The Navy and Jointness: No Longer Reluctant Partners?

by

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December 1991

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Master's Thesis

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This thesis examines the intention and effectiveness of the changes initiated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) with emphasis on the United States Navy. This assessment considers the implications for future national security of present trends in the balance of power between joint and service institutions within the Department of Defense (DOD). Interviews conducted by the author with key individuals involved in the writing and implementation of GNA legislation, coupled with a review of the literature, provide the basis for understanding the intent behind GNA and its provisions. In assessing the effectiveness of GNA, this thesis focuses on three areas: operations, plans, and people, and how the key change mechanisms implemented by GNA are impacting these areas. The author forwards policy recommendations, for both DOD and the Navy aimed at making “jointness” more relevant and meaningful.
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The Navy and Jointness:
No Longer Reluctant Partners?

by
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the intention and effectiveness of the changes initiated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) with emphasis on the United States Navy. This assessment considers the implications for future national security of present trends in the balance of power between joint and service institutions within the Department of Defense (DOD). Interviews conducted by the author with key individuals involved in the writing and implementation of GNA legislation, coupled with a review of the literature, provide the basis for understanding the intent behind GNA and its provisions. In assessing the effectiveness of GNA this thesis focuses on three areas: operations, plans, and people and how the key change mechanisms implemented by GNA are impacting these areas. The author forwards policy recommendations, for both DOD and the Navy aimed at making "jointness" more relevant and meaningful.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis examines the intention and effectiveness of the changes initiated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) with emphasis on the United States Navy. This assessment considers the implications for future national security of present trends in the balance of power between joint and service institutions within the Department of Defense (DOD).

Officer promotions, assignments, and education are the fundamental mechanisms driving DOD from a service-dominated, towards a balanced service/joint organizational culture. While these mechanisms have succeeded in shifting the balance of power, the results have fallen short of both an ideal balance and Congressional expectations. This study attempts to explain the gap between actual results, the ideal balance, and what was expected by Congress.

The methodology utilized in this thesis establishes a baseline for comparing the cultural change mechanisms of GNA by modelling United States Naval culture. An historical review of United States defense reforms portrays the tension between efforts aimed at creating an ideal joint/service balanced culture and Naval culture. This background provides the setting for an analysis of GNA. Interviews conducted by the author with key individuals involved in the writing and implementation of GNA legislation, coupled with a review of the literature, provide the basis for
understanding the intent behind GNA and its provisions. The interviews conducted between May and November 1991 included:

- Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO), chairman of the HASC subcommittee on military education;
- Rep. Nicholas Mavroules (D-MA), chairman of the HASC investigative subcommittee;
- Rep. John Kasich (R-OH), member HASC;
- Dr. Archie Barrett, professional staff member HASC;
- James R. Locher, III, ASD SO/LIC and a former member of the SASC professional staff;
- VADM M. Boorda, Chief of Naval Personnel;

In assessing the effectiveness of GNA, this thesis focuses on three areas: operations, plans, and people, and how the key power mechanisms are impacting these areas.

This thesis concludes that:

- GNA has resulted in a stronger joint institution within DOD. However, the results have fallen short of both an ideal balance and Congressional expectations.

- The Navy has worked hard to accommodate the changes mandated by GNA. But this has not translated into visceral internalization of the concept of "jointness" by the Navy's culture.

- The Navy's autonomous, operationally orientated culture has put it at variance with the national trend toward unification and jointness. Service-unique incompatibilities still exist between the Navy's professional military education system, staffing emphasis, and promotion/assignment philosophy and the post-GNA national emphasis on "jointness."

- During interviews the rejection of my proposition "that balancing power between the service and joint institutions must involve a cultural shift in the Navy" was surprising. It may "not have been the intention to change the Navy culture," as Rep. Ike Skelton contends, but can we realistically have it both ways? This thesis argues that you can't permanently change the balance of power between service and joint institutions without altering service culture.
The Title IV provisions covering the promotion, assignment, and education of officers are the key reasons why GNA is shifting the balance of power within DOD. GNA coupled with the environmental changes (diminished Soviet threat and reduced defense budgets) have made cultural change inevitable. Service culture, particularly the Navy's culture, is changing.

Whether the Navy takes aggressive initiative to shape these cultural changes or continues to tread a more cautious middle ground of accommodation will determine how the resulting balance of power within DOD is forged.

Since 1947 the Navy has been on the "losing side" of every contentious issue involving service unification. While the Congress and the nation have moved in one direction, the Navy has moved in another. Although intended to preserve naval autonomy, this divergence has stimulated more conflict and created unwarranted perceptual blocks to legitimate naval viewpoints.

The term "jointness" is ill-defined. Furthermore, the translation of "joint matters" into joint assignments via the joint duty assignment list (JDAL) reflects both this inconsistency (fewer warfighters, more supporters) and thus a divergence from the original Congressional intent.

The detailed and numerically orientated focus of GNA and its subsequent frequent revisions have unwittingly skewed the emphasis from developing and assessing jointness as a system aimed at improving national security to one emphasizing bookkeeping and numbers. The burgeoning number of wickets may preclude the Admiral Bull Halsey of tomorrow from advancing under today's system.

The Congressional focus on joint and service PME, by eschewing other important areas encompassing readiness such as training and exercises, has created an imbalance in the factors necessary for developing healthy "joint perspectives" in officers and ultimately improving national security.

Finally, this study offers several policy recommendations to facilitate a smoother implementation of the GNA provisions and to improve the present system's ability to achieve "jointness" -- thereby improving overall national security.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA)\textsuperscript{1} legislated far-reaching changes to the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA). This thesis examines the intention and effectiveness of these changes with emphasis on the United States Navy and considers the implications for future national security of present trends in the balance of power between joint and service institutions within the Department of Defense (DOD).\textsuperscript{2}

In enacting the joint officer personnel policies contained in Title IV of GNA, Congress went beyond structural reform of DOD organization by attempting to alter organizational behavior through the modification of attitudes and beliefs. Congress intended to shape the roots of service organizational culture. As the House Panel on Military Education Report states, "Congress' objective is

\textsuperscript{1}In this study references to GNA will refer to the original Act which was passed in 1986 and subsequent amendments to the Act which have been nearly an annual occurrence as part of Defense Authorization Acts. This study views the GNA as a process of reforms which has continued until the present.

\textsuperscript{2}Power in this thesis is considered to be the ability to implement and carry out plans, conduct operations, and control personnel. This author acknowledges that programming control is a major source of power within DOD. This thesis does not directly assess the programming area. Joint institutions are defined as the Joint Staff (JS) and unified command staffs. Service institutions refer to the Navy and Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army. While Congress views the Navy and Marine Corps as a team when considering joint matters, this thesis primarily focuses on the Navy.
nothing short of a change in the culture of the officer corps."

Officer promotions, assignments, and education are the fundamental mechanisms driving DOD from a service-dominated culture, towards a balanced service/joint organizational culture. While these mechanisms have succeeded in shifting the balance of power, the results have fallen short of both an ideal balance and Congressional expectations. This study attempts to explain the gap between actual results, the ideal balance, and what was expected by Congress.

The methodology utilized in this thesis establishes a baseline for comparing the cultural change mechanisms of GNA by modelling United States Naval culture. An historical review of United States' defense reforms portrays the tension between efforts aimed at creating an ideal joint/service balanced culture and Naval culture. This background provides the setting for an analysis of GNA. Interviews conducted by the author with key individuals involved in the writing and implementation of GNA legislation, coupled with a review of the literature, provide the basis for understanding the intent behind GNA and its provisions. The interviews were conducted between May and November 1991 and included: 1.) three members of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Rep. Ike Skelton (D-

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MO), Chairman of the House Panel on Military Education, Rep. Nicholas Mavroules (D-MA), Chairman of the House Armed Services Investigative Subcommittee, and Rep. John R. Kasich (R-OH); 2.) two primary drafters of GNA - Dr. Archie Barrett, professional staff member HASC, and James R. Locher III, former Senate Armed Services Committee professional staff member and currently Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; and 3.) active duty military officers serving on the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and on the Navy staff. This latter group included VADM M. Boorda, then Chief of Naval Personnel and RADM James Cossey, Assistant Deputy CNO for Operations, Plans, and Policy (OP-06B).

In assessing the effectiveness of GNA, the focus was on three areas: operations, plans, and people, and how the key power mechanisms impacted these areas. This assessment was based on written material, interviews, DOD reports, and external reviews (GAO reports and Congressional hearings/reports).

The thesis is organized into eight chapters. Following this, Chapter II presents a model of Navy culture along historical, environmental, and sociological dimensions. Chapter III is a history of United States defense reforms, which also serves to highlight unique aspects of Navy culture. Chapter IV presents a history of the GNA, including an emphasis on its unique characteristics.
Chapter V enumerates the key factors of GNA that potentially affect the balance of institutional power. The provisions of the original GNA, legislated changes, and problems of interpretation provide the basis for this theoretical presentation. Chapter VI assesses the GNA in light of changes in Navy culture and examines three areas of this culture: operations, plans, and people. Chapter VII reviews implications of present trends and patterns for future national security, including policy recommendations for improvements. Finally, Chapter VIII concludes with a summary of the major points contained in this thesis.
II. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

A. INTRODUCTION

What makes an organization function? Simultaneously capable of rationality and randomness, organizations are invariably seen by "other" groups as parochial and self-serving. This chapter offers an explanation for the apparent illogical behavior of organizations by examining the concept of organizational culture. This chapter also defines the concept of organizational culture and relates it to the United States Navy by delineating a Navy-specific organizational culture.

B. CULTURE - OPERATIONALLY DEFINED

Consciously and unconsciously shaping the perceptual lens of the organization, culture often underlies decisions and actions. Culture provides a level of analysis rooted in the identity of organizations.

Let there be no delusion. Even though they all [individual military services] serve the same common purpose and do so in all the honesty and sincerity

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'This is but one level of analysis, others being the rational actor model and the bureaucratic politics model. See for example, Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1971). In all situations causation is not clearcut. Often, true behavioral explanations and future predictive value is best offered by a blend of competing levels. However, for the sake of rigidity and coherent analysis, adherence to a specific conceptual model is preferable. It is the author's contention that the cultural level represents a powerful and underdeveloped level of analysis.
of able and dedicated men, they do not think alike.\textsuperscript{5}

Much of the context of our received wisdom...reflects little more than the character...of our own culture.\textsuperscript{6}

Despite the logical wrappings of defense planning, there is considerable evidence that the qualities of the United States military forces are determined more by cultural and institutional preferences for certain kinds of military forces than by the "threat".\textsuperscript{7}

We could not begin thinking our strategic problems completely anew, but must be bound by our inheritance from the strategic thinking of the past.\textsuperscript{6}

What does the concept of organizational culture mean? One text refers to it as "the prevalent patterns of activities, interactions, norms, values, attitudes, and feelings. Culture includes the informal aspects of organizational life as well as the formal."\textsuperscript{9} Edgar H. Schein in his book, \textit{Organizational Culture and Leadership}, describes organizational culture as the "pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external


adaptation and internal integration - that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems." Colin Gray describes a variant of organizational culture - the national strategic culture:

It is hypothesized here that there is a discernable U.S. strategic culture - that culture, referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, derives from perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behavior in national terms, and from all of the many distinctly American experiences (which stem from geography, political philosophy, and practice-i.e., civic culture-and way of life) that determine a U.S. citizen. The idea of a U.S. national style derives from the idea of a U.S. strategic culture, suggesting that there is a distinctly American way in strategic matters.

Colin Gray’s ideas may be applied at the military service level by hypothesizing that unique individual military service cultures exist and, additionally, by focusing on this culture one can better understand the motivations, aspirations, and proclivities of the individual services. Frederick Downey and Steven Metz state that the "sensitivity of the military strategist to political culture helps determine the eventual acceptability of his product." A sensitivity for service culture amongst both military and

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11Gray, 36.

12Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," Parameters, September 1988, 35.
political leaders would enhance interservice cooperation and hence national security. This point is underscored by Carnes Lord who states, "the rivalry of separate military organizations and services...can greatly affect the formulation and implementation of military strategy."\textsuperscript{13}

The following definition of organizational culture is developed for this study:

Organizational culture consists of shared assumptions learned by a group in response to its historical adaptation and development. These assumptions form discernable patterns which often operate below the level of consciousness.\textsuperscript{14}

Such assumptions elicit nearly automatic group responses to external and internal issues of survival. John Shy highlights the importance of learning theory with respect to conditioned response, stating that "in the future we must ask more seriously than before to what extent they are dealing with learned responses which operate beneath the full level of consciousness."\textsuperscript{15} Because they constitute the most fundamental level of human consciousness, these core assumptions, which form the basis of the learned responses, are difficult to determine and analyze.


\textsuperscript{14}This definition is the author's own and reflects a blend of both the definition offered by Stoner and Schein.

Therefore, most studies examine the product of these assumptions in the form of observable values and behavior.

Determining the link between cultural assumptions and observable behavior is often circuitous. What comes first, the assumption or the behavior? How are the two related in shaping the dynamic nature of culture? Schein describes the process of cultural analysis as a "step of examining the shared assumptions" in the system.\(^{16}\) The examination of shared assumptions is fraught with pitfalls, alternative explanations, and levels of analysis problems.

Differentiation between the levels of culture helps avoid these pitfalls. Schein outlines three levels of culture. First, artifacts are the creations of the group, whereby the culture is revealed through externally observable phenomena such as physical space, language, products, uniforms, and organizational structure. Values constitute the second level and reflect the outward manifestation of the beliefs\(^{17}\) and core assumptions the group holds. As the values begin to be taken for granted, they gradually become beliefs and assumptions - dropping out of consciousness. "Many values remain conscious and are explicitly articulated because they serve the normative or

\(^{16}\)Schein, J.

\(^{17}\)The terms beliefs and assumptions are used interchangeably in this paper.
moral function of guiding members of the group in how to deal with certain key situations."^{18}

The third level consists of core assumptions. These constitute the basis for the group's, and hence the individual member's, existence. There is little variation in basic assumptions, and output behaviors are only conceivable based on this subconscious level. The core level of assumptions provides the foundation for the group, thus shaping the group's values, perceptions, and behavior. Because assumptions represent the underlying basis for the group's unity and purpose, they become difficult to change.\(^{19}\) Actions which seem inconsistent with the assumptions may not reflect real changes, but rather reactions to contingency changes in the external or internal environment. Ultimately the group will act to ensure its survival while struggling to justify survival-based decisions that may be at variance with basic beliefs.

Categorizing culture risks oversimplifying the tremendous overlap between levels. If ideas and concepts become assumptions, then periods of transition occur in which they have not yet been assimilated into the group's

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\(^{18}\)Schein, 16.

\(^{19}\)The three levels, artifacts, values, and assumptions, are adapted from Schein, 14.
beliefs.\textsuperscript{20} Full assimilation into the organization's belief system ensures institutionalization of the assumption for its members, in this way members are expected to internalize the belief.\textsuperscript{21}

The fact that large cultures, such as American society, contain thousands of subcultures means generalization about cultural assumptions are dangerous. Therefore, the number of items which can realistically represent assumptions is extremely small. The individual military services are microcosms of American culture and in many respects harbor the same basic assumptions. Yet, each individual service has its own unique culture.\textsuperscript{22} Owing to the number and diversity of subgroups within each of the services, the

\textsuperscript{20}The cultural model adopted for this study is based on two levels: basic assumptions and artifacts. The author believes that the distinction Schein makes between values and assumptions is too fine. In many cases the cultural values are subsumed in the assumptions. For a thorough discussion of beliefs and learning theory, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976)

\textsuperscript{21}This does not mean that the group and all members will always act consistently with the core assumptions since there are other factors and individual beliefs that come into play; only that there exist strong tendencies for groups and the members of the associated groups to act according to certain norms of behavior. Large inconsistencies between a concept and the organization's culture might result in certain reactionary behavior. Beliefs that are not fully internalized but rather simply accommodated also exhibit the tendency to evoke culturally based behavioral inconsistencies.

\textsuperscript{22}Most studies focus on United States national culture or the national strategic culture and only touch on service differences. For examples of the national culture approach see Colin S. Gray, National Strategy and National Style and 'National Style in Strategy,' International Security, vol. 6, no. 2, Fall 1981, 21-47. Service-specific cultural studies include, Carl Builder's seminal study, Masks of War, which distinguishes the services according to differences in "practices" or the artifacts of culture; Vincent Davis', The Admirals Lobby, which examines service cultural differences with particular focus on political interaction; and LCOL C. Kenneth Allard's Command, Control and the Common Defense which presents a hierarchy of interrelated factors rooted in unique service cultures that exacerbate problems of command and control.
service-unique cultural assumptions must also be few and specific. There exists the risk of ascribing assumed beliefs to individuals or subgroups that, while representative of overall group patterns, are alien to those in question. This represents the challenge in identifying the prevalent patterns while recognizing that behavioral anomalies are often the result of genuinely distinct individual or subgroup beliefs.

The organization's founder plays a key role in shaping the culture. The behavioral patterns instilled in the early stages of an organization become the basis for subsequent cultural attributes. The heroes, rituals, and symbols associated with these patterns define and shape the organization. In the Navy, as this chapter and Chapter III will demonstrate, the historical influence of early leaders and the nature of operations at sea have contributed to the formation of a distinct Navy subculture within the overall military culture.

In analyzing organizational change, what is "defined as 'change' depends on immediate effects and what we expect or hope for." Change depends on perception. Expectation

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2The role of the founder and subsequent leaders in this process is essential, for they translate ideas into mission statements and operational concepts - the guiding principles behind forming organizational essence.


25Schein, 298.
that change was intended by a given action can be self-
fulfilling. For example, Edgar Schein states that
"politicians who have promised to make changes find all 
 kinds of evidence of change, while entrenched conservatives 
find all kinds of evidence of stability in those areas for 
which they want credit." Recognition that change was 
intended is an important element in determining the outcome
of actions that initiated change.

The impetus for change can be external or internal to 
the organization. External, environmental crises arising 
from economic or national security threats often stimulate 
revolutionary change. On the other hand, both deliberate, 
external and internal actions are used to manage change 
through processes, programs, or leadership initiatives. 
While all change is motivated by some force, there are 
also forces acting to resist change. The forces for change 
and those for the status quo encompass the basic opposing 
sides on change-related issues.

Methods of changing organizations include: structural 
change in which reporting relations, control spans, 
functional alignments, and centralized/decentralized 
arrangements are altered; technological change whereby

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26Schein, 298.
27Schein, 300.
28Stoner, 367.
workplace efficiency is analyzed and refined, and people-related change in which behavior, skills, attitudes, perceptions, and expectations are the focus of change. The type, degree, and method of change are dependent on the desired result and the timeframe in which the change is required. People-related methods for changing organizations are generally longer-term.

Implementing people-related organizational change encompasses a wide range of behavioral fields and management strategies. The understanding of organizational culture is essential in this area.

Culture solves problems for the group or organization, and, even more important, it contains and reduces anxiety... culture gives a group its character, and that character serves for the group the function that character and defense mechanisms serve for the individual. Learning theory, psychoanalytical theory, and sociodynamic theory are, therefore, elements that need to be brought together with leadership theory into a dynamic model of culture.

Specific implementing methods for cultural-based change include organizational development processes, training and education programs, and reward systems. Both educational programs and promotion schemes are tools for altering expectations and beliefs. These mechanisms are examples of people-related organizational change techniques, which, as Chapter V will demonstrate, are used in the GNA.

29 Stoner, 372-373.
30 Schein, 312.
The next section draws upon theoretical literature, expert opinion, and the author’s analysis and experience to develop an operational concept of U.S. Navy culture by exposing the underlying assumptions. Since "organizational artifacts are better used to check one's hypothesis about basic assumptions than to decipher what those assumptions are," the operational definition of culture is reinforced in Chapter III by an historical review of defense reforms in the United States.

C. NAVY CULTURE OPERATIONALIZED

The fundamental assumption underlying the United States Navy’s organizational culture is the belief in naval autonomy. This is reflected in the historical, environmental, and social dimensions of the United States’ naval experience. Examining the unique Navy experience with respect to these dimensions reinforces the case for the existence of a specific Navy style - a derivative of its service-specific culture.

Historically, the U.S. Navy is steeped in tradition based on wartime success and British origins. In the environmental dimension, naval units, groups, and task forces operate in all physical mediums, air, land, sea, and undersea, with their own army, air, and strategic forces. Socially, the nature of command at sea and its relationship

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"Schein, 127."
to a belief in decentralized control provides individual U.S. Naval commanders power unequaled among Army and Air Force contemporaries.

Identifying the fundamental Naval cultural assumption as autonomy does not mean that other cultural assumptions are absent. The identification of a single cultural assumption serves to illustrate the most unique aspects of U.S. Naval culture, which leads to values and artifactual differences which set the Navy apart from the other services and the national culture.

