeter of the post grounds then extending inward throughout the building. 52

The DSS Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) served as a vital link to the American private sector during the crisis. OSAC both gave and received help. Demands for information were numerous, as US interests around the world became possible terrorist targets as a result of the wartime environment.

OSAC formed a task force that included two professional security officers on loan from private firms. The task force designed an information listing system of security/terrorist incidents that had occurred world-wide. The list was updated daily and was available on the Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB); thus, EBB users had access to security conditions in areas where their people were located. The OSAC service was well-received by corporate users. Word of the service and its effectiveness quickly spread, and there were additional requests for EBB access.

The private sector, in turn, provided assistance to DSS by passing pertinent information from their foreign-based employees. The information proved useful as another source of data for planning and in keeping track of unofficial Americans working overseas. 53

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Resource Management (RM) Division was active in support of the DSS Desert Shield/Storm global mission. RM made advanced arrangements to provide travel, procurement, and financial assistance to DSS components affected by the Gulf crisis. Of particular note, RM arranged for the use of DOD
aircraft as well as those of other USG agencies and commercial charter companies. As a result, DSS had aviation support available 24 hours-a-day anywhere in the world.\textsuperscript{54}

In October 1990, DSS made the decision to brief Chiefs of Mission (COMs) of each of the countries identified on the critical threat list. The decision had the full backing of State Department and the White House. Five senior agents were selected for this mission. They were instructed to reemphasize the life-over-operations policy stressing that if the time came when the local situation became tenuous and the host government was not in a position to provide protection, then everything was to be secured and all personnel evacuated. The agents, while at posts, reviewed EAPs with the RSOS and appropriate personnel to ensure feasibility. They also reviewed non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) plans and briefed on other forms of possible DOD assistance.

Upon return from their visits, the agents submitted trip reports which were sent to the National Security Council (NSC) via senior State Department management. After review, copies were sent to DOD, including DIA, and the CIA.

As DOD began committing personnel and assets to Desert Shield, it became evident there would be difficulty in meeting a number of simultaneous evacuation requirements. OP and the DSS Emergency Plans and Counterterrorism (EPC) Division worked with DOD officials to refine plans which had been orginated by unified Commands' Operations (J-3) Staffs. These staffs are responsible for DOD planning of NEO missions in countries located in their regions. The critical threat
countries were located in two DOD unified command areas of responsibility. DOD advised that these two commands could not support NEO requirements because of Desert Shield/Storm priorities and therefore other commands would be tasked to provide necessary support. DOD liaison teams were established with OP to facilitate this support.

Another factor was identified regarding the number of persons potentially requiring evacuation. Aside from official Americans, large numbers of unofficial Americans and other foreign nationals had to be considered. Allied and other friendly nations frequently request last-minute US assistance in the evacuation of their nationals. This potentially increased DOD NEO planning requirements.

In November 1990, NSC directed DSS to undertake a second visit to critically threatened posts. It was also suggested that selected DOD personnel accompany the agents. The purpose of the visits was to review updated EAPs, particularly evacuation plans. As in the case of the first visits, trip report distribution included the White House, Secretaries of State and Defense, and the CIA.

On November 12, 1990, drawdowns began at most critical threat locations. While some posts had started this process earlier, others had not. Most posts were able to use commercial means to transport departing personnel, but others had to rely on DOD assets.

As the drawdowns commenced, OP became the primary point for information and coordination regarding the welfare of overseas Americans and served as a government clearing house for such information. OP maintained up-to-date information on the locations
The Gulf Crisis placed heavy demands on RSOs all over the world. In response, OP dispatched 41 agents to 15 countries. A total of 1382 man-days was used to support and/or increase security postures at posts needing additional assistance. The DSS Mobile Security Support Division (MSD) assisted by sending emergency response teams. OP coordinated a major project of providing hand-held radios to critical threat posts. Protective mask procurement for Gulf region posts also became an OP priority project.

As the January 16, 1991 UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait approached, many posts were ordered to drawdown to minimum staff or to close. To support the evacuation activities, DOD placed assets on alert for DSS use. In one instance, this saved the day. While Desert Shield was unfolding, a civil war was being waged in Somalia. The war finally reached the capital of Mogadishu in December 1990. The post had earlier reduced to minimum staff. As the fighting raged, it became clear the Somali government was no longer in control and could not provide protection to diplomatic interests. In early January 1991, the situation became critical. Commercial flights in and out of Mogadishu were suspended. DSS, working with DOD, arranged for the USS Inchon to respond from the Indian Ocean. Using helicopters, the ship successfully evacuated Americans and nationals of other countries, including Soviets.

By the time Desert Storm began in February, DSS had successfully ensured the evacuation of over 20,000 persons from critical threat
areas. It also had enhanced the security posture of American interests world-wide. DSS was able to thwart five known terrorist threats around the world, any of which if successful, would have had catastrophic consequences. It is unknown how many other terrorist actions were foiled by DSS-directed security measures.55

As Desert Storm concluded, attention turned to reopening closed posts. Of prime concern was the possibility of buildings being booby-trapped or penetrated by hostile intelligence services.

The reopening of the US Embassy in Kuwait illustrates how DSS, in conjunction with DOD elements, accomplished its task. On February 26, 1991, the liberation of Kuwait began. A DSS special agent team was instructed to depart Washington for Riyadh. Its purpose was to provide protection to Ambassador Edward Gnehm. The team arrived on February 28th and was met by the RSO. They picked up weapons and protective gear and then made the five-hour drive to Dhahran.56

Once in Dhahran, they met with the Ambassador and mapped out the next day's journey to Kuwait and appropriate security plans. A USAF C-130 transport carried the Embassy staff, two fully-armored vehicles, and essential supplies to Kuwait.57

Prior to the Ambassador's arrival, one of the DSS team was assigned duties as RSO. The Embassy compound had been secured by US Special Forces (SF). The RSO met with the SF and coordinated security using the SF who held the ports of entry, vehicle entry, and pedestrian gates. SF Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) teams had swept the compound, to ensure no booby traps were in place.58

Once in Kuwait City, the vehicles and other equipment were used...
as a decoy motorcade. The Ambassador and the protection team flew to the compound by helicopter. SF members were used to supplement the DSS team. Upon arrival, the Ambassador raised the American flag.\(^{59}\)

Offices and quarters were set up. Since basic services such as power and water were not functioning, needed supplies were brought by DSS. A hotel across the street was surveyed for use as possible Ambassadorial quarters and offices. Due to the damage and lack of services, the hotel was not used for a residence.\(^{60}\)

The RSO requested that no Embassy staff, including the Ambassador, go outside the compound without prior coordination and clearance because the security situation in Kuwait City was still unsettled. Pockets of Iraqi resistance still existed, and there was unexploded ordinance to be avoided. Coordination was established with the Military Police and the US Army Liaison Office for all moves outside the compound. As the Ambassador had many visits to accomplish, his moves were advanced by the team and coordinated with both US military and Kuwaiti authorities. Team activities outside the compound were facilitated by use of DSS cloth Special Agent badges. The badge became so recognized that it expedited moves through roadblocks, checkpoints, and during motorcade moves. This proved particularly useful when numerous Congressional delegations visited, as the team organized all security for these groups.\(^{61}\)

On March 7th, a DSS Mobile Security Support Division (MSD) team arrived and began training new local guards for the Embassy. MSD members were also used in the Ambassador’s protective detail. Security Engineer Officers (SEOs) and US Navy Seabees also arrived.
and began to install and reinstitute technical security systems.

