CLOSED RANKS:
THE SECRET OF ARMY ACTIVE AND
RESERVE COMPONENT HARMONY

David E. Shaver

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**ABSTRACT**

The ongoing, historical debate between the Active and Reserve Components of the U.S. Army heated up when three Army National Guard Roundout Brigades were not programmed with their divisions during Desert Storm. The author of this thinkpiece does not revisit this well known history, but does provide a candid assessment of where relationships among the components are today and what to do to improve them. He recommends a high level meeting of the components to "take the gloves off" and solve all the problems in the "too hard" box. In addition, he proposes several concrete gestures and concepts which seem easy to implement at reasonable costs. As with any thinkpiece, the author has expressed his own ideas in the hopes of stimulating alternative paradigms for the future of the Army in the Total Force.
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FOREWORD

The ongoing, historical debate between the Active and Reserve Components of the U.S. Army heated up when three Army National Guard Roundout Brigades were not deployed with their divisions during Desert Storm. The author of this thinkpiece does not revisit this well known history, but does provide a candid assessment of where relationships among the components are today and what to do to improve them.

He recommends a high level meeting of the components to "take the gloves off" and solve all the problems in the "too hard" box. In addition, he proposes several concrete gestures and concepts which seem easy to implement at reasonable costs. As with any thinkpiece, the author has expressed his own ideas in the hopes of stimulating alternative paradigms for the future of the Army in the Total Force.

This is the second of three separate monographs in SSI's 1992 Annual Study Plan which address Active and Reserve Component issues. In the first, The New Military Strategy and Its Impact on the Reserve Components, Colonel Charles E. Heller addressed the impact of the new strategy on Army force structuring and force mix with an emphasis on Total Force Policy. In the third monograph, Restructuring the Army: The Road to a Total Force, Colonel Philip A. Brehm will examine the roles of the Reserve Components to determine the relevance and feasibility of converting combat units to support units. These and future SSI studies are directed toward finding solutions to the AC/RC issues that are critical to the future force.

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Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
COLONEL DAVID E. SHAVER is a Strategic Research Analyst with the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. His previous assignments have included command of combat engineer battalions in the 1st and 8th Infantry Divisions; Chief, Military Engineering and Topography Division, U.S. Army Europe; and S-3, 937th Engineer Group. In Vietnam he served as a unit commander and staff officer in the 62d Engineer Battalion (Land Clearing). He received a Bachelor's Degree from the University of Nebraska-Omaha and an M.S. from Florida Institute of Technology. Colonel Shaver is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. He is coauthor of Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Army Perspectives; How to Think About Conventional Arms Control: A Framework; Burdensharing and Mission Specialization in NATO; On Disarmament: The Role of Conventional Arms Control in National Security Strategy (Praeger, 1991), and author of Force Structures: The United States and Europe in the Coming Decade, Justifying the Army, and Flex-Lease: An Acquisition Strategy for the 1990s. He currently holds the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research at the U.S. Army War College and recently served on the DOD Total Force Policy Study Group Staff, Washington, DC.
CLOSING RANKS:
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One suspects that the problem emanates from the reserve component's ability to resist national level Army resourcing decisions concerning funding and equipping issues. . . What is especially unfortunate is that the active Army has not welded itself to the political acumen of the reserve components in the Total Army's current survival struggle with the other military services.¹

A State Adjutant General

The Break in Ranks.

It is no secret that the Army senior leadership is seeking ways to improve relations with its Reserve Components (RC)—the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve. The current disagreements on both sides of the AC/RC debate may not have started with the mobilization of three National Guard Roundout Brigades during DESERT SHIELD/STORM, but these actions certainly brought issues to a head. Acrimonious debates within the Total Army by both sides during crucial budget debates among the military services are not in anyone's best interest. What the Total Army needs to do is "close ranks" quickly, before budget "market share" is lost.

The current senior leadership of the Army has embarked on a renaissance of Reserve Component policy. One of the new policy changes involves a concept known as "Bold Shift." In response to a question in a recent interview with National Guard magazine, Chief of Staff, Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan replied:

It's (Bold Shift) going to focus very clearly . . . in combat units. Training [will be] down at the lower building blocks: the individual, the tank, the infantry squad, the company . . . then we can build on the training. . . . The battalion staffs will train using the simulations,
but the primary focus in the combat battalions is going to be down in the basic building blocks. Then when they come on active duty, we'll be able to move very quickly into task force training, brigade training, because the building blocks will be there. The essence of "Bold Shift" is to balance the readiness of all elements of the total Army to respond to the new world situation.²

This simple policy will do much to facilitate readiness and evaluation standardization among the three components, but will it restore harmonious relations? Perhaps a more comprehensive approach to improving AC/RC relationships does not wholly lie in training and evaluation, but should encompass attitudes and perceptions held by the components' leadership. For example, Bold Shift does not build on RC senior leadership, but instead focuses on lower ranks and thus may be seen by the RC as the same old rebuff by the AC senior leadership. If we accept the premise that attitudes and perceptions are the secrets to AC/RC harmony, then the real question becomes how to change them.

