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NAVAL ARMS CONTROL: A POST-COLD WAR REAPPRAISAL

by

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**Abstract**
Examines the field of naval arms control in the post-Cold War world. Author postulates that fundamental changes in the geo-strategic environment require the development of new criteria to evaluate alternative security policies for the future. Introduces a cognitive flow chart for post-Cold War security decision making which depicts naval arms control as a FIFTH ORDER question, which awaits consensus answers for higher order political decisions. A "snapshot" of US participation in naval arms control is presented which highlights the fact that the US Navy does not receive enough credit for the vast amount of naval arms control already underway. Recommends that future naval arms control not be undertaken by negotiated treaty. Evaluates naval arms control alternatives based upon their potential applicability to President Bush's new national security strategy and likely congressional tests for the strategy. Co-includes that a unique opportunity now exists to synthesize international naval arms control policy with the critical domestic priorities of the American agenda. recommends A NEW REGIME OF NAVAL CSBMs be adopted now (CONSISTING OF JUNIOR OFFICER EXCHANGES AND INCREASED NAVAL PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS). Postulates that this arms control philosophy will best serve the American public and will also enhance the Navy's political capital for future resource allocation decisions.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The world order is changing dramatically before our eyes. No longer do prominent spokesmen warn that the revolutionary changes taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are indicative of a sophisticated scheme of political maskirovka, designed to dupe the West, nor do analysts expect a rejuvenated form of détente, designed to secure victories in the international arena of the Cold War. These notions were serious potential explanations of the original "Gorbachev phenomenon" and were advanced by experts both inside and outside government as recently as two years ago, during the period when the greatest tangible symbol of Cold War hostility, the Berlin Wall, passed into history. Today, these possibilities are merely historical footnotes which muster no bureaucratic support or sponsorship. The question now appears to be whether the Soviet Union can itself survive the era of glasnost and perestroika, rather than if the West can survive a brilliantly crafted diplomatic onslaught. This is one measure of how fundamentally the nature of the policy debate has changed. The democratic revolution of 1989 and its attendant political, military, economic and cultural parameters have reshaped the world as we have known it, redrawn the map and challenged nearly all

1Maskirovka is a fundamental concept of Soviet military art which describes the process in which an enemy is presented with information and indicators which lead to an erroneous interpretation of events (i.e. strategic deception). This process may very well include both political and military component phases. For a more detailed explanation see Soviet Union, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, Volume V, (JPRS-UMA-86-010-L) 1986, p. 1774.
previous assumptions of international security structure. *The changes are undoubtedly real and they permeate every issue of international relations, national strategic management, and politico-military strategic planning.* Strategic planners, if their products are to be relevant and useful in the 1990s, must recognize that the world has undergone a dramatic revolution, not merely an incremental evolution or short term aberration, *regardless* of the ultimate destiny of the identity crisis currently wrenching the Soviet Union. The dramatic changes in international security structure which have occurred, without being spawned in the aftermath of epic warfare, are unprecedented. The national strategic management and politico-military planning processes are in a phase which is analogous (in magnitude if not substance) to the era in which the post-World War II Containment Strategy was born. This time, however, the challenge is more difficult—both intellectually and practically—because the luxury of simply planning to counter the designs of a universally distrusted and unpopular aggressor nation is no longer viable. *The new focus will undoubtedly be upon questions concerning what the United States should actually be doing in the world, rather than how it should prevent the Soviet Union from accomplishing its international agenda.* America is now clearly able to assume a highly pro-active posture with respect to macro-level global strategy—and this is far better suited to traditional American ideology, values,

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2The United States has certainly executed pro-active programs in the Cold War World, however they have been on a second order (or micro-level) strategic plane. Containing communism, which is clearly a reactive posture, has been the first order (or macro-level) goal of all supporting policy in the Cold War era.
history and spirit than is a reactive posture. The U.S. Navy need not fear the assumption of a pro-active global strategy or assume that it will automatically become a more vulnerable target of the budget axe because of it. The U.S. navy can and should thrive in this environment, since it has been historically committed to instilling this mindset, internally, at every level of naval command. Therefore, the Navy need not fear an external environment which demands pro-active thinking, since it surely possesses the intellectual and experiential muscle to make its case in a dynamic policy formulation setting. The new international environment, while not to be feared, will, however, change the rules of the game. It will demand the formulation of new, inspired and creative visions for national policy and forward-looking strategies to match. Warmed-over Cold War strategy is no longer sufficient; it is not acceptable to U.S. allies, it is not acceptable to Congress, it is not acceptable to top administration officials, and it is not acceptable to the American public. It is within this basic context that any strategic plan or issue of politico-military significance must be viewed.

B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

The objective of this thesis is to examine the value of naval arms control in the post-Cold War world, within the framework of a new paradigm for international relations and new critical priorities on the national agenda. Instead of focusing on the quantitative questions of platform procurement and military utility, this historical juncture demands a philosophical, rather than a technical or dogmatic approach to questions of the role of naval force in the newly emerging national security environment. Following a
normative methodological review of naval arms control policy, a distinct second phase of imaginative political packaging and salesmanship will be required to transform the recommendations reached here into workable Washington policy.

Since the world has changed so dramatically, the conceptual models used to evaluate the Navy's role in post-Cold War defense posture must also change in order to effectively model the new environment. For the purposes of assessing the potential value of naval arms control in the post-Cold War world, this thesis provides a new model for evaluating naval arms control proposals based upon a top-down cognitive flow methodology, consistent with the broad outlines of President Bush's new national security strategy.\(^3\)

The top-down approach taken here (which employs a specifically articulated relationship between ends and means) is required in the current strategic environment, just as the top-down review of American defense structure (initiated by the President's Aspen speech) is now appropriate. This approach implies that an increased level of sustained inter-agency cooperation can take place to facilitate a long term national vision. Sustained bureaucratic cooperation is not the norm in a democratic government; the positions of various departments and agencies are often at odds as they each attempt to effectively represent differing constituencies. The methodology advocated here (a formal, top-down approach) is more reminiscent of classical Soviet

\(^3\)See George Bush, "Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium" (as delivered), Office of the Press Secretary (Aspen, Colorado), The White House, August 2, 1990. Ultimately, a permanent title for the strategy will be coined by the administration or emerge from another source. In the interim, the title "new national security strategy" has been chosen by the administration to fill the need of a standard label.
style strategic planning than the typically more ad hoc American style. While virtually no one would postulate that the results of the Soviet political system are desirable, western analysts of Soviet defense planning would contend that there are valuable lessons which can be borrowed from the formal process of establishing national military policy.

In the present era of declining resources available for defense programs, a top-down, streamlined, blueprint for national security strategy must be fashioned to garner consensus support among the legislative and executive branches of government and the public at large (much as the containment strategy did). This is precisely the process that has begun via President Bush's speech to the Aspen Institute (see chapter 4). While the specifics of the new strategy are yet to be decided, certain basic concepts associated with it (e.g. smaller budgets for all services via a restructuring process, more emphasis on "jointness" to consolidate DOD functions, procuring forces which can be more flexibly employed across the full spectrum of potential combat intensity, etc.) are going to happen. Now the armed services and other key players need to begin formulating positions on specific issues, such as arms control, designed to meet the basic concepts of the new strategy and the future planning, programming and warfighting directives which are likely to be based upon it.

C. ORGANIZATION AND APPROACH

Rather than focusing on NATO-Warsaw Pact order-of-battle calculus (as was typical during the Cold War) the model proposed in this thesis attempts to view naval arms control in the context of the new critical components of
national security, namely: national budget and defense resource constraints; military flexibility and mobility; expansion of U.S. military service roles to include increased statesmanship in the new world order; concern for the environment; humanitarian programs; and a renewed emphasis on education. The critical dilemma which will be addressed is how to maintain a potent, viable, fighting navy—designed to prevail against possible adversaries in times of crisis (and against a potentially rejuvenated Soviet threat)—while simultaneously functioning as a significant diplomatic player abroad (in the new world order) and as a credible political player at home in the domestic policy debate. Clearly, institutions which lose domestic political credibility will become irrelevant during the policy formulation process, a process which will surely be dominated by an increasingly introspective national agenda for the foreseeable future. An institution perceived as

4 Recommendations to be wary of a power grab by the Army and Air Force, with respect to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) which will emerge from the new strategy, is arguably premature and counter-productive. For a recent example of this approach see the lead off article in the 1991 Naval Review issue of Proceedings: RADM J.C. Wylie, USN (ret.), “Heads Up, Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 117, No. 5, May 1991, pp. 17-18. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS have described their vision of the future U.S. Navy in terms which should be reassuring (e.g. maritime superiority, power projection and sea control). If these statements accurately reflect the desires of the Secretary and the CJCS, then crying foul prematurely is not in the Navy’s best interest. The Navy will have to endure a share of the force structure cuts dictated by this process and will undergo restructuring along with the other services. The Navy would do well to play the role of unselfish team player at this point in the debate, garner political capital from such a stance, and then go to “battle stations” if and when unfairly or inappropriately brought under siege. Before that determination can be made, however, some type of “debate” of strawman UCP proposals is destined to occur. The Navy should concentrate on building its case for such second order policy questions in a manner consistent with the favorable description of the future U.S. Navy which has already occurred; see, for example James L. George, “A Strategy in the Navy’s Best Interest,” (1991 Prize Essay Contest winner), U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 117, No. 5, May 1991, pp. 114-123. Crying wolf should be reserved for real evidence of manipulating the UCP debate, not for the initiation of a debate process.
bureaucratically irrelevant and out-of-step will be a sure loser in the resource allocation game, regardless of the intellectual purity of it’s positions or successful track-record of the past.

It is instructive to recall that arms control is conceptually no different than any other tool of statesmanship; it can be used as a "cooperative" tool for building a better diplomatic relationship or it can be used as a "competitive" tool for securing politico-military advantages in the international arena. Throughout the history of the superpower relationship, the United States has been predisposed to viewing arms control as "cooperative" while the Soviets have viewed it as "competitive." For the United States to most effectively employ the arms control tool (of which one possible choice is to refrain from it entirely) a comprehensive review of naval arms control's place in post-Cold War security strategy is in order. Rather than examine naval arms control questions in a vacuum of maritime analysis, which is frequently done, this thesis attempts to put the question back into a coherent strategic context, subordinating it to higher order political and military objectives of the United States at this juncture of history.5

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II. NAVAL ARMS CONTROL IN THE COLD WAR: FUTURISTIC OR FOLLY?

A. BACKGROUND

Throughout the history of the Cold War, naval arms control has been a favorite subject of the Soviets, who desired to constrain, in any way possible, the more powerful and technologically superior U.S. Navy. Although the international environment may have fundamentally changed since Soviet naval arms control proposals were first voiced, the ideas which comprise the proposals, the supporting literature, and the players (on both sides of the now defunct "iron curtain") have not. If new ideas are to emerge in this field, they will most likely germinate from "old" ones, spawned in the era of Cold War. It is imperative, therefore, that strategic planners be well informed and conversant with the Soviets' proposed schemes for naval arms control. Was the Soviets' fixation with naval arms control actually ahead of its time, geostrategically, or was it (and does it continue to be) little more than a waste of time? To answer this question, it must be realized that the Soviets have

6There is a general consensus in the academic community that now is not the appropriate time for naval arms control, but that an appropriate time may come to exist in the future. For reasons why naval arms control may make more sense in the future, but not in the current international environment, see James J. Tritten "Naval" Arms Control: A Poor Choice of Words and an Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Come". Current Research on Peace and Violence, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere Finland, Vol XIII, No. 2, 1990, pp. 65-86. For reasons why naval arms control made sense in the Cold War, but not in light of the current internal priorities of the Soviet government, see Georgi Sturua (The Institute of World Economy and International Relations) "Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed", Presentation to the Naval Arms Limitation and Maritime Security Conference, sponsored by the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 26 June 1990.
advocated nearly every possible way to constrain all significant capabilities of the US Navy. Despite Soviet persistence, naval issues never came to the forefront of the superpower arms control agenda because the concept of negotiating naval issues was steadfastly rejected by U.S. government policy (not just by the Navy) for a variety of reasons (which can be summarized in nine specific items):

- Naval arms control is inherently difficult because naval forces are "...diverse, hard to compare, flexible and mobile."\(^7\)
- The historical record of attempts to control naval armaments is generally perceived as disappointing, especially the Washington and London Naval Treaties of the interwar period.\(^8\)
- Maritime nations value naval assets far greater than do continental powers.\(^9\)
- Maritime nations are more concerned about constraints upon the freedom of navigation than are continental powers because of the


\(^8\)The Washington and London precedents, along with the others of the interwar period, are still fertile fields for professional evaluation and debate. While some benefits to the effort existed, they were swept away in the rising tensions which led to the Second World War. Geoffrey Till's observation that "...arms control often appears as much a consequence as a cause of improved relations" ("Naval Arms Control Between the Great Powers: The Lessons of the Past", Naval Arms Limitations and Maritime Security Conference, (sponsored by the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University) Halifax, Nova Scotia, 26-28 June 1990) is a clear historical signpost that is equally germane today. See also, for example: Barry Hunt, "Of Bits and Bridles": Sea Power and Arms Control Prior to World War II. Presentation to the Naval Arms Limitation and Maritime Security Conference, sponsored by the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 26 June 1990; Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922. Princeton University Press, London.: 1946; and Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (5th ed.), chapter XXXVI, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc, New York.: 1967.

maritime approach to national security and the fostering of overseas economic interests.\textsuperscript{10}

- The U.S. can justify the need for naval superiority to counterbalance Soviet conventional superiority in Europe and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{11}
- Naval arms control has not been perceived as being as urgent an item for the superpower agenda as strategic nuclear arms control.\textsuperscript{12}
- Intrusive inspection regimes are not attractive to the side which "has more to lose". The U.S., although philosophically enthusiastic about intrusive inspection regimes in the strategic nuclear or conventional ground force contexts (arenas of competition in which it feels "behind") would be reluctant to compromise its clear technological and qualitative naval superiority (an arena in which it feels "ahead") to intelligence collection from abroad.\textsuperscript{13}
- Soviet arms control initiatives have been numerous and sporadic, resembling diplomatic trial balloons replete with repetitive ideological rhetoric rather than by being packaged and marketed as serious, "front burner" diplomatic proposals.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{10}A recent expression of these Mahanian tenets is ADM Carlisle A.H. Trost, "Soviets know Navy is the key to U.S. Strength", \textit{The Stars and Stripes}, September 26, 1989, p.10.

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{12}One simple evidence of this is the relatively small place that naval issues occupy at summit meetings of superpower leaders (CDR R. Mitchell Brown, USN, OP-06 Chair of Strategic Planning at the Naval Postgraduate School, interviewed by the author on December 12, 1989 following CDR Brown's receipt of a debriefing of the Malta Superpower summit at sea). Another example is the willingness of the Soviet Union to accept the exclusion of navies from the CFE mandate (see Ronald O'Rourke, "Naval Arms Control", CRS Issue Brief, 8 February 1990, pp. 1-2).


\textsuperscript{14}This was recently admitted to by a visible Soviet academic, Dr. Georgi Sturua (The Institute of World Economy and International Relations) "Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed". Presentation to the Naval Arms Limitation and Maritime Security Conference, sponsored by the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 26 June 1990.
- **Soviet adventurism** (principally the Brezhnev Doctrine) has derailed potential avenues for superpower agreement. (A conservative backlash by the Gorbachev government against its people threatens to derail the process again). This derailment has occurred primarily in the strategic nuclear arena, but other arms control avenues have also been affected (perhaps even including naval arms control).15

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union took every opportunity to score points in the East-West ideological struggle with their positions on, among other issues, naval arms control. The general thrust was that if the US strategy of containment was purely defensive, then why was the US Navy not only capable of massive, nuclear strikes against the Soviet homeland but why was it also routinely deployed in geographic position to execute such an attack, exercised in a manner indicative of a desire to perfect the technique, and why did it continue to develop the technological means to do it better? It should be noted that the Soviet Union was not only using naval arms control as ideological cannon fodder; it had real fears that the United States was preparing a nuclear assault against it in the early 1980s.16 The US Maritime Strategy was another piece of supporting evidence, in the minds of some...

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15A clear example of this is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Not only was SALT II a victim of this incident, but several proposals, at least of some interest to the Carter administration (particularly ASW free zones) went dead in the water. For example see James J. Tritten "'Naval' Arms Control: A Poor Choice of Words and an Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Come". *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere Finland, Vol XIII, No. 2, 1990, pp. 65-86. This list of factors which contribute to the back-burner status of naval arms control is not intended to be all inclusive or itemized in order of importance. It is simply a brief synopsis of the issues evident in the existing literature.