During the course of reestablishing the Embassy, agents came to know members of the Kuwaiti Royal Guard Force. One turned out to be a graduate of a DSS dignitary protection training course. Another was wearing a US Federal Law Enforcement Training Center insignia. He knew many DSS agents and told of his gratitude for the DSS training he received. He stated he had used the training, particularly the driving skills, as a member of the Resistance.62

Approximately one month later, the team completed its mission and returned to the US. DSS continued to send in support until the security situation stabilized. In other locations, DSS provided similar support, often with DOD assistance.

By the time Desert Shield/Storm drew to a close, DSS successes were noted in the most basic of terms: No Americans killed by terrorist acts, all posts secured, and those facilities which were closed were reopened safely.63

Riyadh

In the latter part of July 1990, before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the RSO in Kuwait contacted the RSO in Riyadh and reviewed evacuation procedures from Kuwait to Dhahran. RSO Kuwait explained there was a growing concern that the Iraqis would take over the Kuwaiti oil fields and thus would likely prompt an exodus of large numbers of Americans to Saudi Arabia.

RSO Riyadh advised the Embassy Country Team. A decision was made to send a group of embassy representatives, including the RSO, to the
US Consulate General (CG) in Dhahran to review contingency plans and offer additional assistance for such an evacuation. The team arrived, prepared contingencies, and waited. RSO Kuwait contacted RSO Riyadh and advised that Kuwait and Iraq had reached agreement over their differences. Therefore it appeared Americans would not be hastily departing. The Riyadh team then returned to post.

On July 31, 1990, the RSO was notified by a Saudi Government liaison contact that an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was anticipated within days. The contact stated Saudi citizens were quickly departing Kuwait and expected out by day’s end. The RSO passed this information to the Ambassador and appropriate Country Team members.

During this period, many reports regarding Iraqi intentions were received, and it was difficult to determine their degrees of creditability in such a short time. Nonetheless, contingency plans were still in place in the event Americans decided to evacuate.

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Americans, both official and unofficial, began leaving. The Riyadh team quickly departed for Dhahran to assist the CG.

The Dhahran CG is located on a 60-acre compound. The American school is co-located on this site. The team set up on the compound and at points near the Saudi-Kuwaiti border to handle the American evacuees. The team also drew up contingency plans to evacuate Americans from the eastern Saudi provinces to Riyadh. Of the approximately 36,000 Americans in Saudi Arabia, some 14,000 were in Eastern Province, where the most of the oil fields are located. After team processing operations began, the RSO returned to Riyadh.
During the initial days of the invasion, many rumors began to circulate as to Iraqi intentions for the Saudi Kingdom. This led to a sense of panic among many of the resident Americans. The RSO took on the responsibility of rumor control. As a result of OSAC guidance and local initiatives on the part of the RSO, an ad hoc council composed of local American business executives and the RSO, had been previously established. This group's purpose was to act as a liaison between the Embassy and the private sector for security matters. The council was a two-way street for information sharing. As rumors rapidly emerged, the RSO was able to accurately keep things in perspective because of his contacts with the Saudi government, private sector, and pertinent USG agencies. This was not an easy task because of the large number of rumors and the time it took to determine the creditability of each one. The RSO and his staff's efforts calmed the fears of the American community.

In mid-August 1990, three members of an American family, including children, were shot and killed in their car by a Saudi male in downtown Riyadh. The Saudi police investigation indicated the killer had been involved in drug trafficking and was fleeing police pursuit. During his escape attempt, the man came to a busy intersection and saw an expatriate group in a car. The group was the American family. By threatening them with a gun, he gained entry into the vehicle because he thought being with Westerners would give him sanctuary from the police. He then forced the driver to exit the area, but the police pursued in a high-speed chase and soon cornered the car. As the police closed in, the man panicked and shot members -52-
of the family, killing three.

This event led to rumors of a terrorist attack, and panic again began to spread. The RSO contacted Saudi Police and was informed of the actual circumstances. He then spent long hours making the facts known to the American and certain expatriate communities. This averted alarm and prevented hysteria among these groups.

By August 10, 1990, all commercial flights in and out of Saudi Arabia had ceased because of the Iraqi invasion. The Embassy began planning and instituting alternate transportation for Americans desiring to leave. DOD was called upon for assistance, and NEO operations commenced. The RSO was involved in this activity.

In the third week in August, General Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief, Central Command (CENTCOM), his staff, and supporting units arrived in Riyadh and set up their operations. The RSO was soon overwhelmed by visits and requests for assistance from CENTCOM forward headquarters, staffs of subordinate units, USAF Office of Special Investigations, US Army Criminal Investigation Division and Military Police, US Naval Investigative Service, etc.

As US and coalition military presence grew, the demands on the RSO increased. He met with the CENTCOM Director of Intelligence (J-2) and discovered they had previously served together at another diplomatic post. Therefore, an informal as well as a formal work relationship was quickly established. In order to serve the needs of CENTCOM and the Embassy country team, it was agreed that bi-weekly intelligence/law enforcement briefings would be held at the Embassy.

These briefings were chaired by the RSO. The main purpose of
these meetings was to exchange pertinent information and ensure that uniform threat levels were being reported by all agencies. Embassy attendees included appropriate agencies involved in such activities. Military representatives were designated and approved by the CENTCOM J-2. It was soon discovered that a private sector country council representative possessed a valid government clearance, and he was permitted to join the briefing group. His contributions provided information from the large private sector community and were of immense value. These meetings continued until May 1991.

As Desert Shield began, the unofficial American community grew apprehensive about staying in Saudi Arabia. Within the Embassy Country Team, there were differing views on the situation. Some wanted to encourage Americans to stay, thus demonstrating faith in the Saudi Government's ability to protect interests; others felt that during this crisis, it would be best for many of the 36,000 people to leave as soon as possible. This would allow for fewer non-combatants to be exposed to potential wartime dangers and reduce the NEO burden of both the Embassy and DOD. This issue remained unresolved until the life-over-operations guidance was received from Washington and reinforced with the two visits of the DSS Agents. In the meantime, all Americans who wished to leave were assisted by the Embassy. The RSO, by virtue of his rumor control duties and position in the American private sector ad hoc council, was a major conduit in addressing concerns and offering advice and assistance to both the Country Team and the American community.

Since Iraqi actions had occurred in August, many official and
unofficial Americans were on vacation and out of the country, especially those with school-aged children. Some elected not to return to Saudi Arabia until the situation stabilized. Others, however, did return, particularly those who had lived and worked there for entire careers, such as those employed by the Arab American Oil Company. American schools opened on schedule. The RSO took the lead in developing emergency contingency plans for these schools located in Dharhan, Jidda, and Riyadh. The RSO used DOD assistance in formulating these plans, because the schools were designated as evacuation points.

In order to reach the private sector Americans in Saudi Arabia, the RSO instituted a FAX alert network to disseminate security information. This proved to be the best and most effective way of reaching the greatest number of Americans in the shortest possible time. The RSO also obtained beepers for designated wardens in the American warden alert network. This system again proved its value, especially when Scud attacks began.

Due to the unique nature of life in Saudi Arabia, an understanding of Saudi cultural sensitivities was essential. CENTCOM understood this and required all personnel to have cultural awareness briefings. The RSO was a member of the Embassy team that conducted these briefings for key individuals of commands arriving in-country, who in turn briefed their subordinate units. As the military build-up continued, this became very time consuming. The RSO began a program where incoming commands were briefed and trained. These commands would then be responsible for briefing all assigned
personnel and subsequent incoming units. The program worked so well that no unfavorable incidents occurred during Desert Shield/Shield.

