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SELECTED COMpendium OF STUDENT RESEARCH
AT THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE

Background

The Defense Intelligence College is chartered by US Department of Defense directive and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) memorandum to provide educational and training programs to prepare military and civilian intelligence personnel for positions in the national and international security structure and to assist in their career development.

Since 1980, when the Congress authorized the College to confer the Degree of Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) more than 400 MSSI degrees have been awarded. The College’s MSSI degree is the only advanced degree in strategic intelligence granted in the United States.

In order to complete their MSSI program, students are required to satisfactorily complete either a Master’s thesis or two research papers in conjunction with special research seminars offered by the College. The theses/research papers thus produced represent a potentially important contribution to the literature on strategic intelligence. They embody an impressive array of subjects indicative of the far-reaching nature of intelligence analysis.

What is the Compendium?

This first volume of the Compendium includes selected unclassified student papers and theses completed during the College’s 1988-89 academic year. Subsequent volumes will provide updates by each new academic year. Each entry is referenced alphabetically by author and additional information includes the name of the approving faculty member, title of paper, date of completion and abstract.

Papers listed in this publication can be requested by writing to the Academic Research Center, Defense Intelligence College, DIA/DIC-R, Washington DC 20340-5485 (ATTN: COMPI). The College is required to obtain, for each paper, permission for release from the Office of Security, Defense Intelligence Agency. Consequently, there may be some delay between the request and receipt of the paper should it not already have been approved for release.

The views contained in any of the papers included in this compendium are those of the author and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policy, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Intelligence College, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.
M1 Abrams and Leopard II Main Battle Tanks: A Comparative Study

In 1963, the US and W. Germany initiated a joint venture in tank development in order to reduce research and development costs and to increase weapons commonality within NATO. The MBT-70 (Main Battle Tank 70) program was to enhance NATO's combat capability by alleviating problems in maintenance and support. Furthermore, the sharing of innovative ideas and advanced technology between the US and W. Germany was a logical way to develop the best main battle tank in the world. The program was initially driven by good intentions, but was immediately beset with problems. The ongoing disagreements in tank concepts between US and W. German generals, engineers, and designers led to delays, back-up research, and enormous cost overruns. The program was canceled in 1972 and both the US and W. Germany developed their own tanks, the M1 Abrams and Leopard II respectively. Although these two systems are the world's most advanced, significant differences exist in areas of firepower, propulsion, and survivability. While the M1 rates better in armor protection, the Leopard II has marked advantages in firepower, fuel economy, NBC protection, target acquisition, snorkeling ability, and automotive handling in extreme weather conditions. Some of the Leopard II characteristics, such as the 120mm gun and the NBC overpressure system are currently being incorporated into the improved M1A1 Abrams model. Ironically, these are characteristics that were proposed by the W. Germans and rejected by the US. The M1's biggest problem is its horrendous fuel consumption attributed to its gas turbine engine, a concept which the W. Germans have opposed all along. The W. German tank program was better organized enabling W. Germany to formulate and define clear and consistent priorities in tanks concepts, development, and production. In contrast, the US was handicapped by its inconsistent armor doctrine, changing project managers, and contracting problems.

Ahrens, Patrick J. (Wardlaw)

US Narcotics Policy and the Latin American Source Countries: Measuring Costs and Success

A key objective of current US narcotics policy is to stop the export of drugs from the source countries. Unfortunately, evidence increasingly suggests that the current programs and resources applied in pursuit of this goal are ineffective. This is particularly true of cocaine exports from South America.

Across the US political spectrum, drugs are perceived as a threat to the very core of American culture. All drugs are labeled under the category "evil." There is no differentiation between narcotics that may pose varying degrees of threat. Consequently, US policy makers do not consider competing options to narcotics control and deny that different policy objectives may be more appropriate for different types of narcotics.

At a minimum, mind altering and addictive drugs that serve no medical purpose should be treated with caution and skepticism. But the current narcotics philosophy has politicized the narcotics debate beyond the reach of critical analysis. As a result, no real effort is made to determine if the benefits derived from current policies are worth the costs. Under the current narcotics philosophy, any effort to slay the narcotics dragon is, by definition, worthy of pursuit.

In order to stop the flow of narcotics out of source countries, US policy focuses on three mutually supportive objectives. The first is to bring traffickers to justice, either by extradition to the US or by prosecution in the source country. The second is source country interdiction. This includes destruction of cocaine processing factories, seizure of the raw materials used for processing, and interruption of the infrastructure that supports these factories. The third is coca crop eradication.

But other implied goals must be pursued in conjunction with those listed above. The US must help improve economic activity in Latin America in order to provide incentives that could lure coca farmers and traffickers away from the profitable narcotics trade. In addition, the US must seek to improve government security and political stability. Currently, narco-terrorism has rendered ineffective the very weapons needed to fight drug trafficking.
The resources expended in pursuit of source country narcotics control are relatively small, but so are the results. Traffickers continue to evade prosecution en masse, the numbers of cocaine factories continues to grow and crop eradication makes virtually no dent in the numbers of hectares under cultivation. The Bureau for International Narcotics Matters at the State Department estimates that several hundred million dollars would have to be expended annually just to halve the amounts of cocaine and marijuana currently exported from Latin America.

Unintended side effects of US narcotics policy must be included in the overall measure of success. The political destabilization that results from narcotics related terrorism is a particularly high price that Latin American governments are paying for their efforts to stop trafficking. The United States must consider whether the risk to Latin American stability is worth the minimal benefits currently derived from US policies in the region.

The measure of policy success in source countries requires further study in other related areas of narcotics policy. Further study on the impact of specific drugs on health may indicate that the threat is not worth the expense. If this proves to be the case, then current control strategies in South America could be abandoned. Legitimizing the trade would bolster Latin American economies, decrease the violence associated with trafficking and improve political stability. If further study revealed that specific narcotics are as destructive as currently believed, then the US government would be justified in committing the vast resources necessary to wage an all out war on drugs.

Ambrose, Barry P. (Finan) AUG 1988

Colombia: Can the Government and the Insurgents Negotiate a Settlement for the 1990's?

Determining the likelihood of a settlement could prove very important in deciding future US policy toward Colombia. Ending the insurgency would free military and economic assets that could then be used to combat the Colombian drug traffickers, an issue of importance to the United States.

Little analysis has been made of the negotiations and settlement between the Colombian government and M-19, and the more recent talks between the government and the FARC, the EPL, and Quintin Lame, all active Colombian guerrilla organizations.

The first part of the paper discusses the unique political nature of Colombia. Negotiation in the face of partisan political violence is a traditional means of ending that violence in Colombia. This began with the establishment of the National Front, the political pact that ended la violencia, the conflict between the Conservative and Liberal parties from 1948-1958.

The second part of the paper analyzes the origins and nature of the insurgent groups. The group currently involved in negotiations with the government, M-19, is a nationalist, non-Marxist center-right group that has long sought involvement, as a legal political organization, in Colombian politics. The FARC, the largest guerrilla group in Colombia, has also maintained a tradition of demands made against the government that indicates a fundamental belief in the legitimacy of constitutional democracy in the country. Other Colombian groups have also changed their political demands to regional or local importance, instead of calling for dissolution or overthrow of the central government. The common theme among all the groups tends to be frustration with the monopoly of governmental power as a result of the National Front.

The third section deals with the failed negotiations that took place in the early 1980s. The final section of the paper deals analyzes the current talks, including the probable motives of each side and the possible threats to the settlement.

The desire of the insurgents to be involved legally in Colombian politics makes the chances for a settlement very good within the next six months. While economic reforms have not been successful, recent political reforms have restored a great deal of faith in the Colombian electoral process. These reforms seem to have encouraged the guerrillas to seek a settlement.

Whether the agreement with the M-19, or any of the other groups, will last, is dependent on the government's ability to control the death squads. Death squad violence against the Union Patriotica, the legal Communist Party, ruined the peace process in the early 1980s. The current truce will likely end the same way if the death squads are not stopped.
The Guatemalan Model for Counterinsurgency: Success or Failure?

Guatemala is one of a very few countries to defeat a significant insurgency. Determining the success or failure of the Guatemalan counterinsurgency model is important not only for the study of low intensity conflict, but also for the implications it might hold for US policy in the region. Successful features of the Guatemalan model may prove useful to other countries engaged in combating a guerrilla threat.

Many books and articles have been written about different parts of the Guatemalan counterinsurgency model, and on the impact they have had on the people of Guatemala. No single work exists, however, that analyzes the features of the government's model on the basis of their contribution to the success of the campaign to defeat the insurgents.

The first part of the paper introduces the political, cultural, economic, and military roots of the insurgency. In order to grasp the significance of the Guatemalan model, the problem or grievance must be understood. The second part of the paper describes the army's response to each of the political, cultural, economic and military problems. I analyze the impact each policy had on the conduct of the campaign, and whether or not it contributed to the defeat of the insurgents.

The campaign to defeat the insurgency in Guatemala succeeded, at a very great cost to the population. Thousands have been killed and maimed, hundreds of thousands are homeless or in refugee camps in Guatemala and Mexico. The eradication of the guerrilla support network was based in the rural Indian communities of Guatemala has also brought the Indian culture close to destruction. The government strategy to prevent the return of the insurgency is centered on the economic and cultural integration of the Indians into the dominant ladino (Hispanic) culture of Guatemala's working and upper class. Thus far, it has been marginally successful. The legitimacy of the central government has been temporarily restored with the election of President Vinicio Cerezo Arevale in 1985. The economic integration of the displaced Indians has not been accomplished. The government has been unwilling or unable to include a comprehensive program of land reform into its policy of national integration. As long as the ownership of land and distribution of income is so heavily slanted in favor of the wealthy elite, the insurgent movement will have a lever to force itself back into Guatemala's political milieu.

Islam's Role in the Stability of Sudan

Having arrived in the 7th century, Islam spread throughout the northern two-thirds of the land now called Sudan. It greatly influenced the country's history and will play the major role in the future of the country.

Largely as a result of Islam's exclusion from the south by both geographic barrier and by British colonial policy, Sudan emerged into the modern world as two very different regions under one government. Sudan is divided by both regional and political differences. This has resulted in a poor economy, an uneasy government coalition and the young nation's second civil war.

Sudan's regional and political differences emerged largely because the nation is part Islamic and part Christian or Animist. Thus, issues related to Islam must be resolved if the country is to have any reasonable opportunity to end the war, tackle its economic problems and enjoy political stability.

This paper examines the role played by Islam in Sudan's history, and considers its impact on its two diverse regions. The political diversity is also explored, followed by a description and costs of the civil war, all in the context of Islam's role.

Paroquat: A Worthwhile Solution or Simply a Smokescreen?

Marijuana consumption in the United States today appears to be just as much a problem as it was during the 1960's when its use first became widespread. The number of users seems to be leveling off at between 20 and 50
million consumers. An important feature of recent years, however, is that the amount of the drug which is cultivated in the United States has increased dramatically. A major catalyst for this change probably was the initiation of paraquat spraying in Mexico in the 1970's. Now, after much heated debate, the use of paraquat is again being proposed as a weapon against the war on drugs in the United States.

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) cites the need for herbicides such as paraquat as part of its flexible alternative approach to eradication. To keep costs to a minimum, and to use the best possible approach to protect the environment, the DEA seems it best to have the option to use paraquat. The question, however, after all the debate on whether the herbicide should be used, is just how effective is this alternative? Will paraquat make a difference in the long term supply of marijuana in the US, or is it more a public relations ploy to satisfy the demands of the public for the DEA to combat this war?

To prohibit persons from obtaining the drug, paraquat is an effective tool for eradicating large areas of Cannabis stands or stands in difficult areas. It is also a dangerous poison. Yet when applied according to instructions it does little harm to anything other than its intended target. The DEA has commissioned extensive studies that have concluded that the use of paraquat is an effective alternative to Cannabis eradication. Yet the use of paraquat both in the United States and Mexico has forced growers to pursue more sophisticated growing techniques, move to smaller, less obvious plots, and most significantly, forced the grower indoors and into the cultivation of the more potent Sensimilla variety. For these reasons, the use of paraquat is not going to make a significant impact in the war on Cannabis production in the United States. The legitimization of the herbicide for use in this country is seen more as a moral victory for the DEA, so that it can set an example to neighboring countries that it is good enough for them to use it too. Thus, for the average US citizen, the use of paraquat is largely a smokescreen, more to set this example than to dramatically reduce our level of domestic cultivation.

Belisle, Monica M. (Harris)  AUG 1989

CFE: Will It Succeed?

This paper discusses briefly the arms control negotiations before World War II and more extensively at the long-running Mutual Balanced of Force Reduction (MBFR) including the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) proposals and their probability of success. There are two key factors which suggests the CFE talks may succeed where the MBFR failed. These are changing Soviet attitudes reflected in Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost which were manifested in the unprecedented success of INF, and the United States' renewed and confident attitude toward arms negotiations and arms control.

This paper provides examples of the changing attitudes, such as the Soviets' asymmetrical conventional force reductions and the US's willingness to negotiate on troops and aircraft. After this discussion, some criteria is shown which each side can implement to show their arms negotiations are sincere. These criteria are commonly called confidence-building measures. However, these are not associated with the Confidence and Security Building negotiations also on going in Vienna.

As a result of the changing Soviet and US attitudes coupled with compliance with the criteria suggested, the CFE talks have a good chance to succeed. A successful negotiation will benefit both Alliances. The Soviets have the opportunity to improve their economy, gain Western technology, and reduce their defense spending.

Belisle, Monica M. (Smith)  AUG 1989

Maskirovka at the Battle of Kursk

In the spring of 1943 the situation on the Soviet-German Front was stabilized for several months. As the Soviet military prepared for the next German offensive, they fortified the region, now known as the Kursk Salient, for a strong defense. The Soviets employed many elements of maskirovka for their operations at the Battle of Kursk. Soviet military leaders employed five basic techniques. These were camouflage, concealment, simulation, disinformation, and feints. Examples of some of these are discussed in this paper as they were employed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
This paper examines the maskirovka, particularly at the Battle of Kursk because Soviet military writers continue to write papers stressing the experience gained from this battle. Therefore, based on their history and their teachings, Western analysts should assume maskirovka is an integral and inevitable product of Soviet strategy.

Bothwell, Thomas A. (Smith)

**Operations Security: Policy and Practice in the United States Navy**

In the past four years, America’s attention has been riveted on a series of sensational espionage cases involving US citizens and foreign intelligence service officers. Resulting studies have assessed the damage and recommended precautions to prevent further occurrences. What these investigations and the Navy’s Operating Forces have overlooked are the possible security failures occurring at United States military installations and defense-related industrial complexes as a result of the lack of adequate Operations Security programs.

Operations Security is a systemic approach to preserving the essential secrets of an organization’s activities. It attempts to increase mission effectiveness by identifying and controlling indicators of activity that may be altering an adversary’s intelligence system, allowing them more time to respond to our actions. Significant amounts of official literature exist which discuss the concepts involved in Operations Security and provide direction and guidance in how to establish and maintain progress. The apparent lack of effective Operations Security programs indicates that a gap exists between those who formulate policy and those who are tasked with implementing it.

Three methodologies were utilized in preparing this paper. First, an extensive review of Navy literature on Operations Security laid the foundation for a theoretical grasp of the basic concepts involved in this topic. The next two methodologies are attempts to illuminate the policy-implementation problems. Personal interviews with selected members of the Department of Defense describe some of the problems, rationalizations, and misconceptions that presently inhibit the practice of Operations Security. These interviews either deal with the subject on a day-to-day basis or have some significant interface with it during the course of their duties. Finally, case studies of two specifically chosen installations serve to highlight some of the problems raised during the discussions.

This paper concludes with a discussion and critique of the United States Navy Operations Security policies and practices. Without an effective training and education program for both communities, the US Navy’s mission effectiveness may be drastically reduced before the breakout of any future conflict. While our philosophy of deterrence acknowledges the need for potential enemies to understand something of our power, it does not call for their detailed knowledge of current operating practices and construction methods.

Buck, Katherine (Vernon)

**Principles of Human Rights in the US and USSR Compared with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights**

The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights was issued in 1948. Since then, the Declaration has been used to judge the behavior of governments by looking at whether or not their actions comply with the principles expressed in the UN Declaration.

This thesis attempts to discover whether it is realistic to expect the behavior of the US and USSR to comply with the UN Declaration. I suggest that the answer can be found in the philosophic doctrines which influenced the founders of each nation, and whether or not those philosophic doctrines disagree or concur with the principles of the UN Declaration.

First, to understand the principles of rights the nations’ founders adhered to, I studied the philosophical works which influenced them. Second, I compared those works with the constituting documents of the applicable nation to establish whether the documents are in accord with the philosophic principles of the respective nation’s founders. I then examined the UN Universal Declaration itself and attempted to extract its basic principles. Lastly, I compared the principles of human rights in each country with those expressed in the UN Declaration.

Each nation’s constitution contains ideas consistent with its founders very specifically as rights: however, the very specificity of the philosophic foundation of each nation mitigates against their agreement with one another while remaining true to their founding principles. Finally, the ideas expressed in the UN Declaration are not congruent with the founding principles of either the United States or the Soviet Union.
It is true that each nation is constituted in accordance with the philosophic doctrine which influenced its founders, and that each nation's very specific ideas of right are not congruent with the other's nor with those expressed in the UN declaration. This means one cannot expect either nation to comply completely with the UN Declaration. Moreover, it will always be problematic to use this document to judge the behavior of the United States or the Soviet Union unless the nation in question renounces its founders' philosophical principles.

