THESIS

GORBACHEV, THE GENERALS, AND THE "TURN TO THE RIGHT"

by

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Gorbachev, The Generals and the
"Turn to the Right"

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of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This Thesis attempts to gauge the effects, on Soviet-Western relations and East European stability, of the conservative turn taken by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in late 1990, early 1991. The signs of this move include: the repression in the Baltics, Foreign Minister Schevardnadze's resignation, the removal of other reformist leaders from Gorbachev's retinue, and the growth of military influence. While apparently being negative for prospects of continued good relations and stability, this conservative turn was taken as a result of internal political dynamics and not specifically as a reaction against the West or against East European developments. Gorbachev, the 'new thinkers', and the foreign policy conservatives are involved in a power struggle. The conservatives, the generals, have gained influence and are now in a position to slow down but not derail the 'new thinking' diplomacy. The 'Turn to the Right' signals an end to the dramatic breakthrough diplomacy of 1989 and 1990 but is not a harbinger of a return to old relations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Recent events in the Soviet Union, the so-called 'Turn to the Right', are disquieting. Gorbachev is no longer the reformer that he once seemed to be. The Soviet military, while withdrawing from Eastern Europe, is on the move within the USSR. 1991 Europe is a colder and more dangerous place than that of 1990 or 1989. This thesis focuses on the nature of the 'Turn to the Right' and its implications for Western foreign policy and the health of the East European revolutions of 1989. On the surface Gorbachev's "Turn to the Right" seems to be a negative development for East European stability and Soviet-Western rapprochement.

There is a power struggle going on in the USSR. Earlier, with Gorbachev on their side, the reformists were at the helm. As a result of their policies Eastern Europe was freed, the Cold War thawed, and East and West came closer together. Gorbachev has seemingly switched sides in the power struggle. The aim here is, by examining Soviet political maneuvering, to understand whether the influence of the conservatives has increased, and how this might affect the foreign policy achievements of the reformists.

Gorbachev's turn to the conservative side brings up concerns that 'new thinking' is over and old thinking has returned. Is new thinking indeed dead? Has Gorbachev been
coopted by the right wing? Are the foreign policy conservatives, the generals, on top? If this is a possibility, what are upper-echelon military views on East European developments? What is their ability to negatively influence East European stability and the 1989 revolutions? What is their ability to negatively influence Soviet-Western relations? All these questions are evoked by Gorbachev's maneuver. By examining the mechanics of the "Turn to the Right" this paper attempts to answer first, if the right wing has gained preeminence in Soviet foreign policy, and second what the conservatives will be able to do with the increased influence that Gorbachev's reliance on them seems to confer.

Before moving on, the conservatives need to be placed into the context of the political debate in the USSR. The Generals, and their allies in the KGB and the military-industrial sector, are the empire savers. By virtue of self-interest and belief the conservatives favor the retention of the USSR as a multi-ethnic polity. Marshall Akhromeyev, for one, has said that the army "was going to defend the constitution and the unity of the state."[Ref. 1] The conservatives are the acolytes of "imperial consciousness" identified by Roman Szporluk [Ref. 2]. They keep its flame alive. "An "imperial consciousness" is alive in the USSR seventy years after the death of the empire"[Ref. 3] and it is the conservatives that cherish and sustain it. It is this group that sustains "the legacy of Imperial Russia in current Soviet
"The right-wingers wish to imbue it [the state] with a sense of mission, of manifest destiny rooted in an imperial past. This does not necessarily mean that they would see Russian armies carving out a new tsardom, but it implies an antagonistic, aggressive world view at odds with the basic theme of Gorbachev's 'New Thinking', of an interdependent world order."[Ref. 5]

One of the problems with this legacy is its geographical haziness. The Russians "lack any clear national identity and consciousness."[Ref. 6] The borders are not universally understood and agreed upon.

"Not all Russians necessarily agree that Russia's "home" is in Europe- or only, or mainly, in Europe. Just as they had before 1917, the Russians are still debating the question of their country's identity...all Russians [do not] know what parts of the Soviet Union they understand "Russia" to include, or whom they consider to be Russian and whom not. Many conflicting answers to these questions are currently being offered. Thus, some Russians seem prepared to accept the "RSFSR" (the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) as their narrower homeland within the USSR. Others think of the entire USSR as Russia - although not all of them necessarily accept all Soviet citizens as their compatriots in "Russia.""[Ref. 7]

Because the borders are not fixed, as they are in most Western nationalities' mindsets, the Russian approach to national borders seems to be more one of gradually decreasing influence as one moves away from Moscow rather than an abrupt legalistic demarcation of the end of state power. This way of looking at borders and influence, coupled with the maximalist interpretations of what is Soviet or Russian common to the conservatives, has destabilizing potential for the new East European democracies. Whether the Western edge of the empire
is perceived to end at the Oder-Neisse or at the Bug is, for example, central to conservative attitudes towards Polish sovereignty. The Poles seem to feel that the unilaterally announced Soviet withdrawals from their country are evidence that "the Soviets feel free to come and go as they please."[Ref. 8] The Polish case is but one example of the frictions possible because of the lack of clarity in Russian definition of boundaries.

Having placed the conservatives in the context of their beliefs on the 'empire', another issue needs to be addressed. It is the question of the relevancy of the Soviet domestic power struggle. There are those that would argue that the Soviet Union is so weak that its domestic political maneuvering can be disregarded. They consider that, given Soviet weakness, East European stability is not threatened from that direction and that the West can ignore any belligerent Soviet grumblings.

"It is not the growing debility of its external position that creates the principal doubt over the persistence of the threat that once confronted Western Europe, important as the weakening of its external position undoubtedly is, but the steady erosion of the Soviet domestic base. The many developments - political, economic, environmental, ethnic, ideological, and spiritual - that have marked this erosion need not be entered into here. Almost every conceivable pathology a society - and an empire - can suffer from has now made its appearance in the Soviet Union."[Ref. 9]

The author of this quotation concludes from this "that the Soviet Union will increasingly follow a passive and contractive foreign policy and that it will do so whether the
government of Mikhail Gorbachev remains in power or not. In either event, the retrenchment of Soviet power and influence in the world will in all likelihood continue. 

"[Ref. 10] As a middle term forecast this seems eminently reasonable and probable. In such a future the West ought to be able to act with relative impunity, following the dictates of its own best interests. (Soviet and East European experts would not be needed because the West can act freely.) One would then, be able to choose policies based solely upon Western desiderata. However the West will almost assuredly not have this luxury. Focusing on Soviet decay is a concentration on the mid-term. It ignores the short-term because it ignores vestigial aspects of Soviet power. It ignores the long-term because it ignores the potential power inherent in Russia. "Even if it breaks up, Russia alone is a huge Euro-Asian power and will not fit as an equal among European peers."[Ref. 11] Also, "Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, noted in early 1991 that the Soviet Union"...will retain the world's largest military machine. Despite the Kremlin's preoccupation with domestic political and economic reform, modernization of this vast military arsenal will continue...."[Ref. 12] So, while agreement with a diagnosis of decay for the USSR is reasonable, it is not the whole picture.
In several decades one can envisage a Russian nation, having survived the intervening difficulties, emerging to realize the power inherent in its geographic position, its wealth of resources, and its population. A tempered, stronger, Eastern political entity could evolve. After all, perestroika and the transformation of the military had as its "over-arching goal...to propel the USSR into the twenty-first century as a full-fledged superpower, with an armed force to match."[Ref. 13] The conservatives, such as the KGB [Ref. 14], and Gorbachev's reformers shared this goal. "Gorbachev and his colleagues did not labor to attain supreme power in the U.S.S.R. only to expedite their country's decline. They were seeking instead to ensure that the Soviet Union would enter the 21st century, in Gorbachev's words, "in a manner befitting a great power."[Ref. 15] Gorbachev's perestroika could be accepted by the conservatives, the flag rank military officers and the KGB, because it was a modern-day thread of Russian imperial nationalism.

"Russian imperial nationalism has never been a reaction against the dislocations of modernization. Rather, it has been a modernizing ideology that aimed to "catch up and overtake" technologically superior foreign powers to enable Russia better to project its power abroad and defend its territories. In this sense, Gorbachev's original understanding of perestroika fell squarely into the traditional pattern of Russian imperial nationalism. Its aim was not to undermine ethnic stratification or to contain the dysfunctions of modernity, but rather to preserve the empire by furthering the modernization process."[Ref. 16]
While long-term assessments of Soviet or Russian revitalization smack of fantasy, given the seemingly endless rot in the empire, prudence and Soviet military hopes for such a future dictate its careful consideration. In the long-term one has to ascertain which policies will be better for the West given the possibility of a strong Eastern power.

More immediately critical is the behavior of the USSR while it is in the process of decay. An observer of the European security process cannot ignore the capability of the USSR to do mischief, despite its decline. The Kremlin's casting about for a role in the Gulf War was a clear indication that it will not sit idly by and let the West achieve its policy goals without accommodation to Soviet interests [Ref. 17]. The Soviet leadership was not able to get its peace proposals accepted, nevertheless their insertion into the situation caused considerable concern for the success of U.S. policy. Another clear instance of mischief was the repression in the Baltics. The choreographed procession of events was evident very early on. "The Kremlin's campaign...seems to have followed an artful script with precedents in Soviet political strategy dating to the Bolshevik Revolution."[Ref. 18] The crackdown has had deleterious effects on Western security. It has, for example, prompted a slowdown in ratification of the CFE treaty and delay in negotiations on a new nuclear weapons treaty.[Ref. 19] Clearly, action undertaken by the
Soviet Government, whether domestic or foreign, will be cause for concern despite the decline in its power.

The short, mid, and long-term labels are useful to bring some clarity to the discussion of threats emanating from the USSR. It seems obvious that a 'mid-term' vision ignores the threats created by vestigial Soviet power as well as those attendant upon its likely eventual resurgence. The point, that the threat is qualitatively different, is, however, well taken.[Ref. 20] The old threat: the echeloned, tank heavy, breakthrough and envelopment threat, that used to face NATO is most unlikely. This should remain true for the short and the mid-term. Yet one should not be deceived by these divisions of time. The short-term vestigial Soviet power will blend into the mid-term decay of the empire, or even until a possible long-term resurgence. After all Soviet nuclear weapons could remain a functional deterrent and a measure of ultimate state power for some time to come and this despite the vicissitudes of other measures of state power. What is argued here is that, while noting the decline in Soviet power, it retains sufficient potential to warrant ongoing concern and evaluation. One cannot ignore the repository of power remaining to the USSR. Given Soviet power, the question to ask is: what aspects of the recent, and apparently negative, changes in the USSR will affect Soviet-Western relations. Two related trends come to mind, one the subset of the other. The first is "Gorbachev's turn to the right".[Ref. 21]
The second is the increased influence of the high-ranking military. An increasingly conservative government encompassing a more forceful military component does not bode well for the possibility of European stability and continued democratization. The next two chapters of this paper treat these two trends in the order that they have been delineated above. The aim is to come to an assessment as to how much of an impediment to good relations that these two seemingly negative developments pose. With this assessment one ought to be able to gauge the likelihood of Soviet obstructionism to Western goals. For example, it will provide an answer to questions of whether the West can, in light of Soviet attitudes, successfully resolve the CFE deadlock, achieve other agreements, and promote stability in Eastern Europe. The next two chapters should provide an indication of whether recent ominous events in the USSR are proof positive that mutual accommodation is no longer possible. The fourth chapter is an assessment of the Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe and their impact on potential Soviet conservative leverage to be applied against the rest of Europe. The fifth chapter is, of course, the conclusion.
A consensus seems to have been built around the idea that Gorbachev's turn to the right should be measured from his rejection of the Shatalin 500 day plan for transition to a market economy. [Ref. 22] With hindsight this may indeed prove to be the point that history uses to measure Gorbachev's change in course. Wherever the change is measured, it is clear that he has indeed made a turn to the right. There are several indications of this.

A. OVERVIEW

1. Personnel Changes

A dramatic indicator, or right turn signal if you will, was Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's resignation. At the Congress of People's Deputies in December 1990, he warned: "Comrade democrats, in the broadest sense of the word, you have scattered, reformers have left the stage - and a dictatorship is coming," he said. "Nobody knows what kind of dictatorship this will be or who the dictator will be." [Ref. 23] Shevardnadze criticized Gorbachev for yielding to the right and for amassing tremendous power in his hands. [Ref. 24] The Former Minister was tired, it seems, of being criticized by the right, especially Colonels
Alksnis and Petruschenko, without being defended by Gorbachev. [Ref. 25] The fact that Shevardnadze was compelled to proffer his resignation in public seems to be evidence of Gorbachev's insulation from pro-perestroika reformers. [Ref. 26] Gorbachev was almost certainly distancing himself from criticism directed at his erstwhile advisors.

Shevardnadze's case was just the most visible to the West, of the turnover in personnel which happened in conjunction with Gorbachev's sidling up to conservative forces. Former Interior Minister Bakatin and Politburo Member Yakovlev have both been ousted. [Ref. 27] The primary author of the 500 day plan, Shatalin, is also gone from the roster of advisors to the Union President. [Ref. 28] Pro-reform aides have been replaced one at a time, by conservative, acceptable-to-the-hardliners, individuals [Ref. 29]. Bakatin was replaced by Boris Pugo at the Interior Ministry. "Boris Pugo is a very, very tough cookie," says a U.S. Official. "He is somebody who is out there to crush the nationalities." [Ref. 30] This was reported in December of 1990, that is before the crackdown in the Baltics. Pugo's newly appointed deputy is Boris Gromov, an Army General [Ref. 31]. Gromov was commander of the 40th Army in Afghanistan, and involved in planning the repression in Azerbaijan in January of 1990 [Ref. 32]. This was the same, purportedly charismatic, Gromov who, early in 1990, had
voiced strong public opposition to Gorbachev's security policy [Ref. 33]. Gorbachev is evidently coopting some of his critics in his turn to the right. He is making them responsible for nationalities security, something that will be almost impossible to control. This Gorbachev tactic of taking aboard one's critics and using them in precisely the area of which they were critical has at least one precedent [Ref. 34].

2. Presidential Power

Shevardnadze criticized Gorbachev for, among other things, abrogating to himself immense powers [Ref. 35]. Appealing to concerns of chaos, Gorbachev called for increased executive power. "This reasoning [need for a strong man due to the chaotic situation] is being used to justify the recent strengthening of presidential powers...'There are signs of the movement toward chaos, toward anarchy,' Gorbachev told a recent meeting of intellectuals."[Ref. 36] Gorbachev seems to be accumulating these powers in a 'step-back-to-take-two-steps-forward' tactic. "The new powers granted the Presidency form the cornerstone of his short-term strategy...Designed to gather conservative support for an emergency regime to stabilize the situation, it seeks to create a second chance for more measured reform, learning the lessons of the 'first perestroika'."[Ref. 37] In December of 1990, "the
Congress [of People's Deputies] approved virtually the entire package of constitutional amendments sought by the president. The laws create a powerful presidency with both executive and legislative powers. The Cabinet is now subordinate to him rather than to the parliament. A national security council is now formed under the president. And he can now legislate by decree." [Ref. 38] Since the creation of the presidency at the Congress of People's Deputies session in March of 1990, Gorbachev has dramatically increased his constitutionally based power [Ref. 39]. Shevardnadze's fears are understandable given the similarity between Gorbachev's manipulation of the legislative organs and the process leading up to and including the Enabling Act of 23 March 1933 in Germany.

3. Conservative Organs

Along with Gorbachev's increase in power, the institutions he is now using have also gained in strength. "The right camp has regrouped. As the Communist Party's influence faded, the military-industrial complex appeared in the limelight... but today it is starting to bring pressure to bear on the political course of the state." [Ref. 40] The army is now being used alongside police patrols in many cities [Ref. 41]. It has also been granted the right to fire upon civilians in the event that it is threatened [Ref. 42]. The Minister of Defense, Marshall Yazov announced
on November 27th 1991 that the military would use force to protect its installations, monuments and servicemen against threats in the rebellious republics [Ref. 43]. The KGB has been greatly strengthened [Ref. 44]. "It is coolly amassing unprecedented legal authority and wielding ever greater political and economic influence...Gorbachev has given it vast power to combat economic and organized crime, traditionally the Interior Ministry's turf."[Ref. 45] KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky has stated publicly that he believes that the KGB leadership will continue to support Gorbachev because they owe their positions to him. He also noted the "leap in the KGB's importance since last October—and it has grown even more since [former Foreign Minister Eduard] Shevardnadze resigned."[Ref. 46] In addition, the KGB has added several combat divisions to its roster [at a minimum the 103rd Guards 'Vitebsk' airborne division has been added [Ref. 47]], creating in effect an organization independent of the Interior Ministry, with the means of a small army linked to a near monopoly on information [Ref. 48].

