FORGING A NEW NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY IN A POST-COLD WAR WORLD:
A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE JOINT STAFF

Harry E. Rothmann
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STRATEGIC CONCEPTS IN NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY SERIES

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Comments pertaining to this publication are invited and may be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed by calling the Conference Organizer, Dr. Gary L. Guertner, commercial (717)245-3234 or DSN 242-3234.

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FOREWORD

In January 1992, the first unclassified National Military Strategy document was published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The document outlines how the armed forces intend to implement the defense requirements contained in the President's National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense policies spelled out in the Defense Planning Guidance.

Colonel Harry Rothmann served as a member of the Joint Staff and direct participant in the formulation of the National Military Strategy. This study is an insider's account of the process and people involved.

The National Military Strategy represents the calculations of objectives, strategic concepts, and resources by the nation's military leadership. The process depends not only on the Chairman's strategic vision, but also on the informal personal relationships that cut through interservice rivalry and parochialism, building consensus by persuasion and compromise. The real test of the current National Military Strategy will be the effectiveness of these same tactics during future budget deliberations.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this study as a reference for those staff officers who one day will participate in the process described here, and for students at senior service colleges and elsewhere who study national military strategy.

KARL W. ROBINSON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
OF THE AUTHOR

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FORGING A NEW NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY IN A POST-COLD WAR WORLD: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE JOINT STAFF

This report concerns the role of process and people in the making of the U.S. National Military Strategy in the immediate aftermath of the cold war. Although the title suggests that the perspective is from the Joint Staff, the view is really of a Joint Staff officer who has observed and participated in the forging of that strategy. Hence this is a personal account, with all of the biases and prejudices familiar to such endeavors.

The report consists of two parts. The first examines the new military strategy as a major departure from previous cold war military strategies in the calculations of ways and means. The second compares and contrasts the way military strategy was supposed to be made, and the manner in which the major participants really developed it. In this latter part, the author concludes that people and not process were more important in the forging of the new strategy. He further proposes that strategic formulation is more art than science, more judgment than fact. He also makes some observations on the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act on strategic formulation, and stresses the importance of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in the process. The main theme is that strategic vision is vital to formulating strategies.


The National Military Strategy, 1992, was released in January. The roots of that strategy can be found in a number of sources ranging from the President's speech at Aspen on August 2, 1990 and General Powell's speeches on the "Base Force," to the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) of March 1991 and the National Security Strategy Report to the Congress in August 1991. The strategy's military objectives are summarized at Figure 1. They are derived from and support the national interests and security objectives detailed...
in the National Security Strategy. In many ways U.S. interests, security objectives and military objectives—the ends of the strategy equation—have not changed. Indeed, they reflect what our nation's leaders unanimously have observed: that despite the dramatic changes of the last several years the United States has enduring global interests and must continue to remain involved in the world.

On the other hand, major changes in the security environment demand changes in the way we view the pursuit of those ends. So with the demise of communism and the break up of the Soviet Union into a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Administration has argued that U.S. security policy has significantly shifted from one of containment to one of "engagement." As the President has noted on several occasions, continued U.S. leadership is indispensable to ensure orderly transition to a new world order—an environment based upon global community values

<table>
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<tr>
<th>NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DETER OR DEFEAT AGGRESSION, SINGLY, OR IN CONCERT WITH ALLIES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- DETER MILITARY ATTACK BY ANY NATION AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, ITS ALLIES, AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHOSE SOVEREIGNTY IS VITAL TO OUR OWN, AND DEFEAT SUCH ATTACK, SINGLY, OR IN CONCERT WITH OTHERS, SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ENSURE GLOBAL ACCESS AND INFLUENCE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- PROTECT FREE COMMERCE: ENHANCE THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY; GUARANTEE U.S. ACCESS TO WORLD MARKETS, ASSOCIATED CRITICAL RESOURCES, AIR AND SEA LOCOS, AND SPACE; AND CONTRIBUTE TO U.S. INFLUENCE AROUND THE WORLD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROMOTE REGIONAL STABILITY AND COOPERATION</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL STABILITY THROUGH MILITARY PRESENCE, MUTUAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AND DISCOURAGE THEREBY, IN CONCERT WITH OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER, POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES INIMICAL TO U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>STEM THE FLOW OF ILLEGAL DRUGS</strong></td>
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<td>- STEM THE PRODUCTION AND TRANSIT OF ILLEGAL DRUGS AND THEIR ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMBAT TERRORISM</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- PARTICIPATE IN THE NATIONAL PROGRAM TO THWART AND RESPOND TO THE ACTIONS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS</td>
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Figure 1. National Military Objectives.
and international consensus and action. This significant shift in policy, reflecting not only dramatic changes but also enduring realities, is fundamental to the new military strategy. Indeed, this new policy and its associated geopolitical changes necessitate changing the focus from a threat based strategy to one that is interest and capabilities based. In addition, the end of the cold war has shifted the U.S. strategic purpose from one of waging a global war against the Soviets to one of managing regional matters of vital interest. Much more will be said about these transformations later.