The unique position of the Navy is illuminated in numerous statements by DOD and other government officials. For example, General David C. Jones, USAF, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, characterized the Navy as:

...the most strategically independent of the services - it has its own army, navy, and air force. It is the least dependent on the others. It would prefer to be given a mission, retain complete control over all assets, and be left alone.\textsuperscript{32}

In a \textit{Washington Post} article rebutting Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's views concerning the ongoing defense reform debate, Congressman Ike Skelton stated:

In all honesty, it should be noted that as a service the Navy is unique. It has its own air force, its carrier air wings; its own ground forces, the Marine Corps; and of course its own warships\textsuperscript{33}


\textsuperscript{33}Ike Skelton, "We're Not Trying To Be Prussians," \textit{Washington Post}, 16 June 1984, 13.
Congressman Skelton's analysis turned into an indictment when he equated Secretary Lehman's opposition to reform proposals as "the Navy's traditional reluctance to play on the team." This attitude is prevalent among government, military, and Department of Defense officials. The following comments from my interviews are typical: "the Navy has always been a reluctant partner [in joint matters]" ..."the other services view us as isolationists - and that is a view which is not entirely incorrect"..."the Navy historically doesn't change anything that they don't have to"...and "there is just something different about the Navy". Unfortunately, when these views are combined with the Navy's record of opposition to every defense reform proposal since the National Security Act of 1947, the inevitable conclusion leads to Navy isolationism and obstructionism. The perception of the Navy as different has grown to become a reality. This perception of the Navy which, in part, emanated from the defense reform debates, has clouded the principal reason for the Navy's uniqueness - its culture.

Vincent Davis in The Admirals Lobby, examines the social behavior of the U.S. military, particularly the Navy. His work was motivated by the "primary conviction that the

\textsuperscript{1}Skelton, 13.

\textsuperscript{2}These statements are based on a number of interviews conducted by the author in the summer of 1991.
nature and employment of armed forces... would be to a large degree determined by the nature and culture of that nation.\textsuperscript{36} He concludes that "the officer corps of each American military service may appropriately be regarded as a distinctive subculture within the overall American political culture." The Navy, in particular, has manifested certain "distinctive" patterns of behavior.\textsuperscript{37} Davis traces these patterns to factors rooted in pre-World War II service history, including a sense of isolation from society and its political processes, the difficulty coping with technological change, and reluctance to get involved in politicking.\textsuperscript{38}

One internal Navy study conducted in 1958 by RADM Allan L. Reed of OP-92 (intelligence) sought to ascertain why the Navy seemed so defensive in the unification debates. The conclusions uncover some revealing aspects of the Navy's culture.

The habit of thinking of naval officers has always been more individualistic than of officers in the other services. This makes for vigor in action and produces good ideas, but it...tends to inhibit teamwork and support of officially stated policies and doctrines necessary in the highest staffs... Naval officers in general do not consider it an honor to be assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations... The degree of identification with

\textsuperscript{36}Vincent Davis, \textit{The Admirals Lobby} (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), VII.

\textsuperscript{37}Davis, 315.

\textsuperscript{38}Davis, 23 and 215.
special interests, such as Naval aviation, the submarine service, or surface specialties tends to encourage formation of cliques and to discourage viewpoints and thinking orientated toward the best interests of the Navy as a whole.39

Any one of the military services could similarly stake a claim to uniqueness and thereby generate a self-confident belief in autonomy.40 With this consideration, it may not be what is factual, but what is perceived. One study which examines the differences between types of warfare concludes that the uniqueness of naval warfare is not so much real as perceived.41 The same could be said of the organizations that conduct this warfare. However, differences between the services exist and understanding these differences may change perceptions which have become reinforced by observable behavior instead of the more revealing, yet elusive, underlying assumptions.

The question of what the Navy is and what it's all about is inextricably linked to its historical roots. Like

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40The key point here is that when examining one of the major concerns of this thesis, power sharing, perceptions are an important consideration. Dr. Robert Jervis states that people tend "to fit incoming information into pre-existing beliefs and to perceive what they expect to be there." Jervis, 143.

41A recent study of organizational culture "shows shared perceptions of daily practices to be the core of an organization's culture." Geert Hofstede and others, "Measuring Organizational Cultures: A Qualitative and Quantitative Study Across Twenty Cases," Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 35, 1990, 311.

American society, the U.S. Navy emerged victorious from beneath the shadow of Great Britain. Carl Builder asks, "Who is the Navy?"

It is the supranational institution that has inherited the British Navy's throne to naval supremacy. What is it about? It is about preserving and wielding sea power as the most important and flexible kind of military power for America as a maritime nation. The means to those ends are the institution and its traditions, both of which provide for a permanence beyond the people who serve them.\[^{42}\]

The example of British supremacy at sea inspired the United States Navy. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson once remarked, "the admirals were wrapped up in a 'peculiar psychology' in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true church."\[^{43}\] If this is the case, then Admiral Horatio Nelson is the guiding spirit. Nelson's inspired victories epitomize the individual daring and initiative so highly regarded as essential elements in naval operations and naval officers.\[^{44}\] Dr. Michael Palmer illustrates the historical similarities between the decentralized style of operations championed by the aggressive leadership of Admiral Nelson and the style used by Admiral Arleigh Burke in World War II.

\[^{42}\]Builder, 32.


\[^{44}\]Geoffrey Bennett, Nelson The Commander (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), 98.
The comparison of the methods of Nelson and Burke reveals that these two successful commanders learned similar lessons from their early combat experiences. They shunned centralization and came to believe that delegation of authority, that is, decentralization of command, offered the best hope of enhancing fighting power and achieving victory. They did so during periods when much-heralded communications technology seemed to offer the prospect of ever greater centralized control.46

The Navy has embraced decentralized operations. The examples of Admiral Nelson and the World War II heroics of Admiral Burke, coupled with his leadership of the Navy in the 1950s, went far to institutionalize this concept.46 Unification of the services runs counter to these historical roots of the Navy. Clearly, Admiral Burke used this argument as a Navy captain in OPNAV, tasked to write proposals countering unification efforts and later as CNO, when he unsuccessfully fought President Eisenhower's reforms.47

The Constitution reflects the institutional importance attributed to naval power by providing for the "maintenance" of a navy while calling for the "raising" of armies. The necessity of maintaining a fleet originated from both the historical experience and geographical situation of the United States.


47"Heroes are persons, alive or dead, real or imaginary, who possess characteristics highly prized in the culture and who thus serve as model for behavior." Geert, 291.

47Hone, 27.
The second dimension of the United States Navy's culture, the environmental dimension, has shaped the Navy and the nature of its forces. As an island nation, the sea has historically provided life or portended death for the United States. The geographic isolation of the United States influenced the authors of the Federalist Papers. It was envisioned that the Navy would play the keystone role in defense and growth of the Union. Alexander Hamilton writes that "every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the quality and extent of the means concentrated towards its [the Navy's] formation and support." In contrast armies were regarded with suspicion. Hamilton writes that "the industries and habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain and devoted to improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers."

The Navy possesses all the elements and instruments of an independent military power. Furthermore, only the Navy operates warships and submarines at sea, operations which by the nature of the medium have different characteristics and objectives. "States conduct war on the land in order to achieve long-term political control over territory. Warfare at sea, on the other hand, is concerned with temporary

"Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper No. 11.
"Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper No. 11.
control over, or denial of use by the adversary of, sea areas for influencing what is taking place on land."\(^{50}\)

Ships operating at sea are physically cut off from land and remain tethered only by their dependence on support vessels. The stability and safety of the vessel demand attention and respect. Ships take on personalities reflecting this relationship. The dependence a sailor develops on his ship transcends a mere fascination for toys, touching the roots of sociological bonding. This survival relationship is the essence of naval autonomy. The endearment toward the ship more aptly characterizes the Navy's "altar of worship," rather than simply tradition as Carl Builder suggests.\(^{51}\) Belief in the ship fosters a sense of superiority over the environment, thereby reinforcing concepts of autonomy. Furthermore, ships at sea operate at near-wartime tempo. The continuous operations and close integration with the environment are factors unique to the Navy.

The geographic necessity and isolated, autonomous operations of the Navy were more unique before the added variables of aerospace power and nuclear weapons. These technologies challenged the Navy's organizational survival


\(^{51}\)Builder, 18.
by radically altering the environmental aspects of time and space.

The sociological dimension is the third aspect of United States Navy culture. The Navy's deep historical roots and unique man/machine/environment synergism provide the context for its sociological underpinnings. The interaction of people in the Navy entails a set of priorities and unwritten rules different from the other services. This uniqueness is reflected in the relative emphasis placed on promotional milestones, education, operations, and planning processes in the Navy. 52 Individual identity within the Naval organization is reinforced by the power bestowed on the commanding officers of ships at sea and the emphasis placed on subgroups within the Navy, such as the submarine, air, and surface communities. 53 These relationships create a tremendous pride both for the Navy and for the identity within the Navy. The relationship between this pride, the Navy's storied past, and its supremacy over the environment is self-reinforcing. Since 1945, in the absence of a major "blue-water" challenge for the Navy, organizational defeats

52This translates into a warrior (operational) versus staff focus. For comparative statistics on promotional data see appendix D of the Annual Secretary of Defense Posture Statements for FY 1991 and 1992 and appendix A of this study. The Navy contrasts sharply with the Army and Air Force in that the Navy places more emphasis on operations in promotions and career progression. The small physical confines of ships have necessitated small staff sizes. Chapter VI will expand on these comparisons.

53Of all the services, the Navy has perhaps the most unique and distinctive subcultures within its overall organizational culture. This contributes to emphasis on decentralization as a format for satisfying subculture identity.
at home, in the form of perceived losses in battles over defense reforms, have evoked a culturally based response of wounded pride. The outward manifestation of this has been the view that the Navy fails to play on the team and is obstructionist.

The next chapter illustrates how differences in service preferences, which surface as interservice rivalry, can be partially explained by service culture. The accepted notion is that the military services act according to parochial interests. While this may be true in some cases, historical patterns reveal consistencies in thought which transcend mere parochialism. Belief in the organization is paramount and fosters action to ensure survival and health. New situations and challenges are handled within the bounds of organizational culture. While the wrappings may change to fit the situation, the basic tenets which represent the essence of the organization are consistent.
III. DEFENSE REFORM HISTORY

A. PRE-WORLD WAR II

The Department of War and the Department of the Navy were created in 1789 and 1798, respectively, with grave reservations and only to provide for national security. James Madison states:

A standing force...is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be necessary, provision...A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.\(^5\)

The Constitution cemented these feelings of mistrust.\(^5\)

Necessity and control were clearly more important than efficiency and military power. The resulting military forces were ill-prepared for integrated operations necessitated by America's growing expansionist spirit.\(^5\)

The Spanish-American War demonstrated these shortcomings.

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\(^5\)James Madison in Federalist Paper No. 41.

\(^5\)By providing for dual, civilian control of the military through the President as Commander in Chief (Article II, section 2) and the Congress in charge of the resources (Article I, section 8), the authors of the Constitution sought to institutionalize civilian control of the military.

\(^5\)The Monroe Doctrine issued in 1823 signaled a change in America's isolationist policies. The decades following this, particularly the 1890s, marked the beginning of expansionist policies with U.S. involvement in the Philippines, Cuba, and Panama. President T. Roosevelt propelled this forward with the around the world cruise of the Great White Fleet.
The Spanish-American War, particularly the Cuban campaign, demonstrated serious deficiencies in the performance of the U.S. military establishment in both operational and administrative areas. The utter failure of the Army and Navy to cooperate in Cuba was the forerunner of inter-service bickering and uncoordination during World War II, the Vietnam War, the seizure of the Pueblo, the Iranian rescue mission, and the Grenada incursion. 57

Despite such shortcomings the United States Army and Navy continued relatively independent operations and planning until World War II. 58

The Pearl Harbor debacle suggests the adverse impact of this system of interservice coordination. Rep. George H. Bender highlights the perceived deficiencies in the Pearl Harbor command structure: "It would seem obvious after Pearl Harbor that the division of authority prevalent there was a large contributing factor in the losses sustained in our fleet." 59 Until then the state of technology had permitted virtually autonomous existence for the two services without adverse operational impact. As uses of air power, rapid communications, and the U.S. military's global reach


58There were some attempts at unifying the services prior to World War II, notably a proposal forwarded in the inter-war period that had limited Navy support. None of these proposals were enacted because there was a lack of constituency, demonstrated need, and fear of a powerful military. See, Defense Organization: The Need For Change, 49 and Davis, 13-24.

simultaneously expanded, the boundaries between operational theaters blurred. Rapid response became a necessity. There was no longer time to craft ad-hoc command arrangements. These trends necessitated improved inter-service cooperation and joint efforts. For the post-war Navy this translated into heated debate about the unification of the services. At stake for the Navy was the future of naval aviation and more fundamentally, the organizational survival of the service.

B. WORLD WAR II

Reorganization movements designed to institutionalize a unified service began in the latter part of World War II. The concept of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) originated in World War II when President Franklin D. Roosevelt formed the JCS as a replacement for the Joint Board of the Army and Navy which had functioned as an inter-service planning board and provided American representatives to the combined Chiefs of Staff. The success of the war ensured that some form of the Joint Staff (JS) system would remain in place.

Post-war reorganization proposals were dominated by two views. The Army and its nascent Air Corps favored strong centralization and unification under a single military department. The Navy opposed this view. The Navy perceived

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60 Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff the First Twenty-five Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 14.
Army proposals as an erosion of its power. Centralization of the military by creating a single department, it was thought, would hinder naval operations by unduly constraining the required decentralized type of control so essential for success. Furthermore, the proposed creation of the Air Force provided a direct challenge to the Navy's autonomous viewpoints, particularly with regard to the control and operation of air power. Instead the Navy favored a structure that would ensure its autonomy and departmental stature.

C. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 (NSA)

Realizing the inevitability of some type of unification, the Navy took the initiative in presenting an acceptable compromise to the Administration and Congress. James Forrestal, the Secretary of the Navy, skillfully used a Navy initiated study by Ferdinand Eberstadt to convince pro-Navy allies on the Senate Naval Affairs Committee to support the Navy compromise, despite Army and Presidential desires for even more unification. The compromise, in substance, reflected most of the Navy's proposals. The Navy won the 1947 battle but lost the reorganization wars because the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA) created precedent

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61Ferdinand Eberstadt, Report on the Unification of the War and Navy Departments to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, 79th Congress, 1945.

62Hone, 16.
towards centralization. By taking initiative on a subject the Navy abhorred, unification, it paradoxically facilitated the trend towards more of the same. Consequently, future Navy positions on service unification would be less forthcoming and characterized by foot dragging rather than enlightened leadership of the issues.63

The NSA created a Secretary of Defense as the head of a National Military Establishment, formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and created the Department of the Air Force. While the NSA forged mechanisms for inter-service coordination, it left the services considerable power by neglecting the burgeoning issue of roles and missions. Each Executive Military Department possessed virtual autonomy, with powerful individual service secretaries retaining cabinet level stature. The balance of power between service and joint institutions remained heavily tilted in favor of the services. On the one hand, the Navy felt that a strong service-oriented balance favored its type of operations and style. The Army, however, saw an enhanced joint institution as a way of strengthening its organizational stature, since Army operations are highly dependent on the other services.

63The success of the wartime JCS, the outcry over the Pearl Harbor disaster, and the emergence of a strong Army Air Corps clamoring for independence made some type of unification inevitable. The Navy took initiative to shape this unification as favorably as possible. It succeeded in maintaining its independent departmental stature against Army wishes. However, the Air Force was created over Navy objections and the institutionalization of the JCS concept created a baseline from which future reforms would grow even more centralized.
In the "absence of real global conflict", the services carried out a "surrogate war" for institutional survival. To understand how and why this surrogate battle was fought, it is necessary to examine the roots of the post-World War II national security structure and inter-service power balance.

World War II ended amidst a heated controversy over service roles and missions. Some scholars attribute the dispute about service unification and roles and missions to the "uncertainties created by technological change." Technological change was certainly one of the primary catalysts in the debate. However, the reasons why technology stimulated feelings of paranoia in the Navy go deeper, reflecting the challenge posed to the Navy's organizational survival by the sense of having lost the preeminent spot in U.S. national security after, in the Navy's view, having personally won World War II. The Navy was grappling with the paradox posed by great wartime success and rapid technological advance which seemingly rendered their experiences in the war meaningless. Steven Miller observes:

The Navy emerged from the war, however, not only triumphant but also troubled. At the moment of its

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greatest success, the Navy embarked on one of the most difficult half-decades in its modern history, a period in which its strength was drastically reduced, its command fired, and its contribution to the national security questioned.66

Nuclear weapons changed the thinking and approach to warfare, creating confusion and uncertainty about traditional methods of waging war. Possessing the bomb bestowed prestige, preeminence, and programs on the immediate post-war Air Force. "The new Air Force recognized the bomb to be their strongest bargaining card and played it for all it was worth, carefully fudging the question of whether the vast destructive power concentrated in a single device ought really to allow for contraction...in numbers of aircraft."67 The real lessons of World War II, with respect to strategic bombing effectiveness, were not lost on the Army and Navy. The Strategic Bombing Survey indicated the mixed effectiveness of bombing, with problems ranging from poor accuracy to inflated bomb damage assessments.68 Despite the analytical results, the lessons of World War II went ignored, the awesome power of Hiroshima and Nagasaki silenced criticism of strategic bombing. Only "the inquiring scholar or the parochial Army or Navy man"


questioned its true effectiveness. With post-war demobilization drastically reducing the Navy's funds, and the newly created Air Force perceived as the darling of the national security establishment, the Navy desperately fought for its secure niche.

D. KEY WEST AGREEMENT

In March 1948 James Forrestal, now serving as the first Secretary of Defense, gathered his service chiefs in Key West, Florida and hammered out the Key West Agreement, officially titled, "The Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Most of the provisions of the Key West Agreement remain embodied in DOD instruction 5100.1, "Functions of DOD and its major components." This compromise remains today as one of the most powerful determinants of service roles and missions. The agreement is testimony to the military's recognition of both the need to resolve inter-service differences and the difficulty in deciding how. Within a month following the Agreement, Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, CNO, sent a memo to

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69Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace 1939-1945, as quoted in Freedman, 23.

70All services were severely impacted by post-war demobilization. The Air Force, however, was the least affected. Newly forged trans-oceanic ties necessitated commercial air power. This reinforced positive public perception concerning air power. The spillover from this development helped to enhance the Air Force's stature relative to the other services.

Secretary Forrestal seeking to clarify the Agreement. He stated that the "joint war plans would soon recognize and exploit the ability of carrier aircraft 'in the near future' to deliver atomic bombing attacks." This argument countered the division of responsibility assigned in the Key West Agreements which delegated the strategic air role to the Air Force. Although it signed the Key West Agreements "the Navy had little intention of abiding by the Key West Agreements which in reality had provided the wedge it desired." 

E. 1949 AMENDMENT TO THE NSA

Frustrated over his inability to control the military establishment, Secretary of Defense Forrestal pushed for further change. President Harry S. Truman, supportive of efforts to unify the military, tasked the Hoover Commission with investigating ways to improve the national security process. The Hoover Commission's recommendations supported Forrestal's conviction that further centralization was necessary. The 1949 Amendment created the Department of Security.

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73 Greenwood in Hurley, 233.

74 Secretary Forrestal resigned on 2 March 1949, his resignation possibly helped spur the subsequent passage of the Amendment to the National Security Act in August 1949. Some argue that the pressures of the job combined with his lack of statutory power and conflicts between having previously been SECNAV were factors in his resignation.
Defense, consolidated power in the office of the Secretary of Defense, appointed the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) - albeit with nonvoting status, and removed the executive status of the military departments by subordinating them to the Secretary of Defense.

The Navy vehemently resisted the 1949 Amendment. Naval leadership perceived Secretary Forrestal to be "behaving more like an enemy." The Navy reacted by forming a new division, the Organizational Research and Policy Division (OP-23). "The head of the new division, Captain Arleigh Burke, who was charged with countering arguments favoring service unification, eventually became one of the most articulate spokesmen for the Navy's views on defense organization."

OP-23's arguments in 1949 formed the basis for the Navy's later positions toward the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department. The Navy suspected that both institutions were following a long-term strategy to strip the Navy of its independence and to overcentralize the military leadership of the country. OP-23 memos presented an argument familiar to readers of James Madison's Federalist Paper No. 10: competition among factions was beneficial because it allowed civilians both to retain control of the military and to consider alternative national military strategies. Burke carried that view with him into office when he became CNO in 1955.

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75 Hone, 23. The Navy loses again as the ex-Secretary of the Navy seemingly turns against it. This introduces additional bias and perception that "the establishment was out to get the Navy."

76 Hone, 23.

77 Hone 27.
The Navy tried to stem the tide toward unification, but lost. The Executive Branch again demonstrated a willingness to support service unification while Congress became a partner in legislatively supporting service cooperation.

The Navy's nadir in power occurred during the revolt of the Admirals in 1949 when two issues triggered the resignation and firing of the Navy's top leadership. The first was the cancellation of the supercarrier United States because the new Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson, felt that:

The newly created North Atlantic Alliance gave the Strategic Air Command access to bases in England from which its bombers could reach targets within the Soviet Union. Publicly, Johnson claimed that the country could not afford such large ships and their accompanying air groups.

Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan "resigned in anger" over the cancellation of the carrier.

The second issue arose when the new Secretary of the Navy, Francis P. Matthews, fired Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations, because Denfeld gave testimony...

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79 Hone, 24.

80 Schratz, 68. The B-36 hearings provided the focal point for the ensuing conflict as the Navy tried to expose flaws in the Air Force's pet project, the B-36. Some felt that the Navy was still sore over the cancellation of their coveted carrier. Public opinion clearly sided with the Air Force. "A Gallop poll conducted during the hearings on 15 October 1949 found an overwhelming 74% of voters favoring the Air Force in future war, with only 6% the Army and 4% the Navy."
that conflicted with Matthews’ views before the House Armed Services Committee during the 1949 Unification Hearings.