4. Media

Of concern to the West is Soviet rhetoric, reminiscent of the Cold War, which is being heard in Moscow. Vladimir Kryuchtov, the KGB chief made allegations that separatist movements in the USSR had foreign backers [Ref. 49]. forces for ideas of dubious value in ameliorating the present
Soviet news reporting has regressed to the point where, "The United States Ambassador to Moscow ... assailed the main Soviet evening television news program for reviving the old practice of blaming foreign interference and connivance for Soviet problems."[Ref. 51] The fact that the Soviet media is saying such things bodes ill for smooth East-West relations. What is worse however is the fact that the government has reasserted control over the media. As someone put it, "The Big Lie is back".[Ref. 52] Leonid Kravchenko, "an orthodox Communist Party bureaucrat" was appointed "head of Gostelradio, the state broadcast-media committee."[Ref. 53] Censorship has returned to the USSR and Glasnost "is the first casualty of Soviet repression."[Ref. 54]

5. Baltic Repression

Important as all of these things are, none of them have the dramatic impact in demonstrating Moscow's turn to the right, that the repression of the Baltic states evokes. The night of 12 January 1991 left 15 dead, 64 missing, and over 100 wounded [Ref. 55]. The aim seems to have been the capture of broadcast media in Vilnius, which was complete by the 14th of January [Ref. 56]. By the 17th of January the army had done little beyond securing the media hubs it captured on the 14th [Ref. 57]. Television was then used to spread the regime's version of events. The actions which resulted in civilian casualties were termed defensive.
In fact, Sajudis guards were blamed for firing first, when Western and other sources at the scene maintain that Soviet troops opened fire on unarmed civilians [Ref. 58]. Leonid Kravchenko, the aforementioned chief of Gostelradio, said that, "Television should not be radicalized, either to the right or the left," and when asked who determines "what is radical and what is middle-of-the-road, he said, 'I do.'"[Ref. 59] What is problematical about this is that uncensored television and radio reports were allowed to broadcast from Kaunas, Lithuania's second largest city [Ref. 60]. Likewise "there has been no concerted move against the legion of foreign journalists that continues to grow."[Ref. 61] The implications of this indicate a less than total commitment to the idea of a substantive crackdown. "If the coup had been serious, telephone and other communications lines would probably have been cut immediately and foreign journalists expelled. But reporters kept arriving in Vilnius throughout the crisis, with the Soviet Foreign Ministry taking a remarkably liberal attitude toward enforcing travel restrictions."[Ref. 62] There seems to have been a dysfunction between the harshness of military measures, running over people with tanks, and the lack of concern of the Foreign Ministry with these events being reported upon.

The attacks were undertaken under the flimsy legitimacy of a 'National Salvation Committee' which requested help from the
army in preventing civil war [Ref. 63]. The group's members were not identified. It has remained a faceless cipher [Ref. 64]. So called "salvation committees" were formed in the other baltic republics [Ref. 65]. Riga has been subject to the predations of pro-communist black beret troops who attacked the Latvian Interior Ministry in Riga, ostensibly because one of their member's sister was raped [Ref. 66]. In Tallinn, bomb explosions rocked the capital of Estonia [Ref. 67]. All these ostensibly unrelated events: the attack on the Vilnius broadcasting station, the attack on the Interior Ministry in Riga, and the bomb explosions in Tallinn, occurred on two subsequent Sundays [Ref. 68]. This seems to have been specifically chosen because most Soviet newspapers do not publish on Sunday or Monday, leaving two days for the repressive forces to act without press reporting and in which they could get the jump on reporting their version of events [Ref. 69].

6. East European Reaction

All of the events related to the crackdown in the Baltics evoked memories of repression in that region and in Eastern Europe and jitters over the similarity of methods. Parallels have been drawn between the Baltic repression and repression in Eastern Europe [Ref. 70]. "The official Soviet explanation for the military intervention in Lithuania...strongly resembles official explanations by
Gorbachev's predecessors of the invasions of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979." [Ref. 71] "Miklos Vasarhelyi, a member of the Hungarian Parliament's foreign relations committee and a veteran of the 1956 revolt" said, "Everybody is a bit afraid, and very cautious." [Ref. 72] Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, while condemning the Soviet measures were very careful to give a measured response, one that would not unduly irritate the USSR [Ref. 73]. The Soviets used a similar tactic in the Baltics that had been used earlier, in that they tried to portray a situation of civil anarchy into which their troops had to be inserted to restore order [Ref. 74]. "The strategy is to create the impression that two popular groups are warring for power in Lithuania, [the Sajudis dominated parliament and the Committee of National Salvation] and that the only solution is for President Mikhail S. Gorbachev reluctantly to impose direct Kremlin rule." [Ref. 75] Commentary in "Soviet Analyst" generalized the behavior into a general recipe for Soviet repression which is discernable in the Baltic case.

"The events in the Baltic have followed the classic pattern of Soviet communist methods: a barrage of lies and disinformation about threats to the safety of lives and the breakdown of order, the emergence of anonymous "Committees of National Salvation" which have "taken power", and whose instructions and requests are then carried out by the armed forces." [Ref. 76]

Given this Soviet use of the same methods that were earlier used to subdue Eastern Europe, East European
nervousness is understandable. At face value this use of the old thinking would seem to undercut East European independence and stability.

B. ANALYSIS

1. Where Stands Gorbachev?

"Soviet Analyst" concludes from all of this that, "There is no way back to the centre-ground for [Gorbachev] - there is no longer any centre-ground. There is also no longer a "Gorbachev reform programme", to which many Western leaders, notably in Germany and Italy, continue to cling, despite all evidence to the contrary."[Ref. 77] The first sentence is probably true but needs some qualification. Gorbachev did not leave the centre-ground, so much as he stuck to his position on the union. "Mr. Gorbachev, even in days when his prestige was higher, has always backed the concept of the current centralized union and insisted the constitutionally guaranteed independence for the constituent parts was an unthinkable option, even for the Baltic republics that were forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940."[Ref. 78]

Gorbachev seems to have been remarkably consistent. "When we look at Mr. Gorbachev in the context of [his] beliefs, ["He has never expressed less than total conviction that a future Soviet Union will be socialist and controlled by the apparat."] his policies take on new coherence."[Ref. 79] In
a televised address politicking for the union referendum, he continued to stick to his position: "All my convictions are based on the preservation of the union".[Ref. 80] Gorbachev's spectrum of acceptable possibilities does not include the implications of the Shatalin plan any more than it includes the independence of the union's constituent republics. The editor of Moscow News, Yegor Yakovlev, regrets Gorbachev's inability to go further down the path of democratization [Ref. 81]. "Describing the current political landscape, some journalists [Soviet Analyst?] say that Yeltsin, Popov and Sobchak are now in the centre while Gorbachev has moved to the right. In actual fact, the President's stance has not changed a bit. What has changed is the political yardstick."[Ref. 82]

One change in the political yardstick is the disarray on the left. "Radical leaders also say the political left is in total disarray and is in no position to resist the drift toward authoritarian rule. They add that democratic institutions are still fragile and could easily crumble."[Ref. 83] Richard Pipes sums up the situation on the left very nicely.

"...unfortunately, democratic forces are divided and poorly organized. They consist of splinter parties gathered around powerful personalities. Attempts to form larger groupings have failed from lack of effective leadership and the fear that enforcing party discipline will lead to Bolshevik-type regimentation. Democratic politicians have gained control of municipal government in about fifty cities, but they face too many urgent problems to concern themselves with national issues."[Ref. 84]
This is not to say that the left is devoid of power. "Democratic Russia, for example, is extremely disorganized...yet this movement...is able to call huge street demonstrations at a moments notice."

[Ref. 85] But the capability to mount demonstrations is entirely different than the power to govern effectively, come to decisions quickly, and implement them effectively. "Even some democratic leftists criticize their own movement for failing to unify itself. Indeed, leaders such as Moscow Mayor Gavril Popov and Leningrad Mayor Anatoly Sobchak rail against the endless parliamentary debates that stymie their governments." We criticize Gorbachev for his wariness vis-a-vis the radical democratic wing of perestroika," commentator Len Karpinsky observed in the liberal weekly Moscow News. "But sometimes I can visualize the man taking stock of the democratic forces which he himself brought into being and which he can now rely on. And I don't think that there are many of them."

[Ref. 86] Notwithstanding Gorbachev's differences of opinion with the radical democrats, as regards the desirability of the Shatalin plan or the breakup of the union, they could not be relied upon to provide him with a sound political foundation. The fight between the old bureaucracies and the new reformists that are in power was not going well for the reformists. Popov and Sobchak are having problems running their respective cities because of the well-entrenched antagonistic municipal bureaucracies, Gorbachev
could not possibly run the union or a federation on the unstable back of like constituencies.

A New York Times reporter described the problems that the Soviets have with implementing reform.

"The Soviet body politic has been neither decisive or consistent in articulating and putting into effect plans to revive an economy that is sick unto death. Many Soviet voters understand the debating aspect of democracy, but not how to proceed to the decision phase. As a result, they have debated, debated, debated about moving to a market economy but have not actually begun to, and stores have become emptier and emptier and emptier."

The reform end of the political spectrum was not a viable alternative for Gorbachev because of its weakness. In light of the lack of an alternative to the conservatives, and keeping in mind the consistency of Gorbachev's views on the union, the 'turn to the right' is not as sinister as it might at first seem. It is not a repudiation of all that has gone before.

2. A Gorbachev Doctrine

The Gorbachev onion has not been peeled to reveal a vintage 1956 Khrushchev, or 1968 Brezhnev. While the Soviet republics are a different matter, he does not seem to covet Eastern Europe. There does seem to be a distinct difference in his mind between the republics and Eastern Europe. "Jettisoning Eastern Europe was not a foreshadowing of what was to happen in the Soviet Union but rather a means of preserving the Soviet Union and its socialist form of society. Letting the Eastern European countries go was different from
allowing any of the states in the original union to secede."[Ref. 87] So, while the language of repression in the Baltics evokes 1956, 1968, and 1979, Gorbachev need not be feared as a proponent of Soviet military control over Eastern Europe. He is a proponent of Soviet control over Soviet territory. In this light he should not be viewed as having changed, or as being an insurmountable obstacle to East European independence.

A Gorbachev Doctrine has emerged but it does not go beyond Soviet Borders [Ref. 88]. The Baltic crackdown "is consistent with at least five other bloody incidents that have soiled Mr. Gorbachev's rule: in Kazakhstan in December 1986, in Georgia in April 1989, in Kokand, Uzbekistan, in August 1989, in Azerbaijan in January 1990, and in Tadzhikistan in February 1990."[Ref. 89] Yes, the Baltics are closer to the East European countries in question, and to the West, than these other republics. Yet one cannot escape the feeling that the West's response to the Baltic repression was greater, than over the crackdowns in the other republics, because of eurocentrism or ethnocentrism. In most of the other cases of the use of force, it was muslims, non-europeans, that were repressed. Events in the Baltics were in fact not much more dramatic than some of these other incidents, such as the use of gas in Georgia [Ref. 90]. The Baltic repression has to be put into perspective. It would be a mistake to interpret it as much
more dangerous to European security than the use of force in Uzbekistan.

This rings true especially when considering the manner in which the 'crackdown' was conducted. Gorbachev would have gotten very poor marks from Krushchev or Brezhnev as regards the attack in the Baltics. The fact that the Kaunas broadcast facilities were permitted to continue objective reporting has already been noted. Speaking of the differences between the East European crackdowns and the Baltic measures a reporter noted that:

"What is different today is that, so far at least, the Soviet Army has not clapped the Lithuanian legislators in jail, arrested President Vyautas Landsbergis, or cut off international telephone and telecommunications links. They are, for the moment, still free to denounce Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet Army's actions, and international news organizations are still able to report what they see in Vilnius to the world."[Ref. 91]

There seems to be a consensus that, despite the horrible deaths, the Baltic attacks were really not much of a crackdown. Another observer stated that:

"On the pragmatic level, the Soviet military did not fully carry out a coup in Lithuania, for it left the elected Parliament still sitting in Vilnius and apparently more popular than ever. If the present confusion of authority continues there, the Kremlin may feel further threatened by a growing popular suspicion that it has grown so inept that it can no longer even impose martial law."[Ref. 92]

Speaking from Vilnius, the same observer wrote that: "The hard-liner's formula, resorting to force to settle political conflicts, has been clumsily and selectively applied and has not returned them to power here."[Ref. 93] Speaking
of the attacks in the Baltics, George Kennan criticized the perspective that would link them to repression in Eastern Europe. "They have not, contrary to the lurid exaggerations that have appeared here and there in the Western press, constituted a serious "crackdown" on the countries in question, comparable to what took place in Hungary in 1956 or in Czechoslovakia in 1968." [Ref. 94]

While down-playing the danger from the repressive measures in the Baltics, Mr. Kennan is concerned by conclusions he draws from the fact that they were not effectively implemented. "The principal significance of these recent episodes has lain rather in the revelation they offer of a state of truly alarming incoherence and lack of coordination in Moscow itself, leading the other Western governments to ask themselves whether any sort of serious and effective central authority exists at all in that city." [Ref. 95]

Kennan is not alone in this concern. A sub-title to a recent article read, "Did Soviet Leader Botch Crackdown?" [Ref. 96]

This questioning of Moscow's grip on events derives from the simple question: Who ordered the crackdown? This question was posed in L'Express. "Crucial question: either the Soviet president ordered the massacre, and perestroika is definitively dead; or he has been outmaneuvered by his military, which indicates that he no longer governs anything. "I was not informed", explained Gorbachev, echoing the responsible ministers, Boris Pugo (Interior) and Dmitri Yazov
In fact, numerous indications lead one to believe that the head of the Soviet Union is only barely in control of the reinstitution of order in the Baltic republics. [Translated by this writer.] [Ref. 97] By saying that either Gorbachev ordered the crackdown or that he is no longer in charge, the writers oversimplify but do manage to get at the heart of the concern over control of the military.

The waffling of the Kremlin over who is responsible for the repression, actually the issue they are unwilling to pin down is who is responsible for the deaths, is causing concern over a lack of authority.

"Today, Mr. Gorbachev said he learned of the deadly assault after the fact and he contended the Lithuanians themselves were to blame in bringing down the army on their heads. His ministers attempted to spare him personal blame, contending that there was no direct order from the Kremlin for the attack. They talked as if the central Government's army has somehow come under control of a hurriedly cobbled Communist front group in Lithuania that operated with neither the knowledge nor blessing of Mr. Gorbachev's office."[Ref. 98]

Gorbachev did change his tone regarding the civilian deaths and express some regret [Ref. 99]. He also promised an investigation into culpability for the deaths [Ref. 100]. At the international level the Foreign Ministry promised the withdrawal of extra troops from the Baltics, [supposedly complete by 30 January 1991 [Ref. 101]], and a return to dialogue and away from violence [Ref. 102]. Gorbachev is backing away from what happened in the Baltics, at the same time that he does not seem to be
entirely displeased with the idea that events may have subdued their independence drive.

3. The Military & The Baltics

The decoupling of the civilian leadership in Moscow and military units in the Baltics seems unexplainable until one considers the role the military has played. There has been evidence of long-term military disaffection with events in the Baltics. The Soviet military press, including "Soviet Military Review" and "Soviet Soldier", has been highly critical of Baltic agitation for greater autonomy [Ref. 103]. The danger to purely military interests posed by such agitation is underlined [Ref. 104]. The Soviet military still seems to be indoctrinating its personnel with the story that the Red Army acted in a legal and protective role in taking over the Baltic states.[Ref. 105] The military was working to set its personnel against Baltic aspirations for some time. Military propaganda seems to be responding to what the military sees as threats, overt opposition to the military, and the indirect threat to the military of breakup of the union. Marshal Akhromeyev himself said that the army "was going to defend the Constitution and the unity of the state."[Ref. 106]

Marshal Yazov's announcement of the Gorbachev approved extension of military powers was at least in part, probably a large part, targeted against the Baltics. The new measures
authorized the seizure of power, water and food installations if local authorities cut them off, as some threatened they would do [Ref. 107]. These and related measures were designed to reinforce the military in its disputes with belligerent republics.