Button, Daniel T. (Gordon)  
SEP 88

Soviet Short-Range Ballistic Missiles: Still a Formidable Threat

Despite the effects of the INF Treaty, the Soviets still maintain a large, capable, fully-deployed short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) force. While losing two systems under provisions of the treaty, the Soviets still field three systems in their SRBM force, totaling over 1400 launchers. This force provides the Soviets with a significant force multiplier for which NATO currently has no real defense.

SRBMs have played a significant role in Soviet strategy, operational art, and tactics since the 1950s. Since the early 1960s, through several evolutions of Soviet "doctrine" related to the nature of war, SRBMs have been fully integrated into every combined arms formation from Divisions to Fronts. Over the years, they have been primarily designated for delivery of nuclear weapons. However, as accuracy has been improved in third generation systems (SS-12 Mod 11, SS-23, and SS-21), conventional delivery has become not only practicable, but probable, at least in the first stages of a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Despite giving up two of their third generation systems, the remaining SRBM force of over 1400 launchers retains a prominent role in Soviet war fighting plans. In this regard, the SRBM force figures significantly in the Soviet's calculation of the correlation of forces.

The post-INF Soviet/Warsaw Pact SRBM force is still extremely capable. Deployed directly opposite NATO are over 300 SCUD-B launchers, 240 FROG-7s, and at least 140 SS-21s. These systems pose a formidable threat to US and NATO forces, particularly in the Central Region. Under NATO's strategic concept of Forward Defense, most of the West's highest value targets lie within 500km of the inter-German border. Many of these, such as ground maneuver forces, air bases and air defense assets lie within 300km. This number of SRBM launchers, with any number of resupply missiles, pose a threat for which we have little defense.

People in the highest levels of the NATO military and political establishment, including former SACEUR General Bernard Rogers and current NATO Secretary Manfred Womer have warned of NATO's vulnerability to the SRBM threat. Though perhaps diminished somewhat by the loss of the SS-12 and the SS-23 systems, their warnings of the threat still apply. NATO has acknowledged the SRBM threat for some time, however, it has just recently developed a program to address this vulnerability. Active measures such as an ATBM defense or targeting these mobile systems for destruction are necessary if NATO seriously hopes to blunt the onslaught of SRBMs in the initial stage of war.

The Soviets can be expected to improve their SRBM forces by increasing the range and/or improving the accuracy of the SCUD system, as well as continuing the replacement of older FROGs with the greatly improved SS-21. Research and development of follow-on systems within the 500km range limit provided in the INF Treaty is a sure bet. The Soviets will continue to upgrade their existing SRBM force as long as it is in their best interests to do so. Right now there is no reason to expect otherwise, as this still formidable force continues to provide an offensive capability unmatched and virtually undefended by NATO.

Carlantonio, Michael S. (Finan)  
AUG 1988

Nicaragua: An Analysis of Somoza's Rise to Power

The search for a viable US policy in Nicaragua began during the first two decades of the twentieth century. At that time, policymakers resorted to direct military intervention as a possible solution. In the aftermath of the American withdrawal, Anastasio Somoza seized power and his family ruled Nicaragua with an iron hand until their overthrow in 1979 at the hands of the modern-day Sandinistas. In the intervening years, the United States has been providing political and military support to the Somoza Dynasty. This criticism has given rise to a popular misconception as to the degree of support the US Government gave to Somoza. Some schools of thought even suggest that the US was part of a conspiracy that brought Somoza to power. This paper will examine US
policy toward Nicaragua during that time. It will review and analyze the factors contributing to Somoza's rise to power, both as commander of the National Guard and as President. The issues will be viewed from both an American and Nicaraguan perspective. The analysis will attempt to determine to what extent the US was responsible for Somoza's successful coup d'etat.

Carter, Robert F. (Finan)  
AUG 1989

The Sandinista National Liberation Front's Insurrectonal Strategy and the Nicaraguan Revolution

After 18 years of failing to incite a communist-inspired revolution, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) movement went from near decimation to the forefront of the Nicaraguan Revolution and emerged as the dominant political force. The revolution had been initiated by the domestic opposition as a nationalistic anti-Somoza movement demanding political and socio-economic reforms. However, the Sandinistas gained control of the movement by implementing a vanguard strategy that would capitalize on the growing revolutionary sentiment, and on the ineffectiveness of the domestic opposition in their attempts to remove Somoza. The paper explains how the FSLN was able to gain control of the revolutionary movement and emerge as the dominant political force. The paper examines the background of political activities in Nicaragua, shows how this background influenced the revolution, and covers the evolution of the FSLN during its struggle against the Somoza dynasty. The paper also details the manner in which the Tercerista faction gained control of the FSLN, devised the vanguard strategy, and applied it to the unfolding revolutionary events. The result was an end to the Somoza dictatorship, with the FSLN emerging as the dominant political force in Nicaragua.

Chittenden, Dale L. (Finan)  
JUN 1989

Guatemala 1954: Was There a Threat to US National Security?

The United States' foreign policy for Central America has oscillated over the years from direct intervention to total neglect. Critics of US policy have charged that American administrations have been short sighted, implementing policies to achieve short-term goals at the cost of long-term relations and objectives. At a time when the Bush administration is conducting a review of all US foreign policy, it is appropriate to analyze past events from a modern-day viewpoint in an attempt to improve US tactics. This study looks at the 1954 Central Intelligence Agency backed coup in Guatemala. It evaluates the extent and nature of the threat that the Arevalo and Arbenz governments posed to the US. This is accomplished by analyzing US security issues of the times, the reforms, policies, and personalities of the Arevalo and Arbenz administrations, and US reaction to each.

After World War II, international communism was considered the primary threat to US security. In 1954 the US administration was convinced that political stability was linked to the containment and rejection of communism. The reforms instituted in Guatemala, although widely recognized as modest in nature and badly needed, significantly affected US capital investment. Guatemala also began pursuing an independent foreign policy that was always aligned with that of the US. The most damaging incident occurred when Guatemala purchased arms from Czechoslovakia after several years of an effective weapons embargo imposed by the US. Unable to buy the equipment it needed for its army from non-communist countries, a desperate Guatemala ventured behind the iron curtain. To many in Washington, that was what proved the existence of Soviet influence in Guatemala.

The reforms of this period unavoidably put Guatemala on a path of confrontation with the United States. The extensive monopoly held by the United Fruit Company in Guatemala would obviously be affected by any land reform program. Although the communist party enjoyed a legal status under Arboz, there is no evidence of it receiving continued direction from the USSR. The Guatemalan Revolution had a strong democratic and capitalistic foundation. Had the US been able to take a larger view of Guatemala, outside of the Cold War, the violent situation existing in Guatemala today may have been avoided. Through support and assistance that fostered the goals of the revolution, the US might have helped create a strong democratic institution that could not have been easily subverted by communism. Instead, a dictatorship system was re-established that served to foster a status quo environment conducive to communist manipulation and influence.
The Rastafarians: The Evolution of a Caribbean Drug Culture

Reggae music, now a multi-million dollar industry, has continued to gain in popularity throughout the Caribbean and in the United States. Few, however, realize that reggae is the revolutionary language of an indigenous Jamaican religious movement—the Rastafarians. Most people, even if they are familiar with the term Rastafarians, think of a violent, marijuana-smoking criminal. The Rastafarian movement has strong religious, although non-Christian, underpinnings with its roots firmly planted in Africa. This study looks at the emergence and development of this movement. It evaluates the movement's inception in the 1930s, its period of struggle through to the 1970s, its association to criminal activities worldwide and where it stands today.

The Rastafarian culture's most important religious sacrament is marijuana and this has increasingly attracted attention throughout the Caribbean countries, the United States, Great Britain, Canada and Africa. Much as the coca plant had been a part of the Bolivian peasant's life for years prior to it becoming a cash crop, so has marijuana for the Rastafarian. There is no evidence that the Rastafarians, as a movement, are engaged in the international drug trade.

Besides the dilemma over the Rastafarian's strong belief in ganja as a sacrament, the loose organization of the movement allows many criminals to use the disguise of a Rastafarian as a cover. Several pseudo-Rastafarian groups, such as the mostly white, Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, have taken the "shape" of a Rasta, in terms of appearance and the claiming of ganja as a sacrament, but do not hold any other doctrinal similarities. The actions of these groups have contributed to the negative image of the true Rastafarian.

The reality of this problem is that no solution has been found yet, and one isn't in sight. It is, therefore, vital that those involved in fighting international drug trafficking know and understand as much as possible about any culture, or legitimate movement, where an illegal drug plays an inseparable role to its existence. In the case of the Rastafarians, if the forces of society fail to address the challenges they put forth, a return to their earlier, more violent ways of critiquing society seems likely.

Gorbachev and the Soviet Military

This paper will examine General Secretary Gorbachev's impact on the Soviet military and Soviet security vis-a-vis East-West relations by appraising the effects of Gorbachev's perestroika initiatives. Particular attention is given to Gorbachev's recent unilateral troop and equipment reductions in his 7 December 1988 speech before the United Nations.

The Marxist-Leninist approach is generally conceded to be an economic failure. Gorbachev's efforts to shift Soviet economic priorities from the military sector to the civilian sector while maintaining various military modernization programs, while introducing many Western-style reforms, and while further consolidating his own position are herculean tasks. His survival and eventual success are viewed by many as extremely slim. Yet, while the issue remains in doubt, it is true that there is no viable alternative. The Soviet system must change if it is to compete and survive in an increasingly technical and interdependent world.

The ramifications stemming from Gorbachev's perestroika program and the changing nature of the Soviet threat are significant, complex, and far-reaching challenges for the West.
one on exercise use of smoke. The section on the Great Patriotic War follows the historical phases used by military historians while the exercise section is an examination of selected modern-day exercises.

The preponderance of available Soviet literature on use of smoke during the Great Patriotic War has been written within the last decade, indicating that smoke weapons have retained the level of importance achieved during the war. Modern-day doctrine that Soviet ground forces use for the employment of smoke remains virtually unchanged from the methods of employment developed and utilized during the Great Patriotic War. In short, the only thing that has changed is the method of delivery, smoke producing equipment today is more sophisticated than that used during the war.

Cranston, Kenneth D. (Taylor)  JUN 1989

MILSTAR: The New US Military Communications Satellite

The US is currently developing MILSTAR, a new military communications satellite that will operate in the EHF band. MILSTAR will supplement existing US military communications satellites such as DSCS and FLTSATCOM, which operate primarily in the SHF and UHF bands, respectively. The use of the EHF band, coupled with advanced onboard processing and other spacecraft features, is expected to make MILSTAR highly resistant to jamming and nuclear burst effects and an integral part of the US C4I communications satellite network. The MILSTAR program has experienced cost overruns in the past, but has maintained strong military and Congressional support. The initial launch of the first MILSTAR satellite is expected in 1991, with the full constellation of seven MILSTAR satellites expected in orbit by the mid-1990s.

Cranston, Kenneth D. (Baldwin)  MAR 1989

The United States Defense Research Program

The US defense research program can be divided into two broad areas of research. The first area is military policy research. Military policy research is most frequently conducted by government FCRC's (Federal Contract Research Centers), which are also called think tanks. The five FCRC's of the Department of Defense receive a small portion of the defense R&D budget, but have considerable influence over policy decided at the highest levels of the US government. The second area of defense research involves scientific research. During the Reagan administration increased funds were provided for scientific research. Current R&D funding has increased dramatically for advanced technology research and new weapon systems. This has been at the expense of basic research, which is the foundation of the US technology base. In the next several years increased funds must be provided to procure the systems current being researched. Funds for this will likely come out of military operations and maintenance accounts, which could lead to reduced troop levels and readiness. The process by which R&D leads to weapon acquisition and production has not been optimal due to production concurrency and the use of cost-plus-fee contracts. Reform measures of the past have not been entirely successful due to the involvement of political factors and the complexity of the acquisition and production process.

Cuff, William D. (Ingersoll)  AUG 1988

The Communist Threat in Guatemala

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the attempts by Marxist elements to take control of the Guatemalan government. Due to Guatemala's proximity to the United States and the increased importance placed on the Central American region, there is a need to examine the three instances, separately and as a whole, in which Communism has threatened the very core of Guatemalan politics, making that country the "land of the chronic insurgency." There is also a need to examine the role of the military in allowing and, at times, also preventing the government from moving towards the left in the political spectrum.

Chapter one delineates the creation of the Guatemalan Communist Party in the 1920s and its unprecedented influence it gained over the Guatemala government in the 1940s and early 1950s. One of the most controversial
debates has centered on the only two consecutively elected presidents in Guatemalan history. Chapter one attempts to answer the question of whether they were actually Communists. Chapter two traces the evolution of the Communist-led insurgency of the 1960s and the subsequent counterinsurgency campaign staged by the military. Chapter three discusses the third insurgency movement of the 1970s and 1980s and the on-going counterinsurgency campaign. Chapters two and three also discuss the myriad of information implicating Cuban involvement in the Guatemalan insurgencies.

The Communist movement in Guatemala has been inspired by an incontrovertible desire to realize either a political or military takeover of the government; but it has also been laced with internal dissent on the methods to be used to achieve this goal. Much of the success, or lack thereof, of the insurgencies has centered around the Guatemalan peasants and the guerrilla's ability to capitalize on their poverty and suffering. The success of the government to counter the threat has rested on their ability to terrorize the population and to eliminate all elements, including the moderates, who stand in their way. This tactic, however, has done nothing to eliminate the problem. The "chronic insurgency" lays low for a while and then rebounds with increased determination. The future success of the Guatemalan government will depend on how well they address the grievances of the peasants and how the peasants view the government's sincerity.

Darnauer, Dorothy L. (Parchomenko)  
DEC 1988

Human Rights in the Context of Soviet-US Relations

In Mikhail Gorbachev's era of "New Thinking," there is growing evidence of change and reform in Soviet human rights policy. However, questions remain as to the authenticity and permanency of these changes. However grandiose the words of Mr. Gorbachev, many observers remain skeptical about deeds that might flow from his human rights policy. Significant changes, including the legitimization of Soviet human rights organizations such as the Public Committee for Humanitarian Questions and Human Rights, lend credence to Soviet claims that they are open to discussions of human rights in the Soviet Union. However, organizations such as this one, when not protected by law, exist at the peril of the withdrawal of their legitimacy and official status by the government. In summary, although there is some cause for hope in this area, much cause for skepticism remains.

Darnley, Thomas D. (Finan)  
MAY 1989

Why the Reagan Administration was Unable to Oust General Noriega from Power

This paper reviews current periodicals and government documents to examine why the Reagan Administration was unable to oust General Noriega from power. Drawing largely from political, economic, and military thought, it demonstrates how the administration failed to accomplish President Reagan's goal. The lessons learned from the Reagan administration's failure may provide the Bush administration with an insight on how to accomplish the same objective.

Dean, Gerald D. (Finan)  
AUG 1989

Avoiding Another Mariel: Analyzing the 1980 Cuban boatlift and its Impact on US Immigration Policy

The 1980 Cuban boatlift was an immigration disaster for the United States. In a matter of months, over 125,000 Cubans flooded our immigration system. Immigration authorities were unable to screen and document all refugees properly, and Fidel Castro was able to slip thousands of criminals, mental patients, and spies into the United States. From the immigration policy perspective, it is important for the United States to avoid another mass exodus from Cuba. The paper looks at the underlying causes of the 1980 migration, and the reasons behind Castro's decision to open the port of Mariel. Most importantly, it analyzes US policies and actions that may have contributed to the 1980 boatlift, and the inherent contradictions between US foreign policy and US immigration policy.
toward Cuba. The paper concludes that normalized immigration with Cuba is the best approach to avoiding another Mariel.

Dean, Gerald D. (Finan)  
JUN 1989

Closing the Border to Illegal Immigration: Physical and Political Obstacles

Illegal immigration into the United States has reached unprecedented levels. While no one knows for sure how many illegal aliens are in this country, the Immigration and Naturalization Service is apprehending record numbers. Most of the illegals are Mexicans. Furthermore, many other illegals cross into the United States over the Mexican border.

How can we stop illegal immigration over the southwest border? The most obvious answer is to close the border. That is easier said than done, however. There are several physical and political obstacles to overcome.

The length of the border, the lack of adequate barriers, and the ethnicity of the border region are all physical obstacles to closing the southwest border. Possible remedies include more Border Patrol officers, better fences, use of electronic sensors, and repatriation for Mexican illegals to the interior of Mexico. Unfortunately, all of these options are expensive, and may not be effective.

Political obstacles to securing the border may be even more formidable than the physical obstacles. Souring US-Mexican relations, the consequences for Mexico, and the effect on the US economy all must be considered before any border closure is effected.

Though illegal immigration from Mexico is a legitimate concern in the United States, these physical and political obstacles make closure of the border an unlikely possibility.

Drehoff, Donald G. (Parchomenko)  
DEC 1988

Gorbachev's American Problem

Mikhail Gorbachev, in his short tenure as leader of the Soviet Union, has captured the imagination of his people and the attention of the West. His success, however, is intertwined with events and policies of the US. To succeed in his own country, Gorbachev must successfully deal with American policies and actions. Gorbachev’s goal is to revive and renew the Soviet system, and US cooperation is an important ingredient to achieving that goal. America needs better relations with the Soviet Union, but not at the price of renewed Soviet strength and expansion. Although it is an unpopular position with the Soviets, America should continue to link important military and economic compromises to Soviet improvements in standards of living and human rights. The US must be an active but cautious partner as Gorbachev seeks to find a middle ground for succeeding with his reforms.

