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GENERAL A.P. HILL, C.S.A., LEADER-WARRIOR:
A STUDY OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP

BY

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Jordan, Jr.
United States Army

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**Abstract:**
This paper studies and presents concepts of senior leadership competencies extracted from; Field Manual (FM) 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, Clausewitz's Chapter Three, "On Military Genius," On War, and Sun Tzu's, Chapter IV, "A Discussion of Generalship," The Art of War. The major focus of the paper will be an historical analysis of the senior leader competencies of General A.P. Hill during his command at the Division and Corps levels. This study attempts to identify General Hill's strengths and weaknesses as a senior leader in combat. Additionally, this study attempts to prove that General Hill was a soldier - senior leader - warrior worthy of study by U.S. Army War College students and other future military senior leaders.
GENERAL A.P. HILL, C.S.A., LEADER-WARRIOR:
A STUDY OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL A.P. HILL
COMMANDER, 3d CORPS, C.S.A.

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"Soldiers will forget the daily success and accomplishments of their units - but they will never forget the character and integrity of their commanders!" 1

Mike Bingham
Ltc, Infantry

INTRODUCTION

During the course of an academic year at the United States Army War College the curriculum provides an excellent opportunity for students to study leadership at the senior and strategic levels. Throughout every course and block of instruction leadership is researched, analyzed, and discussed to determine strengths and weaknesses. Understanding our current Army doctrine and philosophical perspectives of such greats as Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and others is important to this process of learning.

The importance of studying leadership from a historical perspective is clearly defined in FM 22-103. It states that in order to establish and maintain a historical perspective, senior leaders must read and study history. The knowledge of history provides a fundamental basis of understanding and knowledge. It is from this knowledge that leaders should gain a sense of purpose, moral strength, analytical skills, and calmness in the face of future uncertainties.2

The purpose of this paper is to present an analysis of a famous historical figure, General A. P. Hill, C.S.A., one of Lee's 1.
Lieutenants. It will analyze his competencies as a commander at the Division and Corps level.

This paper will use the Army's doctrine from FM 22-103 as it relates to senior leader competencies, Clausewitz's theory on military genius, and Sun Tzu's theory on generalship, as the framework for analysis. Through this analytical approach it will present the strengths and weaknesses of Hill. It will provide facts that will substantiate that General A.P. Hill is worthy of study as a senior leader - warrior - commander.

...once a force is engaged in battle, superior combat power derives from the courage of soldiers, the excellence of their training, and the quality of their leadership.

...execution of doctrine depends on skillful and competent senior leaders.3

FM 22-103
CHAPTER 1

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The intent of this framework for analysis is three fold. First, and most importantly it defines the doctrinal competencies which a senior leader should have. Secondly, it is designed to abbreviate, clarify, and interpret the philosophical definitions of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Thirdly, it is intended to limit the scope of this study. Additionally, this framework should provide the reader a thorough understanding of the authors analytical approach to studying the senior leader competencies of General Hill. An explanation of all three sources of reference follows.

First of all a look at FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, which defines leader skills and competencies. There are numerous field manuals, training circulars, and other doctrinal publications that address many various aspects of leadership. The focus on the above cited reference is an attempt to narrow the scope, provide clarity and common understanding of applicable definitions. From the author's perspective the following competencies are significant when analyzing a senior leader.

FM 22-103 defines competency skills as those skills which provide a senior leader with the confidence to be flexible, the courage to face change, and the willingness to apply ones conceptual skills fully. The competency skills are:
**PERSPECTIVE:** Perspective skills allow one to rise above detail and view a situation in its entirety. They demand that senior leaders or commanders be able to look at an event or a requirement and contrast its present utility with its long-term importance to establish its context and relevance.

Perspective is necessary to practice tactical and operational art. When correctly mastered, perspective skills foster an ability to determine quickly the context and relevance of an event. They provide those in senior positions with the capability to reconcile the "art of the possible."

**ENDURANCE:** The ability to be present at critical places and times, look to the well-being of soldiers, and teach and develop subordinates depends on solid endurance skills. Only with endurance can senior leaders or commanders maintain patience, sense of humor, and perspective while sharing the hardships and frustrations of their units and soldiers.