"Gorbachev earlier took steps to appease the Army by issuing a decree voiding any legislation passed by the republics concerning the military. The decree was apparently aimed at the Baltics, where Latvia approved a law last month cutting off supplies to military bases in the republic. Other republics, such as the Ukraine and Russia, which have shown a desire to form their own armies, will also be banned from doing so. Dissatisfaction with Gorbachev's policies had been mounting in the military. Particularly bothersome for the establishment was the fact that thousands of youths in the republics failed to report after being drafted."[Ref. 108]

As part of this empowering of the military so that it could get what it needed, it was able to send 1,000 paratroopers to Vilnius as early as 11 January 1991, to capture draft evaders [Ref. 109]. The president himself seemed to champion the military and warn Lithuania of its power. "Gorbachev called on Lithuania today to halt its defiance of Soviet authority immediately, and warned that "people are demanding" the introduction of direct Kremlin rule of the breakaway republic."[Ref. 110] After the attacks occurred, Gorbachev, Yazov and Pugo all included, in their justifications for the measure, the "persecution of Soviet soldiers and sailors and their families in Lithuania".[Ref. 111] The military had its own

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organizational reasons for the repression and seems to have managed to get a temporary ally out of Gorbachev.

The results of the attacks in the Baltics are very revealing. In Lithuania, the parliament suspended legislation that restricted food and services for the local Soviet Army garrisons [Ref. 112]. In Latvia, the parliament acquiesced to military demands that roadblocks be lifted,[Ref. 113] and adopted a much more conciliatory stance [Ref. 114]. In Estonia, republic and military leaders came to an agreement on conscription in the republic [Ref. 115]. Reporters in Vilnius were told by a Defense Ministry representative, Major General Yuri I. Nauman, that, regarding rumors of an attack on the Lithuanian parliament building, "Such an action will not be taken...the military do not need it."[Ref. 116] The clear implication is that the military acted separately, that it needed to do something, that this did not include attacking the parliament, but that in any case it was solely a military decision as to whether or not to do so. In other words, the military got all that it needed out of the acts of intimidation that it conducted. Supplies to its garrisons were protected, the conscription problem was being worked on in a more constructive way, with the local governments participating in talks and not obstructing any dialogue, and some respect for the military position was injected into the parliaments. The local Baltic

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obstructing any dialogue, and some respect for the military position was injected into the parliaments. The local Baltic military measures were decoupled from the center at Moscow. Gorbachev had already enabled them, through his decrees, to protect themselves and their interests vis-a-vis the republics, as they saw fit.

4. Political Maneuvering

Michael Dobbs from the Washington Post seems to have gotten a solid grasp around the reasons for the 'half-crackdown'.

"According to the semi-official version of events, Gorbachev came under mounting pressure from hardliners at the end of last year to reimpose strong central authority. The disarray among pro-democracy forces meant that it was very difficult for him to resist demands by hard-liners in the Communist Party and army for a crackdown. So he gave these forces—known here as "conservatives"—a free hand to "reimpose order" in Lithuania, the republic that had gone further than any other in rejecting the Soviet constitution. This portrayal of Gorbachev still struggling with the hardliners even as he climbs into bed with them is partly self-serving, designed to reassure the West that the president remains a "good guy" at heart. But it is consistent with Gorbachev's long-standing political stratagem of staking out the middle ground by maintaining a constant balance between opposing political forces. The available evidence suggests that Gorbachev never intended last month's abortive coup in Lithuania to develop into a full-scale military crackdown. Indeed, he may have been banking on a sharp domestic and Western reaction as a way of reining in the hard-liners."[Ref. 117]  

Gorbachev's follow-up to the crackdown: including the aforementioned regret over the casualties, the already noted, announced withdrawal of troops involved in the measures, and also the sending of an emissary to facilitate
normalization, [Ref. 118] lend credence to the idea that he is distancing himself from the military repression. The emissary, "Georgii S. Tarazevich, chairman of the committee on Nationalities and Inter-ethnic Conflicts of the Soviet Parliament, told legislators, "My mission is to give help to the legal government of Lithuania, the Parliament of Lithuania, to return to normal life, to find a way to constructive cooperation among all factions." [Ref. 119] This tone belies the harsh pre-crackdown voice of the central government. Whether Gorbachev is using the crackdown to control the hardliners is impossible to say from this distance, but there is definitely a change in tack from confrontation to conciliation. The conservative tactics may have been discredited, or the army might have gotten, as noted from Major General Nauman's comment, what it wanted.

In discussing the targeting of broadcast facilities for attack in the Baltics, it was noted that foreign reporting was permitted, with the Foreign Ministry being very liberal, one might even think, supportive of it [Ref. 120]. Their presence and their reporting was certainly not welcomed by the military who were compelled to come up with some extravagant lies to dismiss, for example, the charges of tanks running over civilians. "Asked about photographs and witnesses' accounts of tanks running over unarmed civilians, the general [Nauman], quoted one paratrooper as claiming: "One civilian put his leg under the right tread of my tank, and they
photographed him."[Ref. 121] The photograph that the
good general referred to is probably that which appeared on
certainly could have been staged but Western reports clearly
state that civilians had been killed by Soviet tanks
[Ref. 122]. The general's statements did not respond
in any way to the deaths that did occur. Western reporting
could, from the point of view of Soviet conservatives, almost
certainly have been dispensed with. In permitting Western
media coverage of the Baltic repression the Foreign Ministry
was obviously not acting in the way one would expect if
Gorbachev had been captured by the conservatives.

Like the repression in the Baltics, Eduard Shevardnadze's
resignation seemed a dramatic flag, indicating Gorbachev's
right turn. While Bessmertnykh may not be as simpatico to the
West as his predecessor, care has been taken to insist that
his instatement is not evidence of a chill in Soviet foreign
policy. Gorbachev, in a 16 January speech at the Foreign
Ministry, affirmed the continuity of the Soviet Foreign Policy
which had started in 1985 [Ref. 123]. It appears
that Mr. Bessmertnykh was picked with an eye to continuing his
predecessors policies [Ref. 124]. During the
nomination process at the Supreme Soviet Bessmertnykh, "in his
speech and answers to many questions openly and boldly
defended our foreign policy"[Ref. 125] Shevardnadze
himself described Bessmertnykh as a colleague in the
application of new thinking, of the ongoing Soviet foreign policy line [Ref. 126]. Bessmertnykh does owe his new prominence to Gorbachev and new thinking [Ref. 127] but it must be remembered that he served Brezhnev for far longer. He is a bureaucrat weaned on old style Soviet policies, this might make him somewhat more palatable to the hardliners than Shevardnadze was [Ref. 128]. While writing of other personnel shifts, one writer noted a difference with regard to the Foreign Ministry. "Only Shevardnadze's replacement, Alexander Bessmertnykh, represents any degree of reformist thinking, but his appointment appears to be Gorbachev's singular attempt to maintain some connection with the West. The Foreign Ministry seems to stand in limbo, an isolated bastion of political moderates in an increasingly hard-line regime."[Ref. 129] An illustration of this is the attributed "common view at the Soviet Defense Ministry, where complaints about the Foreign Ministry's "softness" are frequently heard."[Ref. 130]

Gorbachev's tendency to go from left to right, his ability to form tactical alliances, to survive politically, is notable [Ref. 131]

"Traditionally, Gorbachev and his entourage are described as the Centre. They really do try to manoeuvre between the left and the right. But how possible is such manoeuvring in a country with no centrist movement? Such a movement cannot emerge without a middle class and the elementary traditions of political compromise. That is why our leaders have to lean on the left today and on the right tomorrow, gravitating towards the latter."[Ref. 132]
Because the left proved itself to be unstable up to the 'Turn to the Right' [Ref. 133], and because the nationalist republican leadership - Yeltsin for example - was unpalatable, Gorbachev did his maneuvering between bureaucratic constituencies and not, as the above writer assumes, between the left and right on a traditional political spectrum. The political spectrum was not a reflection of the power spectrum. The left had little to no power. The power spectrum is shared by the bureaucracies, those of the center no less than those of the republics. The situation is aptly summed up by the title of an article in Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review: "1990 - The Balkanization of Soviet Power." The Soviet situation is described in the article's first few sentences.

"One can no longer talk of a Soviet state, less yet of a reform programme. The past year has seen the Party's carefully developed and husbanded monopoly of power shatter as new bodies, groups, leaders, and constituencies vie to ensure their aspirations and ideologies are represented in the post-Communist order." [Ref. 134]

By giving the military free reign in the Baltics, enabling them to protect their own threatened institutional interests, Gorbachev moved towards the goal he holds in common with the military, the preservation of the union. At the same time the Foreign Ministry was allowed to permit media coverage of the events, undercutting any increase in military power. The two organizations, with their antagonistic programmes, seem to be held in check by each other, with Gorbachev's role insured as
an arbiter. The most skillful organizational player, however, seems to be the KGB.

"The KGB has been equally skillful at cleaning up its present [as it was with its past], minimizing any public association with the violent crackdown by the Soviet military in the Baltics and with trouble in other ethnic hot spots. After 15 people were killed in Vilnius in January, Interior Minister Boris Pugo and Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov were called on the carpet and grilled about the killings by an angry Supreme Soviet in Moscow. While the two squirmed at the podium, Kryuchkov sat quietly at his place, marking work papers from pink and red folders, looking up occasionally to follow the debate and see who was speaking. Mention in the Soviet press of KGB participation in the crackdown came only after it became known that among those killed in Vilnius was a Lieutenant, Victor Shatsiksh, from a KGB spetnaz (special forces) unit. In February, not a single deputy asked Kryuchkov a question during his perfunctory confirmation hearing in the Supreme Soviet."[Ref. 135]

This organization was a strong impetus for perestroika; and while it certainly objects to some of Gorbachev’s reforms, namely the discarding of the vanguard role for the Party, because of its strong Party sympathies; it may have much else that is in common with Gorbachev’s efforts to reform the empire [Ref. 136].

Citing the placement of small detachments of airborne troops in the Baltic, Transcaucasia, and Western Ukraine, ostensibly to round up draft evaders, one analyst interpreted this move as Gorbachev upping the stakes in the struggle between the central authorities and republican governments [Ref. 137]. The military attacks in the Baltics were certainly an escalatory move on the part of these same authorities. The other rambunctious republics certainly must
be reconsidering their positions in the light of the Baltic events. Georgia in particular seems to consider itself next on the list for repression. Zviad K. Gamsakhurdia, the leader of the pro-separatist Georgian Parliament, said, "If they get the Baltics, they'll come and get us...Apparently, it's the military who are deciding things." [Ref. 138] Interior Minister Pugo had assured Gamsakhurdia that the army would not intervene in Georgia, the latter attributed this to the high likelihood of heavy fighting should the army make a move in the republic [Ref. 139]. "The Army isn't doing a thing to stop the fighting," said Arkady Shivkaev, a South Ossetian militia member. "After Lithuania, they are afraid to get involved." [Ref. 140] The army may indeed have gotten its hand slapped because of Lithuania. Gorbachev might have used events there to better control it. This reluctance to get involved might also be because the army is not being threatened as severely in Georgia as it was by measures to cut off local garrisons from supplies which were taken by the Baltic republican governments.

Nevertheless, Moscow does seem to be using similar tactics in Georgia (and elsewhere), creating an atmosphere of chaos, as it did in the Baltics. The Georgians accuse Moscow of fomenting violence among the Ossetians in the republic [Ref. 141]. Disclosures of KGB activities reveal a modus operandi of inciting ethnic violence and chaos in order
to prepare the way for a turn away from reform and towards order-restoring authoritarianism [Ref. 142]. A New York Times editorial stated that, "food shortages are being manipulated to create the impression of chaos" [Ref. 143]. Disruption plays into the hands of the conservatives. "The latter bide their time: the greater the disorder and the more disastrous the state of the economy, the better their chances of regaining power." [Ref. 144] Richard Pipes cites "polls [which] suggest that the prospects for political and economic democracy in the USSR are not at all promising, and that the conservatives have a bigger potential constituency than appears at first sight. Behind the facade of complete renovation, old attitudes survive, as do the forces that hope to profit from them." [Ref. 145] He says that, "people are disenchanted with democracy, perhaps because they had no inkling how much more difficult it is to institute than dictatorship." [Ref. 146] Against this one has to weigh the resiliency of nationalism. At present the scales are tipped in favor of the forces of centralism. However, many, including Richard Pipes [Ref. 147], and George Kennan [Ref. 148], seem to think that the nationalists will and should win out in the end.
C. ASSESSMENT

Given Gorbachev's sea change, from running against the nomenklatura to running with it, what is one to make of it? Is it a hard 180 degree turn? Or is it a tack? That is, is he going back the way he came? Or has he changed course while retaining his ultimate goal? As one can see the record of the 'turn to the right' is extremely ambivalent. The 'crackdown' was not as extreme a reverse as it at first seemed. The Foreign Ministry remains in the hands of a reformist. If Gorbachev is replaced, Mr. Bessmertnykh seems perfectly capable of adjusting to more conservative masters. The military has had its discretionary powers greatly expanded, but seems (like the Interior Ministry) to have been burned in the Baltics. The KGB remains untouched by those events and probably has a hand in stirring up problems in the republics. This mixed bag of trends does not indicate a 180 degree course change. Gorbachev does indeed seem to have formed a tactical alliance with the conservatives. He, like they, wants to preserve the union. Gorbachev ran into some headwinds, the nationalist-republican resistance, such that he could not make headway. He had to tack. He had to change direction. That has meant turning away somewhat from his goal but this does not mean that, in his own mind, he is not heading towards it. A sailboat sailing into the wind cannot go directly towards its objective. It has to turn back and forth until it finally achieves its destination. Gorbachev is the same.
Speaking to this, "President Mikhail S. Gorbachev declared today [22 Jan.91] that the confrontation in the Baltic states did not mark any change in his policies, and he rejected accusations that he had abandoned his reformist course..."The events of recent days were used by certain circles to aggravate the situation under the pretext of a purported turn to the right and the danger of dictatorship," Mr. Gorbachev said. "I resolutely rebuff these allegations. The achievements of perestroika, democratization and glasnost were and remain eternal values, which presidential power will protect."[Ref. 149] The goal, perestroika, remains the same. Speaking of Gorbachev's accumulation of power, a presidential aide Georgy Shakhnazarov said, "Without this, it is impossible to stabilize the situation or reform the economy...The president is strengthening his powers only in order to protect democracy and perestroika [restructuring], the cause of his whole life."[Ref. 150]

Keeping in mind the fragility of the reformist left on the Soviet political spectrum, even some reformist personalities are in accordance with the need for authoritarian measures.

"Others, including many liberal intellectuals, endorse the view that democratic institutions are too weak to protect the process of reform at this moment...Liberal historian Nodari Simonia compares the Soviet Union to countries such as South Korea or Spain, which used strongman rule to modernize and gradually democratize. "In transitional periods, you need authoritarian regimes to carry out the process of democratization, " he contends. Vladimir Sokolov, writing in a recent issue of the liberal weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta, argues that a combination of military and presidential power are needed to put market
reforms into effect. He compares this to the role of the United States military occupation of Japan and West Germany after World War II."[Ref. 151]

Igor Kliamkin and Andranik Migranian hold, and have publicly expressed, similar views [Ref. 152]. These independent writers all seem to agree that a turn to authoritarianism is not necessarily a bad thing. It does not necessitate a rejection of perestroika. Gorbachev may not be doing things inside the USSR that meet Western approval, but if he is able, following his tack to the right, will come a tack to the left.