The cancellation of the carrier and the perceived sellout by the civilian leadership of the Navy’s position on unification posed a serious threat to the organizational survival of the Navy. Like Secretary Sullivan before him, the frustrated, discouraged, and angered Admiral Denfeld refused to compromise his beliefs.81

The Korean War arrested the Navy’s organizational power dive by demonstrating that limited wars without the use of nuclear weapons were possible. The overall defense budget soared, and the Navy benefitted through the funding of additional ships, particularly aircraft carriers. While the Navy’s struggle for missions was partially alleviated, the Air Force still controlled the national security picture with over 37% of the total defense budget and the preponderance of nuclear weapons.82 The creation of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in 1946 had institutionalized Air Force domination within the nuclear weapons arena. The Berlin crisis (1948), technological developments in nuclear weaponry, and the rise of the powerful General Curtis LeMay

81 Schratz, 67. In addition, several other senior Naval officers were “forced” into retirement. The “intervention of President Harry S. Truman in Captain Burke’s behalf thwarted subsequent attempts to block his promotion to RADM.”

as SAC Commanding General contributed to SAC's (hence the Air Forces's) preeminence. 83

F. REORGANIZATION PLAN 6

After assuming office on 20 January 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower acted decisively on his campaign pledge to improve DOD's organization. He sent a message to Congress in April 1953 outlining Reorganization Proposal 6 which was based on the findings of the Rockefeller Committee on Defense Reorganization. Congress failed to oppose the Plan within sixty days; therefore on 30 June 1953 Plan 6 took effect. 84 Plan 6 increased civilian control over the military by concentrating power in the civilian service secretaries. "A single line of authority ran from the President to the Secretary of Defense and downward, with the Secretary acting through service secretaries viewed as 'operating managers' and his 'principal advisors'." 85 The Chairman's position was strengthened by power to approve appointments to the Joint Staff (JS). Additionally, the JCS duties of the service chiefs were given statutory precedence over their service duties.

83Rosenberg, 19.

84Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study Chronology Function and Comparison of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Historical Division Joint Secretariat (Washington, D.C., 1979), 101.

Predictably, the Navy resisted the changes. Admiral Charles M. Cooke, former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy during World War II, testifying before the House Committee on Government Services, stated that the proposed Plan 6 would give the CJCS excessive power such that the Chairman would acquire the attribute of an overall "Chief of the General Staff." Admiral Carney (CNO) responded to Plan 6 by becoming more aggressive in the Navy Department and in the JCS. He perceived that the plan left more authority in the hands of the service secretaries than the average civilian appointee could handle.

In the post-Korean War period President Eisenhower's emphasis on efficiency drove reforms. The Army and Navy believed that massive retaliation ignored the lessons of Korea by concentrating on total war with the Soviets when lesser conflicts were more likely. This dissatisfaction contributed to their opposition of reform proposals which seemed to emphasize efficiency against reality. More fundamental to their arguments against massive retaliation and defense reforms was the threat posed to organizational survival by a lack of key roles in the national security picture. In contrast, the Air Force continued to benefit

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86 Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study Chronology and Composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 107.

87 Hone, 34.
because of its virtual monopoly on nuclear weaponry and related policies.

By the late 1950s the Navy had recovered from its 1949 lowpoint. Sputnik and the perceived ICBM gap shifted concerns from massive retaliation and air power to ICBMs and vulnerability.88 While neither the Air Force nor the Navy embraced the emerging missile technology, both recognized the necessity of staking a claim in this new mission area.

G. 1958 AMENDMENT TO THE NSA

President Eisenhower was a staunch advocate of centralization and unification of the armed forces. His January 1958 State of the Union address emphasized the need to "assure ourselves that military organization facilitates rather than hinders the functioning of the military establishment in maintaining the security of the nation."89 Dissatisfied with the degree of inter-service cooperation, planning, and resource allocation, he recognized that advances in technology and nuclear weaponry presaged a revolution in warfare. In a widely acclaimed speech to Congress in April 1958 announcing his proposals, he stated:

88 The advent of missiles and other developments in national military policy had become so disturbing to the descendants of Billy Mitchell that Hanson W. Baldwin reported in the New York Times: 'The Air Force believes it is fighting for the country's life, but it is also fighting for its own.' As quoted in Davis, 228.

89 Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study Chronology and Composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 130.
Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort... singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service.\(^\text{90}\)

Despite naval opposition in the person of CNO Admiral Arleigh Burke, Congress enacted President Eisenhower’s proposals by July 1958. The 1958 Amendment to the NSA consolidated more power in both the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS by streamlining the chain of command and removing the service chief’s operational authority. The revised chain of command ran directly from the Secretary of Defense through the JCS to the unified commanders.\(^\text{91}\) Additionally, it expanded the size of the JS, empowered the Chairman to assign JCS tasking, and permitted the Chairman a vote on JCS issues.\(^\text{92}\)

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 granted unprecedented power to the Secretary of Defense, particularly concerning his ability to realign organizational structure. Understandably this did not sit well with the Navy’s preference for decentralized control and autonomy.

\(^\text{90}\)President Eisenhower as quoted in the \textit{Congressional Record}, 99th Congress, 3 October 1985, S12535.

\(^\text{91}\)A Unified Command has forces assigned from two or more services, whereas a Specified Command has forces from a single service only.

Shortly after the law's passage the Strategic Air Command "took advantage of its provisions by requesting that SAC be given operational control of the Navy's Polaris submarine force then under construction...over the next fifteen months Burke stubbornly fought the proposal, not only within the Joint Chiefs but before Congress and in the press." 93 Preempting any SAC moves to consolidate power, the Navy arranged for its own modified command structure which recognized the importance and status of the growing submarine fleet. 94 The final organization devised to coordinate strategic nuclear targeting, largely forced by then Secretary of Defense Gates, represented a compromise for both the Air Force and Navy. The Navy favored separate control of their SSBNs with coordination and integration at the JCS level, while the Air Force favored all functions at the unified command level. The Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff (JSTPS) would coordinate but not control strategic nuclear targeting. The close alliance of JSTPS to SAC, including the dual-hatted commander, ensured Air Force domination. Force control and weapons employment, however, would still be a unified command function. The differences would be in targeting. In this area the Navy viewed itself

93David Allan Rosenberg, Arleigh Albert Burke, as quoted in Hone, 43.
the loser, having effectively relinquished direct control over target selection. The Navy reluctantly accepted the decision. "To Admiral Burke the setup looked like an Air Force plot to deprive the Navy of control of its carriers and Polaris submarines." 95

H. PATTERNS OF REFORM

The NSA, Amendments of 1949 and 1958, and Plan 6 of 1953 all strengthened both civilian control and military effectiveness by enhancing the statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS. Concern for American values reflects a duality which places emphasis on both independence and efficiency. Consolidated civilian control undoubtedly reflects "traditional" American fears of a strong military, epitomized by the syndrome of a powerful German General Staff. The Navy's stance contributed to this belief both in the post-World War II and the pre-GNA unification debates. 96 The simultaneous enhancement of the Chairman's power illustrates the American propensity toward efficiency, quick decision, and strength. The advent of the


96 There exists considerable mythology surrounding the comparisons between U. S. Military organization and the German General Staff. These fears translated into law in both the 1958 Amendment and the GNA which contain explicit prohibitions concerning a General Staff concept. See Robert L. Goldich, "The Evolution of Congressional Attitudes Toward A General Staff in the 20th Century," Congressional Research Service report, 30 August 1985, as reprinted in appendix A, chapter 4, of Defense Organization: The Need For Change, 244.
nuclear age, with its emphasis on rapid response and precise command and control as a cornerstone of a credible deterrent, meant that expediency was becoming increasingly important in warfare.

All of these reorganization initiatives attempted to strengthen both the Secretary of Defense and CJCS, giving due consideration to Constitutional prerogatives and military efficiency. These considerations, however, inherently conflict. In addition to the civil/military conflict, there are several other conflicts that emerge from debates about service unification. These are: centralization vs. decentralization; conflict (inter-service rivalry) vs. cooperation (backscratching); and service (warrior orientation) vs. joint (staff orientation). The services took positions in support of the issue that best supported their visions and perceived roles in the national security picture.

In the first eleven years, the NSA underwent two major revisions (1949 and 1958), was augmented by Executive Plan 6, and purportedly clarified by the Key West Agreement. Yet, it would be another 28 years before another change occurred.\textsuperscript{97} Unfortunately, this wasn’t because the problem of service unity was solved, nor were service rivalry and parochialism eliminated. Some twenty studies conducted

\textsuperscript{97}For an excellent history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff see Robert J. Watson, "The JCS at 40," \textit{Defense} 82, January 1992, 22.
between 1958 and the early 1980s demonstrated remarkable congruency in problem identification. The studies demonstrated the inability of DOD "to achieve a balance between centralized control and decentralized operations. They question the utility of service secretaries and staffs as presently configured ... They affirm the relative impotence of the joint side of the structure."  

Despite their number and congruency, the studies performed between 1958 and the early 1980s resulted in few changes. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the recommendations made by most of the studies lacked Executive level support because it was unclear as to what changes could or needed to be made.

Secondly, with the exception of a few individuals or the study spokesman, a consensus force (such as lobbyists or Congress) pushing for defense reorganization was largely missing. The absence of Administration support, as well the lack of consensus, meant that reform issues weren't politically salient. The post-Vietnam malaise that gripped the country in the 1970s would seemingly have created ideal conditions for making defense reforms politically salient. Other factors, however, replaced the necessity of defense reform. The Executive Branch was under fire as Watergate dominated Congressional concerns, and a weak Carter

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Administration was unable to convert campaign pledges for reforming defense into action.\textsuperscript{99}

Third, the professional military was reluctant to fix something that they perceived was not broken. Evolutionary, versus revolutionary change has always been desirable and in fact evolutionary measures are often recognized as the only feasible change mechanism, given the propensity of organizations to resist change.\textsuperscript{100}

Fourth, despite the numerous studies the long hiatus on defense reforms from 1958 until GNA in 1986, may indicate something more than an absence of political saliency and consensus. General David C. Jones, USAF (ret.) former CJCS stated:

> It is commonly accepted that one result of this imbalance [between service and joint interests] is a constant bickering among the services. This is not the case. On the contrary, interactions among the services usually result in "negotiated treaties" which minimize controversy by avoiding challenges to service interests.\textsuperscript{101}

As long as the services maintain their relatively secure niches within DOD, instances of rivalry are minimal, hence any perceived necessity for changing the status quo does not

\textsuperscript{99}The Defense Organizational Study of 1977-1980 was part of a Carter Administration pledge to examine and reform the defense establishment. Very few reforms were initiated as a result of this study, despite numerous recommendations for change. See Barrett, 5.

\textsuperscript{100}Recognition of this organizational tendency was a factor in the enactment of GNA. William J. Lynn discusses this in "The Case for JCS Reform," \textit{International Security}, Winter 1985/86. Also see Barrett, 7.

surface. Furthermore, Secretary McNamara's strong control of DOD, through enforced use of his Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), signaled to all the services that perhaps unification had gone too far. There was a distaste among the services for further strengthening the OSD. "Accordingly, the officer corps of the three major United States military services...began to share a steadily increasing degree of common ground in resisting further measures toward the centralization of authority within the U.S. defense establishment." The creation of a perceived common enemy within the defense establishment, in this case the micromanagement of the services by OSD, drove the services together. Cooperation served as the manifestation of service culture by masking parochialism and rivalry.

I. SUMMARY

This chapter has illustrated a consistent pattern of Navy opposition to defense reforms. The Navy has historically argued that centralization of DOD counters the Constitutional principle of civilian control of the military. The Navy's opposition also stems from a result-reinforced perception of having lost each time it attempted to take the lead on unification issues. While dogmatic arguments may have been sincerely espoused by such reform

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102Davis, 234.
opponents as Admiral Burke, they are more reflective of
artifactual values the Navy maintained than the underlying
assumptions that constitute Navy culture. The differences
reflect cultural assumptions that transcend mere
parochialism and bureaucratic preference. The cultural
assumptions underlie the social relationships that affect
bureaucratic interaction. The artifacts of culture, such as
positions on issues of unification, really remain fairly
constant over time. Changes in espoused strategy genuinely
represented packaging techniques for organizational
survival. The packaged changes are not necessarily planned,
but reactionary efforts to ensure organizational survival
which is perceived to be in the best national interest.
Survival of the organization takes on paramount importance
with respect to national security since service members
believe that the two are mutually interdependent.

The influence of the changing national security
environment - the contingency environment - is very
important in forecasting the degree of conflict between
cultural assumptions and assigned roles with which the
service leaders must deal. Fat budgets bode well for
everyone's philosophy and conflict is minimized. Conversely
lean budgets exacerbate service cultural differences. Since
money and interservice rivalry appear to have a proportional
relationship, the services are charged with parochialism.
The fissure is, as I have attempted to illustrate, much
deeper - even the best of leaders with the most ideal structural arrangements can experience frustration.

The issue of rivalry has been discussed, but the reverse situation is also prevalent. Excessive cooperation, in what has been labeled as backscratching, frequently occurs. Services find a comfortable niche within the roles and missions hierarchy and work towards preserving and respecting the status quo; this can be reinforced by the perception of a common organizational enemy such as OSD (or Congress).

Finally, what are the implications of this for national security? Understanding that service differences have historical roots because they are based on fundamental assumptions of organizational survival is of paramount importance for all national leaders. Services will not change overnight. Efforts to effect change that fail to consider underlying attitudes are doomed to failure - most reform efforts have beaten this tack.

Rivalry is a manifestation of cultural differences. The ultimate organizational bond is preservation. In time of war, with a clear external threat, the American services have demonstrated that organizational survival and national survival are one. In the absence of real war, threats to survival frequently relate to lateral shifts in power within and between the services. The Navy, with its strong sense of autonomy and tradition of independent operations at sea,
has felt the pain of these "surrogate wars" most acutely. The next chapter examines the historical roots of the latest effort to effect DOD organizational change - Goldwater-Nichols.
IV. HISTORY OF THE GOLDSWATER-NICHOLS ACT (GNA)

A. BACKGROUND

Vietnam, the Pueblo incident (1968), Mayaguez (1975), Desert One - the aborted Iranian hostage rescue mission (1980), Lebanon (1983) and Grenada (1983) tarnished the American Military image and credibility. Six hundred dollar toilet seats confirmed public perceptions of ineptitude, extravagance, and disarray. While the varied causes of these debacles are arguable, the net effect is a matter of historical record. Widespread debate over military structure, leadership effectiveness, and doctrine ensued.

Congress responded by forming the Congressional Military Reform Caucus (MRC) in the summer of 1981. Concerned that an inept military was wasting the burgeoning defense budget, the MRC focused primarily on resources. President Reagan's defense build-up meant "big bucks" for the military; Congress, in turn, appropriated the funds and wanted a larger "say" in how the money was to be spent.

103Dr. Archie Barrett says that Beirut was the 'big one because the same subcommittee that was dealing with GNA conducted the Beirut investigation. The feeling was that the CINC was responsible, but did the CINC have the authority? The chain of command was too convoluted. Beirut helped to crystalize the subcommittee." interview by author, Washington, DC, 25 July 1991. There is a parallel between the Beirut hearings and the post-WW-II Pearl Harbor hearings as both spurred reforms.

Internal conflicts among MRC members over priorities, coupled with a lack of support for reform from DOD and the Executive Branch, stymied their initial efforts.

B. THE GNA DEBATE

General David C. Jones, CJCS, fired the opening shot in the defense reorganization legislative battle. On 3 February 1982 during a closed hearing on the FY83 Defense Authorization Bill, General Jones (who would soon retire) criticized the defense organization’s ability to plan, prioritize programs, and prepare for war.105 He followed this testimony with a series of scathing articles in national publications. General Jones received support from General Edward C. Meyer, then current Army Chief of Staff, who wrote a critical article in the April 1982 edition of Armed Forces Journal International. General Meyer’s revolutionary recommendations included dissolving the JCS in favor of a separate advisory board.106 The emergence of internal DOD sponsors for reform galvanized Congress and the public, producing widespread support for change.

These interrelated factors - military failure, the Congressional Reform Movement, and the internal DOD reform

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push - ensured the viability of reform legislation. Spurred by these factors, Congress moved to conduct hearings on defense reorganization.

The House Armed Services Investigative Subcommittee conducted the first round of hearings from 21 April through 5 August 1982. The result was a relatively modest proposal which called for minor modification of existing practices. The bill was "intended to overcome the most pressing JCS organizational problems" by concentrating on the organization and quality of the JCS. Following passage in the House, the bill went to the Senate for consideration.

The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), under the leadership of Senator John Tower (R-TX), reservedly took up the issue of reform. The opening Senate hearings were conducted on 16 December 1982. Portions of these initial Senate hearings turned into an indictment of Navy intransigence:

The staff [JCS], we found, had some real problems ... In some services, the services were inclined to try to give their very best people's service to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's staff, but we found that in other services, it was regarded by the officer corps that service on the Joint Chiefs of Staff was sort of a way station, an inhibition in the progress of their career. So therefore, people really were not seeking service on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And

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107Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services Report 98-382, Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1983, 98th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3.
indeed, we found that often, the services were not putting their very best people on the staff.\textsuperscript{108}

While not mentioning the Navy by name, it was understood that "other services" meant Navy. This would be a theme repeated in later Congressional hearings, as the Navy was widely viewed as part of the problem both in terms of supporting a strong JCS and advocating change to the existing structure.

During the Senate hearings Admiral James Holloway, USN, (ret.) emphasized the necessity of strong civilian control over the military; a theme that had long been advocated by the Navy.

Our approach to a national military command structure must be fully consistent with our national ideals and democratic form of government. What would work for a totalitarian regime will not be acceptable to the American people. The twin foundations of national policy governing the concepts of a national military command structure for the United States are: First, that it will produce the correct military decisions for the survival of this country; second, that it will preserve the democratic principles of civilian control. I will get to my point quickly by saying that...HR 6954 in one single piece of legislation will violate the safeguards for the assurance of civilian control and substantially reduce the opportunity for arriving at the best military decisions crucial to our national survival.\textsuperscript{109}


\textsuperscript{109}\textit{Structure and Operating Procedures for the Joint Chiefs of Staff}, 35. HR 6954 was the House proposed legislation. It recommended strengthening the authority of the CJCS, tied the JS directly to the CJCS, further enhancing the power of the individual, and designated the CJCS the principal military advisor to the President.
In other testimony, by stating that the proposed reforms had not gone far enough, General Maxwell Taylor, USA (ret.), former CJCS, permitted the Administration and Republican-controlled Senate an out - more study:

Indeed it would be damaging to national security if this bill in its present form became law. If passed, it would foster a general belief that Congress after months of study had found and corrected such weaknesses as may have existed in the Joint Chiefs system and henceforth...there would be little chance for true reform for another decade or so.119

Based on the December 1982 hearings, Senator Tower initiated a study that would take nearly three years. In addition to Senator Tower's hesitance over reform, there were legitimate reasons for further study. It was widely viewed among reform proponents that indeed, the House proposals did not go far enough.

Another "crucial factor missing" was the Administration's view.111 In a letter to the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger reviewed the initiatives undertaken by DOD to address recognized shortfalls in organizational structure. He stated that needed changes were already in effect, owing to internal DOD measures. Additionally, he introduced a modest bill thought by many to simply placate

119Structure and Operating Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 30.

By this time the outspoken generals Jones and Meyer were retired and their successors were more supportive of the Secretary of Defense's view. Secretary Weinberger's letter acknowledged DOD's acceptance of the need for minor change, but advocated that this change come from within.

Behind Weinberger's tactful, yet resistant, approach lurked the staunchest DOD opponent of reform, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman. In a 1984 *Washington Post* article, Secretary Lehman commented on the proposed reforms saying that "an old, bad idea surfaces again". The Navy Secretary declared:

...this bad idea subverts two of the most important principles of American military institutions: civilian control, wherein authority to decide whether to conduct military operations is reserved to civilian authority advised by service chiefs, and command responsibility, wherein authority to plan operations once decided, including tactics and timing, is vested primarily in those who have to carry them out, the operational and joint commanders, not the unaccountable military staffs...many of those who are proposing the change...do not realize that such a change would do violence to the basic concepts on which this nation is founded.\(^\text{113}\)

While DOD attempted to come to grips with the growing clamor for reform, Congress tested the legislative waters by attaching an amendment to the FY85 Defense Authorization bill. This amendment met little opposition because its

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\(^{113}\) John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, "Let's Stop Trying to be Prussians," *Washington Post*, 10 June 1984, C(7).
substance largely reflected the Administration’s bill as proposed by Secretary Weinberger. The provisions made the Chairman the spokesman on operational requirements for the unified and specified commanders, increased Joint Staff tour lengths to four years, and made the Chairman responsible for the selection and assignment of officers to the Joint Staff. The Secretary of Defense was made responsible for ensuring that officer promotion, retention, and assignment give consideration to performance as a member of the Joint Staff.¹¹⁴

Reorganization hearings continued throughout 1983 and 1984. The question was not whether the Department of Defense would be reorganized, but how much and when? The House viewed themselves as the leaders on the issue. Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Les Aspin, stated:

Compared to Bill Nichols, Barry Goldwater comes in a far second in the reorganizing effort. Bill Nichols is the person who has been pushing this legislation consistently, patiently, doggedly, skillfully, intelligently for all these years ever since he has become chairman of the Investigative Subcommittee. He stared down John Tower and got him to accept a

¹¹⁴The 1984 changes (FY85 Defense Authorization Bill) actually went beyond structural changes by attempting to ensure a quality Joint Staff. These provisions, however, gave broad guidance to the CJCS and Secretary of Defense. Just two years later Congress’ belief that the measures were not tough enough is reflected by the extensive and detailed measures enacted in the GNA to ensure compliance.
limited amount of reform and John Tower wasn’t for reforming anything.\textsuperscript{115}

The task force study initiated by Senator Tower received renewed priority in 1985. Fueled by the Democratic leadership of Senator Sam Nunn and the final push of Republican Senator Barry Goldwater, in his last term before retirement, the study was completed in the fall of 1985.\textsuperscript{116} A series of Senate floor speeches by Nunn and Goldwater presented the study findings while sounding a call for action.\textsuperscript{117}

The momentum leading up to the enactment of GNA reflects bipartisan Senate leadership and acquiescence from within the Administration. The radical proposals endorsed in the Senate study, such as dissolving the JCS, seemed to move DOD, and the Navy in particular, toward compromise. As a result, Secretary Lehman’s formal testimony became less adversarial while then CJCS Admiral Crowe’s testimony is even somewhat supportive of the House initiatives.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{115}Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Full Committee Consideration of H.R. 4370 To Amend Title 10, United States Code To Reorganize The Department Of Defense, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 25 June 1986, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{116}The study report was entitled, The Defense Organization: The Need for Change. The study director was James R. Locher III currently serving as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. The study was considered so crucial that an extra edition of Armed Forces Journal International was published in October 1985 highlighting the study findings.

