THE BALTIMORE QUESTION
AS IT
RELATES TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

by

Steven A. White

December, 1990

Thesis Advisor: Mikhail Tsypkin
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4. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

White, Steven A.

5. TYPE OF REPORT

Master's Thesis

6. TIME COVERED

FROM ______ TO ______

7. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)

December 1990

8. PAGE COUNT

119

9. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS

10. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

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The Baltic Question
as it
Relates to European Security

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1990

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the reemerging "Baltic Question" and its implications for European security. Relatively neglected for decades, the issue dramatically recaptured international attention on 11 March 1990, when Lithuania declared its independence from the Soviet Union, and then gained momentum from the subsequent moves toward secession by Estonia and Latvia. This thesis argues that the security of Europe and stability of the Baltic states are closely intertwined and that, therefore, this drive for independence demands careful attention by those who are constructing a post-Cold War security paradigm for Europe. To show that the three states are an important component in the European security equation, the thesis examines both the historical (12th-20th Centuries) connection, and that of the post-World War II era. With this discussion as background, it investigates alternate courses that the future might take, and assesses the effect each would have on the security of Europe, the three Baltic states, and the Soviet Union.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to Professors Mikhail Tsypkin and Jan S. Breemer for their infinite patience and guidance in preparing this thesis. Their long hours and numerous suggestions were very much appreciated. Professors Forrest E. Studebaker and David S. Yost contributed invaluable insights, and may have read more of my papers about the Baltic region in the past year than they ever cared to see. Professors Russel H.S. Stolfi, Donald Abenheim, and David Winterford significantly influenced my views on Europe and European security, and I thank them all. Nevertheless, the views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of any of the above.

This thesis is dedicated to my family. I am sure there are many, many days they thought I was off on deployment.
I. INTRODUCTION

In the midst of the dramatic and historic changes which took place in Eastern Europe in 1989-90, an unprecedented event occurred in the Soviet Union--on 11 March 1990, Lithuania became the first Union republic ever to declare independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The Kremlin's reaction to this declaration was swift and negative, despite Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement two months earlier that secession might indeed be possible. Moscow had tolerated, even encouraged, changes in the status quo when they occurred in Warsaw Pact countries, but now balked as they affected Soviet territory. Lithuania refused to back down, so Gorbachev attempted to isolate it (and intimidate other republics) by exerting diplomatic and economic pressure. Undeterred by such blatant arm-twisting, however, Estonia and Latvia demonstrated solidarity with their southern neighbor by resurrecting the 1934 Baltic Council and embarking on their own paths to independence.

These events marked the resurfacing of the "Baltic Question," an issue that has simmered unresolved since the 1940 annexation of the three Baltic countries by the Soviet Union. That action, as this thesis shows, violated the letter and spirit of numerous treaties and principles: the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 1920 treaties between Russia and all
three states, the 1926 Treaty of Friendship with Lithuania (renewed in 1931), the 1932 Non-Aggression Pacts with Latvia and Estonia, and the 1939 Defense and Mutual Assistance Pacts with all three. Further, Soviet incorporation of the independent Baltic countries was a flagrant violation of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact,¹ and of the principles set forth in the charter of the League of Nations (all four countries were members). The United States and most other nations criticized Moscow and refused to recognize the annexation. Still, they refrained from harsh diplomatic, economic, or military action to liberate the "captive nations," thus giving birth to the Baltic Question. Were the Baltic states sold out? Why was this action allowed to stand? Can it be remedied 50 years later? Should it be? Such questions, long-repressed, once again are demanding attention, in the wake of Lithuania's 11 March 1990 declaration and subsequent Estonian and Latvian secessionist activities.

The Baltic Question is reemerging at a time when the international community is commencing a post-Cold War restructuring. In the wake of sharply changed bipolar relations, allies and former adversaries now are attempting to create a new security paradigm for Europe. The would-be

¹Signatories to the Pact renounced aggression, and declared war to be an acceptable instrument of national policy only in cases of self-defense. The Soviet Union (February 1929) and 62 other nations eventually ratified it. See: Great Soviet Encyclopedia 12, (New York: MacMillan, Inc., 1973), 398.
architects of this paradigm are studying many options, such as using the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or European Community (EC) as the basis for an all-new security system, or building upon existing structures, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They intend to ensure that their framework offers the most rational and stable structure possible. Depending upon one's point of view, the reemergence of the Baltic Question at this time either comes at a most propitious time, or it complicates an already complex job.

To create an effective and equitable system, planners will need to balance *regional* and *national* interests, each of which involve a broad range of often conflicting economic, political, cultural, and military factors. At the *regional*, or European level, the ultimate concern is to provide stability and security, two concepts which are very much intertwined. Thus, it becomes important to determine whether the Baltic drive for freedom--successful or not--will contribute to, or detract from, regional stability. One must realize that the Baltic states' status as sovereign or dominated nations has been influencing European stability for over six centuries. As this thesis shows, they have been the victims of international politics, for much of that time. Stronger, more aggressive powers have been attracted to their access to the sea, their harbors and productive lands, and their industrious people. However, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania have been unable to defend themselves or obtain sufficient backing from the Great Powers. This has created periodic power vacuums, which have provided even greater temptation for the aggressive powers to invade. This instability, in turn, has affected the European security environment in much the same way (though perhaps less dramatically) that the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has sent waves of uncertainty through the Middle East. Thus, the three states have been, and continue to be, an important component in the overall European security equation. Because this will continue to hold true in the future as well, it is essential to understand how their current actions or their reemergence as sovereign states might affect the evolving balance of power.

Regional security paradigms are more than the sum of national interests, but national interests are also important to consider. Europe can never be truly secure until major disputes are resolved and each nation-state in the region feels secure. Therefore, it is important for strategists to weigh not only the wants and needs of the overall international community, but also the requirements of the individual Baltic states and their neighbors, including the Soviet Union. The Balts, for example, have claims which legitimately demand attention. Though not a party to any aggression and though declared neutrals at the outset of World War II, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania emerged from the
conflict as the only countries to lose complete sovereignty. Even the primary aggressor of the war, Germany, soon regained partial sovereignty, and is now totally sovereign. There are many who would argue that this situation morally cannot be ignored while other European wrongs are being righted.

On the other hand, Soviet defense strategists view the Baltic republics as crucial to security of the USSR, whether they remain part of the Union or ultimately regain their independence. Therefore, Soviet interests must be addressed. Similarly, each of the neighboring states in the region must feel assured that its interests are not jeopardized, either by instability caused by restive, frustrated Balts, or by any power vacuum arising from the reemergence of unguaranteed, weakly-defended independent countries.

The final settlement signed at the "two plus four" talks and subsequent political unification of the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany have left many with the impression that, after 45 years, the war is finally over. In reality, however, what the two events did was to resolve the domestic part of the German Question. This thesis contends that World War II cannot be considered truly ended as long as the Baltic Question remains unanswered. In fact, much of the western boundary of the USSR still requires clarification. Policy makers and planners of the future order must be sensitive to this, in order to make more informed judgments while formulating new, forward-looking strategies.
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to that search for new strategies, by offering a timely analysis of the Baltic Question. It argues that stability and security of the three Baltic states has affected European security—from the 12th Century to the present—and examines the implications of modern Baltic secessionist efforts. After examining historical precedent as background to the present circumstances, it considers what alternative courses might be in store for the future and assesses the effect each would have. Change in Baltic sovereignty is not necessarily unmanageable, undesirable, or inherently destabilizing, despite historical precedents which may suggest so.

Methodologically, this thesis employs a chronological, empirical approach that makes substantial use of the measured judgments of experts on the region, and incorporates two levels of analysis—nation-states and regional systems. Considering other levels might contribute to an even better understanding, but would produce an unwieldy document. Additionally, this thesis concentrates on political and physical security issues, though it is clear that cultural

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Singer has observed that different levels of analysis (e.g., individuals, bureaucratic structures, global systems, etc.) provide different perspectives on why states and systems act the way they do. Each contributes in its own way to a better understanding, and levels are selected according to each study’s needs. See: J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in The International System: Theoretical Essays, ed. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 77-94.
and economic variables are also deeply intertwined in the overall matter of European security.

Organizationally, this thesis is divided into four major blocks of investigation. Chapter II establishes the historical legacy, by considering how events in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have affected European stability and security from the 12th Century through 1940. As is shown, this legacy does not make a very encouraging case for the coexistence of Baltic independence and European stability. This chapter should also correct the widespread misperception that the three republics are a single, homogeneous entity, and it should demonstrate important traditional political and cultural links between the Baltic states and their neighbors.

Annexed by Stalin as a result of secret protocols to the 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the Baltic states were quickly and thoroughly integrated into the Soviet Union's national security plan. Chapter III demonstrates what this development meant for the Baltic states and for European security over the next fifty years. Further, it attempts to assess the actual value of the three republics for Soviet security--can Moscow afford to lose them? The answer to this question shapes, to a considerable degree, how viable certain alternative futures are.