Despite Gorbachev's domestic maneuvering, he is still the leader that enabled Eastern Europe to go its own way. This discussion should provide the basis for an understanding that recent Soviet domestic events do not necessarily preclude international accord. Gorbachev does not have to be an obstacle to East European independence. European stability is not precluded by recent events, once one gets beyond the alarmist reaction that naturally occurs when Soviet tanks are on the move.
III. THE SOVIET MILITARY

This chapter, on the increase in the Soviet military voice in internal and external affairs, is in effect a subset of the first chapter on the turn to the right. Whether the apparent increase in military power is cause for the turn to the right, or whether the reverse is true is impossible to say and really a moot point. What can be noted is the relative congruence in time between the two events. The military had been suffering from a tremendous decrease in prestige. Glasnost seems to have opened the floodgates of criticism over issues of hazing, the Afghanistan debacle, ethnic problems, the costs of defense, military reform, and the military role in quelling internal unrest [Ref. 153]. Along with these internal events, external events have also been threatening. The breakup of the Warsaw Pact [Ref. 154], and the renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the loss of Eastern Europe have been hard blows [Ref. 155]. The criticism and the changes to the European status quo have led to what has been described as a "'besieged fortress' psychology now prevailing in garrisons scattered all over the country [which] is exceptionally dangerous today." This "makes the military ask for extreme rights."[Ref. 156] These demands for extreme rights have apparently been granted to some extent, as noted previously in the granting of extraordinary powers to the military, and the free reign given them in the Baltics.
One question needs to be addressed before proceeding; why the close perusal of the military and not the KGB? The KGB, as noted, has gained in power and has seemingly maintained a better profile throughout the repression process. The focus is on the military because it was largely through that instrument that Soviet hegemony was maintained in Eastern Europe. The demise of the East European regimes can be dated from the time that it was made known that the USSR, under Gorbachev, would not militarily support them. The bottom line for Soviet influence in Europe, and especially Eastern Europe was, and will be, their military threat. It is in this light that the Soviet high command's relative power in the USSR, and its worldview are critical. In the domestic Soviet arena the relationship between the generals and Gorbachev, who despite internal conservatism seems to retain his "new thinking", has repercussions for Europe. In the Foreign Policy arena, given the senior military officers' greater voice, their point of view becomes correspondingly more important. The first section of this chapter discusses pertinent issues of internal civil-military relationships in the USSR. The second section discusses the military elite's agitation in the foreign policy arena. The third addresses aspects of the military worldview of importance to Eastern Europe. The goal is to come to some understanding of the impact that a seemingly greater military voice has on Soviet-Western relations.
A. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The KGB - early-Gorbachev alliance in starting perestroika has already been mentioned. The military and the early-Gorbachev seem to have shared a similar relationship for much the same reasons. "The high command supported Mr. Gorbachev's restructuring agenda precisely because it responded to the military's long-standing concerns. Perestroika promised to deliver what the military needed: a modern economy, capable of producing the requisite quantity and quality of high-tech weaponry, and a healthy society, able to produce educated, fit, and motivated citizens to man the new weapons. Concurrently, Gorbachev's global initiatives were to stabilize the international environment, grant the USSR access to Western technology, and constrain the United States from racing ahead to field its technological edge. In short, perestroika promised to give the Soviet armed forces a most precious commodity: the time to rebuild and to remain competitive."[Ref. 157]

The military seemed to have asked, 'What is to be done?' back in the early 1980's. Their answer seems to have run parallel to the conclusion that Gorbachev came up with a few years later.

"Five years before Gorbachev made perestroika a household word, Marshall of the Soviet Union Nikolay V. Ogarkov appealed for 'perestroika' of the Soviet Armed Forces and, in support of their mobilization and warfighting readiness, for restructuring of 'the entire economy, [as well as] political, societal, scientific, and other institutions'. While the similarity in terminology is
interesting in itself, the conceptual consistency between Ogarkov's 1982 blueprint and Gorbachev's much more comprehensive model is compelling. What is perhaps most striking about Ogarkov's agenda for change is the urgency and cogency of his argument, reflecting the conviction that the USSR simply has no other alternative but to reform - or else fall hopelessly behind. It is that same urgency - driven by similar convictions - which resonates so clearly in Gorbachev's perestroika."[Ref. 158]

Marshal Akhromeyev seems to have pursued Ogarkov's line of reasoning, although probably more circumspectly than his predecessor. Ogarkov's role seems to be minimal but the two of them are purportedly advisors to Gorbachev [Ref. 159]. Defense Minister Yazov and Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev are both said to be adherents of Ogarkov's ideas [Ref. 160]. The basic congruence between the military reformers and Gorbachev, their continued presence at his side, and their common point of view with regard to internal policies; all point towards continued military influence with Gorbachev. And this despite divergences over past foreign policy moves which have seemingly been laid at Shevardnadze's door.

It is not only in foreign policy that there has been divergence between Gorbachev and the highest military officers. In general terms what seems to have occurred is a fracture between the military and the civilian leadership along the military-technical and socio-political dividing line of Soviet military doctrine. Gorbachev's and Ogarkov's visions of a renewed and strengthened socio-political base upon which
to build a solid military-technical future were remarkably consonant.

"Basic agreement seems to exist among the Soviet political and military leadership on the broad aspects of the social-political component of doctrine... However, general agreement on terms and broad concepts does not necessarily equate to commonality of meaning and application in practice. In December 1987, Marshall Akhromeev, former Chief of the General Staff, indicated that while there was agreement on the political aspects of the new doctrine, the military-technical aspects pose 'complex and fundamental questions, the correct answer to which is of great theoretical and practical significance."[Ref. 161]

It is in the military-technical branch of Soviet doctrine that differences emerge. The military elite see it as their bailiwick and they resent the meddling of others,[Ref. 162] especially the institutchiki [Ref. 163] and the Foreign Ministry. It is in the implications that one draws from perestroika that differences emerge between the civilian and the military reformers. While agreeing in their overall assessments as to force reductions in 1988 "the General Staff and the political leadership held divergent opinions when it came to actually executing the force cuts."[Ref. 164] Gorbachev's reliance on political guarantees vice military strength for security has not been fully swallowed by the high command [Ref. 165]. It continues to emphasize the modernization and development of its forces as the guarantor of Soviet security [Ref. 166]. Reasonable Sufficiency and Defensive Defense do not seem to mean the same
thing to the military elite and the civilian reformers [Ref. 167]. "A recent article in the Soviet defense newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda questioned the wisdom of Soviet military doctrine that concentrates primarily on defensive actions." [Ref. 168] These differences seem to continue to the present.

However recently, probably as a result of Gorbachev's need for the military in holding the union together, he has been more supportive and less critical of the armed forces. William Odom noted this change.

"Gorbachev has begun to back-pedal on making the military put up with public abuse. For example, he recently stated in a talk to Komsomol congress delegates that a volunteer army is precluded for the present because of the large costs it would entail. After the army met public resistance to call-ups for units used in repressing the Popular Front in Azerbaijan in January 1990, his language toward the military has become more conciliatory (and he even promoted Yazov to Marshal of the Soviet Union on May Day 1990)." [Ref. 169]

Gorbachev's self-criticism made during his 12 December 1990 speech, "Perestroika is Marked by Pitfalls" [Ref. 170], to the Congress of People's Deputies, is further evidence of back-pedaling. "We underestimated the depth of our society's crisis. Insufficiently grounded and hasty decisions were taken during the implementation of our economic and political reforms. The emerging dangers were not always correctly and promptly addressed. We were not sufficiently resolute in our efforts to prevent them from turning into negative phenomena." [Ref. 171] Gorbachev seemed
to be trying to defuse criticism, much of it from the military
"By the time of the Twenty-eighth Party congress in
July...attacks by military leaders on Gorbachev's security
policies had assumed a virulence unprecedented in Soviet
history."[Ref. 172], at the same time as he soothed military
sensibilities.

"There is also the question of our armed forces. They are
responsible for the defence of our state. The Army is an
important bulwark of the country's state sovereignty and
its internal and external stability. It is now living
through a period of in-depth reforms and requires utmost
attention and care. I believe that it is essential from
this platform to resolutely denounce any mud-slinging and
discrimination against our armed
forces."[Ref. 173]

It seems unlikely that Gorbachev will be successful in
wooing the high military echelons to himself once more. He had
their support early in the perestroika program only to lose it
as the implications for the military of the road Gorbachev was
travelling became clear. "Officers who appeared sympathetic to
his broad objectives at an earlier stage in the reform process
have watched in dismay as he has embraced progressively more
radical initiatives, some of which run counter to the
intrinsic interests of the military establishment."[Ref. 174]
The high command is unlikely to trust Gorbachev again. At the
moment they seem to recognize a congruence of interest with
him in maintaining the integrity of the union. At some
possible future date, if the union survives, they are likely
to regard continued cooperation with Gorbachev as contrary to
their interests. Both sides are fellow travellers now, but in those moments when immediate events do not fill their field of view, they all must see an eventual fork in the road they are following. With a secured union, Gorbachev would probably continue with his interrupted plans of perestroika and new thinking. The military elite must look to a less radical future of gradual reform.

As noted earlier the two sides started off together with remarkably similar conceptions of what needed to be done. During the course of events they separated. The military was understandably threatened by some of Gorbachev's initiatives. Now they are cooperating again under the rubric of preserving the union. Yet, as has been intimated, this new arrangement is qualitatively different. From the military point of view, Gorbachev created the rupture by going too far in his program. Stephen Foye has written about the civil-military arrangements under previous Soviet leaders, and the effects of Gorbachev's changes upon it.

"Despite tensions during the Khrushchev years, civil-military relations in the postwar period seem to have been relatively harmonious. This probably had less to do with the Party's methods of control than with its willing embrace of a militarized economy and a confrontational foreign policy. Particularly under Brezhnev, a "social contract" appears to have been fashioned on the basis of this Marxist-Leninist world view, benefiting the defense community and several other elite groups, including the Communist Party apparatus itself. Gorbachev's perestroika program abrogated that "social contract"." [Ref. 175]
Perestroika seemed to promise the military, faced as they were with an apparently undesirable future, with the possibility of a renewed social contract once the country restructured itself. However the pitfalls of perestroika that Gorbachev mentioned in his speech [Ref. 176], were threatening to the military elite. With the old civil-military arrangement broken, and the consensus over perestroika lost, the military is becoming more of an independent actor. There is a present tie to Gorbachev in an alliance to save the union, but this is tactical. There seems to be a time limit to it. It will expire once the union's future is assured. The long-standing and stable civil-military ties of the past are gone. The generals have been burned once by trusting Gorbachev's reforms. It will probably play a role increasingly defined by what it sees as its' institutional interests and the interests of the state as it sees them.

With Gorbachev siding with the military on the issue of its prestige, and calling for support for it during this period of military reform, it seems highly likely that the military will get its way in deciding on the direction of those reforms. The much commented upon debate over defense policy [Ref. 177] seems to have been resolved in favor of the military participants in that debate. As mentioned earlier, Gorbachev has reined in Glasnost and made it clear that criticism of the military is no longer tolerable. As a result, the opinions of the so called
institutchiki seem to matter much less now. Their adoption of Robert McNamara's criterion of 400 equivalent megatons (EMT) as reasonable sufficiency to deter nuclear attack has apparently gone by the wayside [Ref. 178]. The same seems true for the idea of a military force capable only of defensive combat actions [Ref. 179]. It is the General Staff version of 'reasonable sufficiency' (nuclear parity not 400 EMT) and 'defensive defense' (not entirely defensive) that seem to have won out against the more favorable, to the West, civilian versions.

The Soviet military looks for parity in forces with the West [Ref. 180] so further unilateral force reductions are less likely. "In a long commentary on military doctrine, published Monday [4 Mar.'91] in the Army daily Red Star, the Soviet tank force chief, Marshal Oleg Losik, attacked liberals who call for a smaller military and argued the Soviet Union must maintain nothing less than absolute parity with the West."[Ref. 181] Reasonable Sufficiency is not likely to be as comforting to the West in reality as it sounds. Likewise defensive defense will probably have more of a counteroffensive capability, given military druthers [Ref. 182].

Speaking to several developments in the structural changes undergone by the military under the frontispiece of perestroika, one analyst came to unsettling conclusions. He examined the effect of the removal of a tank regiment from
Soviet tank divisions, the roughly 300 percent increase in self-propelled artillery and 200 percent increase in infantry fighting vehicles in Soviet MRDs, and the switch from concentration of mass to concentration of firepower to achieve breakthroughs [Ref. 183].

"In sum, the Soviets are in the process of restructuring their forces into true combined arms formations, as opposed to the tank and motor rifle divisions which they had in the past. These formations are structured so as to meet Soviet military doctrine, which the Soviets have described as 'defensive' ever since the foundation of the USSR over 70 years ago. In today's milieu, however, what must be considered is the overall trend in the Soviet military. Pronouncements by the Soviets that their units are being restructured into strictly defensive forces cannot be taken at face value considering the spectacular increases in firepower and the Soviet use of massed fire to achieve breakthroughs now being discussed by authorities such as General Vorobyev."[Ref. 184]

Soviet Military Power 1990 addressed this issue in discussing the highly publicized defensive reorganization of Soviet ground forces. "What has not been widely publicized is the fact that the new structure is a well-balanced combat force featuring a significant increase of artillery systems, armored infantry fighting vehicles, and personnel."[Ref. 185]

Soviet commentators have underlined the peaceful nature of Soviet security policy since 1917 [Ref. 186]. The terms 'Reasonable Sufficiency' and 'Defensive defensive' should carry the same dubious connotations for Westerners that peaceful coexistence once held. With the high command in the
driver's seat of military reform the West should not feel comfortable with these terms no matter how often they are spouted.

The military has regained control of the armed forces reform process and has cleared the other parties to the defense debate from the table. The loss of more moderate voices in the discussion is an unhappy result for the unhindered exercise of East European independence, and for greater European security. There are other pernicious influences upon resulting from the increased influence of the military establishment in external affairs.

B. RENEGADE MILITARY FOREIGN POLICY

The most alarming development for prospects of European security agreements is evidence that the Soviet military is conducting it's own foreign policy. A most striking example of this was the nuclear test conducted at Novaya Zemlya. 'New Times' expressed reservations about this and about the Army's private agenda.

"Society needs a good, reliable Army. It wants to be sure that military secrets do not disguise negligence. Society wants to know whether current military doctrine corresponds to the policy of the state and the president. Can society be sure that the Army serves the state and is controlled by the parliament, if neither local nor Russian Republic authorities were informed in advance about the recent nuclear test on Novaya Zemlya? It is hard to believe that the Kremlin would have agreed to this nuclear muscle flexing which damaged the prestige of this country's leadership on the eve of the signing of important disarmament accords."[Ref. 187]
The point was made earlier that military doctrine does not and probably will not, given military influence, reflect what was meant by reasonable sufficiency and defensive defense when the terms were coined. The most recent Novaya Zemlya blast seems to be evidence, like the inconsistencies in the Baltic repression, of Defense and Foreign Ministry infighting. The Ministry of Defense seems to have been trying to undercut diplomatic disarmament initiatives. If the USSR had abided by the spirit of the CFE agreement then it would have had to submit to enormous arms cuts. These would have entailed reductions of: 11,748 tanks, 5,125 artillery pieces, 12,320 armored combat vehicles, 3,040 aircraft, and 1,350 helicopters [Ref. 188]. If they had come through and cut these arms, then Western security assessments would have had to include some measure of Soviet good faith. Such a drastic cut would have demonstrated a massive Soviet investment in the CSCE process and in integration into Europe and a foundation for common security. CFE would have been the example par excellence of the type of political solution to security problems that the Soviet military finds so unacceptable. The fact that the Soviet high command is looking after its own narrow interests has been shown by public denunciations of the CFE treaty by Soviet generals who view it as detrimental to the Soviet military position in Europe [Ref. 189]. The military used the two year treaty negotiating period to conduct an end run around its provisions.
In the course of the negotiations the Soviet military transferred "thousands of weapons East of the Urals into Soviet Asia. Since the equipment was not in Europe when the data exchange took place ...[18 November 1990]...the Soviets are not bound by the treaty to destroy it."[Ref. 190] John Mendelsohn, deputy director of the Arms Control Association, has argued over the real significance of these Soviet equipment transfers. "At the very least, the Soviet equipment is out of the European theater, so that any massing of forces for attack would involve a long cumbersome undertaking...You do not drive tanks from beyond the Urals to the front lines."[Ref. 191] SACEUR, General John Galvin, has a different point of view. While the Soviets might need time to breakout of the CFE treaty using troop movements from outside the ATTU area, General Galvin is concerned with the reaction time of the western democracies to initial Soviet measures. He stated that the West would have 30 days to prepare for an assault once Soviet troops moved West of the Urals.[Ref. 192]

Soviet Military Power '90 estimated that about 7,000 Soviet tanks had been moved outside the CFE limitations area [Ref. 193]. There are about 300 tanks in a maneuver division [tank or motorized rifle division (MRD)] [Ref. 194]. Theoretically the 7,000 tanks could be formed into roughly 23 tank divisions or MRDs, a substantial force. More recent information, reportedly from the director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, asserts that 10,000 tanks, 4,000 other armored vehicles, and 20,000 artillery pieces have been shifted east of the Urals to avoid destruction under the CFE agreement [Ref. 195]. General Galvin's worries are understandable given the magnitude of the equipment stockpiled.

