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TITLE IV - JOINT OFFICER PERSONNEL POLICY: A PEACE DIVIDEND IS REQUIRED

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TERRY J. YOUNG
United States Army

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Joint Officer Personnel Policy: A Peace Dividend is Required

LTC Terry T. Young

Study Project

FROM 6 March 1992 TO

The 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Goldwater-Nicholo Act) had far-reaching implications for military affairs. Of particular importance was its Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policy. Although the original intent of Title IV was to improve the quality of the officers assigned to joint duty positions, the major issue now is how to develop future military leaders who will have the correct mix of operational expertise and joint background. New challenges, especially the reduction of the force, make it increasingly more difficult to meet the intent of the act. Although fewer officers are available to fill these positions, joint requirements continue to increase. This study focuses on Title IV and its implications on the Army. It will identify major problems and recommend changes for both provisions of the act and in Army officer personnel management procedures. It attempts to conclusively demonstrate that these changes are necessary in light of the challenge presented by the smaller Army and the need to preserve the experience and warfighting skills of the officers involved.
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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TITLE IV - JOINT OFFICER PERSONNEL POLICY:
A PEACE DIVIDEND IS REQUIRED

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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UNCLASSIFIED
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Terry J. Young, LTC, IN, USA
TITLE: Title IV - Joint Officer Personnel Management: A Peace Dividend Is Required
FORMAT: Individual Study Project
DATE: 6 March 1992 Pages: 41
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Goldwater-Nichols Act) had far-reaching implications for military affairs. Of particular importance was its Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policy. Although the original intent of Title IV was to improve the quality of the officers assigned to joint duty positions, the major issue now is how to develop future military leaders who will have the correct mix of operational expertise and joint background. New challenges, especially the reduction of the force, make it increasingly more difficult to meet the intent of the act. Although fewer officers are available to fill these positions, joint requirements continue to increase. This study focuses on Title IV and its implications on the Army. It will identify major problems and recommend changes for both provisions of the act and in Army officer personnel management procedures. It attempts to conclusively demonstrate that these changes are necessary in light of the challenge presented by the smaller Army and the need to preserve the experience and warfighting skills of the officers involved.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The 1986 Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act (HR3622-PL99-433), commonly referred to as The Goldwater-Nichols Act, had far-reaching implications for military affairs. Its provisions contained the most sweeping and drastic changes in DOD officer personnel management since Congress created the Department of Defense in 1947. Two of the original designers of the act, Senators Sam Nunn and Barry Goldwater, described the significance of this legislation in their testimony before Congress.

Senator Nunn stated....

"....this legislation is probably the most important undertaking regarding national security in the last 30 or 40 years and perhaps longer."\(^1\)

Senator Goldwater stated....

"....the reorganization of the Department of Defense may be the most important thing that Congress does in my lifetime. It will be the most important thing that I tried to do in mine."\(^2\)

General (Ret) William E. Depuy, a respected, senior Army officer, called it "an astounding and historic intervention by Congress in the organization and internal operation of the Department of Defense."\(^3\)
Of particular importance in this reorganization act was its Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policy. Assignments, education, promotion, and tour length policies for officers selected for joint assignments were all addressed in these provisions. The original intent of Title IV was to improve the quality of the officers assigned to joint duty positions, thus improving service cooperation in the joint arena. While the intent is still valid, the major issue now is how to develop future military leaders who will have the right mix of operational expertise and joint background.

We face new challenges and problems which make it increasingly more difficult to meet the intent and still fulfill normal service requirements. All services, particularly the Army, must reduce their forces. Technology continues to improve all facets of the defense environment at a fantastic pace. Service requirements for "success" continue to compete for the little time available in an officer's career. Although fewer Army officers are available to fill joint requirements, those demanding highly qualified and proven officers, these requirements continue to increase. Adding to this problem are the numerous other requirements we expect from our modern military officer. In a candid self-evaluation, an Army discussion paper explained it this way:...

"We place a tremendous burden on our senior officers. We charge them to perform as statesmen, as spokesmen for their organizations, as stewards of tremendous resources, as role models, as standard setters, as long-range planners, and decision
makers. In short, we demand that they perform as though they were effective corporate executives. In time of peace, there is a blurring of the distinction between pure warrior and pure corporate executive. In both peace and across the spectrum of conflict, we expect our senior Army leaders to be both.