Access to the Embassy needed to be addressed. With the increased numbers of military and civilian government personnel, visitors multiplied, as did the demand for appropriate identification badges. This overloaded control procedures and caused delays. An Embassy full clearance badge became a much sought after item and status symbol. For CENTCOM, the number of requests approached 1000. The RSO met with CENTCOM to work out guidelines concerning who should be issued a badge and who should be handled as a visitor. Eventually, 50 badges were issued, and the remainder of those needing embassy access were placed on a list, and upon display of appropriate identification, issued a temporary full access visitor badge.

As the UN-imposed deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait was announced, official and unofficial Americans voiced concern over availability of chemical protective masks. The number of required masks was over 14,000. The RSO, again working with CENTCOM, was able to arrange for the desired number to be procured, assembled, and distributed to all those who requested them. This was accomplished by mid-January. Not only were the masks issued, but people had to be fitted and trained in their use. The RSO staff successfully undertook this task, including assembly of the 14,000 masks.

With the beginning of the air phase of the campaign, Scud attacks became a major concern. Once a Scud was launched and its direction determined, early alert could be given and targeted areas had seven minutes to prepare. A Patriot Missile, when successful in hitting a
Scud, does not in all cases detonate it in mid-air, but rather causes it to break up into pieces. Therefore, pieces would land in the target zone. The RSO, working with the military, used the warden system to warn of impending attacks and impact areas. As a result, no official or unofficial civilian Americans were injured or killed in Riyadh; and, with the exception of the tragic impact on the military billeting area in Dhahran, no one was killed or injured in Dhahran. This is notable, as there were 18 Scud attacks on Riyadh and 16 on Dhahran.

The beginning of the Scud attacks in Riyadh on the night of January 20-21, 1991, gave rise to many rumors concerning the use of chemical and biological weapons. The RSO addressed the rumors through use of the FAX network and warden system.

In February 1991, a terrorist incident did take place in Jidda. A bus transporting American military personnel was attacked in an ambush. Two Americans were wounded and two Saudis killed. A thorough Saudi police investigation led to the arrest of eight Palestinians who were operating on orders from Iraq. Again rumors spread, but RSO rumor control procedures ameliorated the problem.

With the completion of the 100-hour ground war, priorities shifted for the RSO. He then became the official travel coordinator and logistical support for DSS activities in Kuwait. An example was the immediate support supplied to Ambassador Gnehm, his staff, and the DSS team that went to Kuwait just hours after the capital had been taken. This support would continue long after the completion of the military mission and subsequent drawdown, lasting until the
logistical situation in Kuwait stabilized.

The security arrangements and precautions for endless VIP visits required considerable RSO support. This included a Presidential visit, a Vice-Presidential visit, nine Secretary of State visits, six Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff visits, as well as visits by two-thirds of the Senate and half of the House of Representatives. All visits took place without incident.

The RSO staff, consisting of two DSS agents, the RSO and the Assistant RSO, a secretary, MSG detachment, local investigators, and local guard force, met the enormous challenges and were successful in carrying out the DSS mission to protect and save lives.\textsuperscript{64}

\textbf{Amman}

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Government of Jordan publicly endorsed Iraq's action. This, coupled with the large resident Palestinian population in Jordan, created security concerns for the official and unofficial American community in Amman.

Prior to the invasion, the RSO and his staff (which included three DSS Agents, the RSO, Assistant RSO, New Office Building Site Security Manager, secretary, one SEO, one Navy Seabee, the MSG Detachment, local investigator, and local guards) had maintained very strict security measures because of the possible problems for Americans, given Jordan's political and geographic position. The country was always a potentially volatile place.

Once the invasion of Kuwait occurred, the RSO in Amman increased the tempo of his operations and instituted stricter controls. NEO
planning was further refined, to include evacuation via the Allenby Bridge over the Jordan River into Israel. The RSO coordinated with his counterparts in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem to ensure they could support the plan. The official Americans numbered approximately 110 employees and 150 dependents. Authorized evacuation for official Americans was granted on August 20, 1990 and some chose to leave.

The unofficial American presence was less than 250 and consisted mainly of American spouses of Jordanian citizens, their children, and American teachers. Many believed there was no threat against them and chose to stay. Since the American School decided to remain open, the RSO met with school officials and assisted them in setting up appropriate security contingency plans.

In August, many Americans in Iraq, including the official community, were permitted to depart for Jordan via overland routes. The RSO assisted in the evacuations, including departure from Jordan.

While the Jordanian government officially supported Iraq, it never shirked its responsibility for providing protection to the foreign diplomatic missions. The RSO had established excellent contacts with the National Police, known as the Public Safety Division, who were very professional in the performance of their duties. The police always kept the RSO informed of anti-American activities, such as demonstrations, which were known in advance.

The RSO also maintained informal but active contacts with counterparts at British, Canadian, and German embassies. As tensions increased, those embassies brought in military personnel to strengthen their security posture and provide additional protection.
to their ambassadors. On one occasion, the British Ambassador’s vehicle broke down. He was protected by British Special Air Service (SAS) personnel and they requested RSO assistance until the car could be repaired. The RSO lent them one of the fully-armored vehicles which had been sent to the Embassy by DSS.

Jordan was one of the countries twice-visited by the DSS briefers. As a result of the visits, contingency plans were improved and drawdown lists were finalized. In view of the Iraqi threats of terrorism, the RSO informed DSS that he needed additional agent support for the Ambassador’s protection detail. They were sent immediately and also assisted in other security duties.

Prior to the start of the air war, several incidents took place. The American and Egyptian Defense Attaches’ vehicles were doused with gasoline and burned. There were no injuries or deaths. In another incident, the French Cultural Center was burned. In a third incident, a Canadian military guard caught a Palestinian attempting to break into the Canadian Embassy and set it on fire. The Palestinian was turned over the Jordanian police.

There were a number of pro-Iraq/anti-Coalition demonstrations, but the Police kept the RSO informed as to their locations and provided additional protection to the embassy compound.

On December 26, 1990, an evacuation of non-essential official employees and dependents was ordered. Jordanian Airlines was the only commercial airline still operating and therefore was used for departures. The unofficial American community was advised to leave as well. The teachers left, but most spouses did not. After the
evacuation, 25 official American employees remained in-country. These employees were moved into cloistered housing and protected by the RSO local guard force and mobile patrols.

When Desert Storm began, Iraq obtained Jordanian clearance to place their commercial jets at the Amman Airport. As the Scud attacks began in Saudi Arabia and Israel, there was a demand for protective masks from the unofficial American community. This request could not be honored, and the community was again advised to leave the country or obtain masks through commercial sources.

The Jordanian police did an excellent job of protecting the interests of Coalition countries. However, there were two incidents which occurred against American commercial interests. The Marriott Hotel and the Chase Manhattan Branch Office were hit by weapons fired from passing vehicles. Minor property damage resulted, but there no injuries or deaths. In both cases, the police immediately advised the RSO and kept him informed on their follow-up investigations. No other similar events occurred during the Gulf hostilities.

Desert Storm ended and Jordan artfully regrouped from its previous support for Iraq. It gradually regained its former position as a moderate political force in the Middle East. In April 1990, most of the evacuated Americans began to return. As in Saudi Arabia, the RSO and his staff had effectively met the security challenges, tailored their activities to fit the situation, and produced the same result -- no injuries or deaths to Americans.65
CHAPTER IV

LESSONS LEARNED

Desert Shield/Storm was a victory for US foreign policy. It also was a tribute to the various elements of government uniting to accomplish their particular missions. In achieving success, plans and procedures were put to the test. Some were found to work well, while others did not. In DSS' case, key areas which required improvement or new initiatives included: policy, reaction to threats, contingency planning, and US Government focal point.