Endurance skills have two components - physical and mental. Senior professionals who have good endurance are energetic and involved, worthy of emulation, and clear and fresh in thought and action.

**RISK TAKING:** Risk taking means making needed decisions in varying degrees of uncertainty. Risks are necessary for outnumbered forces. Risk are calculated decisions made carefully; they are not gambles. They are based on a fundamental undertaking of the commander's intent.

Competent risk-takers know what risks they are taking. They understand that it is a matter of perspective.

**COORDINATION:** Coordination skills include activities designed to enhance the ability of elements of the organization to work together. At more senior levels, ... one must continue to demonstrate this competency by broadening the ability to include activities internal and external to the organization.
Internally, senior professionals create units and teams that understand and can respond. Externally, they articulate the problems, positions, ethos, and philosophy of their organization so that its activities receive the necessary support.

**ASSESSMENT:** Assessment skills are important to senior professionals because they provide the capability to determine the condition of organizations and then develop strategies to respond to identified strengths and shortcomings.4

A look at the Clausewitzian theory of military "genius" from ON WAR, reveals a similar assessment of competencies. However, when compared to the Army doctrine in .FM 22-103, Clausewitz takes a more scholarly approach and has a greater focus towards senior leader traits during the conduct of war.

Clausewitz defines "genius" by assessing it from a military perspective and emphasizes that military genius is not one trait or competency, but rather a combination of different elements, according to his definition.

"genius" refers to a very highly developed mental aptitude for a particular occupation.

Genius consist in a harmonious combination of elements, in which one or the other ability may predominate, but none may be in conflict with the rest.5

Understanding the second quote is probably the essence of Clausewitz's theory on military genius. An analysis of the elements or competencies which he considers in assessing military genius is abbreviated in the following definitions.

5.
COURAGE: Courage is of two kinds: courage in the face of personal danger, and courage to accept responsibility.

Courage in face of personal danger is also of two kinds. It may be indifference to danger, which could be due to the individual's constitution... Alternately, courage may result from such positive motives as ambition, patriotism, or enthusiasm of any kind.

INTELLECT: ... A sensitive and discriminating judgement is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.

... an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth ...

Clausewitz further explains his concept of intellect by relating the above quotation to the French term "coup d'oeil" which he defines as the inward eye, and the concept merely refers to the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection.

DETERMINATION: Determination in a single instance is an expression of courage; if it becomes characteristic, a mental habit. But here we are referring not to physical courage but to the courage to accept responsibility, courage in the face of moral danger.

"Determination" also applies to a propensity for daring, pugnacity, boldness, or temerity.

PRESENCE OF MIND: Is nothing but an increased capacity of dealing with the unexpected.

Whether this splendid quality is due to a special cast of mind or to steady nerves depends on the nature of the incident ...
This next and final competency selected from the writings of Clausewitz is only identified through very careful study of his writings. The term is ambition. He does not make it as obvious as his other definitions.

**AMBITION:** Of all the passions that inspire man in battle, none, we have to admit, is so powerful and so constant as the longing for honor and renown. Other emotions may be more common and more venerated – patriotism, idealism, vengeance, enthusiasm of every kind – but they are no substitute for a thirst for fame and honor.

An analysis of another great military philosopher, Sun Tzu, reveals a more direct approach in defining the requisite competencies of a senior leader. These competencies are addressed by Sun Tzu as; five matters to which a general must pay strict heed. They are defined very simply as:

**ADMINISTRATION:** means to control many as he controls few.

**PREPAREDNESS:** means that when he marches forth from the gates he acts as if he perceives the enemy.

**RESOLUTION:** means that when he approaches the enemy he does not worry about life.

**PRUDENCE:** means that although he has conquered, he acts as if he were just beginning to fight.

**ECONOMY:** means being sparing in laws and orders so that they are not vexatious.

The description of the framework for analysis is almost complete. During the research of General A.P. Hill the
abbreviated list of terms depicted in figure 1 was used to maintain focus.