This study focuses on Title IV and its implications on the Army. It does not attempt to address whether or not Congress needed to establish these mandates or how well the Services met the requirements in the past. It will identify major problems and recommend changes in Army officer personnel management while still meeting the spirit of the law. These recommended changes should not be interpreted as an attempt to subvert the original act. Rather, they are an attempt to meet the important needs of the joint community and to assist Army personnel managers in meeting the challenges of living within the intent of the act without degrading the experience and warfighting skills of the officers involved.

Because of the universal acceptance of this legislation and the importance and power of the original designers, considerable resistance to change any portion of this act should be anticipated. Bill Nichols, D-AL, chairman of the investigation committee and co-sponsor of the bill, initially indicated some flexibility could be given. He stated that he would be "more amenable to change if the military would first try to follow the reorganization theme." Changes, therefore, ought to preserve the original intent of the bill and conclusively demonstrate they are required in light of the challenge presented by a smaller
Army. Numerous politicians have indicated that the end of the Cold War and resulting decreased requirement for military forces should result in some "peace dividends". The Army's share of the dividend should be increased flexibility in implementing Title IV through a reduction in joint requirements. The reorganization theme has been followed; now some changes are necessary.


Congress recognized the complexity of military operations, especially joint operations. Unfortunately, our recent experiences all demonstrated significant problem areas and they were not limited solely to armed conflict. Reform was called for and Congress took the lead. They used horror stories about $400 hammers and $600 toilet seats' along with after-action reports from operations URGENT FURY (Grenada) and DESERT ONE (Iran hostage rescue) to generate political energy for change. Senator Nunn said...

"A close look at the Grenada operation can only lead to the conclusion that, despite our victory and success, despite the performance of the individual troops who fought bravely, the US armed forces have serious problems conducting joint operations. We were lucky in Grenada; we may not be so fortunate next time."

Similar comments resulted from the unsuccessful DESERT ONE Operation. One recent speaker at the Army War College described it as a "national embarrassment". Most analyses of the operation indicate that "flawed planning and execution spelled doom for the endeavor and made an already bad political problem even worse."

Many reasons were cited for fundamental deficiencies in joint operations. Congress perceived that poor quality, training
and experience of officers assigned to joint duty positions was a major factor. The Honorable Lawrence J. Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, testified that . . . .

"By and large officers assigned to joint duty, especially the joint staff, are not the 'best and brightest.' Nor are they prepared as they should be for joint assignments. Finally, they are not as competitive for promotion as officers who have remained close to their services."

Other critics who sought the original reorganization act argued that officers in joint assignments who had not supported their Service's point of view were punished by being denied promotion. Partly for that reason, they argued, most talented officers had avoided joint duty.5

Whether the problems experienced in Operation URGENT FURY or DESERT ONE and the numerous examples of fraudulent overcharging were a result of joint personnel assignment policies is highly argumentative. In fact, no assignment polices concerning joint duty existed at that time. Therefore, the designers of the 1986 Reorganization Act developed Title IV to achieve this critical void. It should be anticipated that many will use the success of the Panama operations (Operation JUST CAUSE) and Saudi operations (Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM) to demonstrate the improved quality of officers in joint assignments and, therefore, the unqualified success of the Title IV provisions. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has only been in existence for five years and has not been fully implemented. Consequently, it may be premature to
equate these successes to the Act. Even if it were true, ensuring we maintain a trained and ready, smaller Army, capable of meeting the uncertain demands of the future, requires additional flexibility in the provisions. While there is little debate concerning the need for military leaders to be experienced in joint matters, there have been varying views, both in the Services and in the joint arena, as to how much is enough.

A summary of the specific provisions of Title IV (Joint Officer Personnel Policy) are as follows:

1. Establishes an occupational category, referred to as the "joint specialty", for the management of officers who are trained in and oriented toward joint matters.

2. Provides that joint specialty officers shall be selected by the Secretary of Defense from nominees submitted by the Service Secretaries.

3. Requires that an officer may not be selected for the joint specialty until he completes a joint education program and a full joint tour.

4. Requires that 50% of joint duty positions in grades above captain/Navy lieutenant be filled by officers who have been nominated for or selected from the joint specialty.

5. Directs the Secretary of Defense to designate at least 1,000 critical joint duty assignments that must always be filled with joint specialty officers.

6. Requires the Secretary of Defense to establish career guidelines for joint specialty officers.

7. Requires, subject to a waiver by the Secretary of Defense, that all officers promoted to general or flag rank must attend an education course (CAPSTONE) on working with the other armed forces.
8. Requires all joint specialty officers and a high proportion of other officers (50% plus one) who graduate from a joint school to be assigned immediately to a joint duty position.