Policy

DSS saw the need to take the initiative in defining the State Department policy on evacuations. Prior to the Gulf Crisis, there had been no defined guidance and this led to various interpretations as to the importance of life-versus-operations. This inevitably created mixed signals for COMs in determining when to draw down and/or stop operations. DSS simply stated that in order for it to carry out the mission to protect and save lives a policy that "life was more important then operations" was necessary. A command decision was needed. DSS took an aggressive approach through the chain of command and was successful in getting the Secretary of State to issue such instructions. Given the backdrop of the Gulf crisis and possible terrorist threats, it was important that American lives not be jeopardized for the sake of keeping diplomatic missions open.
in critical threat areas. The White House endorsed this move. The US Government now recognizes this principal in the conduct of foreign relations, and senior leadership and COMs are now fully sensitized to the importance of security and their responsibility to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the safety of American lives. Security considerations are now a part of foreign policy. This is significant, because previously such factors were often ignored when foreign policy was being made. Deputy Secretary Eagleburger’s observations, mentioned earlier in the Introduction, underscore the importance of this achievement.

Reaction To Threats

As the Gulf crisis developed, Saddam Hussein publicly announced that terrorist acts would take place against those countries which opposed him. The US was singled out. This led to numerous threat reports of terrorist activities targeting US interests. No reports could be ignored, and all were investigated to determine creditability. Since the threats were global in nature, forceful action was needed to further counter the potential impact of these threats. DSS recommended to the Secretary of State that US policy become pro-active in deterring these threats. This meant approaching foreign governments at the ambassadorial level, identifying particular threats in their countries, making it a matter of record to request that action be taken to counter the threat, and offering assistance. RS03 often accompanied Ambassadors to assist in demarche presentations. In the past, there had often been reluctance to be
forceful for fear of offending host governments. Most countri
responded to the requests and took appropriate actions, and thus he
incidents directed at US targets to a minimum. In one cas
information turned over to a foreign government prevented a terrori
incident which targeted a scheduled US air carrier flight. Due
the success of this bold initiative, the State Department has n
made this pro-active security stance a matter of official polic
instead of relying on diplomatic subtleties. This policy complimen
the life-over-operations philosophy, in that strong positions ha
now been taken to protect Americans.

**Contingency Planning**

Emergency action plans (EAP) or contingency plans came und
intense review as the Gulf crisis began. Key sections, dealing wi
the evacuation and safehaven policies of overseas posts, were fou
to have been written simply to fulfill a requirement rather than
address realities. Plans seldom reflected the philosophy that li
was more important than operations. Another major shortcoming w
that no procedures had been established for exiting buildings
life-threatening circumstances. No instructions were listed on h
to close embassies and consulates in a manner designed to note a
indications of illegal entry or penetration activity while t
premises were vacated. These shortcomings were noted a
instructions passed to all posts to revise their EAPs accordingly a
to submit corrections immediately. State Department policy al
directs that copies of the EAPs be passed to the appropriate
unified commands. In addition to a DSS review, the commands have an opportunity to examine the plans and use them as databases for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).

DSS also discovered its own plans for closing and reopening posts lacked necessary guidance to take into account booby traps and hostile intelligence service penetrations. DSS had to develop new standards to correct this oversight. Assistance in establishing this doctrine was received from other appropriate agencies, including DOD.

Another area needing further refinement was destruction time for classified information. Critical threat posts were ordered to reduce holdings to an amount which could be destroyed within five minutes. All other holdings were to be pouched back to Washington immediately.

In sum, there is now greater emphasis to COMs for post contingencies plans to be accurate and realistic in addressing emergency scenarios. Within DSS, a new area of contingency planning, post closings and openings, was identified and is now in effect.

**US Government Focal Point**

The Gulf crisis heightened the awareness within the US Government of the role of DSS. By virtue of its history and prescribed mission, it is always been involved in supporting national security objectives, but is not well known due to its low profile. Frequently it is mistaken for other agencies. The actions of DSS in the Gulf crisis focused attention on what had gone unnoticed by many key policy makers, namely that DSS is a valuable partner in national security and foreign policy. Increased recognition came from the
White House, DOD, CIA and other government elements.

DSS provided an accurate accounting of US citizens overseas. It served as a clearing house for security and terrorist-related information for US interests world-wide. DSS provided much of the analysis for the critical threat list used to plan protection of Americans aboard. It coordinated with DOD in arranging evacuations and other types of DOD support in critical threat countries. DSS protected foreign diplomats of targeted countries residing in the US. It served as the vital link to the American private sector with overseas interests and established uniform security policies for all other government agencies operating abroad.

As the focal point for protection of Americans overseas, DSS worked closely with DOD. Initially, there were no formal procedures established for coordination. DSS found the DOD decision-making process in this regard cumbersome, often taking days to get a decision on requests requiring immediate action. DSS representatives met with appropriate DOD officials and received authority to direct coordinate missions and support with individual military commands. The commands were instructed by DOD to honor DSS requests. DOD was totally responsive at a time when priorities were dedicated to Desert Shield/Storm. One example was the dispatch of the USS Inchon to evacuate Americans and foreign nationals from Somalia.

With the end of the Cold War and the passing of the Gulf crisis, DOD missions are being redefined. There is renewed and heightened interest in low intensity conflict (LIC) and special operations. As a result of the Gulf crisis relationship, DOD recognized that DSS w
a natural ally, able to assist in a number of missions, particularly special operations. DSS is the Department's special operations component, has some responsibilities similar to those of DOD, and operates from over 140 world-wide locations. This capability had been overlooked by key DOD leadership, but is no longer the case, as now there is a memorandum of understanding with DSS. One result is that DSS provides certain specialized training to selected DOD personnel, and in turn DOD reciprocates for selected DSS agents. The Service now works jointly with DOD on various LIC planning issues.

Presently, there is one agent assigned to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC). The agent makes recommendations on DOD counterterrorism (CT) and anti-terrorism (AT) policy. He chairs various interagency CT and AT projects and represents OSD during meetings of various DOD committees. DSS, with DOD approval, is establishing liaison positions in each regional unified command. The position will be on the operations (J-3) staff and will coordinate LIC activities between the command, the target countries, and DSS.

Other foreign affairs and law enforcement agencies have long recognized DSS' valuable role and taken further steps to ensure that close working relationships are maintained. The American private sector, as a result of DSS's assistance, remains a strong supporter of the Overseas Security Advisory Council functions. More companies have joined the Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) information network.

The results speak for themselves. DSS plays an important role in national security, and the Gulf crisis clearly proved the point.
DSS - PARTNER IN NATIONAL SECURITY

Senior leadership is cognizant of the role of the State Department in national security and foreign policy; however, few are familiar with DSS' supporting role. DSS is the operational arm of the State Department for the protection of American lives and property abroad. Given the evolution of its history in response to threats to American interests, that responsibility has become more diverse, to include special operations capabilities.

DSS has a unique advantage that few other government agencies enjoy. It has the capability to provide various security related services in every country where the US has diplomatic ties. DSS is an overt operation and has professional relationships with police security, or military organizations in most countries of the world.

The Service does not duplicate the missions of other government agencies, but rather offers a different set of eyes, ears, and assistance. As an example, for the American law enforcement community, DSS is their representative in countries where these agencies have no resident offices. DSS conducts liaison with host country law enforcement officials to facilitate investigative requests, conducts investigations upon request, and arranges visit in foreign countries for American law enforcement agencies who have official business with host government officials.