Soviet defense analysts, that the United States was preparing a nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{17}

If the concept of naval arms control is about to enter a new contextual era, then it is important to be aware of the various alternatives for naval arms control which have already been considered in order to assess what aspects, if any, are relevant, useful, workable, and potentially in the US national interest. Table 1, below, is an organized presentation of proposed avenues for naval arms control.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Possible Avenues for Naval Arms Control}
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Restrictions on Capability} \\
\hline
\textbf{A) Limitation on Weapons of Mass Destruction} \\
\hspace{0.5cm} 1) Nuclear Weapons \\
\hspace{1cm} a) Total Naval Nuclear Arsenal \\
\hspace{1cm} b) Nuclear Weapons Deployment \\
\hspace{1cm} c) Nuclear Weapons Testing \\
\hspace{0.5cm} 2) Chemical Weapons \\
\hspace{1cm} a) Total Naval Chemical Arsenal \\
\hspace{1cm} b) Chemical Weapons Deployment \\
\hspace{1cm} c) Chemical Weapons Testing \\
\hspace{0.5cm} 3) Biological Weapons \\
\hspace{1cm} a) Total Naval Biological Arsenal \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{17}Reports are beginning to surface that the cumulative effect of several strategic and political effects during this period caused real panic in the Kremlin about possible U.S. intentions to launch a nuclear strike against the USSR, most notably: deployment of Pershing II (see Oleg Gordievsky “Pershing Paranoia in the Kremlin”, London \textit{The Times} in English, February 27, 1990, pp. 12-13 (FBIS-SOV-90-052-A, March 16, 1990, pp. 76-80, 79)); and the saber-rattling rhetoric of top Reagan administration officials (in the form of public statements by President Reagan, Secretary of State Haig and Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese on the fighting of a limited nuclear war and American willingness to reinterpret or ignore provisions of previous arms control agreements).

\textsuperscript{18}Outline typology is the author's, however the substance of the typological breakdown has been drawn from several sources, including: James J. Tritten, "Naval Arms Control: A Poor Choice of Words and an Idea Whose Time Has Yet To Come", Radm J.R. Hill, \textit{Arms Control at Sea} and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Report on Naval Arms Control" (submitted to the the Senate Committee on Armed Services and The House Committee on Armed Services), April, 1991.
b) Biological Weapons Deployment

c) Biological Weapons Testing

B) Limitations on total force structure quantity (e.g. total number of ships allowed, etc.).

C) Limitations on specific categories of force structure quantity/quality (e.g. size of combatants, numbers of missiles that can be carried, etc.) This is the brand of naval arms control which was undertaken during the inter-war period (via limitations on battleship and cruiser construction).

D) Limitation on specific naval applications of technology, for example:

1) ABM Defense
2) GPALS
3) Cruise Missiles
4) ASW Defense
5) SLBMs
6) Stealth Aircraft

E) Limitation on total resource level allocated to the Navy (i.e. only a specified navy budget is permitted). While this idea is possibly attractive to defense budget cutters and is, theoretically, a legitimate path to arms control objectives (see chapter three), it is highly problematic because: it violates the established concept of a sovereign nation-state's right to a self-defense policy of its own choosing, verification concerns, and the justification for national naval power which is independent from the size/capability of another nation's navy.

• RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONS

A) Limitation on naval exercises

1) Limitation by number allowed
   a) Global in scope
   b) Regional in scope

2) Limitation by type/size allowed
   a) Global in scope
   b) Regional in scope

3) Limitation by duration allowed
   a) Global in scope
   b) Regional in scope

B) Limitation on peacetime deployment of naval power

1) Limitation by number allowed
   a) Global in scope
   b) Regional in scope

2) Limitation by type allowed
   a) Global in scope
   b) Regional in scope
C) Limitation on deployment of specific naval capabilities, for example
   1) Zones of Peace
   2) Nuclear Free Zones
      a) Global in scope
      b) Regional in scope
   3) Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
      a) Global in scope
      b) Regional in scope
   4) ASW Free Zones
   5) SSBN Safe Havens
      a) Global in scope
      b) Regional in scope

• CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES
  A) Measures designed to strengthen politico-military predictability
     (via enhanced transparency). Examples include:
     1) Static Data Exchanges
     2) Notification of Naval Exercises
     3) Bilateral/Multilateral Crisis Control Procedures
     4) Doctrinal Talks
  B) Measures designed to strengthen politico-military relationships
     among nations and via their respective political and military
     leadership, for example:
     1) Personnel Exchanges
     2) Bilateral/Multilateral Wargaming
     3) Professional Journal Article Exchanges
  C) Measures designed to “deconflict” potentially dangerous naval
     activities
     1) Via agreed procedure (e.g. the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement
        (INCSEA), the Dangerous Military Activities Agreement
        (DMA), the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement,
        The Respective Rights of Innocent Passage through Territorial
        Waters Statement, The Law of the Sea (Nautical "Rules-of-the-
        Road" portion, not seabed mining rights portion), etc.
     2) Via agreed technological standard (e.g. SLBM permissive action
        links (PALS)).
     3) Via declaratory weapons employment policies (e.g. no first use
        of nuclear weapons).
  D) Measures designed to use naval assets to contribute to top
     national/international items of priority, for example:
     1) Common naval procedures for bilateral/multilateral
        environmental protection/clean-up
     2) Common naval procedures for humanitarian relief operations
     (Source: the author)
It should be noted that the United States has not objected to all proposals. In fact, it has led the process and signed agreements which can be characterized as some of the most successful arms control agreements in force, namely the agreements on naval confidence building measures designed to "deconflict" potentially dangerous naval activities and those providing for military-to-military contacts (section 3C of Table 1).

A brief overview of these alternatives can shed light upon potentially promising regimes and those that appear of little value.¹⁹

B. RESTRICTIONS ON CAPABILITY

The history of arms control shows a general abhorrence for agreement between nations which impose "a capability vacuum"; traditional arms control regimes have codified both improved qualitative and quantitative enhancements to capability. Notable exceptions are the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty (which constrained an avenue of the arms race that, for different reasons, both superpowers chose not to embark upon); the INF Treaty (which was a complete anathema, heralded as a great success) and the naval agreements of the interwar period. In the latter case, the restrictions on battleship and cruiser construction simply provided incentives for redirecting the naval arms race onto other platforms, notably submarines, aircraft carriers, and more heavily armed cruisers. This regime did little, if anything, to reduce the signatory nations' capability to wage destructive warfare by sea via means not directly addressed in the treaties. If that was condition was not

¹⁹Radm J.R. Hill, Arms Control at Sea and James J. Tritten, ""Naval"" Arms Control: A Poor Choice of Words and An Idea Whose Time has Yet to Come" are excellent references.
bad enough, warship construction specifications that were specifically included in the treaties were flagrantly violated by Germany, Italy, and Japan. Perhaps more significant than the occurrence of flagrant cheating was that the British government (and perhaps others as well) unequivocally knew that violations were occurring and chose not to go public with them. For example, Great Britain had the opportunity to weigh an Italian cruiser in its Gibraltar drydock, and after discovering that it exceeded the 10,000 ton weight limit, hid its findings. In yet another case, the British Admiralty continued to record the incorrect but treaty-compliant tonnage for the German battleship BISMARCK, even after it was sunk and the Royal Navy’s Intelligence Division had examined the surviving ship’s logs and crew.

Democracies have, for political reasons, historically demonstrated reluctance to publicize clear treaty violations for fear of exacerbating the problem further and for fear of jeopardizing administration credibility. The Reagan administration, for example, was accused of trying to whip up anti-Soviet fervor by making official protests and public disclosures regarding Soviet violation of the ABM treaty (the object of the dispute was the Krasnoyarsk phased array radar). When President Gorbachev and former Foreign Minister Schevardnadze admitted (in the spirit of glasnost) that Krasnoyarsk was indeed an ABM Treaty violation, Western apologists for

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Soviet defense policy found their traditional, Cold War justifications for Soviet arms control positions had lost a considerable degree of credibility. The most disturbing aspect of the Krasnoyarsk radar dispute was that while the Soviets were publicly questioning the administration’s commitment to preserving the integrity of the ABM Treaty (by questioning the legality of American pursuance of SDI), they were knowingly and flagrantly violating the very same treaty. Even more recently than the Krasnoyarsk confrontation, serious concerns about Soviet violation of the INF treaty (due to the stockpiling/distribution of SS-23 intermediate range missiles to satellite states) under the surfaced and then were quietly killed; similarly, concerns over Soviet attempts to circumvent portions of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty are currently being monitored.22

While causing doubts about their own compliance with the INF Treaty and the unratted CFE Treaty, the Soviet Union still would like to negotiate the reduction of the Tomahawk SLCM and even American aircraft carriers, if possible. (It is critical to remember that regardless of Gorbachev’s true colors, the defense establishment which will supervise and direct any arms control negotiation are pedigreed cold warriors of long standing.) The SLCM is of grave concern to Soviet defense planners and has provided the impetus for the SLCM control measures which they have advocated in recent years:23

- SLCM range limited to 600 km (proposed during SALT II)

22For additional information on both of these cases see chapter three.

23In Whence the Threat to Peace (1892 ed.), USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow, 1982, the depiction of American cruise missile trajectories over Norway and Sweden effectively served to exacerbate the highly sensitive political implications of the “dual track” missile deployments and the execution of the U.S. maritime strategy.
• Prohibition of SLCMs w/range>600km until 31 Dec 81 (SALT II Protocol-June, 1979)
• Ban on deployment of SLCM w/range>600km (START negotiations 1982-June 1986)
• Ban on surface based SLCMs w/range>600km/numerical ceiling on submarine launched SLCMs (June, 1986)
• Ceiling of 400 nuclear SLCMs w/range>600km, all on submarines (Soviet draft agreement for START, July 1987)
• Limitation of 6000 nuclear SLCM warheads, 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems (agreement, distinct from START, during Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, Washington D.C., December, 1987).
• Expansion of above to stringent on-site inspection rqts.
• Ceiling of 1000 for all long-range (>600km) SLCMs-600 conventional (on certain categories of ships)-400 nuclear on two types of submarines and one type of surface ship.\(^\text{24}\)
• Exchange of data on nuclear SLCMs (with range of 300-600 KM). The confidential exchanges will take place annually.\(^\text{25}\)

The United States has been firmly opposed to limitation of this system by formal negotiation for several reasons: it would set a potentially dangerous precedent of capability limitation, the inherent force multiplier effect of the system is critical to maintain if aggregate numbers of platforms are to be reduced, and there are highly complex verification issues associated with such a regime.\(^\text{26}\) A sense of the Senate amendment to the FY1990 defense

\(^{24}\)The above listing is provided in David S. Yost "Controlling Sea Launched Cruise Missiles-The Most Difficult Question." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (vol. 115), September 1989, pp. 61-70.


\(^{26}\)Some possible verification schemes can be found in Valerie Thomas. “Three Approaches to Reductions in Tactical Naval Nuclear Weapons”. Presentation to the Naval Arms
authorization bill (S. 1352, passed on 1 August 1989) stated that any agreement on reducing or limiting strategic nuclear arms "should not prohibit or limit the deployment of nonnuclear cruise missiles."\textsuperscript{27} The ultimate effect of OPERATION DESERT STORM will be interesting to track, since it could stimulate more intensity to constrain this system, or stimulate precisely the opposite effect; reportedly, the Soviets would like to restrain the newly demonstrated US SLCM capability (which reinforces their fear of the effect of sea power upon the land theater) but might also like to reserve the right to obtain this capability for itself.

Proposals for the complete ban of naval nuclear weapons are discussed frequently in the literature. Supporters of banning naval nuclear weapons (other than submarine-launched ballistic missiles) include Admiral William Crowe, USN (ret.), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Paul Nitze, former U.S. arms control negotiator.\textsuperscript{28} These proponents argue that since the Soviet Navy is more heavily nuclear-armed and better prepared for nuclear war at sea than U.S. and its allies, nuclear war at sea would benefit the Soviet Union and possibly eliminate allied technological and conventional weapon superiority. A naval stalemate or "nuclear draw" would be to the strategic advantage of the Soviet Union, because the naval factor in military science is not central to its security and potential war effort, whereas it is very important to the security and the potential war effort of the United States and

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\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Congressional Record}, daily ed., 1 August 1989: S9198-S9199. \\
\textsuperscript{28}O'Rourke p. 12.
\end{flushright}
its allies. Banning nuclear weapons from naval forces would presumably eliminate the possibility of the Soviets resorting to nuclear war at sea to reverse losses in conventional naval warfare and would not test the concept of a firebreak between nuclear war at sea and nuclear war ashore. Such a ban would also eliminate the risk of a peacetime nuclear-weapon-related accident at sea, and reduce the potential escalation of any U.S.-Soviet naval incident. It would reduce the naval administrative workload associated with deploying nuclear weapons at sea, and it would free up scarce magazine space on the ships for conventional weapons that are much more likely to be used, especially in crisis-response operations in the Third World. A nuclear weapons ban would carry the side benefit of eliminating the political and public relations problems associated with the presence of nuclear-weapon-capable ships in foreign ports and waters (e.g. New Zealand). Since the United States is already phasing out older naval nuclear weapons because they are no longer militarily useful (the submarine launched anti-submarine rocket (SUBROC), the surface launched anti-submarine rocket (ASROC), and the nuclear surface to air missile (TERRIER BTN); banning naval nuclear weapons would thus only continue an effort that the U.S. Navy has already begun to implement.

Opponents of a ban argue that even if the agreement is strategically desirable, it would be impossible to verify and has a dangerous potential for nuclear breakout. They also assert that naval nuclear weapons are still

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29 Parenthetical note was inserted by the author.

30 O’Kourke p. 12.
needed to defend a post-INF European Theater. and other overseas allies, and
that the administrative workload and isolated problem of New Zealand do
not justify the sacrifice of a potentially important strategic capability.

Despite the specter of the oft discussed "slippery slope" leading from
acceptable naval arms control regimes uncontrollably to unacceptable ones, a
ban on all naval nuclear weapons could theoretically lock-in American naval
superiority, vis-à-vis not only the Soviet Union but future seaborne nuclear
threats from a plethora of other sources as well (see the possible future
international paradigms discussed in chapter 3). Such a ban would only be
acceptable, however, if a sufficient compliance scheme is first, possible;
second, able to be fully adopted (i.e. enforceable); and third, multilateral in
design. In the post-Cold War world, countries other than the big five nuclear
powers are sure to develop nuclear weapons that have the means for some
type of naval application, even if initially crude (e.g. a nuclear armed Indian
Navy). It is surely in the national security interest to prevent U.S. naval
forces from facing a third world nuclear threat in a time of crisis. Consider
how differently the US Navy would have operated in OPERATION DESERT
STORM if Saddam Hussein's Iraq had been thought capable of possessing
even the crudest nuclear weapon aboard a naval patrol boat. Despite the
theoretical merit of such a treaty, it is extremely difficult to imagine the
translation of the concept of banning nuclear weapons into a workable and
verifiable multilateral agreement when there has been so little progress on
naval arms control in the bilateral framework. With the removal of U.S.
nuclear systems from Europe (as a result of the INF Treaty), sea based nuclear
SLCM has become an important weapon system which can be quickly
returned to the European theater in order to bolster deterrence in time of crisis or war, without exposing U.S. allies to the political firestorm resulting from the basing of nuclear weapons ashore.

Another avenue of capability limitation schemes that the Soviet Union is pursuing is a trade of attack submarines for American aircraft carriers. These ideas, in their current form, have questionable military soundness (since the submarines considered are from obsolete classes) and should not be allowed to enter the debate, unless and until the new world order evolves into a more predictable cooperative structure over the long term.

C. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONS

The conceptual basis for restrictions on operations has been in existence for quite some time and been increasingly emphasized and advocated in the Gorbachev regime. Exercises could be limited, regulated, and observed, using the Helsinki and Stockholm models now in force for land exercises. Application of the Stockholm Agreement (now superseded by the Vienna 1990 Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures) directly in the blue water naval theater has been rejected by the western nations on many occasions. Restrictions could also be placed upon certain types of operations (e.g. limitations on forward deployed forces, ASW free zones, nuclear free zones, SSBN safe havens, etc).