9. Prescribes, subject to a waiver by the Secretary of Defense, that joint duty tours shall be at least 3 years in length for general and flag officers and at least 3 1/2 years in length for other officers.

10. Requires the Secretary of Defense to exclude joint training assignments and assignments within the Military Departments from the definition of "joint assignments".

11. Specifies that each promotion board, subject to a waiver for the Marine Corps, that will consider officers who have served in joint duty assignments shall include at least one joint duty officer designated by the Chairman of the JCS.

12. Establishes the following promotion review process for officers who are serving, or have served, in joint duty assignments:

- Requires the Secretary of Defense to furnish to the Service Secretaries guidelines to ensure that promotion boards give appropriate consideration to joint duty performance;

- Directs the Chairman of the JCS to review promotion board reports before they are submitted to the Secretary of Defense;

- Authorizes the Service Secretary, if the Chairman of the JCS determines that the promotion board acted contrary to the Secretary of Defense's guidelines, to return the report to the promotion board (or a subsequent promotion board) for further proceedings, convene a special board, or take other appropriate action;

- Directs the Secretary of Defense to take appropriate action to resolve any remaining disagreement between the Service Secretary and the Chairman of the JCS.
13. Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty assignments are such that the average promotion rates of their service will be achieved or exceeded.

14. Requires, subject to a waiver by the Secretary of Defense, that no officer may be promoted to general or flag rank unless he or she has served in a joint duty assignment.

15. Requires the Chairman of the JCS to evaluate the joint duty performance of officers recommended for three and four-star rank.

16. Requires the Secretary of Defense to advise the President on the qualifications needed by officers to serve in three and four-star positions.

Thus, Title IV established a system for joint officer management with the intent to upgrade the quality of officers in joint duty positions by establishing detailed instructions and management procedures for their selection, education, assignment, and promotion. While a transition period was allowed to insure a smoother, less turbulent period of implementation, the message was very clear. Joint duty was very important and only good officers should be assigned to these billets. Associating the ultimate selection to general or flag rank with joint experience clearly demonstrates the quality of officer that Congressional leaders envisioned.

These provisions, while fairly straightforward in their approach, caused Army personnel managers significant challenges as they developed policies to implement the provisions of the law. The major diversion of high quality officers caused
considerable problems with other critical officer assignments. While the Secretary of Defense had a residual waiver authority during the transition period, waivers are, and will continue to be, more difficult to obtain. It also raised the concern expressed by General Thomas R. Morgan:

"I worry about the young officer who may be forced to choose between operational experience that will sharpen combat skills and administrative requirements that will enhance promotion potential."


TITLE IV - JOINT OFFICER PERSONNEL POLICY
A PEACE DIVIDEND IS REQUIRED

CHAPTER III
PROBLEM AREAS

The most significant challenge facing personnel managers now is how to fill the numerous joint requirements, meet the intent of the law, and still provide quality officers to other critical service positions. While the Army has already started its force reduction from 770,000 personnel to a force level of 535,000 or below, there has not been a corresponding decrease in its joint requirements. In fact, joint requirements increased by 25 positions in fiscal year (FY) 91. FY 92 requirements are not finalized but a similar or greater increase is expected.1 A restructured joint officer program concept proposes increasing the Joint Assignment List (JAL) from approximately 9,000 positions to 11,500 over the next four years.2 Current Joint Duty Authorization List (JDAL) requirements by grade and specialty are shown on the next page. It clearly highlights the problem of the high number of requirements in some of the combat support and combat service support branches. As the force is decreased, this problem will be exacerbated.
Filling these positions will be very difficult with a decreased population of officers. This will be particularly true immediately in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel because of the number of officers expected to be selected by the Selective Early Retirement (SEPB) Board and retirements that followed once the board was announced. When majors are reduced
through the reduction in force (RIF) boards, a similar problem will exist for that grade. And, if guidance is not given to these reduction boards to safeguard certain specialties, those with a high proportion of joint requirements (Signal-specialty code 25, Military Intelligence-specialty code 35, Foreign Area-specialty code 48, and Automation/Data Processing-specialty code 53) will be especially hard pressed to meet their requirements let alone meet the promotion goals of Title IV. Lieutenant Colonel (P) Barry D. Miner, a former Military Intelligence Branch Chief at PERSCOM stated....