Drehoff, Donald G. (Wardlaw)  
DEC 1988

Improving the US Navy's Role in Drug Interdiction

This paper examines improved strategies for the US Navy’s increasing role in drug interdiction. These strategies result from an examination of the severity of the international drug problem, the current US strategies in combatting this problem, and the role the Department of Defense currently plays in enforcing these strategies.

Duclos, Edward D. (Parchomenko)  
DEC 1988

Gorbachev's Challenge in Central America: "New Thinking" and Its Implications for the United States

This paper explores the impact of "New Thinking" (glasnost and perestroika) in the Soviet Union, and the impact of the current changes in Soviet Foreign policy on US influence in Central America. The paper covers Premier
Mikhail Gorbachev’s power and influence as the vanguard of the new Soviet leadership; assesses the anticipated foreign policy implications in Central America; and reviews American foreign policy in view of the historical interests held in regard to Central America. The paper concludes with a call for, and presents a justification for, some new thinking by the US regarding its interests in Central America.

Dunleavy, Kevin P. (Harris)  NOV 1988

The Decline of the Italian Communist Party: Caught in a Compromising Position

In the mid-1970's Eurocommunism was poised to unlock the door to power in Western Europe. Feeding on the social mobilization of the times and discontent with the US role in Vietnam of Eurocommunism offered a high degree of independence from Moscow and a deviation from the capitalist status quo. US policy-makers were deeply concerned as a new generation of young leftists seemed to ensure the strength of Eurocommunism for decades. At the forefront of the movement was the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Preaching a brand of Communism that espoused democracy and renounced revolution, the PCI gradually gained the trust of the Italian electorate and challenged the supremacy of Italy's dominant Christian Democrat Party (DC). The PCI had distinguished itself as more Italian than Communist, and with over a third of the electorate in its corner, the future was full of promise.

This paper examines the deterioration of the PCI, focusing on its strategic failures of the past decade and a half. It begins with a discussion of the PCI's rise to power, how the party legitimized itself in the eyes of Italian voters by following "the democratic road to socialism," and how the party won broad-based support by combining popular discontent with the DC with the social mobilization of the 1960's and 70's. The paper continues with an analysis of the "historic compromise," how it came about and why it prevented the PCI from taking further advantage of the 1970's social unrest.

An examination of socio-economic factors in the 1980's that have contributed to the decline of the PCI follows. There is a discussion of the PCI's inability to attract marginalized forces: women, youth, homosexuals, environmentalists, and the shrinking working-class. The party's failure to make inroads into the large Catholic population is also explored.

The paper concludes with a look at the PCI's current strategy options. "New Internationalism," an attempt to find a role for the party in the international arena by tying itself to the Euroleft, is currently favored by the party.

Dunleavy, Kevin P. (Heymann)  AUG 1988

The Hungarian Reform Dilemma: Communist Barriers to Economic Development

Twenty years of economic reform have left Hungary with a curious blend of socialism and capitalism, state and free enterprise, affluence and austerity. Despite introducing many of the instruments of western capitalism, Hungarians have been unable to make their economy competitive at home or in Western markets. Today, with stagnation and a burdensome debt, the one-time demi-paradise of the Eastern Bloc is threatened with serious economic decline.

The country's economic and political brain trust has realized the compelling need for further departures from the traditional socialist system; however, the 1980s have brought a reluctance to engage in more radical reform. The regime's timid response is born of concern that the unemployment and inflation that accompany economic reform would intensify social tensions and deepen opposition to the regime.

While nearly all agree that further reforms are necessary, there are disagreements concerning how they should be accomplished. Debates in Hungary pit the gradualists who favor slow incremental change in the economy against the reformists who argue for sweeping, all-encompassing initiatives toward a free-market system.

A huge obstacle to the implementation of economic reform in Hungary is the entrenched power of state-run industrial enterprises. The conservatism of the state industrial ministries was a major force behind the reversal of the 1968 NEM reforms, and although their power has diminished somewhat, they could almost certainly exert enough influence to block a similar reform package today.
Little in the way of change can be expected from Hungary's new leader Grosz. A long-time supporter of the previous regime's conservative policies, Grosz will in all likelihood continue to support Hungary's timid course by limiting austerity measures and curtailing reform initiatives.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's calls for change have little relevance today in Hungary where reforms have exceeded those in the Soviet Union. However, if Gorbachev is forced into more radical marketization reforms in the 1990s, Hungary and all of Eastern Europe would be likely to follow suit.

Eldridge, Justin L. C. (Gordon) FEB 1989

The Role of German Intelligence in the Planning and Conduct of Operation Citadel

In 1943, German military intelligence did not accurately assess major changes in Soviet military operations which contributed to the poor command decisions Adolph Hitler, his staff and field commanders made prior to and during Operation CITADEL (battle of Kursk). German military intelligence had difficulty in determining the size and location of Soviet operational and strategic reserves. This explanation may more accurately reflect the reasons for the operation's failure than the more popular interpretations that blame Hitler.

This paper examines the organization, analytical and intelligence collection capabilities of German intelligence in the summer of 1943. Poor German analysis, inaccurate and inconsistent enemy order of battle files between echelons, an inappropriate and misleading focus on tactical details, overconfidence in intelligence capabilities, vague intelligence estimates from the German high command and wide qualitative intelligence product differences all contributed to CITADEL's failure.

Though German intelligence personnel correctly took pride in their ability to provide the maneuver commander with timely intelligence information, the results of their efforts were often inaccurate, resulting in poor command decisions, or too vague to base decisions on. Each German intelligence source (human, communication signals intercept and air reconnaissance) were tactically helpful, but individually and collectively failed to provide the Germans with accurate assessments or insights into how the Soviets would deploy and commit their forces at Kursk.

Emch, Roger L. (Finan) JUN 1989

Haiti: The Rise and Fall of the Duvalier Dynasty

This research focuses on the rise and fall of the Duvalier regimes in Haiti. It also covers the history of political rule in the country. It is in Haitian history that the cultural traditions of her people, related patterns of Haitian government, and the significance of the US intervention from 1915-1934, can be recognized and the Duvalier Dynasty put in perspective. That history explains the evolution of the unprecedented autocratic, dictatorial, and repressive regime of Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier and that of his son, Jean Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier. So solidly did Francois Duvalier consolidate the basis of his power, upon his death, his son and designated heir, 19 year old Jean-Claude Duvalier, was able to assume that power and the presidency without a ripple of violence in a country known for its violent politics. After nine years of rule by Baby Doc, the Duvalier Dynasty began to crumble. The paper outlines the causes for this turn of events.

Emch, Roger L. (Marsh) MAR 1989

The Japanese Commercial Space Program, An Assessment

From humble beginnings in the mid-1950s, the Japanese have progressed rapidly to the point where they will soon be capable of launching commercial satellites for third countries. They will be unfettered by licensing restrictions which were the price of much of their technological progress to date. The H-2 booster will make this possible when it becomes operational in 1992. For the present there seems little doubt, given their clearly established goals, continuity of effort, magnitude of resources being dedicated to the overall space effort, and technological progress, that the Japanese will be a major competitor in the world commercial space market. Japanese methods
for acquiring existing technology are well established and effective. Whether or not the Japanese are capable of major technological breakthroughs on their own in satellite technology remains to be seen.

Fisher, John W. (Wardlaw)  
DEC 1988

Can Intelligence Win a War on Drugs? -- The National Drug Intelligence Strategy and efforts for a "Drug-Free America"

The dilemma of a rapidly expanding illicit narcotics problem, especially in the last 10 years, has heightened concern about its implications for national security. Public concern has risen to the level where drug trafficking is identified as the most serious policy problem. There are five national drug strategies that address the issue by primarily targeting the supply of illegal drugs in an assault on trafficking organizations and individuals. The national drug intelligence strategy directs the use of intelligence in support of this attack. Considerable debate exists, however, over the utility of intelligence in implementing and evaluating the overall narcotics control effort.

The design of the national drug intelligence effort, both past and present is far from optimal. Common problems of the structure include duplication, bureaucratic in-fighting, and overall lack of coordination. The difficulties in integration increase as the federal effort has expanded. Planning and coordination is hampered by an organizational partiality for enforcement measures and problems with reaching a coherent consensus. The pending reorganization mandated by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 promises substantive remodeling, but while several provisions are viewed by the intelligence community as meaningful, a considerable portion will be cosmetic.

The application of intelligence in drug control has been heavily focused on supply reduction. The national policy structure believes that intelligence is primarily valuable when employed in interdictive law enforcement efforts. While the alliance of intelligence and interdiction is most often cited as the locus of narcotics control, despite large increases in intelligence and interdiction expenditures over the last eight years, the effectiveness of supply reduction is negligible. Analysis of the present approach suggests that endeavors are neutralized by traffickers ability to rapidly and efficiently adjust to US intelligence and interdiction, which is forced to operate reactively.

National intelligence resources are subject to increasing insistence that drug intelligence be a high priority. However, consideration of the potential benefits and perils in employment demonstrates that expansion, particularly for national systems is problematic. Concerns regarding protection of sources and methods and timely dissemination suggest that augmented use for the present tactical and operational modes is limited, though employment for strategic narcotics intelligence is unnecessarily neglected. Human intelligence is the source and method that demonstrates the most promise, particularly for the real-time targeting desired, though collection management is complex. Finally, while the issue of increased military participation is the subject of much discussion, it appears that any greatly intensified participation by the DoD would bring about more complications than benefits.

It is reasonable to conclude that intelligence is not the solution to achieving a "Drug-Free America." Intelligence can, however, be more effectively utilized in a strategic form that permits more informed policy decisions, as opposed to its present emphasis in obtaining enforcement-oriented information. Intelligence is probably not sufficiently used to evaluate strategies and plans aimed at reducing the demand for illicit drugs, yet demand reduction is the alternative that bears the most promise for eventual attainment of a victory in the War on Drugs.

Fisher, John W. (Blake)  
DEC 1988

National Security Advisor -- The Iran-Contra Affair and Prospects for Future Politics and Policy

The National Security Act of 1947 established a council whose sole function is to advise the President in the execution of his constitutional responsibility and accountability for the proper conduct of ensuring the national security. A recent controversy, the Iran-Contra affair, has given rise to debate concerning the operation, policy, and manner in which national security decisions are made. The role of the President's National Security Advisor was prominent in this controversy, and considerable debate has continued to wage over the proper function of the Advisor, and appropriate design of the infrastructure itself.

The historical background giving rise to the existing role of the National Security Advisor is examined, demonstrating that the present role of the Advisor grew out of a need to make the NSC responsive to the most
pressing Presidential concerns. President Kennedy established the archetype for the Advisor’s role, finding the autonomy of an advisor with the President as his only constituency to be the best advisor in the forum of national security policy. President Reagan began his presidency with a significantly different concept of the role for his Advisor.

Analysis of the recommendations of the various investigative bodies suggest political motives. Constructive measures to inhibit the recurrence of systemic breakdown do exist, however, among these being maintenance of a formal decision-making process by the President.

Future prospects involving the National Security Advisor include the likelihood of continued Presidential development of directives designed to prevent systemic malfunction in the future. The probability of increased congressional oversight is enhanced as a result of Iran-Contra, though opinions of its efficacy differ.

Analysis of the position of the National Security Advisor authenticates its viability within the framework of the present system.

Florich, Stephen (Atkeson) NOV 1988

The Strategic Importance of Afghanistan Into the 21st Century

Afghanistan has been of little significance to US strategic interests over the last century. In the last decade Afghanistan’s role in US interests and policy has had a complete reversal. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the changes and significance of events in recent history that have made Afghanistan strategically important to the US.

Historically Afghanistan’s strategic importance was as a buffer state between Russian and British interests. Caught in a tug of war between two empires, Afghanistan finds itself in much the same position today. However, today’s situation places Afghanistan between the US and the USSR in a battle of regional interest and political importance that holds a world-wide impact.

I have briefly covered the historical significance of Afghanistan in South West Asia and follow with another chapter that highlights the severe geographical considerations that are necessary in understanding Afghanistan’s role in that region. The next two chapters focus on the economic and military considerations in reference to Afghanistan’s strategic importance. Both US and Soviet perspectives are used in these chapters to build a foundation for my most important chapter; the political considerations of Afghanistan’s strategic importance. It highlights the political impact Afghanistan has on the image and roles of the US and the USSR in world affairs. It is in this light that Afghanistan has a large role in strategic importance for both countries.

The conclusion takes the considerations in the first five chapters and combines them with the political considerations in Chapter six to illuminate the strategic importance of Afghanistan for the US into the next century.

Glodosky, John P. (Padelford) MAR 1989

Islamic Fundamentalism in Tunisia: A Historical Perspective

When Tunisia gained independence from France in 1956, Habib Bourguiba set the country on a moderate, pro-Western course. This has proved to be of value to the US in dealing with the more radical Arab states. Domestically, Bourguiba initiated radical changes in the relationship between state and Islam. These changes, when coupled with a repressive, one party political system and a failure to meet the economic expectations of the Tunisian people, gave birth to the Tunisian fundamentalist movement.

Alternately suppressed and tacitly accepted, the fundamentalists grew to be one of the strongest opposition groups to the Bourguiba regime. The largest and best organized of the fundamentalist groups is the Movement de la Tendance Islamique (Islamic Tendency Movement)(MTI). The "Supreme Combatant"'s last attempt to suppress the MTI set the stage for his removal from office.

Since assuming the Tunisian presidency in 1987, Zine El Abideine Ben Ali has moved swiftly and decisively to open the political process and address the complaints of the major opposition groups. Ben Ali has reinstated many of the traditional customs and rites desired by the fundamentalists, but he has insisted upon a strict separation of politics and religion.
These changes have removed much of the fundamentalist popular support and forced them to try to set a specific political agenda. So far, the fundamentalists have failed to set a requisite political agenda. Given Ben Ali's popularity, they are unlikely to fare well in the upcoming elections. Such failure could lead to more violent tactics by the heretofore relatively peaceful fundamentalists. However, such a move at a time of declining popular support should be easily contained by security forces.

Glodosky, John P. (Taylor)  
JUN 1989

The ULTRA Intelligence Tactical Dissemination System

"ULTRA" was the code name that the Allies assigned to intelligence derived from decrypted German radio message traffic that had been enciphered by the Enigma machine. The British organization for obtaining and disseminating this intelligence was centered in Bletchley Park, England. An organization called the Special Liaison Units (SLU's) was formed to deliver ULTRA intelligence to tactical commanders. These units were also responsible for ensuring that commands receiving ULTRA intelligence followed the strict security procedures governing its handling and use.

The British refined the SLU system and the staff processing of ULTRA through the early war years. By end of the war in North Africa, in 1942, the British had devised a procedure of having cleared personnel in the G-2 section put together a complete intelligence picture based on ULTRA and open sources and then presenting it to the commander and indoctrinated staff members.

The Americans initially used the British dissemination system in North Africa, but modified it prior to D-Day. The Americans continued to use the British SLU's to deliver ULTRA messages, but attached an American ULTRA representative to American commands receiving this intelligence. This representative was tasked with presenting ULTRA to the commander and for its security.

Lack of American standard operating procedures and the representative's close attachment to the staff led to a variety of problems. The problems included dissemination procedures to the Commanding General and indoctrinated staff members, ULTRA security enforcement, and lack of relief for the representatives. These problems were, to a great extent, alleviated or exacerbated by the importance placed on ULTRA intelligence by the Commanding General.

The greatest vulnerability to the ULTRA program was the lack of redundancy throughout the system. From Bletchley Park to final consumer there was a single channel that could have been cut at any point. The risk assessment to the ULTRA program was well done except for the redundancy problem. The security procedures were well thought out, well implemented and enforced almost 100 percent.

Gooden, Royal T. (Atkeson)  
AUG 1988

Malta: A Strategic Political and Intelligence Assessment

The Maltese archipelago of three islands has occupied a position of strategic importance in the middle of the Mediterranean since ancient times. This paper is an affirmation of its continued importance in the nuclear age because of its militarily significant fortifications, its central position in Mediterranean shipping lanes, and its fragile political status as a nonaligned but westward-leaning democracy.

Major political movements and the impact of the 1987 elections are analyzed. Internal stresses involving the National Police and the Armed Forces of Malta are documented. An order of battle for the Armed Forces of Malta, derived entirely from unclassified open sources, is presented. The extensive fortifications built on the main island over the past millennium because of the unique geology of Malta are surveyed. Conclusions are drawn for the continued importance of Malta to NATO.

Goodwin, Paul A. (Finan)  
AUG 1989

The Latin American Debt Crisis: How Can it be Solved?
The severity of the Latin American debt crisis became apparent in 1982, when Mexico threatened to default on its multibillion-dollar foreign debt. Soon after, many other Latin American countries found themselves unable to service their own interest payments on dollar-denominated loans from international banks. The very real danger of defaults by as few as two or three of the most highly indebted countries could bankrupt almost all of the banks, and adversely impact the entire Western financial system. In order to service their debt, most of the debtor countries have had to curtail their imports and initiate severe austerity programs. Additionally, they have explored several potential solutions to ease their debt crisis. These include: Debt Forgiveness; Debt-Nature Swaps; Debt-Equity Swaps; The Baker Plan; The Brady Plan; and The Perez Plan. 

The causes for, and the problems of, Capital Flight are also explored. After outlining the pros and cons of the above options, the author draws some conclusions and recommendations concerning the Latin American Debt Crisis.

Green, Richard F. (Wardlaw)  

Can Naval Special Warfare Assist in Fighting the Drug War? 