figure 1

**SENIOR LEADERSHIP**

**FM 22-103**

PERSPECTIVE
ENDURANCE
RISK TAKING
COORDINATION
ASSESSMENT

**CLAUSEWITZ**

COURAGE
INTELLECT
DETERMINATION
PRESENCE OF MIND
AMBITION

**SUN TZU**

ADMINISTRATION
PREPAREDNESS
RESOLUTION
PRUDENCE
ECONOMY

8.
He was unknown to me but as I noticed his military bearing and soldierly appearance I felt that in taking me in to his military family I was to be thrown with a great soldier and from that moment on I loved him with all a young soldier's love and I was with him until he died ... 8

Captain Murray Forbes Taylor
C.S.A., (April 1861)

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND OF GENERAL A.P. HILL

Ambrose Powell Hill was born on November 9, 1825 to an affluent family in Culpepper, Virginia. His ancestors were aristocrats, descendants of English royalty. Hill's grandfather served in the American Revolutionary War as a Colonel under the command of "Lighthorse Harry", the father of General Robert E. Lee.9

At the age of seventeen Hill entered West Point Military Academy. Some of his classmates who also achieved great fame during the Civil War were Thomas J. Jackson, George E. Pickett, Fitz John Porter, George B. Mc Clellan, Henry Heth, and Ambrose E. Burnside. Hill's tour at the military academy was disrupted by illness and he graduated a year late after a medical furlough. He graduated fifteenth of thirty-eight in 1847.10

After his commissioning as a Brevet Second Lieutenant, Hill served in Mexico, Florida and Texas for several years. In 1855 he volunteered for duty in Washington D.C. During that tour of duty he was promoted to captain, the rank he held when he
resigned his commission from the U.S. Army in March 1861. Hill immediately took an appointment as a Colonel of Infantry in the Virginia Volunteers. Colonel Hill was highly respected by General Joseph E. Johnston as a great young leader, organizer, and trainer. On February 26, 1862, he was promoted to Brigadier General and soon after was given command of a brigade. As a Brigade Commander Hill led his men to a victory in the battle of Williamsburg, May 5, 1862. As the Army of Northern Virginia rapidly grew, the need for division commanders created an opportunity in which Hill emerged as a young Major General at the age of thirty-seven. He was promoted to Major General on May 26, and placed in command of what later became known as the famous "Light Division".

Hill commanded at the division and corps level with great distinction during the period June 1862 until his death in April of 1865. His division played a leading role in the Seven Days Campaign. He later proved his worth at Cedar Mountain and at the Second Battle of Bull Run. His most celebrated achievement was at Harpers Ferry and more importantly, his timely arrival at the battle of Antietam. Additionally, at Fredericksburg Hill's troops, especially those under the command of Brigadier General James J. Archer played a key role in stopping General Meade.

In the reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia following the death of Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville, Hill was promoted to Lieutenant General, May 23, 1863, and given
command of Lee's third, (III), Corps. Hill's corps opened the battle of Gettysburg and sustained severe losses.13

In October 1863 Hill experienced the most devastating defeat of his career at the battle of Bristoe Station. He launched an assault against two entrenched corps with two brigades which resulted in fifteen hundred losses in forty minutes of fighting.14 Hill did achieve victory and redeem himself as a commander in future battles. One historian, James Robertson, has written, "Hill was Lee's most dependable general in the last year of the war."15

After the battle of the Wilderness in May 1864 Hill's illness (a kidney disease) caused him to be absent from the battle of Spotsylvania. After enduring many months of siege at Petersburg Hill again took leave of absence due to his illness in March 1865.16

On April 2, 1865 the Federals launched a major attack into the Confederate lines at Petersburg. Hill left General Lee's headquarters and was attempting to establish communications with Heth's division on his right flank. He and his courier encountered numerous groups of Federals and were attempting to bypass a large group when they came upon two lone Pennsylvania infantrymen, who, when confronted with surrender by Hill, killed him. The courier escaped to notify General Lee of the tragedy.17
Lieutenant General A.P. Hill was memorialized May 30, 1892, in a residential area in Richmond, Virginia. The Memorial Day ceremony, a two-hour parade, observed by an estimated 15,000, was compared as second only to the honors bestowed upon General Robert E. Lee. The most fitting eulogy to General A.P. Hill came from Colonel Venable of General Lee's staff.