DSS is a collector of information related to the safety o
Americans, although it is not an intelligence agency, *per se*. It does not compete with others who have a similar mission, but offers a security perspective for relevant information. Timely information has permitted DSS to protect American and foreign diplomatic personnel and other targets, to warn American officials of threats against them, and to expose the intentions of various terrorist groups to friendly countries. Not only have DSS provided authorities with advanced terrorist information, thus permitting steps to be taken to minimize possible damage, but it also helps in locating suspected terrorists and their patrons. This role was quite apparent during the Gulf crisis, both in the US and abroad.66

Since 1985, DSS has worked with American companies having overseas operations on security problems of mutual concern. This information exchange is a productive two-way street. The thousands of employees of US international businesses abroad represent a vast pool of information pertinent to potential security threats and incidents overseas. This relationship has become an outstanding joint venture and an effective vehicle for security cooperation.

DSS is one of the key organizations involved in counterterrorism research and technology. For example, in January 1988, DSS hosted a "Security Awareness Day" in the Department. Among items displayed was a firing range system that DSS helped to develop. It was designed to test both reflexes and judgments. Users of the system are placed in the role of protective agents and are confronted on a large video screen with a number of potential, though often ambiguous, threats known as shoot/no shoot situations. This system
is used to train DSS agents and other personnel going to high
terrorist threat posts.67

Several years ago, DSS developed a course called "Coping with
Violence Abroad". The course provides briefings to State Department
personnel being assigned overseas on how to deal with natural
disasters, criminal acts (including rape, riots, and other civil
disturbances), and, most importantly, terrorism. The course includes
guidance on how to cope with violence-related stress, such as being
taken hostage, and includes instruction related to being a member of
a hostage victim's family. The course proved so effective that in
1984 attendance was made mandatory for all personnel being assigned
to overseas diplomatic missions. The policy remains in effect
today.68

DSS coordinates all security activities for high-level American
government officials visiting overseas. This includes the President,
Vice President, Cabinet Secretaries, and other dignitaries such as:
agency heads, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc.

DSS offers assistance in the following areas:

1. Counter-terrorism.
2. Anti-terrorism Assistance.
3. Law Enforcement Matters.
5. Investigative Matters.
7. Overseas Private Sector Liaison.
10. Liaison with Foreign Country Law Enforcement and
    Security Organizations.

With this wide range of expertise, DSS offers senior leadership
valuable asset in national policy and security decision-making. A
budgets shrink, many agencies will have overseas activities curtailed or eliminated. DSS can help to fill that gap in areas noted. It offers skilled personnel to provide the kind of information and assistance necessary to assist in those agencies’ missions.

For example, it has been very useful to DOD at a time when the military is going through dramatic mission and personnel changes. With the end of the Cold War, there is no longer an East-West confrontation, and the former Soviet military has ceased to be a threat. The US military is in transition and priorities are being redefined. Major armed conflicts are unlikely; however, low intensity conflicts may increase. The US can expect to be involved in some manner in such conflicts in the foreseeable future. As the Desert Shield/Storm analysis indicated, DOD and DSS have worked well together. With reduction or elimination of DOD overseas presence, DSS offers ways and means to assist military planning and operations in low intensity conflict situations.

In sum, DSS is an organization with broad responsibilities. It operates world wide, is able to adapt quickly to changing national security situations, and offers the full range of security options necessary to protect and defend American interests. Therefore, DSS can assist key leadership in important ways in the execution of foreign policy and national security responsibilities.
POSTSCRIPT

Our Nation is deeply indebted to all those men and women who have devoted their careers to protecting American diplomatic and consular posts. As you well know, the successful execution of United States foreign policy depends on the safety and the integrity of our personnel, our facilities, and our communications. The hundreds of agents, engineers, couriers, and civil servants who work in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security provide a tremendous service to all Americans, and I welcome the opportunity to thank you for a job well done.70

These comments were made by President George Bush on November 21, 1991, on the occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Diplomatic Security Service.

Two months earlier, Congress had passed a Joint Resolution designating November 4, 1991 as "Diplomatic Security Day" to honor the men and women of the Diplomatic Security Service for so ably providing security for the nation’s diplomatic activities.
APPENDIX I

ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) is a component of the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security. This appendix provides an organizational overview of the State Department, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, DSS and describes DSS responsibilities.

Department of State

The Department of State (DOS) is composed of the Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Deputy Secretary, four Under Secretaries (Political Affairs, Economic and Agricultural Affairs, International Security Affairs, and Management), Office of the Counselor, Office of the Inspector General, seven director-level offices, and 19 Bureaus. Each Bureau is headed by an Assistant Secretary; major sections within a bureau are headed by Deputy Assistant Secretaries. See DOS Organization Chart, Figure 1.

Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)

The Assistant Secretary (AS) for DS advises and assists the Secretary of State in the formulation of security and information management programs of the Department of State. The AS directs security policy implementation to provide a secure environment for the conduct of American diplomacy and the promotion of American interests worldwide.71
DS is comprised of three major directorates: DSS, Information Management and Systems Operations (IMSO), and Resource Management (RM). The structure of DSS will be explained below; IMSO and RM are each headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary. Information Management is responsible for global Department communications and systems operations. Resource Management is responsible for administrative services for the Bureau. Figure 2 contains the DS Organization Chart.

Diplomatic Security Service (DSS)

DSS has approximately 1300 Foreign Service and Civil Service employees. This includes approximately 800 Special Agents (SA), 180 Security Engineers (SEO), 60 Diplomatic Couriers (DC), and 300 special support staff. Approximately 250 SAs, 80 SEOs, and 40 DCs are posted overseas. There are also approximately 1400 US Marine Security Guards (MSG) and 125 US Navy Seabees assigned to DSS and under its operations control. Approximately 1300 MSGs and 110 Seabees are assigned abroad.

The head of DSS has two titles: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS) for Diplomatic Security and DSS Director (DS/DSS). He reports to the Assistant Secretary (AS) for DS.

DSS activities include: Operations, Countermeasures and Counterintelligence, and Emergency Plans and Counterterrorism. The Director oversees Operations, while the other areas are headed by Deputy Assistant Secretaries (DAS). Figure 3 shows The DSS Organization chart.

The Director, DSS has the following responsibilities:

1. Serves as the senior deputy to the AS for DS.
2. Directs the day-to-day operations of the DSS.
3. Oversees the world-wide security program for the protection of life, facilities, and information.
4. Directs the Department's security clearance program.
5. Oversees DSS domestic and world-wide law enforcement and protective security responsibilities.
6. Advises the AS for DS, the Under Secretary for Management, and the Secretary of State on the formulation and implementation of security programs and policies.
7. Oversees legal support to DS, including legislative, regulatory, and procedural matters.
8. Chairs the Overseas Security Policy Group, whose members include the security directors of the foreign affairs and intelligence agencies represented at diplomatic missions abroad.
9. Chairs the Secretary's Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), which promotes cooperation between the American private sector having overseas interests and DOS.
10. Responsible for the following DSS Operations:
   a. Overseas Programs.
   b. Protection.
   c. Investigations.
   d. Intelligence and Threat Analysis.
   e. Field Office Management.

The Director, DSS oversees the activities of the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). It is a joint venture between DOS and the American private corporations and businesses having activities abroad and was established to interact on overseas security problems of mutual concern. The functions are to:

1. Promote cooperation on security-related issues between American private sector interests world-wide and DOS.
2. Establish liaison and provide for operational security cooperation between DSS and the private sector.
3. Provide for regular and timely interchange of information between the private sector and DSS concerning developments in protective security.
4. Recommend methods and provide material for planning and implementation of security programs.