The National Military Strategy and Its Ways.

The new military strategy consists of a dozen interrelated military strategic concepts shown in Figure 2. Collectively, these concepts (referred to as strategic foundations and principles) are the way in which we intend to use or ensure the use of military force to achieve the objectives. Many of these
concepts are familiar. Yet, several represent a significant departure from previous military strategies. For instance, the combination of forward presence with crisis responses represents a change from a cold war strategy of forward defense with significant forward stationed forces backed up by rapid reinforcement. The new concepts focus on retaining enough forward deployed or stationed forces and CONUS-based forces to provide certain functions and capabilities, and to create certain effects. The intended effects of forward presence are to show commitment, to lend credibility to our alliances, and to enhance stability. The functions and capabilities that both concepts afford are the ability to respond to regional crises through readiness and the capability to deploy rapidly, prepositioning supplies and infrastructure, combined military organizations, and exercises. The two concepts also take into account the realities of anticipated changes to resources available for the strategy.

A second set of concepts that together represent a significant change in our military strategy consists of strategic deterrence, strategic defense and reconstitution. Although strategic deterrence has been a military concept since the 1950s and strategic defense since the mid-1980s, the new concepts differ significantly in their scope. They now concentrate on the rising threat posed by global ballistic missile proliferation and the increasing possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch resulting from political turmoil. Therefore, the focus is on primarily ground-based defense systems that can provide protection against limited strikes upon the United States, forward deployed or stationed forces, and our allies. Reconstitution also centers on the possibility of reemerging or emerging global conventional threats. Here the objective is to preserve a credible capability to either forestall any potential adversary from competing militarily with us, or to deter a potential threat from remilitarizing, or, if deterrence fails, to rebuild military power to wage a global conflict. The National Military Strategy further clarifies that reconstitution:

...involves forming, training, and fielding new fighting units. This includes initially drawing on cadre-type units and laid-up military
This set of concepts was, in the formative stages of development, heavily focused on the former Soviet Union. Since the disintegration of the old union and the recent far-reaching nuclear initiatives, the concepts have looked to more generic adversaries. Moreover, the resources that the strategy now anticipates for these concepts are considerably smaller.

There are two other strategic concepts that represent a significant departure from previous strategies—strategic agility and decisive force. Before the sweeping changes of the last three years and before DESERT STORM, the Soviet threat had U.S. strategy formulation concentrated on the Soviet capability to launch multitheater offensive operations on a global scale. U.S. strategy and its supporting plans assumed that there would only be a certain number of days of strategic warning, that the likelihood of Soviet intervention in regional crises was high, that any regional conflict with the Soviets would be a global war, and that the main theater of war would be Central Europe. As a consequence, strategic plans for both global and regional conflicts prioritized force deployments to Europe. For example, the Korean contingency plans had some Reserve forces in lieu of Active because planners assumed the latter would be needed in Europe. In addition, ground forces deployed in Allied Command Europe were not to be in plans for other theaters, nor even in contingency plans in European Command's other area of responsibility.

The geopolitical changes in Europe and in the former Soviet Union have offered an opportunity to alter these planning assumptions and concepts. Changes are incorporated in the phrase, strategic agility. Most simply stated,

The force needed to win is assembled by the rapid movement of forces from wherever they are to wherever they are needed. US forces stationed in CONUS and overseas will be fully capable of worldwide employment on short notice.
The deployment and employment of forces from Europe to Southwest Asia in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM demonstrated this concept. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) now apportions forces for planning based on this concept.