Area proposals are probably the least likely regime since they exploit, to the advantage of the Soviet Union and perhaps more importantly, other

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31Hill, p.70.
potential adversaries, the difference in naval force structure and operating philosophies between advanced Western navies and the rest of the world. ASW free zones, for instance, would greatly assist the Soviet Union and any other participant in solving one of the most difficult strategic targeting problems: localization of U.S. ballistic missile submarines. Similarly, limitations on forward deployed forces and nuclear free zones/zones of peace also prey upon the asymmetries of the two navies. Of particular concern in many quarters is the cumulative decoupling effect of the INF treaty and nuclear free zones (in the Mediterranean or northern theaters) on the European balance of power equation. If this were not enough, the definitional, verification and enforcement hurdles which must be overcome for such a regime would be extraordinarily complex (e.g. basing questions within the zones, the role of superpower allies and circumvention strategies (reflagging of ships/retitling of bases), etc.).

The Soviet have repeatedly stated proposals for nuclear free zones and have, not surprisingly, focused their rhetoric on areas most closely adjacent to the Soviet homeland:

We have proposed a limitation of military-naval activity in the northern seas, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific to the West several times.... However the United States and its allies reject even the possibility of conducting dialogue in this field. They attempt to justify this refusal with the most varied arguments: the freedom of passage, the inability to organize monitoring [kontrola] of military-naval forces' activities, the vulnerability of its communications, and so on.

The real reason lies in the West's refusal to give up its superiority at sea. This is where the main obstacle on the road to turning the seas and oceans into a peace zone lies.34

America, as the world's only maritime superpower, has little or nothing to gain by restrictions on operations (regardless of the final character of the emerging world paradigm). Steadfast U.S. commitment to the principle of Freedom of the Seas has been constantly and unequivocally articulated in all relevant policy statements.

D. CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMS)

The objective of confidence building measures is to bolster security and stability through political predictability and military transparency. They can encompass a broad range of activities which include: the exchange of strategists (military and civilian), bilateral/multilateral wargaming and simulations, data exchanges, advanced notification of weapons testing, measures to prevent the occurrence of dangerous incidents at sea, strengthening of the role of permissive action links (PALs), and doctrinal/declaratory policy statements (e.g. no first use of nuclear weapons at sea policy). This arena contains several potentially useful arms control regimes.

To begin with, strategist exchanges are already being conducted as part of the overall effort to improve superpower relations (an exchange of senior

33See, for example, Hill, pp 80-81, 138, 168-71.

officer students of U.S. and Soviet war colleges was recently conducted following the planting of the seeds for such ventures via the Admiral Crowe/General Akhromeyev reciprocal visits). Additionally, the Soviet Union and United States signed the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement and the 1989 Dangerous Military Activities (DMA) agreement, expanding on the successful 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement ("INCSEA," 1972). INCSEA has nearly eliminated the dangerous confrontations that were once all too prevalent. The Soviet Union has not stressed this theme in their literature recently due to apparent prioritization of other proposals (especially ship/submarine launched cruise missile (SLCM) control). They have indicated at INCSEA review commissions, however, that they are interested in expansion of the INCSEA model and they have formally proposed several naval CSBMs in March 1989 at the CSBM talks of the Vienna meeting of the 35 nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Additional milestones in US-Soviet naval CSBMs are the


37In the past the Navy took great pains to make the distinction between maritime safety agreements (such as INCSEA and DMA) and arms control confidence building measures.

38Capt Jack Grunawalt, USN (ret.), "Rules of Engagement Seminar" presentation by the Naval War College to deploying surface forces, Long Beach Naval Station, Long Beach, Ca., February 8, 1989.

The conduct of bilateral/multilateral military simulations and the exchange of non-sensitive data are in the sphere of confidence building measures and present some interesting possibilities. The Soviets are missing no opportunities to state their desire for a confidence-building measures agreement, as this recent statement by Fleet Admiral Chernavin (Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy) indicates:

The USSR supports the idea of calling a special conference to discuss questions of limiting the activities of the military-naval forces, as well as their reduction. We are ready to work toward that aim through an agreement on the most simple decisions like strengthening confidence-building measures of trust in relation to military-naval forces. However, the United States and its allies reject even the possibility of conducting dialogue in this field....

The value of CSBMs is the ability to strengthen the military-to-military relationship and/or the political relationship between nations. One critical test for their value must be if the political strengthening can be accomplished without significant loss of military capability or intelligence. Another test is if the strengthening of the military-to-military relationship has appreciable value in its own right.

39See Tritten, "Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Come".

E. WHERE IS THE COLD WAR MOMENTUM LEADING US?

Thomas L. Friedman's piece, "Why Arms Control Isn't Sexy Anymore" makes the case that building a package of security arrangements with a nation whose future is highly uncertain is a potentially futile business, since the U.S.-Soviet confrontation is no longer the only game in town. The United States needs to return to an analysis of the basic objectives for arms control (see chapter 3), explore competing strategies for arms control, and put arms control back into its strategic context, rather than simply allowing the inertia of history to carry it forward. Such a redefinition of objectives is only possible through strong, powerful and credible presidential leadership.

The nine traditional inhibiting factors associated with naval arms control must be re-examined under "New Thinking." While the ultimate destiny of perestroika has yet to be decided, the evolution of the superpower arms control agenda to an era beyond domination by strategic forces only, willingness of the Soviet Union to negotiate on asymmetrical reductions of land forces in the CFE context, the more benign tenor of Soviet foreign policy, and the new willingness to tolerate on-site inspections, radically alter the traditional assumptions—all of which make naval arms control a more likely possibility. During Admiral Trost's tenure as CNO, he delivered a speech advocating, essentially, to stall the naval arms control process as long as

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possible while the West gets more time to draw reliable conclusions about the true character of the Soviet Union's military reforms.\textsuperscript{43} While the Bush administration adopted this course for the near term (which made sense), the position has given the Soviets an angle (whether valid or not) for labeling the Americans as reluctant participants in the new international environment. The Soviet commander-in-chief of their Naval Force, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, has assessed the situation in the following way:

Our American partners do all they can today in order to have their naval force outside the agenda. They have advantages in certain aspects and they don't want to part with them. [Words indistinct] that the United States is more a sea power than we are, that its sea performs the function of a communication with the allies and as a protection, and we as a land power can use trains, doesn't correspond to reality.

So, mutual distrust and inability to understand each other-this is what we run into in the naval sphere. It seems that we've overcome that barrier to land and air forces. As far as the naval forces are concerned, we are only approaching it, and we hope that the stepped-up contacts between Soviet and American military will help surmount this obstacle as well.\textsuperscript{44}

Naval arms control has receded from being the "hot topic" that it was becoming in 1989/1990 for two primary reasons: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the growing internal unrest and power struggles within the Soviet Union. Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM relegated all other international issues to the back burner, however war fixation has already


\textsuperscript{44}Dobrov, Mikhail, Commentary in World Service, in English, 1510 GMT 21 OCT 1989 (FBIS-SOV-89-204, October 24, 1989, p. 7).
disappeared. The Soviets can be expected to once again seize opportunities to lambast American reluctance to negotiate on naval arms (via the usual state-controlled media and government sources). In fact, the rhetoric can reasonably be expected to increase in conjunction with any reassertion of the conservative power bloc within the Soviet government. The Soviets can be expected to advance proposals for SLCM control and for increased confidence building measures. This will be, however, low voltage rhetoric for a low order issue of the US-Soviet agenda.

There are much more significant economic and political issues on the table and therefore, it is logical to expect that the Soviet Union will continue to take pot shots at naval arms control, but will not waste scarce high-level political capital on the subject.\textsuperscript{45} If the CFE treaty withstands its current difficulties and is ratified, and if there is continued progress on non-naval confidence building measures via the CSCE process, the pressure to match asymmetrical land reductions with asymmetrical naval reductions (both from the internationally community and from congress) is likely to escalate. When these forces combine with the fiscal requirements of budget politics, the prospects for some form of naval arms control become greater still. The preceding alternatives are, however, only the momentum of naval arms control's Cold War legacy. If the United States does not want to lag behind

\textsuperscript{45}Georgi Sturua (the Institute of the US and Canada) "Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed." Presentation to the Naval Arms Limitation and Maritime Security Conference, sponsored by the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 26 June 1990.
change, coping with the Cold War momentum is not good enough. Naval Arms control must be redefined in a new and appropriate strategic context.
III. THE NEW STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

A. BACKGROUND

The democratic watershed of 1989 has not only permanently affected relations with the Soviet Union and the face of Europe, it has stimulated debate of issues whose significance extends well beyond those concerning Gorbachev's intentions and importance. Several critical implications of the Gorbachev phenomenon continue to stimulate lively debate, however:

- What will the nature of the government and leadership be which will ultimately succeed Mikhail Gorbachev?
- Will the Soviet Union actually be able to pursue a non-zero sum game strategy (as the West would like to believe) or is a zero sum game strategy inevitable?\(^4\)
- Is it in the best interests of the United States if Gorbachev succeeds or fails?\(^7\)

The issue of Gorbachev's stability is still unclear, especially after the crackdown on the Baltics and other signs of a conservative backlash. While Gorbachev must now deal with a more explosive Soviet agenda than was the case when he initially assumed power (the collapse of every Communist

\(^4\)The term “zero sum game” is a term of strategic gaming theory. It denotes a gaming regime in which only one side can win (and the other must lose, by definition). A gaming regime which postulates an outcome in which both sides can win (or both can lose) is termed a “non-zero sum game”. This reference to gaming theory is often used to introduce the dilemma of Gorbachev’s strategic vision. Is perestroika designed to ultimately strengthen the socialist state to compete more effectively with the West, similar to the rationale for détente (zero sum game) or is it designed to forge a more cooperative and peaceful world order in which all will ultimately benefit and prosper (non-zero sum game)?

\(^7\)The critical implication of this question begs consideration of the strategic cost of various political deals intended to “reward Gorbachev”. Perhaps an alternative to Gorbachev, even more friendly to the West, can be encouraged by keeping Gorbachev's feet to the fire.
regime in Eastern Europe, worsening domestic economic and labor conditions, worsening ethnic unrest and demands for autonomy, etc.), he has solidified his power base early in his tenure, established a reform element as a key power bloc within the Politburo and party apparatus, and has secured for himself unprecedented emergency powers. Of prime importance to the West, he has personally engendered an unprecedented degree of excitement for re-integration of the Soviet future into the Western-led international community, and is receiving substantial assistance from democratic governments who fear that any alternative to Gorbachev's central leadership would be worse.

In regard to Soviet foreign policy, however, much more time will be required to accumulate enough information to form a consensus on Soviet defense prioritization; grave contradictions currently exist in defense cuts announced by the Soviet government, Soviet procurement trends, and estimated defense spending levels.\(^48\) Due to the current contradictory nature of the evidence, the lag time inherent in even the most sincere attempts to slow the Soviet military juggernaut, and the critical implications of the final conclusions of this process, the CIA and the intelligence communities of the armed services are creating entirely new methodologies to assess Soviet

\(^{48}\)See, for example, Representative Les Aspin (D-Wis), Chairman, House Armed Services Committee "Defense Priorities in the Gorbachev Era", Address to the Fourth Annual AAAS Colloquium on Science, Arms Control and National Security, Washington D.C., November 17, 1989. This address highlighted uncertainties within the U.S. government concerning the real trend of Soviet expenditures on modern strategic nuclear systems, R&D, warships, tanks, aircraft, etc. (trends which may be independent from the elimination of older, obsolete systems).
defense efforts in the Gorbachev era. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Radm. Thomas Brooks, USN and Mr. Andrew Marshall, Director of the OSD Net Assessment Office have announced that the United States has observed reductions in the exercise and deployment tempos exhibited by the Soviet navy. Other administration officials have contradicted this view and postulated that despite patterns which may be emerging in ground forces, Soviet naval exercise and operations levels may actually be increasing. The administration has concluded, not without dissenters however, that the prospects of a more cooperatively oriented international system (if not a non-zero sum game philosophy proper) is too promising not to be pursued wholeheartedly, and therefore Gorbachev's success was deemed to be in the long-term best interests of the United States.

This current climate has raised the specter of unprecedented international uncertainty and the prospect of peaceful change in many arenas of previous


50 Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, "Testimony Before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues", March 7, 1991, pp. 8-12, etc. and Mr. Andrew Marshall, Director, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), presentation to the National Security Affairs department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca, September 24, 1989.


52 Ibid. Additionally, Secretary of Defense Cheney's about face on this question, which literally occurred within the matter of a few days, following testimony on the question before congressional committees, is highly indicative of the prelude to, and final adoption of, a common policy position for the administration.
superpower confrontation and stalemate, such as Nicaragua and Cambodia. Progress is also more likely between the two Koreas and in the Middle-East. Even South Africa, a potential tinderbox of bloody social upheaval, is making unforeseen progress to peaceful change within this climate. Clearly, this is the most dynamic period of international change since the beginnings of the Cold War. It has been fascinating to observe the expanding scope of the implications associated with this period; not only are political observers questioning the ultimate destiny of Soviet "new thinking": glasnost, perestroika, and "defensive defense"/"reasonable sufficiency," but questions of a new world order and a system of international law, with a potency heretofore thought merely idealistic, appear to be increasingly viable possibilities. The coordinated action of the permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait supports this view. In addition to unprecedented military action against Iraq and the imposition of the most comprehensive regime of economic sanctions ever, U.N. progress on other issues, such as resolution of the Cambodian conflict, is further testimony to the fact that the Cold War is over. While the scope and longevity of this transformation are as yet unclear, it is certain that a new paradigm for the international system is emerging which fundamentally differs from the classic Cold War paradigm. The post-Cold War era is upon us.

In order to be a successful player in the new system, America must clearly define the new environment and her place within it. The current era will not be known for what it is not much longer; it will soon be known for what it evolves into, just as surely as Pax Britannica is known as Pax Britannica, not
merely as the post-Napoleonic period. Whatever the outcome of the current paradigm shift, the critical strategic decisions for the future of America must be made against the backdrop of a completely new international environment. The emergence of a new fundamental framework implies that entrenched policy positions, initially established in a world order now defunct, must be reevaluated to assess their potential applicability and utility within the new system. Simply stated, old questions will need new answers.

One such strategic question now facing American national security strategists is the future of the arms control process. Arms control has traditionally been a complicated venture, due to complex technical issues of verification and superpower defense calculus; negotiations with a counterpart not bound by the constraints of an open society and free press; ratification procedures which are unpredictably sensitive to world political events, the power and influence of individual legislators; the domestic political environment; and the image the administration desires to portray to the public.

Today, the complexities of the arms control process can be thought of as superimposed upon new and more complex dimensions of strategic decision making. Although the U.S.-Soviet relationship is undeniably not the confrontational one that existed in during the era which preceded SALT negotiations, ratification of an agreement by the cognizant Soviet legislative body (the Committee on Defense and State Security of the Supreme Soviet) implies that a Soviet administration may become, in the near future, as limited in controlling the ratification process as a U.S. presidential administration. While the committee has not evolved into a truly
independent body, analogous to congressional committees in the United States, it certainly does not function as a mere rubber stamp for the Soviet President. The possibility of the Soviet government trying to justify an agreement to a skeptical legislature, analogous to the American experience with SALT II, introduces an unprecedented, yet highly significant new variable in arms control negotiation. Furthermore, far greater technical complexity in arms control may be on the horizon, since the United States and Soviet Union have moved beyond the era in which arms control was concerned only with strategic nuclear systems. Whereas an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminates theater nuclear weapons (whose ranges are between 500 and 5500km) and chemical weapons (CW) treaties are now in force, major problems remain which jeopardize the recently signed Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and the long-sought (and still unfinished) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). In addition to these negotiating fora, both the United States and Soviet Union have openly discussed the framework for a possible CFE II and START II (which envisages warhead reduction 25% below START I levels).

While counting rules and methodologies for comparing asymmetries in strategic nuclear systems have, for better or worse, been institutionalized; counting rules and evaluating "offsetting asymmetries" in newly evolving

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54 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. For annual assessment of treaty compliance and issues of interest relating to the treaty see United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's annual report to Congress.
realms of arms control have yet to be fully defined, compared and debated. It can be postulated that “offsetting asymmetries” is entering an infinitely more complex definitional era than has existed previously. How, for instance, does one trade asymmetries in strategic arms for conventional arms, conventional land forces for conventional naval forces, strategic offensive systems for strategic defensive systems, conventional arms for chemical weaponry, chemical for nuclear, etc.? The emergence of strategic defense technology and the current “open skies” proposals highlight the specter of arms control in space as well as for nuclear, chemical and conventional systems in the terrestrial environment. It is clear that the current U.S.-Soviet arms control agenda is more lengthy and complex than at any time in the history of the relationship.