Illegal drug use has become one of the greatest problems facing the US. The US response to this threat has been to try to interdict the drug supplies before they get into this country. The agency responsible for the enforcement of this policy in the maritime environment is the Coast Guard. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard does not have the resources to stop and inspect every vessel entering US waters. 

Currently, Navy ships are being used to assist the Coast Guard in drug interdiction operations. However, a Navy ship cannot participate unless it has a detachment of Coast Guard personnel on board to actually conduct the search and seizure. This program does extend the influence of the Coast Guard beyond the reach of its own ships, but does not utilize all of the Navy's capabilities to transport Coast Guard personnel to a target vessel for drug interdiction. 

This essay will attempt to demonstrate how another Navy asset, Naval Special Warfare, could assist the Coast Guard in the drug war. The primary goal being to increase the Coast Guard's mobility, while providing Navy units with improved training opportunities. This would be accomplished by creating teams made up of Naval Special Warfare and Coast Guard personnel. These teams would use Naval Special Warfare Insertion techniques to put Coast Guard personnel in the vicinity of an interdiction target. Chapter two describes the Coast Guard's lack of resources and what has been done to alleviate this problem. Chapter three describes the Posse Comitatus Act and how it impacts on the use of the military in drug interdiction. Chapter four explains what Naval Special Warfare is and what its capabilities are. Chapter five describes possible joint operations by the Coast Guard and Naval Special Warfare. Chapter six addresses the effect this program would have on the Navy and Coast Guard, and also discusses casualties and this programs impact on drug smuggling. Chapter seven contains the conclusions.

Green, Richard F. (Blake)  

Did the Cancellation of the Air Strikes on D-Day Cause the Bay of Pigs Invasion to Fail? 

In April 1961, the United States tried to remove Castro from power in Cuba with an invasion force made up of Cuban refugees. The invasion at the Bay of Pigs failed leading to embarrassment for the US while Castro gained prestige around the world and increased backing by the Soviet Union. President Kennedy took responsibility for the failure, but several high level CIA officials were forced to retire. 

There has been speculation that the invasion could have succeeded if President Kennedy had not cancelled a crucial air strike against Castro's air force. The investigation, initiated by President Kennedy after the US backed forces were defeated, was hampered by not being able to interview the leaders of the invasion, who were still in Castro's prisons. 

This essay will attempt to answer the question of whether the decision by President Kennedy to cancel the D-Day air strikes against Castro's air force, caused the Bay of Pigs invasion to fail. Chapter two describes some of the issues that prompted the anti-Castro effort by the Eisenhower administration and how far the efforts had progressed when the Kennedy administration took over in 1961. Chapter three describes the original invasion plan that was proposed by the CIA for removing Castro from power.
Chapter four explains what modifications were made to the plan, and how successfully the preparatory phases were carried out. Chapter five describes the actual invasion and the response by Castro's forces. Chapter six discusses two investigations of the Bay of Pigs failure. Chapter seven discusses why the invasion failed. Chapter eight contains the conclusions.

Henderson, Crystal O. (Finan)  
AUG 1989

In Search of Legitimacy: Does Latin America Fit the Ferrero Model of Shifting Legitimacy?

Social scientists, as well as politicians, have been studying the rise and fall of governments throughout history. Their goal is often to determine the strengths and weaknesses of a particular system. They seek to find what makes some systems stable, long lasting, and productive, while others are volatile, short lived, and destructive. The key to this is found in the term legitimacy.

In 1940 Guglielmo Ferrero wrote *The Principles of Power* in which he delves deeply into the definition of legitimacy, its principles, and its changes over time. This paper summarizes the most salient of Ferrero's principles of legitimacy and the performance measures by which governments are measured. It then applies these measures to three Latin American governments and critiques their legitimacy and performance. The purpose of this is to determine if Ferrero's model, designed to explain the unrest in Western Europe, is equally applicable in Latin America. The conclusion of the paper finds that Ferrero's model, while having some shortcomings, is applicable to Latin America and provides a helpful tool in determining the legitimacy of governments.

Henderson, Crystal O. (Finan)  
JUN 1989

Dependency Theory: The Andre Gunder Frank Model and its Shortcomings

Since the sixties, economists and social scientists studied underdevelopment in what are now termed third world or lesser developed countries. They have also studied it in the context of the causal effects of colonization on underdevelopment. One of the most famous and widely supported theories on the cause of underdevelopment, is the dependency theory.

This paper examines dependency theory as developed by Andre Gunder Frank. The model is first described and then critiqued, not on the basis of immediate content, but on its completeness. The purpose is not to support or defend what Frank says, but to define the shortcomings in the model, those aspects of underdevelopment that are entirely overlooked in Frank's model. This discussion is designed to show that underdevelopment is caused by many varied influences and that an exclusively economic model is incomplete.

Hines, Ralph L. (Smith)  
AUG 1989

Maskirovka in the Belorussian Campaign

This paper presents a case study of Soviet maskirovka as applied to a battlefield situation, namely the Belorussian Campaign of 1944. Drawing largely from recent translations of Soviet military literature, it demonstrates the importance of WWII maskirovka in modern Soviet doctrine. The Great Patriotic War has been divided into three periods by Soviet military historians. To enhance the study of deception used in the Belorussian Campaign, each period is discussed to stress the evolution of Soviet maskirovka during the war, and the vulnerability of the Germans to these deception tactics. The focus of this paper is on the strategic planning and operational implementation of maskirovka prior to the initiation of the Belorussian Campaign. This includes the role of the Soviet Supreme High Command, as well as defensive and offensive techniques used at the operational level. Finally, the significant events expressed in this paper are analyzed with the intent of relating the importance of WWII maskirovka to modern Soviet doctrine.
Gorbachev’s "New Thinking" in Soviet Third World Policy

The most notable aspect of the Soviet Foreign policy in recent times is its dramatic change in style. The change in style of Soviet foreign policy advocates more responsible decision-making based on practical considerations and is no longer tied exclusively to an unrealistic ideology. The new Soviet leadership is keenly aware of US sensitivities toward Soviet activism in the Third World. They seem to realize that, in the Third World, equality cannot be accomplished by military power alone, but must encompass the economic and political spheres as well. The result is that the Third World has been assigned a lower priority in Soviet foreign policy. "New Thinking" has enabled the Soviet leadership to accept the fact that the gains of indiscretionary expansionism in the Third World are not necessarily worth the costs. The Soviet concept of security is moving beyond the purely military dimension and is incorporating the idea of an interdependent, interconnected world that functions under a global economy.

How Presidents Have Used and Abused the Director of Central Intelligence: 1968-1986

In a system where intelligence is power, the control of information becomes a valuable political weapon. In striving to gain control, presidents have tried to pressure the DCI into a variety of activities. These activities range from altering intelligence estimates for political convenience, to assuming responsibility for illegal actions. The use of the DCI has evolved to the point where the tendency has been established in the last two administrations of changing the DCI with each change in administration. This tendency of formalizing the political nature of the appointment of the DCI is potentially dangerous for an intelligence community designed to operate outside the political arena. By linking the DCI to an administration politically, the likelihood of a DCI compromising his intelligence judgments for political purposes will increase. The evidence show this was attempted frequently during the period 1968-1986.

The Red Army Faction: An Anarchist Group

Of particular concern to the Western world is the threat posed by terrorist groups. When looking at world terrorism today, one must look at the past to better understand the theories and actions of terrorist groups to include their evolution and political theory. Of significant interest to the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies is the terrorist threat posed by West Germany’s Red Army Faction (RAF). The RAF is a leftist group that expounds the violent overthrow of governments. A brief study of anarchism in the nineteenth century can help lay the foundation for understanding the RAF of today. The RAF emerged from the New Left of the 1960s and was founded by Andreas Baader and Ulricke Meinhof. The evolution of the group from a local West German leftist group to an international anarchist terrorist group is discussed in detail. Sections on the RAF’s ideology and tactics further support the RAFs anarchist label. Use of violence and the total absence of a plan for the future after the fall of the West German Government/State, place the RAF near the anarchist pole of the political spectrum. This study of the nineteenth century anarchist (the hay day for anarchism) shows the actions of the RAF (e.g., bombing and assassinations) are similar to those of anarchist groups in the nineteenth century. In addition, the RAF’s inarticulation of a plan for a post-revolutionary structure is demonstrative of a society without government or central authority, i.e., a state of anarchy.
An Examination of Proposals to Improve Management of US Foreign Intelligence

As a result of the Iran-Contra Affair and subsequent investigations, a number of legislative proposals were introduced as attempts to correct perceived problems in the management and procedures of the National Foreign Intelligence System. Senate Bill 1820, The National Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1987, introduced by Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, is the most far reaching of these proposals. Most significant, is the proposal to separate the Director of Central Intelligence from direct operational control of the Central Intelligence Agency.

This paper examines the proposed legislation and the rationale for its various suggestions for other changes in the National Foreign Intelligence System. In addition, the paper examines the original legislation, The National Security Act of 1947, that created the DCI post in the CIA and established the foundation for our present intelligence structure.

An examination of the proposed legislation is preceded by a brief characterization of the relationship between intelligence officer and policy maker. This provides a backdrop for reviewing repeated proposals for restructuring of the nation’s intelligence system at the highest levels.

The National Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1987 has a number of proposed changes in addition to the proposed separation of DCI and CIA. Each of these is explained and examined in the paper. Additionally, the paper provides some background on similar proposals offered prior to Senator Specter’s plan. Included are opinions, pro and con, of congressmen, commissions, and government officials.

This examination of the proposed legislation and the arguments for and against it was developed using a number of sources. First, the proposed legislation and the text of the floor statement of Senator Specter are used to present the proposed plan for restructuring the intelligence system. Second, reports from commissions such as the Church, Murphy, and Rockefeller Commissions of the mid-70’s are examined as they also addressed many of the issues as Senate Bill 1820. Legislation related to intelligence is also reviewed and includes the National Security Act of 1947. Further, interviews of former officials of the Intelligence Community provide further insight into the issues unique to the intelligence community and provide opinion on the proposed restructuring and the rationale.

Finally, the paper provides the opinion of the author on each of the proposals to change the present system of managing the national foreign intelligence effort.

Covert Action/Paramilitary Operations: Short of War and Far From Doing Nothing

The purpose of this paper is to explain and defend the role of covert action/paramilitary operations (CA/PM) in support of US foreign policy. The paper begins with a discussion on how and why CA/PM operations have become an exploited, headline-making issue when they should be kept secret. The paper also explains the motivating factor behind this highly publicized, controversial issue and its use as a justifiable American foreign policy tool. Covert action/special activities are defined and the role for paramilitary operations as an option is clarified.

The body of the paper starts with a brief history of CA/PM operations dating from the American Revolution to the early endeavors of the Central Intelligence Agency. Five individual case studies are presented in brief to more fully describe and defend the role of CA/PM operations. A section devoted to explaining the role of CA/PM operations in the arena of counterinsurgency operations and a section is also devoted to describing the role of the US military Special Operations Forces in support of CA/PM operations.

Lastly, the paper discusses the management of CA/PM operations, describing essential criteria for successful conduct of these operations. Also addressed in this section is the issue of oversight and accountability, taking into consideration the nature of Congressional oversight and how the executive branch in its entirety needs to strengthen its own accountability mechanism before accusing the Congress of “leaks.”

The conclusion addresses morality regarding the use of CA/PM operations in a liberal democratic society and discusses the awkward paradox faced by the President in dealing with this contentious issue. The rationale for the use of CA/PM operations in support of US foreign policy is fully justified and should leave the reader with the conviction that CA/PM operations are sensible and effective options short of war and far from doing nothing.
Regional and Global Implications of the Kurdish Movement

The purpose of this paper is to explain and explore the probable success of the Kurdish movement. The paper begins by defining "the guerrilla" and guerrilla warfare in general and then specifically addresses the Kurdish warrior heritage. The paper also identifies motivating factors which are behind the highly independent Kurdish attitude which strives to obtain autonomy as a people/state.

The body of the paper starts with a brief historical background of the Kurdish movement from the close of the Ottoman Empire to the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. The movement is further described by type, organizational structure, strategy, stage and logistical support. Throughout the narrative, a clear analysis of leadership and objectives of the movement can be assessed.

The Kurdish movement has been a "stabilizing element in the Middle East for decades. To clarify regional implications of the movement, primary countries discussed as actors are Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. To address the effects of external influences on the movement, as assessments, is made of the global implications for involvement by the Soviet Union and the United States.

The conclusion contains a projection for the Kurdish movement and describes three likely alternatives and/or courses of action for the Kurds to take in order to achieve autonomy. Rationale for continuation of the movement is fully justified and leaves the reader with a conviction that the guerrilla war being conducted by the Kurds is successful as a Third World revolutionary movement.

Mexico's Evolving Central American Foreign Policy

To understand Mexico's policy in Central America, one must view it in the following context. The country coexists with an unfinished revolution and a restless military, while living between a giant neighbor to the north and turbulent Central Americans to the south. Traditionally, Mexico's foreign policy has been inward-looking, with an aim of preserving the country from inside forces rather than projecting its influence externally. Although Mexico's political leaders publicly express a laissez-faire attitude toward Central America, the military's concern for events in Central America remains high. While acknowledging the region of Central America as in the US sphere of influence, the Mexican military increasingly view the developments there as directly affecting the security of their own country. Mexico's guiding principle in dealing with Central America must be to eliminate this tension spot that could lead to future international conflict close to its southern border.

The Decline of Eurocommunism in the 1980s

In the 1970s, Eurocommunism promised new party structures and tenets for the West European Communist parties and seemed to be a threat to Western democracies. Yet, the 1980s saw a decline in Communist support, a splintering of the main Communist parties, and a virtual abandonment of Eurocommunist principles. A closer look at the Italian, French, and Spanish Communist parties reveals both similarities and differences in each party's involvement in Eurocommunism and in the problems it faces. Eurocommunism has not replaced capitalism, nor does it any longer appear to be the threat to capitalism that was anticipated in the 1970s.

The results of this research paper identify five problems the main Eurocommunist parties have failed to resolve: the definition of a clearly-defined program that articulates just how capitalism is to be phased out and how socialism, minus all the totalitarian vestiges of Soviet Communism, is to be instituted into Western Europe; the promise of social justice and economic relief for the working class which has not been carried out; a clash between progress in the scientific-technical field and the Eurocommunist ideals of eliminating capitalist labor division and the idea of giving the working class the power to make decisions; the lack of expertise in handling sophisticated defense issues which need technical proficiency; and the unsuccessful attempt to deal with new social issues that are only
marginaly related to traditional Communist ideas of social class conflict and ownership over means of production. In the final analysis, Eurocommunism has not provided a viable alternative to the Soviet model of ideology and Communist party organization. No party has been completely comfortable with total rejection of a Soviet-like identity. Therefore, capitalism, not Eurocommunism, has flourished.

The movement in Southern Europe that began in opposition to Soviet Communism has gradually lost power, due to the changes in Western industrial society, technology and consumerism. The main Eurocommunist parties all face problems with leftist partners, economic reform, and ideology. All three parties face problems in their maintenance of relations with the USSR because of the old Eurocommunist ideal of a clean break away from the Soviets -- an ideal which has not been carried out. In the Gorbachev era, the Eurocommunists are moving closer to the USSR because of perestroika, in hopes of sharing some of its promising advantages. However, the problem of Eurocommunist identity remains -- whether to obtain more power through coalitions and abandoning uniqueness or whether to remain weak, yet Communist.

Jones, Laurence M. (Finan) AUG 1988

Are Reagan’s Nicaraguan Policy Goals Achievable?

During the last seven years of the Reagan presidency, relations between the United States and Nicaragua have progressively deteriorated. The Reagan administration’s foreign policy toward Nicaragua has centered on four goals: fulfillment of Sandinista promises for democratic pluralism, an end to Nicaraguan subversion of its neighbors, severance of Nicaraguan ties with Cuba and the Soviet bloc, and a reduction in the Nicaraguan armed forces. The United States security concerns, its national interests in Central America, and Nicaragua’s current pivotal role for peace or conflict in the region, enables an hypothesis to be drawn about US foreign policy toward the region: Are Reagan’s Nicaraguan Foreign Policy Goals Achievable?

This essay is an analysis of the Reagan Administration’s policy goals toward Nicaragua. Chapter two explores each goal individually to determine its origin, its validity, its consistency as part of the foreign policy for the whole Central American region, and finally, whether the goal is achievable. Chapter three examines the three main instruments, (economic measures, diplomacy, and the use of force), the United States has employed in its efforts to accomplish these goals. Each instrument is critiqued to determine how effective it has been in accomplishing one or all of the goals and whether it is consistent with the goals. The effect that other factors, such as congressional support, public support, and regional consensus, have on these goals and instruments is also reviewed. Chapter four concludes the goal and instrument assessment and provides recommendations and policy options for goal achievement.

Jones, Laurence M. (Eisenhauer) SEP 1988

Should There Be a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence?

One of the most important issues facing the United States Intelligence Community today is Congressional oversight. The improprieties discovered in the Iran-Contra Affair have resulted in new legislation aimed at fixing what some regard as an inadequate intelligence oversight structure. One measure is a bill sponsored by Representative Henry J. Hyde (R-III) which calls for merging the intelligence oversight committees in the Senate and House of Representatives into a single Joint Committee on Intelligence. Proponents of this measure assert that the current system is no longer capable of performing as an effective oversight mechanism because it has become embroiled in partisan politics, duplication of effort, and unauthorized disclosures. Advocates of the two-committee system, while acknowledging these problems, refute the assertion that a Joint Committee is the solution and fear that such a measure would be counterproductive and disastrous for both the Congress and the Intelligence Community. Intelligence plays an important role in the formulation of foreign policy and the conduct of our national security. Congressional oversight of intelligence can have a positive or negative impact on this process. It is therefore, important that we determine if the Intelligence Community, Congress, and subsequently, the American people, would be better served by a Joint Committee on Intelligence.