I think the answer is simple, and I will provide a comprehensive outline of actions which may greatly improve AC/RC relations, while also improving the readiness posture of the Total Force. My answer is for all parties to meet (not just the Big 3 [CSA, CNGB, CAR] or the Reserve Component Coordination Council [RCCC][3] and other standing Reserve policy councils, but a representative grouping of General Officers from across the country); take the gloves off; admit that both sides have been overly parochial in promoting their component's interests; identify the problems involved; establish actions and procedures to resolve the problems; implement and adjust the results. Simple? Yes! But we must do the hard part first. We must face the issues openly and honestly. The AC must admit it has been less than totally candid about its commitment to the Total Army. The RC must also confess to its ineptitude at large scale combined arms operations at brigade and higher levels. Thirty-eight days a year plus many Additional Training Assemblies (ATA) are just not enough to perform in the sophisticated battlefield environment of today.
Perhaps the most sensitive task during this face-to-face "showdown" is to identify the root causes of AC/RC problems. I'm talking about attitudes which reach far back into history. As the holder of USARNG, USAR and RA commissions, I may be able to shed some unbiased light on these sore spots. For an RC officer, the AC officer seems to possess an arrogance toward, and an ignorance of, the RC. Although this is only my opinion, based upon numerous lecture question and answer sessions at Senior Reserve Component Leadership seminars and classes conducted at the Army War College, I can assure the reader that this perception is quite prevalent. Lieutenant Colonel Albert E. Bryant in "AC/RC Mix: Attitudes and Perceptions" states:

...attitudinal obstacles which make change painful are:

1. a superiority complex, AC to RC;
2. benign neglect;
3. intolerance; and
4. a general lack of confidence in the abilities of reservists, especially at unit level.

Arrogance is not cornered by AC; RC leaders have it too. (For a more comprehensive matrix of AC and RC perceptions and attitudes, see Appendix A.) My point is that AC arrogance (I'm right and you're wrong) stands out as the dominant perception at annual training. I've personally seen, time and again, officers exude not confidence in, but flagrant disdain for RC unit leadership. The elimination of the perception of AC arrogance, more than anything else, save resolving the AC lack of knowledge about the RC, is vital to the harmonization of the components.

To an AC officer, the RC officer appears to be political, incompetent or untrained, and independent of AC absolute control, which frustrates the AC officer. Random AC opinions that harm relations also include:

- If the RC officer were really dedicated, he/she would have gone regular rather than appear to serve as a "hobbiest," especially in years when overseas duty or conflict could be avoided.

3
• Aren’t a lot of RC officers let go after their initial active service? Don’t some apply for RA and get turned down?

• Aren’t RC general officers really political appointees, and if not, aren’t they all too political?

Once these AC/RC negative stereotypes are fully examined by all parties, and honest discussion ensues, we should be prepared to identify solutions, fixes, and remedies to restore harmony and close ranks.

**Meaningful "Gestures" and New Concepts.**

In the following discussion, I will address gestures and concepts which may improve existing relations, as well as improve Total Army readiness. Army senior leaders, to improve relations with the RC, must penetrate the negative "stereotypes" that distort perceptions in order to see both sides clearly. One of the easiest quick fixes to demonstrate that the AC is serious about improving relations and readiness standards of the RC is through meaningful gestures. The following gestures by themselves may start turning current relationships around:

• Select one National Guard and one Army Reserve officer as Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Fellows (we’ve never had an RC officer selected for this honor).

• Add more M-Day/Troop Program Unit (TPU) billets at TRADOC service schools (to prove we are one army); also, by using unit officers (perhaps more realistic in periods of economic decline), we reestablish closer ties with RC unit leadership, rather than AGRs who are sometimes perceived as "near-regulars" by the RC; and finally, we create unit vacancies using this method, which increases RC promotion opportunity. (That’s a lot from one gesture.) In any case the Army must make it easier for unit officers to flow into and
out of a more flexible Active, Guard and Reserve (AGR) program, as well as make it easier, rather than tougher, to obtain full retirement benefits.

- Establish in the CSA's Terms of Reference (TOR) for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USCGSC) and the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), requirements for core curriculum instruction on RC organization, structure, budget, CAPSTONE missions, etc. Perhaps the only way to change attitudes and perceptions is through formal education which promotes better understanding. Specific proposals concerning officer education are presented later in this paper.

- Add interviews of the former and current chiefs of the National Guard Bureau and the Army Reserve and other senior RC leaders past and present to the U.S. Military History Institute Oral History Program.

- Cosponsor an Army Constituency Conference with the National Guard Association (NGA), the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), the Reserve Officer Association (ROA), The Retired Officers Association (TROA), the State Defense Forces Association (SDFA), the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), American Legion, the Military Order of World Wars (MOWW), etc., to build strong grassroots support for our military (include Congress). The "hard part" for the AC is to learn how to use the RC's political leverage to the benefit of the Total Army, not to stiff arm one of its strongest constituencies before Congress.

- Sponsor a Total Army division commanders' conference. Although the AC has conducted AC (only) division commanders' conferences in the past, an AC/RC division commanders' conference may never have taken place. Why not? The timing is right and the issues are of mutual concern. This gesture should
stimulate other similar conferences which can bring the component leaderships together to achieve common goals.

- At the USAWC and USACGSC, during the period of downsizing (which may result in reduced AC attendance), add qualified RC officers to keep classes a steady size. Don't select every AC officer as a resident graduate (MEL-1) goal for USAWC, for example (in the event that sister services, government agencies, or international agreements do not provide more students to fill the seats).