"In the Military Intelligence Branch, over 50% of our Lieutenant Colonels are assigned to battalion command, Division Intelligence (G-2), Army Staff, Joint assignments, and other key nominative positions. Since these positions all require the best available officers, the bill payers (those organizations which receive the bottom 50% of officers based upon demonstrated performance) are Major Commands (MACOMS), Service Schools, and other EAC and below assignments. Other than a few positions, officers providing warfighting guidance and training, could conceivably come from the lower half of their branch."4

Similar opinions exist on the Army staff. A 21 November 1991, Information Paper from DAMO-SSP in DCSOPS stated:

"DCSOPS has observed, and promotion statistics seem to support him, that the joint assignments have a higher proportion than the Service of the finest quality officers. DCSOPS suspects this is especially evident in troop units and headquarters other than HQDA."3
The turbulence caused by the reduction in force over the next few years will frustrate personnel managers in meeting joint and service requirements. If officers currently assigned to joint billets are selected by a SERB or RIF board, it will send a message that they are of lower quality. Some of these officers probably would have been selected by subsequent promotion boards had the force not been reduced. Because of the high priority of joint positions, officers who retire or are selected for release will be replaced quickly. Considerable pressure can be expected to ensure personnel managers take great care in selecting replacements for these joint billets to ensure these replacements will not be selected by subsequent SERB or RIF boards (as best they can determine). That, in turn, will cause additional turbulence throughout the Army since high quality officers with the right qualifications will need to be reassigned regardless of tour length. The continued effects of this higher proportion of requirements for the smaller proportion of "quality" officers can not be accurately predicted. It is very clear, however, that faced with a reduced number of available officers, "the Army will have to make some difficult decisions on how to allocate scarce officer resources".  

Quality can no longer be equated to selection for promotion; only the best will survive if SERB and RIF boards are conducted correctly. A Department of Defense chartered study by Computer Based Systems, a consulting firm, warned shortly after the Reorganization Act was discussed that "tampering with the
promotion system could be harmful". While no changes were made to the promotion system, mandating promotion comparisons, by rank, between the joint officers and the service averages had the same effect. Greater flexibility in joint promotion goals is now required. Good faith attempts to comply with statutory deadlines and statistics must be balanced by measured analysis of the potential effects of the change. Normal assignment considerations and policies should be applied (best qualified, most available, least turbulent, officer preference, family considerations, etc.).

Another problem that exists in the joint arena is the identification of critical joint billets. These positions were originally envisioned to be of such great importance and difficulty that only officers with previous joint experience and who had already been selected as Joint Specialty Officers (JSO) could be assigned to these positions. In some shortage specialties with a high density of joint requirements, this requires some officers to be assigned to repetitive joint assignments. With a smaller population of officers, this will occur with greater frequency. While this provides a joint staff with a highly qualified joint staff officer, it prevents that officer from being assigned to a professional developing service or branch position, thus reducing his/her service competence and skills. LTG Anthony Lukeman, USMC (Ret), former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Manpower and Personnel Policy, explained the dilemma this way.
"Senior leaders have been virtually unanimous in expressing the view that an officer can bring no more important tool to a joint assignment than a current perspective on service issues and operational methods. Any significant deterioration of service currency can detract from officers' effectiveness both in joint assignments and upon returning to operational duties in their services." In addition he added: "Filling critical billets with only joint specialists--intended to help joint leaders by assuring placement of experienced officers in key jobs--sometimes inadvertently constrains the abilities of leaders to select the best qualified officer for a particular assignment when that officer happens not to possess one of the prerequisites for designation as a joint specialist."9

As will be shown later, repetitive assignments in the joint arena could make him/her less competitive for promotion; exactly opposite of the original intent of the act. Fewer joint critical positions would decrease this occurrence.

A close look at some of the positions designated as joint critical casts some doubt on their validity as joint critical. No specific guidance was originally provided to identify these billets.10 Services and staffs were merely limited to the total number of positions that could be identified as critical so they logically all took the maximum number. Specific questionable positions will not be identified in this paper to preclude a perception that one organization, specialty or position is less important than another. However, if you use the argument that Congress originally wanted to prevent recurring problems in joint operations by developing senior staff officers and commanders from a small, highly selective group, a comparison of the joint
critical list by specialty and position, does not necessarily support that argument. Many of the "CINC producing" assignments are not critical while others (such as some aide positions) are.