This essay attempts to answer that question by evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the current system against those anticipated from an untested joint intelligence committee concept. Chapter two begins this process
by defining the responsibilities and functions that effective oversight should encompass. Chapter three examines the historical origin of the two-committee system and details its structure and composition. The chapter concludes with a detailed assessment of the advantages and disadvantages this system has afforded. Chapter four accomplishes the same process for a joint committee, reviewing its development and probable composition, and ending with an analysis of its expected results. Chapter five concludes the evaluation of the two oversight structures and provides recommendations for improved oversight.

Kelley, Thomas M. (Blake)  

Covert Action: Is it Still a Viable Foreign Policy Tool?

Covert action is the most controversial component of foreign policy and the intelligence community. From the founding of this country to the present day, covert action has been used to promote and protect the US's interests abroad. As to whether or not covert action represents a viable option today, the author concludes that that it does. However, due to increased congressional involvement and intense scrutiny by the media, the use of covert actions has been greatly reduced. The ability to use covert action as a policy option could be seriously jeopardized if Congress continues its attitudes of distrust and its penchant for openness regarding covert activities with which it does not agree. Covert action is a viable foreign policy tool, but the executive and legislative branches of our government must work in concert to keep open all foreign policy options.

Kelley, Thomas M. (Atkeson)  

Special Operations Forces: Why They Fail in a Direct Action Role

The purpose of this paper is to address the issue of why US Special Operations Forces (SOF) have failed in performing direct action missions. The paper begins with a definition of SOF and special operations, establishing a base for the reader. The paper explains the difficulty involved in defining SOF, and how this leads to some of the problems encountered by SOF.

The body of the paper focuses on the external and internal problems that confront SOF, and how these problems have caused our SOF to fail in this direct action role. Chapters one and two introduce and define the subject. Chapter three outlines the major problem areas both internal and external. National strategy, policy, and command and control are the external problems addressed. Inter/intra service rivalry and internal problems within the services are discussed, and parallels are drawn to contrast our system with Great Britain, Israel and West Germany.

Chapter four addresses three case studies: Son Tay, Mayaguez, and Desert One. A brief description of each mission is presented along with the factors that eventually led to each mission resulting in failure.

Chapter five discusses the future of SOF and where this country is heading in terms of establishing a viable SOF capability. Congressional and Executive actions affecting the revitalization effort for SOF are discussed, and how these actions have been affected by the current world situation.

The conclusion addresses where the US needs to improve its SOF capability and why. We can no longer just react to every crisis situation that occurs. The US must establish its goals and objectives now in order to preempt us from being manipulated by those that would embarrass us in front of the rest of the world. This paper should leave the reader with the conviction that we have failed in these missions, and we must act to rebuild our SOF structure in order to protect our citizens and our interests, both at home and abroad.

Kelley, Thomas M. (Blake)  

Covert Action: Is it Still a Viable Foreign Policy Tool?

Covert action is a viable foreign policy tool, but its use has been reduced due to increased congressional involvement and scrutiny by the media. In order to more effectively use this tool, consensus between the Executive
Branch and Congress must be reached. The open nature of American society further complicates the use of covert action, but the desire to use it does not justify restriction of that open society.

Klingner, Bruce (Baldwin) NOV 1988

The Congressional Role in Covert Action: A Constitutional Analysis

The 1970s were a decade marked by drastic upheaval in the US Government. Congress, displeased with executive conduct in Vietnam and Watergate, began to assert a role for itself in areas previously reserved for the president, to include foreign affairs, military operations, and intelligence. This new relationship between the two branches would forever change the way in which the US Government conducted intelligence operations.

While many argue that this change is a proper inclusion of the legislative branch in the determination of American policy, others challenge it as Congressional usurpation of the constitutional powers of the President. Research based on a thorough study of the Constitution supports the latter view. An analysis of the Constitution, debates of the Constitutional convention, and the memoirs of the Framers reveal the original intention of the Founding Fathers was for the executive to conduct foreign policy and military operations, with the legislature acting as a check afterwards. Since Covert Action is a hybrid creature of these two fields, this information is directly relevant.

Two centuries of American history are marked by executive conduct of covert operations with virtually no input from Congress. The actions taken by presidents who were Framers, combined with Congressional acquiescence by Framers in Congress, shows the original intent regarding the conduct of Covert Action. While the Federal Courts have traditionally shied away from political questions, there have been several seminal cases regarding the delineation of foreign affairs and Covert Action authorities. In US v. Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court declared the President to be the "sole organ" for the conduct of foreign affairs.

In light of this, recent Congressional actions to insert itself into a policy-making role in Covert Action through its intelligence committees is nothing less than a deliberate attempt to skew the constitutional system of checks and balances created by the Framers.

This study concludes with recommendations for improving the deficiencies of the current Congressional oversight system.

Lemons, Steven M. (Harris) APR 1989

Soviet Military Doctrine: A Dialectical Approach to Cause and Change

Soviet military doctrine has moved away from being dominated by the belief that an eventual war will be totally nuclear. They accept the possibility that a conventional operation, or at least a conventional phase with eventual escalation to the use of theater nuclear forces, is possible if not probable. Understanding the Soviet’s concept of doctrine is a prerequisite to understanding their development of strategy. Doctrine is a hard concept to translate exactly, but one definition might be "formally codified and approved policy based on an accepted consensus." A successful appeal to doctrine is sufficient basis for almost any decision or change. It is important for US policy makers to understand the political and military doctrine of the Soviet Union in order to effectively negotiate with them.

Lemons, Steven M. (Harris) OCT 1988

US Army Tactical Intelligence Superiority: A Shortfall

The formation of the Army Technical Control and Analysis Element (Army TCAE) represents a quantum leap in efforts to support the tactical commanders with real-time intelligence. It establishes signals intelligence (SIGINT) as an effective combat multiplier in support of air/land battle doctrine. The impetus to establish a fully capable Army TCAE is rooted in the Army’s long-standing challenge to provide continuous, state of the art SIGINT support to tactical units, and to continually train and upgrade the cryptologic skills of user personnel. It is impera-
tive that the TCAE structure be understood by Army-level and National-level intelligence officers and utilized as a tool to fill the void that has been present since the Army Security Agency was disestablished. The leaders of Army intelligence have taken many steps to improve the way intelligence information is provided to the tactical commander. Continued development and maturation of the Army TCAE is one of the more important steps.

Lucas, William E. (Padelford) APR 1989


Algerian-Soviet relations have matured during the past three decades as Algeria matured and the Soviet Union’s interest in North Africa grew. It began with Soviet aid for Algeria’s quest for independence from France during the late fifties and early sixties. Relations came into full bloom with the rise of anti-imperialist, pro-Soviet President Houari Boumedienne. Under the current leadership of President Bendjedid, these relations have reached a mature and stable position, while the Algerians continue their fight for Third World economic and political independence with a neutral, non-aligned status. The Soviets have realized the Algerians will accept political and economic aid, but will not serve Soviet foreign policy that does not fulfill the needs of their independent non-aligned, but increasingly westward-looking nation. The economic problems of both countries have contributed to a more pragmatic and even handed policy towards each other.

Mack, Cynthia M. (Kim) SEP 1988

Sino-Soviet Relations: Kampuchea the Toughest Obstacle

Three obstacles stand in the way of China and the Soviet Union normalizing relations: the removal of Soviet troops from the Sino-Soviet border, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and the withdrawal of Soviet aided Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. China is satisfied with the progress made on the first two. The third obstacle is cited by the Chinese as the most important and toughest to resolve. This paper examines the significance of this obstacle in normalizing relations.

Soviet backed Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea has historic as well as strategic implications for China. Historically China felt betrayed by Vietnam, its once close associate, for aligning with the Soviet Union. This alignment has led to security problems for China. China fears Vietnamese and Soviet expansion and encirclement in South East Asia (SEA). Due to the high level of Soviet involvement in Vietnam, China’s fear of Vietnamese-Soviet expansion is valid. Vietnam, assisted by the Soviet Union, has expanded its influence into Laos and Kampuchea. This influence is not only a security concern for China, it goes against the tenets of China’s foreign policy. China believes in a foreign policy of independence and anti-hegemony. In order to maintain its influence Vietnam remains dependent upon the Soviet Union militarily, economically, and politically. In return, Vietnam allows the Soviet Union to use Cam Ranh Bay for air and naval activity. Cam Ranh Bay gives the Soviets a base for potential power projection in SEA and beyond. If the Soviets forced the Vietnamese to withdraw from Kampuchea, as China maintains it should, they would risk losing their foothold in SEA.

The Soviet Union has tried to find solutions to the Kampuchea issue without openly forcing Vietnam to leave Kampuchea. The Soviets support national reconciliation and were successful in helping convince Vietnam to participate in the Jakarta “cocktail party” talks in July. Also, the Soviet Union supports Vietnam’s latest withdrawal of 50,000 troops from Kampuchea. The Soviets refuse to push the issue any further using the excuse Vietnam is an independent country and the Soviet Union has no right to force them to withdraw its forces. The Chinese are wary of Vietnam’s latest moves and would like international confirmation of the withdrawal. China contends as long as the Soviets refuse to press the Kampuchea issue, which it has political, economic, and military leverage to exert, normalization of relations and a Sino-Soviet summit will not occur. The Vietnamese government says it will be out of Kampuchea by 1990. If they remain true to their word the Soviet Union’s dilemma and its diplomatic waiting game will be over.

The Soviet withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, Vietnam’s announced withdrawal of troops from Kampuchea by 1990, and Soviet self-criticism of flaws in their foreign policy noted at the 19th Conference of the Soviet Communist Party, are China’s reasons for hope.
Once the third obstacle is met, China has several options in establishing normalized relations with the Soviet Union. This paper examines four possible options. China’s options include close alignment with the Soviets as in the 1950’s, but on a more equal basis; to create new obstacles to block normalization from occurring; to reach a dramatic rapprochement with the Soviets; or given the premise Sino-Soviet normalization has already occurred China would just have to go through the "official motions" of normalizing relations while actually remaining in a status quo position. The author feels, given the progress made on the first two obstacles, plus improvements in Sino-Soviet relations since 1982 in trade, education, technology and culture, the normalization process between China and the Soviet Union has begun. Once the third obstacle is met, Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev will meet and party to party ties will be restored. The nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship has already formed and will continue to operate on the same level it does today for quite awhile.

Mack, Cynthia M. (Finan) DEC 1988

International Drug Trafficking in Central America: A Threat to US National Security?

International drug trafficking since 1986 has been a top priority of the Reagan Administration. It is labeled, in NSDD 221, a threat to US national security because the government believes drug trafficking has the potential of destabilizing governments, degrading the health and moral fiber of US citizens, and has high economic costs to the nation. Many drugs used in the US are supplied by South American countries (typically Colombia), and go through Central America before reaching their destination. Recently, Central America has been the focus of a great deal of attention due to its alleged drug trafficking and terrorism links, especially in Nicaragua. These alleged links have reinforced government sentiment that drug trafficking in Central America poses a threat to US national security and have rallied public sentiment to fight against the cause. While the US rallies to fight against international drug trafficking in Central America, internal issues such as how to stop demand for drugs continue to take a back seat. This paper examines whether international drug trafficking in Central America is a threat to US national security.

A threat to national security is the anticipation on the part of the decision maker of impending harm of a military, strategic, or economic nature affecting the system established to protect the values, the government, and the domestic and international environment of the US.

Mangin, Debra J. (Padelford) FEB 1989

Reforming the Algerian Revolution

Algeria is in a state of flux. Economic and social realities are altering Algeria’s path to socialism. The failure of post-independence policies to develop a sound, diversified economy has exacerbated demographic trends and caused profound setbacks in the daily lives of Algerians. The aging Algerian revolutionary is being replaced by a young, more impatient generation, that is now demanding returns for the investments and sacrifices of the post-independence era. Attempts to move toward a free market economy are taking place just as changes are occurring in Algeria’s political power structure and new patterns may be emerging in popular political participation.

President Benjedid’s program for liberalization is not without opposition and barriers. For the political vanguard, it is an unacceptable compromise of the socialist goals and policy directions established by post-war leaders. For the Algerian populace at large, it is not moving fast enough. In view of Algeria’s ironic economic dependence on Western markets, its political and economic potential, and its leadership role in the Greater Maghreb as a whole, the US may well have a growing interest in current trends in that country. US foreign policy may best work to ensure the stability of the region through support of its goals for political nonalignment, unification, and local resolution of conflict.
Poland: A Basic PSYOP Study

Poland is on the verge of real and lasting change. The communist system which was imposed on Poles more than 40 years ago is a failure. The US government, in concert with its allies, should psychologically exploit this failure and the strong antipathy Poles feel for communism.

This study surveys Poland in history, ideology, society and culture exposing psychologically exploitable themes useful for the conduct of psychological operations (PSYOPS). The result is a potential target group/vulnerability matrix (Appendix A) which will be useful to a skillful psychological operator in planning and conducting PSYOPS.

In conjunction with the matrix, three important target groups and possible themes for a PSYOPS campaign against Poland are identified. First, there is the Roman Catholic Church. As a social institution within Poland independent of state control, it has a long history of hostility toward communist rule that is exploitable despite recent government reforms designed to win favor with the church. Second, Solidarity and the workers, who have reached new heights of political power, remain most vulnerable to a campaign that highlights their personal economic plight. Finally, Poland’s intellectual activists have slowly increased their opposition to a regime they regard as lacking in legitimacy, inefficient because of state planning and still reluctant to allow complete freedom of expression and association.

Within these three target groups exist the most potential for a successful PSYOPS campaign whose objective is by definition "to create in neutral, friendly and nonhostile foreign groups the emotions, attitudes and behavior to support the achievement of national objectives."

Soviet Countermeasures to Deep Attack

The US Army and the US Air Force are embracing concepts of war fighting that call for enhanced emphasis of the use of conventional deep attack (up to 100 miles or more in front of the friendly Forward Line of Own Troops-FLOT) to defeat a deeply echeloned Soviet attack. Deep attack is a highly complex effort, and has many potential weaknesses. The Soviets can exploit such weaknesses and generally are moving to do so. One weakness is in effective deep reconnaissance to detect and track targets. This reconnaissance can be degraded by Maskirovka and targeting of the reconnaissance platforms, especially advanced radar aircraft. Furthermore, the vulnerability of NATO’s ability to wage an integrated deep battle can be disrupted through C²I and Neutralizing NATO deep attack forces through a mixture of offensive and defensive measures, operational techniques (immediate offensive, preemption), timing, and tactics (dispersion, mobility). The ability of the Soviets to reduce target signatures and to reduce the vulnerability of potential targets to deep attack through such measures as hardening and dispersal is another weakness. Also, the potential ability of the Soviets to exploit the vulnerabilities and limitations of the precision guided munitions which will be central to deep attack is noted.

Because of these limitations and weaknesses, the ultimate effectiveness of deep attack is questionable. We should proceed carefully and skeptically before investing large resources in tactics and technologies which may not work in practice.

The Development of the Nicaraguan Counterrevolution: An Economic Perspective

The emergence of the Contras has been seen as the product of United States interventionist policy toward Latin America. While the US has certainly played an important role, there are many other, perhaps more important, causes for the development of the Contra movement. These other factors have been obscured by the dense cloud of political rhetoric which have surrounded the movement. The most important objectives of this thesis are to examine some of the likely contributing factors, particularly those grounded in agricultural economics, the emergence of the Contra movement.
This paper first examines the course of Nicaraguan history with a view toward the subsequent development of the contra movement. The roots of the movement most deeply imbedded in Nicaraguan history are thereby exposed, and a fundamental element of the conflict in Nicaragua emerges. The element which spans Nicaraguan history is a conflictive dualism involving the inhabitants of the Pacific coastal areas and those of the region from the Central Highlands eastward. Regional antipathy, accentuated by geographical barriers and historical economic and social isolation of the area beyond Lakes Managua and Nicaragua, was fundamental in the development of the Contra movement. The policies followed by the Sandinistas, including their direct turn toward Marxism-Leninism, repression of the Catholic Church, control of the news media, and massive military buildup accompanied by conscription, alienated many Nicaraguans. Moreover, their exclusive hold on power, brought about by the effective merging of the Sandinista party with the government and the military, allowed little breathing space for a peaceful opposition.

This paper examines how Sandinista economic policies were an important cause for the development of the violent opposition. The agrarian reform in particular, to the extent that it favored landless peasants of the Pacific region over the independent peasants of the Central Highlands, created relative deprivation among the Central Highlands peasants. The reform exacerbated the historic Pacific-Central Highlands antipathy and was probably a major reason for the swelling of contra ranks, particularly after 1984.

Despite the growth in the movement, this paper argues that it is unlikely to garner the support of a majority of Nicaraguans, primarily because its base of support among the people is limited to the sparsely populated central and eastern regions. Although the contras will probably continue to exist as a military force for some time, the conventional opposition poses a much greater long-term threat to the power of the Sandinistas.

McKnight, Scott A. (Parchomenko) MAR 1989

East European Economic Needs and US-Soviet Relations

Important political and economic changes are occurring within Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet Union. The US has little leverage on Soviet and East European domestic policy, and any direct attempts to exert influence will have a negative impact on US-Soviet relations. US policy makers will need to focus on the needs of Eastern Europe in this effort to salvage their economies. This effort will have to be closely coordinated with our West European allies to prevent a negative impact on their own economies or hamper their dealings with East Europe. The US will also have to realize that the East European governments will have to change from within for these economic reforms to work. This will be a long, drawn-out process with many false starts as East Europe adjusts to these reforms. The US must maintain an open dialogue with Moscow and realize that, while Gorbachev’s goals for Eastern Europe are not identical to those of the US, there are some mutual interests.