The above seven gestures will certainly indicate that the AC is serious about improving relations, but much more substance is needed than initial gesturing. We must agree on new "concepts" which will substantially fix the current climate between "the arrogant and the independent."

The first concept is to address the assumption that whenever an RC unit fails to achieve readiness standards, it is the fault of the AC. Given that there are some less competent or lesser trained RC leaders out there, this assumption will be difficult for the AC to accept, but let's try. If the output is bad, let's follow the unit up through the AC advisory chain. Did the AC have strong input into the unit's Mission Essential Task List (METL)? Was the AC evaluator known well in advance, selected by FORSCOM a year ahead so that he could input and describe to the RC unit what he was going to evaluate? Did the RC unit respond? What kind of relationship does the RC unit have with the various AC "tools in the tool box," including the Affiliation Program, Readiness Group, Senior Army Adviser, Mobile Training Teams? Unfortunately, there are enough problems for all to share the blame, but these problems must be resolved with AC priority, resources, and serious interest, not just lip service. The AC must fully accept responsibility for establishing the standards of evaluation, as well as training. "The issue is not whether the ARNG(RC) will provide combat forces to the Total Army, it is how do we ensure that RC units receive the quality training needed to meet the readiness required?"
In a USAWC paper, "Reserve Component Readiness," Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Hogan, a former Squadron Commander of a divisional cavalry troop, states that he has:

repeatedly seen RC unit training plans that were unrealistic. Units attempt to conduct complicated maneuver training at the task force level during AT periods, while their leadership struggles to master the tasks required for success at the lowest level. The result is often a poorly executed event where training objectives are lost as leaders struggle to overcome shortfalls at the individual and simple collective training level.\(^7\)

Observations and evaluations from other AC commanders seem to have influenced the Army’s Senior Leadership to prescribe a new training focus for all combat units at company, platoon or lower levels, while higher level organizations and staffs concentrate on battlefield simulation exercises.\(^8\) In any case, the AC must develop a new evaluation protocol to encompass the new training focus, as well as to determine resourcing required.

Along with the new evaluation standards and procedures, DA should establish a one-week course for evaluators and joint and combined command planners at all levels, perhaps tasked to the U.S. Army Management Staff College, to ensure consistency in actual evaluations, as well as to provide knowledge to the joint planners concerning RC capabilities and organizational structure.

General Officer pre-command and update courses should also provide instruction on the RC. AC general officers and colonels need to be assigned to Echelons Above-Corps (EAC) RC units as a "quality infusion" for the Total Army. Why not integrate AC and RC troop and officer billets in TOE positions? After all, it is specifically legal to assign AC officers to RC division chief-of-staff positions.\(^9\) Why not start there? At this point in my reasoning, I considered exempting colonels and lieutenant colonels from annual Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERBs), if assigned to RC duty, to stimulate good officers to seek these assignments,\(^10\) which could start the informal network and mentoring systems resonating. What that approach sought was to get some quality officers talking up
RC duty as a professionally rewarding endeavor. What I did not realize was that after the SERBs and Reductions-In-Force (RIFs), there will be no need for AC quality officer incentives since, theoretically, only quality officers will survive Army downsizing. In any case, a return to high priority "3-R" (ROTC, Readiness Group, Recruiting Command) tours of post-Vietnam days is warranted. Is it possible that Congress, in its warm relations with the RC, might waive a joint assignment requirement in trade for RC advisory duty?

The concept of "Roundout" is perhaps at the heart of the current AC/RC debate. I recommend to both components that roundout as a force structuring concept be totally eliminated. Instead, reposture the existing RC roundout battalions and brigades into new National Guard divisions, some as cadre divisions, within state boundaries. All across-state-line National Guard Divisions should be dissolved while keeping the units as wholly National Guard divisions with RC cadre roundout. (An indepth look at the history and principles of Roundout and CAPSTONE is provided in Appendix B.) Each former state which participated in the across-state-line divisions would then establish a division headquarters within its borders to serve as a leadership cadre for full mobilization.

Given the above or similar force structuring changes, the CAPSTONE must be revised or eliminated. If the Base Force survives, then its full AC/RC organized structure should be afforded legitimacy and AC priority in the CAPSTONE. Senior AC leaders need to participate in and orchestrate CAPSTONE Conferences (more than a gesture).

In lecturing before several Reserve Component National Security Seminars, Adjutant General seminars, and Senior Reserve Component Officers Courses, I have been truly shocked by the emotional, embittered discussion concerning the AC/RC debate. In RC senior commanders' eyes, the biggest detriment to AC/RC harmony is AC honesty and integrity. Without fai. these Senior RC officers address their embarrassment for believing in and strongly selling the CAPSTONE alignment: "If they go, we go." Yet, during OPERATION DESERT STORM, units were not mobilized at all, were used for "fillers," went with another parent unit, or were
sent to an area other than the area specified and trained for. These leaders perceive that they have been telling their soldiers "tall tales" based upon CAPSTONE for years, only to have their units shuffled around in one manner or another. Yes, I understand that we have to remain flexible as the CSA stated in his recent interview with National Guard magazine, but perhaps not so flexible that we become "limp." Only very senior AC leadership involvement will turn the lack of faith in a new CAPSTONE around.