\textsuperscript{117}Congressional Record, 1,2,3,4,7, and 8 October 1985.

Administration reflected this new spirit by forming the Packard Commission.

After the House version of the Defense Reorganization bill, HR3622, passed on 20 November 1985 by a vote of 383-27, the stage was set for passage of the major defense reform legislation. When the Packard Commission issued its interim report on February 28, 1986, the findings were remarkably congruent with those of the Legislature. "During its markup sessions, the Senate Committee on Armed Services evaluated the Packard Commission's recommendations and found them to be consistent with provisions" of their bill. On the surface the proposed defense reorganization bill and Packard Commission Report were similar. Key differences, however, existed. The Packard Report lacked an in-depth review of joint officer management. It focused instead on acquisition reform which was directly opposite the focus of Congress. Yet, this dichotomy received little notice outside DOD which continued to resist the joint officer policies because it viewed them as micromanagement of officers.

The final thrust for change came in the form of a letter from President Reagan to Congress endorsing the Packard Commission's findings and urging Congress to make the right

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decisions. The Senate passed its version of reorganization legislation on 7 May 1986 by a vote of 95-0. The House in turn considered the Senate version, as well as four other independent House proposals, arriving at a compromise, HR 4370, which passed the House 406-4. Both House and Senate versions then went to conference. During the drafting of the Conference Committee’s version of GNA, DOD refused Congress’ request for officers to assist them in writing the joint officer management portions of the bill. Agreement within DOD existed on the necessity and inevitability of most of the reforms, but the officer management provisions were not appreciated by the services who felt that the broad guidance given in the FY85 legislation to the Secretary of Defense was sufficient to ensure adequate officer management and emphasis on Joint Staff duty. It is not entirely clear why DOD refused the request to assist in drafting the officer management policies, since this would have provided an opportunity to shape the issue in its genesis. Perhaps DOD felt that this would send a message to Congress or that the provisions would really only reiterate existing wide policy guidance. In any event, the resulting provisions were a far cry from

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121 Dennis Clausen, LCOL, USA, and others, Joint Specialty Officers: Improving the Military During a Period of Reform (Harvard University, National Security Discussion Paper, Series 88-03), 9.
the broad guidance originally enacted in the FY85 Defense Authorization Bill. The joint officer management program was the most revolutionary element that survived Congressional debate and compromise, and DOD continued to resist these provisions throughout the debate. Officer management provided a direct challenge to each of the individual service cultures. Based on the Navy's historical disdain for staff duty, one might expect this to counter Naval culture. When those provisions threatened individual service autonomy and how each managed its own people, then a culturally evoked response of resistance emerged from each of the services.

On 12 September 1986 the Conference Committee reported out the Goldwater - Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which the President signed into law on 1 October 1986.

C. GNA PROVISIONS - UNDERLYING INFLUENCES

Two of the prime movers behind the (HASC) and (SASC) bill drafting and reconciliation in conference committee were Dr. Archie Barrett and James R. Locher III. Dr. Barrett focused on an appreciation for the "politically possible" reforms. The reason reform proposals had largely been disdained, he argues, is not because of the inability to identify common problems. In fact, the

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122Barrett, 7.
numerous studies conducted since 1970 demonstrated the validity of the identified DOD organizational deficiencies by independently arriving at similar conclusions over a significant time span. The problem was that proposed solutions usually were either too radical, thereby receiving immediate rejection by the bureaucracy, or too easily molded into existing directives and instructions, thus never receiving adequate emphasis or followup. Dr. Barrett's modest recommendations form the backbone of many of the subsequent GNA provisions. He emphasized that the skewed balance of power between the services and Joint Staff (JS) was in part because, "the services control its [the JS] personnel structure and have no interest in developing a JS whose talent rivals service staffs." In this regard the most fundamental way that the GNA would enhance national security is by:

Attesting to balance the organizational structure of DOD. The joint and service institutions were out of balance. The Act sought to achieve balance and to strengthen the joint institutions.

Yet, despite the recognition of this need for shifting the balance of service interests, in what he refers to as the "maintaining arm" of the military, and joint interest,

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123 Barrett, 6-7.
124 Barrett, 78.
125 Barrett, interview.
meaning the "employing arm," his proposals primarily consisted of modest structural modifications such as:

Establish a joint military institution within the present employing arm, at its core consisting of the Chairman of the JCS and the CINCs, with an organizational interest in advancing joint military positions. Strengthen the Chairman and CINCs. Increase the independence of the Joint Staff. Leave the JCS essentially unchanged.126

While the net effect of Dr. Barrett’s recommendations emphasized the necessity for institutionalizing the joint culture, his proposals for accomplishing this contained only structural modifications.

The impetus for GNA major personnel changes arose from the study headed by Secretary Locher. The bipartisan study report entitled The Defense Organization: The Need For Change continues to be heralded as a landmark contribution to the understanding and analysis of DOD organizational, as well as Congressional deficiencies, with respect to national security. The study aggregates 92 recommendations into ten problem areas.127 However, few of the study’s more controversial recommendations, such as disbanding the JCS in favor of a separate advisory council, made it into the

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126Barrett, 264.

127Defense Organization: The Need for Change, 614-632. The ten problem themes are: 1. imbalance of emphasis on functions versus missions, 2. imbalance of service versus joint interests, 3. inter-service logrolling (backscratching), 4. predominance of programming and budgeting, 5. lack of clarity of strategic goals, 6. insufficient mechanisms for change, 7. inadequate quality of political appointees and joint duty military personnel, 8. failure to clarify the desired division of work, 9. excessive spans of control and absence of effective hierarchical structures, and 10. insufficient power and influence of the Secretary of Defense.
Senate version of the defense reform bill because of their radical nature.

A significant difference between Dr. Barrett's study and the Senate study was the discussion of personnel quality. Both agreed that a major shortcoming behind the JCS' inability to provide quality advice and effect strategic direction over the services was due to the poor quality of its staff. The Senate study went much further:

...organizational realignments, by themselves, will not be sufficient. They will need to be augmented by major changes in the education and training of military officers of all Services. The objective of these changes should be to produce military officers with a greater commitment to national (instead of Service) security requirements, a genuine multi-Service perspective, and an improved understanding of the other Services.\textsuperscript{128}

From this analysis the study recommended establishing "in each Service a joint duty career specialty."\textsuperscript{129} This became the basis for the Joint Officer Personnel requirements of Title IV to the GNA.

It is within these requirements that Congress intended for the long-term shaping of attitudes and molding of the officer corps. More recently Secretary Locher stated his belief that "the most overriding intention of the GNA was to shift the balance of orientation within the military from service-dominated toward a balanced service/joint

\textsuperscript{128}Defense Organization: The Need For Change, 618.

\textsuperscript{129}Defense Organization: The Need for Change, 11.
Furthermore, he asserts that the joint officer management provisions were designed to:

Change the organizational lines by tying in promotions...numerous military officers were interviewed for the study, most did not covet joint duty despite being supportive of GNA actions. Congress decided that this was one of the most important aspects of the proposed legislation. Resistance was furious, but the modifications have measurably improved the quality of the joint staff.13

The task of writing into law the concept of joint officer management fell to Dr. Barrett who states that "the kernels of the officer management program were sparked by a 1982 study conducted for the Chairman known as the Brimm report and the 1985 CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) report."132 Dr. Barrett states:

Writing this concept into law was one of the hardest things I have had to do. Initially we were not going to do anything with personnel, a lot of people kept telling us that organizational shifts don't matter without good officers to support...we started to think that maybe this was more than lip service designed to keep us from changing the organization.133


131Locher, interview.

132Barrett, interview. Also see, Toward a More Effective Defense: The Final Report of the CSIS Defense Organization Project, (Georgetown University Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Feb. 1985), "Giving the Chairman greater authority over the Joint Staff would only improve cross-service military advice if the military personnel system were also modified so that officers were attracted to, trained for, and rewarded for service in joint positions. Toward this end, we recommend that each service establish a 'Joint Specialty.'" 14.

133Barrett, interview.
From these origins, the personnel provisions of the GNA were enacted into law. This signified the end of decades of only changing DOD structure as a way of achieving a balanced service/joint DOD organization.

D. SUMMARY

There were major similarities between the reform movement of the 1980's and previous successful efforts. These similarities were a perceived inefficient use of resources, the tocsin from within the defense establishment, and the opposition of the Navy. This time the call for reform was sounded by the uniformed chiefs rather than the President or Secretary of Defense, but it still had the same effect of making the issue politically safe. Both the FY85 Defense Authorization Bill and GNA were precipitated by Executive compromise proposals. In 1983 it was an Executive-sponsored bill, while in 1986 it was the Reagan endorsement of the Packard Commission. Congress could support defense and credit itself with enacting change, both political pluses, without alienating DOD or the Executive Branch.

The Navy again aligned itself against unification using many of the same arguments that were forwarded in 1947, 1949, and 1958. But it was not just the Navy that disdained the joint officer personnel provisions of the GNA. All of the services considered these provisions micromanagement.
While the centralization provisions of the GNA countered Navy proclivities for decentralized operations, the joint officer management provisions challenged the organizational strength and autonomy of all the services.

There were significant similarities between earlier reforms and the roots of GNA. There were, however, also new patterns. First, failures diminished public esteem for the military, making them easier targets for reform. No longer were the services viewed predominantly as bastions of integrity and competence.\footnote{134} The public and Congress were skeptical of military performance. The formation of the MRC before reform became a politically safe issue reflects this.

Second, the new Congress mirrored evolving attitudes in the post-Vietnam United States. Unlike previous successful reforms, Congress was taking the initiative by aggressively pursuing hearings and bill proposals. The work of highly principled members, such as Bill Nichols, was instrumental in this effort.\footnote{135}

Third, for the first time members of the internal DOD structure, notably Generals Jones and Meyer, spoke out in favor of reform while still on active duty.

\footnote{134}{For examples of public and military opinion data see: "The Top Brass, Can They Fight a Modern War?," Newsweek, Special Report, 9 July 1984, pp. 32-51.}

\footnote{135}{Barrett, interview.}
Finally, the fundamental difference between the GNA reforms and any previous efforts are the personnel policies. Congress went beyond structural changes, seeking to influence and alter the beliefs of individuals. By tying promotions to joint duty, Congress sought to enhance national security by ensuring that the best officers were enticed into joint jobs. By strengthening the bond between the individual officer's need for job security and career enhancement and joint duty, Congress has created the mechanism for a cultural shift in the military.
V. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT (GNA) PROVISIONS, CHANGES, AND PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews the provisions, changes, and interpretation problems of GNA. More far reaching than simple structural changes to DOD organization, key provisions covering the promotions, assignments and education of officers are the backbone of GNA. These provisions, largely contained within Title IV of the GNA, are the principal mechanisms behind the shift in power within DOD. As Dr. Archie Barrett stated, "anyone who doesn't understand what Title IV was designed to achieve hasn't studied GNA."\textsuperscript{136} In addition to these key provisions, numerous changes to GNA have been enacted in the annual Defense Authorization bills since 1986. These changes are part of the GNA reform process and reflect both Congressional intent and DOD desires. Considering the revolutionary aspects of the joint officer management programs of Title IV, the complexity of all the GNA provisions, and the number of changes that have been enacted since 1986, problems have arisen interpreting the intention of some key provisions, particularly with regard to Title IV.

\textsuperscript{136}Barrett, interview.
B. PROVISIONS

The preamble of the GNA states:

In enacting this ACT, it is the intent of Congress...
1. to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department;
2. to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
3. to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishments of missions assigned to those commands;
4. to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
5. to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
6. to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
7. to improve joint officer management policies; and
8. otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.\(^\text{137}\)

These eight broad areas cover the objectives Congress sought in enacting specific provisions of the Act. The fundamental purpose of GNA was to improve national security.

Congressman Ike Skelton states:

The primary purpose of the GNA was to cause things to work better...to change things in the chain of command, the power structure, the joint specialty, and the special education requirements, thereby causing things to work better and more smoothly.\(^\text{138}\)


This was accomplished through a number of provisions, the most significant of which were designed to:

- increase the authority and responsibility of the CJCS and CINCs, including improved staff quality, power over their staffs and subordinates, and inputs into the budget process. To streamline and reduce the staffs of the service secretaries and service chiefs while lifting the size restrictions on the CJCS staff.

- establish a new joint military occupational specialty for the management of officers who are trained and orientated in joint matters. Specifies educational qualifications, tour lengths, and promotion requirements for a new cadre of officers termed joint specialty officers (JSOs).

A Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issues Brief offers this analysis of the provisions in GNA:

Implicit in these changes is the acceptance of the notion that DOD's organizational structure prior to enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act did indeed suffer from excessive service independence and inadequate central planning, direction, and leadership, and rejection of the opposite critique that the organizational status quo had been satisfactory or even excessively centralized.  

Structurally, the Chairman was designated "the principal military advisor to the President." The criticism that this would isolate the President from necessary and divergent viewpoints was answered with a provision that any service chief "may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or opinion in

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140 GNA, sec. 151(b).
addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the
President, National Security Council, or the Secretary of
Defense...Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of
such member at the same time he presents his own."141

The law removed the corporate JCS from the chain of
command. The streamlined chain of command runs from the
President to the Secretary of Defense, to the unified
commanders. A common myth is that GNA removed the service
chiefs from the operational chain of command. In fact, this
was accomplished by the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act.142
GNA simply clarified the intent of Congress by ensuring that
the JCS is not unnecessarily supplanted within the chain of
command.

The influence of the Chairman and CINCs was also
enhanced through provisions allowing them greater "say" in
budget matters. While the budgetary provisions have shifted
the balance of power toward the joint institutions, the
services continue to have the preponderance of power in this
area. The General Accounting Office (GAO) noted that

141GNA, sec. 151(d).

142Defense Organization: The Need for Change, 147. The Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 specified that the "chain of command runs
from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the commanders of unified and specified commands...this function
has often been misinterpreted to mean that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
actually in the chain of command for military operations." Congress sought
to clarify this in GNA by stating that "unless otherwise directed by the
President, the chain of command to a unified or specified combatant command
runs-(1) from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and (2) from the
Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command." GNA, sec.
162 (b). As noted the President does have the authority to modify this and
the current practice has been to include the JCS.
although the unified commands were permitted to develop separate budget inputs under GNA, they were not doing so. GAO determined that while this is not a violation of the law, it clearly undermines the intent of Congress and lessens the unified commanders' real power over component commands and the services.

Redrawing the structural lines, by clarifying the chain of command and designating the CJCS as the principal military advisor to the President, has increased the power of the joint side of the military. Budget power has also improved joint influence in the process, but the real drivers are the Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policies which require that:

The Secretary of Defense shall establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps on the active-duty list who are particularly trained in, orientated toward joint matters...such officers shall be identified or designated...in such a manner as the Secretary of Defense directs...officers to be managed by such policies, procedures, and practices are referred to as having or having been nominated for, the "joint specialty."

The Secretary of Defense is required to establish career guidelines for "1. selection, 2. military education,

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14GISCOC, the Special Operations Unified Command is the exception to this.


14GAO, sec. 611 (a).
3. training, 4. types of duty assignments, and 5. such other matters as the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate."\textsuperscript{146}

The selection criteria for joint duty is designed to ensure top quality officers on the JS and the CINC staffs by specifically tying in promotion requirements.\textsuperscript{147} By including the "bread and butter" of personal careers, Congress ensured individual officers would seek joint jobs and that the overall quality of joint staffs would be high. This provision, perhaps more than any other, has significant potential for facilitating the shift in the balance of power between service and joint institutions. Vice Admiral M. Boorda, Chief of Naval Personnel, states that clearly "the promotion system is the driver"\textsuperscript{148} with respect to strengthening the joint institutions and making the military more joint.

In the area of military education the Secretary of Defense was required to:

\textsuperscript{146}GNA, sec. 661 (e). JCS Admin Pub 1.2, Joint Officer Management. 30 June 1989, is the official DOD implementing document for the Title IV GNA Joint Officer Personnel Policies. A new directive is being written that will consolidate this guidance, expected completion is December 1991.

\textsuperscript{147}GNA, sec. 662 (a) (1), promotions of officers who have served or are serving on the joint staff are expected to be promoted at a rate not less than comparable contemporaries on service headquarter staffs. The rule for officers with the joint specialty...other joint duty assignments...or officers other than the above shall be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for comparable contemporaries service wide.

...with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall periodically review and revise the curriculum of each school of the National Defense University (and any other joint professional military education school) to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters. The Secretary shall require such schools to maintain rigorous standards for the military education of officers with the joint specialty. Secretary of Defense shall require that each Department of Defense school...periodically review and revise its curriculum for senior and intermediate grade officers in order to strengthen the focus on-(1) joint matters and (2) preparing officers for joint duty assignments.149

GNA sought to emphasize education as a means of improving the officer corps and strengthening the joint institution. Professional military education was envisioned as a mechanism to influence the culture of the officer corps and thereby provide the long-term mechanism for stimulating organizational change. To accomplish this Congress initially established broad guidelines giving the Secretary of Defense considerable leeway in the mechanics.

The provisions of GNA which sought to streamline and reduce the staffs of the services, while easing size restrictions on the JS, have provided a simple yet flexible source of power for the CJCS. Dr. Archie Barrett recognized this possibility:

Reducing...operations-orientated parts of the service staffs could supply the personnel needed to man a dedicated staff for the Chairman, increase Joint Staff operations, planning, and command and control capabilities, and provide the unified commands with the wherewithal to assume new

149GNA, sec. 663 (c) and (b).
This area has received even more emphasis post-GNA, as the ceiling on JS size was lifted in 1990.¹⁵¹

C. CHANGES

Size restrictions on the JS are just one of several provisions of the Act that have been modified since 1986. The current law has been amended four times in the FY87, 88, 89, and 90 Defense Authorization Acts.¹⁵² The extensive changes to the law since 1986, designed in part to provide flexibility to DOD and ensure continued compliance, have skewed the focus away from the big picture towards an emphasis on details. The changes illustrate Congress' commitment towards making GNA work. The changes also reflect DOD's desire to see some of the management restrictions eased.

DOD has attempted to have some of the more specific and rigid joint officer management provisions eased. DOD desired more flexibility by seeking less restrictive joint

¹⁵¹The pre-GNA limit on JS size was set at 400, GNA changed it to 1627, now there is no limit on size (changed in PL 101-510 stat. 902 5 Nov 1990).

tour lengths, joint military education and tour sequencing requirements, and less restrictive tour requirements for critical occupation specialist (COS) officers. The amendments to the joint officer personnel provisions of GNA agreed to in the FY88 National Defense Authorization Act (sections 1301-1305) were much more limited and restricted...due to the adamant wishes of the House to give the original provisions more time to work before changing them.\footnote{153}{COS officers are the warfighters in each service, for the Navy these are the aviators, surface officers, SEALS, and submariners. There is considerable language and discussion with regard to this category of officer. Clearly the intent of GNA was to ensure that the JS contained a substantial proportion of these officers and that their tour lengths were long enough to provide continuity and benefit from their warfare experience. A previous criticism was that "hot runners" would serve a minimal amount of time in a joint tour so as to get their "joint ticket" punched.}

While DOD generally leans toward less restrictive measures, the House wants to stay the course. The compromises reached in the FY88 Defense Authorization Act have produced some confusion as well as given DOD a small margin of greater flexibility. For example, while tour length requirements were shortened and sequencing requirements for COS officers were eased, the amendments placed stringent restrictions on the flexible use of COS officers. One such restriction limited "the number of 2-year COS joint duty assignments that may be excluded from the annual computation of the average length of joint duty

\footnote{154}{CRS Issues Brief, 17 Dec. 1987, 10.}
assignments to not more than 10 percent of the number of all joint duty assignment positions identified.  