B. IS GORBACHEV'S ARMS CONTROL FOR REAL?

It seems only to prudent to recognize the difficulties in the current arms control regimes before conceptualizing new ones, especially ones which will be conceived in a new international environment. Verification and compliance concerns have not disappeared along with the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, or even Soviet admission that the Krasnoyarsk radar was indeed a violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

55The Reagan administration made it a point to differentiate between verification and compliance, indicating that compliance was the critical goal. What good, the administration argued, is the ability to verify a treaty if a violation could not be made public without compromising the means of verification. Such cases, (of which many existed) resulted in the inability to translate treaty violation data into future treaty compliance. Compliance, then, rather than verification, had to become the benchmark of acceptability.
After the initial euphoria over the completion and signing of a CFE Treaty, contentious issues are surfacing with regard to Soviet redesignation of units to preclude them from aggregate Treaty Limiting Equipment (TLE) force levels, namely:

- Exclusion of Soviet land-based naval aircraft from their allowed total of combat aircraft from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU).
- Exclusion of three motorized rifle divisions (transferred to the Soviet Naval Infantry) which are outfitted with, among other systems, 800 modern tanks. Justification of such a force for "coastal defense" purposes is highly questionable.56

This behavior is difficult to understand: why would the Soviets sacrifice the political capital they bought with a willingness to engage in CFE negotiations for a marginal quantity of naval force which is not geo-strategically significant? These forces may have a limited operational role, but clearly do not resurrect the potential for mounting a theater strategic offensive at the group of fronts level of warfare (the classic planning scenario for NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in Europe). The coalition of military and conservative political forces in the Soviet Union are making a statement through this action. The West must question the wisdom, however, of negotiating with a partner who can not deliver in a consistent or reliable manner.

CFE is not an isolated case in point. The INF Treaty is also one in which there was a major disconnect between grandiose political rhetoric and actual Soviet follow through. One of the principal selling points of the INF treaty was that the zero-zero formula made it very difficult to cheat and easy to

verify.\textsuperscript{57} It is abundantly clear that the INF treaty can be easily circumvented, in strategically significant ways, even in an era of \textit{glasnost}. The relatively small missiles can be covertly stockpiled, new weapons can be introduced to cover the same target set but whose range parameters exclude it from INF confines, etc. Debate concerning treaty circumvention turned from theoretical objections to serious concern when the governments of East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria admitted that Soviet made SS-23 intermediate range missiles were deployed in their countries, following press reports that such missile deployments had indeed occurred. Reportedly, 72 SS-23s were located in Czechoslovakia, 24 in Bulgaria and 24 in East Germany.\textsuperscript{58} The Soviet Union's response to the situation has been to claim:

- The missiles were “dispatched” to Eastern European allies before the INF Treaty was signed and and were therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union during treaty negotiation.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{57}A thorough examination of arms control policy in the first Reagan term can be found in Strobe Talbott, \textit{Deadly Gambits}. Alfred A. Knopf, New York: 1984. The book recounts the bureaucratic struggle between Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (PM) and Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (ISP), the pointmen for competing schools of thought on arms control policy within the administration. The author's characterization of the policy evolution has been viewed as more sympathetic to the positions of Richard Burt and the State Department than the positions then ascribed to Perle and the Defense Department.

\textsuperscript{58}Bill Gertz, "Discovery of Soviet missiles sidetracks arms-control efforts". \textit{Washington Times}, 2 April 1990, p. 3.

• “All OTR-23's (SS-23s) that were at the Soviet Union's disposal have been scrapped under the control of the American commission set up in compliance of the treaty.”

• “Manufacture of such missiles has stopped, which too has been checked by the U.S. Commission supervising the production process at the missile assembly plant in Votkinsk.”

• “…The sole existing OTR-23's are the property of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria respectively, and it's up to these countries to decide what to do with their missiles. The East German Government, for one, has decided to scrap them.”

• “…All of the OTR-23's are equipped with conventional, not nuclear warheads.

The prime reason for the dismay about the SS-23s is that during the INF negotiations U.S. negotiators sought assurances from the Soviets on 10 occasions that no INF missiles had been transferred to Warsaw Pact allies. The Soviets responded in the negative on each occasion. An unnamed Bush administration state department official is reported to have said, “If we had known about these missiles before the [1987] treaty was signed, we would not have recommended that Ronald Reagan sign it.” A pentagon official, also unnamed in the press, put it as follows: “This was a failure of intelligence and a case of Soviet duplicity”. The official said that “discovery of missiles covered by the INF Treaty has prompted the administration to slow down

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60 Gertz, p.3.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.
negotiations for the START and CFE treaties, which senior administration officials had hoped to conclude this year. This assessment appears to have been borne out by the results of the Bush-Gorbachev Summit in Washington (June, 1990). In addition to Soviet concerns regarding German unification and domestic political pressures on Gorbachev, American concerns over INF and the future of the arms control process all appear to have contributed to the slowed pace of START and CFE negotiations, resulting from the superpower summit. The SS-23 case is sure to be an issue in the ratification effort of any future arms control treaty, since the verification provisions of INF are the model for potential verification regimes for START and CFE. The provisions, heretofore thought nearly impossible to secure from the Soviet Union, were intended to greatly enhance treaty verifiability, such that a situation like that of the SS-23s would not occur. Fortunately, however, the possibility of a repeat of the SS-23 situation is far less likely in emerging Eastern European democracies than it was in the now defunct satellite states of the Cold War era.

At this juncture, the critical implication of this issue is not SS-23 missile characteristics, whether the possible violation was a result of Soviet duplicity or mismanagement, the true orientation of emerging Eastern European states, the degree of freedom of the press in these countries, or even the

65Ibid. The SS-23 incident may allow Sen Jesse Helms (R-NC), one of the few prominent congressional critics of the INF treaty, to champion another look at the issue of “cover” Soviet missiles. Sen Helms has called the INF treaty the “It’s Not Finished Treaty” in his speeches on the subject.
inability of western intelligence to adequately monitor the agreement. The critical implication is the wisdom of proceeding so quickly to complete an entire package of arms control agreements in a period of revolutionary change and uncertainty for the sake of political expediency.

Regardless of whether the INF treaty was violated, many senior officials and defense specialists believe that the recent flurry of arms control progress threatens to outstrip, in a fundamental way, the U.S. ability to monitor existing agreements and those on the horizon. For example, Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) recently expressed concern that the military services and defense department will be unable to provide the requisite number of Russian linguists and other arms control observers necessary just for verification of INF and START, not to mention START II, CFE, CFE II, etc.66

International change and geo-political uncertainty have the potential to force a redefinition of the objectives, rules and dangers lurking in the arms control thicket. This has certainly been borne out in the slowdown on CFE and START, which were nearly accepted as "done deals" less than one year ago. The danger of rushing headlong to capture a moment of political promise, despite the weight of evidence on "technical issues," is very real. A fundamental reappraisal of the traditional arms control process (originally created to meet the needs of a now defunct system of international relations)

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66RADM Thomas Brooks, USN, Director, Naval Intelligence (DNI) briefing at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., January 17, 1990.
must logically occur before lower order issues of agreement, execution and implementation are considered.

C. REFRACTING THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR ARMS CONTROL

Having briefly reviewed some of the topical arms control obstacles, it is worthwhile to recall the underlying philosophy for engaging in arms control in the first place. Since the inception of U.S.-Soviet bilateral arms control (a relatively recent development in the diplomatic history of agreements to control armaments)\(^6\) an unquestioning commitment to strategic nuclear and land based conventional arms control has become politically akin to loving motherhood and apple pie. Commitment to the continuation of the process, was, in the opinion of some, more important than the final results produced by the process, or whether the process really furthered the initial objectives at all.\(^7\) The arms control community reached a general consensus in the early 1960s that there were three basic goals of arms control:

- \textit{Reduce the Likelihood of War}—Arms control should reduce military capabilities and therefore reduce fear of an enemy's first strike.
- \textit{Reduce the Consequences of War}—Arms control should reduce the damage inflicted should war occur due to the reduced stockpile of weapons or limited availability of weapons.

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\(^6\) See James L. George, \textit{Negotiating Naval Arms Control in Multilateral Fora.}, Presentation to the Naval Arms Limitation and Maritime Security Conference, sponsored by the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 27 June 1990.

\(^7\) See Strobe Talbott, \textit{Deadly Gambits}. The Reagan administration was unusual since it began with unabashed disenchantment with the products of the process, and therefore, with the arms control process itself.
• *Reduce the Cost of National Defense*—Arms control should reduce the cost of national defense since limitations on weaponry, personnel, and/or operations would result in budget savings.\(^6\)

Since the time these goals were articulated and generally accepted, the evolution of the arms control process can be depicted pictorially as three overlapping circles, each of which represents a distinct realm within the arms control umbrella (see Figure 1). Each circle defines a distinct methodology and theoretical construct for achieving the aims of arms control. From these different conceptual approaches flow differing policy alternatives associated with their implementation.

It is important to note at the outset that one of the circles, under the broader aegis of arms control, is itself labeled "Arms Control" and is therefore not typologically precise since it represents one distinct path (or subset) for arms control. This specific path is no more or less valid than the competing paths depicted by the other two circles. The "Arms Control" approach has become incorrectly synonymous with the entire process. This realm, more accurately described as "arsenal balance," "offsetting asymmetries" or
“balancing asymmetries”, represents the policy route which has dominated the superpower relationship since the 1972 SALT I and Anti-Ballistic Missile System (ABM) agreements. One of the initial observations which can be made from Figure 1 is that the orientation of the U.S.-Soviet arms control relationship, characterized by SALT and START, is not the only option for future progress and is not the only precedent which has met with some degree of success. In fact, the fundamental change in security strategy, spawned by the democratic watershed of 1989, logically implies that fundamentally different methodologies will need to be explored.70

Eric Grove of the Foundation for International Security, argues quite convincingly that the overlapping circles which depict competing arms control methodologies are quickly evolving into a confused collage, devoid of strategic coherence. It is imperative, however, to appreciate the differences represented by each sphere and recognize the policy implications associated with these differences. The three circles represent competing strategies of achieving the principle aim of arms control: namely, the preservation of national security through international military stability.71 The methodologies can be described as follows:

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70 See George, for instance.

71 Dr. Eric Grove, Foundation for International Security, Adderbury, United Kingdom, Epilogue Address, "Signalling Intentions, Limiting Capabilities and Maintaining Security-A Fine Line?" for the Naval Arms Limitations and Maritime Security Conference, (sponsored by the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University) Halifax, Nova Scotia, 26-28 June 1990. In Dr. Grove’s typology, each circle is a metaphorical realm whose objective is stability. I define the real objective of arms control in the current era to be national security through international military stability, rather than just stability itself. While these terms have become fuzzy during the Cold War, it is appropriate in the post-Cold War era to think through them anew. Is stability between the US and USSR vital in an era in which the USSR could
- **Disarmament**—Security and stability are functions of force quantity. Lower force levels mean lower risks, consequences, and costs. Disarmament can be achieved through unilateral, bilateral, and/or multilateral means.

- **"Arms Control"**—Security and stability are functions of arsenal balance. This is the methodology, more accurately denoted as arsenal balance or arms limitation, which has dominated the U.S.-Soviet arms control relationship since the inception of the SALT process. If quantities of force can't be reduced, then balanced (or equal) levels of force are deemed more stable than unconstrained or unbalanced ones. Since the military arsenals of sovereign nations have different compositions, formulas for absolute equality are impossible. Therefore, stability can be fostered by attempting to balance the inherent asymmetries existing between the parties.

- **Confidence Building Measures**—Security and stability are functions of political predictability and military transparency. Predictability of a potential adversary's actions and intentions is the critical factor for security, regardless of force quantity or force balance. Predictability, although perhaps bolstered by constrained force levels, is actually acquired through military transparency, namely the acquisition of information via formal communications and/or through the inertia of experience accrued during a relationship (i.e. the relationship's history).72

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cease to be a superpower? Adherence to the concept of stability implies that the US must also become weak to preserve the balance. National security, not stability itself, has historically been the dominant theme in global politics since the Treaty of Westphalia and will remain so in an international order of sovereign nation-states. Through the Cold-War experience, the goal of strategic stability between nuclear superpowers, each of whom represent opposing ideological camps, became entrenched. It need not always be so. The Bush-Gorbachev Summit in Helsinki, (September 1990) stimulated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait raises the specter that military stability (i.e. stability through balanced force levels) may not be absolutely essential in the Post-Cold War world. Can the world be stable if Germany, India, or China, for example, fields a larger army than the Soviet Union or United States? Ultimately, international military stability need not be the guarantor of national security. Perhaps, in the words of President Bush, the rule of law (via the UN) will replace the law of the jungle (military force). The philosophy of US arms control policy should be to encourage the transition, without leaving our nation exposed to the many threats to it's survival which will continue to exist for a lengthy period.

72 Author's adaptation of the Grove presentation.
In addition to suggesting that there are other paths to the goals of arms control other than through force level caps and balances, it is equally important to appreciate that the three methodologies, distinct and separate in theory, are in fact related and exhibit important common characteristics, pictorially represented as areas of overlap. For instance, the INF Treaty not only dictated balanced force levels or a SALT type building cap, it actually reduced existing operational forces (in this case, intermediate range nuclear systems). Reduction, rather than the previous and politically more modest goal of limitation, was the policy of the Reagan administration and was the underlying philosophy which necessitated rejection of the SALT precedent in favor of START and INF. The INF Treaty, then, conceptually exists in the overlap area between the “arms control” circle and the “disarmament” circle. It could also be argued that a significant degree of confidence is gained from enhanced on-site inspections (OSI), intelligence gathering and personnel contacts, thereby conceptually locating the treaty in the overlap area shared by each of the three metaphorical circles. Not only should the “arms control”/(arsenal balance/building cap) regimes be reevaluated through the typology of Figure 1, but other arms control precedents should also be reviewed as well. The oft-cited 1963 “Hot Line” agreement is solely a Confidence Building Measure (CSBM), while the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTB), Outer Space Treaty (OST), Seabed Arms Control Treaty (SACT), etc. would most closely fit into the overlap between between “arms control”

(arsenal balance/building cap) and CSBMs. If the model could be conveniently depicted in three dimensions, the aforementioned "environmental" agreements would exist in the "arms control"/CSBM overlap, on a recessed dimensional plane representing environmental impact concerns. These examples are intended to provide an *illustrative* demonstration of the content potential of the arms control model which has been introduced. It is not intended to be comprehensive.

It is only through a framework of desired outcome objectives (such as that which is presented here) that examination of potential future arms control regimes can be intelligently made, rather than upon an extrapolation of the entrenched Cold War precedent. One such issue is so-called "naval arms control". This catch all term, like similar generic terms for nuclear arms control or conventional arms control, encompasses proposals for disarmament, "arms control" (arsenal balance/building cap), operational restrictions and CSBMs.

**D. THE NAVAL ROLE IN POST-COLD WAR ARMS CONTROL**

With the Cold-War over, naval arms control (like many other well entrenched Cold War "non-starters") is being reexamined. Who could have predicted even a year ago that Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, senior arms control advisor to President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, would testify as an expert witness before the United States Senate.\(^7^4\) Is the climate for naval arms

\(^7^4\) See Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, senior arms control Advisor to President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, testimony before the Subcommittee on Projection of Forces and Regional Defense, Committee on Armed Services, "Toward the Banning and Complete Elimination of Tactical
control (consisting of either CSBMs, restrictions on operations, or limitations in force structure or technology) conducive to an agreement that could enhance mutual interests? Rather than examine these questions in a maritime vacuum, which is frequently done, it is imperative to put the question back into its strategic context, subordinating it to higher order political and military questions. Naval arms control should be approached, in simplest terms as a third order policy question, or as a fourth or fifth order question if a more rigorously analogous typology is adopted. The simplest way to view naval arms control, within a coherent context for national security, is as the third step in a three step hierarchical model of policy formulation (Figure 2).

Figure 2 presents a cognitive map which depicts the relationship between ends and means in a logical “top-down” methodology similar to the classical Soviet approach to strategic planning. Historically, the United States has

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Nuclear Weapons of the Soviet Union and the USA Naval Forces. About the Problem of Negotiations of Naval Forces of these Countries. [sic], May 8, 1980.