OSAC provides the private sector with timely unclassified security-related information by means of a computerized Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) system. Information includes threats and attacks against US personnel and property, violent crimes, local unrest and natural disasters. The information flow is a two-way
street in that the private sector also provides pertinent informatic
from their sources. Presently, there are over 1200 companies on the
OSAC mailing list and more than 700 firms subscribing to the EBB. 74

OSAC established "country councils" in selected foreign citie
where there are large American business communities. A council i
comprised of key business representatives and a DSS Regional Securit
Officer; its purpose is to exchange security information and promot
cooperation on other security issues of mutual concern. 75

A. Operations

Operations is composed of the Overseas Security Advisory Council
Overseas Operations, Protection, Investigations, Intelligence ar
Threat Analysis, and Field Office Management.

Overseas Operations (OP) provides oversight and direction for th
all Regional Security Offices (RSO). These offices are staffed t
approximately 250 DSS Special Agents located in over 140 world-wid
locations (see Figure 4). OP responsibilities include:

1. Ensuring DSS overseas security programs and
activities are responsive, effective, and conforms with DS
directives and DOS policy and procedural guidelines.
2. Providing primary DS contact for all DOS elements
and other USG agencies for security programs and activities.
3. Participating in planning and review of security
services, including DSS overseas personnel assignments.
4. Reviewing and monitoring progress of security
projects and programs at overseas posts.
5. Coordinating overseas security activities and
issues with posts, DOS elements, and USG agencies.
6. Coordinating the establishment of priorities for
all DS programs at overseas posts.
7. Coordinating overseas security program briefing
papers and related materials for DS/ DOS senior management.
8. Reviewing overseas security operations.
9. Providing technical assistance to overseas posts. 76
Like DOS, OP has regional sections for Africa, America Republics Area, East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Canada, and Near East and South Asia.

OP provides guidance for RSOs assigned to Embassies and Consulates overseas. The RSO is the principal advisor to the Chief of Mission (COM) on security-related matters and is a member of the Country Team. He/she is responsible for protection of assigned USG personnel, diplomatic facilities, and pertinent classified material. The RSO designs, implements, and manages programs for threats posed by terrorists, criminals, and hostile intelligence services.

OP supervises the DS Coordination Center (CC), a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week operation with the following responsibilities:

1. Receiving, coordinating, and disseminating security related information from US and foreign sources to DS, other appropriate DOS offices, and USG agencies.
2. Providing secure telephonic communication links with both domestic and overseas USG agencies and missions.
3. Supporting DSS missions with its computerized information retrieval systems.
4. Making routine and emergency notifications to DSS action offices, as well as to other pertinent DOS Offices including the Operations Center.
5. Providing communications with protective security details and telegraphic communications with RSOs world-wide.
6. Receiving, analyzing, collating, processing, and disseminating incoming DSS communications to DSS offices.

Protection (P) is responsible for the protective security of the Secretary of State, dignitary protection, and DOS protective liaison programs. It supervises DOS programs for protection of foreign missions and officials in the US, including the reimbursement of state and local jurisdictions for expenses incurred in the protection of foreign diplomatic and United Nations missions and officials.

Its three divisions are: the Secretary’s Detail (SD), Dignitar-
Protection Division (DP), and the Protective Liaison Division (PL).

The Secretary's Detail (SD) has 40 Special Agents (SAs). It provides protection for the Secretary, both in the US and abroad, comprehensive security coverage for his/her residence, and protection of the Secretary's family, as required.79

DOS is mandated by law to protect visiting foreign dignitaries beneath the head-of-state level. DSS has the responsibility for this requirement. DSS and US Secret Service (USSS) have similar missions and often work together, particularly when the President and Secretary of State travel together. The Dignitary Protection (DP) Office adjudicates requests for protective services to visiting foreign officials, selected resident foreign officials, selected USG officials, and determines appropriate levels and types of protection to be provided. Each fiscal year, DP manages 100 to 200 protective details for visiting foreign officials and special events involving multiple protectees such the United Nations General Assembly, Mid-East Peace Talks, international sports events such as the Pan Am games and the Olympics. P's activities require coordination with the USSS, DOD, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.80

The Protective Liaison (PL) Office maintains liaison with appropriate USG agencies, foreign governments, and state/local law enforcement agencies in matters effecting the DOS's protective responsibilities. It conducts protective security briefings, obtains police protection for foreign diplomatic and consular missions, assists foreign embassies in handling security threats, and gives guidance on security aspects of diplomatic and consular immunity.81
Intelligence and Threat Analysis (ITA) has these responsibilities:

1. Analyzes intelligence and provides current threat assessments for policy and operational purposes to DSS, senior DOS management, and overseas locations.
2. Monitors and analyzes threats directed against USG personnel abroad, senior USG officials, visiting foreign dignitaries, and foreign diplomats resident in the US.
3. Conducts liaison with the intelligence community.
4. Conducts intelligence liaison with certain nations.
5. Participates in compiling the Department's classified composite threat list. Categories include crime, terrorism, human intelligence, and technical intelligence.

ITA annually publishes an unclassified widely-disseminated document entitled Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans. The document gives a comprehensive report on overseas political and criminal violence against US interests that occurred during the year. ITA produces classified material on terrorist groups, including their modus operandi. This data is utilized by appropriate USG agencies. ITA has liaison with certain foreign governments who are involved in terrorism information collection and analysis.

Investigations (I) supervises the following investigative programs:

1. Passport, visa fraud, and illegal passport crimes.
2. Counterterrorism.
4. Munitions Control.
5. Employee Misconduct.
6. Other Special Investigations.
7. Investigations and investigative assistance abroad for other USG agencies.
8. Protective Intelligence.
9. Liaison with INTERPOL and El Paso Intelligence Center, El Paso, Texas.
10. Rewards Program for prevention and suppression of terrorism.

Its five divisions are: Criminal Investigations, Counterterrorism, Personnel Investigations, Evaluations, and Document and Information Services. Investigations are conducted by special agents (SAs).
assigned domestically and overseas.

Field Office Management (FLD) supervises 9 DSS field offices and 13 resident agent (RA) offices in the US, employing 300 SAs. Figure 4 for locations.

DSS FOs and their subordinate RA offices conduct investigations to provide protection to foreign dignitaries and resident officials, carry out security-related liaison with Foreign Diplomatic and Consular Missions located in the geographic region of the FO, liaison with local and federal law enforcement agencies for information and intelligence sharing purposes.

FLD administers the contract security investigator program. Investigators assist in domestic background investigations. FLD serves as the contracting officer’s technical representative for the program.

B. Countermeasures and Counterintelligence (CMI)

CMI is headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary who manages countermeasures and counterintelligence programs. He reports to DSS Director and the AS for DS. His responsibilities include:

1. Formulating security policy for the countermeasures and counterintelligence programs.
2. Representing DOS in negotiations with other USG agencies on security issues regarding countermeasures and counterintelligence.
3. Representing DOS in meetings with other countries having mutual security concerns.
4. Planning, analyzing, and evaluating programs which effect DOS security, both domestically and abroad.
6. Chairing the Joint Special Projects Office Steering Committee.
7. Directing and providing management oversight of:
   b. Counterintelligence Office.
Security Technology (ST) is comprised of five divisions: Countermeasures Programs, Security Technology Operations, Plain Test Processing Equipment, and Joint Security Programs Office. ST’s responsibilities are to:

1. Provide technical security expertise, equipment, and services in support of DOS activities domestically and abroad, including:
   a. Electronic and mechanical security systems.
   b. Vehicle ballistics armoring.
   c. Technical security countermeasures.
   d. Automated information systems security.
   e. Plain text processing equipment.
   f. Emanations security.
   g. Shielding.

2. Serve as DOS technical security program point of contact with USG intelligence community.

3. Provide technical security support to the Secretary of State, both domestically and abroad.

4. Provide management direction and policy guidance to one domestic and 33 overseas Engineer Service Centers (ESCs) and Offices (ESOs).