Most of the Title IV requirements can be waived by either the Secretary of Defense or the President. Congress, however, clearly intended for the waiver provisions to be the exception rather than the rule. This is underscored by the requirement to report numerous categories of waivers, including a person-by-person accounting. Clearly this is detail-orientated administration. Dr. Archie Barrett echoes this observation by saying that, "many provision of the GNA are rightly described as micromanagement."  

Another amendment to GNA contained in the FY88 Defense Authorization Act reflects Congressional desires to emphasize the importance of joint duty at the highest levels of the military. The amendment stipulates that a

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155Congress, House, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Conference Report to accompany HR 1748, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 17 November 1987, 695. In addition to the 10% rule the amendments also imposed several other numerical wickets notably the 25% and 12.5% rules. The point is that while the law was amended to provide some flexibility additional numerical requirements were imposed by Congress to quantify just how much flexibility would be permitted. In some cases these requirements have actually made the officer management more confusing. One joint personnel action officer wailed, "do they mean 10% by paygrade/year, 10% for all paygrades, or just approximately 10%/year." Interview by author, July 1991.

156Panel on Military Education Report, 4. Also see Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces (as amended through April 6, 1991), Committee Print, April 1991, 191-194, requires 18 categories of reports from the Secretary of Defense to Congress with respect to joint officer management.

157Barrett, interview.
substantial (agreed that substantial means 50%) portion of joint duty assignments (JDA) for general and flag officers shall be designated as critical. This requirement, in combination with the other provisions that cover flag officers, has enhanced the status of joint jobs. The other provisions include: for flag promotions to LGEN and VADM, the CJCS shall submit to the Secretary of Defense the Chairman's evaluation of that officer's performance as a member of the JS and in other joint duty assignments; the requirement that the CINCs must be joint specialists and that in order to be the CJCS or the VCJCS, one must have served as a CINC; and the requirement that all new flag officers must have served in a joint duty assignment prior to selection for flag. One LCOL on the JS cited the provisions of GNA that tie joint duty with promotion and advancement to flag as "the keystone behind making GNA effective." There have been growing pains associated with these provisions, and as with most officer management requirements, the Navy has felt these pains most acutely.

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159 A critical joint duty assignment is a joint duty position designated as requiring someone specially trained and educated in joint matters—a joint specialty officer (JSO).

160 Interview with JS O-5, November 1991. DOD instruction 1320.5, which required that a flag officer serve in a joint duty tour prior to selection to flag, was in existence prior to GNA, but adherence was not widespread.
with the Navy relying on "good-of-service" waivers and special waiver authority for nuclear-trained officers.\(^6\)

These provisions ensure that the general/flag officer leadership in the military will have experience shaped by joint duty, thus theoretically translating into a greater appreciation of the joint perspective among the senior officer corps. The first group of amendments to GNA accommodated some of the DOD desire for flexibility while still ensuring rigid Congressional oversight.

The second area of major change to GNA has been in the area of the educational aspects of joint officer personnel policy. Changes here arose from a Congressional belief that DOD’s performance was not meeting the intent or the letter of the law, particularly those areas where Congress had established broad guidelines for DOD. Dr. Barrett comments:

> It became apparent that DOD was hooking onto other provisions of GNA which undermined the intent. They were simply waving a magic wand in order to credit all existing service schools with giving joint education.\(^6\)

In 1987 responding to perceived deficiencies in the education on joint matters, the House formed the Panel on Military Education (also referred to as the Skelton Panel).


\(^6\)Barrett, interview.
The Panel's mission included assuring that professional military education provides the proper linkage between the service-competent officer and joint officer. Congress feels that influencing service culture is best achieved through education and officer management. The Panel on Military Education Report stated that "joint education is a major way to change the professional military culture so that officers accept and support the strengthened joint elements."\footnote{Panel on Military Education Report, 12.}

A letter sent to the Education Panel Chairman, Ike Skelton set forth the charter of the education panel:

The Panel on Military Education should review Department of Defense plans for implementing the joint professional military education requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act with a view toward assuring that this education provides the proper linkage between the service competent officer and the competent joint officer. The panel should also assess the ability of the current Department of Defense military education system to develop professional military strategists, joint warfighters and tacticians.\footnote{Les Aspin, Congressman, Chairman House Armed Services Committee, letter to Ike Skelton, Congressman, reprinted in Professional Military Education: Hearings before the Panel on Military Education, 100th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., 13 Nov. 1987, 3.}

The Panel conducted a voluminous series of hearings in 1987 and 1988, consisting of former top military leaders, government officials, Secretaries of Defense, leading strategists, and academics.
The Panel concluded "that the DOD military education system is sound." Despite this overall assessment the system was found to be lacking in several areas. There was an overall lack of rigorous and quality education, nor was there a standardized system to ensure a DOD-wide framework for joint and strategic education. In general the Panel felt that the intention of the GNA was not being met:

The service schools fall far short of any reasonable standards for the joint education they are required by law to provide in their curricula for all students. The narrow service-orientated focus appears to be the product of several factors: limited student and faculty representation from the other services; the resulting shortage of expertise; lack of a body of joint doctrine and other materials to support joint education; and, possibly, the inclination of the leadership of the service schools.\footnote{Panel on Military Education Report, 80. Service schools refer to the particular service orientated professional military education schools, namely the College of Naval Command and Staff and College of Naval Warfare, Newport, RI; The Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA; The Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS; The Air Command and Staff College and Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL; and Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA. The joint schools are the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA; and National Defense University and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, DC.}

The Panel’s analysis led them to conclude that the military education system should return to the preeminent position it occupied in the 1930s:

The panel’s conclusion after its review of the evolution of PME since World War II, however, is that a return to historical roots is indicated. The Goldwater-Nichols Act, with its emphasis on the imperatives of joint warfare and the consequent strengthening of joint institutions, demands a reappraisal of the direction in which professional military education has evolved. What World War II
military leaders learned from the war about how to structure military education is more consistent with the demands of the Goldwater-Nichols Act than the PME system today.  

The recommendations of the Skelton panel with regard to joint education were enacted into law by the FY 1990 Defense Authorization Act. The changes created a two-phased educational process for joint education, established several reporting requirements with respect to joint education, and clarified the intent of Congress in areas of joint education including a specific prohibition in calling a service school a joint education facility.

D. PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION

Has the Department, however, through its implementation efforts met not only the letter of the law but also its underlying spirit or intent?

Because of the sparseness of the legislative language, the panel next found it necessary to develop a more detailed portrait of the joint specialist.

Neither the legislation nor the legislative history further explains the intended meaning of the phrase (joint matters) . . . Secretary of Defense has

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167 Panel on Military Education Report, 50. See, also The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Education System 1943-1986, March 1988, for a detailed account of the evolution and content of the joint education system.

168 Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces (as amended through April 6, 1991), Committee Print, April 1991, 185-195.


170 Panel on Military Education Report, 43.
interpreted the phrase as including both operational and nonoperational joint positions. 171

Given so much precise language, detailed statutes, extensive oversight, and voluminous analysis in publications and studies, why do questions of interpretation or problems of implementation still arise?

First, "the devils are in the details" of the language and the laws. The requirements are detailed and explicit and although instituted to ensure compliance, they have translated into cumbersome reality. VADM M. Boorda, Chief of Naval Personnel comments:

I think we should have a military that produces greater amounts of readiness. One way for accomplishing this is to do it in a joint way, without destroying service identification. The issues standing in our way evolve around not flailing ourselves to death over little bureaucratic things...to understand we're evolving...to not be too tied to procedures that get more important than the end result. For example, we have a rule that says a joint billet can be filled by a JSO nominee who is also a COS, but that it cannot be more than 12.5% of the JDAL. Now isn't it awful that the Chief of Naval Personnel knows that and worries about it...why 12.5% and not 10 or 42%? That's what I'm talking about when I say we don't want this to become a system for clerks, we want a system that makes sense, that produces the most jointness and military combat power. 172

The emphasis on meeting numerical requirements skews the focus and draws efforts away from the real priority of GNA


172 Boorda, interview.
which is to improve national security by redistributing the power balance between joint and service interests.

Second, the term "jointness" has become a buzzword for everything. There is no official DOD definition of "jointness." The closest definition is in GNA which defines "joint matters" as:

The term joint matters means relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces including matters relating to (1) national military strategy; (2) strategic planning and contingency planning; and (3) command and control of combat operations under unified command.173

In conjunction with that definition, GNA specifies that a joint duty assignment (JDA) is an assignment:

...in which the officer gains significant experience in joint matters and shall exclude-(A) assignments for joint training and education and; (B) assignments within an officer’s own military department.174

It was envisioned by the drafters of GNA that DOD would generate programs and flesh out the details of what a joint duty assignment would be and what qualifications the officers filling those billets would have. The conferees recognized that "only a limited base of information and only a few existing policies were available...unanticipated problems will be identified as the Defense Department implements the provisions of Title IV...adjustments will be

173GNA, sec., 668 (a).

174GNA, sec., 668 (b).
necessary." The original joint officer policies were intended to give the Secretary of Defense sufficient latitude in establishing the 'joint specialty', including designating it with another term. The conferees believed that the...amendment provides the necessary latitude and unambiguously states the intent of Congress that an effective system for the management of joint specialty officers be established." With this understanding the Education Panel Chairman, Representative Ike Skelton, was disappointed. "What are the characteristics of the JSO? That question has not been answered, the panel was disappointed to learn, fully two years after passage of GNA "

DOD made some attempt to clarify the meaning of jointness and come to understand the concept. The Senior Military Schools Review Board (SMSRB), or Dougherty Board, expanded the definition of joint matters to include "national security policy...joint and combined operations, joint doctrine...and actions related to mobilization of forces/resources, joint logistics, communications, and

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178 Panel on Military Education Report, 52.
intelligence, and the joint aspects of the planning, programming, and budgeting process."\textsuperscript{178}

Using the Dougherty Board report as a basis, the Skelton Report defined joint matters "to include: (1) the elements contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Act...(2) several other subjects subsumed in the Goldwater-Nichols definition such as: joint and combined operations, joint doctrine, joint logistics, joint communication, joint intelligence, theater/campaign planning, and joint military command and control systems and their interface with national command systems, and (3) force development including certain military aspects of mobilization."\textsuperscript{179}

The Skelton Panel next specified what it felt the characteristics of the joint specialist should be:

In the view of the panel, the joint specialist most consistent with the law is an officer, expert in his own warfare specialty and service, who develops a deep understanding, broad knowledge, and keen appreciation of the integrated employment and support of all service capabilities in the pursuit of national objectives...should be in the top quarter of their year group.\textsuperscript{180}

JCS Admin Pub 1.2 \textit{Joint Officer Management}, which implements and explains the Title IV provisions provides a definition of a JSO that is consistent with the Skelton Panel report, but the definition of joint matters included in the JCS Pub


\textsuperscript{179}\textit{Panel on Military Education Report}, 60-61.

\textsuperscript{180}\textit{Panel on Military Education Report}, 56.
1.2 is not, in that it repeats the GNA criteria excluding the additional support emphasis. The expansion of the characteristics of a JSO and the dichotomy between definitions of "joint matters" contributes to problems discerning intention. The Panel on Military Education Report is inconsistent in that it calls for the redirection of the joint duty assignment list (JDAL) toward an operational focus while also extending the original definition of "joint matters" to include support elements.

The dichotomy of views about what jointness, read "joint matters", means stems from the changing interpretations of its definition. The GNA provides a broad, warfighting interpretation of "joint matters" while subsequent reports, that do not have the statutory teeth of the law, have expanded the definition to include support elements. Two problems arise from this. First, a clear understanding of what constitutes "joint matters" and its associated jobs and officers are extremely important because these concepts set boundaries for the emerging joint culture. There is a lead/lag effect associated with these concepts; little opportunity existed for adjusting to the original GNA direction before it was changed. Secondly, while the

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1. The joint duty assignment list (JDAL) is a GNA-mandated list which designates the authorized joint duty assignments. A joint duty assignment is "an assignment to a designated position in a multi-Service or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three services." JCS Admin Pub 1.2
guidance forwarded in the Skelton Report was intended to clarify and delineate the JDA and JSO concepts, it also expanded them. Now the implementors in DOD, who in many cases were just beginning to understand what the original law intended, are left with a new intention based only on a report. Furthermore, the intention contained in the Skelton Report contained some unrealistic specifications such as, a JSO should be in the top 25% of his year group.\footnote{Panel on Military Education Report, 56. Year groups are ranked according to lineal numbers.}

Apparently Congress felt that the guidance forwarded in the Skelton Report and translated into DOD policy by JCS Admin Pub 1.2 was adequate since it did not enact it into law. Unfortunately the expansion of the definition of "joint matters" in these sources has been relatively obscure when compared to the language of the original GNA. A number of persons interviewed for this study pointed out the discrepancy between the law and other sources. The changing definitions of what constitutes "jointness" compounds the interpretation of Congressional mandates.

It is this study's conclusion that adequate written guidance exists for discerning the intent of the "joint matters" and "joint duty assignment" provisions of the GNA, but that the guidance is difficult to find and follow because it is not contained in the original law, nor adequately explained in any other source. The present
interpretation of what constitutes "joint matters" has also expanded to include too much support emphasis; a point which will be further discussed in Chapters VI and VII. The problems of interpretation contribute to a communication breakdown between the implementors, in the trenches of DOD, and the enactors in Congress. A lack of a consensus as to what constitutes "jointness" has compounded the already difficult task of shifting power between service cultures and the joint culture. Without a clearly defined notion of what the joint culture should be, shaping the military around it is meaningless.

Finally, the third source of interpretation problems relates to the entire Title IV program of GNA and the way it was enacted. As stated previously, DOD balked at Congressional requests for assistance in writing the Title IV portions of the law. The understanding and subsequent communications problem began here. Then in areas where DOD was given latitude, it either fell short of Congressional expectations or responded with a flurry of waivers and watered down provisions. Problems of communication continue today. Numerous documents had to be reviewed to understand what Congress intended "joint matters" to encompass. Apparently Congress perceived this problem, as

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8Barrett, interview.
it felt compelled to reiterate its intent when considering DOD-proposed changes to GNA.

The conferees agreed that their action should not be considered as changing the original purposes of the altered provisions which include:

(A) making joint education relevant to joint duty by establishing a pattern whereby education normally precedes a joint duty assignment for officers attempting to qualify for selection to the joint specialty;

(B) lengthening joint duty tours in order to increase the experience level of officers in joint duty assignments and, thereby, the quality of their contribution;

(C) requiring that key joint duty assignments be filled only by officers who have met the educational and experience requirements and have been selected for the joint specialty;

(D) safeguarding the future promotions and assignments of joint officers;

(E) making joint duty a prerequisite for promotion to general or flag rank.

From the trenches of DOD (Navy side) the laments of one action officer are juxtaposed with the complaints from within the HASC. CDR Doug Roulstone, joint personnel action officer, states, "where is the trail that discusses the JSO concept? What does Congress intend by some of the specific legislative requirements?" While Dr. Archie Barrett complains:

The supporting organizations (individual services) are always seeking the advantage. These individual services are hardy, invigorating institutions with a lot of power. The joint staff should be protecting the power given them under GNA, but they seem to pass along service views. I'm seen as pessimistic

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185Roulstone, interview.
and hardline. Every proposal we see is to weaken GNA. A primary reason it is working on the other hand is because of Congress’ oversight. This oversight has been intense. In addition to our hearings, the GAO has conducted numerous investigations, with several currently ongoing and more in the works. We’re continuously amazed that five years after the law was passed, many issues are still not resolved.\textsuperscript{186}

Somewhere in between there must be a middle ground of communication and understanding. In shifting power toward balanced service/joint cultures, it is essential to understand what the system is shifting toward. In that regard the continuous changes and problems of interpretation have prevented the creation of a clear concept of the joint culture. As VADM Boorda stated, "we must understand that we are evolving and to not be too caught up in the little bureaucratic things."\textsuperscript{187}

E. SUMMARY

This chapter covered the GNA provisions, changes, and problems of interpretations. Three points are noteworthy. First, the provisions of the law were consistent with the ideas of the principal architects in that considerably more than structural changes were sought. The mechanisms necessary for creating cultural change, particularly promotion, assignment, and education requirements, were enacted into law.

\textsuperscript{186}Barrett, interview.

\textsuperscript{187}Boorda, interview.
Secondly, the changes to the GNA have reflected DOD desires for more flexibility versus Congress’ adamant intention to stay the course. Congress believes that tough, numerically binding requirements are the only way to force a still-recalcitrant DoD to comply with the more difficult portions of the joint officer management initiatives. This is evident in the detailed person-by-person accounting and reporting that Congress has required of DOD. This does not, however, foster the openness and communication necessary to make such a monumental undertaking and revolutionary law work more efficiently.

Third, interpretation problems flow from these first two points. Lots of new requirements, nearly annual revisions of GNA for the past five years, and communications barriers have created problems discerning intent. These problems are both real and perceived. Their existence detracts from implementing the law and improving national security.

Tying promotion and career progression to joint duty heightened individual awareness by relating personal job security needs to joint duty. Behavior, attitudes, and beliefs concerning the desirability of joint positions were potentially altered. By structuring joint duty assignments, creating a JSO category, and tying flag promotions to joint duty, the creators of GNA sought to force the services to accommodate its provisions and ideals. Educational changes are the long-term glue designed to preserve the ideals of
jointness thereby internalizing a "joint perspective" into the officer and service belief system.

Have the provisions of the GNA, the key mechanisms of promotion, assignments, and education in particular, resulted in shifting the balance of power within DOD? Is DOD more balanced between joint and service institutions today than five years ago? Chapter VI assesses the effectiveness of the GNA by considering the perceptions of key leaders and military personnel and examining the output variables of operations, plans, and people-related programs.
VI. ASSESSMENT OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT (GNA)

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter assesses the effectiveness of the GNA and its application by asking several questions. For example, what constitutes "effective?" How does one know whether the Act is working or not? How do you measure jointness? Congress has recognized this problem and installed a number of measures by which to gauge DOD's performance. Measuring jointness, however, involves more than numbers. Jointness is an attitude that says "together we can do it better" and "I'm committed to making it happen in the best way, regardless of cost to my service." This chapter will examine some of the Congressional measures for jointness; in addition, it will try to determine how the country's leadership and members of the military perceive the effectiveness of GNA. Measuring perception is critical, since the attitude of those involved will determine future directions and changes. Behavioral change (evidence of internalization by the service cultures) is inextricably linked to values and beliefs. Once the organizations have seriously committed jointness to their belief system, this will be reflected in the artifacts of culture - organizational behavior. The subconscious internalization
of jointness will then be manifested through joint actions, writings, and thinking. Three dimensions of the U.S. military - operations, plans, and people - are examined by considering whether the GNA has instilled a greater joint perspective in the U.S. military and particularly, the Navy.

B. PERCEPTIONS

Jointness has improved...but there is still not enough of it. Egos get in the way, as well as service parochialism. We can overcome this by continuing to concentrate on leadership, schools, and joint operations.188

Joint awareness is unquestionably high within the U.S. military. Professional journals, newspapers, and newsletters are laden with the benefits of doing things jointly. The concept of "jointness" receives only minor criticism compared with overall support. In the lexicon and writings of the military, jointness has become motherhood. As one Congressional staff member put it, "this is what President Harry Truman envisioned in 1947."189 Yet beneath this overall positive evaluation, pockets of resistance, uncertainty, and caution remain. The Navy, which stubbornly resisted GNA, is now seen by those outside the Navy organization, as supportive of jointness. On the other


hand, Navy beliefs, on whether GNA is effective and if the Navy is onboard, are less convincing.\textsuperscript{190}

There is a certain degree of inevitability behind the law. One Navy captain stated:

Whether people agree or disagree (with Goldwater-Nichols) doesn't matter. The law is very clear. It's almost impossible to do any operation that isn't joint anymore.\textsuperscript{191}

This sentiment was virtually unanimous among those interviewed and in the literature. General Colin Powell, CJCS, explains:

It [the law] isn't going to be changed; it isn't going to be reversed; and the sooner everyone acknowledges that Goldwater-Nichols is here to stay in this brave new joint world, the better off we will all be.\textsuperscript{192}

The editors of the Marine Corps Gazette acknowledge that:

...jointness is a theme of the times...any conceivable military action of size will certainly require the capabilities of most if not all of the Services, and today's military leaders at all levels should understand this, prepare for it, and adjust their thinking accordingly. Jointness is reality.\textsuperscript{193}

Yet, despite the overall opinion that the GNA and its emphasis on jointness is good for national security, the

\textsuperscript{190}Based on author's review of Navy writings, Navy official statements, and interviews (conducted in the summer of 1991). The author conducted approximately thirty interviews with OPNAV, OSD, and Joint Staff military personnel of all ranks and services.


\textsuperscript{192}Colin Powell, General, USA, CJCS, ltr to the editor, \textit{Marine Corps Gazette}, vol. 75, no. 10, October 1991, 15.

\textsuperscript{193}Editors, \textit{Marine Corps Gazette}, vol. 75, no. 10, October 1991, 2.
military, and the Navy, some pockets of resistance and individual notes of caution still exist.