Another concept reflects the need for the various Reserve Components themselves to pull together. In approaching internal component problems within the Army, I have kept the discussion at a macro-level. It should be noted that there are both major and minor problems among the two principal reserve components—ARNG and USAR, as well as "differences" between the ARNG and the State Defense Forces (SDFs) and State Defense Force Association of the United States (SDFAUS). It seems that Compo 2 (ARNG) would just as soon eliminate Compo 3 (USAR). The USAR seems poised to present its case as part of the "Federal force" as opposed to the State militia, and the ARNG's passive disapproval of State defense forces goes unnoticed. Although the knowledgeable reader may certainly be aware of National Guard/USAR differences, the principal mission of SDFAUS may not be known. Its mission is to "foster and encourage cooperation between SDFs, DOD, NGB, active forces and reserves." SDFs voluntarily perform emergency duties for the state, the FEMA and "stay behind" military duties after the mobilization of National Guard units. Although SDFs have been given a "bad rap" from Jack Anderson, they are all volunteers, many veterans and military retirees, who donate their time and effort to the overall defense effort. Their argument with the State National Guards which control/monitor SDF activity is that they are not provided with adequate support equipment. SDFs, since they are volunteers, cost nothing and in some cases can arrive in an emergency faster than State National Guardsmen, who must be alerted after a governor's declaration of the emergency.
The concept I am recommending to the AC is to "stay clear" of any of these debates. My advice to the RC is to also close ranks within the RC on the many issues and press for similar behavior from the AC. In any event, AC officers should be well aware of the striking differences among the various elements of the RC.

And, finally, the last concept I will discuss is the creation of a united front against the "billpayer" mentality. It is illogical, politically, for the AC to argue in Congress for reduction of the RC. The RC is the AC’s main political constituency. The alienation of the Army’s major constituency is not a good idea. As previously stated, the AC must learn how to use the RC’s political leverage to achieve Total Army goals. This means shifting AC responsibilities and units in the Army’s base force to the Reserve Components. The AC and RC must stand united before Congress and defeat OSD, OMB, and other advocates of the "billpayer" paradigm. We, the Total Army, must ask for what we need, not what we think we’ll get. If we need 12 divisions, full up, ask for it. Let those politicos above us find us the money from other accounts, or generate the funds from within (as in flex-leasing17). In any case, we must break this paradigm to provide the nation with an adequate defense.

In determining the role of the Reserve Components in National Security Strategy we might simplify the process by stating that the real roles are to:

- Help win the next war;
- Help gather the local support to win;
- Help with Congress, as the AC’s strongest constituency;
- Help keep America the only superpower;
- Help train our youth; and,
- Help America fix America.
Closing Ranks: Outline For Success.

In summary, we, the AC and the RC, need to:

- Meet;
- Take the gloves off;
- Admit faults and address perceptions;
- Identify the problems among us;
- Resolve those problems; and,
- Implement and follow-up.

Through a series of gestures...

- Add TPU/M-Day officers to CSASF;
- Add TPU/M-Day instructors at TRADOC schools;
- Improve AGR access flow to and from unit duty and enhance AGR retirement potential;
- Establish mandatory courses of instruction about the RC at USCGSC, USAWC, in G.O. classes and for evaluators/joint planners at the Army Management Staff College;
- Co-sponsor a Constituency Conference;
- Sponsor AC/RC division commanders' conference; and,
- Add more RC billets to SSC as we downsize.

And through a series of concepts...

- Ensure that the AC too accepts responsibility for RC readiness;
- Develop a new evaluation protocol in "Bold Shift";
- Assign more AC G.O.s and colonels to RC and vice versa to slowly integrate the force;
- Reinstitute the 3-R's;
- Waiver joint service requirements for RC duty;
• Eliminate roundout as we know it today;
• Make a new, flexible CAPSTONE an AC top priority; and,
• Eliminate the "bill payer" mentality.

In conclusion, what do we then wind up with?
• An AC which provides for and attends to the RC accounts on a high priority basis.
• A knowledgeable, well-educated AC concerning the capabilities of RC units.
• An improved RC readiness posture through new training focus (Bold Shift) and evaluation procedures and active participation at unit levels by the best AC officers.
• An increased integration of the components at M-Day/TPU and service school levels.
• An eventual elimination of injurious characterizations—"ego, arrogance, ignorance/incompetence, untrained, independence," replaced by respect for each other's professionalism.
• The elimination of the current roundout concept and the birth of an all new RC in state roundout/cadre divisional organizations.
• A strong budget stance for the Total Army, not divisiveness from within.
• A political realization of who the AC constituency is (RC) and how to use this rediscovered grassroots political power in future budget battles.
• A new era of asking for what we need (with grassroots congressional support), rather than what we expect to receive.
• A trust, a new harmony, in AC/RC relations.
• A closing of the ranks.
ENDNOTES

1. Written comment received from a State Adjutant General concerning the Strategic Studies Institute study Justifying the Army. The comment was directed at a statement made by the author on page 30: ". . . the state National Guard has more political integration and influence with the U.S. Senate than the Regular Army. Their (National Guard) work in disaster relief, crowd control, rescue operations, drug war support, playground and park construction and repair, and many other domestic missions assigned or approved by state governors, makes these forces more difficult to direct, command and control (read 'influence') by the Regular Army." The U.S. Army War College "non-attribution" policy prohibits public release of the comment originator's name without his permission.