In him fell one of the knightliest Generals of that army of knightly soldiers. On the field he was the very soul of chivalrous galantry. In moments of the greatest peril his bearing was superb and inspiring in the highest degree. ... The name of A.P. Hill stands recorded high on the list of those noble sons of Virginia at whose roll-call grateful memory will ever answer: 'Dead on the field of honor for the people they loved so well.'
He was always an easily recognizable figure. Five feet, nine inches tall, he weighed but 145 pounds and was called "Little Powell". Hill rarely wore a uniform or insignia. He commanded in shirt sleeves (preferring a bright red shirt for battle) and was never without a revolver, sword, field glasses, and a pipe, which he smoked regularly.20

The Confederate General

In reference to commanders of corps with the rank of lieutenant general, of which you request my opinion, I can confidently recommend Generals Longstreet and Jackson, in this army. ... Next to these officers, I consider General A.P. Hill the best commander with me. He fights his troops well, and takes good care of them.21

General R.E. Lee

CHAPTER 3

DIVISION COMMAND

Major General A.P. Hill took command of his "Light Division" in June 1862 and relinquished command when he was promoted to Lieutenant General and placed in command of General Lee’s third (III) Corps, in May 1863. A look at Hill’s first battle identifies some senior leader competencies which remain as a stigma with Hill throughout the remainder of the war and with his reputation in history. Specifically, from the moment General A.P. Hill prematurely launched his "Light Division" into the battle of Mechanicsville, he earned the reputation for being restless and impetuous in action.22 There are various theories...
in regard to the Confederate shortcomings during this first battle of the Seven Days Campaign. It appears that General Lee's Order Number 75 was extremely clear, and that General Jackson was undisputedly late. The issue here however is General A.P. Hill's actions. Hill's report of the battle in the official records reads, with "no intelligence from Jackson or Branch, I determined to cross at once rather than hazard the failure of the whole plan by longer deferring it."23

An analysis of Hill's aggressive action to proceed without Jackson reveals the following assessment of leader competencies in regard to his first battle. The competencies of perspective, risk taking, and coordination are clearly relevant to this situation. Hill failed to rise above the detail and view the situation in its entirety, which can be assessed as an example of his lack of perspective.24 It is also apparent that Hill took an unreasonable risk in order to achieve the overall plan or that he gambled because of a lack of perspective.25 Lastly Hill failed to coordinate externally with Jackson or Lee.26

When assessing this first battle the competencies of courage, intellect, determination, presence of mind and ambition from Clausewitz are equally relevant. Hill demonstrated courage to accept responsibility. In this example personal courage is also a consideration, possibly motivated by ambition, patriotism, or enthusiasm.27 It is possible that his intellectual
judgement was tainted by his courage and determination. Hill's presence of mind was lacking. Recorded history does not reflect any evidence of an effort on Hill's behalf to deal with the unexpected. Ambition is possibly a factor. One cannot determine the motivation of that ambition; patriotism or loyalty to Lee's plan or a thirst for fame and honor.

In assessing this example Sun Tzu's competencies of preparedness, prudence, and economy are applicable. Keeping in mind that this was Hill's first battle as a division commander, a battle of such magnitude, it is questionable that he understood the enemy capabilities. In looking at the entire plan it is clear that he lacked prudence and economy.

Hill commanded six brigades in his "Light Division's" first battle, 14,000 men; one source states that their losses at Mechanicsville on the first day were approximately 800. While yet another source states that Hill's losses the first day were 1,400. The Seven Days Campaign consisted of a series of battles fought over a seven day period, therefore many of the official reports were not submitted for days, months or ever, which may account for discrepancies in the casualty figures. Hill, like many other Confederate generals was apparently willing to accept extreme losses in order to achieve the desired end or objective. In Hill's report some months later he wrote: "It was never contemplated that my division alone should have sustained the shock of this battle, but such was the case...."
The Seven Days Campaign ended with both armies in need of rest, reorganization, and reconsolidation of forces. It was during this period that Hill's division was attached to Jackson. One could speculate that Hill harbored ill feelings toward Jackson due to Jackson's lateness at Mechanicsville. This theory is purely speculation and is not documented.

General Lee was very perceptive. He attached Hill's division to Jackson, by a written order that clearly demonstrated General Lee's knowledge of his subordinate commanders.