Messer, John B. (Garst) JUN 1989

The Soviet Northwestern Theater of Military Operations After Perestroika: Capabilities and Intentions

The Northwestern Theater of Military Operations (NWTMO or NWTSMA) is a vital link in the strategic defense of the Soviet Union. Over the past two decades, Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula in the NWTSMA have steadily grown until they posed a significant strategic and regional threat, especially from the Northern Fleet. This thesis examines the NWTSMA: Its significance to the USSR and NATO, the forces stationed there, and the potential for change in the forces under perestroika. The force reductions announced by Mikhail Gorbachev are accounted for in the analysis of the forces, and potential impact of those cuts on the NWTSMA is examined.

This thesis outlines the historical build-up of Soviet forces in the NWTSMA and then examines the current forces, which lays the groundwork for a later examination of potential changes in both the forces and the overall threat from the theater. The threat is examined against the standards of defensive sufficiency, which has been announced as the new standard in Soviet force structure and manning levels.

Of the forces in the NWTSMA, the Northern Fleet poses the greatest threat to NATO. It possesses the capability to perform all of the missions necessary for defense of the homeland. If the current trend of reinforce-
ing the fleet continues, the offensive capabilities will outweigh any positive changes made under the program of restructuring and force reductions.

The National Air Defense forces (VPVO) are equally capable of performing their assigned defensive missions. Since they are intended as a defensive first line against strategic attacks against the USSR, it is reasonable to assume they will be strengthened in a period of defense-oriented thinking in the Soviet General Staff. Most of this strengthening will come from new systems which will be introduced into the inventory as a result of the new emphasis on qualitative parity with the US.

Ground forces in the theater are the lowest priority but pose a serious threat to Norway. The Western assumption that Soviet ground forces must attack Northern Norway to secure the NWTSMA is short-sighted. The ground forces have a defensive mission as well. The restructuring occurring in the Groups of Forces will affect the NWTSMA, and will increase the combat capability of the ground forces stationed there.

The purpose of the restructuring is not altruistic. There are many practical reasons for what is happening in the Soviet forces today. The public relations advantage they provided to Gorbachev was well managed. However, the changes in the NWTSMA are being made for the same reason as all of the others, the Soviet forces must change in order to keep up technologically and doctrinally with the US.

Moser, Greg (Marsh)  
AUG 1989

The Philippines: Influence of Insurgency on Government Legitimacy

When the Philippines received its independence on July 4, 1946, it was one of the first of many new nations to be established in the post-World War II era. Independence in these new nations has not been without problems, one of the most common being insurgency. Insurgency is basically a question of legitimacy and often springs from a combination of socio-economic problems and the government’s perceived or real inability to resolve these issues. Playing on the existing problems, communist ideologues have repeatedly come forward to mold and lead dissatisfied segments of the populations in many developing countries in armed insurgency. The paper first examines two distinct communist-led insurgencies since World War II: the 1946-54 period known as the Huk rebellion and the 1968-present insurgency.

The Aquino government has achieved a great deal since it came to power in February 1986. The structures of a functioning democracy have been restored and Philippine politics is returning to its previous energetic state. The legitimacy of the Philippine government, as embodied in President Aquino, has been firmly established for most Filipinos. However, economic recovery and social reform continue to pose problems. Although the Philippine economy has shown encouraging signs, social and agrarian reforms have been slow and the traditional elites are reasserting their control and may effectively block and manipulate any major reform efforts. The Philippine government is currently struggling to effectively meet its obligation to create a free and democratic country in which all its citizens can share the resources of the nation and build an economically and politically stable future. Many of the problems, i.e., population growth, geography, cultural-linguistic variation, the economy; urbanization, lack of effective infrastructure, military and agrarian reform, and the structural deficiencies in the political and party system will be extremely difficult to correct. However, it is largely the responsibility of the government to take the initiative in resolving these long standing issues. The failure of the government to meet these challenges will be readily seized upon by radical forces on both the right and the left. The outcome of the resulting struggle is unpredictable but it would not bode well for democracy in the Philippines. Mrs. Aquino has won a brief reprieve for the forces of moderation and democracy. How well this time is used will determine the fate of the people, the government and the communist insurgency in the Philippines.

Neary, Patrick C. (Kauppi)  
JAN 1989

Motivations Behind Soviet Arms Control Initiatives Under Gorbachev

Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the USSR has changed to a bold and innovative approach to arms negotiations. This remarkable change is credited by some to the General Secretary, or attributed to the economic imperatives of restructuring. Some analysts indicate the Soviets acquiesced in the face of President Reagan’s Strategic Modernization Program and Strategic Defense Initiative. Rather than fitting Soviet policy into a preconceived behavior
pattern, this thesis explores the motivations behind the change in Soviet arms control policy from three perspectives: the international environment, changes in the Soviet state and society, and the announced change in military doctrine.

In the international environment, the Soviets perceived a negative trend in the correlation of forces. Still, the USSR had faced unfavorable circumstances before, and had never turned to negotiating concessions as a result. The international environment provided a favorable milieu, but did not greatly influence Soviet policy.

Perestroika, the rubric for changes in the Soviet state and society, appeared to require immediate defense spending reductions. It is unlikely the Soviets pursued strategic arms reductions out of necessity, since such reductions do not save resources in the near term. Furthermore, Soviet willingness to negotiate pre-dated Perestroika.

The most convincing cause for the change in Soviet policy was the change in military doctrine. Due to weapons technology improvements, the Soviet General Staff began a doctrinal review in the mid 1970s. This review indicated the revolution in Military Affairs had intensified, and the USSR had to develop a strong technological base to compete militarily with the West. The Soviet military supported strategic arms reductions in return for the development of a technology base to support the future military force structure. Once the Brezhnev era was over, the military pursued an arms control agenda designed to impose quantitative limits, qualitative controls, and technological prohibitions on Western forces.

While Gorbachev provided the political will to implement these proposals, the military was the original sponsor. Since the military supports the Soviet negotiating positions, these positions are firmer than generally believed in the West. Also, the perceived disagreement between the Soviet civil and military leadership is questionable. Finally, this analysis indicates that perestroika could eventually result in an improved Soviet military force, a result far from encouraging for the West.

O'Sullivan, Terrence L. (Schutz) DEC 1988

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

Events in Latin America have always attracted US security interests. Although the major emphasis is in Central America, national security concerns have broadened to include South America. Colombia is now one of the key regions that requires additional US attention should internal problems threaten its stability as a democratic institution.

Recent US Congressional interests have focused on drug trafficking as Colombia's paramount problem. However, Colombia's insurgency has emerged over the last decade to become a potentially viable military and political obstacle in maintaining domestic stability. There are indicators of rural insurgents becoming increasingly involved in drug trafficking.

The Colombian authorities want to approach the drug and insurgent problem as separate issues. This is now becoming more difficult as insurgent groups like the FARC use drug involvement as a chief source of income. The FARC's involvement in drugs places additional pressure on the government to maintain a delicate truce agreement with this group.

This paper analyzes the FARC as Colombia's oldest, largest and best equipped insurgent group, in order to examine whether the lucrative drug trade will derail their Marxist-Leninist goals. This theme will be placed within the framework of Colombia's historical background, the violent nature of its society, and a breakdown of the group.

Page, Anthony M. (Garst) SEP 1988

The Indian Constitution: Its Approach to, and Effect on, Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflict is a major source of instability in many Third World countries and the framers of the Indian Constitution designed it with this in mind. This paper examines the Indian Constitution's effect on ethnic conflict, and on stability in general. The purpose is to gain insight into ethnic problems, giving analysts a better understanding of the dynamics of ethnic conflict.

The paper begins by examining the historical forces that shaped the Constitution, including British colonial rule, Indian political philosophies, leaders of the Constituent Assembly, and the crises surrounding independence. This background discussion is used to illustrate the intentions of the constitution's provisions.
The next section of the paper describes specific provisions of the constitution. Structural provisions include organization of the central and state governments, the distribution of powers, President's Rule, and the constitutional amendment process. Provisions which deal specifically with ethnic issues include the protection of minority rights, political representation of minorities, and preferential discrimination for minorities.

The next section analyzes the positive and negative effects of the various provisions. Graphic models of ethnic conflict are used to illustrate the dynamics at work.

The conclusion of the study is that the overall effect of the Indian Constitution has been positive. Distribution of powers, and provisions for the expansion of central powers, have lowered the level at which conflict takes place, making it more manageable. The democratic process has enhanced government legitimacy, increasing its ability to deal with conflict situations. It has also prevented the rise of militant opposition to the government by providing a means for revolutionary change within the constitutional system. Some positive effects have been unintentional, such as the shift from inter-ethnic to intra-ethnic conflict caused by preferential discrimination.

Constitutional provisions have always had negative side effects. The revolutionary social change directed by the constitution is a major source of ethnic conflict. Constitutional provisions for preferential discrimination have made ethnic issues a political issue for the foreseeable future. Finally, provisions for the expansion of central government powers are vulnerable to political abuse. The success of the Indian Constitution, as with most constitutions, is ultimately dependent on the good intentions of the national political leaders.

Patterson, Catherine W. (Gordon)  

Soviet Military Preparedness in World War II

The Soviet Union took about one year to neutralize the German National Socialist offensive in World War II (WWII). This runs contrary to Western military historians' views that the Soviet Union was unprepared for war and therefore incapable of challenging and winning against the Germans. The prevailing view had its roots in western views of the Great Purges of the 1930s, which caused weakness in the Soviet armed forces and a perceived lack of preparedness for war. In spite of the unexpected attack and the purges, the Soviet Union turned events to its advantage in a relatively short period.

This paper will look at viewpoints of German sources, Soviet writings, and western views to examine how these people viewed Soviet military preparedness at the outset of WWII and whether or not it affected the functioning of the Soviet armed forces militarily.

Westerners have contended the Soviet military was unprepared for WWII, in terms of personnel, experience, and in equipment. They generally contend that the purges hindered the ability for the Soviet military to conduct war.

The German military viewed the Soviet military in a similar light initially, but came to have a regard for the Soviet combat forces soon after hostilities began. German intelligence did not accurately regard indicators which pointed to a strong Soviet military at the outset of WWII, specifically ideas from prominent German leaders and from Soviet military successes in Finland and Japan, whose nations had both experienced Soviet military capability first hand. Once the Germans fought the Soviet forces, a new respect for the Soviet soldiers and their preparedness emerged.

Soviet writings contend consistently that the Soviet military was prepared for war. They reveal that by the time WWII was imminent, the Soviet military had developed capabilities in terms of personnel strength, preparedness, and leadership. It is erroneous to think that this force had not been rebuilt to be capable of fighting a large enemy invasion force.

There are some western writers who agree with the official Soviet view about their preparedness at the outset of WWII. Germans wrote that the borders were prepared and some western scholars noted the necessity of the purges prior to WWII. Western writers have also recognized Soviet training and doctrinal changes which prepared the commanders and troops for WWII.

These views open to consideration the prospect that in spite of the purges of the 1930s and the destruction of the officer corps to its highest levels, the mid-level officer corps and combat troops performed well and were prepared for war, despite surprise and the stifling command structure. When one considers the adversity the Soviet leadership was experiencing at the time, and when one considers the loss of experience the military suffered after the purges of the 1930s, one can be impressed by the level of Soviet military preparedness at the outset of WWII. The Soviet success defied many nations’ predictions that it would take years, maybe decades for the Soviet military
to recover from the purges. The initial failure of the Soviet military seemed to confirm the belief that the Soviet Union would be on its knees in a matter of weeks. The Soviet military not only proved this false, it took one single year to change the course of events from the defense to the offense, from which the Germans never fully recovered.

Perez, Debra J. (Heymann)  SEP 1988

Austerity and the Rising Opposition Parties in Mexico: Implications for US Policy

Mexico is a long ignored but valuable neighbor. The US should have seen crisis in the making prior to de la Madrid’s term of office. However, due to a combination of Mexico’s over-reliance on petrodollar earnings, excessive borrowing and unwise investment policies, Mexico is in the worst financial status in its history and faces a difficult challenge to govern its restless people.

This paper examines three areas: the evolution of Mexico’s economic troubles and the imposition of austerity measures, the nature and objectives of the rising opposition parties, and the possible implications for US-Mexican relations.

Mexico’s economic troubles are traced back to the periods of the Echeverria and Portillo presidencies and brought forward to the de la Madrid presidential term. Even though austerity measures were implemented in all three terms, those imposed by de la Madrid have hit the Mexican people the hardest. The severity of his austerity programs was made necessary by the combination of high rates of inflation, high interest and exchange rates, excessive government spending and borrowing, and a poor foreign trade performance. Mexico’s indebtedness grew out of control, forcing Mexico to negotiate for rollovers and rescheduling and for new loans to cover the heavy burden of interest payments. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) helped guide Mexico in this process, but corrupt officials siphoned from the loan, meant to improve conditions further crippling the economy.

Not until de la Madrid began to take measures to rid his administration of such corruption did the government begin to achieve trade surpluses and build reserves.

The Mexican people have made their voice heard through their vote. For the first time in sixty years, voters made a significant break with the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and succeeded in taking numerous seats in the government. The paper describes the nature of the two key opposition parties, the National Action Party (PAN) and the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM) and their party platforms.

The US and Mexico have some problems in common: a huge national debt, drug trafficking, vast labor migration and internal security concerns in Central America. But they view these problems from quite different perspectives.

Peshinski, Teresa A. (Smith)  AUG 1989

Maskirovka: Soviet Naval Application

The practice and employment of Maskirovka, which can be traced back to Tsarist times, has long been an integral part of all aspects of Soviet military doctrine since 1917. Maskirovka has played a key role in ensuring effective military operations as it enabled the Soviets to attain an element of surprise, and the advantages often needed to achieve success.

Russian use of the concept of maskirovka is quite comprehensive, and includes camouflage, concealment and deception as well as secrecy, security and similar activities. In short, anything which confuses or misleads an opponent falls under the Soviet definition of maskirovka. More specifically, this paper examines maskirovka during the period of the Great Patriotic War (GPW). The Soviet Navy was successful in operations during the GPW. This success provides a solid foundation for the current uses of maskirovka as a significant part of Soviet Naval art.
Pruitt, Joni G. (Padelford) APR 1989

US-Algerian Relations: A Quiet Success

While relations between the US and Algeria have not been close, they have gradually changed from a state of near enmity under the Ben Bella and Boumedienne regimes to one of greater mutual respect and cooperation. A part of this improvement has been due to changes within Algerian society, and in particular to the passing of the "us and them" world view which was a legacy of the revolution. Another part has been due to the personality of President Chedli Benjedid. Lastly, a part has been due to dramatic changes in the world economic and political climate. One by one, major problems affecting the relations have either faded in importance or been resolved, the most recent example being the opening of talks between Morocco and the Polisario. US policy, while not aggressive in courting the good will of Algeria, has been, under the Reagan administration, tolerant of the differences between the two countries. With the exception of actions which would have been inimical to relations with Morocco, Algeria's neighbor and rival, US policy has been to seek out opportunities to improve relations. The results have for the most part been favorable, with Algeria backing away from blindly anti-American policies.

Rapp, Jeffrey N. (Baldwin) MAY 1989

Conquering the Low Frontier: The US Military and Low-Intensity Conflict

Low-intensity conflict is the most recent "buzz word" in discussions of the type of security threat the US faces today and in descriptions of the face of future war. The concern over meeting the challenges of low-intensity conflict, and the perceived failure of the US military to do so, has even prompted legislation from Congress that mandates changes in the National Security Council, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and in the military command structure itself. This paper examines the military reform effort against a background of conceptual, political, historical, and cultural problems that exist in the US with respect to low-intensity conflict.

Based on this examination, it is concluded that military reforms alone, although necessary, will not provide the military capability required to deal with low-intensity conflict because they have taken place without changes in national strategy and American and Service attitudes toward low-intensity conflict.

Several recommendations for improving our capability are suggested. The term "low-intensity conflict" is too broad to provide an adequate conceptual base for the development of national strategy and military doctrine. If an adequate conceptual base can be developed for approaching low-intensity conflict, the potential for developing appropriate strategy and doctrine is nearer achievement. The US political leadership must know what military capabilities it wants, place budgetary emphasis on them, and cultivate advocates for the governmental program in universities and private research centers. It must also seek political consensus for low-intensity conflict policies. Military-civilian agency liaison must also be improved, especially special operations forces coordination with the CIA and State Department.

Reedberry, Stephen J. (Stewart) SEP 1988

The Case for Argentine-Soviet Trade Dependency, Its Apparent Impact on Argentina’s Foreign Policy and Implications to the United States

Argentine-Soviet trade and political relations have been increasingly strong since 1980. This paper analyzes the trade relationship between the two countries and postulates that there is a trade dependency involved and it is to the advantage of the Soviet Union. It suggests how the trade dependency may have affected Argentina's political relations with the USSR and its international diplomatic posture. Finally, it addresses implications of recent Argentine-Soviet relations as they relate to United States security concerns.

Trade data since 1966 is presented and analyzed to prove the hypotheses. A historical trade imbalance to the favor of the USSR has existed, and has consisted mostly of Argentine exports of primary products and imports of Soviet manufactures. The trade gap widened in recent years, particularly since the US grain embargo against the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s, the USSR became Argentina's primary export market, while imports of Soviet
goods, already substantially lower in value, increased much more slowly. Partly in response to the huge trade imbalance, the Soviets dramatically reduced their Argentine imports in 1986.