3. Ibid., p. 77.


7. Ibid., p. 4.

8. Sullivan, p. 78.

9. Title 32, United States Code, Section 104: "To insure prompt mobilization of the National Guard in time of war or other emergency, the President may, in time of peace, detail a commissioned officer of the Regular Army to perform the duties of Chief of Staff for each fully organized division of the Army National Guard. . . ."

10. But, on the other hand, exemption from the SERB may be too strong. It can cause marginal officers to dive for cover. That would be seen through by all, including our RC customers. The old-fashioned instructions to the board are about as far as this kind of incentive could go.
11. In conversing with state Adjutant Generals concerning across-state-line divisions, several force-contributing TAGs expressed to me complete dissatisfaction with the current structure.


13. Personal opinion of the author, drawn from numerous discussions in an academic atmosphere.

14. Ibid.

15. The author presented lectures to both the SDFAUS National Convention and the California State Defense Force in Fall 1991. Spirited discussions before and after the lectures (on Justifying the Army: A Second Chance) revealed the lack of support provided by state National Guards to the SDFs.


| 1. Field Grade officers are wary and reluctant to participate in RC unit/programs because such association is not a reliable path to professional success. | Poor AC/RC officer and NCO integration.  
Cultural dichotomy between AC/RC.  
Inequitable personnel practices.  
Personal management systems do not reward cross duty AC - RC, RC assignments are not career enhancing for AC.  
AC Field Grade officers assigned to RC units are not first choice. Assignments are often pre-retirement; AC officers are often exiled by assignments. The fact that AC officers are rarely promoted or returned to AC assignments is especially galling to the RC.  
Conversely, AC Command HQs do not give RC officers equal status on boards or other decision-making groups. RC also claims that AC Command may rate them differently, even use RCs to "spread" the profile because an RC career is not as important as the career of an AC member of the Command.  
RC sees some AC advisors as patronizing. | Make RC affiliation a high priority for all AC officers.*  
Manage AC career patterns so AC officers/NCOs return to AC units after RC assignments.  
Integrate RC into AC TOE positions and AC into RC TOE positions instead of the current practice of calling them "advisors." This would provide a much better cross-fertilization.  
Accept the fact that there is and always will be a cultural difference between AC/RC.  
Good management and equitable distribution of resources and personnel can minimize friction. |

* "Affiliation" assumes that a smaller army cannot assign large numbers of officers on RC tours. Making AC commanders responsible for RC readiness will cause them to get good officers/NCOs to work with the RC.