The Soviets seem to be continuing to pull equipment from the Atlantic to the Urals [ATTU] area [Ref. 196]. There is also some feeling in the Bush administration that the Soviets are understating their force levels in the ATTU region [Ref. 197]. "Western spokesmen say their intelligence shows that the Soviet Union still has a number of formations in place that its spokesmen said had been disbanded or removed."[Ref. 198] Without a clear, mutually agreed upon level of troops in the region as of 18 November 1990, the Soviet military can continue to withdraw equipment from the area with impunity. They have subverted the whole point of having a deadline after which forces in the area were to have been counted and destroyed if above the agreed to limits. Further high command bad faith is evidenced by their attempt to save three divisions by reclassifying them as coastal defense units, naval units, and so exempt from CFE related ceilings [Ref. 199]. That the Soviet negotiating posture was patently obstructionist was attested to by a Western diplomat privy to the negotiations. "Since the Soviets weren't really making it possible for us to do much
substantive work we decided that the schedule of meetings should reflect that". [Ref. 200] The military seems to be putting the brakes on substantive arms cuts. The Bush Administration has taken the slowdown in arms control negotiations to be a reflection of the resurgence in the Soviet military [Ref. 201]. Soviet military actions are a strong countercurrent to Foreign Ministry policies.

It is not only through a sub rosa, renegade foreign policy that the military is flexing its recovered influence. The military establishment is muscling the Foreign Ministry out of the official arms control process. It is trying to regain some of the influence lost to the 'new thinkers' in the early Gorbachev years. The backhanded military influence on foreign policy, as with the Novaya Zemlya blast, is now coupled with greater input directly into the foreign policy process.

"Baker may be feeling nostalgic for the days of former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who led the arms control talks and was able to deliver important concessions from the military. But since Mr. Shevardnadze resigned in December under pressure from conservatives, Foreign Ministry officials privately complain they no longer have such clout...That was confirmed by the unusual decision to place the Soviet arms control delegation during the Baker visit under the direction of Gen. Mikhail Moiseyev, the armed forces chief of general staff, rather than a Foreign Ministry official." [Ref. 202]

The military elite, acting in its own interests, or those it perceives as the state's interests, is undercutting the administration's, the president's, foreign policy with its own agenda. They are undercutting the foreign policy that let Eastern Europe go free. The high command's views on Eastern Europe go free. The high command's views on Eastern
Europe have become more pertinent as its influence has increased and as its semi-autonomous foreign policy role has become evident. The fact that the enemy of East European independence, the Soviet military, is acting independently and counter to reformist policies could serve as an inhibiter to East European exercise of independence. The Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, and Hungarians in any attempt to join Europe will be negatively influenced by the growth in Soviet military importance and the concomitant decline of the Soviet reformists in foreign policy. This subversion and supplantation of the more moderate Foreign Ministry stance in Soviet Foreign Policy bodes ill for Western security, and specifically for the possibility that it might be able to extend its umbrella over the East European states.

C. SOVIET MILITARY AND EASTERN EUROPE

The conservatives in the USSR clearly see Soviet interests as intimately tied up with events in Eastern Europe.

"As the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party labored over their future course today, they confronted the tumult of Eastern Europe as a lesson and a threat. Throughout a day of impassioned debate, fears of Eastern Europe surfaced again and again - stark fears that the new shape of Europe, and especially Germany, could menace Soviet security". [Ref. 203]

The civilian conservatives seem to see a shift of political clout away from the USSR. In addition, the military sees a continuing threat from NATO and the West, making the impetus for military reform more cautious [Ref. 204].
"As envisaged by the high command, military reform is to be implemented cautiously, "so as not to harm, even for one minute, the nation's defense capacity and the armed forces combat readiness."[Ref. 205] The perceived NATO threat will almost certainly continue to be a justification for calls for military parity and an obstacle for arms control efforts. Chief of the General Staff, "Moiessev remained cautious in his personal appraisal of the Western threat. He warned that "the aggressive orientation of imperialist policy has been maintained." He also charged that the United States remained intent on equipping its troops with the "most modern technologies" and weapons systems, and that countering these advances would be both difficult and time consuming for the Soviet Armed Forces."[Ref. 206]

A common refrain is that the West is trying to deal with the USSR from a position of strength. Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Yazov, after listing various U.S. defense programs in an interview, concluded that, "It's logical to assume that the objectives are to give the U.S. the "position of strength," to inspire fear in the Soviet Union and to demonstrate America's ability to conduct offensive operations on a global scale."[Ref. 207] As says the Defense Minister, so says the Ministry. This "view [of the West] inspires the Defense Ministry's draft military reform plan. "There is no guarantee against the irreversibility of the positive changes in the world." the draft warns. A careful analysis, [Major
General Sergei Bogdanov [head of the center for operations and strategic research of the General Staff] says, yields the conclusion that NATO and the US continue to operate "from a position of strength." Despite the "dramatic change" in Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. NATO forces are unchanged. "and it is quite dangerous to us." [Ref. 208] Likewise Marshal Akhromeyev bemoans 'NATO's unchanged structure'. "I don't understand why under present conditions the Americans preserve a military organization like NATO and refuse to carry on reductions of naval forces - while the Soviet Union is reducing all other kinds of arms." [Ref. 209] As if to highlight Soviet concerns, the impressive American showing in the war with Iraq has only heightened Soviet concerns [Ref. 210]. A large part of Soviet military resistance to the CFE treaty seems to stem from its contention that the loss of the erstwhile Pact allies constitutes a net increase for the West such that NATO's strength is 150 to 200 % greater than that of the USSR [Ref. 211]. The Soviet military seems to be weighing the loss of the Warsaw Pact [Ref. 212], the troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, and the unilateral cuts, against the perception that NATO has not changed but has even been strengthened by the addition of the former GDR [Ref. 213].

The picture that emerges of the Soviet high command's worldview is one of nostalgia for the perceived better
security of the past, and skepticism that perestroika's political solutions to security problems are beneficial.

"Asked by a Soviet interviewer in February [1990] whether withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland would not "bring harm to our defense," Lieutenant General Igor Sergeyev responded bluntly: "Undoubtedly. Parity was calculated on the existing status quo. Defensive doctrine counts on the present grouping and deployment of troops. As we lose space, we come closer to danger. If under parity someone loses, that means someone else gains. The impending changes in the Warsaw Pact certainly are a loss for us from the military point of view. And all the theoretical dissertations about replacing a military-political alliance with a political-military one are little consolation."[Ref. 214]

Sergeyev's point of view reflects the attitude apparently held by most of the high command. The fact that parity is still held to be of paramount importance in the security equation, as the general notes, implies a zero-sum understanding of the Soviet security dilemma. Sergeyev points this out so that no one can be mistaken. The democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe are perceived to be a loss by the Soviet military [Ref. 215]. Generals Makashov and Rodionov have publicly bemoaned "the loss of our allies in Europe".[Ref. 216] The "Southern Group of Forces political chief Major General Ivan Mikulin...echoed Makashov's charge that reform had surrendered Eastern Europe to its ideological foes."[Ref. 217] A neutralization or Finlandization of Eastern Europe might be a loss to the Soviet military but it would minimize any gain to the West. This worldview stands as an obstruction to any sort of East-West European security rapprochement.

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Coupled with the resurgence of the right, the most alarming news to come out of the USSR with regard to Eastern Europe has been Shevardnadze's revelation that the conservatives advocated the use of force in 1989. He said of this that, "There was of course an alternative...We were quite actively pushed to use force, that is to resurrect the doctrine under which a crisis of power in one country of the 'socialist community' must be overcome by military intervention from the others. In other words, we were being told to act, according to the scenarios of 1953, 1956 and 1968".[Ref. 218] The idea that those conservatives who lobbied for the firm application of the Brezhnev doctrine in 1989 are probably now in situations of increased power is chilling. However, others have written that, "Even Shevardnadze's outspoken military critics do not call for a rollback to the old days".[Ref. 219] While no one, not even the conservatives, might seriously be considering a true rollback, a return to the Brezhnev doctrine; their previous willingness to use force in Eastern Europe is disconcerting. While not perhaps thinking of retaking Eastern Europe, "Soviet military hard-liners are now talking about repairing Shevardnadze's "mistakes.""[Ref. 220]

The retention of the alternative to use force mixed with the conservatives sense of loss of Eastern Europe is a dangerous brew. Colonels Alksnis and Petrushenko, with the tacit approval of the high command, are voicing the military
elite perspective on the foreign policy which let Eastern Europe go [Ref. 221]. "Alksnis accuses Gorbachev and Shevardnadze of selling out Soviet interests to the United States, of helping to "eliminate the Soviet Union as superpower in the world arena. And this is all being achieved without the use of force"...[The West] "used to think of the Soviet Union as Upper Volta with missiles. Now they think of us just as Upper Volta. No one fears us."[Ref. 222] From this point of view any substantive European-wide initiatives which brought the new democracies closer to the West and further along the road to democratization would be a slap in the face. The previously noted East European fears resulting from the Baltic repression must have been music to these conservative ears which had previously registered a lack of respect.

The military retains an emotional commitment to Eastern Europe and their prestige linked to the role of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War, an attitude which will be almost impossible to eradicate [Ref. 223]. General Makashov "complained that, "because of the so-called victories of our diplomacy, the Soviet army is being driven without a fight out of countries that our fathers liberated from fascism." Admiral Gennadii Khvatov, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, declared: "We have no allies in the West. We have no allies in the East: Consequently, we are back where we were in 1939.""[Ref. 224] An article written by a Soviet Army major to
New Times entitled "Save our tanks!" is an example of the zero-sum, continued-NATO-threat, compromise-is-weakness, visceral military opposition to security reform which seems to be prevalent in the upper echelons. "Aren't we being too generous in selling off our national might? Will we feel better if our poverty is aggravated by helplessness in the world arena? Why did the Soviet team at the Vienna talks agree that the USSR should retain thirty percent of its total ceiling of conventional armaments deployed in Europe, as had been suggested by NATO and stop insisting on the forty percent?" [Ref. 225] The major fears that the "new thinkers" are giving away the store [Ref. 226]. These attitudes, hostile as they are to political solutions to the USSR's perceived security problems, would find much to disagree with in East European movement towards the West. Such a move would almost certainly be seen as hostile and aggressive.

Interestingly enough the major says that, "One NATO tank crew consisting of professional soldiers is capable of challenging 2 to 3 Soviet tanks with unprofessional crews. And in modern warfare people are the decisive factor! Which side will have more tanks as a result then?", and he points out that 5,000 German vehicles blew by 20,000 Soviet ones in 1941 [Ref. 227]. The results of the Gulf war inevitably must have reinforced this last opinion. Retired General Odom, U.S. Army, seems to share this view. "What the Gulf war shows
them [the Soviets] is that the training competency required for soldiers and field-grade officers is not easy to obtain—and, when you have it, it's awesome...You are not going to deal with" an army of this kind with "two year draftees."" [Ref. 228] The high command may be retaining its numbers advantage over NATO because it recognizes NATO superiority and the need to counter it with numbers.

The East Europeans and Soviet reformists are concerned over the conservative perspective on Eastern Europe and over the conservative comeback.

"Andrei Kozyrev, the liberal Foreign Minister of the Russian Republic, warned, "If the forces of darkness prevail in the Soviet Union, Central Europe is next on their agenda." In Poland, Lech Walesa sees a "deadly threat" on the horizon. The First Deputy Minister of Interior of Czechoslovakia, Jan Ruml, warns of "the state terrorism of Soviet forces, which, under certain circumstances, could destabilize the situation in the former Communist countries." Although Moscow may be economically and politically too weak to crush these new democracies, its capacity to create instability is considerable...What lends credence to Central European concerns most is the Soviet debate about who "lost" eastern Germany and the rest of what was the Soviet bloc...Having experienced upheaval at home and retreat abroad, hard-liners also want the Soviet Union treated with respect. They want no more anti-communist rhetoric from former allies, no declarations of support for Lithuania, no talk about joining NATO [emphasis added]. To heal the country's wounded pride, they call for a large dose of Soviet assertiveness abroad."[Ref. 229]

It would appear, from our discussion of military attitudes and from Mr. Gati's analysis, that the very stability of the East European countries is threatened.
Considering Gorbachev's turn to the right, in Chapter II, led to the conclusion that the repression in the Baltics did not of itself portend badly for overall European security. This subsequent examination of increasing Soviet military power and of the high command's stance with regard to Eastern Europe leads to the assessment that arms control accords, and East-West rapprochement might not be easily accomplished. The section on civil-military relations revealed a continuing antipathy between Gorbachev and the military elite in Foreign Policy, despite their collusion on internal policies. The sections on the independent foreign policy conducted by the military, and its feeling of loss over Eastern Europe point towards prolonged high command resistance to East European independence and stability.
IV. WITHDRAWAL & LEVERAGE

A. WITHDRAWAL

The sense of loss of Eastern Europe felt by the military elite is engendered by their withdrawal from the region. The military position on parity with the West, and its objections to Gorbachev’s giving up of Soviet capabilities without commensurate NATO measures have already been examined. Their opposition to the reformist course in Eastern Europe was further aggravated by the results of the 1989 revolutions.

"Gorbachev established a two-year timetable for the Soviet reductions, but before that period was even half finished, the rapid pace of political change in the region overtook them. That was when the new rulers in Czechoslovakia and Hungary demanded that all Soviet military forces be withdrawn from their countries. Instead of the 50,000-strong reduction in the Group of Forces anticipated by the Soviet General Staff in 1988, the generals were now committed to pulling out three times that number of first-line troops." [Ref. 230]

This apparently unforeseen side-effect of novoi myslenie, (new thinking), exacerbated military opposition to Gorbachev.

"There were two major consequences of this [withdrawals]. On the one hand, it led to increasingly vocal opposition to Gorbachev's security policy by members of the High Command...By the time of the Twenty-eighth Party Congress in July, the withdrawal from Eastern Europe was under way, and attacks by military leaders on Gorbachev's security policies had assumed a virulence unprecedented in Soviet history...the officer corps spent the first half of 1990 struggling with the strategic and organizational implications of the withdrawal from Eastern Europe". [Ref. 231]
The pullback to Soviet territory of the Groups of Soviet Forces was the touchstone for discontent over other military related matters. In addition, it was the rapidity, the perceived precipitous nature of the reductions which so alarmed the high command. "Also, certain officers, specifically Generals Tretyak and Chabanov go so far as to criticize the current doctrinal orientation towards "defensive" arms and the counter-offensive limited to the retaking of national territory, while contesting the rapidity of unilateral Soviet troop reductions in Eastern Europe."(Translation by this writer.), [Ref. 232] The Soviet generals seem to be looking for an "orderly withdrawal of the Red Army from the glacis to its sanctuary". [Ref. 233] and dislike the way the withdrawals are being conducted. They feel humiliated by the withdrawals: "Many Soviet officers stationed in Eastern Europe are resentful of the "humiliating" way their former allies are asking them to leave."[Ref. 234] They feel that the withdrawals are evident of a defeat, without as General Makashov said, having given the Red Army an opportunity to fight [Ref. 235].

Celestine Bohlen has written a good summary of the situation from both the East European and the Soviet military point of view.