The Argentines may have been influenced by their trade dependency on the USSR. Diplomatic cooperation has been exceptionally great since 1986, when President Alfonsin became the first Argentine president to travel to the Soviet Union. It was significant that Alfonsin’s meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev occurred at the end of the year, after it was apparent that the USSR had drastically reduced its Argentine imports. Since then, Argentina has been very supportive of Soviet foreign policy goals, and exports to the USSR have tripled.

Implications to US security interests are also covered. They include an increasing Soviet presence and influence in the regions, reduced flexibility in US foreign policy initiatives (due to Argentina’s refusal to take part in economic sanctions), and the possibility of regional destabilizing arms transfers.

Robertson, Jeffrey C. (Wardlaw) DEC 1988

The American Drug War: Who’s in Command?

One of the most important issues facing the US is the international illegal drug problem. The American public is daily faced with new statistics and scientific research expounding upon the severity of this problem. Of major importance is the question of what type of leadership the Federal Government is going to provide in the declared war on the drug problem. With thousands of federal, State, and local agencies involved in the drug law enforcement and prevention campaign, a question arises as to the effectiveness of the overall program. Without adequate central coordination on the Federal level, the US drug effort will not be the efficient program it must be to gain ultimate victory.

This research addresses the issue of coordination in the Federal drug control effort and poses some alternative policy choices. Chapter II analyzes some of the players in the Federal program, pointing out operational and jurisdictional responsibilities. Chapter III examines the heart of the problem focusing in on the coordination issue. Chapter IV poses the authors opinions with respect to the possible alternatives to present drug control policy coordination. Chapter V concludes the examination by making recommendations for improving coordination of the national drug control program.

Robertson, Jeffrey C. (Garst) NOV 1988

Burma’s Ethnicity: Fertile Soil for Insurgency

Ethnic conflict is the standard rather than the exception in Burma. Since gaining independence from the British in 1948, anti-government activity arising from ethnic diversity has been the primary challenge to the regime in Rangoon. This challenge has come in the form of secessionist ethnic groups and revolutionary communist armies. But, for forty years the Burman ethnic majority has been able to maintain a seemingly stable political system. Internal mechanisms active in Burmese society assist the government in maintaining this degree of stability.

This paper addresses the question of how the political system in Burma has withstood political challenges and the prospects for future success. To understand the current ethnic conflicts in Burma, the first section addresses the history of the current Burmese state. The following section is a discussion of the current ethnic dilemma including the various ethnic groups and the sources of conflict. The next issue to be addressed is the state of the insurgency which involves the groups involved, their typology, and the government’s counterinsurgent efforts. Once the challenges to political stability have been discussed, the internal mechanisms which aid the government in maintaining political stability are analyzed—nationalism, military control, and Theravada Buddhism.

Qualitative analysis was the primary tool used in conducting this research because of the difficulty in quantifying the effect of ethnic conflict and the influence of nationalism, the military and religion on Burmese society. Based on this research and limited available data, the future of Burma’s political system is likely to be a reflection of the past forty years. The strengths of the internal mechanisms outweigh any possible challenges by the ethnic minorities. Any erosion of these mechanisms, however, would likely serve to reduce the ability of the government to maintain stability.
Ruff, George R. (Finan)  JUL 1989

The Impact of Land Reform on the Revolution in El Salvador

For many years the land oligarchy has been able to exploit a class of landless peasants in El Salvador. Gross inequities in land ownership have contributed to disparity in the distribution of wealth. An impoverished rural sector in El Salvador provides fertile ground for discontent and revolution. The growing revolutionary movement of the late 1970s dictated that significant reforms be undertaken if a democratic form of government was to survive in El Salvador. Land reform seemed to be a logical solution, but many were not foreseen or fully considered. It appears that land reform will not solve many of El Salvador’s problems, but it may have temporarily reduced the level of conflict to a point that other actions may be able to avert a successful revolution.

Russell, Mark W. (Wardlaw)  DEC 1988

An Analysis of Naval Aviation's Role in the War on Drugs

Naval Aviation has been supporting the war on drugs since 1978. This supporting role was further clarified in 1981 through congressional legislation and subsequent executive directives. Since then, Naval Aviation's role has expanded, but this expansion has been moderated by a restriction that prohibits the Navy from letting the drug mission adversely impact combat readiness. This paper examines the impact the drug mission has had on Naval Aviation's combat readiness and the future role of Navy Air in the war on drugs.

These topics are addressed through a variety of methods. The first section of this paper looks into the laws and regulations applicable to Naval Aviation's role in the drug war. The following section details Naval Aviation's participation in some significant drug interdiction operations. This section also addresses why the past methods of determining the value of these operations is faulty, and suggests an alternative view in assessing their value.

The third section of the paper focuses on the debate over Naval Aviation's participation in the drug war. This section addresses the impact of the drug mission on readiness and compares the similarities and differences between the drug mission and the combat mission of different Naval Air communities.

The concluding section looks at Naval Aviation's future role in the war on drugs. This section deduces that there is only a minimal impact on combat readiness attributable to flying the drug mission and that of Naval Aviation, as demonstrated through past operations, is an essential part of this country's air interdiction program.

Russell, Mark W. (Blake)  DEC 1988

A Study of the Congressional Intelligence Committees and the Problem of Unauthorized Disclosures

The congressional Select Committees on Intelligence play a dual role in the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. They are at times a source of these disclosures and they are also the committees responsible for considering legislation designed to discourage leaks. This contradictory role has proven to be a major obstacle in passing laws that would stiffen the penalties for leaking information.

The comparison of Congress' role as both a source of leaks and as the source for "leak" legislation is interesting. Congress has long had a desire to oversee the operations of the Intelligence Community. Along with oversight comes access to sensitive information. While Congress was quick to enact legislation protecting their right to oversight, they moved much less slowly to protect the sensitive information they came in contact with. The history of the early development of the oversight committees shows several occasions where Congress failed to adequately protect intelligence information.

Leaks have become a way of doing business for some people in Washington. This problem has been allowed to go unchecked for too long. Congress' failure to act on the problem of unauthorized disclosures, either through legislation or personal example, has inhibited the cooperation of some foreign countries with American intelligence agencies. Furthermore, some Congressmen have used leaks as a method of vetoing proposed Executive actions. Any time one person is allowed to dictate the actions of our government, we take one step backward on the road
of Democracy. Unauthorized disclosures, regardless of the motive behind them, deprive us of our right to a democratic government. Congress must take action now to prevent leaks from becoming an even greater voice in the actions of our Government in the future.

Simpers, Bruce R. (Gordon)  

The INF Treaty: An Arms Control Foundation

The INF Treaty signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on 8 December 1987 is an important foundation for future arms control treaties and greater detente. It represents a dramatic change from previous arms control treaties by its worldwide elimination of two classes of existing nuclear missiles and its intrusive verification procedures. While the Treaty eliminates only 2,695 intermediate range missiles (1,000-5,500 km) and shorter range missiles (500-1,000 km) worldwide, its importance is greater than many originally expected.

This paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of the INF Treaty as an arms control foundation which can either represent a turning point in US/USSR relations to increase detente or a return to the cold war. It also examines the impact of the INF Treaty on the militaries, politics and economies of the participants and future treaty negotiations. By reading this paper one gains a better understanding of the role of the INF Treaty and its impact on the participants. This gives an appreciation of the complexity of treaty negotiations and intricate domestic and foreign interrelationships which aids in comprehending world events.

Simpers, Bruce R. (Baldwin)  

Space, A Changing Frontier

Outer space is currently undergoing some dramatic changes as more nations seek to utilize the technological potential and power of it for political, economic, scientific, and military purposes. Revolutionary technological changes are occurring in many fields such as optics, electronics, computers, information management and reliability/maintainability. In addition to technological changes, more nations are entering outer space and space nations are joining in multinational cooperative space ventures. These changes will have a direct impact on our space program. They will require the United States to resolve many national and international issues in such areas as the continued militarization of space, the role of treaties, the role of the state, the role of civil and commercial space programs, space law, territorial rights, space and international economies.

A historical analysis of the evolution of the United States and Soviet Union's roles in the space program is essential for understanding the complexities of outer space issues. The United States and the Soviet Union are embarking on a new phase of outer space militarization in which they are shifting from developing and deploying space assets to integrating them into increasingly complex and sophisticated space systems. By doing so, the superpowers will be able to manage battles using remote command and control.

Our government is challenged by these changes. Leaders must make a commitment to a long range space plan, decide on the United States space objectives, and assure ample funding to permit attaining those objectives. Reliable and safe access to space must be a priority of any long-range plan. Consistency is necessary to permit acting in forward-looking manner rather than reacting to Soviet actions. A joint effort by all concerned parties - military, civilian, and commercial - will further US progress more quickly and effectively. The United States must be willing to offer the ways and means to assist Third World countries in gaining access to space; these countries present domestic problems precludes them from implementing space technology that has the potential to help solve these problems.

This paper examines complex issues that the changing space arena presents to the government. These issues, both international and domestic, need to be addressed so that the United States will be able to protect its own best interests well into the twenty-first century.
Cuban Foreign Policy: What are the Possible Effects of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking on Castro’s Export of Revolution?

As Cuba enters its fourth decade of the revolution, Fidel Castro remains committed to a radical foreign policy based upon the export of violent revolution. The primary obstacle to normalized relations with the US, Castro’s revolutionary ventures have been bankrolled by Moscow in return for Cuba’s strategic advantage and sponsorship of Soviet objectives in the Third World. With the rise of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking (NPT) in the Soviet Union, however, an innovative, reform-minded Soviet government is developing a fresh approach to the developing world, an approach that conflicts with Castroism. It is, therefore, probable that Soviet support for Castro’s foreign policy is likely to undergo a drastic change. Thus, an important question arises for the US: What are the possible effects of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking on Cuba and will it affect Castro’s commitment to the export of violent revolution? This question is important to the US because of the consequent effect of a change in Cuban foreign policy on US-Cuban relations, Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere, and Cuban influence in the developing world.

In an attempt to answer this question, the history and development of the Cuban-Soviet relationship and Cuban foreign policy will be discussed. An analysis of Gorbachev’s NPT, its effect on Soviet Third World policy, and a review of his statements during the recent visit to Havana will help to discern the Soviet Union’s priorities in its relations with Cuba. A study of Castro’s response to NPT will include a discussion of his speeches during Gorbachev’s visit and why NPT is not to his advantage. A final evaluation of the above information will provide the basis of an appraisal of the effect of Gorbachev’s NPT on Castro’s export of revolution.

If Gorbachev lasts, Cuban foreign policy will feel the effects of NPT and will most likely take on a new character. Castro, unlikely to change his ways, will remain committed to the export of violent revolution and a fiercely anti-US policy, while remaining dependent upon decreasing Soviet aid to fund his adventures. Thus, large military operations such as Angola and Ethiopia will disappear; and developmental aid, which the Soviets will continue to finance, will become the primary means of Castro’s global ambitions. Still committed to violent change, Castro will continue to support armed revolutions on a scale he can pay for himself, but that involvement will be constrained within the context of US-Soviet relations and the need to limit Soviet embarrassment. In summary, Castro’s personality and world view will not allow his commitment to armed revolution to waver, but his dependence on Soviet aid will force tactical and pragmatic shifts in his conduct of Cuban foreign policy.

Western Sahara and the Polisario: An Insurgency Analysis

The conflict in the Western Sahara between Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (Polisario) continues to rage over who represents the true aspirations of the Saharan people and the Saharan people’s right to self-determination. A comparative analysis of the Polisario’s development as an insurgency group provides indicators of the potential success or failure of this insurgency and likely Moroccan responses. A description of the origins of the Western Saharan people, the Western Sahara, the Polisario, and the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) provides the background for an effective analysis of this insurgency. Mauritania’s capitulation to the Polisario in 1979, Morocco’s wall strategy, and the seating of the SADR in the OAU are discussed in order to illustrate the evolution of the conflict as well as the strengths and weaknesses of each of the participants. The nature of the insurgency is determined from a discussion of its goals, strategy, and stage of development. Its likelihood of success is evaluated against six factors: popular support, organization, cohesion, environment, external support, and Morocco’s response. Morocco’s vision of a reunification of its pre-colonial empire has been the impetus for its massive commitment of manpower and resources to the occupation of the post-colonial Western Sahara. Though receiving scarce support from the international community for these claims, King Hassan II of Morocco enjoys tremendous popularity at home where his Western Saharan policies are a source of national pride. Hassan’s opponent, the Polisario, has enjoyed broad international support for the principle of self-determination, but this has not translated into universal acceptance of its claim to represent the Saharan peoples. An insurgency group based on nationalist principles, the Polisario has mounted a crusade to establish a
Western Saharan nation where none has ever existed. The Polisario has developed a strong sense of unity and nationalism within the Saharawi people and gained wide political recognition due to its commitment to the maintenance of Saharan tradition while also representing the Saharawis in the international community via the nation-state framework. After fifteen years of conflict it appears that this struggle is headed for resolution over the next two years, however there is still a danger of renewed hostilities and continuation of the war. Despite the recent conditions that brought Morocco and the Polisario to the negotiating table, the Polisario’s willingness to use military operations to influence ongoing negotiations and Morocco’s national pride may clash. If Morocco does leave the negotiating table, they will eventually be back, forced by the economic conditions at home and diplomatic isolation that brought them to the talks. Despite Algeria’s warming relations with Morocco, they are unlikely to turn their back on the Polisario or kick them out of the Tindouf region. This is still a war of attrition; but the factors discussed indicate that, because of the strength of the Polisario and the increasing Moroccan problems, a negotiated settlement and referendum on the self-determination issue is the only realistic answer.

Sperry, Martin W. (Finan) JUL 1989

Were President Reagan’s Efforts to Remove General Noriega from Power Appropriate?

The author explores the relationship between the US perception of illegal activities allegedly conducted by General Manuel Noriega of Panama, and the efforts of the Reagan administration to remove Noriega from power. The question of the "appropriateness" of US actions against Noriega is raised. The author reasons that, if "appropriate" is defined as successful, then President Reagan’s actions were not appropriate. Reasons are presented to explain why the US, during President Reagan’s tenure, was not able to remove Noriega from power. The diverse reasons include factors having to do with Panamanian history and values, the contention that Noriega is not a threat to US security or economic interests in the Canal Zone, and the concluding position that US interests are best served by efforts to support regional stability. An appendix which addresses the history or Panama and US-Panamanian relations is included.

Staab, Tracy D. (Atkeson) SEP 1988

Soviet Operational Art and the Question of the Operational Maneuver Group

In the early and mid-1980s a "new" Soviet concept for employing operational ground formations surfaced in the Western press. This new concept was given the name Operational Maneuver Group (OMG). This analysis challenges the "newness" of the OMG concept by investigating the roots of current Soviet operational doctrine, Deep Battle, and the World War II Mobile Group, the "ancestor" of the modern OMG. Soviet operational doctrine from the end of World War II to the present is then traced to show its continuity with Deep Battle and Soviet World War II experience.

The missions of the OMG have been traditional missions of the Soviet second operational echelon for many years. Current emphasis on certain aspects of these missions appears new only when taken out of context and viewed without the benefit of historical knowledge. The current emphasis reveals only a variation of the application of traditional Deep Battle concepts, not a "new" concept.

Stephan, Randy (Wardlaw) DEC 1988

A New Strategy Proposal for the War on Drugs: Legalize Marijuana

The issue of legalizing marijuana is a complex and emotional one. Amidst the complexities of this issue, and because of the emotions attendant to it, the issue has become highly polarized. The polarity of the issue has resulted in literature that tends to be absolute in nature. This paper makes a case for the futility and counter-productive effects of the prohibition of marijuana. It contends that the costs of prohibition strategies outweigh the benefits of such strategies. The paper advances an alternative approach to prohibition in the form of a revised demand reduction strategy which hinges on the legalization of marijuana. The argument to legalize marijuana is advanced,
and defended against the anticipated concerns of those who would oppose legalization. A conclusion is drawn that legalization is inevitable, and that the benefits of legalization outweigh the costs.

Stockmoe, James L. (Garst) JUN 1989

The Political-Military Implications to NATO of the Follow-on to Lance Decision

In 1983, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed in principle to modernize its short-range nuclear weapons. Politically, following the INF Treaty, the realization of this goal has encountered serious public opposition in Western Europe. Militarily, it is necessary to upgrade the short-range nuclear forces (SRNF), if the alliance is going to continue to espouse "flexible response."

The issue is complicated by a potentially changing Soviet threat. Modernization of Soviet SRNF forces during the 1980s, at a time of NATO reductions in SRNF artillery rounds, gives the USSR a nuclear capability unmatched by NATO.

The key events which the author examines are: the 20-3- May 40th NATO Anniversary Summit; the upcoming 1990 Federal German elections; progress of the conventional arms talks in Vienna; Soviet unilateral reductions in conventional and nuclear forces; and changing NATO public opinion of the threat.

After a careful examination of the political-military implications of the follow-on to Lance decision, the author concludes that the alliance will move characteristically slow and ambiguously on the issue. This serves everyone's interests; West German Chancellor Kohl who wishes to avoid a major election year issue; the United States and Great Britain, which want to avoid negotiations; and third parties which simply do not want to cause a split in the highly successful Alliance.

Straight, Bobby, G. (Finan) MAY 1989

Liberation Theology: What Is It and What Are Its Implications for United States Foreign Policy in Central America?