The concept of decisive force also reflects considerable change from previous strategic planning. As the new strategy notes:

Once a decision for military action has been made, half-measures and confused objectives extract a severe price in the form of a protracted conflict which can cause needless waste of human lives and material resources, a divided nation at home, and defeat. Therefore, one of the essential elements of our national military strategy is the ability to rapidly assemble the forces needed to win—the concept of applying decisive force to overwhelm our adversaries and thereby terminate conflicts swiftly with a minimum loss of life.7

This concept highlights three important ingredients for U.S. military strategic planning and employment. First, military force should only be used with the commitment of the Nation to the task at hand. Second, that commitment would have clear and obtainable objectives. Third, the force should be applied in such a manner as to ensure success quickly and decisively. As with strategic agility, DESERT STORM also demonstrated the validity of this concept.

Before turning to the "means" or resource component of the strategy, one other element of the new strategy warrants examination. This element is called adaptive planning. As discussed above, global conflict with the Soviets was the cornerstone of U.S. strategic planning in the 1980s. Those plans, as well as many regional plans, were based upon a set of assumptions about warning, and generally encompassed a single, rigid plan for war. The new strategy's adaptive planning construct, on the other hand, calls for the development of a diverse spectrum of military options—a menu from which the National Command Authority can choose in a crisis. These options are keyed to several different crisis conditions and assumptions about mobilization and transportation capabilities. These strategic plans recognize what Admiral
J.C. Wylie so astutely has argued, "We cannot predict with certainty the pattern of the war or [crisis] for which we prepare ourselves....[And] planning for certitude is the greatest of all mistakes."


The Chairman's "Base Force," portrayed in Figure 3, is the means to carry out the new military strategy. By now this force is fairly well known. What perhaps is not well known is what has determined its size. The Chairman and some members of the Joint Staff began a dialogue on geopolitical and fiscal trends soon after General Powell took office in 1989. This examination, driven heavily by the Chairman's personal views, culminated in a series of papers and briefs entitled "A View to the Nineties." This view represented a best educated guess on the future changing world order and anticipated domestic fiscal constraints. The needs of the new military strategy were

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<tr>
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<th>FY 91</th>
<th>BASE FORCE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRATEGIC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>B-52 + B-1</td>
<td>B-52H + B-1 + B-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBNs</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>16 Divisions</td>
<td>12 Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>10 Divisions</td>
<td>6 Divisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cadre</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Divisions</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NAVY</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ships</td>
<td>530 (15 CVBGs)</td>
<td>450 (12 CVBGs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>13 Air Wings</td>
<td>11 Air Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>2 Air Wings</td>
<td>2 Air Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USMC</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>3 MEFs</td>
<td>3 MEFs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>1 Division/Wing</td>
<td>1 Division/Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>22 FWE</td>
<td>15 FWE</td>
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<td>Reserve</td>
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Figure 3. Force Composition.
then derived by choosing contingencies which could either be anticipated as likely, or by studying scenarios which the group felt were prudent missions for desired future military capabilities. Among these were two major force sizing scenarios and contingencies. One was a return by the Soviet Union to an aggressive military strategy and to force levels predating the conventional force agreements. The second was the need to be able to defend, almost simultaneously, our vital interests in several regions. The changes resulting in the break-up of the Soviet Union subsequently required adjustments to the Base Force as originally envisioned. These changes entailed reductions in strategic forces and adjustments to modernization and procurement programs. The National Command Authority, CJCS, the Joint Chiefs, and the Unified and Specified Commanders consider the remaining force structure shown in Figure 3 as the level necessary to execute the new strategy in the 1990s.