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<tr>
<th>Active Component Perceptions</th>
<th>Reserve Component Perceptions</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Options for Better Force Integration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• AC is concerned about RC training standards, personnel qualifications, and readiness. Standards for RC have been unrealistically set. Personnel qualifications have been poorly recorded and overrated; too many are shown to be qualified when they are not.</td>
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<td>• Maintain AC officer/NCO assignment cycles so that &quot;lessons learned&quot; in RC assignments are carried back to AC. Assign AC advisors down to platoon level; avoid isolating AC advisors at RC HQs. Change the term &quot;Advisor&quot; to &quot;deputy.&quot;</td>
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<td>• AC has a lack of sensitivity to RC problems. RC stresses that it is treated like a second-class citizen as a result of frequently being bumped from training areas, ranges and other active training facilities.</td>
<td>• Inequitable training policy for RC units.</td>
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<td>• RC is a training dump for AC admin and personnel problems. For example, AC overproduced 21 Lts, forcing them into RC with no provisions for OBC. OBC then causes RA depletions, including training.</td>
<td>• AC personnel and equipment problems often dumped on RC.</td>
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<td>• RC equipment is often hand-me-downs from AC and in poor condition.</td>
<td>• AC leadership substituted in activated RC units.</td>
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<td>• AC reluctant to share HQ Command. For example, some RC units were activated for Desert Shield without their controlling RA HQs. AC compounded problem by creating provisional HQs commanded by AC officers. RC sees AC attempt to exclude senior RC officers.</td>
<td>• Who should be held accountable for RC readiness - RC peacetime chain of command or the AC/RC wartimer chain?</td>
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<td>• Expand exchange programs so that selected RC officers can take full-time positions in AC units and return to RC where they can apply &quot;lessons learned.&quot;</td>
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<td>• Accept the fact that RC cannot meet AC standards in some areas with significant post-mobilization training. There must be a single standard for the Total Army.</td>
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<td>• Readiness rating system must be modified, and rating must tell it like it is.</td>
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<td>• Explore the feasibility of CFE-like &quot;cascading&quot; and &quot;harmonization&quot; policies to achieve appropriate distribution of equipment as Total Force declines and as readiness requirements for some RC units change. Even AC, however, is not uniformly equipped. Equipment is not always the key variable. 4th Brigade was modernized as a first to fight unit.</td>
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<td>• Better planning by monitors of training facilities to safeguard RC limited training time.</td>
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| | | | • Place all Army Personnel Centers under one command.
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<tr>
<th>ACTIVE COMPONENT PERCEPTIONS</th>
<th>RESERVE COMPONENT PERCEPTIONS</th>
<th>ISSUES</th>
<th>OPTION FOR BETTER FORCE INTEGRATION</th>
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<td>3. RC as 'weekend warriors' can, by definition, never be comparable to AC and will always require long periods of training between mobilization and deployment. SECF und announcement that in the future the Army's rapid deployment divisions should be composed entirely of AC forces. The Guard and Reserve should be consolidated into whole divisions used as 2nd or 3rd echelons. It would be deployed after 90 - 120 days of work up. will bring the issue to a head in Congress.</td>
<td>RC is living expression of the American experience and the true heir to the traditions of our founding fathers - i.e. a large reserve force is the norm. DOD reluctance to activate ARNG round-out units and, later, not to deploy them reinforced deeply held suspicion about AC attitudes.</td>
<td>Proper AC/RC mix. Reasonable readiness levels of RC units, especially ARNG round-out units. Attainable training levels and time between mobilization and development. Has the round-out concept failed? D = 108; 307; 607; 907.</td>
<td>AC/RC mix decision is nearly in place, probably 12 and 6. The real issue will be readiness levels and role, if any, of RC units in contingency forces. SECF und recommendation seems a solid base on which to build. Extend round-out deployment schedules in light of SWA experience and in light of changing conditions in Europe which permit longer warning time and smaller standing armies. Limit reserves in contingency forces to vital CS and CSS units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTIVE COMPONENT PERCEPTIONS</td>
<td>RESERVE COMPONENT PERCEPTIONS</td>
<td>ISSUES</td>
<td>OPTIONS FOR BETTER FORCE INTEGRATION</td>
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<td>4. RC carrying of congressional favor gives it an unfair advantage as a result of working outside the system. RC relies on political clout rather than professional competence.</td>
<td>• AC ignorant of state and local politics as they relate to ARNG.</td>
<td>• Will strategic and operational calculus or political dynamics of Congress determine AC/RC issues?</td>
<td>• Army leadership should clearly articulate CSA concept of rapidly deployable forces, initial reinforcement units, follow-on reinforcements, full mobilization, total mobilization, and how RC units best fit concept under new conditions of reduced resources and longer warning times.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• 1973 evolution of &quot;Total Army Policy&quot; raised RC expectations beyond AC commitment. &quot;Total Army Policy&quot; was rhetoric to placate Congress and the RC. RC viewed as second-class citizen.</td>
<td>• The Army leadership is in a strong position now, because of high prestige after SWA, and because SECDEF has taken a leading position on the AC/RC relationship. Will these conditions last long enough to push through Congress while issues of military strategy are on the ascendancy over the politics of the issues?</td>
<td>• Emphasis should be on vital role of AC contingency forces and USAR/CRS and CSS, and ARNG divisions on follow-on reinforcement missions (after 60-120 days training). This mission gives us credible extended crisis management/warfighting capability.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• ARNG believes Total Army Model (and recent Cheney proposal) will: (a) Require Guard to become smaller, (b) remove ARNG combat units from contingency force, (c) reduce readiness levels and resources.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Army needs to decide what it wants, and, with OSD, JCS, get to Congress with its best case.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Initial base closure deliberations did not take into account the full impact on RC training.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• AC must convince Congress that it is the impartial spokesman for the Total Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• USAR at a disadvantage in Congress. Weak in defending RC budget. ARNG more effective because of state representation in Congress and appeal of combat units over CS &amp; CRS.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• AC does not consider Total Force in appropriations, fails to support its USAR.</td>
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Roundout: History and Principles.

History. The genesis of Roundout dates back to 1908 when the War Department announced a plan for the creation of 17 tactical divisions. The plan called for integrating Regular Army units and National Guard units located in the same geographic area into tactical divisions. One unit of regulars were to be assigned to every two units of National Guard so that Guard units would compose 2/3 of the division.

The General Staff continued to work on the plan for the next four years. In 1910, War Department General Order 35 created the First Field Army. Three tactical divisions were organized from the National Guards of the six New England states and New York and all Regular units stationed in those states. This plan, however, was short-lived. In 1912, the General Staff decided that the Regulars and Guard should organize their own separate divisions. The Army began organizing its own tactical divisions for the first time while the Guard made plans to organize 12 of its own divisions. Under a new plan the Army was to reorganize into tactical divisions for use as an expeditionary force while Guard divisions mobilized and trained for deployment.

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While the General Staff had given up the Uptonian plan of expanding the Regular Army instead of relying on the National Guard in wartime, it was not fully committed to organizing and equipping Guard divisions. The National Defense Act of 1916, however, required that the National Guard be organized in conformance of Army tables of organization (TOE). That year a new plan for organizing 12 National Guard divisions was formulated. Plans to activate the divisions were well underway when the United States entered World War I. The 1917 plan called for the National Guard to organize 18 divisions: 3 state divisions, the New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio National Guards each fielded a division; one national division composed of units from 27 states; one division made up of Black Guard units; and 13 regional divisions made up of National Guard units from four states. The divisions were designated 26 through 42 while the Black division was designated as the 93d Division.

These 18 divisions deployed to France making up 42 percent of the divisional strength of the American Expeditionary Force. The German High Command rated eight U.S. divisions as excellent or superior; six of them were National Guard divisions.