The 1980s were notable in that there was little of the interservice disagreement that marked the first two decades after World War II and Korea. All is sweetness and light and happy jointness; few realize that this sweetness and light basically is the result of expanding—or at least adequate—budgets. There has been little about which to disagree.\textsuperscript{194}

People who go to the joint staff have to learn their role. They represent me. I have to look out for the "white shirt" interests.\textsuperscript{195}

The Navy is arrogant in victory, surly in defeat, and difficult to deal with at all stages in between. The Navy is coming to grips with the inevitable. There are some people with some vision. But to some in the "old school", integration still means subordination.\textsuperscript{196}

To the typical Navy officer jointness is a block that needs checked to get flag...the Navy is falling further behind the power curve as it continues to put Navy interests ahead of national interests.\textsuperscript{197}

These quotes serve to illustrate the underlying caution and confusion regarding the effectiveness of the GNA. Much of the caution and negativeness about how the Navy is living up to the letter and spirit of the law reflects a curious Navy self-perception regarding past opposition to defense reforms.


\textsuperscript{195}Interview with Navy 0-6 in OPNAV, May 1991. Reflects interviewee's viewpoint on proper Navy-joint relation.

\textsuperscript{196}Interview with Navy 0-6, June 1991.

\textsuperscript{197}Interview with OPNAV 0-3, former JCS intern, July 1991.
The self-doubt is an interesting aspect of the Navy’s image of itself on jointness and may reflect inner beliefs which still cling to the ideals of naval autonomy. The self-doubt also reflects organizational perspective. For example, most Naval officers interviewed, when asked to characterize the Navy’s attitude with respect to jointness and how the other services view us, responded in a similar manner. The following quote represents a typical Navy self-perception, "the other services view us as isolationists and it is not an inaccurate view. It will take a generation to wipe out." 198

Those outside the Navy don’t necessarily view the Navy in this light. 199 Dr. Archie Barrett states:

The Navy sees itself as having the most institutional interest in getting onboard with jointness. They have a very supportive Chief of Naval Personnel in VADM Boorda. The Navy had the farthest to come and perhaps it has come the farthest. 200

An Army colonel on the joint staff sees the Navy as "onboard" with regard to jointness; an Air Force colonel

198 Interview Navy O-6, July 1991.

199 The author noted that those in OPNAV, particularly of junior ranks (O-4 and O-3), tended to be more open, while those outside the Navy, members of Congress, other services, and Navy officers serving on joint staffs seemed to give more politically correct answers. Two point arise from this. First, how much will anyone really tell an O-3 working on a research project, although some interviews were very candid and open? And secondly, this introduces a certain bias error on the perceptual findings. As one O-5 stated, "You’ll be hard pressed to find anyone in this building (Pentagon) who will speak publicly against jointness."

200 Barrett, interview.
says that "the Navy is very supportive of GNA";\textsuperscript{201} and Rep. Ike Skelton states:

\begin{quote}
We have come along way. In Desert Storm I give all five services a lot of credit. The Navy did a remarkably fine job.\textsuperscript{202}
\end{quote}

The Navy has gone from opposing jointness in the mid-1980s to accepting it today; others see us as part of the team as well. But, we in the Navy often see ourselves in another light. Perhaps this reflects deep-seated assumptions about ourselves. Clearly it will take more than five years to alter basic assumptions so deeply steeped in the Navy's historical and sociological roots. Culture changes slowly. The internalization of new beliefs and the self-perception of being onboard with jointness will lag changes to the law.

C. OPERATIONS

The extent to which operations in the Gulf and within various staff echelons demonstrated the degree of jointness sought by GNA will likely remain an active topic in the media, in Congress, and in Departmental and professional circles...the Department is committed to continuing actively to foster jointness.\textsuperscript{203}

Has the GNA affected the way the U.S. military, and the Navy in particular, conducts operations? Are operations today

\textsuperscript{201}Interviews by author, October 1991.

\textsuperscript{202}Skelton, interview.

\textsuperscript{203}Secretary of Defense, Interim Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, July 1991, 262. This report contains a specific question asking DOD to assess "the effect on the conduct of U.S. military operations resulting from implementation of the GNA."
less plagued by the types of communication and organizational bungling that characterized Beirut, Grenada, and Desert One? The Gulf War provided a real-time test of GNA effectiveness. One analysis of the GNA concluded that "we are left, in fact, with a sobering thought: the true test of military reform will come not in peace but in war."204 A recent article in the National Interest concluded that "the Goldwater-Nichols reform will be judged largely through the prism of U.S. victory in the Persian Gulf."205 The article asserted that, "the first - and ultimate - test of reform is whether what was legislated has helped national leaders to plan, prepare, and execute military operations better in crisis and war. The Gulf War provided the first real test of the quality of military advice and operations under the system that Goldwater-Nichols established."206

A number of top military and political leaders believe that GNA was instrumental in the U.S.-led coalition's smashing victory. Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman HASC, states:

No longer was it necessary to assign tasks among the services for parochial reasons, an operational commander could make the best uses of his resources

204Mark Perry, Four Stars, as quoted in Report on the Study of Joint Officer Management Initiatives, 44.


206Campbell, 56.
regardless of service. It [GNA] created one clear line of command, one integrated operational plan, and one focal point for decisions on the ground.\textsuperscript{207}

Rep. Nicholas Mavroules, Chairman HASC Investigative Subcommittee, states that "when General Schwarzkopf came to the Hill, he said that GNA was a 'wonderful piece of legislation.'\textsuperscript{208} General Schwarzkopf characterized Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm as the "classic example of a multi-service operation, a truly joint operation."\textsuperscript{209}

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney states:

\begin{quote}
GNA was clearly a success, as demonstrated in the Gulf War. It enabled the CJCS to give specific non-parochial advice to the President and myself and it allowed the CINCs to do their jobs.\textsuperscript{210}
\end{quote}

To what, do these Congressional and military leaders argue, do we owe the success? Specifically, what provisions within GNA resulted in improvements in joint operations such that the "inept" military of the 1970s and early 1980s would be transformed into an effective warfighting machine? To this the common answer is that GNA empowered the commander, in this case General Schwarzkopf, to do his job. Rep. Kasich states that, "GNA empowered those on the ground to conduct

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\footnotesize


\textsuperscript{209} Norman Schwarzkopf, General, USA, speech at Naval Academy Graduation, Annapolis, MD, 29 May 1991.

\textsuperscript{210} Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, remarks at the Naval Postgraduate School, 4 April 1991.
\end{flushright}
the campaign by allowing them to concentrate on the important aspects of operations."211

Yet many argue otherwise. ADM David Jeremiah, VCJCS, comments that "most people would argue that given the same cast of characters, the operation would probably have played out very much the same even if Goldwater-Nichols reforms had not been in place."212 Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown remarks, "one should not draw too many conclusions from the Gulf War because in many ways it is not reproducible."213 There is no doubt that GNA provided the framework for a streamlined chain of command and improved operational planning. One wonders, however, how convoluted Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf, with their prior Vietnam experience, would have permitted the chain of command to become, regardless of legislated requirements. Despite the euphoria of the War and the connection made by Congress and top military leadership positions between GNA and the War's success, significant problems in joint operations existed.

VADM James D. Williams, Deputy CNO for Naval Warfare, points out one of the Navy's biggest problems during the war:

We need more command and control for the USN in the next two years than in the last fifteen years

211Kasich, interview.


213Grossman, 15.
combined. Communications was our biggest problem during Desert Storm. We spent half our time fighting to communicate.214

A **Defense News** article analyzed the Navy’s problems:

...among the problems outlined...sharply limited communications channels, poor coordination with allies and with the U.S. Air Force, inadequate distribution of ciphers...and slow dissemination of intelligence pictures...These problems can be traced back to the Navy's longstanding lack of interest in multi-service and allied cooperation...215

RADM James D. Cossey, Assistant Deputy CNO (Plans, Policy, and Operations) (OP-06B) commenting on the Navy’s communication deficiencies in the Gulf War states, "we can’t get joint if we can’t even talk to the other services."216

Were these new problems that raised their ugly heads only during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, or were they previously identified deficiencies that should have been fixed and avoided? There is evidence that some of these issues "raised their heads three years ago" during the Solid Shield 1989 exercise. The Navy demonstrated that it could apply the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFAC) concept at sea by using borrowed Air Force equipment. Without the Air Force equipment there was limited ability to communicate and

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integrate Navy assets into the JFAC concept. There was a nearly unanimous opinion that communications problems were the most critical issue in Desert Storm. Is this shades of Grenada or the debacle of Desert One?

Why, given the legal mandate for jointness, the evident acceptance of this, and the tremendous emphasis on joint education as a facilitator, did the first wartime test in the Gulf War test prove so mixed? There appear to be three possibilities.

First, true mission integration and joint coordination does not routinely occur in the military outside the JS and the CINC staffs. In the 1950s President Eisenhower said that "separate warfare was gone forever", yet we see statements today saying that it is "just" now going away? What's going on here? For example, there is some evidence that concepts of warfare have changed as a result of Desert Storm. Vice Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Navy Program Planning (OP-08), offered the revealing comment that during the Cold War, naval operations were characterized by "autonomous" operations while now, post-Cold War, these operations are characterized by the

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217 Interview with OPNAV O-6, June 1991. An internal Navy memo from October 1988 also recognized incompatibilities with the Air Force JFAC doctrine and existing Navy air control doctrine.

necessity for "joint" interaction.\textsuperscript{9} If it took Desert Storm to demonstrate to the Navy that the "low ground fog of jointness" sprung on the services as a result of GNA was not going away, then truly there are problems of jointness at levels below the top echelon of the chain of command.

Why wouldn't these perceptions have changed years ago? Perhaps the analogy to a sporting event can offer a partial explanation. We can change the rules, the coaches, the playbook, and the philosophy, but if we don't adequately practice and test the new system, will we really know if it works? Or will we really know the system? In the absence of effective integration at all levels of the military, problems of jointness remain. As Rep. Kasich states, "we play like we practice...we're doing better at integrated joint operations, but we still have a ways to go."\textsuperscript{20}

Second, while the chain of command may have been streamlined and the officer corps convinced that jointness was the wave of the future, much of the military's hardware carries a uni-service flavor. Navy ships' systems were not compatible with Air Force systems for transmitting the Air Tasking Order (ATO) - a vital link in air operations. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) was created to

\textsuperscript{9}Henry H. Mauz, VADM, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Navy Program Planning (OP-08), and former COMUSNAVCENT (COMSEVENTHFLT during Desert Shield), remarks and briefing slide from Superintendent's Guest Lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, 27 August 1991.

\textsuperscript{20}Kasich, interview.
oversee and eliminate these types of interoperability problems;\textsuperscript{221} the truth, however, is that the services continue to control the preponderance of resources.

Third, just as it may be shortsighted to credit the success of the Gulf War on GNA, it is equally wrong to blame military shortcomings on deficiencies in the legislation. It has only been five years since passage of the Act and a far lesser time since much of the follow-up legislation was enacted. Time will reveal additional strengths and weaknesses with GNA and more fundamentally, with the joint/service balance of power.

The most revealing lesson of the War is that "jointness" still needs work. Navy and Air Force planes still fly their separate missions. Much has been accomplished, but significantly more effort remains.

Since the War considerable initiative has gone into fixing some of these problems, particularly the Joint Force Air Coordinator (JFAC) concept. The Air Force and the Navy signed a mutual pact to "provide operational commanders flexible and interoperable forces, supported by appropriate joint doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures...the memorandum of agreement on Joint U.S. Navy-U.S. Air Force

\textsuperscript{221}This research did not investigate programming areas and therefore is not assessing the JROC. To be fair, the problems that surfaced in the Gulf War were spawned long before the formation of the JROC. The point is that despite all the internal measures and external laws enacted in the programming and acquisition areas over the past five years, the services continue to wield the preponderance of power in this area.
Effort for Enhanced Interoperability and Cooperation... calls for the creation of a joint service board to address...issues that have been singled out for initial consideration.  

While indicative of an appreciation for the lessons learned from the War and demonstrative of motivation to make things work better in the post-War joint military environment, the fixes are like patches. Missing is a focus on the underlying systemic deficiencies that spawned the problems. For example, what inhibited the Navy from fixing deficiencies with JFAC before the first wartime test? Why hasn't the tremendous emphasis placed on jointness by the GNA resulted in better ways for leaders to assess the readiness of the military to fight? When the author posed the question to interviewees, as to what some of the missing dimensions in the present jointness focus might be, for example training, exercise, or assessment capabilities, the answers ranged from: "I don't know."..."That's too much for GNA." to "Maybe we should look into that."  

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222 Robert Holzer and Barbra Opall, "AF, Navy Sign Mutual Pact," *Defense News*, 16 September 1991, 4 and 42. The Pact identified six areas for initial examination, expansion of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFAC), common fuels, Air Force tanker support policies, joint munitions programs, consolidation of automated mission planning systems, and common night vision goggles for tactical air.  

223 Interviews by author July 1991, the author noted that the people he interviewed were in general focused on the particular issues they confronted on a daily basis, therefore, there was a hesitancy to delve into other related but unfamiliar areas. Since exercises are in general the purview of the CINCs, whom the author did not interview, there probably is some continuity in the system. At the policy level, however, there seemed to be a fragmented view of how to best achieve jointness.
The Skelton Panel Report on military education placed some emphasis on the concept of readiness. It was stated that while the Panel did not have time to review the dimensions of readiness, including training and doctrine, these areas constituted a fundamental part of the joint equation. It would be impossible to fully develop joint specialists and a joint perspective in the military if these areas were lacking. The Panel concluded that "if such inadequacies exist, the problem is of the highest moment. Lives could be lost needlessly in future military operations if separate service units are not properly integrated into combat forces." In order for the Experience + Education + Talent equation to be effective in developing a truly joint perspective in the military, this dimension must be explored.

D. PLANNING

The second area in which to assess the effectiveness of GNA is planning. Planning here refers to producible plans in the form of doctrine and strategy and human planning in the form of service staff/JS interaction.

An early indicator that the GNA has been only partially successful in instilling a joint planning perspective in the Navy occurred at the 1990 Cooke Conference held at Monterey,

\footnote{Panel on Military Education Report, 62.}

\footnote{See Chapter VII recommendations.}
CA. The conferees included Navy-Marine Fleet CINC planners and strategists, CNO and HQ USMC staff representatives, the Naval War College Strategic Studies Group, a Joint Staff representative and academics. During the briefing of the CNO's proposed Navy Department long range planning system, a question was asked, "...with all due respect, where are the joint inputs?" The tone of the response was, "we have to get it right first, why do we need joint inputs at this level?" While there may have been some "tongue in cheek" in this exchange, the proposed planning cycle did not include joint inputs.

The area of joint doctrine was identified as a fundamental weakness by pre-GNA studies. Despite the noted deficiencies, legal mandate for change, and importance of this area, the Navy effort to improve joint doctrine has lagged behind the other services. The Navy has an internal doctrine problem that must be solved in addition to the joint effort. One Navy captain said that "Navy doctrine supposedly bubbles up from the fleet. The result of this magic is that Naval Warfare Publications (NWPs) are woefully outdated." In response, the fleets operate on tactical

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227Interview with Navy 0-6, June 1991. A 13 October 1988 internal Navy memo addressed the JFAC and joint doctrine issues. This memo resulted in the formation of the Navy joint doctrine shop OP607.

228Interview with Navy 0-6, June 1991.
memos, often with West/East coast differences. One Navy commander comments that, "my guess is that knowledge exists in the fleet, but it stays at sea, and you end up with Atlantic doctrine and Pacific doctrine, but no collective doctrine."\textsuperscript{229}

Has the emphasis on jointness produced a more coherent vision of the future as articulated in national and military strategy? The services continue to produce individualized justifications for roles and missions, based on programmatic needs. There is no question that service-specific strategies are necessities - but these must supplement a well-articulated national strategy. GNA mandated that the President produce an annual national strategy, which has been completed including a section on national military strategy.\textsuperscript{230} Additionally, the President, Secretary Cheney, and General Powell have articulated aspects of this strategy in speeches and press conferences,\textsuperscript{231} but there is little articulation of this strategy beyond that level. Unlike service strategies which receive advocacy in other mediums, such as the Navy's recent article on "The Way

\textsuperscript{229}Interview by author.


\textsuperscript{231}The President's Aspen speech of 2 August 1991 was the first public articulation of the new military strategy. See Commander James J. Tritten, USN, (ret.), "What If It's Peace?" United States Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1991, 36-41.
Ahead" in United States Naval Institute Proceedings, there has been little public articulation, explanation, and fleshing out of the national strategy. This is especially troublesome considering the complexity of the new concepts espoused, particularly "reconstitution" and the "base force".

While the tocsin for change has been sounded at the national level, the services have continued to produce strategies largely justifying existing programs, force structure, and methods of warfare. The Navy's "The Way Ahead" implies a certain sense of old momentum with its projection of existing programs into future scenarios. Another example, is an Air Force White Paper entitled "Global Reach - Global Power" which pays scant attention to integrated operations; instead it forwards bureaucratic arguments for air power vice how air power integrates into the national security framework.

The criticism expressed in the Senate staff study that "the vagueness of the strategic goals of DOD as a whole has led to their displacement by the subgoals and sub-ideologies of the Services" is still applicable. To be fair,

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however, the radical world-wide changes in the threat environment have made the development of strategy more difficult. The point is that service culture still dominates strategic thinking. Service culture is an important element in overall strategy formation and service expertise must remain strong and viable, but it must do so within the framework of the national and overall military strategies. With the forthcoming publication of Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*, the U.S. forces may finally have the hierarchial framework for a true overall paradigm of how to fight as a team:

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team...Service skills form the very core of our combat capability. Joint warfare does not lessen Service traditions, cohesion, or expertise. Successful joint operations are impossible without the capabilities developed and embodied in each Service; Service "cultures," heroes, and professional standards are indispensable.

The doctrine and strategy area of planning is very dynamic; considerable evidence exists that the system is moving toward better coordinated and cogent plans.

Human aspects of the planning process have changed considerably as result of GNA. The CJCS has utilized his

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235 The Joint Staff is currently undertaking a massive joint doctrine strategy revision including the development of an overall DOD joint wargaming guide, Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*, that is intended to provide a joint paradigm for other joint and service doctrines and strategies. Interview with CDR Walsh, OP-607, Navy Joint Doctrine Branch, May 1991.

significantly enhanced powers and staff strength to implement streamlined methods of decision making. The old "safe" but cumbersome staffing procedures that involved a repetitive system of concurrence and review have been streamlined.\(^{237}\) Under the new system, inter-service decisions that can be agreed upon at lower levels don't necessarily have to go to the "Tank" for higher level approval.\(^{238}\)

Has all this resulted in improved decisions and, is this improved advice available to the CJCS and the President? Some argue that it has provided a possible mechanism whereby future leaders might be shut off from vital "conflicting" views. This concern has been at the core of the historical civil/military debates in the United States. The Navy culture has traditionally favored methods which permitted greater civilian access to divergent views. A recent article in the *National Interest* states:

An important question remains, however, as to whether the President and his senior civilian

\(^{237}\)Buiffs, Greens, and Red Stripes were part of the lingo of joint and service action officers. For an explanation of the old iterative process see *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, 156.

\(^{238}\)The number of decision "Tank" sessions has decreased since GNA. LCOL Powers, JS, phone interview with author, 10 October 1991. There are basically two levels of "Tank" sessions and two types. The first level is the OPSDEP, three star level; at this level service operations deputies meet to review issues for decision at their level or referral to the service chiefs, which is the second level. At both levels there are information sessions and decision sessions. The Joint Staff Director, currently an Air Force three star general, is the CJCS' right-hand man in deciding what issues go into the "Tank" for decision; clearly this rotational position is a major power broker.
advisors hear enough military advice that runs counter to the chairman's council...there is still concern that the current structure creates the preconditions for some future chairman to dominate and shut out his uniformed colleagues.\textsuperscript{239}

There is some perception that the services have less ability to influence the process. A recent article in the Marine Corps Gazette states:

It is not clear, however, that Congress intended to abolish the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a condition that one could argue is in real danger of happening...It is clear from press accounts and direct observations that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wasn't present when the important dialogues were occurring and neither the President, SECDEF, nor the Chairman bothered to include them even by reference. It was a narrow "we" and not infrequently an "I" that described the foundation of thought behind decisions.\textsuperscript{240}

The Navy has favored decision making processes which permit a full voicing of its autonomous viewpoints. Under the old, repetitive system, a strong Navy staff could easily interject ideas into the weaker Joint Staff. This was possible for two reasons. First, the quality and quantity of Naval officers on the JS was low.\textsuperscript{241} OPNAV could leverage this into an advantage because it clearly maintained the edge in expertise concerning naval matters. Secondly, the process ensured issues had to be repetitively

\textsuperscript{239}Campbell, 58.