Several observations on the Base Force are worth emphasizing. First, it is a planned or programmed force—one that is designed for the 1995-96 time frame. It is the minimum force deemed necessary to deal with global threats as well as its designers can see them evolving in this decade. Moving to these levels sooner, or falling below them would, in the opinion of the Nation's military leadership, risk the hollow force of the 1970s, and could seriously erode the cohesion of the U.S. military. Of course, if other geopolitical changes occur that warrant further changes, then they could be made. But additional changes must be done prudently; keeping the right balance between Active and Reserve forces, and retaining a joint, coherent, effective warfighting capability. Thus the new National Military Strategy refers to the Base Force as a "dynamic" force. Second, the Base Force is usually addressed in terms of conceptual force packages and supporting capabilities (see Figure 4). This is not meant to be a blueprint for a new command structure, but rather a way the Chairman has conceptualized and judged force sizes and capabilities to support "strategic agility" and "adaptive planning" as described above.
Before discussing the process of developing the new military strategy, three additional observations on the strategy as a whole are important. First, this is not a maritime or aerospace or continental strategy. Rather, it is a comprehensive strategy that seeks to integrate jointly all military capabilities and apply them to protect or promote strategic centers of gravity. The new military strategy also accounts for all forms of national power, considers the American strategic culture of decisive action and national commitment, and recognizes the unique U.S. geopolitical situation as a continental, maritime nation that has aerospace capabilities and the potential to exploit time and distance factors. Second, some early critics of the strategy have argued that it does not "represent a new conceptual approach for a new security era but is essentially 'less of the same,'" that
is, a downsized force largely shaped by cold war priorities.\textsuperscript{12} As indicated in the above discussion, the strategy and its forces have accounted not only for the changes in Europe brought about by the unification of Germany and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, but also the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. The unenviable task at hand now is to convince the congressional critics.

A third major observation of the new strategy is that it is not a threat based strategy in the traditional sense. Although some specific threats can plausibly be identified, the real threat is the unknown, the uncertain. The strategy seeks to remain vigilant and prepared to handle a crisis that no one can predict. It does this by calling for a ready pool of tailorable general purpose forces that can respond quickly and effectively to crises. This pool can also serve as the core for rebuilding or reconstituting forces should some unforeseen adversary attempt to create a global warfighting capability. Thus, the strategy recognizes an historical fact—for the most part we have dealt with crises or fought wars with forces that were not specifically purchased for those particular contingencies. The key, then, is to have enough flexible forces able to adjust to the unknown. We can do this if we recognize the kinds of military capabilities that are currently fielded in the world, if we can anticipate technological changes, and if we can keep or develop capabilities to deal with those kinds of forces in areas of vital interest. In sum, the military strategy is capabilities and interests based for an uncertain world.


The remainder of this report discusses the process of developing the new military strategy. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the formal process by which the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs, and the Unified and Specified Commands formulate the strategy and interface with and advise the National Command Authority and Department of Defense on plans, programs and requirements. The Joint Community revised that system in the beginning of 1990. The purpose was to incorporate the statutory responsibilities of the Chairman as delineated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and to
streamline and simplify strategy formulation, operational planning, and force planning. The previous system was cumbersome, dependent on a myriad of planning documents, and characterized by a step-by-step process of JCS, Joint Staff and Service planners meeting to reach agreement on usually contentious issues. The revamping of the system did not, in itself, eliminate all contention, rivalry and parochialism. But together with congressional pressure, changes in emphasis from Service duty to Joint duty, and greater participation of the Unified and Specified Commands, the joint planning system became a more effective process. It also became more reflective of the CJCS and Commanders-in-Chief's views, and less reflective of service bickering. Hence, the focus of initiative, resolution, and advice has shifted in various degrees from the Services to the Joint Community.¹³

(See Figure 5.)

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**Figure 5. JSPS - Old and New.**

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The participants who revised the system envisioned a process driven by a top-down systematic review of threats, capabilities, evolving global changes, etc. This review was to produce a series of written documents and culminate in a written Chairman's Guidance. This guidance was to feed the development of the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD), which outlines the military strategy for Presidential approval and presents programmatic advice for the Secretary of Defense's consideration. Upon completion of the NMSD, the Joint Staff, in coordination with the Unified and Specified Commands and the Services, would then develop the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP implements the military strategy through CJCS-approved planning guidance and apportioning forces for the development of contingency plans. An interesting aspect of this new system was a change in the methodology for force planning. The previous system and its documents had created an elaborate series of force levels to compare and evaluate fiscally unconstrained and unreasonable military requirements. The objectives of these various force levels were to measure risks associated with budget realities and to make a case to support increased force structure. Conversely, the new system takes a more reasonable approach by recognizing from the start that there will be fiscal constraints, and by providing one risk evaluation force structure that could achieve national military objectives with a reasonable assurance of success.14

Since its inception, however, the new JSPS has not been executed as designed. Rather than working top-down, both policy and strategy formulation have been running concurrently. For example, the National Military Strategy was not published until January 1992. The JSCP was already published in October 1991, thus propelling the planning community down the road to implement the strategy before it was finalized. The Joint Staff also had been drafting the National Military Strategy concurrent with the development of the National Security Strategy until the latter was published in August 1991. In addition, there has been little formal production of written products from the Joint Strategic Review. For example, there has been no written Chairman's Guidance nor formal establishment of a risk evaluation force. The reason
for this apparent breakdown in the formal process is readily understandable. Simply, world events have been moving faster than any strategic formulation system, even one intentionally streamlined, can operate. Also the bureaucracies and organizations just can not keep up the pace of the changes that are forcing strategic alterations.