The National Defense Act of 1920 authorized the National Guard to reorganize 18 infantry divisions and four cavalry divisions. The divisions were organized on a regional basis while the states of Massachusetts, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania fielded complete divisions. Divisions were shared between four states; interstate command arrangements, which continue in the Guard’s current six multi-state divisions, were worked out. In the mid-1930s the Guard activated its first separate infantry brigade, the 92d of Minnesota. The 1920 Act also organized 27 Organized Reserve divisions. However, these divisions were little more than officer cadre units with little funding and equipment.

During the 15 months preceding Pearl Harbor, the Guard’s 18 divisions entered Federal service as part of the buildup of the U.S. Army. The Guard also provided all of the units for the American Division when it was organized in 1942. The four
cavalry divisions were inactivated. The personnel of the 27 reserve divisions were called to active duty as individuals while the unit designations were used for new divisions.

It was during World War II that National Guard units were employed as Roundout units for AC divisions. The 7th, 8th and 25th Infantry Divisions were assigned National Guard regiments in order to complete the divisions prior to deployment. The Guard units deployed and fought with their parent divisions until inactivated at the end of the war.

After World War II, the Reserve Components expanded to 22 USAR and 27 ARNG divisions. However, these divisions were never fully manned or resourced. In 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara determined that the 27 National Guard divisions and remaining six Army Reserve divisions were not required nor could they be supported. The six USAR divisions were inactivated; however, the Army Reserve wanted to maintain some combat arms capability. The USAR was authorized to activate three separate infantry brigades; 157th, 187th and 205th. Four Guard divisions were inactivated and three separate infantry brigades were organized to replace them. The Guard had activated three separate infantry brigades in 1959: in Hawaii and Puerto Rico, ostensibly for area defense, and one in Arizona. This brought the total of Guard and Reserve brigades to nine.

Despite this reorganization of the Reserve Components, OSD still thought that 23 Guard divisions were far too many. In 1967, 15 Guard divisions were inactivated. The remaining eight divisions were reorganized from one and two state organizations to three-state organizations. Twelve new separate infantry brigades were activated for a total of 18 in the Guard. OSD reasoned that by activating 20 Guard and Reserve brigades that these units and the remaining eight Guard divisions could be fully supported.

The Army now had more separate infantry brigades than it knew what to do with. No doctrine existed for the employment of separate brigades. During the Vietnam War, two Guard brigades were mobilized but their personnel were used as individual replacements in Vietnam. However, the
implementation of the Total Force Policy in 1970 changed the Army's thinking. Greater reliance was to be placed on the Guard and Reserve both in peacetime and wartime. RC units would be the initial and primary source for any emergency or rapid expansion of the Army.

Roundout began in 1973 when the Army was looking for a way of increasing the number of active divisions from 13 to 16 without increasing end strength. According to Colonel Harry Summers, General Creighton Abrams, then Army Chief of Staff, was also looking for a method to closely integrate Guard and Reserve units with the active Army. General Abrams did not want the Army to ever fight a war without the support of the American people. A special working group came up with a novel solution: the Roundout Program.

The Army planned to assign four ARNG separate infantry brigades to understructured active divisions in order to bring the divisions to full strength. The Army Staff believed that National Guard brigades could be equipped and trained for deployment earlier than Guard divisions. In order to employ these divisions in any contingency, future administrations would be forced to gain the support of the American people in order to mobilize the Guard and Reserve and then employ them in the contingency thus avoiding another Vietnam scenario. The plan was briefed to and accepted by Guard leaders in 1973.

The first ARNG brigade to participate in Roundout was the 29th Infantry Brigade, Hawaii ARNG. The 29th was assigned to Roundout the 25th Infantry Division in August 1973. The division's 3d Brigade had been inactivated shortly after its return from Vietnam. Roundout now allowed the Army to activate the 7th Infantry Division in October 1974 and the 5th and 24th Infantry Divisions in September 1975. The 256th Infantry Brigade, 48th Infantry Brigade, Georgia ARNG was assigned to the 24th Infantry Division and the 41st Infantry Brigade, Oregon ARNG in 1976.

Roundout was originally a subset of the Affiliation Program whereby Guard and Reserve units were linked with active units for training assistance. A number of separate ARNG brigades
were affiliated with active divisions not only for training assistance but as augmentation brigades. Since there were 14 ARNG brigades with no defined mission, many of them were to be employed as fourth brigades for CONUS divisions with European missions. The augmentation mission lasted until 1979; however, the Affiliation Program continues under Capstone but is limited to selected combat support and combat service support units.\(^9\)

The Roundout Program grew as the relationship between AC divisions and Guard brigades seemed, by many accounts, to be a successful marriage.\(^10\) The 155th Armored Brigade, Mississippi ARNG was assigned to Roundout the 1st Cavalry Division in 1983; the 81st Infantry Brigade, Washington ARNG was assigned to the 9th Infantry Division in 1985; the 27th Infantry Brigade, New York ARNG was assigned to the 10th Mountain Division in 1986; the 205th Infantry Brigade, USAR was assigned to the 6th Infantry Division in 1987; and the 116th Cavalry Brigade, Oregon/Idaho ARNG was assigned to the 4th Infantry Division in 1989. The 29th and 41st Brigades were relieved from the Roundout mission when the 25th and 7th Infantry Divisions were reorganized as light infantry divisions. In addition, seven separate ARNG battalions also Roundout AC divisions.