Chapter IV examines the reactions of selected governments to current Baltic efforts to secede from the USSR. This chapter is important for understanding whether or not the
prospects of Baltic freedom make neighboring countries fearful for their own national interests. Although the international community has adopted a generally cautious approach, this chapter argues that it is possible to discern the foundations of the next generation of economic, cultural, and possibly security institutions.

With this discussion as background, and with the full understanding that history guides but does not predetermine the future, Chapter V offers an analysis of alternative courses the future might follow—remaining in the USSR, non-alignment, neutrality, and alignment—and the implications of each. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to design a new, overarching security plan for Europe. Therefore, the options considered here generally conform to existing frameworks.

Although the contributions of independent Baltic states to European collective security may have been destabilizing in the past, there is good reason to believe that the future can be much more positive. Many of the factors which lured aggressive powers to the Baltic region in the past continue to be valid, but others are no longer. For example, it is difficult to imagine that the Nordic countries, Poland, or Germany have any designs on the region. Less certain is the USSR, but this thesis argues that, if Moscow is willing, the Baltic Question can be resolved in ways which can add to, rather than detract from, regional security. Even if Moscow
is not willing,\(^3\) though, present conditions demand that strategic planners take another hard look at the Baltic situation. Baltic governments are accelerating their drive toward secession, and any such changes carry the potential for unrest and conflict. Therefore, whether or not the three states regain their independence, it is imperative to begin thinking now about the extent of Baltic influence on European security, and about what niche they should occupy in any future security order.

\(^3\)Soviet leaders are concerned about more than just security from external military threats. They also must consider other factors, such as economics and prestige, as well as the very real danger that Baltic secession might set off a "domino effect" which could unravel the Union.
II. PAST: HISTORICAL PLACE IN THE SECURITY FRAMEWORK

A. THE EARLY YEARS

Near the end of the 12th Century, outsiders began invading the backwater area of Europe which now makes up Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Teutonic Knights, who were suffering set-backs in their Mediterranean crusades, found that the path of least resistance led, instead, to the pagan north. The Danes followed suit by establishing their own presence in northern Estonia at the turn of the century. Thus, before they could develop indigenous political or defense systems on anything larger than a tribal scale, Estonia and what is now Latvia were assimilated into Western Christendom. Although they were able to preserve elements of their ethnic character, residents of the area soon adopted many European social and cultural habits. The Danes divested their interests in 1346, leaving the region largely under the domination of the Teutonic Order.

Lithuanians, on the other hand, successfully resisted advances by outsiders, largely as a result of the efforts of

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Mindaugas, a local chieftain. Between 1240-63, he forged a political entity out of tribes in Lithuania and parts of what is now Belorussia. He and his successors turned Lithuania into a major power that steadily expanded its borders eastward into the Duchy of Muscovy. After years of persistent, heavy pressure from the Teutonic Order, however, Lithuania looked to Poland for support. Polish backing was secured by dynastic marriage in 1386, but only after the Lithuanian ruler agreed to convert his subjects to Catholicism. The loose, ill-defined union of the two countries that resulted, stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and from Poland to near Moscow. Through this association, Lithuanians—particularly the nobility—became politically and culturally Polonized.

By the 1500s, the Teutonic Order had grown weaker and Sweden, newly-independent and competing against Danish hegemony, began expanding its reach southward across Estonia. In 1557, Tsar Ivan IV launched the Livonian War (1557-82), hoping to gain Russian access to the Baltic Sea. In fear and seeking protection against the Russians, Livonia (present-day southern Estonia and eastern Latvia) allowed much of its territory to be incorporated by Lithuania. As the Russian threat grew stronger, Lithuania signed the 1569 Union of Lublin, which transformed its two hundred year old personal

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union with Poland into a formal commonwealth. The Russians pressed westward, but eventually were pushed out of Estonia and Livonia by Swedish forces. Lithuania also repelled the Russians, and gained territory in Livonia and Courland (now western Latvia). However, Lithuanian's forces were unable to push the Swedes out of the Baltic area.

Russia again attempted to expand westward when Peter I launched the Great Northern War (1700-21) against Sweden. This time the Tsar's reorganized and greater forces prevailed, and Sweden ceded Estonia and Latvia to Russia by the Treaty of Nystad (1721). Meanwhile, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth showed signs of internal decay, so it too became an inviting target for Russian attentions. By the three partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795, Lithuania eventually joined Estonia and Latvia as possessions of the Tsar.

Although the three Baltic states had political, social, cultural structures that were different from each other and quite distinct again from rest of Russia, a sense of fellowship evolved from sharing a common fate. That feeling increased as the Tsar implemented programs designed to integrate them into the burgeoning Russian empire. These "Russification" policies began in earnest in Lithuania after its 1830-31 revolt against cultural and political oppression,
and were in full swing in Estonia and Latvia by the 1860s.\textsuperscript{6} The results were resentment and a simmering nationalism, which broke into open unrest, disorder, and anti-Russian sentiment by 1905.

That instability notwithstanding, the region became progressively more important for Russian trade and security. As the Tsar's railroad network was expanded into the area, Riga, Liepaja (Libau), and Tallinn (Reval) became critical commercial ports and industrial centers. Further, the St. Petersburg-based Russian Fleet found it advantageous to establish naval ports and facilities along the entire east coast of the Baltic Sea. Because of its geographic location, Estonia was viewed as having particular strategic importance, for it forms the southern boundary of the Gulf of Finland—a narrow waterway through which Russian naval vessels had to pass when transiting between the Baltic Sea and facilities in St. Petersburg (Leningrad).

B. TRANSITORY FREEDOM (1918-40)

During the course of World War I, German troops overran Russian defenses and occupied a significant portion of the Baltic countries. However, the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and a near-simultaneous collapse of both the Russian and German empires ended this presence, and allowed Lithuania (16

\textsuperscript{6}Rauch, 8.
February 1918), Estonia (24 February 1918), and Latvia (18 November 1919)—as well as the Ukraine, Georgia, Transcaucasia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia—to declare their independence. Freedom for latter was short-lived, though, for the new Bolshevik government soon moved in to reclaim the former Tsarist holdings. However, hastily-established militias and outside assistance, primarily British in Estonia and German in Latvia, permitted the three Baltic states to avoid being reabsorbed.

Upon Lithuania's declaration of independence, Poland began pressuring it to restore their former union. Lithuania demurred, and territorial disputes soon erupted between the two, including Polish occupation of Vilnius. As a result, relations grew strained, and the two sides did not establish diplomatic relations until 1938.

Moscow finally abandoned its efforts to recover the three Baltic states, and signed treaties in 1920 which renounced all claims to their territories in perpetuity. It followed these treaties with non-aggression or neutrality agreements with each: Lithuania in 1926 (renewed in 1931), Latvia in 1932, and Estonia in 1932.

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7Vilnius, the historical capital of Lithuania, had been returned to Lithuania by the Allied powers in December 1919. This Polish occupation occurred in October 1920, and caused the government to relocate to Kaunas.

8Vardys and Misiunas, 10.
With matters seemingly resolved between them and their eastern neighbor, the independent Baltic countries began their quest for a place in Europe. They pursued a path of neutrality, partly because they felt it inadvisable to antagonize any of the nearby large powers, and partly because they were unable to interest their neighbors in any type of federation. Continuing differences between Poland and Lithuania made Poland an unlikely partner, and Finland's lack of interest in any southern alliance prevented a northward-stretching collective security arrangement. The three joined the League of Nations in 1922, hoping it would be an effective vehicle for resolving conflicting interests of the Great Powers, while protecting the interests of smaller and weaker nations. These hopes ultimately proved to be misplaced.

Unable to raise regional interest in a collective security plan, and cognizant of the fact that tensions were rising all across Europe, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania finally banded together in 1934 to create the Baltic Entente. This pact provided for common action in defense and foreign affairs. However, there was disagreement within the Entente over the nature of the threat to be countered. Lithuania and Latvia were most concerned by a looming German threat, while Estonia

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worried about the Soviet Union. Despite their professed intentions, the Baltic states allowed petty differences and bickering to prevent them from seriously coordinating their efforts until it was too late. At the same time, their neutrality came under criticism by both the Soviet Union and Great Britain, who wanted the Baltic countries to participate in a collective defense against Germany.¹⁰

So, on the eve of World War II, there were competing Great Power interests over the Baltic region. Because the three Baltic countries were unable to defend their neutral status effectively, their security depended upon a delicate—and ultimately untenable—balancing of the interests and appetites of many large and powerful neighbors. For its part, the Soviet Union was anxious to recover territories it had lost after World War I, and it saw great strategic benefits in possessing the Baltic states as a buffer against any potential German invasion. France and Great Britain also worried about the possibility of German expansion, but were unwilling to guarantee Baltic independence to counter that threat. Instead, they ineffectively argued for a regional solution. The two were preparing to offer the Soviets free reign in the area, but were preempted by 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact.¹¹

¹⁰Misiunas and Taagepera, 14.