That is the bad news. The good news is that there has been strategic formulation and, as this report argues, it has been surprisingly effective. There are two major reasons. The first is that the Chairman has brought to his statutorily improved position a true strategic vision— the "View to the Nineties" and the Base Force. The second is that the Nation's security and defense leadership have been able to work closely together to forge new strategies. Thus, vision and personal relationships have been the key to strategic formulation over the last several years.

Strategic vision is especially critical in overcoming bottlenecks in the formal planning process. The word vision has been much overused and is somewhat an unclear term. It appears to mean many things to many different people. Perry Smith equates strategic vision to long-range planning. In this sense he says that strategic planning (vision) "is a way of thinking about the future, thinking about what we want (that is, defining our objectives and interests), thinking about the conditions which are likely to surround us in pursuing our objectives (projecting alternative environments), and thinking about ways to achieve our objectives either within the constraints of these environments or by influencing events to achieve a preferred environment...."15 Some of the management literature seems to indicate that a vision can be anything from a broad statement of direction or "image" of a "possible and desirable future state of the organization" to a comprehensive codification of the "world you want to live in."16

This author has done some historical research on strategic vision—what it may be, what makes some visions more effective than others, and what role it may have played in strategic formulation before World War I and between the two World Wars. Some insights from this research provide some interesting perspectives. The historical analysis indicates that
an effective strategic vision appears to have several characteristics and elements. First, its purpose should be to guide strategic formulation and force planning. Second, its focal point needs to be on defining national interests and ensuring that plans and forces do not exceed or fall short of protecting those interests. In general, interests endure because they are primarily a product of geographical realities. Changes in the threat to those interests can be frequent. Changes in the threat, moreover, can also distract one from vital interests toward lesser ones. Third, strategic vision should encompass all levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical. Concepts valid at only one or two levels may be seriously flawed. Fourth, it should be specific and realistic enough to allow force planners to design, structure, and posture forces. Without that specificity and reality the vision may be nothing more than a sloganeering campaign that encourages complacency and espouses traditional but invalid truths or myths. Finally, a strategic vision should recognize the uncertainty of the future and of war. It should attempt to anticipate but not predict. The Chairman's strategic vision, as described earlier, incorporates these characteristics and elements.¹⁷

As for the role that strategic vision can play, the research, not surprisingly, indicates that it is extremely important in not only guiding military strategy but influencing grand strategies and developing military capabilities as well. Most importantly, in the absence of such vision there is no direction, no effective long or mid-range planning, no focus on protecting vital strategic interests. Military leaders and organizations, without this vision, failed to provide well thought-out and coherent advice to their civilian leaders. As the study notes:

A brief discussion of strategic leadership and vision...demonstrate several (strategic) successes and failures. For example, General Henry Wilson successfully argued the importance of a continental strategy to Britain, and he was specific, realistic, and clear in describing that strategy. The General also led the way toward civilian adoption of that strategy and explained its relevance to the national interests. During the interwar years, British strategists and force planners, for the most part, either did not have the foresight and imagination to recognize the importance of the Continent, or
were not determined enough to lead the way in arguing its relevance to the national interest.... As a result, instead of providing a strategic vision, the military leaders allowed one to be imposed upon them primarily based on financial and domestic concerns. In addition, without a forward looking, specific strategic concept, bureaucratic politics and inertia dominated strategic formulation and force planning. This led to the incessant study of and delay in making the difficult choices. Thus, leaders and planners preferred incremental, evolutionary, and ineffective conservative approaches. When Hitler’s actions finally revealed his intentions, the race to rearm and prepare for war was hectic and too late.\textsuperscript{18}

Ironically, the situation the British military faced in the 1920s and early 1930s—the lack of a precise threat and the need to concentrate resources on solving domestic issues—is strikingly similar to that which we face today. Fortunately, we have a vision that provides a coherent strategic view of where to go, for what purpose, and with the right military capabilities.