"President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's recent tilt toward hard-liners in the Soviet military and the Communist Party has raised concerns in Eastern Europe that their new-founded
independence may somehow be jeopardized by their giant neighbor's political instability. Although the withdrawal of 123,000 Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia has continued on schedule, negotiations over the departure date for 50,000 Soviet soldiers in Poland have bogged down in recent months, while the Soviet parliament has still not given its approval to the treaty guaranteeing German reunification. For East Europeans who worry that the Soviet Union has not reconciled itself to its loss of influence in the region, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact had become an increasingly urgent issue. By the same token, their Soviet counterparts have been increasingly eager to avoid anything that smacks of further humiliation."[Ref. 236]

During the period of new thinking ascendancy, the military had to acquiesce to the withdrawals from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Now that the military has gained more of a voice, it is its intractability that has marked the talks with Poland over troop withdrawals from that country. This change in tone has been evident with regard to the other countries but to a lesser degree than with their Northern neighbor.

"There are disturbing signs of a hardening Soviet attitude toward the former satellites, particularly Poland. Most alarming is the uncertainty over when - or if - Soviet troops will leave the region. Having agreed last year to withdraw from Hungary and Czechoslovakia by mid-1991 and from eastern Germany by mid-1994, the Soviet Union now says it will not pull out of Poland until after its large contingent leaves Germany."[Ref. 237]

One bit of evidence of this hardening attitude is General Viktor Dubinin's refusal to accede to Polish demands for a quick withdrawal. He is the commander of Soviet troops in Poland and chief Soviet negotiator in the withdrawal talks [Ref. 238]. "He announced that his men would withdraw when and how they wanted: "We will be leaving with our heads high, with banners spread, satisfied that we have
fulfilled an internationalist duty." [Ref. 239] (The departure of the first Soviet troops from Poland on 9 April 1991 was marked with a brass band [Ref. 240].) The general is still using Communist terminology to justify the Soviet presence. But he made clear the real reason for the retention of troops in Poland. "To leave Soviet forces in Germany completely cut off from the territory of the U.S.S.R. is inadmissible". [Ref. 241]

There is a discrepancy between the way the Soviet generals view events in Eastern Europe and the actual political realities in the region. The general, and not any general but the commander of all Soviet troops in Poland, does not evince the sensibility of someone who is on the territory of a sovereign state and there at its sufferance. In his mind Eastern Europe seems to remain the Soviet military manoeuvre area that it was a few years ago. The national boundaries do not seem to hold any great significance for him.

Poland's Foreign Minister Skubiszewski noted this Soviet military myopia. He referred to incidents when Soviet troop trains from Germany arrived at the Polish-German border for transit to the Soviet Union in the absence of any understanding between the Poles and Soviets over how such transits might be conducted. "One cannot have a situation where a train arrives at the border and the driver calls out: "We are coming through now." This has to be arranged with Poland beforehand, not just with Germany. I fear that the
military people in Moscow do not understand that, but they will have to. The sooner they understand it, the better for our relations". [Ref. 242] There is some backbone behind the Polish position. In January of 1991 they refused transit rights for 30 Soviet trains [Ref. 243]. The military seem to be operating in the business as usual mode and are disregarding the fact that the Pact is no longer functional, and that the East European state's sovereignty have to be reckoned with.

As an example of the humiliations with which the Red Army feels it is oppressed, General Dubinin reacted strongly to Polish demands that Soviet troops transiting from Germany travel in sealed cars without weapons.

"Gen. V. Dubinin accused the Polish side of treating Soviet troops as an army of occupation and wanting to escort them out of Poland as prisoners of war [the feeling of defeat again], "in locked and sealed railway cars, disarmed, and carrying no military equipment," thus bringing dishonor on the army which liberated us and vanquished the Nazis, which "returned East Pomerania, East Prussia, and Silesia to Polish people to hold in perpetuity, and also established Poland's western border along the Odra and Nysa [Oder-Neisse]," and which, moreover, acting out of internationalist duty, for 45 years "protected and defended your country without charge."[Ref. 244]

This feeling of humiliation is likely to continue to be exacerbated because the Poles are insisting on the sealed trains and disarmed troops [Ref. 245]. In addition they want all dangerous cargo, including nuclear weapons, to go by sea [Ref. 246]. They want about $16,000 per each of the estimated 11,000 troop trains required to move the Group of
Soviet Forces in Germany [Ref. 247]. Lastly, they insist on inspecting the rail and road convoys [Ref. 248].

Events in Poland are obviously tied up with the issue of Soviet troops in the former GDR. The Military cannot countenance the idea that the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany would be cut off from the USSR [Ref. 249]. The Soviets have however unveiled a detailed withdrawal plan for the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) [Ref. 250]. According to this schedule the GSFG should all be gone by the end of 1994 [Ref. 251]. The GSFG was slated to provide 75% of the troops cut as part of Gorbachev's unilateral personnel reduction initiative of 1988 [Ref. 252]. This move was halted, presumably at the behest of the high command, due to the subsequent withdrawal demands made by Hungary and Czechoslovakia [Ref. 253]. Only when further cuts in the GSFG could be linked to Western cuts as part of the CFE process were the GSFG reductions continued [Ref. 254]. The GSFG seems to have been used as an asset both in the CFE negotiations and in the reunification talks with the Germans [Ref. 255]. The time for the GSFG to be counted as an asset may, however, be ending. It is becoming more of a liability as time goes on.

Some of the liability is financial. Despite German contributions as part of the reunification package the GSFG probably cost something in the order of $800,000,000 every 6
months [Ref. 256]. The military housing shortage, also somewhat mitigated by the reunification accord, is nevertheless acute and likely to worsen as troops return home [Ref. 257]. Notwithstanding all this, the greatest liability seems to be in the deterioration of the GSFG, and its estrangement from local Germans. SACEUR, General Galvin, during a recent visit to the USSR said of the Soviet high command that "they're bothered, to say the least, by the poor relationship between the soldiers and local Germans."[Ref. 258] The former East Germans are especially anti-Soviet. "Now and then right-wing thugs attack an officer or a sentry, but more often the attitude is a dismissive pity. These are not men to be feared anymore - but neither are they to be helped. In contrast to western Germany, where people have mounted a large-scale effort to ship emergency food to the Soviet Union, the resentment here in the former East Germany is still fresh enough to reject any such notion."[Ref. 259] Violent incidents are not rampant but are widespread enough and publicized enough that anger is building up on the Soviet side. A Soviet major described "a recent shooting incident, later confirmed by German officials, in which German hoodlums fired on a sentry who fired back with an automatic weapon, wounding a German. Such incidents are not rare, the major intimates, and they feed a bunker mentality. "We'll protect our soldiers if we have to, whatever it takes," the major snarls."[Ref. 260] One
Soviet soldier has reportedly been killed, while 13 incidents of shootings or beatings of Soviet soldiers occurred in the fall of 1990 [Ref. 261]. As the major's example illustrates, such incidents are certain to touch raw Soviet military nerves already sensitized to any intimation of 'humiliation'. One Bonn official said that, "We expect very serious trouble." [Ref. 262]

The combination of injured Soviet hubris and German resentment is not the only liability related to the continued presence of the GSFG in that country. The Soviet forces are undergoing a massive reduction in combat capability as their discipline suffers from reunification. There have been large numbers of desertions. Der Speigel reported 200 in one week alone in November [Ref. 263]. There were 800 deaths in the GSFG in 1990, many from suicide and murder by comrades in arms [Ref. 264]. The terrible conditions of service for conscripts in the GSFG which have induced the suicides and the desertions up to now, could serve, along with the new proximity of the West, to greatly increase the numbers of deserters [Ref. 265]. The desertion problem creates a particularly flammable situation in that Soviet detachments are sent out to catch the deserters [Ref. 266]. The collision of an aggressive detachment of Soviet soldiers and an antagonistic populace seems to be a matter of time under these circumstances. The unit coherence, discipline, and morale of the GSFG is suffering, as a result both the Germans
and the Soviets are worried over the possibility of wholesale disorder [Ref. 267]. The Germans would like a more rapid Soviet withdrawal. Chancellor Kohl has said that Soviet troops could be out of Germany by the end of 1992 [Ref. 268]. The situation seems to call for a quick withdrawal, but the Soviet military would probably see this as another humiliation.

Notwithstanding Soviet denials to the contrary, their troops in Germany seem to be selling off their equipment including weapons of all types [Ref. 269]. The fact that the troops are paid in marks seems to have fostered the breakdown in order as troops attempt to enrich themselves as quickly as possible before they return to the USSR and its grim financial realities [Ref. 270]. The title of an article in the New York Times says it all: "Soviet Troops in Germany Become Army of Refugees" [Ref. 271]. Polish concerns stem from this image of chaos in the GSFG. "Gloom-mongers fear that the withdrawal will happen chaotically, perhaps after a coup in the Soviet Union or a bust-up in the Soviet Army. No one wants to see more than 1m leaderless Soviet citizens scrambling across Poland, but no one knows how to prevent it either." [Ref. 272]

Whether the Soviet military will come to see that it is in its interest to rapidly withdraw from Germany is hard to say. It seems that the longer the GSFG stays in place, the more it will degrade, and the more likely will be a major
conflagration between the troops and the local populace. Soviet military pride would dictate a slow dignified pull-out. These other considerations would have to be weighed against the need to avoid 'humiliations'.

In contrast to the situation in Poland and Germany, the troop withdrawals from Czechoslovakia and Hungary are going better but still generate military resentment. Speaking of the fact that the Soviet military had gained a greater voice in the USSR, the Polish Foreign minister said that, "Because of the domestic situation in the USSR, it is now being said that it was a mistake to conclude agreements about withdrawing the Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary."[Ref. 273] The apparently greater military influence and these kinds of revelations about Soviet military attitudes must make the Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians happy that they made troop withdrawal agreements earlier. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union signed their troop withdrawal accord on 26 February 1990 [Ref. 274]. Hungary and the USSR signed their agreement on 10 March 1990 [Ref. 275]. Both agreements specified phased pull-outs to be complete by 30 June 1991 [Ref. 276].

The withdrawals have not gone off without a hitch. Hungary and the USSR have bickered over the payment terms for Soviet facilities left behind [Ref. 277]. The environmental damage caused by the long-term Soviet troop presence and Hungarian demands for compensation have likewise been sore
The command of the Southern Group of Soviet forces (SGSF) expressed dissatisfaction with provisions of the withdrawal accord that had been developed by the Soviet Foreign Ministry [Ref. 279]. Criticism over the lack of provisions made for the disposition of Soviet facilities seems to have been the primary complaint. Izvestia published an account of the waste of Soviet taxpayers' money as a result of Hungarian insistence that any infrastructure improvements made by the USSR in Hungary are offset by the ecological damage done by Soviet troops [Ref. 280]. The dispute reached a head with Colonel General Matvey Burlakov's, Chief of the SGSF, statement that the continued withdrawal of Soviet troops was predicated upon resolution of the facilities compensation question. "The commander of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary has threatened to halt the Soviet troop withdrawal, unless the Hungarian Government pays for the vacated barracks...Burlakov also criticized the Soviet Government for not coming to an agreement with the Hungarian leadership so far."[Ref. 281] Burlakov was later heard to state that this was just a personal opinion intended to hasten the conclusion of an agreement [Ref. 282]. The only foreseeable solution seems to be the Hungarian preference for a canceling out of debts by both parties.
"Hungarian Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Antal Annus, the government's commissioner in charge of Soviet withdrawal...pointed out to his Soviet colleague, that the "occupiers" are either unwilling or unable to accept the fact that Hungary has its own interests and is not prepared to subordinate them to those of "big brother." To be sure, Burlakov and his advisors are not accustomed to dealing with negotiators as outspoken and firm as the Hungarians, and such a role must be new to the Hungarians themselves. One cannot help but feel that, in the end, the "zero payment" alternative might be preferred, so that no money will be involved."[Ref. 283]

As with Poland and Germany, the relationship between the Soviet military and the civilian population in Hungary is tense. The military has not been cooperative in enabling a smooth transition for Soviet bases in the country to civilian use. "Soviet military authorities did not allow Veszprem civic leaders to inspect the condition of the Soviet base there despite repeated requests. In another case, the Soviet Army invited a delegation from the city of Szolnok to make a fact-finding visit to the three Soviet barracks within city limits. When the Hungarians arrived, the Soviet base commander told them that the Southern Group of Soviet Forces Headquarters had not consented to the visit."[Ref. 284] Soviet soldiers in Hungary are also reportedly selling military equipment including weapons [Ref. 285]. Zoltan D. Barany summed up the situation with the following.

"The Soviets are clearly very tense and uncertain during the current withdrawals. Not only do they see that the Hungarians are often clearly antagonistic, sending the departing troops on their way east with anti-Soviet slogans sounding in their ears, but the returning soldiers pose a serious problem for the Soviets."[Ref. 286]
The situation in Czechoslovakia is similar. The Czechs have also had problems with Soviet soldiers selling off their weapons for personal profit. Firearms and grenades seem to be readily available [Ref. 287]. There is also considerable resentment of the Soviets. Anti-Soviet slogans and graffiti are on the buildings [Ref. 288]. As in the other areas there is concern over the ecological damage done by Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia [Ref. 289]. There has been some, apparently low level, resistance to Czech attempts to determine the extent of ecological damage on Soviet bases [Ref. 290]. On the whole the withdrawal in Czechoslovakia seems to be going quickly. The Soviets, according to Colonel General Vorob'ev, commander of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia, should be out of the country by 20 May 1990 [Ref. 291]. This would be a month early. However, there is resistance to the idea of Soviet troops from the GSFG withdrawing through Czechoslovakia [Ref. 292]. Subsequently, however, in a conciliatory move, Czechoslovakia offered to allow Soviet troops from the GSFG to transit home via its territory once all troops of the Central Group of Soviet Forces (CGSF) had been removed [Ref. 293]. Whether the Soviet high command will be amenable to this offer is doubtful. Soviet troops would be transiting Czechoslovakia without any in-country friendly personnel. The Soviet military objected to this situation in Poland; that is where the GSFG would have been 'cut off' from
the USSR [Ref. 294]. The CGSF's early withdrawal would seem to indicate that the Soviet high command has written off Czechoslovakia. The same is probably true of Hungary with its June 29 termination for withdrawal of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces (SGSF) [Ref. 295].

B. LEVERAGE

Given the troop withdrawals, how much influence does the Soviet military retain in Eastern Europe? Does it retain the levers necessary to move the East and West Europeans as it desires? Soviet forces in place are obviously the easiest way to influence Europe. (This understanding seems to have influenced Soviet Colonel Nicolai Petrushenko's call for a 16 to 19 year withdrawal timetable vice the 4 years to pull-out from Germany and Poland [Ref. 296].) The SGSF and the CGSF will be gone by June and May of 1991. Hungary and Czechoslovakia will then be able to act with more independence than Poland and even Germany. In the latter two countries' cases, the Soviets will retain a de facto veto on any moves which they deem injurious to their interests for the duration of the presence of Soviet troops on their soil. Accordingly, Polish and German policy will likely be subdued until 1994 by the Soviet presence.

This presence, by its very existence would seem to dampen 'host' country moves which would be seen negatively by the Soviet military elite. However, other more active pressures
During the period when the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the new thinkers ran foreign policy, the East Europeans were not, seemingly, interfered with. Soviet military units in Hungary, for example, did not conduct exercises during elections in that country [Ref. 297]. In addition, exercises in the former GDR were curtailed in space and number of troops involved. They were restricted to military training areas and to no more than 13,000 troops [Ref. 298]. Low-level, supersonic, and night aircraft flights were likewise restricted in number [Ref. 299]. Now that the military, old-thinking, wing has regained prominence, it is not hard to imagine that Soviet forces muscle flexing in Poland or Germany might be used to influence those countries. This could include delays on troop withdrawals, military exercises and the like. Whether agitation by the ever weakening GSFG would decisively influence Germany is another matter. What is important is that the Soviet military not be led to believe that such posturing might work.

Another relatively short-term Soviet influence lever is the continuing East European dependence on Soviet made and designed military equipment. The East Europeans must still use Soviet made parts and training to keep their militaries functioning [Ref. 300]. The present economic difficulties of these countries means that they cannot afford massive restructuring of their materiel base. This equipment
dependency will probably be lessened with time. Aside from purely national interest reasons the East Europeans will probably diversify their equipment sources because the Soviets are demanding payments in dollars and at non-subsidized prices for their military goods [Ref. 301].