Theoretically, there are four conceptual approaches to national strategic planning, which depend upon how one desires to begin the policy formulation process. The process can begin with:

1. Identification of broad national objectives/goals
2. Identification and assessment of a threat to the nation
3. Estimate of national resources that will be made available for specific purposes
4. Recognition of the distribution of bureaucratic power within governments (to be followed by a plan of action which will promote a distribution favorable to a particular world view).

Clearly, combinations of these approaches are used in national strategic planning. Few would argue, however, that the United States is not as comfortable with an approach beginning with goals and objectives as with other methods. The Soviet Union and Soviet military in particular, has, at least traditionally (in the pre-Gorbachev era) been more inclined to use that approach.
FIRST ORDER QUESTION:
What will be the new identity of the United States in the post-Cold War era and what role will the United States assume in a changed world order?

SECOND ORDER QUESTION:
What conceptual framework will be adopted to determine the formulation of policy and the prioritization of United States' National Security Strategy in the post-Cold War era?

THIRD ORDER QUESTION:
What composition of defense doctrine, military asset types, asset quantities, budget strategy and INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS will be chosen to execute post-Cold War National Security Strategy?

Figure 2. A Three-step Cognitive Flow Chart for Evaluation of Naval Arms Control Policy
(Source: the author)

been prone to approaching strategic planning based upon external threats (e.g. communism, Naziism, “the yellow peril”, terrorism, etc.) and upon resource availability trends. While resource availability concerns are increasingly

76 Changes in the defense budget are most often argued in terms of dollar percent increases or decreases from previous years and previous administrations. See, for example, William W. Kaufman and Laurance J. Korb, The 1990 Defense Budget. The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.: 1989. An account of how the Reagan defense spending levels were derived
important to ascertain, the dramatic political metamorphoses in the Soviet Union has made planning based upon “the threat” less credible and therefore less politically significant. An underlying theme to be stressed is that the United States government, and the administration in particular, will be required to do more strategic planning based upon goals and objectives if a degeneration into purely political budget politics, devoid of sense and purpose, is to be avoided. Avoiding such a condition is both necessary and desirable if naval arms control or any other policy question is to be responsibly integrated into the U.S. national interest, consistent with the dynamic nature of today’s world.

Figure 2 depicts that the first order question addresses the very orientation the United States chooses for itself in the post-Cold War era. This is not a merely academic question, but the principal dilemma faced by policy makers and politicians. Does the United States still want to be “the leader of the free world”? Would it be preferable to be one of a new set of co-equal great powers along with the EEC and Japan?77 Perhaps the American body politic will opt to philosophically turn inward, devoting the vast majority of available resources to domestic challenges, such as drugs, the environment, the educational system, health care, the Savings and Loan (S and L) bailout, the national transportation system, civilian applications of research and development, homelessness, etc. In addition to the uncertainty of the Soviet

from the previous Carter budgets is presented in David Stockman, The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed. Harper and Row, New York: 1986, (pp. 105-109, etc.).

77This could resemble the pre-World War I balance-of-power formula in Europe with the important difference that economic power, rather than military strength, would function as the currency of international power.
Union's future, the evolution of a "modern" China, India, the Middle-East, Latin America, and Africa contribute to the uncertainty which surrounds the emerging environment. It is clear that a multi-track strategy must be adopted because of the wildly divergent possibilities inherent in the emerging international paradigm. In the academic literature of strategic planning, four works postulate perspectives and methods which provide a suitable framework for analysis of arms control alternatives (due to the breadth, scope, and flexibility of the models): Ascher and Overholt's *Strategic Planning and Forecasting*, Barry Blechman's *U.S. Security in the 21st Century*, Charles W. Taylor's *Alternative World Scenarios For Strategic Planning* and "The Planning Framework Project" prepared by *The Center For Naval Analysis*.\(^7\^8\)

The model advocated by Ascher and Overholt requires the identification of three levels of strategy: core, basic, and hedging. The core strategy represents constant elements which will be prevalent in all future environments, basic strategy represents the elements of the most likely future environment, and hedging strategies represent elements which are included to "hedge" against the less likely environments. The composite strategy which is the final product of this process will be very sound, assuming, of course, that the chosen alternatives were thorough, clear and flexible at their

conception. Taylor postulates four major scenarios which are representative and interesting:

**Scenario A—U.S. as an Isolationist Nation**—The U.S. turns inward and disengages from as many international responsibilities as possible. According to Taylor, this is the most probable alternative in terms of American history, American culture, current political forces, etc. (The reference to American history applies to the full continuum of American history, of which the Cold War was an aberration.) Aprefacing indicator of this scenario would be major economic protectionism.

It is interesting to note that this scenario is the preference of a newly emerging group of power players (within congress and the media) of both the left and right. Isolationism and international economic hardball are the key themes of: House Majority Whip Richard Gephardt (D-Mo) (used extensively in his 1988 presidential campaign), populist Congressman James Traficant (D-Oh), House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-Ga) and Pat Buchanan (syndicated columnist and former speech writer in the Nixon and Reagan administrations).

**Scenario B—U.S. as the Fulcrum Actor**—The U.S. determines that it's national interest is best served by maintaining an international posture in which the U.S. is actively engaged in the international system. This scenario postulates a world in which there are three centers of power:

- North America (the U.S. and Canada acting in concert, regardless of the closeness and formality of political union)
- Europe
- Japan (possibly with Asian allies/economic partners such as Korea, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)), etc.

The U.S. role would be similar to that of Great Britain in the period 1815-1914, namely a fulcrum actor whose foreign policy posture is flexible enough to shift the balance of power, when desired, among nations or power blocs in order to advance long term national interests. This strategy would encourage the formation of short term alliances (or alliances designed for specific, limited purposes) rather than the long

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79 Ascher and Overholt, pp. 21-41.
term alliances of Cold War vintage. Although circumstances have changed significantly, this scenario is certainly reminiscent of the advice from George Washington's farewell address—avoid "entangling alliances."

This scenario is clearly the preference of President Bush and his administration and it serves as the basis for the structure of the new national security strategy.

Scenario C—World of Neo-Nationalism—Nationalism resurges with greater intensity in the aftermath of the Cold War. Likely candidates for autonomy, self determination and/or more voice in the world community are: various Soviet nationalities/republics, Central European nations, pan-Arabism, India, China, the Philippines, Latin America and African nations. This scenario is highly unstable and potentially very dangerous. One possible outgrowth of this system is an increased possibility of civil wars of ethnic nationalism (e.g. Hispanic America). Another possibility is a resurgence of national enmity, similar to the atmosphere that preceded the world wars.

Scenario D—Aggressor Denial—One nation becomes identified as a common threat to international security; historical precedents include opposition to Napoleon, Soviet expansion, etc. This scenario is as likely as any, as it represents the current version of a historically constant phenomenon; it is significantly easier to muster the national will to oppose something tangible than it is to advocate an internal agenda to promote elusive goals. The opposition to Saddam Hussein's Iraq is a timely case in point.80

The next order of business (see Figure 2) is determination of the conceptual framework that will be used to guide the formulation of policy

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and the prioritization of post-Cold War national security strategy (the second order question). To operationalize this step, the administration must develop a coherent synthesis of the different approaches to strategic planning in order to further the ideals of the American identity in a dynamic international system. Clearly, a "given" in the current domestic political debate is that U.S. resources are indeed limited: difficult prioritizing must take place, and the American public is not enthusiastic about current military spending levels or convinced that they are necessary (it will be interesting to see how much, if at all, the Gulf War ultimately affects this trend). There are important alternatives for the composition of national power, regardless of the ultimate destiny of the Soviet Union. For instance, if the United States intends to be the predominant world power and "fulcrum actor", it may opt to retain a military capability only slightly less great than it possesses today, or it may reason that redirection of those resources into the civilian sector will be more efficacious, and that the military need only be large enough to prevail, with likely coalition allies, against likely adversaries. Simply stated, the government must reach consensus on the optimum mix of resource instruments of national power best suited to pursue national security and fulfill the vision of a national identity. Since Gorbachev was able to base his

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81 This vision needs to be described and operationalized at every possible interface node which connects the administration with the public (president's national security strategy document, State of the Union and inaugural speeches, press conferences, testimony of administration officials before congress, etc.)

82 Clearly, it will be difficult to sell Congress the idea that the same basic force structure, justified by the Soviet threat, is nearly the same as what is needed in the post-Cold War world. Unfortunately for the Navy, this difficult case is, probably, legitimate because of an underestimation of the non-Soviet threats in the past.
country's security future on a concept less dependent upon military means than before, it will be very difficult for the United States not to adapt in kind, regardless of important geo-strategic reasons which mitigate against emulating the Soviet course.

Third, a consensus will need to emerge which incorporates a combination of defense doctrine, military asset types, asset quantities, budget strategy and international agreements designed to facilitate the national security strategy. To illustrate:

- **Changes in defense doctrine can result in dramatic force level multiplication/division**—The Soviet Union will require far less military hardware and personnel if they pursue “defensive defense” than if they desired to retain a defense based upon preemptive strike and the capability to assume the strategic offensive at the theater/group of fronts level of warfare (therefore, “defensive defense” is, in theory, a force divider). The U.S. maritime strategy was a defense doctrine adopted as a force multiplier since mission objectives could not otherwise be fulfilled with existing force levels and anticipated procurement.\(^8\)

- **Differences in various combinations of asset types/asset quantities are significant**—If, for example, a squadron of B-2 bombers can accomplish the mission of an entire wing of B-52s, the huge procurement costs may be more cost effective than the maintenance, training, and personnel costs of the older system.\(^8\) "...As another example, we invested heavily in applying the latest technology in the F-18 and the Aegis cruiser to achieve mean times between failures 25 times higher

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\(^8\) This was the rationale used to justify the maritime strategy militarily. See John F. Lehman Jr. Command of the Seas. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York: 1988 (chapter 4, etc). Others have argued, with some evidence, that the maritime strategy's primary value was as a budgetary justification tool. See, for example Robert Komer, Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense. Abt Books, Cambridge, MA.:1984. The comprehensive reference bibliography on this subject is CAPT Peter Schwartz, USN and Jan S. Bremer, bibliographers (James J. Tritten, principle investigator), The Maritime Strategy Debates: A Guide To The Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s. Monterey, Ca.: Naval Postgraduate School (Department of National Security Affairs), September, 1989.

\(^8\) This is intended for illustrative purposes only.
than the Phantom and the Chicago [sic] class cruiser they replaced.... In the case of the Aegis cruiser, we have a ship at least 20 times more capable than the ship it replaces and manned by only 350 officers and men, compared to 1,150 for the older cruiser. Thus today, thanks to high-tech and complexity, our latest fighters and ships are not only far more capable but actually much less expensive to own and operate.  

**Budget strategy and international agreements are critical variables which must be coherent**—Trade-offs in service support for arms treaties in exchange for congressional support for arms funding is a well-established precedent, especially in the SALT era.  
This was only possible, however, because of the clout that the services exercised with respect to waging the Cold War (i.e. the public's ideological fervor during the cold war exceeded national resource expenditure concerns). The current environment has changed 180 degrees; domestic programs are becoming perceived as far more urgent on the national agenda than international concerns (i.e. resource expenditure concerns exceed international ideology in the public perception). Therefore, it should be expected that the cause-and-effect support phenomenon vis-a-vis arms control will be reversed; in the post-Cold War environment, services which are not credible players domestically will be less relevant in the treaty ratification process and can expect to also pay the budget allocation price in an era of declining resources and perceived reduction in the threat.

In order to take the analysis to the next step and apply the possible futures concept to the design of a naval fleet, *U.S. Security in the 21st Century* offers an excellent model. Barry Blechman projects an alternative strategic environment matrix in which each of the world's geographic regions are explored against a range of possible superpower futures. In order to be

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85 Lehman, pp. 155-6.


88 Blechman p. 118.
ultimately useful for naval purposes, the methodology which Blechman advocates needs to be expanded and specialized. The process, however, is ideally suited to an environment in which the future alignment of politico-military "power blocs" is yet undetermined.

An outstanding blueprint for this extrapolation can be found in the Maritime Balance Study of 1979. The methodology employed is termed "cellular analysis," a technique in which maritime missions (termed "businesses"), geographic regions of maritime interest, and maritime strategic competitive factors (e.g. C3I capabilities, availability of bases/logistic support, etc.) are assessed in a three dimensional cell for synthesis and net assessment. Admittedly, this study was designed with purely a bipolar focus (as was logical in 1979). The enduring value of this approach, however, is the clear and effective manner in which the factors critical to maritime success were identified and operationalized. An expansion of this model to a multi-polar focus, in which each of the designated "power blocs" are assessed against each other, will enable the requirements for the future force structure to be intelligently derived.


90 This approach, based upon the Blechman model and the methodology employed in The Maritime Balance Study, was used in a highly interesting way in group presentations concerning the future security environment of the United States in NS3230 (Strategic Planning and U.S. National Security Policy) taught by Professor Frank M. Teti at the Naval Postgraduate School, summer quarter, 1989. In the presentations, a series of alternative power bloc alignments were postulated:

- USA, USSR, EEC, CHINA, JAPAN
- USA/EEC, USSR, CHINA, JAPAN
- USA, USSR/EEC (common European home), CHINA, JAPAN
- USA, USSR/EEC, CHINA/JAPAN (Oriental PACRIM alliance)

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Figure 3 depicts the theoretical genesis of the post-Cold War Navy, specific to its particular role in the eventual military mix. The critical question that this graphic highlights is the trade-off between designing a naval policy with the most potent military role (zero sum game strategy proper) and designing a naval policy which can best contribute to a robust diplomatic/political cooperation strategy among key power blocs via a variety of means, including a more robust arms control process (Figure 3).

Figure 4 depicts how acceptable naval arms control regimes could evolve. The cognitive flow chart of Figure 4 depicts the most logical derivation of these policy options, since it requires that the determination be made about the appropriate role of the navy within the national military strategy as a precursor to the political value of naval arms control. This logical approach would, in theory, prevent "giving away the store" and could bring the Navy bureaucracy on board, able to embrace a broad political and military agenda in a cooperative way, thereby maximizing the value of the Navy to the nation at large (see Figure 4).

Each of the potential power blocs were then assessed in terms of economic strength, military capability, political structure, etc. Based upon a set of seemingly likely assumptions (USA/USSR START agreement signed in the early 1990s, major withdrawals of NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces from Europe, etc.) a cross-impact matrix (CIPM) analysis of these possibilities highlighted common "basic" strategies, possible areas of unforeseen growth potential, and some common dilemmas which demand attention.

Another possibility which needs to be included in this analysis is:

- Cooperative USA/USSR relationship (arms control has increased potential in such an environment due to the need to become better and more functionally acquainted).
FIRST ORDER QUESTION:
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SECOND ORDER QUESTION:
What conceptual framework will be adopted to determine the formulation of policy and the prioritization of United States' National Security Strategy in the post-Cold War era?

THIRD ORDER QUESTION:
What composition of defense doctrine, military asset types and asset quantities will be deemed necessary for post-Cold War defense policy and execution of post-Cold War National Security Strategy?

FOURTH ORDER QUESTION:
What role and resource allocation level will be assigned to the United States Navy to support the post-Cold War National Security Strategy (i.e. how significant a military role is envisaged for the Navy vs. its potential to contribute to a DIPLOMATIC/POLITICAL COOPERATION STRATEGY AMONG KEY POWER BLOCS VIA A MORE ROBUST ARMS CONTROL PROCESS?)

Figure 3. A Four-step Cognitive Flow Chart for Evaluation of Naval Arms Control Policy
(Source: the author)
The Navy bureaucracy will never be brought on board if its military value and institutional survival are in question—and that is totally understandable. If the budget is "in free fall, however, with no end in sight"\(^9\), who can blame the Navy for being sensitive to the possibility of an arms control "slippery slope"?

FIRST ORDER QUESTION:
What will be the new identity of the United States in the post-Cold War era and what role will the United States assume in a changed world order?

SECOND ORDER QUESTION:
What conceptual framework will be adopted to determine the formulation of policy and the prioritization of United States' National Security Strategy in the post-Cold War era?

THIRD ORDER QUESTION:
What composition of defense doctrine, military asset types and asset quantities will be deemed necessary to execute post-Cold War National Security Strategy?

FOURTH ORDER QUESTION:
What role and resource allocation level will be assigned to the United States Navy to support the military component of post-Cold War National Security Strategy?

FIFTH ORDER QUESTION:
What types of Naval Arms Control regimes could potentially support the naval component of the post-Cold War National Security Strategy and other national interests of the United States?