5. Design, develop, and test technical security systems and equipment for DOS facilities.

6. Coordinate the technical countermeasures program with appropriate USG offices.

7. Coordinate with the U.S. Navy for Seabee support for security programs and activities.

8. Conducts research, development, and evaluation.

The Countermeasures Programs Division (CMP) manages the domestic and overseas technical countermeasures program and integrates the operations of other USG agencies with those of DOS. It serves as the principal point of contact for technical countermeasures issues with other members of the intelligence and security communities.

The Security Technology Operations (STO) Division coordinates security engineer service support including technical security issues.
involving security technology and overseas missions. Security Engineer Officers (SEOs) staff the ESCs and ESOs. Most have advanced degrees in engineering fields. Overseas, SEOs work for the RSOs and are key members of DSS Teams assigned to overseas. Presently, there are 150 SEOs, of which 80 are posted overseas.\footnote{87}

STO operationally manages the Naval Support Unit (NSU) and assists DOS construction security tasks. NSU has an authorized strength of 125 Seabees and is commanded by a Navy officer, usually a Lieutenant Commander. It manages the Seabee program in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between DOS and the Department of the Navy.

ST collects information and conducts analysis on technical threats to overseas missions, security systems, and classified information. It protects plain-text office equipment such as automated information systems, copiers, and typewriters from compromise. ST coordinates special interagency programs.\footnote{88}

The Counterintelligence Office (CI) directs DOS’s worldwide defensive counterintelligence program. CI monitors, identifies, and neutralizes foreign intelligence efforts directed against DOS foreign affairs interests. CI conducts investigations concerning:

1. Allegations of espionage.
2. Technical penetration.
3. Developmental targeting.
4. Recruitment and recruitment attempts by foreign intelligence services.
5. Exploitable conduct by foreign intelligence services.
6. Suspect activities involving DOS Foreign Service National Employees.
7. Other matters relevant to counterintelligence.\footnote{89}

CI develops intelligence research and publishes documents related to counterintelligence matters, administers the counterintelligence...
Awareness program, and conducts security screening of DOS personnel and contractors assigned to certain countries.

CI's was formerly from the old SY Special Assignment Staff. Before the 1987 Bracey-Longtree cases, involving two US Marine Security Guards and the KGB, the staff has 10 persons. Now there are 50 agents and specialized staff assigned to this vital mission. Aside from headquarters, CI is located at the US Consulate General Frankfurt and the US Embassy Moscow. CI has active working relationships with the FBI, Naval Investigative Service, and other pertinent USG agencies.

The Physical Security Programs Office (PSP) formulates policies, establishes program priorities, and directs the development and implementation of physical security and security logistics programs at overseas posts for DOS and other USG agencies under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Mission. PSP has three divisions: Physical Security, Facilities Protection, and Protective Equipment and Logistics.90

The Physical Security Division (PSD) defines, approves, and implements physical security programs for the protection of overseas personnel, facilities, and national security information. It provides project managers and/or coordinators for physical security renovations or modifications to existing overseas DOS facilities and ensures security standards are implemented for new office buildings (NOB). PSD determines NOB construction security needs. It recommends and implements policies/procedures for Congressionally-mandated NOB certifications and renovation/rehabilitation projects.

PSD develops minimum physical security and related standards for overseas facilities. It recommends policies and develops procedures

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to ensure that construction and other materials destined for over
installations are provided the necessary protection from the ti
acquisition until installation. PSD manages the American ( Program which secures DOS transit warehouses.91

The Facility Protection Division (FPD) manages the guard
residential security programs required for protection of over
diplomatic facilities and residences. Programs include Mi
Security Guards (MSGs), local national guards, and reside
security protection measures.

There are 1400 Marine Security Guards operationally assign
DSS. These personnel are assigned administratively to the Mi
Security Guard (MSG) Battalion (Bn), Quantico, Va. and Headquar
USMC. The Bn is comprised of a Bn Headquarters and five Companies
commanded by a Colonel. The Company Commanders are Lieut
Colonels. Overseas, MSGs are assigned to over 140 Embassy
Consulate Detachments, which are commanded by Staff Sergeants:
higher depending on size. Detachments range in size from 6
MSGs. Detachment size is determined by diplomatic post size
threat assessment. These detachments are under the operat
supervision of the RSO and are responsible for security i:
facilities on a 24-hour/7 day-a-week basis. FPD maintains li
with the Bn CO and staff and recommends policy regarding
operations. It is a member of the MSG School Screening Board,
school advisor in curriculum matters, and provides instructors
courses. FPD reviews MSG disciplinary cases and deter
suitability for continued service in the program. FPD formulates

-84-
funding proposals and monitors various accounts supported by DOS. 92

FPD manages the Diplomatic Security Guard program at posts where there are no MSGs assigned. FPD manages local guard program (LGP). The LGP provides perimeter security at DOS facilities and at the residences of certain employees under the COM jurisdiction. FPD manages the planning, development, and implementation of world-wide residential, and overseas school security programs. 93

The Protective Equipment and Logistics Division evaluates and procures all protective and special equipment and manages the armored vehicle program. It participates in USG interagency committees involved in physical security standards for security containers, locks, doors, and similar security hardware. 94

The Information Systems Security Office (ISS) develops, interprets, and recommends security policies, standards, guidelines, requirements, and programs for DOS telecommunications, information processing, and office automation systems, both overseas and domestically, and other USG agencies assigned overseas. ISS performs risk analysis, security evaluation, and internal control reviews of DOS information systems. It develops appropriate countermeasures for the protection of equipment and systems against waste, fraud, abuse, loss, and clandestine collection activities by foreign organizations.

ISS conducts security accreditation studies of DOS data-processing installations that process foreign intelligence information for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research as required by the Director of Central Intelligence. It represents DOS in interagency organizations and specialized groups on matters of telecommunications and...
The Procedural Security Office is responsible for DOS information, industrial, and operations security programs and manages these programs at domestic DOS facilities. It recommends policies for classification and safeguarding of national security information used by DOS and provides on-site security for its protection.

PRD administers the information security education and training program for employees having access to classified information. It conducts surveys and inspections to ensure compliance with information security programs and administers the security violation program including communications security infractions.

PRD also manages the guard program at DOS domestic facilities; directs responses to threats and incidents involving employee, visitors, and property; and coordinates security for dignitary visits, special events, and classified conferences at domestic facilities.

C. Emergency Plans and Counterterrorism (EPC)

The Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for EPC is responsible for DSS programs regarding Counterterrorism Assistance, Emergency Plan and the Diplomatic Courier Service. The DAS reports to the Director and the AS for DS. His responsibilities are to:

1. Provide direction within DOS guidelines on counterterrorism programs involving assistance to DOS missions and foreign countries.
2. Develop emergency planning programs for DOS posts and coordinate with other appropriate USG agencies.
3. Manage and administers the Diplomatic Courier Service.
4. Chair the Training and Assistance Group of the
Policy Coordinating Committee to provide intra-departmental and interagency coordination on issues antiterrorism assistance issues.97

EPC is organized into three offices: Counterterrorism Assistance, Emergency Plans and Exercises, and the Diplomatic Courier Service.

The Counterterrorism Office (CTP) develops and manages anti-terrorism assistance (ATA) programs under provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. ATA programs are designed to:

1. Enhance the anti-terrorism skills of friendly countries by providing training and equipment.
2. Strengthen bilateral ties with friendly nations.
3. Increase respect for human rights by sharing modern, humane, and effective antiterrorism techniques.98

CTP oversees development of strategic plans for anti-terrorism training and related assistance which reflects DOS policy guidance and establishes the rationale for geographic and country-specific priorities. CTP works closely with the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, which provides overall policy guidance and coordinates the decision process to ensure the proposed country’s policies are consistent with US foreign policy. CTP designs the programs and implements it with the recipient country.