A western initiative which would mitigate the equipment dependency would be for Germany to offer the former East German Army (NVA) equipment to the East Europeans. Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have all expressed interest in this equipment [Ref. 302]. The Bundeswehr discovered five divisions worth of equipment held as a mobilization base in the GDR [Ref. 303]. Germany could certainly dispense with this equipment. If the West wanted to tightly control levels of conventional arms in Eastern Europe, then this equipment could be parcelled out as necessary solely to serve as a spare parts base thereby weaning the East from its interim dependence on the USSR.

Another dependence, aside from that of equipment, is that of habit. The East European military establishments were in the habit of depending on the Soviet military for direction. They were internationalist in orientation. That is, as will be seen, the training and practice for war conducted in the Warsaw Pact since World War Two lent itself by design to East European dependence upon Soviet guidance. This will have to be overcome to prevent the Soviet military from furthering its goals. If the East European militaries continue to ally
themselves with the Soviet military, then independent East European security policies will be impossible. Given the fractious nature of the erstwhile Pact allies' negotiations over their respective slices of the CFE pie [Ref. 304] this will probably not be a great obstacle. However, three impediments to East European military attitudinal movement from internationalism to nationalism seem to exist. They are; military elite identification with the USSR military; vestigial remains of old relationships to the USSR; and budget cuts which are mandated by bad economic conditions.

The close ties of the East European military leadership to the Soviet Union is of concern in assessing the possibility of Soviet military influence. The Czech armed forces were basically denationalized after the events of 1968. They became an adjunct, auxiliary force to the Central Group of Soviet Forces [Ref. 302]. To a great extent, those Hungarian officers that had studied at higher military schools in the USSR remained loyal to it during the 1956 uprising. Their indoctrination, personal contacts with Soviet officers, and the fact that they owed their position and status to the communist party led them to pro-Soviet or neutral stances [Ref. 303]. These characteristics are common to all the former Pact countries. A study of the erstwhile Warsaw Pact made the distinction between functional and attitudinal integration of the East European militaries into the Soviet
Forces [Ref. 304]. The study concluded that the highest levels of the East European militaries were attitudinally integrated but that lower levels were only functionally integrated [Ref. 305]. The use of training held in the USSR was important to this result [Ref. 306]. Those East European military cadres that were loyal to the USSR, that suffered as a result of the decay of Soviet power must hope for a reversal in present trends.

In all of this discussion it should be kept in mind that Romania has followed its own interests for some time, and has not been a Soviet puppet in its foreign and military policy. "Romania has not, of course, actively participated in the military command of the Pact since the late 1960s." [Ref. 307] Romania has long had an independent military doctrine, has distanced itself from obligations to the Soviet Union, and its defensive posture entails the mobilization of the populace to defend the nation [Ref. 308]. The Romanian leadership, apparently alarmed at Krushchev's recklessness during the Cuban Missile Crisis, "expressed contingent neutrality [in 1963] to the United States" [Ref. 309]. Romania offered assurances that it would not participate in any offensive against the West, and as a measure of good faith, indicated that it would permit inspection of its territory to verify the non-presence of Soviet nuclear weapons [Ref. 310]. Romanian dissatisfaction with Soviet leadership of the Pact, as
expressed in the mid-1960s [Ref. 311], and its concomitant foreign policy reveal a long-standing independence which should preclude Soviet military influence.

The problem for the present regimes is that a part of their military personnel, while not being nationalists, have skills which cannot be dispensed with. In Poland purges of the nomenklatura have been tempered because the new government does not have people to fill their posts [Ref. 312]. This is even more true of the military because of the need for specialized skills and experience. Solidarity member turned Deputy Defense Minister Janusz Onyskiewicz commented soon after getting the post that despite affiliations with the communist party, military members would not be purged because of their political associations. He asserts that military promotions were due more to competence than to political characteristics [Ref. 313]. He also underlines the point that he and his colleagues were ignorant of defense issues, implying a need to rely on the professional military [Ref. 314].

A disturbing trend is that the new regimes want military ties with the USSR. They hope to continue sending at least some officers to Soviet military schools. A complete rupture is clearly not envisaged. In Hungary's case Prime Minister "Antall and Gorbachev agreed in principle on concluding a bilateral agreement, in which military cooperation could also be involved,"...An agreement of this kind would make it
possible for some Hungarian officers to be trained in the Soviet Union. "There are some special fields which we could not replace at the moment."[Ref. 315] In Poland's case Onyszkievicz has said, "We want to keep sending our officers to military academies in the CSFR, Hungary, and the Soviet Union, although not to all the academies and perhaps not in such numbers as in the past."

[Ref. 316] Poland specifically wants to continue sending senior officers to the Voroshilov Academy [Ref. 317]. Similar to the Hungarian hopes for a military agreement with the Soviet Union, Poland would like to get a mutual defense treaty with that country [Ref. 318]. Poland's concern over German reunification is understandable as a motive for close defense ties with the USSR. However the idea of bilateral defense agreements between the East European militaries and their old Soviet masters does not seem propitious in terms of maximizing national sovereignty. The same is true for sending officers to schools in the USSR. While there they will be vulnerable to compromise. Any officer presently senior enough to attend the Voroshilov Academy is certainly more internationalist than junior officers. The stay there would likely reinforce this tendency at the cost of patriotic impulses.

This fact allied with the presence of Soviet troops on East European soil and the fact that much of the military remains in the hands of officers promoted by the former regime
have been cause for concern [Ref. 319]. As an example of ties which bind East European commanders with their Soviet military counterparts, the Czech Chief of the National Security Corps District Administration in Michalovce confers regularly with KGB officials at his office in Czechoslovakia [Ref. 320]. Whether it is extortion, habit, genuine belief in Soviet 'internationalism', or a failure to perceive which way events are proceeding, some individuals within the East European national security establishments are unreliable and some are traitors to their nationality.

Another issue is the problem of diminishing defense budgets in the three countries. Poland's Army Chief of Staff recently complained about the budget describing it as a survival budget for the military [Ref. 321]. Poland's Minister of Defense, Kolodziejczyk, with images of Soviet repression in nearby Lithuania in mind, has said that without adequate funds the military will not be able to defend all Poland's borders [Ref. 322]. This was an obvious reference to the fact that Polish troops are poised on its Western Borders but not equipped to defend the East. Onyszkiewicz said of this that, "We have to take into consideration the danger of local tensions. Without a shadow of doubt the present deployment of our military units has to be altered and in part this is slowly being done. A serious change would entail enormous costs which the Polish state is just not able to meet. A transfer of a single division to a
new location costs about a trillion zlotys."[Ref. 323] This situation must have left Polish defense figures feeling exposed during Soviet military movements in Lithuania.

The Czechs are also running up against the same problem. Defense Minister Dobrovsky said that the ministry's job was to uniformly defend the territory of the state but that to do this certain needs (read enough money] had to be met [Ref. 324]. Cuts in the Czech defense budget are said to be slowing the pace of military reform and inhibiting the relocation of troops to Slovakia and Eastern portions of the country [closer to the USSR] [Ref. 325]. Hungary's Defense Minister in appealing to the National Assembly, underlined the idea that the Ministry would not be able to meet its obligations without adequate funding [Ref. 326]. The Bulgarian armed forces' budget has likewise suffered cuts [Ref. 327]. These financial restrictions directly effect the deterrent posture of the countries militaries vis a vis the USSR. By inhibiting reform, and threatening the military, budget cuts destabilize the interest of the military to ally itself with the new regimes. A defense ministry that felt that it had nothing to loose because it was going to be financially strangled could be very dangerous for the new states.

Different tactics are being used to combat possible areas of Soviet influence or agitation. First among them is the dismissal of the oldest and most penetrated military
officials. Onyszkiowicz has said of Poland's case that 35
generals would be cut in 1990, a like number in 1991, and that
significant numbers of colonels would see the same fate
[Ref. 328]. In Czechoslovakia all generals over 60 years old
have been retired. 6,000 veterans forced out in 1968 have been
rehabilitated and form a pool of 'democratic' military
expertise for the regime to call upon [Ref. 329].
For example, the Military Education University in Bratislava
is now headed by a Lieutenant Colonel who had been forced out
of service in 1968 [Ref. 330]. The Hungarians had
cut 50 high ranking officers as early as 1989
[Ref. 331]. Bulgaria cut its high command by over half. It
retired 78 generals in 1990 to leave a total of 75
[Ref. 332].

Another tactic has been the increase of civilian control
over defense matters.

"The new noncommunist governments of Eastern Europe,
particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, are
wrestling with the problems of transforming their Soviet-
model military establishments into national institutions
serving national interests and responsible to national
political authority. In 1990 all five non-Soviet members
of the Warsaw Pact replaced their Defense Ministers. Among
those forces out of office was Bulgaria's General Dobri
Dzhurov, who, having been in office since February 1962,
had the distinction of being the longest-serving Minister
of Defense in the World. Czechoslovakia and Hungary
appointed civilians and former dissidents to head their
military establishments. Poland appointed two civilian
Solidarity members as Deputy Ministers of
Defense."[Ref. 333]
The Hungarian and Czechoslovak civilian defense ministers are Fur [Ref. 334] and Dobrovsky [Ref. 335]. In Poland the two civilian deputy defense ministers are, Onyszkiewicz and Komorowski [Ref. 336]. It is hard to say why Walesa retained Vice Admiral Kolodziejczyk as Minister of Defense [Ref. 337]. It may have been a compromise with the military.

Aside from the highest military cadre, there has been movement away from internationalism. The biggest step taken has been the depoliticization of the armed services in each country [Ref. 338]. Major General Slimak, Czech Chief of the General Staff said in March of 1990 that the first significant change undertaken by the Army was the abandonment of the leading role of the party [Ref. 339]. The small reminders of party power such as the comrade appellation were dropped. The Hungarians announced the end of the party membership prerequisite for officers in 1989 [Ref. 340]. In Poland, as in the other countries, military members are prohibited from party affiliation and the Main Political Administration has been abolished [Ref. 341]. The Czech law on military service of 14 March 1990 prohibits party activity while serving but also severely limits any possibility that the armed forces could lawfully be used internally [Ref. 342]. There seems to be a groundswell among the Bulgarian officer corps, as evidenced by the formation of
the Bulgarian Legion "Georgi Stoikov Rakovski", desirous of greater professionalism and depoliticization [Ref. 343].

There is reason to believe that, party membership notwithstanding, a good portion of the officer corps was opportunistic and not motivated by ideology. In Hungary 27% of those applying for admission to military colleges "were motivated by the good earning potential, good opportunities for relaxation and enjoyment, good-looking uniforms and other material advantages of being in the service, rather than professional or ideological motivations". [Ref. 344]

The internationalist trustworthiness of the junior officers and NCO's was deemed questionable in 1986 [Ref. 345]. As regards the conscripts, they were assessed as being unreliable from a Soviet point of view [Ref. 346]. There was obviously a large number who had not bought into the system. Another factor in Hungary was the barely concealed nationalism used in the armed forces to motivate the troops. This led to the military being the most nationalistic group in the country [Ref. 347].

As a result of the fragmentation of the Czechoslovakian People's Army and its subordination to the Central Group of Soviet Forces after 1968 its adherence to internationalist motivations was nonexistent [Ref. 348]. In Poland the officers and NCOs were motivated largely by "pragmatic considerations -- career opportunities and various perquisites
-- rather than on ideological beliefs.''[Ref. 349]

This group was said to make up about 50% of the cadre, while 30% was nationalistic, and 20% internationalistic or pro-Soviet [Ref. 350]. The Polish conscripts were anti-Soviet and anti-communist [Ref. 351]. Bulgaria's conscripts seem to show anti-service attitudes, interest in things western, and pragmatic vice ideological concerns, which would be fertile ground for national vice internationalist ideology [Ref. 352]. As regards the Bulgarian professional military cadre, it did not seem to be monolithic in its support of the USSR in the past. The 1965 coup attempt, and critical military press accounts point to some resentment of the former Soviet patron [Ref. 353]. The Bulgarian military is probably more interested in looking for favorable solutions to its own security problems than in supporting the Soviet military.

The reason for pointing out the facts noted in the previous paragraph is that they demonstrate the degree of internationalism-nationalism prevalent in the military establishments prior to the events of 1989 and 1990. In all cases the conscript base reflects societal attitudes and is anti-Soviet and more or less nationalistic. The professional cadres, taking into account those already winnowed out, can probably be characterized as opportunistic. Ideology did not mean anything to most of them under the communist regimes. One would think that nationalism would generate a more effective
appeal to these people. Some of them may indeed be true nationalists. On the whole one would have to say that attitudes in the military must have facilitated their relative non-intervention in the events of 1989-90.

"Overall, the military forces in Eastern Europe came through the revolutions of 1989 with flying colors... Ultimately the armies showed their close ties to the people and responded more to their national rather than their ideological roots. In Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany they were used to disarm the party militias that might have been tempted to resist political reforms by force of arms. In Romania, the army defended the revolution against the securitate secret police, so that interim President Ion Illiescu could tell the nation that "the army has been and remains the shield of hope for the people and the revolution." Polish Navy Commodore Antoni Rudoman, addressing the 4,000 people taking part in Father Jankowski's Mass for the armed forces, said that the traditional Polish military motto of "God, Honor, and the Fatherland" described the highest values that should be in the heart of every Pole in uniform. Military leaders in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany have all stressed that their forces served to defend the nation, and not any particular political party."[Ref. 354]

Since the installation of new regimes all sections of the militaries have probably become substantially more nationalistic than they were in the mid-1980s. The patriots are revealing their true colors and the opportunists see how the wind is blowing and have certainly realized that the Soviets are no longer their masters.

Given the threat of an increasingly hardline Soviet stance those East European military leaders and apparatchiks that have lost power due to the reforms certainly would welcome a reversal of events, a return of Soviet influence. The cashiered generals, and colonels would likely look forward to

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a reversion to the old situation. However the younger leaders that have been promoted in their stead stand to lose if the regime suffers. The conscripts and younger NCOs and officers are probably well along the way towards a nationalistic stance. In a confrontation with the USSR they would probably react aggressively. However there is a danger that the military will become isolated from society, disregarded because of its role in martial law in Poland, or in the uprisings in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. A drifting military, without ties to a democratically inclined populace is probably more likely to follow leaders that would use it against the state's interests. If the military becomes and stays allied with society in the East European countries then it will be extremely difficult for a disgruntled military leadership to mobilize them alongside their former Soviet comrades.

There is a need to build nationalism and loyalty among the professional cadres. At present there seems to be a window of vulnerability to regression towards internationalism. It is however steadily decreasing. The longer the time that the democrats have to establish control over the professional military cadres the safer they will be. Tactics of depoliticization will take time to work. Hopefully the opportunists will see that it is in their interest to cooperate with the new regimes. While they are cooperating, a younger, nationalistic cadre can be educated and prepared to replace them. Military loyalty to the nation and the
The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and the issue of continued Soviet military leverage over the region seems closely linked. Questions of equipment dependency, habits of collaboration, and sympathies between some East European military leaders and their former Soviet comrades, are of secondary importance. Over time these levers will decay. Even at the present time it is hard to imagine that these avenues for Soviet military pressure might influence the East Europeans. The continuing presence of Soviet troops in Poland and Germany is however, a much stronger motivator for the countries involved. Germany can counterweight this with its NATO membership and should be fairly secure against deliberate Soviet military pressure. The issue of a spontaneous conflict between portions of the GSFG and local Germans is another matter. If ignited by an aggressive Soviet military response 'to protect its troops' the Germans would be in quite a bind. Poland, not having NATO membership like Germany, has only domestic opinion to counter Soviet military pressures. The fact that all the other East European countries have negotiated Soviet troop withdrawal accords to their satisfaction, except for the Poles themselves, must be aggravating for the Polish populace and a tender spot for the government because of its delay in concluding an accord. However, once Soviet troops are gone
from these countries there would is no way in which the Soviet military by itself could enforce its desired worldview.
V. CONCLUSION

At first glance Gorbachev and the conservatives bedding down together seemed irreversible, and an indication of a retrograde move towards older policies. The superficial similarities between the 1991 Baltic crackdown and those of '53, '56, and '68 seemed to portend another expansion of the iron curtain and danger for East European freedom. Only upon closer examination was it discovered that the Baltic repression of January 1991 had more in common with: Kazakhstan in December 1986, Georgia in April 1990, Kokand - Uzbekistan in August 1989, Azerbaijan in January 1990, and Tadzhikistan in February 1990, [Ref. 355] than it did with the crackdowns in Eastern Europe. The 'Gorbachev Doctrine' [Ref. 356] applied to the USSR and not to Eastern Europe. Notwithstanding the conservative tack, as regards Eastern Europe Gorbachev had not undergone an abrupt 'on the road to Damascus' change of heart. The 'turn to the right' was not indicative of a change of position on East European independence, but a reaction to internal Soviet developments. Alexander Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze both thought that Gorbachev has not abandoned perestroika and new thinking. "Both expressed the view that Gorbachev's conservative policies are tactical—the result of having to deal with the political and economic crisis while accommodating mounting pressure from the conservatives." [Ref. 357]
Gorbachev's role in recent Soviet developments is not therefore an indication that he would be an obstacle to ameliorating European security. Shevardnadze may have been the builder of new thinking in Europe, he may have been its most visible proponent, but Gorbachev was its architect. For example, Shevardnadze negotiated the CFE arms control treaty, but it was Gorbachev who overruled Soviet military objections to it [Ref. 358]. Responsibility for the repressive internal 'Gorbachev Doctrine' rests with Gorbachev but credit for the external 'Sinatra Doctrine' must rest with him as well. The East Europeans could not very well have gone their own way without his acquiescence. The leader who approved NATO membership for the USSR's greatest historical enemy, Germany, does not seem to have changed his position on Europe. While Gorbachev might not approve of certain Western leaning scenarios; such as NATO membership for Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary; and while he might bargain to attain concessions for the Soviet side as costs for Soviet approval of such moves; his recent political maneuverings hold nothing that might lead one to believe that he would steadfastly hold out against such possibilities.