Figure 4. A Five-step Cognitive Flow Chart for Evaluation of Naval Arms Control Policy
(Source: the author)
IV. A NEW AGENDA FOR POST-COLD WAR NAVAL ARMS CONTROL POLICY

Now is the time to synthesize the cognitive, philosophical approach to naval arms control with a practical agenda for the future. It is in the best interests of the Navy to have thought through such an agenda in-house, so it can drive the coming policy debate and not be relegated to spectator status while Congress and OSD debate the Navy's future. Since naval arms control must be viewed in a national strategic context, it is necessary to ensure that any proposed arms control agenda is consistent with the broad outlines of the new national security strategy.

A. BASIC TENETS OF THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The Bush administration is to be commended for its efforts to date, namely in presenting a strawman proposal to Congress which is credible, realistic and consistent with emerging priorities of the post-Cold War national agenda (especially the need to redirect resources from defense programs to the domestic sector). It was unveiled on August 2, 1990, ironically the same day as another international watershed event: namely the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Strategy is official recognition of the consensus

first priority for the national agenda: major reduction in defense spending levels to contribute to deficit reduction. The Strategy is based upon the implicit need to reduce both defense expenditures and military personnel levels. The Bush plan proposes that expenditures and personnel be cut by 25% each. The Aspen speech was merely the opening volley in what is sure to be an interesting political process of consensus building.

The Strategy announced in the President's speech has been enumerated further and additional options for implementation have been discussed in a series of speeches, articles, and reports that must be examined, in the order of their appearance, to fully understand the evolution of the Strategy and where it stands today.93

The strategy is based upon four major elements:

- Deterrence
- Forward Presence
- Crisis Response
- Collective Security

A "base force", consisting of four military components, was proposed to execute the strategy:

- Strategic Nuclear (both offensive and defensive)
- Atlantic
- Pacific
- Contingency

The strategy calls for the ability to respond to crises that can be described as slow-building, fast-rising, imminent conflict, and conflict\textsuperscript{94} and for the preservation of four supporting military capabilities, namely:

- Transportation
- Space
- Reconstitution
- Research and Development (R & D)

B. CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE NEW STRATEGY

Programming for the strategy is predicated upon the assumption that the Soviet Union could not launch the classic theater strategic offensive operation at the group of fronts level without a two-year reconstitution period which could be used as warning time for the West to reconstitute a defensive force. Specifically, this implies that a conventional force parity will exist in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, all Soviet ground and air forces will withdraw from former Warsaw Pact host nations and return inside Soviet borders, and that the Soviet Union’s internal problems will prevent it from executing expansionist operations. General Powell has stated that ratification of the CFE treaty is necessary to meet these conditions. If trends in the Soviet Union change significantly, Secretary Cheney has stated that he and the CJCS reserve the right to come back to Congress and recommend that the 25% reduction of the US military not proceed on schedule because the aforementioned assumptions for the strategic environment will no longer be valid.

\textsuperscript{94}Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment, March 1991.
In lieu of such occurrence (and pending settlement of other critical choices which have yet to be made\textsuperscript{95}), navy force structure should not deviate significantly from what is already being openly discussed and generally accepted by the Secretary of the Navy and CNO (see Table 2, below):

The foundations of the new strategy, deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and collective security are missions which are natural and traditional for naval forces. There is no reason for naval planners to assume the worst—a robust navy will be important in the new world order and the specter of naval arms control will not destroy the role of the U.S. Navy in national security strategy.

C. LIKELY CONGRESSIONAL TESTS FOR THE NEW STRATEGY

Will the Congress and the public at large ultimately support the new strategy? When addressing identification of the critical tests for any national policy, it is logical to start with the concept that national strategic planning in a free society is based upon the values of the society at large, rather than upon a detached agenda of a non-representative government.

\textsuperscript{95}For example, will a true “can opener” capability be maintained to seize territory occupied by a determined power, what will be the future role of the US in NATO, will NATO fundamentally alter the strategy of flexible response, will NATO accept a formal role in out-of-area-operations, etc.?
TABLE 2. ANTICIPATED NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE AND DISPOSITION FOR THE 1990S

THE NAVY "BASE" FORCE
450 ship fleet (down from 545) of which approximately 30% is deployed
12 CVs (currently 14)—12 deployable (plus 1 trng)
0 Battleships
150 surface combatants
3 MEFs (160,000 personnel and amphibious lift for assault echelons of
2.5 MEBs)

STRATEGIC FORCES
Offensive—OHIO procurement will stop at 18 (not all units will be
retrofitted with Trident II D-5 SLBM)
Defensive—possible procurement of a sea-borne GPALs system. System
basing could theoretically occur on platforms of all three warfighting
communities (SSBN missile tubes, fixed wing carrier air, or “Super
Aegis” equipped surface ships)

ATLANTIC FORCES
Residual Forward Deployed Force—1 CVBG/1 ARG
Reinforcing Home Based Force—5 CVBGs/1 MEB (plus a marine
reserve component)

PACIFIC FORCES
Residual Forward Deployed Force—1 CVBG (Japan)/1 ARG
Reinforcing Home Based Force—5 CVBGs/2 MEBs

CONTINGENCY FORCES
Forces Dedicated Permanently—probable Navy contribution limited to
a contingent of special forces along with some contribution of
transportation and infrastructure capability.
Forces Dedicated for Temporary Operations—Existing Atlantic and
Pacific Units likely to be "chopped" to the contingency force, when
required.

(Source: the author)

96 This course of action would be precluded by the ABM Treaty and would require treaty
modification/abrogation.
While certainly oversimplified, the public supported a fully engaged United States foreign policy during the Cold War to contain Communist expansion and was generally willing to accept the opportunity costs of Cold War military spending levels (most objections in mainstream America and in Congress were relatively marginal in nature). Two vastly different, but nonetheless significant watershed phenomena radically transformed the paradigm:

- Defense Procurement Scandals in the Reagan Administration and
- The "Gorbachev Phenomenon"

Among the defense procurement scandals of the Reagan administration, none caused more embarrassment than the revelation of the exorbitant prices that the government was paying for such items as coffee pots, hammers, and toilet seats. These seemingly outrageous expenditures caused more public outcry than procurement scandals relating to major acquisition contracts for big ticket items. When the dust settled, the public seemed to appreciate that these problems were not the result of deliberate attempts to defraud the taxpayers, but nonetheless retained the conviction that there must be a more responsible way to run "the system". Ultimately, though, the public had to admit that these problems were relatively more palatable than leaving the West vulnerable to the Soviet "Evil Empire" by gutting the defense budget. The Gorbachev phenomenon redistributed a huge weight from the delicately balanced scale of American public opinion on defense spending levels. After the initial euphoria (followed by a short period of skepticism to see if

97 Lawrence J. Korb, Address to the Naval War College, November 13, 1988.
Gorbachev was really a wolf in sheep’s clothing) the government and the public could plainly see that with the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the strategic situation in the world had dramatically changed.

The voting public’s consensus vis-à-vis the worldwide containment of Communism disintegrated, and more attention was given to the new consensus items for the national agenda. These items were destined to become building blocks for the security strategy of a free society, namely:

- Status of the National Economy (especially the budget deficit)
- Concern for the Environment
- Emphasis on Education Opportunities
- Concern for "humanitarian issues" (e.g., homelessness, health care, poverty, etc.)

The Congress will be the ultimate judge of the soundness of the new national security strategy. It is sure to at least focus attention on the strategy’s ability to meet the following basic tests of contextual appropriateness, identified by the author:

1. Does it responsibly address resource constraints, i.e. will the amount of defense spending decrease be deemed sufficient, responsible, and well managed?

2. Does it provide for a residual military force which is highly flexible and mobile, i.e. does it provide for a force that can operate in a modern, high technology battlefield anywhere in the world?

3. Does it seek to responsibly deal with weapons of mass destruction in order that it is responsive to public concern and the change in the international environment, i.e. does it seek to limit the number and role of these weapons to the lowest possible level required to support national strategy?

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98The author’s representation of the public’s assessment of domestic priorities as taken from various public opinion polls carried by the media.
4. Does it encourage the development of military officers who are "joint" qualified warrior/statesmen (in the spirit of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act)?

5. Does it have a positive influence on environmental concerns, i.e. does it provide for enhanced environmental protection/clean-up?

6. Does it allow for a sufficient US military role in appropriate international causes, especially with regard to humanitarian relief efforts?\textsuperscript{99}

The natural question at this point in the analysis is: How does naval arms control fit into these tests for the new strategy? Instead of viewing arms control as a process with an independent inertia and agenda, the process must be regularly reappraised to assess its applicability in the current environment. Even though naval arms control is a FIFTH ORDER QUESTION (which logically awaits the complete answering of the previous four), certain planning assumptions can be made which permit the staffing out of potential naval arms control regimes which are consistent with the emerging environment. The Bush administration is clearly committed to pursuing a world order in which the United States assumes the role of fulcrum actor (see chapter three). The Navy remains a critical national instrument in this construct and will emerge from restructuring relatively better than the other services. It is the fifth order question, then, which must ultimately be planned for; what types of naval arms control regimes could potentially support the naval component of the post-Cold War national security strategy and other national interests of the United States (see Figure 4).

\textsuperscript{99}Author's assessment of critical tests.
D. AUTHOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE NAVAL ARMS CONTROL POLICY

In order to evaluate the current status of naval arms control, Table 3 (below) provides a snapshot reference for assessment of the various proposals. The table categorizes naval arms control alternatives, (whether currently in force or just proposed in the literature) by the postulated enforcement mechanism: negotiated treaty\textsuperscript{100}, executive agreement, unilateral action, or none (i.e. not appropriate for the arms control process). Table 3 and the supporting text describe my typology of US participation in naval arms control to date and serves to depict my policy recommendations for the future. My recommendations are based upon the premise that future US naval arms control policy should fully support and compliment the new national security strategy and meet the likely tests of congressional acceptance of the strategy (listed above).

Tests one and two require that the strategy responsibly account for resource constraints while leaving a residual force whose combat capability is suited to the new international environment. Congressional reaction to date has been favorable and the imminent reduction in naval force structure (as postulated in Table 2) has met little resistance thus far. With regard to limitations on capability, there is no debate that reduction in total force quantity (one “brand” of structural naval arms control) is already happening,

\textsuperscript{100}For reference to the treaties which are germaine to each category see United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, \textit{Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements} (1990 ed.), Washington DC, 1990.
### TABLE 3. CURRENT SNAPSHOT OF US NAVAL ARMS CONTROL POLICY (WITH AUTHOR’S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naval Arms Control Alternatives</th>
<th>Arms Control by negotiated Treaty</th>
<th>Arms Control by Executive Agreement</th>
<th>Arms Control by Unilateral Action</th>
<th>Not Appropriate for Arms Control</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CAPABILITY LIMITS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wpns of Mass Dest</td>
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<td>Nuc Wpns Capability</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<td>Chm Wpns Capability</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<td>Bio Wpns Capability</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Force Structure</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Naval Technology</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPALS</td>
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<td>Cruise Missiles</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
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<td>Stealth A/C</td>
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<td>ASW</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
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<td><strong>Naval Resources</strong></td>
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<td><strong>OPERATIONAL LIMITS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Naval Exercises</td>
<td>C</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacetime Deployments</td>
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<td>Zones Of Peace</td>
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<td>Nuclear Free Zones</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>Nuc Wpn Free Zones</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW Free Zones</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSBN Safe Havens</td>
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<td>N</td>
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</table>
### TABLE 3. CURRENT SNAPSHOT OF US NAVAL ARMS CONTROL POLICY (WITH AUTHOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE) (CONT.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSBMs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuc Wpn Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear Deconflictation</td>
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<td>(procedure)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear Deconflictation</td>
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<td>P</td>
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<tr>
<td>(technological std)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Declaratory Nuc Wpn Employment Policy</td>
<td>P</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pol-Mil Strengthening</td>
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<tr>
<td>Static Data Exchanges</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exercise Notification</td>
<td>C</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doctrinal Talks</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>E/R</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical Deconflictation</td>
<td>C</td>
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<tr>
<td>BL/ML Crisis Control</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>E/P</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relationship Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel Exchanges</td>
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<td>C, E/R</td>
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<td>BL/ML Wargaming</td>
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<td>R</td>
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<td>Journal Exchanges</td>
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<td>R</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Priorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment Protection</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>E/R</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Relief</td>
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<td>R</td>
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</table>

**Legend:**
- **BL/ML** Bilateral/Multilateral
- **C** Currently in Force
- **E** Current Regime Should Be Expanded (As Depicted by Subsequent Code)
- **N** Not in US National Interest
- **P** Plausible After Further Research (Idea is Strategically and/or Mechanically Premature)
- **R** Recommended Now

(Source: the author)
unilaterally, as a result of budget actions and will continue as a result of the new strategy. The US is reducing the quantity of nearly every facet of naval power: submarine forces (SSBNS and SSNs), surface forces (including elimination of the battleships), air power (aircraft carrier hulls and airwings), amphibious forces, etc. (see Table 2). In fact, there is little debate about the aggregate quantity of naval force structure which will emerge from the new environment, only the type of political packaging which will ultimately justify it. It is also clear that the Soviets are conducting unilateral naval force reduction as well.

Arms control experience has demonstrated that intentions can change relatively quickly, whereas force structure changes slowly. Therefore, the process of structural arms control is predisposed to lagging the international trends that it is designed to capture. During the inter-war period the naval arms control process couldn't keep pace with rising international tensions (and therefore may have exacerbated them). During the Cold War, the superpower arms control process could also not keep pace with rising international tensions. In today's environment, the superpower arms control process (e.g. START and CFE) can not keep pace with receding international tensions. This phenomenon occurs because the process of structural arms control is slow, laborious, technically complicated, and politically contentious. Since structural naval arms control is happening unilaterally, via the "disarmament" model of arms control, it should not be jeopardized by attempting to legislate it internationally, via the "arsenal balance" model of arms control (see Figure 1). It should be noted that unilateral arms control is not only theoretically valid, it is perhaps the most
practical way to actually achieve the desired goals of arms control (enumerated in chapter three).  

In addition to total force structure issues, capability can also be bounded through the limitation of weapons of mass destruction, the limitation on key naval technologies, and naval resource limitation. Weapons of mass destruction levels have always been of grave concern to the public, and this concern can be expected to increase in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War and with future proliferation of these weapons. This concern is reflected in test three for new the strategy. The limitation and control of weapons of mass destruction is a problem which, although serious, does not need an additional arms control solution. Kenneth Adelman correctly states, “Certainly a primary role filled by the arms control process is to reassure the public that somehow, someway, its government is grappling with the nuclear issue.”

The Navy can and should make an even stronger defense of its role vis-à-vis the national arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. The public and all relevant government players should be reminded that the Navy is in sync with the national agenda on this issue; the Navy does not possess, test, or exercise with any chemical or biological weapon and is eliminating most tactical nuclear weapons, unilaterally, without the interference of a treaty (as indicated in the capability limitation section of Table 3). The absence of chemical and biological weapons from naval forces is a unilateral policy and


102Ibid. p. 24.
since the force levels are zero, the Navy is in automatic compliance with
governing international law, namely the Geneva Conventions and the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention.

Navy nuclear weapons are also being controlled both by unilateral action
and executive agreement. The Navy is eliminating most tactical nuclear
systems (ASROC, SUBROC, and Terrier BTN) unilaterally. The main theater
nuclear weapon the Navy will posses after tactical nuclear reduction is
nuclear SLCM, which is being controlled via agreements in conjunction with
START. Since nuclear SLCM is needed as a rapidly-returnable deterrent in
the European theater and elsewhere, its current status vis-à-vis the arms
control process is also appropriate. Navy strategic nuclear weapons (SSBMs)
are limited through SALT II (which is adhered to, although the formal treaty
was never ratified) and the START process. The Navy can also "take credit"
for participation in efforts to preclude nuclear proliferation from expanding
into the world's oceans (The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971) and for the
limitation of nuclear testing (The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963).