Poland, too, had visions of restoring its historic union with Lithuania, and hoped to organize the three Baltic countries under its leadership to stand as a buffer between the Soviet Union and Germany. France encouraged creation of such a regional alliance, maintaining it should also include Finland. However, the concept failed to reach fruition, largely because of Polish arrogance and continued occupation of Vilnius, but also because of the lack of a French or British guarantee. Additionally, the Soviet Union and Germany—for reasons that became obvious after 1939—were opposed to any alliance between Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Finally, there were the interests of an ambitious Germany, which viewed the Baltic countries as important trade partners; in the late 1930s, Berlin signed agreements to take 70 percent of all Baltic exports. Further, Hitler had aspirations of annexing and Germanizing the Baltics, goals he revealed in Mein Kampf and in conversations with foreign leaders.

C. STOLEN INDEPENDENCE

As the 1930s drew to a close, Germany's actions became increasingly provocative toward the Baltic states. First, it

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13Rauch, 218.
took control of Klaipeda (Memel) in March 1939, after local elections gave 90 percent of the vote to National Socialists. Klaipeda, a predominately German city, was under Allied control after World War I and had been awarded to Lithuania after it engineered an insurrection there in 1923. Now, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop told Lithuania that if it did not surrender the area voluntarily, the German army might take it forcibly.  

In view of Germany's invasion of Czechoslovakia a week earlier, this was viewed as no idle threat. Lithuania complied and, in return, Germany "guaranteed" Lithuanian independence, and concluded another commercial treaty.

Additionally, Germany exerted pressure on Lithuania to assist in the September 1939 invasion of Poland, offering Vilnius as the spoils. Lithuania refused, hoping that by doing so it could maintain its neutrality and eventually recover Vilnius peacefully. Even with war clouds on the horizon, the Lithuanian government believed it could constrain German aggression through diplomatic means. It also calculated that the Soviets might absorb Estonia and Latvia, but leave Poland and Lithuania to act as a buffer between the Soviet Union and Germany.

14Albert N. Tarulis, Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic States 1918-1940 (University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), 99.
15Langer, 1041.
16Tarulis, 133.
This proved to be a monumental miscalculation. In secret supplementary protocols to the August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, Germany gave its blessing for the Soviet Union to expand its sphere of influence into the Baltic region. Within two months, Moscow had bullied the three Baltic countries into signing mutual assistance pacts, authorizing the Soviet army to station troops on their territory.

These pacts guaranteed Baltic independence and pledged Soviet non-interference in the internal affairs of the three countries. Nevertheless, each was incorporated into the Soviet Union within a year as the result of well-controlled local elections. Russia's World War I loss of the eastern Baltic littoral was at last reversed, and what appeared to many to be a political vacuum was filled again by Soviet annexation of the Baltic states.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The preceding discussion suggests that the historical legacy is not encouraging when it comes to considering the compatibility of Baltic independence and European stability. In fact, some would argue that European security is enhanced

17 By the initial protocol, Lithuania was to fall under German control. The next two protocols modified that agreement so Lithuania would belong to the USSR. See: "Text of Secret Protocols to 1939 Hitler-Stalin Pact," New York Times, 24 August 1989, A10.

18 Misiunas and Taagepera, 16.
when the Baltic states are firmly under the control of a strong outside power. With their tiny size, small populations, and peaceful cultures, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are dwarfed by their neighbors. Any time the three states have been independent—and even at times when they were not—they have been targeted by larger, more aggressive powers who recognized the Baltic states' inability to resist coercion effectively. In short, rather than being primary actors, the three historically have been acted upon.

Estonia and Latvia were overrun even before they had a chance to establish themselves as independent, native powers. Until the 1700s, they developed culturally, religiously, socially, and economically under German and Nordic influences. At the same time that the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) was bringing order to Europe and establishing the modern state system, Estonia and Latvia remained in the clutches of Sweden. Lithuania, on the other hand, had attained considerable power and prestige, but now was locked in as junior partner in a Polish-Lithuanian union and was becoming heavily Polonized.

Stanley Page does as much when he argues that it is impossible for the Baltic states to be independent, given their strategic position. He believes their interwar freedom was essentially an historical accident. See: The Formation of the Baltic States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 184. Of course, an opposing argument (one advanced by those favoring Baltic secession) is that it is, instead, European instability that is harmful to Baltic independence. From this perspective, the Baltic states can remain sovereign if Europe itself remains stable.
Thus, all three Baltic states were dependent in some manner on another power for defense.

Through the centuries, the Balts have been pursued most aggressively by Russia and its successor, the Soviet Union. This was not for reasons of kinship. Although the three Baltic states had evolved along separate lines, they all had a European perspective, and there was no sense of identification between them and Russia or other Slavic nations of the empire. Rather, Russia was engaging in regional expansion for economic and strategic reasons, and it challenged the Baltic nations whether they were independent or under another power's domination. After the third partition of Poland, whereby Moscow finally took possession of the entire area, the only power that seriously attempted to contest its control was Germany, which did so in both world wars. The difficulties that German troops posed for the Soviet military on those two occasions only reinforced Moscow's conviction that possessing the Baltic area was crucial to Soviet national security.

In essence then, the Baltic legacy in international relations is one of small, weakly-defended states occupying an area viewed as strategically significant to aggressive major powers. Unable to cooperate effectively among themselves or with their neighbors to create a regional collective security arrangement, and unable to stand alone behind a shield of neutrality, they were often viewed as a
power vacuum needing to be filled. In a world of realpolitik, this had an adverse effect on European stability. Rather than contributing to feelings of confidence and security, this condition periodically fueled a mood of apprehension, particularly among the smaller states of Europe. The result might have been different, had the Baltic states been capable of defending themselves or had they convinced neighbors to respect their sovereignty. In that case, they might have functioned instead as an anchor for Europe.

These circumstances also have had balance of power implications, because each time the Baltic states changed hands, Europe's equilibrium also shifted. This was especially apparent when Russia took control of the area, and later when the Soviets annexed it again (as is discussed in Chapter III). Even the threat that the Baltic states might change hands could be troublesome. For example, on the eve of World War II, Great Britain and France both wanted the Baltic countries to remain independent and to participate in a regional collective security arrangement, yet they were ready to offer the Soviet Union a free hand in the area. They did so because they recognized that the neutral Baltic governments would be unable to resist military advances against them. They were particularly worried over how much the European balance of power would shift if Hitler was permitted to control the Baltic region. At the same time, Britain and France felt they could not grant their own Great Power guarantee of protection
to the Balts, first, because they were already overextended and so could not offer credible protection\textsuperscript{20} and, secondly, because they felt it was a \textit{regional} problem that could be exacerbated by their outside intrusion. It could upset an already shaky balance in the area. Therefore, they decided Soviet control was the best option for deterring German ambitions, and were preparing to make that happen when they were undercut by Ribbentrop's diplomatic coup--the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact.

\textsuperscript{20}Clearly, the optimum situation would have been an agreement among all the Great Powers that European security would be best served by a joint guarantee of Baltic independence. However, ineffective diplomacy on the part of all, plus aggressive intentions by Germany and the USSR, prevented that from occurring. It is likely that Britain and France understood that their guarantee of Poland already was unrealistic, and that they did not want to compound the problem with a non-credible guarantee of the Baltic states.
III. PRESENT: SECURITY ROLE IN POST-WORLD WAR II ERA

A. CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY

The Soviet Union took advantage of a breakdown in the international order during 1939-40 to annex the Baltic states. After the war, it added to these gains by extracting concessions from Finland and by holding onto captured East Prussia (renamed Kaliningrad oblast). Through these actions, the Soviet Union not only satisfied long-standing expansionist urges, but it also improved important facets of its national security. A review of some of these defense considerations will help explain how the three Baltic states have affected European security from 1945-1990.

1. Creating a "Soviet Lake"

Many military analysts contend that, in terms of political and military geography, possession of the three Baltic republics enabled Moscow to turn the Baltic Sea into a virtual Soviet lake in the post-World War II years. Of the seven littoral countries, two became NATO allies (Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany), two became neutral (Finland, Sweden), and three joined the Warsaw Pact (Soviet Union, 2

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Poland, German Democratic Republic). Clearly, unification of
the two Germanies and steady disintegration of the Warsaw Pact
during 1990 has altered this situation. However, for most of
the post-war era, over one-third of the sea coast has belonged
to the Soviet Union and its allies, and most of the remainder
has been neutral. The Soviet Red Banner Baltic Sea Fleet has
ruled over this "lake" without a strong NATO blue-water
challenge for most of this period.

2. Support for the Baltic Sea Fleet

Appendix A shows that Estonia and Latvia—Lithuania
to a much lesser degree—are valuable to the Soviet Navy.
Their ports and maintenance facilities furnish important
operational and logistical support. All told, 50 percent of
the Soviet Union's ship construction and repair yards is
situated on the Baltic Sea; many are found in Estonia and
Latvia. Such facilities are important not only for the
Baltic Fleet, but for Northern Fleet assets as well.

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22Unclassified literature is limited and sketchy, but a good
picture can be pieced together by studying: Norman Polmar, Guide
to the Soviet Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), Jan
Breemer, Soviet Submarines: Design, Development and Tactics (UK:
Jane's Defense Data, 1989), and Andris Trapans, Soviet Military
Power in the Baltic Area (Stockholm: Lettiska Nationella Fonden,
1986).