It can be safely said that prior to the 1986 Reorganization Act, joint duty did not receive the priority it does now. A 1982 study ordered by JCS Chairman, General David C. Jones, found that fewer than 2% of officers in joint billets had previously served on a multi-service staff. Since joint duty assignments are presently statutorily linked to promotion rates, and ultimately a requirement for selection to general or flag rank, joint duty is a significant factor in professional development. In fact, based upon my four year's experience as an assignment officer in Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), many officers are more concerned with obtaining joint credit than they are in serving in traditional branch positions. Again quoting LTG Lukeman (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Manpower and Personnel Policy)...

"Men fight battles and officers lead, and there isn't anything more critical to winning than that. I have some concern that the (the bill's) concentration on joint staff billets could deflect some officers from that central focus."

Field grade officer personnel turbulence is a major problem in most CONUS divisions. This is particularly true for infantry majors. The results of a recent survey sent to all Division AG/G-1's (five of nine divisions responded) demonstrated the magnitude of the problem. All indicated that the average time an infantry major spent in one of the key troop billets (Bn/Bde S-3
or battalion XO) was 12-14 months. Less than 10% of these officers had the opportunity to fill two positions and, in each case, it required the Commanding General’s approval. Once an infantry major becomes branch qualified (serves twelve months in a critical troop billet), Infantry Branch, PERSCOM normally notifies him for reassignment. The average time on station for an infantry major who serves successfully is twenty-four months.\textsuperscript{13} The average time an officer selected for infantry battalion command (statistics from the last two selection lists) spent in critical troop positions was twenty-three months.\textsuperscript{14} It appears that the amount of troop time directly impacts upon battalion command selection and certainly impacts upon the development of war-fighting skills. The high number of requirements for officers with S-3/XO experience is so great that we cannot build experience with our personnel management procedures. This is no less true for other branches. Joint requirements are only partly to blame, but clearly take the best of any branch. Numerous other requirements also compete for these officers. In fact, "an officer’s career is almost unmilitary because defense data shows there is only one chance in six for an officer to work in a purely military environment."\textsuperscript{15}

A misperception concerning promotion statistics for JSO’s also exists. Numerous officers believe that officers who may otherwise not be selected for promotion will be selected if they are JSO’s in order to meet the Congressional mandates.
Regardless of why or how officers get into a joint assignment, they all experience the same problem; too many professional development requirements and too little time. A 1987 GAO report found that officers have a tough time satisfying joint-duty requirements without adversely affecting warfighting skills. When viewed in the context of other career requirements, joint-duty tours complicate an already complex road to success. The officer selected for joint duty should be one who has been selected for military service schools and promotion at rates higher than the population at large. For combat arms officers, this generally means officers who have successfully commanded at the battalion and brigade level. Using a start point of major (the first competitive promotion and school selection) and continuing the development through the selection to general or flag rank, the problem is very easy to explain.

The typical time span from promotion to major (11 years) to brigadier general (24 years) is thirteen years. As shown below, typical career pattern considerations require eleven years.

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<th>Professional Development Requirements</th>
<th>Typical Tour Length</th>
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<tr>
<td>Command &amp; Staff College</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key 04 Troop Billet (S-3/XO)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Command</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Service College</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade Command</td>
<td>2</td>
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There appears do be enough time to do everything. The real problem occurs while the officer is a major, however. During this time, he/she must attend CGSC, get branch qualified (to be selected for battalion command), and get a joint tour. If the joint tour is delayed, battalion command, senior service college selection and brigade command preclude the joint assignment. And the problem is compounded if an officer is selected early for promotion and loses a year of professional development time. In the 1980 briefing notes to the Chief of Staff of the Army indicated that 80% of the brigadier and major generals, 67% of colonel command selectees, and 36% of lieutenant colonel command selectees on active duty on 1 August 1980 had received at least one below the zone promotion. Therefore, it affects many of the officers needing joint experience.

The problem gets complicated even further. During this same time period from major to brigadier general, there are other important demands for highly qualified officers with proven potential such as functional area development, advanced civil school, Army staff, ROTC/USMA, Recruiting Command, and service school instructors.

A small group of highly competitive officers are selected from each year's Command and General Staff College class to attend an additional year of study (School of Advanced Military Studies - SAMS). These officers have a one year requirement to
serve on a Corps or Division staff, so every available year in their time between major and General Officer has a requirement. Another example of competing demands for the same best officer is the 75th Ranger Regiment. As previous selection and promotion results indicate, only our best officers serve in this unit. Little time is available to an officer to serve in this unit, however, and meet all other requirements and be joint qualified.