**Principles.** Under AR 11-30 Capstone Program, Roundout is one of the types of directed training associations. ODCSOPS has overall staff responsibility and coordination with FORSCOM, NGB and OCAR to select participating units and arrange for resources. CG, FORSCOM executes the program.

The basic premise of Roundout is that RC brigades and battalions are assigned to active divisions to bring them up to full TOE structure. RC units receive the same resourcing as their parent division.

According to paragraph 7d(4a), *AR 11-30* "roundout units will be scheduled to deploy with their AC sponsor or as soon as possible thereafter according to supported CINC priorities." Therefore, Roundout brigades are expected to mobilize and deploy with their division or as soon as possible after completing required validations and post-mobilization training.
In the case of the 48th Infantry Brigade, the brigade needed 4-5 weeks of post-mobilization training, 10-14 days of travel and then it expected to join the 24th Infantry Division in theater. All other Roundout brigades also have post-mobilization training and validations to complete before deployment. Therefore, in real terms, no Roundout brigade deploys with the division but is expected to deploy several weeks after mobilization.

While OPLAN 4102 envisioned CONUS-based AC divisions deploying within days to Europe, it allowed for Roundout brigades to follow-on after post-mobilization training. Since most of the parent divisions are mechanized, Roundout was envisioned for a European scenario whereby there was some warning time. When the 24th Infantry Division was assigned to the U.S. Central Command for contingencies, the 48th Infantry Brigade also became liable for deployment to Southwest Asia. The Total Force Policy and Roundout led to the authorization of 200,000 Selected Reserve call-up in Title 10, USC, if the President chose to.

Light infantry divisions were developed in the mid-1980s as forces that could be rapidly deployed. Of the three AC light divisions, two, the 6th and 10th, depend on Roundout brigades. Without their Roundout brigades the 6th and 10th Divisions would be too light to deploy. Without the mobilization of Roundout brigades in any future contingency, 7 out of 18 AC divisions would be seriously weakened.

Capstone.

The Capstone Program foundation dates back to 1973 when the Affiliation Program was approved. The intent of Affiliation was to improve the training and readiness of RC combat arms units by associating them with AC units. Affiliation had two subsets: Roundout and augmentation. While Roundout brought understructured AC divisions to standard configurations, augmentation assigned Guard and Reserve combat arms battalions and brigades to fully structured AC divisions to increase combat power, but more importantly, AC divisions were tasked to work with their
assigned units to improve training, MOS qualification and generally assist RC units in their training programs.\textsuperscript{12} AC divisions formed training relationships with Guard and Reserve units and worked with units during both AT and IDT.

The program was implemented in June 1974 when 26 ARNG battalions were assigned AC sponsors. It was judged a success and by 1979 four brigades and 109 separate companies and battalions were participating in the program. In 1976, CS and CSS units were added to the program. Two years later, two ARNG divisions were linked with two AC divisions under the Division Partnership Program to increase the readiness of Guard divisions.\textsuperscript{13}

By 1979 the Army realized that the Affiliation Program was working well, however, it had expanded beyond the original goal. The next logical step was to package the entire concept and take it to a higher level, the integration of RC units into war plans. The Affiliation Program, other readiness programs, RC force modernization programs and wartime requirements were all rolled into the Capstone Program. Capstone had five major objectives: (1) to clearly define the role of every unit in the Army, AC and RC, for either USAREUR wartime requirements or the CONUS requirements sustaining base; (2) to establish both planning and training associations between RC units and their wartime AC headquarters; (3) establish a Total Army program for force planning; (4) establish a Total Army program for POMCUS, modernization, training and readiness; and, (5) establish a basis from which to plan mobilization and deployment of RC units in wartime. FORSCOM was designated as the coordinating authority for Capstone and by August 1980 all RC units had received their wartime missions and alignment.

Capstone was a major turning point for the RC. For the first time, RC units were integrated into war plans and, just as important, RC units now worked with their wartime AC headquarters on a regular basis to integrate planning, training, and force modernization. The Army, for the first time, had arrived at a coherent plan for the organization, training, mobilization and deployment of RC units, both peacetime and wartime.\textsuperscript{14} This was a major achievement for the Total Army.
The Capstone Program is governed by Army Regulation 11-30 and by FORSCOM Regulation 350-4. The goals that were implemented in 1980 continue today. AR 11-30 clearly defines training and planning relationships and how Capstone operates in peacetime. FORSCOM Regulation 350-4 details the responsibilities of AC and RC commanders and headquarters. While Capstone was implemented to support USAEUR wartime planning, it now recognizes that the RC has a role to play in contingency operations as well. Capstone remains the bedrock for the training, integration and mobilization of the RC.

APPENDIX B ENDNOTES

2. Ibid., p. 15.
5. The 28th Division of Pennsylvania was actually organized in 1878 and the 27th Division of New York was organized in 1908.
8. COL Summers has described General Abrams' role and ideas for Roundout in his columns in Army Times, on television, and before public and Army forums.
10. See for example, MG John Galvin, "Round Out is Alive, Working In Georgia," Army, November 1982, pp. 36-42.
11. Interview with MG Joseph Griffin, October 3, 1990, Reno, NV.