23Hans Garde, "Alliance Navies and the Threat in the Northern

24A canal connecting the Baltic and White Seas permits ships
and submarines displacing up to 5,200 tons to pass from the
Northern Fleet to Baltic yards. See: J.K. Davis and R.L.
Pfaltzgraff, Soviet Theater Strategy (Washington, DC: US Strategic
The Baltic Sea's low salinity and northern latitudes combine to create severe icing problems in many parts of the sea during winter months. Leningrad and its approaches are particularly susceptible. Therefore, the fact that most Estonian and Latvian ports are ice-free all year long is of strategic importance to Baltic Sea Fleet operations, and is a major reason why Stalin felt it important to reacquire the Baltic states.

Two additional benefits to the Baltic Sea Fleet should be noted. By being able to disperse its assets among many ports along the entire coast, the Soviet navy increases its survivability, and it alleviates crowded berthing conditions in Leningrad and Kaliningrad.

3. Protecting Sea Approaches to Leningrad

Possession of Estonia has been of particular importance to Soviet defense planners, because it forms an integral part of the approaches to Leningrad, which is the Soviet Union's second largest city, primary ship building and

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Milan Vego, an expert in Soviet naval operations, claims that ice halts navigation in the Gulf of Riga for 30-80 days per year, and he says it is not unusual for the entire Gulf of Bothnia to freeze over during severe winters. See: "The Baltic Naval Operations," Navy International 88, no. 2 (February 1983): 70.

Trapans, 16.
repair center, and an important center for defense research and development. Because of the unusual shape of the Baltic Sea and Gulf of Finland, Leningrad-based ships must transit a narrow waterway in order to reach open seas. If hostile forces control the adjacent coasts, these transiting ships can become highly vulnerable. When the Soviet Union lost control of southern Finland and the Baltic republics during World Wars I and II, the Baltic Fleet was forced to spend much of its time bottled up in port by ice and German mines. By reestablishing control over the Baltic republics in the 1940s, the Kremlin attempted to resolve this strategic dilemma.

4. Shield Against Air Attack

With the rise of air power and the concomitant compression of warning time, Soviet military strategists quickly recognized the importance of a Baltic air defense buffer to protect Leningrad, Moscow, and the Soviet heartland against enemy air attacks out of the west. Accordingly, they created an elaborate air defense network in the Baltic republics, consisting of early warning radars, coastal artillery sites, and surface-to-air missile complexes. Soviet fighter aircraft squadrons were also based in the three republics to provide additional protection for these vital air

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27 Breemer, chapters 2 and 3, provides an excellent account of this dilemma.

corridors. An unconditional loss of the Baltic republics, then, would require air defense assets to be moved back into Belorussia or Russia, and would further complicate the Soviets' indications and warning problem.

5. Clearly Defined Border

As Don Kerr of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London has observed, much of Russian history has been dedicated to establishing clearly defined borders.²⁹ Particularly in the west, Soviet terrain is open and flat, lacking any mountains or major rivers to act as clear-cut, natural boundaries. By possessing the Baltic republics, however, the Soviet Union has a geographical feature which conclusively delineates a portion of its western border--a sea shore. That the other side of this demarcation is a large body of water, rather than a potentially hostile foreign power, is an added benefit.

6. Buffer with Poland

Another analyst contends that, while Estonia and Latvia have been most important to the Soviet Union for their access to the sea, Lithuania's most significant contribution has been as a buffer against Polish nationalism.³⁰ The Soviet Union and Poland may have been allies since World War II, but


³⁰Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies (Archon Books, 1967), 104.
the two have a much longer history of mistrust and mutual aggression. Lithuania's location, therefore, offers some degree of insulation. Additionally, Moscow occasionally has been able to exploit historical Lithuanian-Polish tensions to further its interests in the region.31

7. Keeping Kaliningrad Contiguous

By possessing Lithuania, Moscow also prevents Kaliningrad from being cut-off and surrounded by two foreign powers (Lithuania and Poland). The province is of major naval importance, including as it does, the Baltic Fleet Headquarters, numerous ship repair and construction facilities, a Soviet Naval Infantry brigade, and a Spetsnaz brigade.32 Supply lines for these and other important military facilities and organizations run directly through Lithuania. Therefore, the loss of that republic would sever Kaliningrad from the rest of the Union and effectively make it an island. Because of national security implications this would have for the Soviet Union, special air and land access routes across

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31 For example, the day before Lithuania's declaration of independence, the Kremlin attempted to undercut the republic and foment unrest by broadcasting a television program emphasizing past territorial conflicts and past problems of ethnic Poles in Lithuania. See: Anatol Lieven, "Moscow Plays the Polish Card in Warning to Lithuania," The Times (London), 14 March 1990, 11.

Lithuania undoubtedly will be a major Soviet demand in any independence negotiations.

8. Springboard into Europe

In addition to supporting Soviet naval and air defense forces, the three republics are home to forces of the Baltic Military District (BMD)--one of 16 peacetime districts, and a component of the Soviet Western Theater. Reestablished in 1945, the BMD provides the Soviet High Command with second echelon forces for reinforcing the Warsaw Pact and protecting its flanks during any conflict in Europe.

Because BMD emphasis appears to be on "light" units, such as airborne assault and motorized rifle divisions, Western military analysts in the Cold War era generally have envisioned Baltic forces being used in an assault on the Danish Straits region, possibly including southern Sweden and southern Norway. Capturing Denmark would divide NATO's northern and central commands and, thus, contribute to a Warsaw Pact envelopment operation against Central Europe.

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35A third of all Soviet airborne divisions are stationed in the BMD. See: Trapans, 40.

Possession of the Baltic states, therefore, has provided the Soviet Union with a potential springboard into Europe in the event of conflict. In the words of one military analyst, "that's why they were taken over by Stalin in the first place." Troops and equipment prepositioned in the three states—from Western Europe's perspective—have allowed the Moscow a forward-leaning security posture. Further, their role in defending the Soviet Union's western boundary would be important in wartime, particularly if the Soviet Fleet proved unable to deny use of the Baltic Sea to enemy navies.

B. CONCLUSIONS

Rather than cultivate a buffer of "Finlandized" peripheral states after World War II, the Soviet Union opted instead to integrate the Baltic states thoroughly into its national security strategy. Eastern European allies accepted this, if for no other reason than because their foreign and military policies were directed, in large part, from Moscow. For Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, these circumstances brought relative stability, but at an unacceptable price—total loss of sovereignty and subjection to extreme cultural and demographic Russification. Not only did they end up playing

37 Peter Ludlow, as quoted by Minutaglio, 12.

38 The effects of this Russification process are discussed in considerable detail in Misiunas and Taagepera, and in Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Utopia in Power (New York: Summit Books, 1986).
reluctant host to the Soviet military, they also were forced to serve in that military under a policy of "extraterritoriality."³⁹

What has the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania meant for European security from the West's point of view? Sweden and Nazi Germany quickly moved to recognize the 1940 Soviet annexation of the Baltic states.⁴⁰ However, other Western countries rejected *de jure* recognition and many, including the United States, have continued to maintain relations with Baltic governments-in-exile.⁴¹

Even so, some observers contend that, as the Iron Curtain descended and the post-War international community settled into a tight East-West bipolarity, the West came to regard the Baltic republics as part of the Soviet Union on a *de facto* basis.⁴² British Prime Minister Thatcher has stated on several occasions...
occasions that she believes the 1975 Helsinki Final Act constituted de facto recognition of the incorporation.\textsuperscript{43} The United States disagrees with the British interpretation of the Accords, and has meticulously avoided actions over the years which might suggest acceptance of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states.\textsuperscript{44}

Nonetheless, even President Bush—who made repeated references to "captive nations" during his 1988 Presidential campaign—probably would agree that U.S. security planning and war fighting strategies have treated the occupied Baltic states as a Soviet military stronghold and, therefore, "hostile."\textsuperscript{45} As previously discussed, the Soviets have manned and equipped the region in such a manner as to be perceived as an invasion springboard, and this threat had to be countered.

Therefore, the occupied Baltic republics as "one of them" gradually evolved as a feature of the post-War, bipolar international order. Simply put, the West had to view the


\textsuperscript{45}An analogy would be the situation which exists in Kuwait at this writing. Though the international community sympathetically views that nation as occupied, it also believes the territory represents a threat to the region, because of the vast Iraqi arsenal deployed there.
Baltic region as hostile, even though it viewed the Balts themselves as captives. Although Western leaders wanted the Baltic Question to be resolved, they understood very well that righting the wrongs of 1940 could be done only by force. Therefore, they let the situation stand. This decision perhaps was made easier by their realization that the region was relatively stable (despite the fact that European security was based on a seemingly dangerous nuclear balance)—there were no vacuums that needed filling. Western hesitancy to offer significant assistance to the current Baltic secession movement may be traced, in part, to a reluctance to disturb that status quo.46

Before closing this chapter, one final issue should be raised. Although the Baltic states have been thoroughly subsumed within the Soviet national defense plan, the question that must be considered is whether this contribution is so great that the Kremlin cannot allow secession, simply on the grounds of national security. Only Moscow can say for sure, because this judgment requires a careful assessment, not only of security variables, but of the broader political, economic, and cultural considerations as well.