When an officer is assigned to a critical joint billet (one requiring a previous joint assignment), he/she is likely to miss another critical requirement and thus, not be competitive for the next grade or key job. Promotion in combat arms branches particularly, but other branches as well, is keyed to job performance as well as jobs held. General officers have all commanded brigades, attended the War College, commanded battalions, and have served (typically) as a battalion executive officer or battalion/brigade operations officer. Therefore, missing a "step" because you were assigned to another high priority assignment requiring your unique skills and talents could easily take a very competitive officer out of competition for the next grade or position. The additional requirement of a three-year joint assignment is placed on the officer corps during a period of time when they can least afford it. Unfortunately, Congress seemed to miss this in their recommendation for reorganization.

Provisions were made to allow some officers (combat arms only) to be reassigned after two years in a joint assignment and
receive full joint tour credit. They were required to move to critical occupational positions for service professional development, hence the name critical occupational specialty (COS) takeout. There is no guarantee, however, that these officers will not have to wait in line behind other deserving officers already assigned to a unit to get a key troop billet. Even a two-year joint tour added to a year at Leavenworth and the Joint Professional Military Education Course, takes the officer away from his warfighting skills. For pilots, to put them back in the cockpit without recent experience is dangerous. For others, it isn't much different.

Trying to keep officers on the correct glide path is even more difficult if an officer is not selected for battalion command or Senior Service College in his/her first year of eligibility. Placing that individual in a joint assignment requiring a mandatory assignment of three years (two years if they are eligible for a COS takeout), could actually make them less competitive later—just the opposite of the intent of Goldwater-Nichols. They may become less competitive because battalion command may be delayed. If they do not receive an officer efficiency report as a commander, promotion and selection results show he would most likely not be selected for senior service college or colonel. If not selected for brigade command in his first year of eligibility, his chances for subsequent selection is reduced. But those are the type officers originally envisioned of filling these billets and the ones that will
eventually become the CINC's of the future. Some additional flexibility is required to take better advantage of these officers.

The assignment of top performers must be closely managed to meet the intent of the act and to provide our soldiers the best possible leadership. PERSCOM must identify above average performers early and manage their development. But Combat Arms Division, PERSCOM may have gone too far. They initiated a policy which identifies all officers selected for below the zone promotions and/or battalion command. A projected assignment pattern is then developed for them to insure they are assigned to a joint position. Or approved, deviations from this pattern require the approval of the Division Chief. In some cases, critical positions (battalion command, SSC), are deferred to allow for a joint assignment. Jeopardizing key service requirements and future promotion at the expense of becoming joint qualified is not the correct answer.

These successful officers are penalized with additional moves and turbulence because they are successful. Misutilizing the two year COS takeout option also causes additional turbulence in the joint staffs; again contrary to the original intent of the act. Officers selected for CGSC and attending the school in their first of eligibility are also targeted for joint assignments, ideally immediately after their CGSC graduation. As a result, they are assigned to key joint positions, usually as a frocked major, with little experience above Brigade staff, and
compete against other officers (especially for senior rater block checks on their officer efficiency report). If they fail to perform above average (above center of mass on their senior rating profile), they could easily become less competitive for future promotions.

It appears that we are attempting to develop a pool of qualified joint specialty officers and meeting bureaucratic requirements mandated by Congress at the expense of normal personnel management procedures of placing the right officer in the correct position. In a time when family considerations, reduced PCS moves, and stabilization should be the norm, we are doing the opposite to meet the joint numbers.

Attempting to identify future generals at this early stage in their career is also risky, unethical and discriminatory. An elite group could be formed and officers could easily digress back to the "ticket punching" mentality of the late 1960's. As explained above, it appears that assignment officers may already be doing that. This idea fosters "careerism". Officers generally want to do well and get promoted. If joint duty becomes a prime discriminator in terms of promotion, however, some dangerous signals could be received. The officer corps will undergo a very traumatic period as the force is reduced. Add to this the differentiation between joint (the elite fast burners) and the non-joint (other participants), officers and some far-reaching implications can be anticipated. Creating an elite with preferential benefits at the risk of alienation of other highly
qualified officers throughout the Army is not the way to go.

The continued SERB and RIF boards will have a significant impact on the officer corps and add another dimension. Results will be analyzed and some incorrect assumptions could be formed. Regardless of the accuracy of this analysis, one message will be clear. You must be highly competitive to remain on active duty and even better than that to fill those decreasing key positions which lead to future promotions (battalion/brigade command). Officers on promotion/selection boards have a short period of time to form their opinion and make their vote. If the "muddy boots" orientation that seemed to exist in the past continues, assignments out of the norm could be looked upon with a jaundiced eye.