Over the past 20 years, Central America has been embroiled in instability, political dissent, and revolution. In El Salvador, open warfare between the government and various factions is occurring today. The governments of Guatemala and Honduras each have or have had to contend with mass organizations and/or armed elements demanding political, economic, and social reform. In Nicaragua, a regime which lasted for over four decades was toppled, and a radically different government was installed. One factor that contributed to the rise of popular dissent, the disruption of regional stability, and the subsequent reemergence of Central America as a focus of US foreign policy was liberation theology.

This paper examines the concept of liberation theology and answers two questions: What is it and what are its implications for US foreign policy in Central America? To answer those questions, I review the historical role of the Roman Catholic Church in Central America, show why and how liberation theology is a marked departure from that role, and establish what this has meant in terms of social and political stability within the region. Finally, I examine the implications of liberation theology for US foreign policy in Central American and what I believe that policy should be.

Straight, Bobby G. (Marsh) MAR 1989

The Rearming of Japan: 1945-1960

In 1960, when a mutual cooperation and security treaty between the United States and Japan was concluded, Japan maintained a military consisting of air, ground, and naval forces. This capability was in stark contrast to 1946-1947 when, following its defeat in WWII, Japan had been disarmed. This disarmament was accompanied with the intent of the Allied Powers, particularly the United States, that Japan would never again possess the means or will to support a military establishment; furthermore, that same sentiment seemed to be embraced by the Japanese.
This paper documents the events and circumstances, both from an American and Japanese perspectives, which contributed to, initially, bringing into doubt the wisdom of postwar policies in Japan and which, ultimately, led to an American policy reversal, a rearmament of Japan, and its participation, although defensive, in the regional security of the Western Pacific.

Toellner, Michael K. (Baldwin) MAY 1989

Economic Prosperity in the Republic of Korea, How it Impacts on US National Security Strategy

After more than 45 years of bitter rivalry, South and North Korea are calling for reunification. The economies of both countries could have an impact on how the talks will progress. Both governments have met to discuss the establishment of joint ventures and business exchanges, and the US government is looking on with interest. Any change in the political, economic, or military status on the Korean peninsula will affect the US. The concerns of the US are magnified with the incredible growth of the economy of the Republic of Korea, the rising resentment of the Korean people against the US, and the presence of US troops and nuclear weapons on Korean soil. Washington is concerned about the possibility of trading between Seoul and Moscow, especially if such trade will result in the transfer of technology that might work to the disadvantage of the US. Another concern is the possibility that some day Korea may request that the US forces be removed from that country.

Ufford, Richard J. (Harris) AUG 1989

The Bulgarian Campaign to Assimilate Its Ethnic Turkish Population

The assimilation of Bulgaria's ethnic Turks seems to be driven mostly by a combination of official nationalism and concerns about the minority's growth relative to the Bulgarian majority. Bulgaria, while receiving world condemnation for its actions, has not altered its policies and still insists that the ethnic Turks are "Moslem Bulgarians." Bulgaria also faces economic problems as a result of the current exodus of ethnic Turks. In spite of these problems, it appears that Bulgaria can endure as it watches the ethnic issue solve itself through migration or become solved through forced assimilation. Turkey, the one nation with direct interests at stake in the current situation, is faced with few policy options. Overall, there is little reason to believe that the plight of the Turks in Bulgaria will improve, nor is it likely that the issue will have much effect outside of Bulgarian and Turkey.

Ufford, Richard J. (Smith) AUG 1989

Planning and Executing Soviet Maskirovka

There is little written in the West or in the Soviet Union about how the Soviet commander takes the theoretical principles of maskirovka and combines them with his imagination to execute the myriad of measures potentially available to him. The Soviets see many lessons in their experience with operational maskirovka during the Great Patriotic War. Most of these lessons involve the need to adhere to the basic maskirovka principles. These lessons help to link theory with actual or anticipated battlefield situations. These lessons or principles could offer a serious challenge to Soviet adversaries, but they are somewhat mitigated by the nature of modern warfare. This is due to the tendency of the Soviets to adhere tightly to the traditional principles of maskirovka, even though they might be less effective in the rapid conflict scenarios of today. In short, the top-down control and near fanatical secrecy that stood Soviet combatants well during the Great Patriotic War could now work to their disadvantage.
Is Military Intelligence Countering the Caribbean Connection?

The United States military was ordered to turn its vast intelligence apparatus against narcotics trafficking into the United States. By the President so ordering, unprecedented events have taken place that have changed the face of the "War on Drugs." Constitutional law has changed to include military intelligence on United States citizens. This is a direct violation of the century old "Posse Comitatus" law. The military services can now use Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Emissions Intelligence (EMINT), and Signals intelligence (SIGNAL) on persons engaged in illegal narcotics trafficking.

Military personnel can collect against these activities but cannot search, seize, or arrest traffickers. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACTET) are embarked on United States Navy vessels for the explicit purpose of conducting these activities.

Army, Navy, and Air Force now conduct routine intelligence missions to counter narcotics trafficking. Forward Looking Infra-red (FLIR) detectors, Side-looking radars (SLR), Air and Surface search radars are employed against aircraft and vessel traffic.

Military personnel work with the Law Enforcement community in intelligence centers, e.g. El Paso Intelligence Center. These personnel conduct collection management, imagery analysis, and signals analysis. Working side-by-side with the Drug Enforcement Agency and Coast Guard personnel, these highly trained professional soldiers carry the brunt of the analysis process. The new policy changes enlarge the amount of military personnel involvement and require an additional training effort to sensitize the military to the law enforcement environment and to the specifics of the targeted narcotics trafficking.

Even though the military is involved in every phase of the intelligence process, with the growing number of drug addictions in the United States, a different tactic must be taken. Education of the public has to be the main focus of the government. The youth of today (5 and 6 year old children) may be the addicts of tomorrow. Also, re-education and treatment centers for users have to increase 100 fold. If there is no demand for the drugs, there will be no traffickers. At present, the government is trying to intercept traffickers coming into the States. It is an impossible task. Putting the blame on the growing countries is a tactic that ignores reality. Coca is the largest cash crop of many of the Latin American countries. More people are employed in the production and transportation of Coca than any other crop.

Vanore, John J. (Harris)

The Stability of NATO's Southern Region: Regional Conflict or Alliance Unity?

The analysis presented in this paper show that internal divisions between Southern Region nations may constitute a greater danger to NATO alliance unity than the external threat posed by the Soviet Union. A shrewd propaganda campaign targeted against Greece and Turkey or Spain and the US, conducted in tandem with public pronouncements on Glasnost and Perestroika, could put ever greater strain on NATO as it enters its fifth decade of deterrence.

Walters, Eric M. (Watson)

Seaforce as Seapower: A Comparison Between the Naval Policies of Imperial Germany, 1894-1918, and the Soviet Union, 1956-1986

The tremendous expansion of the Soviet Navy in the past 30 years has caused a great deal of concern among observers in the West. The USSR has traditionally been a land power, not dependent on the use of the oceans (seapower) for continued survival in either war or peace. This has had a certain emotional impact on the maritime powers, and for some it has been relatively easy to conclude that since the Soviet Union does not need such a navy to safeguard its sea lines of communication, the primary reason for this naval buildup is to aggressively threaten the West. Such a conclusion can be easily illustrated using a handy historical analogy: the rise of the High Seas...
Fleet of Imperial Germany before the First World War. The similarities that exist in the comparison are dazzling, but some analysts have maintained that they also distract attention from the differences that bring the concept of this comparison as a valid historical analogy into question. Unfortunately, their arguments are too brief and are not sufficient to completely dispel the temptation to use the comparison as an analogy in arguing for an increase in Western naval forces.

This study makes a robust attack on the analogy concept through a detailed examination and assessment of both nations' requirements for naval power (seaforce), the roles of the respective fleets in war and peace, and the effectiveness of both naval policies. The analogy is shown to be fundamentally and irreparably flawed because Imperial Germany did not truly require a large, ocean-going fleet for her own defense, whereas the USSR did and still does today.

The paper also maintains that while the comparison does not hold as an adequate historical analogy, it does serve as a useful analytical tool to understand the growth of the Red Navy. Both Imperial Germany and the USSR built naval power not to protect their seaborne trade, but to fulfill the unique requirements leveled by their respective governments. The differences in these requirements, and ultimately in the effectiveness of both naval policies, highlight the key issues involved in the development of seaforce by land powers, and sets in sharp relief the Soviets' peculiar but vital needs for naval strength.

Ward, Kenneth R. (Gross) JUN 1989

The Libyan Military in Chad: Success and Failure 1984 and 1987

Libyan activity in Chad continues to be a focus of interest for policy-makers in the West, as well as in the Middle East and Africa. All have watched attentively as the Libyans have cycled from intervention, through occupation, annexation and partition, to withdrawal.

One curious note in the entire Libya/Chad imbroglio was Col Muammar Qadafi's ability militarily to bring about the de facto partition of Chad in 1984, but after nearly three years of building up defenses, facilities, and logistics, his military suffered not only a near-total rout by Chadian forces in 1987, but could not prevent a Libyan military facility well within Libyan sovereign territory from being temporarily overrun.

This paper is based on the hypothesis that between 1984 and 1987, political and military developments in the area of Chad controlled by the N'Djamena government (territory south of the sixteenth parallel) had a significant impact on Libya's ability to achieve its objectives.

In addition to the obstacles presented to Libya by opposing parties, several major problems arose in the Libyan ranks. A crisis in the Libyan-supported Chadian rebel factions was one of the most significant contributors to the downturn of Libyan fortunes. Growing economic difficulties, an increasingly unmotivated military, and more resolute support from Chad's beneficiaries also affected Libya's ability to successfully pursue its policy in Chad.

Chapter One contains an examination of the history of the region and the ambitions of Libyan strongman Qadafi. From this analysis can be drawn an understanding of why Libya became involved in Chad and the goals that were to be achieved.

Chapter Two is devoted to how the Libyans achieved their success in the 1983/1984 campaign, based in part on their own diplomatic maneuvering and the weak commitment of Chad's major ally to prevent Libyan aggression. Chapters Three and Four look at the developments which led to the frustration of Libyan aims by the end of 1987. Specifically, investigation of the economies of the two combatants, political and military developments in both countries, and the resolute, new commitment on the part of Chad's beneficiaries reveal how the current state of affairs was achieved.

White, William R. (Gross) OCT 1988

Mahdi: The Role of Messianism in Islamic Fundamentalism

Political and military analysts have a tendency to minimize the role of religion in international affairs. The recent resurgence of fundamentalism around the world has caused a gradual change in this attitude. From Latin America to Israel and from Iran to America, fundamentalism is playing a significant role. Mahdism is a key element within the Islamic resurgence, yet it is an element that most western observers know little or nothing about.
The purpose of this paper is to expose the reader to the messianic expectation of many of the world’s more than eight hundred million Muslims.

Mahdism is a concept that developed during the very beginnings of Islam. It has intriguing parallels with its neighboring religions, Judaism and Christianity, including eschatological overtones that presage international Islamic domination and the Day of Judgment. But mahdism is not just "religion." It is economics, social welfare, politics and military, all in one. It is a promise from Allah and the prophet Muhammad, that a Muslim deliverer will come and destroy all wickedness and establish a reign of equity, justice and plenty.

The chapters of this paper present a conceptual and historical inquiry into the role of the Mahdi. Chapter one deals with a definition of mahdism within the Islamic community, specifically treating the Sunni and Shi’a concepts. Chapter two provides a brief historical overview, bringing the reader from early Mahdist events, right up to a twentieth century rebellion in Mecca, the very heart of the Islamic community. Chapters three through six treat four major mahdist movements which have played significant roles in the past century and are still active and influential.

This paper seeks to demonstrate the vital role that mahdism has played, both in the Islamic world, and in international politics. Mahdism is a powerful force that has the potential to occur at almost any time or place. As technology and science increase, the potential of mahdism increases. It is a vigorous force that can have significant impact on regional and possibly international stability. History documents its potency, and current conditions predicate its resurgence.

Wilson, Jacqueline H. (Gross)

Islamic Revolution or Revolutionary Islam: What Iran Wanted, What it Got, and Where it is Going

Though it came as a complete surprise to many, the Iranian revolution had been developing for many years. This essay is an analysis of that revolution from the viewpoint of the Iranian people.

As revolutions go, the Iranian version is unique, if not for the widespread support for overthrowing the Shah, then certainly for the number of reasons for that support. Throughout Iranian society, segments of the population hoped for change, as many of them had for decades. Chapter two gives a thorough introduction to this historical basis for revolution. Chapter three delves into the groups in Iranian society and attempts to answer the question of why each particular group sought the Shah’s removal from power. Though the reasons range from one end of the spectrum to the exact opposite end, what becomes clear is that the Iranian people sought an Iran without the Shah.

Despite their active support for the revolution, many of these groups failed to win favor with the new regime. The story in Chapter four contrasting what these groups hoped to achieve through revolution and what changes actually occurred is an insightful look at Iran under Khomeini. What becomes obvious is that many pre-revolution “wants” remain unfulfilled nearly ten years later.

The fact that so many Iranians fought to overthrow the Shah yet failed to achieve their objectives leaves one wondering what they had hoped a post-Shah Iran would look like. The discussion in Chapter five reveals that few imagined or wanted the theocracy of Khomeini they eventually got. In fact, though Khomeini’s Islam can be a revolutionary ideology, what the Iranian people wanted was not an Islamic revolution, but simply a change of leadership. The majority of Iranians used Islam for the sole purpose of overthrowing the Shah, not to transform their society.

In short, the Iranians who neither wanted nor called for an Islamicly pure society are biding their time. Only upon the death of Khomeini will the world know to what depth frustration and hope lie. No matter the winner of an already complicated succession struggle, the Iran of the 1990’s is likely to be quite different from Khomeini’s Iran. Most probably, a post-war moderation will abound as Iran seeks to rebuild and redefine its identity and less fundamentalist elements attempt to consolidate power.
The Cuban Role in Ethiopia

The Cuban role in Ethiopia has changed since Cuba first became involved in Ethiopia in the 1960's. This essay is an analysis of the changes in the Cuban role which have included: support for Marxist insurgents against a monarchy, support for a Marxist government invaded by another Marxist government, and support for the existing Marxist government to help it remain in power. The first section of the paper involves an analysis of the history of Cuban involvement in Ethiopia and the reasons behind changes in the Cuban mission. These reasons included the ending of class struggle in Ethiopia in 1974 with the overthrow of the Haile Selassie regime and the establishment of a Marxist military regime. Additionally, the Cubans supported the Ethiopians when they were invaded by Marxist Somalia in 1977 with the commitment of 17,000 combat troops. The Cubans came to Ethiopia to protect its territorial integrity.

Further sections examine the amount and type of aid the Cubans provided Ethiopia, as well as Cuban-Soviet relations, and reasons for continued Cuban involvement. Cuban involvement was the result of both furthering its own interests and those of the Soviet Union. Cuba attempted to enhance its world prestige. This was successful only to a limited extent because of the abandonment of the Marxist Eritrean movement the Cubans supported in the 1960's and early 1970's. Cuba also supported Ethiopia in the face of continued military support for the Somalis and was kicked out of Somalia. After being kicked out of Somalia, the Cubans established themselves in Ethiopia, continuing their presence on the Horn.

The future of Cuban involvement in Ethiopia is dependent on the stability of the insurgent situation. If the Ethiopian government continues to lose battles with the insurgents, the Cuban combat forces will probably remain to support the government in the face of probable unrest in the military. Should the military situation improve, Cuban combat troops may be asked to leave, leaving only military and civilian advisors in Ethiopia. Whatever the case, the situation in Ethiopia is highly dependent on the success of the Eritrean, Tigrean, and Oromo insurgencies.


In the early 1960s, the American civic action program was a key component in the long range goals of president John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for progress. In expanding the Department of Defense’s mission to include "nation building," Kennedy placed great emphasis on the Army to perform military civic action as part of his national counterinsurgency strategy. Unfortunately, there were few doctrinal publications available on counter-insurgency within the Army and none which described civic action as a component of counter-guerrilla warfare.

After years of stagnation and diminished importance within national security strategy, the Army welcomed the counterinsurgency mission but resisted Kennedy’s view of its new role in socioeconomic development. Although Kennedy favored specially trained elite forces to perform counter-guerrilla warfare, the Army decided that it’s conventional divisions should train and participate in counterinsurgency. Consequently, as it fought to win this approach, the Army delayed the publication of a civic action doctrine.

Despite the successful experiences of the French and British Armies with military civic action as an important counterinsurgency measure, the Army de-emphasized the socioeconomic and developmental side of civic action. After the Army won its "all Army" approach to counter-insurgency, it proceeded slowly to define civic action’s place in its new counterinsurgency doctrine. In the process, the Army grew to define civic action narrowly as a supplemental task to the primary counterinsurgency missions of internal defense and security. In fact, it segregated "civic action" by relegating the developmental aspects to Civil Affairs.

Although this concept deviated dramatically from the Kennedy ideals, the views of the Army and the national policymakers converged as Lyndon Johnson succeeded Kennedy and America became more deeply involved in Vietnam. Because the latter experience differed extensively from situations in Latin America, the Army’s new doctrine had little applicability to the Alliance for progress goals. By 1967, when the Army finally published its most articulate doctrinal manuals on counterinsurgency, developmental civic action had virtually disappeared. Be-
cause civic action had brought the Army into the arena of politics and foreign policy, the Army diluted Kennedy’s ideals, the goals of the Alliance for progress and its own counterinsurgency doctrine.
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