A.P. Hill you will, I think, find a good officer with whom you can consult, and by advising with your division commanders as to their movements much trouble can be saved you in arranging details, as they can act more intelligently. I wish to save you trouble from increasing your command.

General Lee's guidance was not well received by Jackson, who was offended by this direct form of counseling. Thus the feud between Jackson and Hill begins.

An incident occurred on August 7 and 8, 1862 when Jackson's forces were moving towards the future battlefield of Cedar Mountain or Cedar Run. He had given movement instructions on the evening of the seventh. A mixing of forces occurred, causing a severe delay. Jackson claimed that Hill was properly briefed and Hill insisted that he was not. The result was a confrontation between the two. On September 4, a similar conflict resulted
from Jackson's perception that Hill failed to execute his command responsibilities by not properly or aggressively taking action to halt stragglers. Again, the two senior officers argued over the issue and as a result Jackson placed Hill under arrest for neglect of duty.39

As we analyze Hill's actions in this feud with Jackson we can identify senior leader competencies that are both relevant and deficient. Hill has demonstrated another example of his failure to realize the importance of external coordination.40 Whether it was Hill's shortcoming or that of his staff is not relevant; the deficiency existed. Hill may have exhibited personal courage by standing up for his beliefs and rights with his superior commander.41 His actions however, could be construed as lacking in intellect because of his inability to sense the truth and accept criticism versus fighting the issue.42 His actions demonstrated an inability to apply the competencies of preparedness and prudence. Hill chose to fight Jackson rather than to conform.43

On September 13th, Hill requested that he be removed from arrest in order to resume command of his division in the forthcoming battle of Harpers Ferry.44 To reinforce the childishness of this feud the request was initiated by Hill through Captain Henry Kyd Douglas (a member of Jackson's staff) to Jackson. Jackson released Hill from arrest that same day.45 His decision to reinstate Hill was a wise one because Hill
was instrumental in Jackson's success at Harpers Ferry and more importantly Hill was the saving grace at the battle of Sharpsburg or Antietam. His division arrived with a divine presence, at the right place and at the right time, to stop Burnside's penetration.46

General A.P. Hill was respected as a commander - leader - warrior - fighter by Generals Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson. He was also held in very high regard by his men.47 According to one authority Hill was,

Genial, approachable, and affectionate in private life, he was restless, and impetuous in action. He did not hesitate to risk heavy losses for substantial gains, but he was prompt in moving his troops, maintained good discipline, and had the good opinion of his subordinates and unquestioning confidence of his soldiers.48
I never saw troops march as ours do; they will go 15 or 20 miles a day without leaving a straggler and hoop and yell on all occasions. For this, all the credit should go to the corps commander. Genl Hill thus far has managed the march of his Corps and I think will give as much satisfaction as Lt. Gen’l as he did as Maj. Gen’l. 49

Major General Willian Dorsey Pender

CHAPTER 4

CORPS COMMAND

Lieutenant General A.P. Hill assumed command of Lee’s third (III) Corps in May 1863 and remained in that position until his death, April 2, 1865. The death of Stonewall Jackson and Lee’s strategy of attacking north to secure materials for his army caused Lee to reorganize and create a third corps. The first major battle under this new organization would be the battle of Gettysburg.50

The initiation of action in Gettysburg was caused by Hill’s Corps. Heth’s Division was foraging for supplies when they encountered a federal cavalry unit. Hill reported this to Lee and was instructed not to bring on any action. Jennings C. Wise, in The Long Arm of Lee, writes,

His orders were specific not to bring on action, but his thirst for battle was unquenchable ... and, as we shall see, took control of the situation out of the hands of the commander - in - chief. It was Hill, therefore, who committed the second great mistake of the Confederate campaign, the practical elimination of the cavalry being first.51

19.
Lee was made aware of Hill's contact on 1 July, when he heard the sounds of his guns in Gettysburg. He was not pleased, because he did not want to fight without cavalry.52

Hill dispatched Heth's division to move forward. Heth and Hill were aware of the presence of Federals in Gettysburg, but believed them to be cavalry only. Neither general wanted to share in the apprehension expressed by Captain Young of Pettigrew's staff.53 The results of which turned out to be devastating for numerous reasons.