46John Van Oudenaren has noted a consistent, traditional timidity on the part of the West to take advantage of revolutionary opportunities to help Soviet allies break from the USSR's grasp. The same trend appears to apply to the Baltic states. See: Exploiting 'Fault Lines' in the Soviet Empire: An Overview (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1984), 15.
However, there are sound reasons for believing that the loss of the Baltic states could be manageable from a Soviet security point of view. First, it is worth noting that the most critical Baltic Fleet facilities are concentrated in Leningrad and Kaliningrad, neither of which is threatening secession. Military facilities in those two areas would remain intact, though it is recognized that operations in an isolated Kaliningrad would be more complicated than in the past.

Second, some would maintain that many of the Baltic bases have long lost their significance, partly because of technology improvements and partly because of a reduced threat from the West. According to this view, most, if not all, of the facilities could be pulled back to Belorussia--assuming it too does not secede--and still provide Moscow an acceptable level of security.

A third argument is that the Soviets themselves realize the Baltic Fleet is not as important as Stalin and his predecessors thought. A reevaluation that began under Khrushchev culminated in a strategic shift in favor of the Northern Fleet during the 1970s. As a result, there has been a steady decrease in the Baltic naval order of battle, both

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47See, for example: "The Empire Cannot Be Saved," Der Spiegel, 09 April 1990, 171-80, as cited in FBIS-SOV-90-069, 10 April 1990, 87-90.
in absolute terms and relative to other fleets.\textsuperscript{48} It remains far and away the Baltic Sea's dominant navy, and the necessity for such a force is now debatable--particularly in view of the virtual disappearance of a Warsaw Pact flank in need of protection, the significantly-reduced East-West tensions, and Moscow's stated intention to transition toward a strictly defensive posture.

A fourth reason why Moscow might find the loss of the Baltic states and their facilities a manageable proposition is that a pull-back of Soviet troops from their forward-leaning position in the Baltics might further enhance Western Europe's feelings of security. Having the mainstay of forward forces positioned defensively in the Ukraine and Belorussia would appear much less threatening than having them in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Thus, a Soviet pull-back could be touted as a confidence and security building measure and used as a bargaining chip for some type of concessions from the West.

A final reason derives from a balancing of benefits against liabilities. One reason the Soviet Union annexed the three states and made satellites of Eastern European countries

\textsuperscript{48}This decline is discussed by A.F. Nicholas in "The Fifty-Year Development of the Soviet Baltic Fleet," \textit{Armed Forces} 5, no. 3 (March 1986): 120-124. For a more in-depth statistical breakdown, see: John Kristen Skogan, \textit{The Evolution of the Four Soviet Fleets 1968-1987}, a presentation given at International Comparative Workshop on Soviet Seapower 06-10 June 1988 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs).
was to enhance Soviet security. It might be argued that President Gorbachev pulled out of Eastern Europe because the costs of maintaining Soviet hegemony in the area finally outweighed benefits. Similarly, costs are going up in the Baltic region in the form of nationalist unrest and rising anti-military sentiment. As a result, it is possible that the Baltic states could outgrow their usefulness. Granting independence not only would alleviate that problem, it might provide an opportunity to create the "Finlandized" buffer that Stalin allegedly set out to create in Eastern Europe following World War II.

A senior Soviet naval officer, recently reached many of these same conclusions. Valeriy Myasnikov believes that agreements to allow a continued military presence in the three republics can be reached. However, he also feels that the military could adapt without significant difficulty to even a worst-case scenario, in which all three secede unconditionally. In Myasnikov's estimation, the most troublesome problem in that case would be the adverse effects on air defense--this would degrade warning time and require an increase of 300-350 kilometers in the operational range of combat aircraft.

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IV. REACTIONS TO EVENTS IN LITHUANIA

When attempting to understand how the Baltic Question might affect future European security options, one should consider how the international community has reacted to Baltic secessionist activities in 1990. It is clear that these reactions cannot be taken as a predictor of final diplomatic positions—there are simply too many other fundamental changes occurring between the major powers which could dramatically affect resolution of the Baltic problem. Nonetheless, initial reactions often reflect basic biases, so it is reasonable to believe they provide a fair indication of what types of arrangements the international community might willingly accommodate. In short, the foundations for future security, economic, political, and cultural relations are being laid now.

At the outset of this discussion, it should be noted that the reactions being considered are largely in response to Lithuanian activities. Latvia and Estonia also have taken steps toward independence, but it was Lithuania that made the first and most radical moves. As a result, international attention was drawn to it first. Despite the Baltic states' differing historical circumstances and ethnic composition, a review of public

51In addition to historical and cultural differences, Russification has resulted in demographic dissimilarities. While ethnic Lithuanians comprise 80 percent of that republic's population, ethnic Estonians account for only 61 percent or theirs, and Latvians hold a bare 52 percent majority. As a result, the two northern republics believe they must move toward independence at
statements and available literature suggests that most observers tend to lump the three states together as a single entity. Further, there appears to be an underlying assumption that whatever concessions Lithuania wins, the others will too. Neither perception is necessarily true, but the fact remains that most commentary continues to focus on Lithuania. Consequently, as this chapter attempts to gauge the depth of international support for Baltic independence, it is, in fact, investigating official reactions to developments in Lithuania. The countries under consideration probably have the greatest influence over how the Baltic Question will be resolved: the Soviet Union, neighboring Poland, the United States, three major Western European countries (Great Britain, France, and Germany), and four Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark).

A. SOVIET RESISTANCE

In the opening months of 1990, Moscow demonstrated--through the actions of its top leaders--that the right of secession guaranteed in the Soviet constitution is a vacuous promise, and that the central government opposes independence for Lithuania or any other republic. During his January 1990 visit to Vilnius, President Gorbachev hinted that the republic would be allowed to secede if it was patient and compensated Moscow for past Soviet a slower pace to ensure they retain public support.
investments in the area.\textsuperscript{52} Given subsequent developments, however, it is likely that the offer was meant to defuse the existing tension and buy time, in the hopes that legislation could be enacted later which would carry the weight of law, offer hope, and yet make secession virtually impossible.

Clearly, Moscow underestimated Lithuania's resolve, for rather than deterring the republic, Gorbachev's offer raised hopes and expectations. The Kremlin's next step was to propose a fee of staggering proportions.\textsuperscript{53} Again, Lithuania showed no hesitation and pressed ahead, ultimately declaring independence on 11 March 1990.

Speaking for the Soviet government, President Gorbachev immediately denounced the declaration as "illegitimate and invalid."\textsuperscript{54} Subsequently, the central government did its utmost to isolate Lithuania, prevent coordinated Baltic efforts, and avoid negotiations. Westerners are well-acquainted with the Kremlin's use of military troops in Vilnius, the eviction of foreign journalists and diplomats from Lithuania, and the subsequent economic blockade. Perhaps less well known is the fact that the central media was directed to wage a misinformation campaign, which analyst Vera Tolz finds to be "unprecedented in the era of glasnost\textsuperscript{55}"


\textsuperscript{53}Economist Lawrence Summers calculates the $33 billion demanded by Gorbachev to be approximately 50 times the annual income of Lithuanian workers. He also contends the investments are worth only one-tenth of Moscow's asking price. See: "Gorbachev Should Pay Lithuania," \textit{New York Times}, 14 March 1990, A19.

and can only be compared with Soviet media coverage of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.\footnote{Vera Tolz, "Central Media Wage Propaganda Campaign Against Lithuania," \textit{Report on the USSR} 2, no. 15 (13 April 1990): 1.} A review of Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) translations confirms her observation that newspapers, letters to editors, radio roundtable discussions, and television programs were overwhelmingly one-sided, anti-Lithuanian, and frequently distorted foreign commentary.