The final serious means of capability limitation is through the control of
key naval technology. As can be seen in Table 3, this limitation is underway
in many important areas. The Navy is precluded from deploying naval ABM
systems by the 1972 ABM Treaty. (Deployment of a GPALS system might
ideally be deployed from naval assets in the future, but this requires more
detailed scientific and engineering research and a revisiting of the ABM
Treaty). The Navy is also adhering to cruise missile controls. As previously
mentioned, nuclear SLCM is limited by executive agreement in conjunction
with the START negotiations and conventional SLCM is being controlled,
unilaterally, through the constraints of publicly announced Planned Procurement Buys (PPB), monitored by the Cruise Missile Project Office (CMPO). Navy SSBMs are now being unilaterally controlled via reduced submarine procurement, as well as through SALT II limitations. The Navy might also "take credit" for unilateral limitations in the emerging field of stealth aircraft (making a virtue out of necessity), as a result of the cancellation of the A-12 program. Finally, significant ASW limitation is happening via the major unilateral force cuts now underway (SSNs, ASW capable surface ships, and ASW aircraft reduction) and formal treaty. Any cut in the US fleet reduces ASW capability in a real way, since virtually all air/sea assets are ASW capable through some combination of: sonar, bathythermograph, radar, visual watch, etc.

The three categories of capability limitation (weapons of mass destruction, total force structure, and naval technology) are currently in force, in reality, even though it is not the practice of the U.S. government to describe many of the unilateral measures in arms control terms. The reduction in total force structure is obvious (nearly 100 total hulls). The only avenue to structural naval arms control not being undertaken unilaterally is a limitation on total resources allocated to the Navy (see Table 1). Although this avenue is theoretically possible, it should never be considered because it is nonsensical.

103 Even though the program was not terminated for arms control reasons, it is a legitimate unilateral action with arms control repercussions.

104 ASW is also limited by the SALT Treaties through SSBN force level constraints. While SSBNs are not designed as ASW platforms, they are capable of executing ASW missions.
to single out navy appropriations in this manner and to employ such an arbitrary methodology in order to achieve the goals of arms control.

Test two calls for a residual force structure which, although smaller, is highly mobile, in order that it be able to cover a wide range of requirements. In a world growing ever smaller through technological breakthroughs in transportation and communications, naval arms control which restricts operational flexibility is simply counter-intuitive. It doesn’t make sense to accept any limitations upon the U.S. Navy’s ability to freely use the seas for whatever purposes it chooses, regardless of what it gets in return from other navies (including acceptance of similar restrictions). This familiar argument may be even more valid now, in an environment in which former superpower “client” states sense relatively less “paternal restraint” and “adult supervision”, than they did during the Cold War. While some scholars may object to the lack of empirical evidence or technical analysis to justify my position, it is my contention that the underlying principle is so clear as to make quantitative or rigorous analysis unnecessary and merely clouds the issue. Nuclear free zones, ASW free zones, and SSBN safe havens represent an arms control gratuity to all potential negotiating partners who are incapable of competing in these respective avenues of naval warfare; they are simultaneously a unilateral penalty to Western nations who have devoted valuable resources to system procurement and personnel/unit training associated with these capabilities. While these proposals may appear relatively more palatable than negotiated force structure cuts (because they can theoretically be reversed quickly if the strategic situation demands), they
are particularly unattractive in an environment which demands that naval forces be as flexible and mobile as possible.

It is clear from Table 3, however, that several operational limits are already in force. Naval exercises which involve projecting power ashore (i.e. functionally-linked amphibious exercises) are accounted for by the Helsinki and Stockholm Accords. The Navy should also make the case that the unilateral reduction in naval exercises and peacetime naval deployments also are worthy of "arms control credit". An expanded regime of exercise notification or deployment limitation could provide enough intelligence to jeopardize or preclude important real-world operations in the future, launched under the cover of a planned exercise or deployment (e.g. a hostage rescue, blockade, etc.). The marginal benefits which can be gained from expanded exercise notification do not compensate for the potentially serious sacrifice of capability, and this potential sacrifice renders these regimes strategically unwise. There is no reason to expand exercise notification beyond the Helsinki and Stockholm accords.

The Navy is also a player in so-called "zone" proposals. Even though it is not often discussed, the Navy already participates in the observance of a zone of peace (established by The Antarctic Treaty of 1959) and a nuclear weapons free zone (established by The Latin America Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of 1967).\textsuperscript{105} Proposals to create additional nuclear weapons free zones must not be analyzed solely with respect to maritime considerations. Does it make

\textsuperscript{105}The nomenclature of this treaty can be misleading. It establishes a nuclear weapons free zone, not a nuclear free zone.
sense to have nuclear weapons free zones at sea but no limit upon deployed nuclear systems in the air? Clearly, the United States will have to reach consensus upon the higher order questions of overall deterrence strategy and force disposition before specific proposals, such as naval operational restrictions, should be entertained. These proposals are strategically premature, but could potentially be productive in the future. For instance, a nuclear weapons free zone on the continent of Europe itself (not to include adjacent bodies of water) could eventually be in the US interest and would also increase the Navy's contribution to extended nuclear deterrence.

The debate over the new national security strategy must first address a prioritization and characterization of the threats to the United States is in the new world order. (Not even this basic first order question will be quickly settled). Threat prioritization decisions will then logically lead to a re-examination of US nuclear strategy and the NATO strategy of flexible response. Entertaining the lower order question of the naval role in nuclear deterrence prior to settling the higher order national and international political questions is strategically inappropriate and potentially counterproductive.

When analyzing the realm of naval CSBMs, a logical place to start, as is the case with force structure questions, is with the control of nuclear weapons. There are four CSBMs, currently in force, which make nuclear war at sea less likely: The "Accidents Measures" Agreement of 1971, The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement of 1987, The Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement of 1988, and The Dangerous Military Activities Agreement of 1989.
Another avenue for naval nuclear deconfliction, depicted in Table 3, is the adoption of common technological standards (e.g. PALS). The justification for PALS, especially in an environment in which GPALS is being pursued, is widely known. Once again, however, the US must not be seduced into the belief that it can accomplish everything possible in arms control immediately and simultaneously. Formally negotiating the PAL issue may preclude it from ever being undertaken (even if it is deemed to be in the US national interest) or may embroil it in an endless quagmire of arms control skepticism, charges, and counter charges. A very unattractive possibility is a demand by the Soviets to subject an agreement on PALS to on-site inspection (as a quid pro quo for nuclear and conventional ground force on-site inspections). It may be in the US interest, in the future, to adopt PALS unilaterally and pressure the Soviets to do likewise. If a GPALS system is destined to be deployed, however, the need to force PALS upon the Soviet Union is less urgent. This is another issue which requires more study to ascertain strategic value and costs and is definitely premature in an environment in which first order political identity questions are unsettled.

The same logic holds with respect to a change in US declaratory policy with respect to first use of nuclear weapons at sea. There is undoubtedly political capital to be gained from such a stance, but it can only be analyzed in context after US nuclear strategy and NATO nuclear strategy have been modernized to conform to the new world order.

Table 3 also depicts my less enthusiastic assessment of the literature’s more “popular” naval CSBMs (those which attempt to strengthen politico-military predictability). Three of the most often discussed possibilities are
exercise notification, static data exchanges and naval doctrinal talks. The arguments against constraining naval exercises in any way (to include prior notification), beyond the requirements of the Helsinki and Stockholm Accords have been mentioned above. Naval doctrinal talks may produce some benefits but static data exchanges would be counterproductive at this time.

In the case of naval doctrinal talks, it should first be noted that the bilateral US-Soviet military doctrinal talks include the subject of navies, at least from the perspective of the Soviets, who view naval forces as but one component of formal military art (and one source for the development of formal military science). Some writers on this subject ask, what would be obtained from doctrinal talks which cannot be obtained in the open literature, observed in deployment patterns and exercise behavior, or created through personnel exchanges? The principal advantage of naval doctrinal talks is that they would allow for the establishment of a common professional language to exist between the two navies, and agreement upon common naval terminology may be useful in the future when the two navies may be politically directed to cooperate on more ambitious maritime tasks (I propose two such ideas at the end of this section). Naval doctrinal talks could, for example, serve as the medium to resolve the dispute concerning the validity of the concept of naval operational art and mutual assured destruction (MAD). Such discussions, while arguably of marginal benefit now, can serve as the foundation for a new navy-to-navy relationship. A precondition for such a doctrinal seminar, however (to be agreed upon privately), should be that the not be used as a public relations forum to press the West on
structural naval arms control issues. If such a prefacing understanding can be obtained, there is no reason not to embark on naval doctrinal talks now.

Static data exchanges of a nation’s naval order-of-battle should not be pursued now, however. With current military restructuring being undertaken by both the US and Soviet Union, why complicate the process by trying to definitively track the status of various units whose future may not be even decided by the cognizant national government for some time to come. The uncertainty and skepticism which now surrounds the CFE process is a testament to the potential seriousness of this problem. If the Soviet government is battling internally over what its future force structure should look like, how can the West expect to receive clear and accurate data now? The trap in arms control policy is the desire to achieve every goal immediately and simultaneously. Since we all agree that structural naval arms control is happening, there is no need to jeopardize that process now, for the sake of marginally useful data which is largely available through intelligence channels (although admittedly in a less reliable and convenient form). This measure, designed to build confidence, could actually erode confidence if undertaken prematurely. (Consider, for example, the possibility of charges by Western conservatives of Soviet attempts to pull off a “naval Krasnoyarsk radar”.) Static data exchanges of naval assets in inventory (and those transferred/sold to other nations) should be reconsidered after post-Cold War military restructuring is near completion in both countries, and if other naval arms control avenues are yielding useful and desirable results.

Another naval CSBM in this functional area is the establishment of joint naval crisis control procedures. Perhaps even a bilateral naval command
center could be constructed which, in conjunction with national command centers, could prevent incidents like the collision which occurred between US and Soviet warships in the Black Sea. The Navy already is a player in the "Accidents Measures" Agreement of 1971, The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement of 1987, The Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement of 1988, and The Dangerous Military Activities Agreement of 1989, as well as the principal player in naval tactical deconfliction via the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) of 1972. The concept of "navy only" crisis control centers may have potential and is certainly worthy of additional study. Until the higher order political questions of SOVIET national identity are settled, however, this idea is premature. Do we really want a joint crisis control center which could gather intelligence and report to a post-Gorbachev government run by the Soviet military and conservative civilians? This is another prime candidate for a "wait and see" strategy.

CSBMs which foster the building of international relationships are already succeeding as policy and should be expanded now to contribute to the broad education of military officers, expanding upon the congressional mandates of The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. This is definitely an avenue for arms control which has benefits which extend beyond the confines of arms control itself and can be used to contribute directly to national strategy (see strategy test four). The publicity which resulted from OPERATION DESERT STORM gave the American people a window into the mind of General Norman Schwarzkopf, USA (USCINCCENT), a combination rough-and-tumble warrior and an articulate strategic thinker. The public undoubtedly liked what they saw and will
certainly expect the same caliber of enlightened leadership from their military in the future. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was a congressional mandate that U.S. military officers be more than just competent warriors and parochial bureaucrats; the Congress and the public want military officers who are statesmen and strategic thinkers with not only "joint" credentials, but international savvy and experience.

Arms control (specifically, international confidence building measures) can play a valuable role in the broad education of a warrior-statesman, a role which cannot be accomplished by purely domestic institutions. Military-to-military contacts, such as the 1989 exchanges and subsequent visits between the U.S. National Defense University and the USSR's former Voroshilov General Staff Academy, are immensely valuable in forging stronger relationships between the respective military systems. Now is the time to plan for the future relationship of the US and Soviet military by conducting personnel exchanges not only at the senior officer level, but the junior officer and midshipman level as well. Naval Academy midshipmen, who will need the best possible understanding of their Soviet counterparts throughout their entire careers, are of the ideal seniority and stationed at a prime location to begin such exchanges. U.S. and Soviet Naval Academies would be excellent settings for such meetings since the institutions are designed for education and would not be prone to exposing military intelligence. Naval Academy exchanges should provide for a full spectrum of cross-cultural sampling, to include professional discussions, foreign language education, athletic activities, and social functions.
Why not also have junior officer exchanges between students at postgraduate institutions and war colleges in conjunction with a broad program of strategic studies and joint professional military education (JPME)? While there would be some new logistical arrangements and security procedures to work through, it may prove very interesting to have exchange officers able to attend unclassified classes on government policy and naval affairs. If the policy of the U.S. government is to bring the Soviet Union into the community of nations, then Soviet participation in existing multilateral exchange programs is called for. These exchange programs could be designed to allow exchange officers to conduct bilateral/multilateral research and publish their findings in professional journals such as the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, as a precursor to journal exchanges authored by naval flag officers and navy strategists. Additionally, junior officer exchanges could test the value of conducting joint wargames (if the games are well designed and executed) to see if the idea is worth pursuing at the senior officer level. When junior officers (who have been exposed to these experiences) reach command rank, they will have nearly twenty years of experience in dealing with issues from a broader international perspective than is possible through mere policy indoctrination. This experience and the personal contacts which can evolve from these exchanges may be invaluable to the nation during times of crisis or potential windows of international opportunity.

These exchanges carry the added benefit of fostering the sentiment that the U.S. Navy is a worldly and progressive organization, and is in the vanguard of desirable change. This perception will not only enhance the US national interest, it will also be transformed into valuable political capital for
the Navy in future budget allocation decisions. These strong recommendations, designated in Table 3, can have real national impact, rather than policies which simply perpetuate or stonewall the process. Neither of these reactive extremes will be valuable perspectives in the new world order.

Test six of the new strategy reflects increasing public awareness that has been devoted to environmental issues in recent years. Four major environmental incidents over the last five years should be considered by strategic planners:

- The 1986 Soviet nuclear accident at Chernobyl
- The Exxon Valdez oil spill
- Kuwaiti oil well fires, set by Iraq, in the last days of the Persian Gulf War
- Iraq's intentional oil spill in the Persian Gulf

The Chernobyl incident not only renewed concerns over nuclear energy, it also focused public attention on the dangers of all hazardous substances. The Exxon Valdez oil spill unleashed unprecedented damage upon the environment, cost over one billion dollars to settle\(^{106}\), and raised difficult questions regarding national preparedness for such emergencies. The environmental terrorism unleashed by Iraq during the Persian Gulf War served notice that the world community must possess environmental protection capability and political response mechanisms which are designed to meet potential, deliberate environmental terrorism, not just unintentional incidents. This assumption is analogous in its magnitude to basing military

procurement programming on the most dangerous military threat (e.g. the Soviet Union) rather than more likely lesser threats. The US Navy should actively support programs which place it in the role of "environmental watchdog", without compromising its warfighting capability.

The Navy has already instituted an aggressive program to control the dumping of toxic waste and non-biodegradable substances at sea and plays in The Environmental Modification Convention of 1977. Now is the time, however, to staff out the idea of navy-to-navy procedures for containing maritime environmental accidents/environmental terrorism (e.g. oil spills, nuclear weapons accidents, etc.). "Arms control" for environmental protection may very well be at the ground floor stage of a potentially booming field of international policy and, unlike many arms control discussions of the past, focuses upon an area of concern which the public genuinely cares about and deems worthy of increased attention. It would be prudent to agree upon common signals (such as those in INCSEA), designate a specific radio frequency for command and control of environmental incident response, and to formulate specific procedures for the designation of the on-scene-commander (OSC), tasking of clean-up assets, etc. This agreement should ultimately be expanded to be multilateral in scope, philosophically, since the environment is of international concern and practically, because U.S. and Soviet ships will not always be on scene first (or even present at all).

Another new avenue for naval agreements is the field of bilateral/multilateral humanitarian relief procedures (see Table 3). Valuable lessons can be learned from the effort to provide relief to Kurdish refugees in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. The Congress and the American
people made it clear to the Administration that in this age of instant worldwide communication and rapid transport capability, there is no excuse for failing to provide humanitarian aide to those in need, regardless of natural obstacles, man-made borders of state, or bureaucratic charter (test seven). Under the new strategy, the US will need to at least maintain, and most probably enhance, its capability to rapidly and successfully deliver humanitarian assistance wherever required. This is another inevitable test of the new strategy which can be bolstered by confidence building arms control. The US would be wise to enter into military-to-military discussions with the Soviet Union (in which navies take the lead) on communication and coordination procedures to execute expanded joint humanitarian operations (e.g. the delivery of supplies to refugees and/or accident victims in littoral regions). The issue is such an important one in the public perception that it demands attention now. It should be emphasized that navy-to-navy procedures for environmental protection and humanitarian relief efforts sacrifice absolutely nothing; unilateral operations can and should be undertaken in situations which are better managed unilaterally, for any reason—political or logistic. These agreements can, however, provide the US government with additional tools to employ if and when they may be necessary and productive.