All of this is good news for Western arms control desiderata, and European stability. However, given the Soviet predicament one is forced to ask about Gorbachev's continued tenure in office. Soviet instability, calls for Gorbachev's resignation from the right [Ref. 359], and from
striking coal miners [Ref. 360], and the worsening nationalities crisis, support the idea that he might lose his post. On the other hand, he could conceivably remain in office but be stripped of effective power. It is impossible to say how long Gorbachev might remain in power. The fact that he has weathered so many controversies so far is indicative of his tactical political ability. He has shown himself able to use the liberals (in the early stages of perestroika) and the conservatives (more recently) to further his aims and his tenure. This political dexterity would seem to mitigate for his continued retention of power. On the other hand, critics might say that he has survived so long that his time must soon be up.

However, just recently he was able to command the allegiance of the Communist Party despite virulent attacks against him, and this at a special session of the Central Committee called specifically to lambast him and his policies [Ref. 361]. Likewise he was able to overcome seemingly intractable differences between himself and the republican leaders to fashion a compromise that would alleviate the threat to his leadership brought on by the coal miners' strike [Ref. 362]. The central - republican authority rapprochement not only assuaged the miners' crisis but has led the way for a possible resolution of the crisis of power in the USSR. A new constitution, new union treaty and new power wielding organs may emerge as a result
Whether such a stabilization of power occurs or not, it is still impossible to say if Gorbachev will be in a position to influence events. Looking at his past record one has to be impressed with his ability to accommodate change, make adjustments, and survive politically. Given this, it seems more likely than not that Gorbachev will be in a position to exercise his relatively benevolent view of the world.

Gorbachev's position, for however long he holds it, and his views on Europe may not run counter to Western diplomatic efforts; but the conservative stance certainly does. Despite their collaboration over aspects of the Baltic crackdown, Gorbachev and the conservatives remain opposed on seemingly almost every issue. He has little support in the conservative corner [Ref. 364]. The most recent evidence of discord was the Central Committee meeting called by the conservatives to criticize Gorbachev and his policies. The meeting seemed to have been called in a bid to unseat Gorbachev [Ref. 365]. The President, however, has one-upped his conservative opposition by offering to resign, as some of them demanded, only to have the Central Committee move to ignore the resignation offer by a vote of 322 to 13 with 14 abstentions [Ref. 366].

All in all Gorbachev seems to be handling the conservative opposition with skill. He did an end run around conservative calls for his ouster, and he also upstaged their mobilization
with his surprise announcement of the accord with the republican leaders. "Mr. Gorbachev meant for this new initiative [the Moscow-republics accord] to pre-empt the closed meeting of some of his critics on the Communist Party Central Committee that began today [24 April 1991] in the Kremlin."[Ref. 367] Despite the so-called 'turn to the right', Gorbachev seems to be maintaining his distance from the conservatives.

Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov seems to be cut from the same cloth as his conservative predecessor [Ref. 368], Nikolai Ryzhkov. Pavlov seems to have the same conservative support that Ryzhkov had. "The coalition of forces supporting Ryzhkov includes the bulk of the party and government bureaucracy, the senior ranks of the armed forces, and what Soviet commentators describe as "the military-industrial complex." Aggressive lobbying by the directors of many Soviet factories who fear production would be disrupted by too rapid a shift to a market economy helped stave off demands for Ryzhkov's resignation earlier this fall."[Ref. 369] Subsequently Ryzhkov suffered a heart attack [Ref. 370]. The Prime Minister's position seems to be held by the conservative lobby, in that the new Prime Minister, Pavlov, holds similar conservative views on the economy. He called for "old style coercion" to stop strikes and said that, "Soldiers or police "cannot make anyone work...But by applying force, you can give people the
possibility to work." [Ref. 371] Gorbachev had little to say about these comments. He is holding his distance while using the conservatives, Pavlov in this case, to get things done. Pavlov signed a decree banning demonstrations to undercut the massive pro-Yeltsin rally planned for 28 March 1991 [Ref. 372]. 50,000 troops were called out to oppose the demonstration but did nothing when it was held [Ref. 373]. This phony show of force undercut the conservatives, while Gorbachev's aides were letting it be known that Gorbachev had nothing to do with the situation and that all the blame rested on Pavlov's shoulders [Ref. 374].

As noted in Chapter II in the Baltic crackdown, Gorbachev gives the conservatives enough leeway to have them discredit themselves by their methods, enabling him to portray himself as the best moderate alternative. During the political maneuvering of the Central Committee meeting in April of 1991 Gorbachev "capitalized on the attack from the right to portray himself as the embattled champion of the center." [Ref. 375] Gorbachev seems to be getting the upper hand in his most recent struggles with the conservative lobby.

In the Foreign Ministry/Defense Ministry struggle over arms control, Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and the new thinkers seemed to have gotten the upper hand over the military conservatives. While Defense Minister Yazov was
telling Former President Nixon that the CFE treaty provisions were "one-sided and unfair" [Ref. 376], the Foreign Ministry was trading away the Soviet position on coastal defense forces [Ref. 377]. Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh was Secretary of State Baker's counterpart in the talks and not General Moiseev [Ref. 378]. Yet, several weeks later it was announced that General Moiseev would be coming to Washington to clear up the remaining obstacles to agreement on the treaty [Ref. 379].

Perhaps the Foreign and Defense Ministries have come to some balance in their influence on foreign policy and specifically arms control policy. If so, it remains hard to believe that this stasis will be more than temporary. However, both the Foreign Ministry initiative and the Moiseev trip are at least indicative of a desire to appear conciliatory. This even if the Moiseev trip achieved nothing. The fact that the Soviet side was willing to compromise on its earlier intractable position with regard to the redesignation of units as naval forces point to a more forthcoming Soviet foreign policy.

The Defense Ministry was criticized for its handling of the crackdown in the Baltics [Ref. 380]. Its handling of arms control, the attendant lack of progress therein, and the worsening of relations with the United States [Ref. 381], must also have been reasons for criticism of the Defense Ministry. In any event the removal of the naval redesignation logjam from the CFE treaty process,
and the apparent lack of senior military participation, point to the end of temporary Soviet military ascendency over the new thinkers. The struggle between the two camps will certainly continue.

Of the continued political machinations of the military, one author warns, "International experience has shown that once they taste political power, generals are hard to drive back to the barracks. This fact cannot be ignored."[Ref. 382]

While the conservative lobby was getting trounced by Gorbachev at the April Central Committee special meeting, and while the Foreign Ministry was undoing the Soviet military arms control position, Soviet troops broke into and seized at least 12 buildings in 8 Lithuanian cities [Ref. 383].

Military power might be more circumscribed in the foreign policy and political infighting arenas but it has certainly continued to enjoy free reign in the Baltics. The Gorbachev cabinet denied that the special mission police unit, OMON, used in Lithuania acts under its orders [Ref. 384]. OMON's commander in Vilnius, Capt. Boleslav Makutinovich, revealed that his unit was supplied and directed by the Interior Ministry under Boris Pugo [Ref. 385]. Pugo equivocated about the ties between his ministry and OMON [Ref. 386].

Despite the retrenchment of military power in some areas, and despite statements to the contrary, Gorbachev seems to be using the conservative instruments of power where his aims and
those of the right are congruent, namely in the repression of radical moves to dismember the union. The conservatives will continue to play a role in defining policy options for as long as they are needed to help maintain order. Unlike the period before the 'turn to the right' when he relied on reformist elements, Gorbachev cannot completely ignore conservative opinion because he needs their support against an overly rapid disintegration of the union.

The conservative end of the Soviet political spectrum will pose a threat to European stability for as long as they are needed to moderate the internal play of events in the Soviet Union. Because the conservative organs were needed to preserve the union, they have gained influence internally. They have also gained in external policy making. Because of this increased voice in international affairs, the Soviet right cannot be dismissed. Charles Gati outlined the right's hope for Eastern Europe.

"The Party, military and K.G.B....hope the Central European experiment with pluralism and the free market fails. That would fortify their case against perestroika. If Poland is mired in strikes, Hungary consumed by nationalist passions and Czechoslovakia torn by strife between Czechs and Slovaks, the conservatives could say to Soviet citizens: Is this what you want? ...Soviet diehards want more tension, more disorder. Their road to power at home is paved with Central European instability. Thus, though to a far lesser extent than before, the region's future depends on the vicissitudes of Soviet domestic politics."[Ref. 387]

The destabilizing role played by a continued Soviet troop presence in Eastern Europe has been noted. The KGB also could
play a role in destabilization. U.S. intelligence and defense officials have been attributed with statements asserting that ties are being maintained between remnants of the East European secret services and the KGB [Ref. 388]. The new head of the Czechoslovak Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Democracy, Jiri Novotny, "confirmed that some of the former StB [Czechoslovakia's version of the KGB] members are being hired by foreign intelligence services to operate against Czechoslovakia. Their number is said to be high enough to warrant action [Ref. 389] While the KGB is not specifically mentioned, it is not hard to imagine that the Czechoslovaks are reluctant to antagonize their powerful and overbearing neighbor. A Czech parliamentary commission reported that StB, "collaborators may continue to keep their old contacts, either out of fear of extortion or fear of being exposed."[Ref. 390] These collaborators seem to be widely spread through the governing organs of the country [Ref. 391]. If the Czech case is any example, the East European countries are penetrated through and through by informants which might be used by the KGB. As with the process of nationalizing the loyalties of the East European militaries, the process of ridding the new regimes of disloyal elements and of socializing the rest to nationalist ideals will take time. Until such time as these processes engender results, remnants of the old regime will offer avenues for destabilization to the Soviet hard-liners.
The picture that has emerged of the 'Turn to the Right' is not one of unmitigated disaster for hopes of European stability and superpower agreement. Gorbachev's move was tactical and temporary. His political survival, while always questionable, seems fairly comfortable for the short term. The vicissitudes of the reformist-conservative struggle mean that prospects for harmonious relations will look more or less favorable depending upon who is on top. At this writing the reformers seem to have regained the initiative. If Soviet troops were already gone from Central Europe, and if the democracies there were less vulnerable, one would be inclined to think that it would be a good time to push more forcefully for Western policies. This situation not yet being the case, a more cautious stance is required.

However, the strength of Soviet conservatives, while perhaps momentarily checked, coupled with the levers of the Soviet troop presence, and ties between the Soviet military and KGB and their East European counterparts all militate against aggressive Western initiatives. The new democracies need to be strengthened against the day when they are subject to a Soviet conservative backlash over 'joining' Europe. John Lewis Gaddis noted of the Marshall Plan, "its main purpose was to shift the expectations of its recipients from the belief that things could only get worse to the conviction that they would eventually get better" and that this is what the West
needs to do in the present situation [Ref. 392]. The West must not let the East Europeans feel abandoned in their search for democracy and security. The door to NATO, as Vaclav Havel noted, must remain open for the East European nations [Ref. 393]. Until such time as Soviet troops are gone the East European states and NATO can expand their ties and cooperation. Care will have to be taken however not to give the Soviet conservatives ammunition in their fight against East European rapprochement with the West. The Soviet military should not be made to think that they are withdrawing as losers to be replaced by NATO moving in on their retreating heels.

The 'Turn to the Right' is not an indication that the USSR has set a conservative course. It is an indication that the policies of 1988, 89, and 90 will not continue as before. The new thinkers and the conservatives seem more evenly matched now. The breakneck pace of East-West diplomacy has slowed down. The new pace is likely to be one of fits and starts as one and the other camp gains and looses ascendancy in foreign policy. Arms control negotiations are and will be more difficult now. Eastern Europe is likely to have some anxious moments from time to time as its large neighbor embraces and then backs off from conservative positions. In the short-term conservative influence in the USSR's European policy will depend on the continued troop presence in Germany and Poland. For the mid-term the reformists seem strong enough to
counterbalance the Soviet generals with occasional tilts to one side or the other. As for the long term, the empire destroyer, nationalism, will also likely do in the empire's generals.
LIST OF REFERENCES


3. Ibid


10. Ibid


24. Ibid

25. Ibid


27. Ibid


59. Ibid


61. Ibid


73. Ibid


77. Ibid, p.3.


90. Ibid


95. Ibid


"Question cruciale: ou bien le president de l'URSS a commandite le massacre, et le perestroika est definitivement enterrée; ou bien il s'est fait "doubler" par ses militaires, et c'est signe qu'il ne gouverne plus rien. "Je n'étais pas au courant", a expliqué Gorbachev lui-même, en écho aux ministres responsables, Boris Pugo (Interieur) et Dmitri Iazov (Defense). De fait, de nombreux indices laissent penser que le patron de l'URSS contrôle mal le processus de remise en ordre dans les republiques baltes."


100. Ibid


110. Ibid


113. Ibid


115. Ibid


124. Ibid

125. Ibid


128. Ibid


133. Ibid


139. Ibid


141. Ibid


145. Ibid

146. Ibid


159. Ibid, p.397.


162. Ibid

163. The institutchiki are civilian security policy analysts drawn from the institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, primarily the Institute of the USA and Canada and the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations. See the following for more information.


164. Ibid, p.231.


166. Ibid, p.229


171. Ibid


121


199. Ibid


222. Ibid


227. Ibid


"Aussi, certains officiers, tels les generaux Tretyak et Chabanov vont jusqu'a critiquer l'orientation doctrinale vers les seules armes "defensives" ou la contre-offensive limitee a la seule reconquete du territoire nationale, tout en contestant la rapidite des reductions unilaterales sovietiques en Europe de l'Est."

"un retrait en bon ordre de l'armee rouge du glacis vers son sanctuaire".


239. Ibid


246. Ibid

247. Ibid

248. Ibid.


251. Ibid


253. Ibid

254. Ibid

255. Ibid

256. Ibid, p.35.

257. Ibid, 36.


264. Ibid


268. Ibid.

269. Ibid


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274. FBIS, "Text of USSR-CSSR Troop Withdrawal Accord", FBIS-SOV-90-043, 5 March 1990, p.34.


276. Ibid
   FBIS, "Text of USSR-CSSR Troop Withdrawal Accord", FBIS-SOV-90-043, 5 March 1990, p.34.


278. FBIS, "Soviets To Pay for Environmental Damage", FBIS-EEU-90-190, p.42.


280. Ibid


284. Ibid


299. Ibid


305. Ibid


314. Ibid, p.46.


318. Ibid, p.5.


345. Ibid, p.455.

346. Ibid


351. Ibid, p.236.


356. Ibid


133

369. Ibid


373. Ibid


378. Ibid


385. Ibid

386. Ibid