During Fiscal Year (FY) 1990, the seventh full year of program operations, 49 countries from throughout the world (12 for the first time, including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland) participated in one or more elements of the program. The program include executive seminars, program design and development, training and related activities, and evaluations. Training in the US was provided to some 1,400 individuals from 44 countries. Over 500 other individuals participated in seminars offered in the respective countries. Since
the program's inception in 1984, nearly 70 countries and over 11,000 individuals have participated. Figure 5 lists the countries.99

The Emergency Plans and Exercises Office (EPE) develops and coordinates emergency planning programs and contingency planning for DOS overseas posts. It manages these programs in coordination with DOS and other USG agencies, particularly DOD.100

EPE reviews and tests DOS overseas post emergency and contingency plans through such means as crisis management exercises (CMEs). In FY 90, CMEs were conducted at 33 posts. It also provides support required to DOD directed and Joint Staff-coordinated exercises.101

EPE also coordinates all DOD support related to evacuation and emergency planning for DOS overseas locations, and coordinates with DOS regarding DOD programs related to counterterrorism contingency planning. It is DOS's representative at interagency forums and groups concerned with emergency and contingency planning for overseas diplomatic posts. EPE provides representation and expertise required in response to crisis situations, including DOS task forces.

The Diplomatic Courier Service (DC) manages and administers DOS diplomatic pouch system. DC is responsible for the secure and expeditious transmission world-wide of classified/sensitive correspondence, equipment, and materials in support of DOS activities and other agencies represented overseas. DC represents the US on matters regarding courier services, missions, and governments of other nations and international organizations involving diplomatic courier issues. It provides secure control during transportation of sensitive materials used in construction projects overseas and it
for controlled sensitive areas of DOS overseas installations. DC has a close working relationship with the DOD Armed Forces Courier Service. DC has three regional locations: Bangkok, Frankfurt, and Washington. DC joined DSS in 1987 and most couriers are agents.

**Resource Management (RM)**

The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Resource Management (RM) administratively supports to the DS Bureau. Within RM, the DSS Office of Professional Development (PDS) formulates and coordinates programs to promote the training and professional development of DSS personnel. This includes professional security and law enforcement training for SAs, SEOs, Couriers, Seabees, and MSGs. Courses range from a few days to 21 weeks. Over 50 courses are offered. PDS also provides specialized security training to Ambassadors, Senior overseas post managers, DOS employees, and other USG personnel assigned to high threat posts.

The DSS Mobile Security Support Division (MSD) consists of specially trained DSS agent teams who travel world-wide to provide specialized training at overseas posts on a variety of security and security-related topics, on a scheduled and emergency basis. In offering 25 different courses for both US and Embassy Foreign National employees, MSD teams conducted 332 classes for over 8,300 participants at overseas posts in FY-90. MSD provides emergency operational security support to overseas posts during periods of high threat, crisis, or natural disaster. It also coordinates overseas activities with ITA and OP. In 1990, MSD deployed on 17 occasions.
Location of Principal Diplomatic Security Offices

Figure 4
The following countries have participated in one or more activities of the ATA Program since its inception in 1984 through September 30, 1990:

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<td>Antigua Barbuda</td>
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<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
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Figure 5
APPENDIX II

GLOSSARY

ANC: African National Congress.

AS: Assistant Secretary.

ASD/SOLIC: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

AT: Anti-terrorism.


Bn: Battalion.


CENTCOM: Central Command. One of the Department of Defense's unified geographical commands.

CG: Consulate General. An overseas diplomatic facility.


CIA: Central Intelligence Agency.


CO: Commanding Officer.

COM: Chief of Mission. Senior diplomatic representative, can either be an Ambassador or Consul General.

CSA: Chief Special Agent. First Security Office of the Department of State.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTP:</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Programs Office. A Diplomatic Security Service activity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAS:</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEA:</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration. A Department of Justice agency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIA:</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency. A Department of Defense agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD:</td>
<td>Department of Defense.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS:</td>
<td>Department of State. Also referred to as the State Department or the Department.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Diplomatic Security. A Department of State operational Bureau.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS/DSS:</td>
<td>Director, Diplomatic Security Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD:</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPIC:</td>
<td>El Paso Intelligence Center.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAX:</td>
<td>Facsimile.</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation. A Department of Justice agency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLD</td>
<td>Field Office Management. A Diplomatic Security Service activity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Field Office. A Diplomatic Security Service domestic installation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPD</td>
<td>Facility Protection Division. A Diplomatic Security Service activity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year.</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>Intelligence and Threat Assessment Office. A Diplomatic Security Service activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>Department of Defense Unified Command Intelligence Directorate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>Department of Defense Unified Command Operations Directorate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGP</td>
<td>Local Guard Program. A Diplomatic Security Service activity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low Intensity Conflict.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>Marine Security Guard.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIS</td>
<td>Naval Investigative Service. A United States Navy agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOB</td>
<td>New Office Building.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council.</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NYPD:</td>
<td>New York City Police Department.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDAS:</td>
<td>Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSO:</td>
<td>Regional Security Officer/Regional Security Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA:</td>
<td>Special Agent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAS:</td>
<td>Special Assignments Staff. An Office of Security Counterintelligence and Special Investigations activity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SD:</td>
<td>Secretary of State’s Protective Detail. A Diplomatic Security Service activity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seabee:</td>
<td>Euphemism for United States Naval Construction Battalion (CB) member.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEO:</td>
<td>Security Engineer Officer.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SF:</td>
<td>Special Forces. A United States Army organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN:</td>
<td>United Nations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>US:</td>
<td>United States.</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCS:</td>
<td>United States Customs Service. A Department of Treasury agency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG:</td>
<td>United States Government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC:</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps.</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSS:</td>
<td>United States Secret Service. A Department of Treasury agency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIP:</td>
<td>Very Important Person.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ENDNOTES


7. "Bannerman Interview."


9. Ibid. The first of numerous convictions of communists for violating the passport laws was that of Alfred Wagenknecht, who fraudulently obtained a passport in 1922 under the name of Alter Frederick Bonstrup. He was fined $100.

10. Ibid.

11. "Looking Back."

12. "Bannerman Interview."

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. "Looking Back."

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17. "Bannerman Interview."

18. Ibid.


20. "Bannerman Interview."


24. Ibid., p. 5.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. "Looking Back."


30. Ibid.


33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., p. 34.

36. Ibid., pp. 45-46.


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40. Ibid., p. 3.

41. Ibid., pp. 3-4.


43. Ibid.


49. Ibid., p. 3.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

52. Ibid., p. 4.

53. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

54. Ibid., p. 5.


57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., p. 2.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
72. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
73. Ibid., p. 12.


75. Ibid.


77. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

78. Ibid., p. 25.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.


82. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

83. Ibid., p. 17. This is a $2 million program and has recently been supplemented by another million dollars from the Air Transport Association (ATA). ATA’s contribution is for information on terrorist activities against aviation. The supplement was a result of the Pan Am 103 bombing. Note: Two DSS Agents and the brother of another agent, who was a USG employee, were aboard Pan Am 103.

84. Ibid., p. 24.

85. Ibid., p. 27-28.

86. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

87. Ibid., p. 31.

88. Ibid., p. 33-34.

89. Ibid., p. 35.

90. Ibid., p. 36.

91. Ibid., p. 39.

92. Ibid., p. 41.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid., pp. 42-54.
95. Ibid., pp. 55-58.
96. Ibid., pp. 58-59.
97. Ibid., pp. 59-60.
102. Ibid., pp. 69-71.
104. Ibid.
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