As a result of Hill's illness he planned to travel that day with Anderson's division and therefore, he was not forward when the fighting began. Due to his illness and Lee's plan for the following days, Hill's role was that of supporting Longstreet's Corps rather than commanding his own.54

An assessment of Hill's actions at Gettysburg revisits some of the deficiencies already identified. His lack of perspective in this situation was most probably influenced by his lack of endurance.55 If Hill had been forward to reconnoiter, he might have been able to prevent the unhealthy meeting engagement which took place. He was in the wrong place at the wrong time. This failure of not being forward precluded him from making an accurate assessment.56 He knew that General Jeb Stuart's cavalry was unavailable. Lee's intelligence information was derived by informants and not confirmed in any way by his own
cavalry. These factors reinforced the need for Hill to have been forward. This is one situation where he possibly lacked courage as a direct result of a lack of enthusiasm. Additionally, Hill's actions indicate an absence of intellect and determination. Lastly, Hill's failure to take command and control of the situation clearly indicates a failure of the competency of administration or control.

Hill's participation in the Gettysburg campaign was insignificant and uneventful. His corps took significant casualties on the first day and was then subordinated to Longstreet's control for the remainder of the fight. The third corps losses at Gettysburg exceeded 7,600 men.

July to October 1863, was a period of time for Lee's Army to recover from its losses at Gettysburg. The next major confrontation was to be the battle of Bristoe Station. Lee's plan was to pressure Meade's right flank and force him to withdraw.

On the morning of October 14th, Hill rode at the lead of Heth's Division, anxious to make contact with retreating union forces. As they advanced before dawn they came upon abandoned campfires, knapsacks, and overcoats which littered the roadsides. Hill rode to high ground overlooking Bristoe Station and Broad Run Creek. He could see union soldiers moving north towards Manassas. What Hill failed to see was three entrenched union divisions of Warren's II Corps, over 3,000 men. He ordered Heth to attack what he thought was a fleeing and confused enemy.
at the ford site on Broad Run Creek. When he gave that order, Heth only had two of his four brigades in line, and Hill's other divisions were not close enough to support. During the forty minute battle Hill lost 1,378 soldiers at Bristoe Station.62

Hill's admission of failure is clear in his after action report of 26 October. "I am convinced that I made the attack too hastily ...." 63 Hill as before acted impetuously, he failed to reconnoiter the area, he attacked in a piecemeal fashion, and he clearly circumvented his subordinate chain of command. Assessing the leader competencies of Hill at Bristoe Station show him at a low point as a corps commander. He clearly lost all perspective due to his over zealous desire to destroy the withdrawing Union force.64 His quick decision to attack is a reflection of gambling versus risk taking.65 He also violated the competency of coordination. His orders and actions caused a piecemeal attack. He commanded Heth's division and basically excluded the rest of his corps. Hill's strength of courage again is not challenged. He exhibited personal courage on the field of battle and the courage to accept responsibility as noted in his admission of fault in his after action report.66 Hill's intellect is at fault by virtue of his poor judgement. His overwhelming determination and boldness cost him dearly in a loss of men and reputation.67

In a letter to his wife Dorsey Pender wrote " for this all the credit should go to the corps commander. Gen'l. Hill
thus far has managed the march of his corps and I think will give as much satisfaction at Lt. Gen’l. as he did Maj. Gen’l. 68

Pender, severely wounded at the battle of Gettysburg, died before the battle of Bristoe Station. Some less flattering remarks were made about Hill after the bloody debacle at Bristoe Station. One of Jackson’s former staff officers wrote that “Hill was a fool and a woeful blunderer,” and other comments such as “unpardonable mismanagement,” “slaughter pen,” “a gross blunder on the part of our corps general,” were made by others after the battle.69
Usually when people discuss generals they consider only courage. Courage is but one of many qualities of generalship. Now a courageous man is certain to engage recklessly and without knowing the advantages. This will not do.70

Sun Tzu

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

General A.P. Hill achieved success and fame as a division commander. This was due in part to timing. He was in the right place at the right time and served with other great leaders such as Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet. Another aspect of his success can be attributed to the early stages of the war being the most successful period for the Confederacy.