Another indication that the Soviet Union does not support the right of secession came in April, when the Supreme Soviet passed a law outlining the process to be followed. The requirements set down by this law proved so strenuous, that critics quickly and accurately dubbed it the law \textit{against} secession.\footnote{For example, see: Paul Goble, "Gorbachev, Secession and the Fate of Reform," \textit{Report on the USSR} 2, no. 17 (27 April 1990): 1, and Ann Sheehy, "Supreme Soviet Adopts Law on Mechanics of Secession," \textit{Report on the USSR} 2, no. 17 (27 April 1990): 2-5.} Other signs of opposition have emanated from the Soviet military, where senior officers frequently have called for Gorbachev to use his Presidential powers to crack down on secessionists. Additionally, retired officers helped create \textit{Interfront} and \textit{Vedinstvo} to organize resistance among Russians and active duty military officers living in the three republics.\footnote{Anatol Lieven, "Baltic Deserters Hit at Root of Soviet Empire," \textit{Times} (London), 23 March 1990, 8.}

Moscow's goal is to keep its Union intact, even though this appears to run counter to popular sentiment—as of this writing,
Kazakhstan is the only one of the Soviet Union's 15 republics that has not made official moves toward increased autonomy or independence. The central government hopes to achieve its goal by drafting a new Union Treaty which will seduce republics into remaining in a "new and improved" Soviet Union. This strategy can be expected to continue until either the political or economic costs become too great, the Baltics and other radical republics give up, or the Soviets fall victim to the total disintegration that former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski foresees.\(^5\)

B. ACCEPTING POLES

Poland's reactions are also important to consider because of that country's historical connections with Lithuania, a shared border, and the Polish-Baltic frictions of the inter-war years. To date, these reactions have been highly favorable. An April 1990 opinion poll demonstrated the "public's almost unanimous acceptance of Lithuania's right to be independent," and found that 43 percent believed independence should be both immediate and unconditiona\(^1\).\(^5\)

The same poll reported that 83 percent believed Lithuania would be a friendly neighbor.

Many political parties and groups also have indicated their

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support, and Solidarity leader Lech Walesa has been particularly sympathetic to the Baltic cause. He has been very critical of Soviet policies toward Lithuania, saying they are undermining "the process aimed at establishing a new order in Europe." The government is more circumspect, but it too supports Lithuanian self-determination and independence. Without mentioning the Soviet Union by name, one of its first official statements carefully noted that Poles want good relations with all of their neighbors. That has remained the official Polish position.

In addition to political issues, it is important to address ethnic and territorial issues when considering relations between Poland and Lithuania, particularly in view of the mistrust of the 1920-30s. Ethnic Poles comprise seven percent (260,000) of Lithuania's 3.7 million people, and in the years since World War II, the Polish government occasionally has expressed concern over their treatment. However, a number of bilateral initiatives designed to ensure the rights of Poles in Lithuania and Lithuanians in Poland have been signed in the past two years, and seem to have resolved most concerns. Warsaw has not expressed any significant anxiety regarding the ethnic Polish community since Lithuania's declaration of independence.


Similarly, there is no sign that territorial issues will pose problems between Warsaw and Vilnius. More than a third of Lithuania's Poles live in the Lithuanian capital (18 percent of the city's population), which lies in an area claimed by Poland in the 1920-30s. However, a Polish delegation, which traveled to Lithuania immediately following the declaration of independence, issued a statement that Poland sees the border between the two countries "to be as permanent as the Oder-Neisse border," a line that now appears secure.

C. RELUCTANT AMERICANS, BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMANS

Upon hearing Lithuania's 11 March 1990 announcement, the United States immediately assumed a cautious position. President Bush urged peaceful dialogue, reiterated America's traditional non-recognition of the Soviet annexation of the Baltics, and avoided actions or statements which could precipitate a crisis or exacerbate Mikhail Gorbachev's domestic predicament. On occasions when the President did issue warnings to the Soviets, he generally included statements to the effect that it is in America's strategic interests to avoid jeopardizing arms control talks, trade negotiations, and gains in Eastern Europe.

This restrained White House position was arguably the

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63 Girnius and Sabbat-Swidlicka, 41.


international community's most significant, because it appeared to set the tone for other countries. Had the United States strongly endorsed Lithuania's declaration or extended diplomatic recognition, it is reasonable to expect that many other countries would have followed suit. An examination of articles in *The Times*, *The Guardian*, *The Economist*, *Reuters*, and *FBIS* soon after Lithuania's declaration reveals that Western European leaders and journalists tended to cite facts and analyze the situation in terms of American and Soviet reactions, with little or no comment on their own positions.

When West European leaders did take public stands, they closely paralleled the U.S. position. Great Britain's official policy urged dialogue, warned against the use of force, and alerted Soviets and Lithuanians alike to its concern for peace and stability. The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs warned Britons against raising Baltic expectations, but also cautioned the Kremlin not to trick the Baltic states "into a cul-de-sac" (referring to the new secession law) which could increase frustration and promote violence. When Prime Minister Prunskiene visited London in May, Prime Minister Thatcher pleaded for Lithuanian moderation and compromise in order to preserve East-West gains being brought about by President Gorbachev.

France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) also

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maintained a low profile on the Lithuanian issue, presumably because they did not want to jeopardize the ongoing political and economic restructuring of Europe. As Marshall Ingwerson has observed, "the Germans are consumed with working out reunification", and "France has been pushing for rapid European integration."68

Despite their low-key approach, France and the FRG became the first West European countries to make a high-level, diplomatic move to resolve the Soviet-Lithuanian impasse. In late April 1990, they jointly called upon Lithuania to suspend temporarily its declaration and make other concessions.69 This proposal was designed to be a face-saving way for Lithuania and the Soviet Union to come to the bargaining table, and both sides did greet it favorably. However, neither France nor the FRG followed through with a public diplomatic offensive, and France immediately ruled out acting as mediator.70 As a result, the initiative achieved no tangible results except to remind Moscow of the West's continuing interest in the matter.

The generally cautious and vague stand adopted by the major Western powers should not be taken as being anti-Baltic


69Hella Pick claims that this initiative, which excluded Great Britain, was actually orchestrated by President Bush to defuse domestic calls for sanctions. See: "US arranged Lithuania Peace Initiative," The Guardian (Manchester), 30 April 1990, 1.

independence. Rather, it reflects their wider interests and different priorities. The United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany look forward to welcoming sovereign Baltic countries into the European order and to expanding political and economic ties with them. However, none is willing to jeopardize broader agendas to help the Baltic states achieve independence. For Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, this reaction is strikingly reminiscent of the response they received when facing Soviet and German aggression in the 1930-40s.

D. "NORDEN" SUPPORT

In contrast to the generally guarded reactions emanating from the United States, Britain, France, and Germany, energetic debates and expressions of support have occurred in the "well-defined regional subdivision of the European subcontinent" that Scandinavians call "Norden"--the five states of Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. These countries are also among the most active in attempting to increase contacts at all levels with the Baltic republics. Further, it is primarily to these states that Baltic leaders have traveled with appeals for assistance. As is discussed in Chapter V, this Norden support has distinct

71 Vincent H. Malmstrom discusses in detail the manner in which history and culture link the people of these five nations in: Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and Progress (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965).
implications for the future and is the reason why this thesis is treating reactions of these countries as a separate group.\textsuperscript{72}

1. Finland

The Finns not only have historical links to the Baltic republics, they have dramatically increased trade, cultural and political contacts since 1988.\textsuperscript{73} However, because Finland must always be careful not to upset its delicate "special relationship" with the Soviet Union, its reactions to Baltic secessionist activities have been perhaps the most restrained of the Nordic group. Premier Holkeri's immediately announced that Finland would state its position on Lithuania's declaration only after Moscow and Vilnius reached agreement on the matter.\textsuperscript{74} Since then, he and Foreign Minister Paasio have emphasized Finland's traditional political moderation whenever defending their subdued support for the Baltics.

In general, Finland's reactions demonstrate that it perceives developments in the three republics as affecting all states in the region. In so doing, it is treating them almost as though they are part of the "Nordic Balance" which has guided

\textsuperscript{72}Reactions of the Baltic states' closest neighbors--Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark are examined here. The sentiments of the fifth Nordic nation, Iceland, are also supportive.

\textsuperscript{73}Sole Lahtinen, "Finland's Vice Consulate Waiting for Space," \textit{Helsingin Sanomat}, 18 December 1989, 26, as cited in JPRS-UIA-90-003L, 05 March 1990, 3.

\textsuperscript{74}Holkeri Comments on Recognition of Lithuania,: \textit{Helsinki International Service}, 12 March 1990, as cited in FBIS-WEU-90-049, 13 March 1990, 25.
Scandinavian policies and actions for decades.\textsuperscript{75} Therefore, it urges caution, stability, and settlement of the matter in accordance with guidelines of the 1975 Helsinki Accords (i.e., borders will be redrawn only by peacefully negotiated agreement between sides to any dispute).

2. Sweden

Like Finland, Sweden has historical connections to the Baltic region, and it too has increased significantly its cultural and political contacts with the three republics since 1988. This has occurred quietly, however, because as French analyst Alain Debove has observed, Sweden, like Finland, wants to avoid a crisis with Moscow and not have its neutrality questioned.\textsuperscript{76}

Sweden is sensitive to the fact that it was the only Western country (May 1941) to recognize the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states\textsuperscript{77}, and so traditionally has been discreet in its public statements on the region. The government quickly welcomed Lithuania's declaration, but added that there could be no


\textsuperscript{76}Alain Debove, "Retrouvailles autour de la Baltique," \textit{Le Monde}, 05 January 1990, 5.

\textsuperscript{77}Nazi Germany became caught up in its invasion of the Soviet Union and never did formally recognize the annexation.
official recognition until that state gains effective control over its territory.\textsuperscript{76} Despite minor personal frictions between Swedish Foreign Minister Andersson and Lithuanian President Landsbergis,\textsuperscript{79} the Swedish government has pledged Sweden's whole-hearted economic, political and diplomatic support to solve the Baltic problem according to Helsinki principles. Additionally, there have been numerous rallies and media editorials in support of Lithuania, as well as calls by opposition conservative and liberal parties to give more active support.