Current briefing charts used by PERSCOM show a desired staff tour on a MACOM staff or the Army staff prior to an assignment to the Office of the Joint Chiefs. Many positions on joint staff require a language qualification, geographic or area country expertise, or other requirements. Too often, the officer most qualified to fill that position is the officer who could not meet service requirements (because of the time it took to obtain the expertise mentioned) and thus did not get selected for battalion command. Although his duty performance, as indicated by his officer efficiency reports, is well above average, the fact that he has not been selected for command, means that the probability of his selection for colonel is less than 5% (based upon selection results over the last four years in Combat Arms
branches). Assigning him to a joint position would be contrary to the bill's intent. However, the "successful" officer, in all likelihood, does not meet the listed requirements for the job. The Army has traditionally equated quality with continuing promotions. Promotions, above lieutenant colonel, are keyed to selection for battalion command. Perhaps we need a new interpretation of quality; there are a large number of highly qualified, experienced officers with tremendous demonstrated performance of duty that have not been selected for battalion command.

Jointness is not an enemy or an obstacle to work around. The smaller force, reduced budgets, increased technology, required synchronization, and numerous other additional requirements placed on today's leaders demand more than merely tactical competence. Joint staffs need qualified and experienced officers. The CONUS based, rapidly deployable forces also need experienced warfighters who are ever-ready to meet the world's dangerous demands. We must maintain a focus on all the objectives as we work the frustrating programs and processes that will get us there. Nonetheless, some changes are required. Without these changes, the Army will suffer severely. Joint operations will suffer if personnel management of joint-duty officers is reduced to seeking the achievement of the myriad of statistical goals contained in the legislation.
ENDNOTES

1. Ricki Sullivan, MAJ., Manager, Joint Assignment List, Joint Management Branch, Total Army Personnel Command, telephonic interview conducted by author on 8 January 1992, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

2. William D. Clark, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), Subject: Restructured Joint Officer Program, Washington, DC., 13 December 1991.


9. Ibid., p. 25.


12. Ibid.


18. Anthony Lukeman, LTG. "Joint Officer Management: Where We Stand," ibid, p. 27.
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General (Ret) David C. Jones warned in 1982...

"Every time we have had a major conflict, we've found that we have had to make ad hoc adjustments to our organization, but then we have fallen back into bureaucratic patterns even though the organizational arrangement wasn't adequate to deter conflict or cope with it."

Operation DESERT STORM clearly indicated that we can meet our missions. But clearly, much work needs to be done in the joint arena. Based upon five years of experience years since passage of the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act, decreasing force, and the Service concerns with the current Joint Officer Management program, it is apparent that both statutory and policy changes are needed. These should not be interpreted as "falling back into bureaucratic patterns". They are necessary to meet the new demands placed upon our Army.

Specific revisions recommended are listed below. A brief explanation of each will follow.

1. Reduce joint requirements commensurate with the force reduction. This is particularly true for the Army's share.
2. Closely scrutinize and reduce joint critical billets.
3. Establish a two-tier joint-duty assignment list
(JDAL) into a joint assignment list (JAL) and a joint operations list (JOP). Manage these as follows:

**JAL** - manage by organization, not billet
- require phase I JPME only
- tour lengths remain the same

**JOP** - all CINC producing and joint critical billets
- manage by billet
- requires full JPME
- tour lengths remain the same

4. Eliminate JSO promotion objectives but continue to review closely.

5. Allow COS takeouts for all specialties and do not restrict it to the initial joint tour.

6. Increase waiver authority for tour length to allow for key school and command selection. Allow cumulative credit for those officers pulled early for these key assignments.

7. Shorten or eliminate JPME II; allow for corresponding studies completion. Incorporate joint planning in all service schools. Give JPME I credit for completion of CGSC Corresponding Studies.

8. Select JSO's and JOP's by a normal selection board.

9. Incorporate joint instruction in the corresponding CGSC studies and give JPME I credit for completion.

Obviously the first step must be a reduction in the total
number of joint billets and, in particular, the Army's share. It does not make much sense to reduce the Army by a third, yet increase its number of joint requirements. Joint critical assignments must also be decreased, especially in those shortage specialties that have a high density of joint requirements. Joint staffs and agencies must accept their fair share of the force reduction and get used to doing more with less like everyone else.