There is ample evidence that the Chairman’s strategic vision has already provided coherent, convincing advice to the National Command Authority. This counsel is a major reason, despite the concurrency difficulties discussed earlier, that the security strategy, defense policy, and military strategy are connected and complement one another. The other reason is that there has been a close working relationship between the CJCS, the Service Chiefs, the CINCs, and the civilian leadership. This relationship has allowed the new national military strategy to be a coordinated expression of the Nation’s needs in a dramatically and quickly changing strategic environment. But much of this dialogue and coordination has been informal. Thus, although there was no formal written Chairman’s Guidance, and many of the other documents of the Joint Strategic Review process were not produced, there were fora such as the annual CINCs’ Conferences at which the Nation’s military leaders discussed important strategic issues. The Chairman used these gatherings, moreover, to provide his verbal guidance and to discuss his vision. Following these conferences the staffs worked significant unresolved issues. This resolution, for the most part, found its way into the appropriate documents. In addition, in lieu of
lengthy formal meetings usually referred to as ‘tank’ briefings, the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and key civilian defense leaders worked the phones, corridors, and offices in Washington to discuss and formulate strategy. The National Military Strategy is the result of that informal process in which personal relationships played such an essential part.

Conclusion.

In sharing his thoughts on military planning in peacetime with the Royal United Services Institute, Michael Howard observed that it is probably not possible to develop military strategies, forces and doctrines which will be entirely right for the next conflict. Nevertheless, he emphasized the importance of peacetime planning for war, and added that “it is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.” From this author’s view the new U.S. National Military Strategy is more than just not “being too badly wrong.” It is an effective blueprint for protecting and promoting our security objectives in an uncertain world against unknown threats. It is a result of the best calculations of means and ways that the Nation’s military leaders can make. This strategy, however, was not born nor forged through scientific or mathematical or cut and dried calculations. Rather, the making of the new strategy has been more akin to Paul Kennedy’s observations that:

...strategy can never be exact or fore-ordained. It relies, rather, upon the constant and intelligent reassessment of the polity’s ends and means: it relies upon wisdom and judgment, those two intangibles which Clausewitz and Liddell Hart—despite their many differences—esteemed the most.

The real effectiveness of that new military strategy has yet to meet its true measure—whether it will survive the budget deliberations ahead, and whether it will serve the country’s needs in the next crisis.

Finally, this paper has argued that the making of the strategy depends more heavily upon informal, personal relationships than any formal process. Therefore, from a political or social science model point of view, decisionmaking
is more like the bureaucratic politic model than the rational actor or organization models. Consequently, persuasion and personal vision were key elements in effective decisionmaking. Accordingly, this paper has portrayed the Chairman's strategic vision and informal power of persuasion as being the two basic ingredients in forging the new strategy. Those two ingredients will also be critical in future budget hearings—hearings that will determine the ultimate outcome of the concepts described here.

ENDNOTES

1. A good compilation of these sources can be found in James J. Tritten's *America Promises to Come Back: Our New National Security Strategy*, Monterey, California: Naval Post Graduate School, October 1991.


3. Although as of yet there has been no labelling of U.S. security policy in the post-cold war, sources describing that policy continuously refer to some sort of "engagement."


9. The author derived this account from unclassified portions of office files. It is an interpretation of these papers and is no way authoritative.

10. These scenarios are outlined in the 1991 *Joint Military Net Assessment*, dated March 1991 and signed by the Secretary of Defense.
11. JSCP adaptive planning guidance, which implements the new strategy, calls for the consideration of how economic, political and diplomatic action in concert with military action may produce deterrent effects in regional crises. As for American strategic culture, see Colin Gray's *The Geopolitics of Super Power*, Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1988. It is interesting to note that when the CJCS has talked about the Base Force he refers to "enduring realities to the Pacific and to the Atlantic." In assessing the strategy in scenarios, the Joint Staff refers to major regional contingencies to the "East" and "West." We no longer view the Western Hemisphere and the United States on the left side of a world map looking east to Europe. Rather, the new strategy views the United States in a central global position, enjoying interior lines between Pacific and Asia.


13. This judgment is based on the author's experience as a staff officer on the Army Staff in 1982-85 and now on the Joint Staff.

14. The new JSPS is promulgated in Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 7, January 30, 1990.


College uses these and other models to examine decision-making case studies in their "Policy Making and Implementation" course.