3. Norway

The Norwegian government immediately welcomed Lithuania's declaration, and then began to follow the type of low-key, non-recognition strategy taken by most of the international community. This initial passive approach brought Foreign Minister Bondevik under heavy fire from many politicians who felt that, because the Baltic people feel closely tied to the Nordic states, Norway has an obligation to become the "initiator" in this process.\textsuperscript{80}


\textsuperscript{79}Foreign Minister Andersson initially drew the ire of President Landsbergis (as well as many Swedes), when he described Soviet actions in Lithuania as both "reasonable" and "more responsible" than the U.S. invasion of Panama. See: "Sweden Supports Soviet Actions in Lithuania," Reuter Library Report, 27 March 1990.

\textsuperscript{80}Geir Salvesen, "Bondevik Criticized for Lithuania," Aftenposten, 22 March 1990, 6, as cited in FBIS-WEU-90-071, 12 April 1990, 44.
Though the government generally has followed the international community's lead, it has tended to be more bluntly outspoken. For example, the Foreign Minister summoned the Soviet Ambassador in March to warn against any use of force and received assurances none would be used. When Soviet forces employed ruthless force the next day to arrest deserters and seize Communist Party buildings in Vilnius, the Norwegian government issued a statement saying "the brutal actions now carried out by the Soviet military are a shocking and unwise step." The statement, which sounds mild, was actually a scathing diplomatic indictment, particularly when compared to the reactions of other governments to the same incident: White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater viewed the matter "with deep concern;" Prime Minister Thatcher declared that "force is not an appropriate way to settle the problem;" President Mitterrand said "our role is not to pour oil on the fire;" and Foreign Minister Andersson of Sweden claimed the Soviets were "acting responsibly."

Additionally, Norway was the only country to offer to sell oil to Lithuania during the Kremlin's economic blockade. To be sure, this offer was less than effusive and included no grants or other promises. The government merely authorized Lithuania to

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buy oil at whatever prices Norwegian oil companies were willing to sell. Nonetheless, it was a public declaration of support and a bold step in a sea of international diplomatic hesitation.

4. Denmark

Denmark, like Sweden and Finland, has increased its connections with the Baltic republics in recent years. A month prior to Lithuania's declaration of independence, Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen came under pressure from many groups to become even more active in promoting the Baltic cause. Though he held out against any increase in diplomatic contacts, he agreed it was time to offer the three republics a share in Danish aid to Eastern Europe.

Both he and Prime Minister Schluter applauded Lithuania's declaration of independence and urged Moscow to avoid threats and pressure tactics, but they again rejected calls to establish embassies or make "empty and ineffectual gestures." Even prior to the Soviet crackdown on Lithuanian deserters, however, the intensity of the government's comments began to rise to Norwegian levels. Calling for international condemnation, Prime Minister Schluter described Soviet pressures as "completely improper and

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He claimed that, small as Denmark is, someone had to take the initiative.

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V. ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE

To date, there has been very little academic debate over the impact of the reemerging Baltic Question on long-term European security. Further, no government has stepped forward to propose publicly a comprehensive plan for fitting the Baltic states into a future European security order. There are several reasons for this lack of debate, one of which is that human nature is inclined to be reactive rather than proactive. Undoubtedly, there are those who believe that, since the Baltic republics are not yet independent--and may not be for the foreseeable future--this is a bridge that does not yet need crossing. Secondly, international attention has been fixed on other issues. Dramatic developments in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Germany, and Kuwait all have overshadowed peaceful Baltic efforts.

A third reason is that many observers do not recognize the uniqueness of the Baltic situation, and tend to blur developments there into the larger debate over ethnic problems in the Soviet Union. Finally, Western governments are not openly proposing security arrangements that involve the three republics, because they are reluctant to push President Gorbachev too hard. They fear this could jeopardize other gains, make the Kremlin stiffen its more accommodating foreign
policy, or even contribute to an uncontrolled collapse of the entire Soviet system.

Europe stands at a crossroads, and it is impossible at this point to forecast what form the next security arrangement will take. Designing an entirely new, pan-European security arrangement based on the European Community (EC), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or some other plan is a long-term proposition and merits an entirely separate study, and is, therefore, beyond the scope of this paper. However, the Baltic Question has the potential to force its way to the top of the agenda in the very near term, so it is crucial, nonetheless, to begin discussing the proper role for the Baltic states. Their ultimate status must be carefully crafted and satisfy the basic needs of all parties, if the Baltic Question is to be truly resolved.

Accordingly, this chapter investigates alternative futures that fall generally within existing frameworks, and attempts to assess the impact of each on European security. With that in mind, the discussion focuses first on a case in which

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Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania do not break away from the Soviet Union. Next, the analysis concentrates on options which feature independent Baltic countries. In broad terms, the latter alternatives are non-alignment, neutrality, or alignment.

A. REMAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION

Gorbachev clearly is dragging his feet on the Baltic issue, hoping to create a new Union Treaty attractive enough that the three republics will remain voluntarily. However, Baltic leaders appear more determined than any other republic to carry through with independence, and have refused to participate in Union Treaty talks. In the unlikely event that they offer to remain in the Soviet Union, the effect for European security will be essentially status quo--there will be no power vacuum, and the Soviet Union will continue to dominate the Baltic Sea.

However, what might happen if the Baltic states continue to demand total sovereignty and the Kremlin refuses to let go also should be considered. Their movement has been unfailingly peaceful thus far, but Moscow must be extremely anxious as it considers current trends. At some point (perhaps already), the Baltic states will cease to be an asset and become, instead, a liability for the Kremlin.

This is a valid concern, for the Baltic states have never been an entirely reliable corner of the empire. The Soviet
annexation of the Baltics in 1940 immediately encountered both active and passive resistance. Partisan groups, known as "Forest Brothers," were very energetic in all three republics during the immediate post-war years, with Lithuanians conducting a guerrilla war that was not suppressed until 1952.89 Political dissent has continued in the years since then, practically without interruption.90

Moscow attempted to overcome this opposition and to integrate the three newly-won republics into the Soviet defense forces. An experiment allowing ethnic groups to serve in national or territorial military formations proved unmanageable and was discontinued by 1956.91 At that time, the Kremlin implemented a policy of "extraterritoriality," whereby soldiers are stationed in ethnically heterogeneous units in Military Districts far from their home regions.92 However, this policy has been very unpopular and drew so much

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90 Statistics compiled by David Kowalewski show that Lithuanians, with approximately one percent of the USSR's population, staged 10.3 percent of all Soviet demonstrations from 1965-78. See: V. Stanley Vardys, "Lithuania's Catholic Movement Reappraised," Survey 25, no. 3 (Summer 1980): 49.

91 Trapans, 28-30.

92 Alexiev and Wimbush, 11-14.
resistance in 1989, that the Defense Ministry finally succumbed to Baltic pressure, and now allows 25 percent of non-Russian conscripts to serve in their home district (the BMD). This "25 percent rule" was subsequently extended to include other non-Russian republics. 93

However, even this concession has not slowed escalating anti-military and anti-Moscow feelings. All three republics have passed laws providing for "alternative service," and are tolerating (if not encouraging) draft evasion movements like "Geneva-49." 94 Further, Estonia voted in April to end all military service in that republic, and Lithuania passed a law in July creating a parallel, domestic draft. 95

This does not mean the area will become chaotic if the Kremlin thwarts Baltic secessionist efforts. Balts are, by and large, very peaceful, and they appear to have drawn lessons of non-violence from their post-war guerrilla


94 This group is named for the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which states that citizens of occupied countries may not be forced to serve in their occupier's army. Organized in October 1989, it claimed in April 1990 to have registered more than 3,500 deserters and draft evaders. See: Esther B. Fein, "Estonian Legislators Defy Moscow by Voting to End Military Service," New York Times, 13 April 1990, A1.

experience. In fact, the only significant physical violence to date has been committed by the Soviet army and anti-independence minority groups. However, other forms of dissent undoubtedly will continue to gain momentum and will be coordinated to a greater degree than ever. Thus, the Baltic republics will be a growing thorn in the side of the Kremlin and will make "occupying" Soviet military forces feel increasingly uncomfortable and anxious. Reports that nuclear warheads are being pulled out of the area suggest that Moscow takes the potential for crisis seriously. Further, turmoil cannot be ruled out, particularly if Moscow believes its interests are served by allowing the KGB of the Soviet army to inflame tensions or provoke incidents. This would have an immediate and negative impact on the security environment in Europe.

With or without violence, then, the Baltic area may be seen as an increasingly destabilizing influence on European security if the three republics are forced to remain in the Union against their will. Repressing the Baltic Question will no longer work; it must be brought into the open and resolved

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to the satisfaction of all three states. Additionally, any solution must be acceptable to Moscow, for Europe can never be completely secure as long as the Soviet Union feels insecure. In the end, settling the Baltic Question will depend upon a delicate balancing of complex economic, political, cultural, and security factors in each of the three states, the Soviet Union, and their neighbors.