Hill was a courageous leader - warrior - commander. He was consistently bold and daring in battle and he clearly demonstrated administrative control between battles. Unfortunately, he never mastered the competencies of perspective, risk taking, or coordination as defined in FM 22-103. He also failed to exhibit the competencies of intellect and presence of mind as prescribed by Clausewitz. It was Hill's courageous, bold, tenacious leadership that endeared him to his men and his superiors.

Hill's senior leadership failure was not learning from his own experiences. He repeatedly took action without exercising
sound judgement, intellect. He took gambles rather than prudent risk. His failings in leadership were a product of his overwhelming courage which clouded his judgement. Additionally, he repeatedly failed to exercise the requisite level of coordination. Hill was a courageous leader but he lacked perspective and a balance of the other competencies required for success.

Sun Tzu stated, "Courage is but one of many qualities of generalship. Now a courageous man is certain to engage recklessly and without knowing the advantages. This will not do."71 This quote describes Hill.

Clausewitz in his explanation of military genius says, "What we must do is to survey all those gifts of mind and temperament that in combination bear on military activity. These, taken together, constitute the essence of military genius."72 Hill did not demonstrate the ability to exercise his gifts in combination.

The Army's current senior leader competencies outlined in FM22-103 states, "Senior professionals who exhibit the appropriate competency skills are resourceful and have energy, self-discipline, balance, and expertise."73 Hill's missing ingredient was balance.

Hill's health deteriorated to such a state in the final days of the war that he was absent more than he was present. His periodic bouts with illness were a detractor from his effectiveness, but not an excuse for his lack of balance or perspective on the field of battle.
James I. Robertson, Jr. wrote an accurate assessment of Hill when he said,

Promotion to Corps command had in essence separated him from the ranks - he had to watch while others participated. It was not a natural role for Hill; he never handled it well, and it brought him more frustration than fulfillment. Hill never bridged the gap from direct leadership to senior leadership.

The competencies used for this study from FM 22-103 and Clausewitz are exceptional. The clarity and relevance of definition are extremely meaningful when applied to an analysis of a specific situation, such as an historical example. Sun Tzu's discussion of generalship is meaningful, but was of less value because it lacks the descriptive detail provided by the other sources.

This study might well serve as a recommendation for the United States Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management to consider using the method of analysis outlined in Chapter 1. This method provides a structured process which accommodates a two fold learning objective. It causes the student of senior leadership to have a greater appreciation and understanding of doctrine. Secondly, it gives a definitive focus for studying leadership. This method is superior to the unstructured process used in Course One.
INTRODUCTION

1. Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Bingham, Infantry, Deputy Commander, 177th Armor Bde, is quoted from a personal letter written to the author on the subject of leadership, friendship, and discipleship. (26 Nov 91)


3. Ibid., i.

CHAPTER 1

4. Ibid., 31-34.


6. Ibid., 101-105.


CHAPTER 2

8. Murray Forbes Taylor Papers, Harrisburg Civil War Round Table Collection, Archives, U.S. Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. The quote is an extract from a letter written by M.F. Taylor to his grandson. The content of the letter addresses his experiences during the civil war as a member of General A.P. Hill's personal staff.


11. Schenck, Up Came Hill, 8.


15. Ibid., 98.


18. Ibid., 324.

19. Ibid., 326.

CHAPTER 3


23. OR., Vol., 11, 835.


25. Ibid., 33.

26. Ibid., 34.

27. Clausewitz, *On War*, 100-104.

28. Ibid., 101-102.

29. Ibid., 100.


28.
34. OR., Vol. 11, 836.


37. Ibid., 269-271.

38. OR., Vol. 12, Part II, 214-216.


42. Ibid., 101-102.


44. Davis, *They Called Him Stonewall*, 323.


47. OR., Vol. XI, Part II, 759.


CHAPTER 4

49. Robertson, *General A.P. Hill*, 204.


54. Ibid., 206-215.


56. Ibid., 34.
58. Ibid., 101-103.
60. Robertson, *General A.P. Hill*, 225.
61. Ibid., 234-236.
62. Ibid., 238-239.
65. Ibid., 33.
67. Ibid., 101-103.
68. Robertson, *General A.P. Hill*, 204.
69. Ibid., 239.

CHAPTER 5

71. Ibid., 161.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


31.