The two-tiered JDAL has been discussed for a number of years and has become increasingly popular within Department of the Army now that the force reduction is in full swing. Under this concept, only limited positions (those whose incumbents are directly involved in the integrated planning and employment of joint forces, e.g., selected officers assigned to J-3 and J-5 on the Joint Staff, the CINC's staffs, and other similar organizations), would qualify as Joint Operational Positions. This concept should be accepted in principal but with reduced total numbers. Only JOP positions should require JPME II; therefore, a large cost savings would result. Officers assigned to JAL positions should fall under a different set of joint provisions (tour length, promotion goals, etc.). This concept would provide the necessary flexibility and relief the Army requires while still meeting the original intent of the Act. And, a pool of qualified JSO's would still be available for GO/Flag selection.

By emphasizing qualifications rather than quality (promotion
goals), personnel managers should be able to fill requirements
with a greater latitude of finding the best qualified rather than
the officer most likely to get promoted. Retaining the
requirement for officers selected for general/flag rank to be
joint qualified will still provide the "honest broker" and
incentive for good officers to seek these positions. Promotion
goals have not been met by any of the services to date. This
does not mean that good officers have not been assigned there or
that personnel managers have not been doing their jobs. Officers
assigned to joint positions who are not selected for promotion
should receive counseling from their chain of command. If their
current duty performance does not meet joint duty expectations,
they should be reassigned without regard to joint tour length
requirements. Promotion goals should be retained for JOP
positions to insure personnel managers add this variable to their
decision making process.

The COS takeout provides an excellent means to insure
service officers meet their professional development needs. All
branches have these requirements. Therefore, this provision
should be granted to all branches, not just combat arms officers.
And, it should not be limited to the initial tour since these
professional development requirements continue throughout an
officer's career. Provisions could be established to insure
personnel managers do not abuse this luxury. By allowing special
provisions for those highly successful officers selected for
battalion command or Senior Service College to be slated at the
first available time instead of waiting until joint tour completion, would provide a valuable benefit. As stated earlier, those officers not selected for command or SSC in their first year of eligibility previously could not be assigned to joint billets without fear of placing them behind their contemporaries. This provision would be especially beneficial for battalion commanders in Hawaii, Panama, or Europe. Their knowledge of the area, language, contingency plans, etc. would be extremely advantageous on the WESTCOM, SOUTHCOM, or EUCOM staff and more than make up for the turbulence it would cause.

JPME II is a twelve-week course conducted at the old Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. Most commands desire the incoming officer to attend TDY enroute so the joint tour does not start until he completes the school. Therefore, they get maximum tour utilization and are not forced to accept a vacancy while the officer attends school. But, this places the officer and his family in limbo during this three month period, forces the incumbent to be retained, and adds a long requirement to an already full plate. JPME II could be shortened or eliminated entirely through the use of correspondence courses or adding to existing schools.

At present, an officer's selection for the Joint Service Officer designation is a personnel management action rather than the competitive selection process used for other critical milestones, such as promotion, command selection, and service school attendance. Board selection of officers for JOP, JPME and
eventual JSO status would provide a more rational process for choosing the Army's joint duty officers. Specifics would need to be determined. Floors for functional areas could be established by PERSCOM to reduce the potential mismatch of requirements versus qualified officers.

Officers who complete CGSC through corresponding studies do not receive JPME I credit; you must attend in order to get credit. Since over 50% of a year group complete the corresponding studies, a large percentage of the population miss the opportunity for JPME I education. Joint education should be included in the corresponding studies so those completing it are educated and receive credit.

As the size of our Active and Reserve forces are prudently reduced, it is essential that the U.S. retain the capability to detect and respond decisively to tomorrow's challenges. That will demand joint teamwork and sufficiently skilled staff personnel necessary to conduct complex and combined operations. Although the likelihood of global war has decreased, the probability of lesser conflict has actually increased because of the breakdown of a bipolarized world that tended to subjugate intra-regional conflicts. More than ever before, Army officers must be well versed in their field and in joint operations. The only way both can be achieved is through prudent revision of Title IV. In order to meet the numerous demands required of our military officers, an officer must make maximum use of all available time in his/her career. To accomplish that difficult
task, increased flexibility in the Title IV provisions are necessary. While there may have been a history of Pentagon non-cooperation in joint matters, recent experience shows that is no longer the case. The Army must get part of the peace dividend--changes to Title IV provisions. As former Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham, Jr. stated, "The law is so micro-detailed, you have hobbled us. Help us help you."
ENDNOTES


3. Ibid.
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