\textsuperscript{241}See, for example the quotation in Chapter IV.
cut through service staffs. Both these factors have changed. RADM James Cossey comments:

GNA has quantitatively improved the quality of officers in the JS. Assignment to the JS is now desired and emphasized. GNA forced the Navy to start sending better people to the JS... however, from the service point of view, the balance of power between the Joint Staff and the services is not fully satisfactory. While the quality of Navy officers on the JS has made a difference in terms of closer working relations and connections, we are playing in fewer issues and our point of view is no better understood.242

RADM Cossey believes, however, that overall the changes have been very positive, particularly those which improved the Navy quality on the Joint Staff. Furthermore, he states, "there are enough checks and balances in the system to prevent any abuses of power."243

Although there is some perception that the services have less input into the joint decision making process, this view seems to be a minority opinion among those interviewed in this study. Also Admiral Kelso, CNO, put the role of the services (in Desert Shield/Desert Storm) in perspective:

Our role was to provide the trained manpower, the beans and bullets and that sort of thing that are available within the U.S. arsenal, in my case the Navy, to the unified commander in the field and see to it that it gets to him the best we can in a timely manner. In other words, I don’t give rudder orders to the ships at sea.244

242Cossey, interview.
243Cossey, interview.
Those who argue that the service chiefs disappeared during the Gulf War fail to understand their proper role which is to train, support, equip, and advise. Those inside the Pentagon say "the chiefs in fact played an integral role in planning and operations for Desert Shield and Desert Storm." The CJCS felt so strongly about the effectiveness of the new system that he personally countered a negative critique of jointness in the Marine Corps Gazette:

I cannot think of a single occasion when I was called upon to provide advice to the President that I did not consult individually, or as a group, with my JCS colleagues...I would submit that the Chiefs were more deeply involved in the planning and execution of this crisis than perhaps any other crisis in the post-Cold War period. The JCS met together over 50 times during the crisis.

E. PEOPLE

The third assessment area examines people-related provisions of GNA, specifically the provisions of Title IV designed to enhance quality by tying in promotions and to influence attitudes through education.

The promotion area includes measuring whether the quality of the joint staff has improved and examining where this quality is assigned by reviewing the implementation of the joint duty assignment list (JDAL). GNA mandated an

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246 Powell, 15.
improvement in quality of the JS. "The reorganization act creates the expectation that officers assigned to joint duty will be at least equivalent in quality to the service average, although some groups (JSOs and the JS) are expected to be equivalent in quality to the headquarters staff."²⁴⁷

Whereas the pre-GNA law also stated that the JS would consist of the most "outstanding officers,"²⁴⁸ Congress sought to guarantee outstanding officers would be assigned by enacting strict promotion guidance and detailed reporting requirements.

A 1989 GAO report states that "significant progress" has been made in implementing the joint matters in personnel policy.²⁴⁹ It is important to note that despite this improvement, the statistics say nothing about improvements in output - is this more qualified group producing better plans and advice?

While the overall improvement of the quality of personnel assigned to joint staffs is noteworthy, there are some indicators which lag. The Navy lags the other services

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²⁴⁸ Before GNA, Title 10 US CODE sec., 143 (a) (2) read "Selection of officers...to serve on the joint staff shall be made by the Chairman from a list of officers...each officer whose name is submitted shall be...the most outstanding officers of that armed force." This remained the same in the GNA; what changed was the tying in of promotions.

²⁴⁹ GAO, April 1989, 2.
in the majority of the GNA-mandated categories.\textsuperscript{250} Root incompatibilities still remain between the Navy's promotional system, its emphasis on operations, and the national emphasis on staff duty. Despite efforts to accommodate jointness in promotional requirements, the Navy still favors operations.\textsuperscript{251} Should it be any different? Clearly the law and the nation have moved in another direction. What implication does this have for the Navy? One adverse implication is that under-representation of the Navy on key staffs has resulted in an inability to get the Navy's point of view across. NAVCENT in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia had 100 Navy personnel, while CENTAF (Air Force) had 2900.\textsuperscript{252}

Another aspect of the promotional and quality question involves where these top-quality officers are being sent. The designation of joint duty jobs on the JDAL has already been explained in Chapter IV. By placing such importance on jointness, joint duty, and the joint specialty, there has

\textsuperscript{250}See Appendix A of this study for a comparison of the GNA-mandated promotional data for FY89 and FY90. DOD was required to begin reporting Title IV-mandated requirements in 1988 but failed to publish the information in time for the annual SECDEF posture statement. Additionally FY91 data was not yet available for this study.

\textsuperscript{251}The category causing the Navy the most trouble is officers serving on joint duty (other than JS and JSOs) that must be promoted at a rate equal to the service average. See "Punching the Joint Ticket," \textit{Navy Times}, 20 May 1991, 15. The GAO April 1989 report and the annual Secretary of Defense Posture Statement data (see Appendix A of this study) also illustrate the problems the Navy is having in the O-4/O-5 bracket; this is the primary zone for warfighters. In this category the Navy lags behind the other services.

been a de-facto elevation of joint duty assignments to a position of primary status. Are these jobs really prime jobs? Nearly everyone interviewed for this study indicated that the current JDAL had many problems including excessive size, loss of focus on warfighting, arbitrary size limits, and imbalanced service representation.

The excessive size is related to a creeping emphasis on "support", which undermines the original warfighting focus of the GNA. While GNA calls for the establishment of a cadre of officers skilled in the joint arena, the JCS Admin Pub 1.2 actually carries this a bit further by stating that a "Joint Specialty Officer or joint specialist is an officer designated as a Joint Specialty Officer by the Secretary of Defense, who is educated and experienced in the employment, deployment, and support of unified and combined forces to achieve national security objectives." This has been further diluted to include a disproportionately higher percentage of support billets than was originally intended by Congress.

DOD's concerns as expressed by Christopher Jehn, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and

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25 JCS Admin Pub 1.2, xiii.

25 GAO found that roughly 60% of positions in sampled operational organizations (joint staffs) provided experience in joint operational matters. 42% of the positions in the sampled defense agencies provide operational experience. GAO, February 1990, 3. Some argue that this is about the right percentage of support to warfighting emphasis. However, the system was created to provide joint perspective and experience for future leaders, such as CIN Cs and general/flag officers - not support organizations.
Personnel), are that a smaller JDAL and a more operational focus would cause problems in the following categories:

1) Enough billets for the general/flag officer requirements.
2) Failure to recognize the true value of support organizations and their work. 3) Disruption of current implementation plans. 4) Reduction of the number of billets and opportunities for combat arms officers.\textsuperscript{255}

While DOD has supported the current JDAL size and composition, Congress has not. The Panel on Military Education Report recommended a complete and thorough validation of the JDAL, recognizing that the total number of 8000-9000 set by DOD, and the number of critical billets (1000) specified by Congress, were arbitrary numbers.\textsuperscript{256} The Panel believed that a review of the JDAL would save money and enhance the status of joint positions. Despite these calls for review and streamlining, to date, nearly two and one-half years after that Congressional report, there has been no review and the JDAL remains large.\textsuperscript{257} The focus


\textsuperscript{256}Panel on Military Education Report, 17.

\textsuperscript{257}An OSD study group is currently reviewing the JDAL, recommendations should be forthcoming late this year. This review is not a position-by-position review as recommended by Congress. LCOL W. Showers, J-1, said that such a review is not feasible, due to the cost and excessive timeframe required to complete the job. What is needed, LCOL Showers stated, is a validation of the existing numbers based on a reasonable assessment of the pool of officers each service needs at the O-6 level to ensure the requisite selectivity and numbers for a quality population of flag officers. A computer model of some type could be produced to do this. Interview author, November, 27 1991.

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of joint duty assignments has also ballooned to include a large portion of non-operational jobs, a trend which has apparently been endorsed by both DOD and Congress.

This is significant for several reasons. First, as the services downsize, a static JDAL might create unforeseen problems. Rigid adherence to an arbitrarily derived number, that paradoxically has such importance, is unsatisfactory. The size of the JDAL must be based on the needs of the services and joint staffs. Key billets must be filled from a large enough pool of officers to ensure selectivity, while enough key billets must also be available to create a competitive supply of officers for future flag duty. Secondly, it shows an unresponsiveness to Congressional concerns by DOD - lack of initiative on this level is not conducive to improving the larger spirit of cooperation necessary for improved understanding and relations.

Thirdly, the perceived lack of significance of certain joint jobs confirms attitudes that joint duty is just another ticket punch and takes away from the overarching importance it has. A revamping of the JDAL and a revision of the philosophy underlying what constitutes a joint duty assignment would contribute to fixing these problems. It also could redirect the focus back to warfighting. VADM M. Boorda comments that "we can't let this become a system for
clerks; it must be for warfighters." A battle royal could emerge over this issue as Defense Agencies and service support branches would fight their perceived degraded status.

Finally, while the intent was that the JDAL and critical joint positions would be equally distributed among the Navy and Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force, the numbers tell a different story. The Navy/Marine Corps has not been proportionately represented.

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* does not include flag positions.

As the numbers indicate, the Navy/Marine Corps has consistently maintained about 26 percent of the total joint duty assignments and about 25 percent of the critical billets. The remaining billets are about equally split between the Army and Air Force. Whether this reflects a continued resistance to joint duty, a failure to leverage into the JDAL-especially critical jobs, or simply assignment distribution (read luck of the draw) is a matter of debate. One joint action officer stated that "he didn't feel that

258 Boorda, interview.

259 Data from LCOL W. Showers, J-1, 1 November 1991. Representation in the critical flag billet category shows approximately 25% of critical flag billets filled by Navy/Marines. Like the listed data this figure has been essentially static since 1988.
the Navy pushes hard enough for equal representation at the JS level." This results, he said, "in a difficulty in getting the Navy opinion heard at higher levels."

The final area of people assessment is that of meeting the educational requirements of GNA. Both the Skelton Panel report and subsequent GAO reviews have lauded the quality of education at the Navy professional military education schools in Newport, RI. The program at the Naval War College "is closer to graduate-level education than that of any other PME school." Thomas Glakas, special assistant for defense affairs to Rep. Ike Skelton, states "that the Navy has an excellent school at the War College." 

Despite this overall positive qualitative assessment, there is one key problem area that has been identified with respect to the Navy and its professional military education. The Navy does not have a genuine two-tiered professional military educational program.

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260 Interview with Navy O-5 on OPNAV staff, July 1991.


262 Glakas, interview.

263 There are other problem areas which are more indicative of DOD-wide educational systemic deficiencies, appropriate mix of officers from other services at the service schools and dilution of phase-one joint education by permitting phase-one, joint education, non-resident correspondence credit. The phase-one non-resident correspondence credit does not meet the intent of Congress. (see Skelton Report, 104) Dr Archie Barrett sees non-resident PME as a weakening of the intent of Congress. (Barrett, interview)
One of the primary recommendations of the Panel on Military Education was for the Navy to develop a tiered professional military educational (PME) system similar to both the Army's and Air Force's. Under the PME systems of the other services, most officers attend both the intermediate (as an O-4/O-5) and senior level (O-5/O-6) war colleges, either in residence or by means of correspondence. This is considered an "essential" career/promotion milestone. In marked contrast, if a Naval officer attends war college it is usually only once, and attendance is considered desirable but not essential for promotion. RADM Cossey remarks:

The Navy has always been torn between the desire to educate and the requirements to operate. However, education is not always required for operations. That's why not all flag officers need advanced degrees and JPME. We have a contrast in assignment philosophy between the Navy and other services. For example, the Air Force O-5s almost all have master degrees, the Air Force has a definite pecking order for service college selection and the Army's the same way.264

Additionally, because Naval officers do not routinely attend both the College of Naval Command and Staff and the College of Naval Warfare, the two courses have a great deal of similarity.

The Skelton Panel's concerns with the Navy system are that if the other services are essentially requiring all their top officers to attend both levels, while the Navy is

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264 Cossey, interview.
not, is this good for national security? How can the Navy effectively integrate its schools into the overall national system for professional military education, with its emphasis on tiered learning, if the Navy remains different?

The Panel concludes:

...that the Navy, both in its school assignment policies and in the Naval War College curricula, has so slighted intermediate PME that it essentially has only a senior-level system. The de facto absence of an intermediate PME level is a matter for both the Navy and DOD to consider...The CNO should consider whether the Navy's system of short courses could be taught more effectively and efficiently in a single school at the lieutenant commander level.265

The Panel further states that:

Just as major wars in the modern era will be joint, so too must PME fit into a joint framework. Because the issue has national security implications for the development of the military officer corps of all the services, the Chairman, JCS, and the civilian leadership of both the Department of the Navy and Department of Defense should exercise oversight of the CNO review.266

The Navy responded by making more distinction between its senior and intermediate schools, but considerable overlap remains,267 and Naval officers are still governed by the old institutional philosophies of attendance at either but not both, and that education enhances but is not essential for promotion. A Secretary of Defense Report states that:

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266 Panel on Military Education Report, 115.

The first priority for the Navy has historically been for a high degree of professional competence at sea for four reasons: 1) the sea is inherently dangerous; 2) war ships are highly complicated with high technology, advanced machinery, volatile fuels and munitions, crowded conditions and autonomous operations; 3) in recent years peacetime naval operations have been essentially the same as wartime and the Navy is required to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea at all times; and 4) operational competence at sea is paramount to the Navy mission. Although still true, over the past three years the Navy has undergone a "cultural change"-joint and staff duty are essential functions to national security and therefore joint and staff duty deserve a share of the top talent.\textsuperscript{268}

The numbers of Naval officers attending PME have risen significantly. Capt. Earl Shaut, joint specialty officer community manager in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, remarks "that the Navy has increased the number of officers attending joint professional military education schools by 33% in the last four years."\textsuperscript{269} However, there appears to be both structural and cultural inhibitors toward further increases. RADM Joseph C. Strasser, President of the Naval War College, in testimony before the House Armed Service Committee on the implementation of the Skelton Panel recommended that:

The Navy currently has an officer to enlisted ratio that permits very few naval officers to attend a war college twice. While I look forward to the day when the Navy can provide resident PME to every officer

\textsuperscript{268}Secretary of Defense Report to The Congressional Committees on Armed Services, Assessment of Professional Military Education in the Services, and Discussion of Proposed Legislation, 8 August 1990, III-6. Report outlines why instituting mandatory phased PME for the Navy would not be in the Navy's best interest.

\textsuperscript{269}"Punching the Joint Ticket," \textit{Navy Times}, 12.
at least once and preferably twice, I do not anticipate this happening in the foreseeable future, particularly as we draw down in size.\textsuperscript{270}

In response to the numbers problem, Congress authorized the Navy an additional 200 end-strength numbers in FY91 for the purpose of PME.\textsuperscript{271} This helped ease the structural problems blocking increased Navy participation. Despite the Secretary of Defense’s claim that a cultural change has occurred, cultural blocks still remain. One House staff member sees the problem as a numbers problem and an attitudinal problem in which education does not count as much as it does in other services.\textsuperscript{272} Rep. Ike Skelton comments:

The Navy hasn’t gotten onboard yet with requiring everyone to go to two schools, we’ll get you there someday. We’ll bring you into the 20th century. We’re lucky to get you to go to one school now, but we’re there.\textsuperscript{273}

The Navy has attempted to accommodate the Title IV changes. The accommodation is evident in improved Navy numbers and educational emphasis, as this chapter has demonstrated. Considerable effort has gone into educating the officer corps and detailing them into joint assignments. However, the Navy’s educational philosophy remains unique


\textsuperscript{271}Roulstone, interview.

\textsuperscript{272}Interview by author, July 1991.

\textsuperscript{273}Skelton, interview.
within DOD. While the Navy has aggressively attempted to accommodate the desires of Congress and the GNA, it has done so within the framework of its traditional operational focus. This dimension of Naval culture has not changed.

The assessment in this chapter highlights incompatibilities between the Navy and the joint system. The Navy has taken considerable action to get onboard with the concept of "jointness", and there is undoubtedly considerable lag-time associated with altering cultural aspects ingrained by generations of conducting operations a certain way. Some of the remaining incompatibilities are structural, but underlying them is the autonomous, operationally focused culture of the Navy. Given the uniqueness of the Naval missions, as previously outlined in Chapter II and as cited in the 8 August 1990 Secretary of Defense Report, whether it is indeed prudent to make the Navy "like the Army and Air Force" remains the essence of the argument. However, where the Navy's traditional way of doing business, whether it is school or staffing, conflicts with the remainder of the military, then something must change. If joint warfare truly is going to be "team warfare", then service cultures must become more attuned to the joint culture, including congruent educational, promotional, and staffing philosophies. The assumption that no change in outlook can accompany force drawdowns, service restructuring, or revolutionary changes to the nation's
laws, may be steeped in Navy culture, but it is shortsighted.
VII. IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Service and joint institutions in the United States military have become more balanced as a result of GNA; in effect the Navy has become more joint in the way it thinks. This has not, however, radically changed the Navy's culture. The United States Navy still emphasizes operations and favors autonomy.

The Navy has accepted jointness by attempting to accommodate the concept within its traditional culture. Two of the biggest influences in this process are independent of the GNA.

First, the environmental changes brought on by the "new reality" that there is no longer anyone challenging the Navy to a "blue water" fight have forced a reevaluation of traditional roles and missions. Beyond GNA, the contingent national security environment has changed radically in the past several years. In the absence of a unifying global Soviet threat, the missions that shaped the services and the military for over forty years became less significant. A sense of organizational purpose is a primary mechanism shaping organizational culture, thus a true test of GNA's influence would require a stable international environment.
Unfortunately this is never very realistic, particularly now, and we are therefore left with tentative conclusions.

Second, the sociological changes provided by new leadership have been instrumental in the Navy's moderate positions on contentious issues such as the new command structure. The leadership of Admiral Burke strongly influenced the Navy's opposition to unification in the late 1940s and 1950s. Secretary Lehman continued the fight into the 1980s. With a generation between the arguments of Admiral Burke and the present leadership, there is little historical bondage to the culturally based issues he espoused. Secretary Lehman's charisma and advocacy for the Navy were often viewed as double-edged swords. Furthermore, Secretary Lehman's legacy was not rooted in historical heroics like Admiral Burke's; consequently, the positions Secretary Lehman advocated did not endear themselves to the uniformed Navy.

While changes in the sociological dimension have facilitated the acceptance of jointness, these same factors color perceptions about the Navy's positions on jointness. It will take longer than the five years since GNA was enacted to erase decades of perceptions that the Navy obstructs jointness. Unfortunately this means that the Navy must work harder than any other service to make its voice heard in the joint arena.
Outside the inevitability that the Navy must accept jointness, what is the proof that the Navy wants to be heard in the joint arena? And where is the proof that the Navy’s culture has accepted jointness through accommodation into its existing structure, versus internalization into its belief system?

Key leaders both in Congress and the military believe that the Navy has changed its orientation; indeed, the Secretary of Defense reported this to Congress.\textsuperscript{274} However, as this study has attempted to demonstrate, full acceptance into the beliefs of the officer corps will take longer. There remains a curious blend of inevitability, self-doubt, and caution among the Navy’s officer corps that is at variance with a concept that has been internalized into the organization’s beliefs.\textsuperscript{275}

The Navy is providing a higher quality of officers to the JS, and these men and women no longer view joint duty as a dead end. But, accommodation vice internalization is evident when considering that the Navy still has trouble meeting promotional milestones, and is still dependent on waivers for certain categories of joint officers.

The Navy has placed increased importance on professional military and joint education. The number of officers

\textsuperscript{274}Secretary of Defense Report, III-6. As discussed in Chapter VI.

\textsuperscript{275}See the quotations and discussion in Chapter VI concerning ‘Perceptions’ and in Chapter II under organizational culture.
pursuing joint education and the number of billets available for education in the Navy has expanded. The importance of education in the promotion of Naval officers has also increased. But, the Navy's system of education remains different from the other services in that, the Navy continues to have essentially a one-step approach. Despite Congressional prodding, the Navy's system of education remains a product of its overall culturally bound operational focus.

Proof that there has been an acceptance of jointness, but lack of internalization, is illustrated by reviewing the output products, in this case, plans and operations. Planning has improved but remains highly colored by service advocacy. The national emphasis on jointness has not translated into joint strategic writings and service strategies that follow.

Operations in the Gulf War were plagued by underlying deficiencies in joint interoperability. The Navy suffered from this most acutely, as its traditional methods of autonomous operations did not mesh with a system that has become increasingly more joint. Failure to attack deficiencies in this area before they became battlefield challenges are perhaps the most revealing artifact of the Navy's deficient internalization of jointness.

Interpretation problems arise from a lack of shared understanding and agreement as to what some of the original
GNA changes were intended to achieve. As Chapter II indicates what is "defined as 'change' depends on immediate effect and what we expect or hope for." The hypothesis that the GNA was fundamentally aimed at creating a more balanced power distribution between service and joint institutions is dependent on the effectiveness of the change mechanisms. As Chapters IV and V emphasize, the key provisions implementing these mechanisms are contained in Title IV. These include promotions, assignments, and education.

Organizational theory holds that these mechanisms can be used to produce cultural change. The genesis of the Title IV provisions indicates that it was drafted in the expectation that these mechanisms would stimulate cultural change. Subsequent assessments in Congressional reports also highlight this point. Joint education, in particular, is viewed as "a major way to change the professional military culture so that officers accept and support the strengthened joint elements." Yet, some leaders still disagree on what type of change was intended, a factor which contributes to the lack of shared understanding. Rep. Ike Skelton states:

Did we intend to cause a cultural change? No, we don't want to change the culture of the services.

Schein, 298.

Panel on Military Education Report, 12.
We might have changed some of it, but that really wasn't our initial intention.\textsuperscript{278}

VADM M. Boorda felt that calling the intended change, "a cultural shift was too strong, but that the desired effect was to create a greater awareness of jointness."\textsuperscript{279}

This thesis argues that the power distribution between the services cannot be shifted without altering the individual service and joint organizational cultures. The two concepts are mutually reinforcing. Lasting change in one will affect the other. Previous efforts to reform DOD have concentrated on shifting statutory power through structural changes with predictable, shortlived results. The service institutions are strong and vigorous. They control the money and programs which reinforce power. By tying both individual survival and the top leadership positions to joint duty, Congress has created a cultural change mechanism that is altering the U.S. military and individual service cultures. These mechanisms are working to offset the strong programmatic power of the services. Understanding what was intended and what is actually occurring is essential to ensure that the mechanisms are best suited towards the ultimate goal of enhancing national security. The present understanding is inconsistent. Perhaps denial of the intention that GNA provisions were designed to alter service

\textsuperscript{278}Skelton, interview.