It should be remembered that the Navy, as an institution, was way ahead of the nation's "war on drugs" campaign by instituting the aggressive urinalysis program which has served as a model for many other institutions within government and the civilian sector. The Navy shouldn't be afraid get out in front again, not only in domestic confidence building measures (e.g.
the Navy's zero tolerance drug policy) but by actively exploring the new avenues for international confidence building measures described here. Creative CSBMs, like those discussed above, are worth exploring further since they could facilitate the goals of arms control by reducing the likelihood of war, serve the recognized needs of the international community, and simultaneously bolster U.S. credibility as the world's fulcrum actor and only fully functional superpower. The Navy should not, however, recommend the adoption of any naval arms control regime (even benign CSBMs) solely to increase domestic political capital. If potential agreements are detrimental to US national security interests, the Navy has a responsibility to the government and citizenry to forcefully articulate such findings. That determination, however, can only be intelligently made after analysis of "new" CSBM ideas is complete. The key point is that the new environment demands more creativity and flexibility and less linkage to Cold War precedents.

A summary of my conclusions and recommendations, as deduced from Table 3, yield several key observations of potential interest to policy makers:

1. THE UNITED STATES IS ALREADY A MAJOR PLAYER IN NAVAL ARMS CONTROL. OUT OF 31 DISTINCT AVENUES FOR THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL FORCES, THE NAVY PARTICIPATES IN 14 BY NEGOTIATED TREATY, 3 BY EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, AND 12 BY UNILATERAL ACTION (these are conservative figures—they don't reflect the fact that many avenues are governed by more than one treaty, agreement, and/or unilateral action). THE NAVY IS NOT "JUST SAYING NO", IT IS CONSTRUCTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE STRATEGICALLY SENSIBLE AVENUES OF NAVAL ARMS CONTROL.

2. There are no naval arms control regimes on the horizon which are appropriate to pursue via negotiated treaty. I recommend six naval
CSBMs be pursued now (by executive agreement) and that six others be revisited, when the structure of the new world order is more clear.

3. THERE ARE FOUR MAIN AVENUES THAT THE US MUST AVOID, AND THESE FOUR AVENUES ARE NOT ONLY STRATEGICALLY UNACCEPTABLE, THEY ARE ALSO THE MOST DIFFICULT TO OPERATIONALIZE AND VERIFY (limitation of naval resources, nuclear free zones, ASW free zones, and SSBN safe havens).

4. Limitations of naval capability—now affecting both the US and Soviet navies as a result of unilateral budget action—should not be interfered with and jeopardized through the “arsenal balance” model of negotiated arms control.

5. Operational restrictions are even less attractive in light of the new national security strategy than they were in the Cold War. These measures are unacceptable.

6. “Popular” CSBMs (e.g. static data exchanges, a no first use of nuclear weapons declaration, bilateral/multilateral naval crisis control centers, and PALS) are strategically premature for the current arms control agenda. They need to be researched further and await the “settling out” of the post-Cold War international paradigm.

7. Relationship building CSBMs (e.g. personnel exchanges, bilateral/multilateral wargaming, journal exchanges, etc.) should be aggressively pursued and expanded to the midshipman/junior officer level because such measures support the US interest, regardless of the identity of the emerging world order. These measures involve little risk since they can be easily “turned off” should there be significant strains in the future US-Soviet relationship.

8. The most exciting possibilities are new CSBMs, introduced in this thesis, for procedures which facilitate naval contributions to critical international priorities. These possibilities reach beyond Cold War precedents for naval arms control and into the realms of environmental protection and humanitarian relief.

The new contribution of this thesis is that through its recommended agenda, arms control can be steered onto an entirely new course; agreements can now be fashioned to tackle problems of real public concern, interest, and passion. During the Cold War, The American public generally trusted the government bureaucracy to negotiate arms control agreements with the
Soviet Union which supported the national interest and simultaneously appeared socially progressive. The public could rarely understand, however, the obscure field of "balancing asymmetries", and if it was occasionally understood, it did not inspire anyone at all, whether they be arms control experts or private citizens.

A continuation of this dynamic is ultimately not in the national interest. With unilateral structural arms control in force as a result of the demise of the Cold War paradigm, the US government has the historic opportunity to use arms control pro-actively to foster US national interests by becoming engaged in critical international priorities which will not only benefit the world community, but will also engender long term support for the US military in the post-containment era. Naval arms control can be turned away from the undesirable course of historical precedent (a course that no one but Soviet Cold Warriors wanted) and instead be creatively channelled to solve problems that matter in both war and peace—and specifically for purposes that the Clausewitzian social structure cares about, understands and supports. This new dynamic is ultimately in the US national interest. This transformation could ultimately reverse the limited value of arms control, both actual and perceived. The goal of making arms control more significant, valuable, and useful as a pro-active tool presents a window of opportunity which should be seized now.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. BACKGROUND

A plethora of literature was authored during the Cold War which analyzed every aspect of traditional naval arms control alternatives, namely: limitations on capability and force structure, limitations on operations, and confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). The vast majority of the literature, while contributing to the body of knowledge on specific proposals, analyzed naval arms control in a purely maritime vacuum, rather than reframing the question in a coherent national strategic context. In my opinion, naval arms control is a FIFTH ORDER QUESTION which logically awaits the fleshing out of the more fundamental strategic choices which precede it in a top-down, hierarchical cognitive depiction of national strategic policy.

The changes which have taken place in the Soviet Union are of such fundamental importance that they require the United States to re-appraise all of the strategic planning assumptions which characterized the Cold War. The United States must first forge a consensus post-Cold War identity (the first order question) before the specific mechanisms of statesmanship are appropriate to consider. Secondly, the United States must prioritize the threats which it faces in the post-Cold War world and make the critical choice between unilateral military superiority against anticipated military threats or size its force to prevail only in conjunction with likely coalition allies, against possible adversaries (the second order question).
The third order question demands that a coherent synthesis be fused from the three distinct types of military strategy: planning strategy, programming strategy, and warfighting strategy. The planning strategy must serve to connect the declaratory warfighting strategy (which may not be the real warfighting strategy) with a supporting procurement philosophy. Although this third order process may be illusory, some form of connecting justification (even a paper strategy of facade) is necessary for bureaucratic continuity. For example, the US national command authorities may have had no intention of ever executing the Maritime Strategy, however it was very useful as the foundation for programming. (As a declaratory warfighting strategy, it required the procurement of additional forces in order to accomplish its mission objectives.) In this case, national programming strategy was based upon a declaratory warfighting strategy which was arguably real.

The fourth order question requires that the Navy’s role, relative to the other services, be articulated in the context of national planning, programming, and warfighting strategies. Each of these “questions” are actually lengthy processes for the entire executive branch of government. Until each of these processes (based upon a world order which no one has yet seen) yield consensus thinking, fifth order questions, like what type of arms control regimes support US national security interests, are cognitively premature. What can be clearly seen now, however, is that a military establishment designed solely as an instrument to be used in a global, zero-sum game competition with the Soviet Union is no longer viable.

The changes which have recently transformed the international strategic environment are undoubtedly real and they permeate every issue of
international relations, national strategic management, and politico-military strategic planning. American strategy must be based upon the realization that the world has undergone a dramatic revolution, not merely an incremental evolution or short term aberration, regardless of the ultimate destiny of the identity crisis currently wrenching the Soviet Union. The politico-military planning process is in a phase which is analogous (in magnitude if not substance) to the era in which the post-World War II Containment Strategy was born. This time, however, the challenge is more difficult—both intellectually and practically—because the luxury of simply planning to counter the designs of a universally distrusted and unpopular aggressor nation is no longer viable.

There are three approaches that can be used to begin the process of strategic planning:

• Identification of goals and objectives
• Preparation to counter a specific threat (or threats)
• Determination of resource availability

The Cold War paradigm was dominated by strategic planning based upon the Communist threat as embodied by the Soviet Union. The starting point for strategic planning in the post-Cold War world can no longer be “the threat” since the Cold War, at least as we knew it, has been won (even with the realization that the Soviet Union remains the only nation militarily capable of destroying American society). Strategic planning will be dominated by resource availability constraints for the foreseeable future, however planning based upon resource availability will need to be justified by the articulated goals and objectives of the United States in the new world order. The United States will have to present a credible plan for what it wants to
accomplish in the world, rather than how it should prevent the Soviet Union from accomplishing its international agenda. With the demise of the Cold War paradigm, the American public clearly is no longer willing to accept the opportunity costs associated with Cold War defense expenditures.

In order to meet the requirements of a new national security environment, the Bush administration presented a plan to Congress to restructure the US defense establishment (announced via the President's speech to the Aspen Institute Symposium on August 2, 1990). The primary objective of the strategy is to justify the reductions in defense spending which are required to meet consensus domestic spending priorities and to respond credibly to Soviet defense spending cuts and geo-strategic concessions. Although President Bush's plan will be reviewed and modified by Congress, the basic target of the plan, a 25% reduction in military expenditures and personnel end strength, is likely to occur.

Future naval arms control regimes will need to be analyzed not in the context of the Cold War strategies and literature, but instead upon the new national security strategy now being presented to Congress. This thesis is the first work which uses the assumptions of the new national security as a strategic backdrop for the analysis of naval arms control alternatives. The recommendations reached in this thesis, however, were derived from the realization that the new national security strategy may take a different shape as a result of congressional action, if trends in the Soviet Union change significantly, or if the CFE Treaty is not ratified (a key requirement for adoption of a new strategy, as articulated recently by General Powell). Additionally, this thesis postulates a set of probable congressional tests of the
new strategy which also are important considerations upon which to base naval arms control policy, namely: the adequate and responsible addressing of domestic resource constraints; the provision of a residual military force which is highly flexible and mobile; the formulation of a weapons of mass destruction policy which is responsive to public concern and the new geo-strategic realities; the encouragement of joint qualified officers; and the enhancement of the military’s role in environmental protection and humanitarian relief efforts.

B. WHY THE US GOVERNMENT DESERVES BETTER MARKS ON NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

Analysis of a current status “snapshot” of naval arms control reveals that the navy is not “just saying no”; it is a major player in every principal avenue of maritime arms control (i.e. capability limitations, operational limitations, and CSBMs). In the case of capability limitation, the primary difference between this period and the Cold War is that both navies are now undergoing simultaneous, unilateral structural arms control. This process is facilitating the goals of arms control (reducing the risks of war, the consequences of war, and the resources devoted to national defense) and should therefore not be jeopardized by exposing it to the rigors, uncertainties, and risks of formal, legally binding international treaties.

The Navy needs to make an even stronger case in its position concerning a specific subset of naval capability—weapons of mass destruction. The Navy does not possess, test, or exercise with any chemical or biological weapon and is eliminating most tactical nuclear weapons, unilaterally, without the interference of a treaty. Additionally, the Navy’s nuclear SLCMs are being
controlled via executive agreement and unilateral measures. The Navy can also "take credit" for participation in efforts to forestall nuclear proliferation in the world's oceans (The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971) and for the limitation of nuclear testing (The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963).

Although rarely mentioned, key naval technologies are also being controlled. These technologies include: naval application of ABM systems, naval cruise missiles (nuclear and conventional), SLBMs, stealth aircraft, and strategic ASW.

When operational limitations are considered, it is not often emphasized that in addition to the Navy being governed by restrictions of functionally linked amphibious naval exercises (The Helsinki and Stockholm Accords), it is unilaterally reducing peacetime naval deployments and already participates in the observance of a zone of peace (established by The Antarctic Treaty of 1959) and a nuclear weapons free zone (established by The Latin America Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of 1967).

Additionally, the Navy is also a principal advocate of many CSBMs, including the agreements which make the use of nuclear weapons at sea less likely: The "Accidents Measures" Agreement of 1971, The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement of 1987, The Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement of 1988, and The Dangerous Military Activities Agreement of 1989. Naval forces also bolster international confidence and security via the INCSEA Agreement of 1972, and an expanding regime of personnel exchanges.
C. RECOMMENDED NAVAL ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES

In conjunction with articulating the often understated participation of the US Navy in naval arms control matters, the Navy would be wise to enhance its domestic political credibility by coming forth with naval arms control initiatives, developed in-house (rather than being mandated by congress) that could contribute to US national security posture. The inescapable reality is that institutions which lose domestic political credibility will become irrelevant during the policy formulation process, a process which will surely be dominated by an increasingly introspective national agenda for the foreseeable future. An institution perceived as bureaucratically irrelevant and out-of-step will be a sure loser in the resource allocation game, regardless of the intellectual purity of its positions or successful track-record of the past. The Navy should not allow itself to become a spectator while Congress and OSD debate its future.

Although naval arms control is a fifth order question which requires that consensus be determined first for the previous four, it is entirely appropriate to staff out regimes, especially in the CSBM area, which would be beneficial in any emerging environment. One CSBM initiative which makes sense within this construct is an expansion of personnel exchanges to the junior officer/midshipman level. Now is the time to prepare for a more cooperative future relationship between the US and Soviet Union by fostering military ties which will be useful to each nation throughout the entire careers and lives of the exchange participants. Exchanges between postgraduate school and war college students would expand the goal of a broad strategic education
to an even higher and more useful plane than mere "jointness"; international sophistication and cultural sensitivity can become core elements in the education of mid-grade and senior naval officers. These exchanges should also be used as a testing ground for journal exchanges, doctrinal seminars, wargaming, etc. to "work the bugs out" of each procedure before they are implemented in senior officer exchanges.

This thesis introduces two new initiatives for naval arms control: bilateral agreements between the US and Soviet Navies which would establish procedures for environmental protection and humanitarian relief efforts in maritime theaters. Recent environmental disasters (including the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the various Iraqi acts of environmental terrorism during the Persian Gulf War) have emphasized the need for increased international attention on this issue, and the issue has become even more important domestically, in the American political psyche. Likewise, the plight of the Kurdish refugees in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War brought increased public attention to the problem of humanitarian suffering throughout the world.

It is imperative that the United States government seize the opportunity now to steer the naval arms control agenda away from the traditionally uninspiring, marginally useful, and highly problematic avenues of the Cold War and instead channel those efforts into priorities which really matter to the citizens of the two nations. A major problem with Cold War arms control was that the process became self-perpetuating and was largely irrelevant in the greater scheme of international relations and domestic opinion. The proposed agreements on environmental protection and humanitarian relief
have a real chance of contributing to efforts which legitimately bring the two nations closer together, and that would serve to satisfy the goals of arms control much more directly and significantly than a theoretical acceptance of mutual definitions for “balancing asymmetries” between our two naval arsenals. Those international arms control technicians who want to continually wrestle with questions of naval order-of-battle calculus are clearly out-of-step with the new strategic environment in which we must operate.

There are some regimes which may be of interest and may be useful in the future, but unlike the ideas discussed above, are strategically and mechanically premature to consider until consensus is reached on each of the four higher order questions of US defense policy. This argument is germaine to the subject of a no-first use of nuclear weapons declaration, static data exchanges, bilateral/multilateral naval crisis control centers, and adoption of PALS. Until the national identities of the US and USSR in the new world order are clarified (and until the respective supporting nuclear and conventional strategies are derived and analyzed), complex fifth order arms control initiatives which can not be easily “turned off” are not appropriate.

D. NAVAL ARMS CONTROL WHICH MUST BE AVOIDED

The new world order requires that the US maintain a potent naval force which is even more flexible and mobile than in the past. For this reason, naval arms control through operational limitation is even more detrimental to US interests than it was during the Cold War and should be completely avoided (e.g. exercise notification, nuclear free zones, ASW free zones, SSBN safe havens, etc). In an era of both fewer naval platforms and more diverse
and lethal threats to US interests, any operational limitation beyond the Helsinki and Stockholm Accords is simply counter-intuitive.

The US should avoid any regime which cannot be easily discontinued or amended, since the international environment (especially the future prospects of the Soviet Union) remains so tenuous. The US should also refrain from pursuing any arms control regime via negotiated treaty. If we have learned our lessons from the Cold War, post-Cold War arms control should be conducted unilaterally, if possible, and by executive agreement, if necessary.

The US Navy should be pro-active in recommending naval CSBMs which support our national goals but must also strongly state the case that we are already fully engaged participants in a naval arms control process and will not support future regimes merely for the sake of political expediency. It is also imperative that the White House continues to state its refusal to negotiate naval force levels or naval operational limitations. A real and sustained continuation of this commitment in the new strategic environment removes the specter of a "slippery slope" to more deleterious forms of naval arms control. Commitment to a consistent national "bottom line" will free the Navy to become pro-active in the CSBM area without having to hedge its bets; CSBMs cannot then cascade down the "slippery slope" to detrimental structural and operational arms control avenues.
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