\textsuperscript{279}Boorda, interview.
culture reflects underlying organizational assumptions rooted in service pride and beliefs. As stated in Chapter II, belief in the organization is paramount, fostering action to ensure survival and health. New situations and challenges are handled within the bounds of organizational culture. While the wrappings may change to fit the situation, the basic tenets which represent the essence of the organization are consistent.

The Navy cannot continue to have it both ways. Since 1947 the Navy has been on the "losing side" of every contentious issue involving service unification. While the Congress and the nation have moved in one direction, the Navy has lagged behind. Rather than preserve naval autonomy this divergence has stimulated more conflict. Curiously, few in the Navy or outside it really wants to change the Navy's culture. But the GNA, coupled with the environmental and sociological changes, make Navy cultural change virtually inevitable. Whether we take aggressive initiative to shape these changes or continue to tread a more cautious middle ground of accommodation will determine how the resulting balance of power is forged.

B. SYSTEMIC DISCONTINUITIES

Connected to the Navy's failure to completely internalize jointness are significant systemic deficiencies that prevent full realization of the advantages of
"jointness." The focus has been too uni-dimensional. As illustrated, the post-GNA legislative oversight has been primarily in the fields of educational/officer management. The Senate attempted strategy hearings in 1987, but there has been little more than this token effort. The Skelton Panel recognized the importance of the other areas that it was not able to examine. Unfortunately there is no evidence that anyone else has given serious attention to these areas either. In the action-reaction world of DOD-Congressional relations, DOD has concerned itself with implementing the programs mandated by law, while refraining from consideration of larger issues. One officer assigned to the Navy Office of Legislative Affairs stated, "we don't have time to give Congress the information they want, let alone look at anything else."

The system currently in place, aimed at fostering the joint perspective, is deficient because it encourages this tunnel vision. By focusing on officer management, Congress has demonstrated where it believes the change mechanisms lie. But if a truly outstanding officer is shaped by the equation: Experience + Education + Training, then each

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280 Most of the GNA oversight has been on Title IV-related issues including GAO reports and Congressional Hearings. Based on a content analysis of the amount of time devoted to Title IV followup versus other GNA investigation, approximately seventy percent of the Congressional hearings have been devoted to this area.

281 Panel on Military Education Report, 62

dimension of the equation should receive similar emphasis. By focusing on some narrow aspects of experience and education, such as the primacy of the joint side of these variables, Congress has unwittingly skewed the focus away from other areas that also are important. Are joint exercises getting sufficient attention? Has training really become more joint? What is the evidence that more professional military and joint education is necessarily better? It certainly cannot hurt individuals, but it may impede overall force readiness if the focus on education is without commensurate emphasis on joint exercises and training.

The cloudiness and inarticulation of already legislated provisions, the interpretation problems, the focus on numerical measures, and the numerous changes to the GNA have contributed to these problems. Communication, cooperation, and continuity from both DOD and Congress would go a long way in accommodating the more difficult aspects of the law.

C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS - NAVY

The Navy should step forward with aggressive and assertive initiatives on jointness. This would facilitate shaping the issues by ensuring a sufficient naval cultural perspective is included. Demonstrating initiative and leadership towards jointness would contribute towards dispelling lingering perceptions of Naval isolationism.
This leadership thrust would accelerate the assimilation of a joint perspective in the Naval officer corps. One OPNAV Captain stated that "we have no program for improving jointness...the answer lies within this building in the hands of its leaders." 

Jointness can provide a worthwhile mechanism for maintaining military service capabilities in a time of significantly decreasing budgets. For the Navy to maximize the force-multiplying effects of jointness, there are several areas which should be addressed. These include: joint and professional military education, Navy presence on joint staffs (qualitative and quantitative), and Navy efforts to develop both joint doctrine and service doctrine to match.

The Navy's professional military education system should be aligned to match the true two-tiered process of the other services. Congress placed significant emphasis on creating a system of education that depends upon a hierarchy of learning. The response by the Navy as to the difficulty of implementing this repeated old arguments about lack of officer end-strength, low officer-to-enlisted ratios relative to the other services, and lack of facility space

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Interview with OPNAV O-6, July 1991, by author.
for expanding education. Another reason offered is that the technical and operational difficulties involved in the safe operation of submarines, surface ships, and aircraft demand more emphasis on operations. The feeling is that more time ashore, at school, will reduce operational proficiency. Another argument against more school is that there is no demonstrated operational benefit gained from more education. The counter argument to all of those Navy positions is that no statistical proof exists that taking another year out of a career for education will result in less operational proficiency. Both sides of the argument are circuitous. If the Navy worked to aggressively change structural inhibitors that preclude increased professional military education in a career, then the operational proficiency question would become secondary.

There are possibilities as to how the Navy could remove these structural blocks. RADM Cossey comments that:

The Navy could obtain more balance between operations and education by cutting time at sea, increasing officer end strength, shortening command tours, and investigating alternative tracks which recognize options other than command at sea for advancement...but not all these make sense, therefore, the options must be examined closely.  

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284 See analysis in Chapter VI and an explanation of the Navy system with its accompanying rationale in Secretary of Defense Report to The Congressional Committees on Armed Services, Assessment of Professional Military Education in The Services, and Discussion of Proposed Legislation, 8 August 1990. Another blocking point is that the Navy would have to expand its educational facilities and this costs money.

285 Cossey, interview.
This study recommends that the Navy pursue several options. First, it could pursue more relative officer end strength, a concept to which Congress has been amenable. Justification should include a study or model that proves numerically what additional numbers are needed to support a two-tiered educational pattern in Navy officer careers. This must include validation of the Navy’s claims that anymore time away from operations in an officer’s career is detrimental to readiness and safety. An historical study of the careers of a large population of Naval officer should be undertaken to determine if any correlation exists between years away from operations and poor readiness or safety. As one Navy commander said "it takes more skill to drive ships and planes than it does to run a battalion." This is a widely held perception, but is it based on fact?

Second, examine Navy career progression and emphasis. The Navy system is highly wedded to advancement gates. In fact, the GAO found it necessary to use executive officer screening in the Navy as an equivalent to selection for senior professional military education in the other services. The Navy should inject more flexibility into its career progression. Solving the end-strength problem is tied to this recommendation. Navy O-4s and O-5s advance faster then their Army and Air Force counterparts.

Restrictive emphasis on career progression at these ranks squeezes out time for education.\textsuperscript{287}

The traditional Navy disdain for staff work, particularly joint staff duty, has left a legacy of under-representation on joint staffs, joint duty assignments, and critical joint billets.\textsuperscript{288} In the most ideal situation an officer with a "healthy" joint perspective will produce balanced plans and operations - the key outputs. In the real world, however, one thousand Air Force voices may bury one hundred Navy voices. While the best idea usually wins, getting that idea heard without having balanced staffs is difficult. The balance should include numbers, rank, and quality. The recent Gulf War indicated the Navy's deficiencies on the first two points. The Navy should actively pursue balanced numerical and hierarchial representation on joint staffs. The pending DOD unified command reorganization offers an opportunity to correct historical deficiencies.

The Navy's efforts toward developing joint doctrine over the past few years have been laudable. There is little evidence, however, that service doctrine (NWPs etc...) are

\textsuperscript{287}For discussion on alternative career paths see, Clausen, Joint Specialty Officers: Improving the Military During a Period of Reform, and Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, Defending America's Security (Washington, DC: Brassey's INC, 1990), 195-205.

\textsuperscript{288}This "disdain" is largely reflective of the environmental aspect of Naval culture. Ships at sea do not have the space for large staffs, therefore the Navy's culture has reinforced the lack of emphasis on staffs.
being revised to match.\textsuperscript{289} Rewriting publications is unglamorous and time-consuming, costly work - an effort unlikely to receive attention in times of budget calamity. This is unfortunate because without a focused guiding set of doctrinal principles, coping with change is difficult. Whether one buys the hypothesis that GNA was intended to cause a cultural change misses the point that the present international and domestic environment have forced cultural change on the services. A guiding set of Navy principles, rooted in doctrine and strategy that supports the emerging joint doctrine, would ease the turmoil.

D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS - DOD

This study forwards three recommendations for DOD-wide policy on jointness. The first recommendation is to be more proactive on joint issues, particularly Title IV. Dr. Archie Barrett states:

No one on the joint side is looking out for joint interests. They are seemingly endorsing what the services send along in terms of Title IV issues.\textsuperscript{290}

DOD should demonstrate to Congress and the services that it is in front of the issues by taking aggressive and truly innovative initiatives toward revising Title IV in light of Congressional intent.

\textsuperscript{289}See Chapter VI under plans. This conclusion was based, in part, by the author's review of post-Desert Storm fleet CINC lesson learned messages.

\textsuperscript{290}Barrett, interview.
Secondly, it is necessary to take a more systemic look at the Title IV interlocking pieces. The present system has created numerous advancement and career gates, such as time sequenced education, joint duty, joint specialists, tour length requirements, promotional equality between joint and service jobs, and flag officer wickets. Congress has correctly given DOD some waiver authority so that the system does not inadvertently block a qualified leader from advancing. In reality, the ability to exercise this waiver authority is limited. The current trend is for DOD to shun waivers and Congress to encourage few exceptions. More should be done to preclude inadvertently excluding tomorrow’s leaders. For example, the following process might be considered.

Step one would be to revalidate the existing joint duty designated assignments. The focus should be on warfighting. The numbers (8000-9000) for the joint duty assignment list and 1000 for critical positions should be based on more than "pie in the sky" guesses. This may mean a smaller joint duty list. The argument that a smaller list would unduly restrict certain individuals and create an elitist cadre of officers misses the point. Creating the joint specialty concept has already created an additional sub-group in the military. Its elitism is no more manifest than service pride or career pride. Worrying about "elitism" is akin to clinging to myths of creeping Prussianism - it won’t happen
in American culture. By basing the joint duty assignments on demonstrated need and quality positions, this would actually enhance the status of joint duty. Many people interviewed for this study viewed the joint duty assignment list as the single biggest problem with the joint specialty programs. By elevating less challenging and less demanding positions to premier status, the system has created a "ticket punch" approach, as opposed to one based on job satisfaction and pride.

Step two would involve creating viable options to aspiring and aggressive officers for obtaining joint duty credit and joint specialty officer designation. The proposal forwarded in the Senate version of the FY 92/93 Defense Authorization Bill is an example in which, individuals serving in joint positions during the Gulf War would receive joint duty credit. The system should examine the output, the officer, rather than focus on the process. Quality is shaped by education, experience, and training. It is individuals that undergo this shaping process. For example, officer "A" may have attended intermediate service school, the Armed Forces Staff College, and served three years in a joint duty assignment while his

291 Congress, Senate, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Report, 102nd. Cong., 1st sess., 266-267. This provision was dropped from the Conference version of the bill pending further study. Rick Maze, "Gulf War Vets Won’t Get Special Joint-Duty Credit," Navy Times, 25 November 1991, 9. The author is not advocating this particular proposal, only making the point that alternative paths to gaining joint duty credit should be explored.
colleague officer "B" served five months as a member of a special joint crises response team. Under the current system officer "A" would qualify for screening as a JSO while officer "B" would not. Officer "B" may know more about joint matters, he may have a better joint perspective, and he may have experienced more socialization with officers from the other services. Individuals can learn, socialize, and internalize in a variety of methods, speeds, and processes. A rigid system excludes the necessary flexibility for cultivating the individual. The Skelton panel identified innate talent as one of the most important dimensions in the officer quality equation. An innovative and flexible system is more conducive to developing this innate talent than a rigid one - the present system needs alternatives.\textsuperscript{292}

Admiral Bull Halsey attended both the Naval War college and the Army War college. He rose to heroic heights within the Navy. Yet, under the current system he may have been excluded from the joint "wickets" because his commissioning lineal number would be too low.\textsuperscript{293} Do we really want to exclude the Admiral Halseys of tomorrow?

\textsuperscript{292}Panel on Military Education Report, 29. States that "innate talent probably is the most fundamental component for development of a strategist." Such officers should be identified "as early as possible during their careers."

\textsuperscript{293}Admiral Halsey graduated last in his Naval Academy class. Therefore he would have had a low lineal number through at least the 0-4 level under the current promotion system.
The joint officer management process should focus on measuring the officer output by a written examination and oral board system. Admiral Leon Edney, CINCLANT, believes that some of the personnel provisions could be better managed if lawmakers would "tell us the principles of joint knowledge", then "give us an exam on the material." A rigorous screening process would consider officer records for consideration as JSOs based on a combination of joint duty, educational background, examination, and board results. While this is more rigorous, it is less rigid. Officer "B" might pass with honors, while officer "A" flunk the board. Making the system competitive would also alleviate a sense of having closed the door on an individual's chances for JSO consideration because of missed "wickets."

Step three in creating flexibility and ensuring proper focus in the joint personnel management system would involve examining DOD requirements to ensure they are not overly restrictive. One JS LCOL said that "a lot of wickets are self imposed." For example, DOD has excluded O-3s and below from joint duty credit, even though GNA has no

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294 *Navy Times*, 20 May 1991, 15

295 Interview by author October, 1991.

296 Furthermore, Congress has excluded them from joint education because of the determination that the intermediate level (O-4) of professional military education is the appropriate level for beginning joint education, see *Panel on Military Education Report*, 14.
provision exempting O-3s from joint duty. The thinking is that an O-3 has not yet achieved service excellence, so that an officer would not be ready to take on a joint perspective. This conclusion counters learning theory which states that events which occur "early in the person's adult life have an especially great impact on his perceptual predispositions."297

Both DOD, from an experience standpoint, and Congress, from an educational vantage, are overly restrictive. Extending joint duty and joint education opportunities to qualified, and exceptionally outstanding, O-3s would be beneficial.

The third overall DOD policy recommendation is the establishment of a Joint Oversight Commission. This special commission would assess the overall readiness of the military to engage in joint operations. It could include a review of plans (strategies and warplans), programs, training, exercises, manning, and education. Such a holistic approach would require broad guidelines and objectives. Establishing such a commission would facilitate a method of measuring jointness as an output, rather than a process. Defining the boundaries of what constituted adequate joint readiness would not be easy. Such an undertaking is not, however, unrealistic, given the

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297 Jervis, 249
important national security implications it portends. The Commission should consist of officers from all services, Congressional representatives, and defense experts. It should meet frequently enough in the field, classrooms, and training facilities to establish a first-hand view of how things are being run.

This is a revolutionary recommendation. Commissions carry a one-time stigma and normally operate outside the process so as to provide unbiased views. This Commission, however, is viewed as a permanent component of evaluating defense readiness. A powerful tool for the CJCS, SECDEF, President, and Congress to assess the readiness of the military to defend U.S. national security interests. At a minimum the present oversight of total military readiness, particularly with respect to joint warfighting, should be more output-orientated. Correct, focused, and educated changes to the present joint system can only be made if the effect on the output is known - does the present system, which is aimed at fostering jointness, enhance the military's ability to fight? Presently, answering this question, short of war, is based on disjointed and piecemeal processes. DOD and the nation need a holistic approach.

The growing challenges that the United States faces on both the international and domestic fronts cannot be ignored. Shrinking budgets are forcing fundamental restructuring of the military. Jointness offers perhaps the
best means to effectively do more with less. The first step in accomplishing this will be internalization of the concept.

Jointness isn't a threat to organizational survival. Nor is it a panacea for defense and service ills. It is a concept - a mindset that says "let's have the best team, regardless of the cost to the individual service." As one Navy commander put it, "your question should be, not is jointness working but, what have you done for jointness today?" In concert with this internalization, Congress and DOD must work together to reexamine what the focus of jointness should be. Define jointness, discuss it, disseminate it, and then dissect it through tough, impartial regular reviews that look at the joint system. Such an approach reinforces the internalization process as the players concentrate on what's important, rather than simply trying to meet the requirements.

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298 Interview with Navy 0-5, July 1991, by author.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter highlights some major points of this study. First, the individual military services have distinct cultures. This unique service culture shapes the way the services operate, plan, and manage their people more than we might think. A sensitivity for this service culture amongst military and political leaders would enhance interservice cooperation and hence national security.

Secondly, cultural change is a slow and involved process. Considerable lag exists between the time change mechanisms are implemented and when the system reaches steady-state. The nearly annual revisions to the GNA, some of which constitute considerable change, not just mid-course guidance, have compounded the evaluation of the balance between service and joint institutions. The mechanisms have barely had time to get initiated, let alone cause the system to reach steady-state.

Third, more discussion, understanding, and study of proposed and enacted changes must occur. Both the initiators of change in Congress and enactors in DOD must have a shared understanding of the intended and potential unintended consequences of change. It is not enough to say, "we didn't intend to change service culture" if that is in
fact what is happening or if other parties involved in the drafting of the mechanisms had that in mind.

Fourth, implementing and managing the Title IV provisions of GNA, have consumed considerable time, manpower, and funds. Of all the areas covered by the GNA this single aspect, more than any others, has become the focus of jointness. This has translated into a process, vice output focus and has actually hindered fully achieving the concept of jointness which Title IV was designed to enhance.

Fifth, despite this paper's contention that there have been too many changes to the law, some revision is warranted to correct deficiencies which preclude the system from being fully credible. The joint duty assignment list (JDAL) has lost a warfighting focus. The entire method in which the system cultivates JSOs lacks the necessary flexibility for managing individuals' careers. There must be alternative paths to the top which measure the quality - not the number of checks in the correct block.

Sixth, will the balance of power between service and joint institutions as it is presently evolving result in the most efficient, synergistic, and effective fighting force? Can the present system of oversight, both externally from Congress and internally via DOD assessments, provide a satisfactory answer to this question? If not, then perhaps the recommendation of a Joint Oversight Commission contained
in Chapter VII should be considered. The evaluation system must examine the balance between education, exercises, and training. Without a holistic approach to jointness, achieving the maximum benefit from the team approach will never be realized.

Finally, the Navy has made significant strides in becoming a partner with jointness. However, service-unique root incompatibilities exist between the Navy’s way of doing business and that of the other services. These are most evident in the educational, operational, and promotional areas. The Navy must examine these incompatibilities to ensure they still make sense. The Goldwater-Nichols Act and the "new world order" have made cultural change inevitable. Whether the Navy continues to tow a cautious line of accommodation or whether it aggressively acts to internalize "jointness" will determine how the evolving balance of power within DOD is shaped.
## APPENDIX A

### PROMOTION DATA

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### NOTES:

1. All numbers are percentages based on in-zone promotion only.
2. Categories are: JS=Joint Staff, JSO=Joint Specialty Officer, SHQS=Service Headquarters Staff, OJ=Other Joint, and BA=Board Average
3. Column (1) represents the "are serving in" that position category; column (2) is the "have served in" category; column (3) is the average of columns (1) and (2).
4. (-) represents missing data
5. Navy numbers represent unrestricted line only. The Navy totals do not reflect the Marine Corps.
6. Source of Data is the Secretary of Defense Report to Congress for FY91 and FY92 (reports FY90 and 89 promotional data).
7. Comparisons, bold numbers, are based on the lowest in that category. Comparison excludes 1989, 0-5, JS since the Navy reported no data, and only compares certain 0-4 categories where enough data existed. 1990 Navy lowest in 12/21 areas (57%); Army 8/21 (38%); Air Force 1/21 (5%).

1989 Navy lowest in 11/19 areas (58%); Army 9/19 (47%); Air Force 0/19. Navy is also missing 6 data points from the 1989 0-5 and 0-6 data.

8. The key interservice comparisons based on the GNA are derived from considering three points of the law: 1. Promotions of officers who have served or are serving on the Joint Staff (JS) are expected to be promoted at a rate not less than comparable contemporaries on service headquarters staffs. 2. Promotions of officers with the joint specialty (JSOs) must be at a rate not less than comparable contemporaries on service headquarters staffs. 3. Other joint duty assignments for officers other than the above shall be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for comparable contemporaries service wide.
APPENDIX B
FURTHER RESEARCH

Time precluded a deeper examination of a number of issues examined in this thesis. First, the major policy recommendations forwarded need expansion and analysis. Second, the recommendation that the Navy's claim for operational emphasis be objectively proved or disproved needs further examination. This would lend credence to traditional Navy arguments concerning the inherent difficulty and necessity for operations at sea. It also might prove that another year out of operations for education over a twenty year career has insignificant adverse operational impact on the Navy. Third, ongoing initiatives, such as the Joint Warfare Doctrine and OSD Title IV JDAL review, hold promise for correcting systemic deficiencies. These efforts should be supported, continued, and studied. Fourth, examination of the finding that the Navy still experiences shortfalls in numerous promotional categories relative to the other services should be extended to include the 1991 data which was not yet available. The data should also be analyzed according to trend analysis since 1988. A comprehensive review of promotional data, Navy shortfalls, and the Navy detailing system might provide a baseline for injecting the additional career path and promotional flexibility that this study recommended. Fifth, a model that validates the existing JDAL, based on the
number of O-6s that must have joint duty assignments to ensure an adequate talent pool for flag selectivity, must be developed. The current JDAL seems too large and its emphasis has strayed too far from operations.
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