Having considered the implications of the Baltics remaining "captive nations," it is time to consider how independent Baltic countries might fit into the European order. Again, the alternative futures fall under the general headings of non-alignment, neutrality, and alignment.

B. NON-ALIGNMENT

"Non-alignment," a term coined by Prime Minister Nehru in 1954, was gradually fashioned by Egypt, India and Yugoslavia into a movement embracing a political, military, and economics position equidistant between the two superpowers. According to J. W. Burton, non-alignment was meant to be a third alternative, whereby nations could refuse peacetime alignment, be "non-neutral," and "participate actively in world affairs including certain aspects of the main [East-West] rivalry." 

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98 J.W. Burton, International Relations: A General Theory (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 165. Chapters 9, 16, 18, and 19 offer a good explanation of the theory and evolution of
Countries which participate in the non-aligned movement reject the bi-polar, East-West international order, and feel little sympathy with traditional Western notions of war prevention, alliances, and balance of power. Burton notes that non-aligned states participate in world councils to pass judgment and promote change, which distinguishes them from neutrals, who traditionally are somewhat more passive. In other words, they attempt to stand outside of the East-West confrontation, while working to influence the behavior and policies of the major powers.

Most non-aligned states are located in Africa and Asia, and they often have strong feelings of nationalism and anti-colonialism. Typically, they are economically and politically underdeveloped, militarily weak, and relatively new to the international system. Additionally, many of them have used non-alignment as a Cold War bargaining tool to obtain badly-needed economic and technical assistance from non-alignment.


100 That Sweden has been quite vocal on some issues, such as its criticism in the 1970s of U.S. actions in Vietnam, may be explained, in part, by noting that its foreign policy calls for "non-alignment in peace aiming at neutrality in war." Nils Andren, Power-Balance and Non-Alignment (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1967), 191.

101 Burton, 186-194.
both the East and West.\textsuperscript{102} This could occur because, whereas major powers want (and expect) neutrals to remain outside of military conflicts, they view non-aligned nations as "fair game" to be enticed into one of the two opposing camps.\textsuperscript{103}

A non-aligned status is possible for independent Baltic states, but this thesis considers it highly unlikely, and no Baltic leader has suggested it as an option. The model is essentially a non-European one, yet the Baltic states identify strongly with Europe in general and Norden in particular. Further, the Baltic governments do not necessarily reject the international order as it has existed for decades--they simply want to change their place in it.

However, the best case against non-alignment as an alternative is that, arguably, it is becoming an irrelevant concept. As the East-West confrontation recedes into history, there is (by definition) no longer an equidistant position to occupy. Some features of non-alignment--such as the flexibility and freedom from entangling political and military alliances--may remain attractive to many countries, but probably not to the Baltic states. History has shown that for them to survive as independent nations, they will require either an effective alliance system, or strong guarantees from


\textsuperscript{103} Burton notes (p. 220) that non-aligned countries would be obliged in any war to declare themselves as either neutral or at war.
major powers or the international community. Therefore, rather than seek a non-aligned status, it is more probable that independent Baltic states will opt for neutrality or alignment.

C. NEUTRALITY

Neutrality, a second alternative for independent Baltic states, differs from non-alignment, though the two are often thought to mean the same thing. Unlike non-alignment, which is a status presently claimed by a majority of the world's nations, neutrality is unattractive to all but a few. This probably stems from the fact that neutrality offers less flexibility, for it involves certain legal rights and obligations, which are to be observed both by neutrals and belligerents.

There are other differences as well. In the words of Curt Gasteyger, "neutrality has its basis in international law and deep roots of European history; nonalignment has its origins in international politics as it was shaped by the East-West conflict and the process of decolonization since 1945." As previously mentioned, he also contends that they differ in their view of the existing international order; the former rejects it and demands a new structure, whereas the latter is generally more willing to work within it. Another scholar

104 Gasteyger, 140.
points out that neutrals must abstain from all armed conflicts, whereas non-aligned countries feel compelled to refrain only from conflicts involving the Cold War. 105

Although neutrality is based in international law and has been an accepted status for centuries, interpretations of exactly what it entails differ widely, even among established neutral countries. However, there are some fundamentals which appear common to most descriptions. Before discussing these, one explanation is in order. This thesis will use the terms "neutrality" and "neutralization" interchangeably though, technically, there is a difference. Neutrality applies to non-belligerency during armed hostilities, whereas neutralization (sometimes called "permanent neutrality") refers to conduct during peacetime as well. 106 However, few observers make the effort to distinguish between the two, and most accounts and public discussion use the term "neutrality," when they actually mean "permanent neutrality" (neutralization).

Most descriptions of neutrality appear to agree that its purpose is "to preserve peace by means of special agreements regarding states that are subjects of international 105


That is, a state being fought over and those contesting it agree to a set of reciprocal obligations and restrictions, with the expectation that this will remove that country a source of conflict. This, in turn, will contribute to international peace. Such an arrangement can be accomplished through a negotiated agreement among great powers. When it does, it often takes the form of a written treaty, which either pledges compliance or offers guarantees to assist the neutral state in preserving its status. Neutralization can also be the result of a unilateral declaration, made with the hope that other states will recognize and honor this self-imposed commitment.

The rights and responsibilities associated with neutrality are outlined in a variety of documents, including the 1907 Hague Convention. This is the aspect of neutrality which is subjected to the greatest range of interpretation by the international community. For their part, neutrals may not use their armed forces for any purpose other than self-defense. Further, they are enjoined from aiding any belligerent by supplying arms or money, or by allowing their territory to be used for training, basing, recruiting, or

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foreign troop transportation. When perpetually neutral, states must extend their impartiality to peacetime as well, avoiding any ties which might circumscribe their freedom of action or undermine their commitment to wartime neutrality. They must not enter into military alliances and, depending upon one's interpretation, may be precluded from joining certain regional or global organizations. For example, neutral states must not be party to collective security arrangements or any treaties of guarantee, and should avoid economic unions if such associations might jeopardize their freedom of political choice.

In return, belligerents are expected to respect the neutral's impartiality, and to refrain from violating its territory or interfering with its commerce. Additionally, they must not support activities by domestic revolutionaries against the neutral's government. Guarantors, if there are any, commit themselves to come to the aid of the neutral if its status is violated. History has demonstrated that the existence of one or more guarantors is no assurance that help will be forthcoming as promised, but it does raise the potential cost and may give aggressors pause when calculating benefits to be derived by violating a state's neutral status.

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It is clear that the success of a nation's neutrality depends to a great extent upon balance of power interests among major powers and guarantors, rather than upon the formal mechanism itself. However, other factors also contribute to the effectiveness or survivability of a nation as a neutral. For example, Bissell and Gasteyger argue that physical size, geography, population, cultural stability, and scale of economy are all important (though not determining) factors.\textsuperscript{110} Further, the neutral nation's ability to present a credible defense will, in some cases, enhance its survivability. In others, however, a less threatening military posture may be more appropriate.

In her study of five nations who successfully maintained neutrality in World War II, Annette Baker Fox reached several additional conclusions. Among them, she found the chances for survival as a small neutral increased when: the small state was farther from a direct line between belligerents; the aggressor felt a moral inhibition to the use of force; there were massive physical barriers; the small state had been independent for a long time; and when there were a greater number of neutrals.\textsuperscript{111}

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The point is, though arrangements among major powers may carry the greatest weight with respect to the viability of a state's neutrality, there are other influencing factors as well. Therefore, it would be valuable to consider the circumstances of Europe's present neutrals, to determine whether any of them might function as a model for independent Baltic states.

1. Armed Neutrals

a. Switzerland

Switzerland's self-ascribed neutrality not only has a legal basis, it has withstood the test of time—it can be traced to Middle Ages, and received formal international recognition at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.\(^\text{112}\) Switzerland's geographical location is an important factor in its ability to remain neutral. Warring powers (including both sides in World Wars I and II) have often found it to their advantage to have a stable, neutral buffer state in center of Europe.\(^\text{113}\) As such, it has served as a constant that could be planned around during periods of conflict or chaos.


\(^\text{113}\)This is not to say that Great Powers have not considered violating Switzerland's neutrality from time to time (e.g., the "Schlieffen Plan" in 1914 and "Operation Tannenbaum" in 1940.). This is why other factors, such as topography, population, cultural stability, and military strength are also important for neutral's survival.

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Another important factor is that, as an armed neutral, Switzerland is quite capable of defending its borders and neutral status. Its mountainous terrain favors defense and contributes to its lack of appeal to potential invaders. Further, though it has no expansionist tendencies, neither is it pacifistic. The Swiss are traditionally one of the most military-oriented societies in Europe, and effective participation in the militia remains an important factor in an individual's ability to get ahead in civilian life.\textsuperscript{114} As a result of this popular commitment and a strong economy, the Swiss have been able to maintain a defensive posture which is highly regarded both internationally and domestically. This has an important deterrence value.

In short, Swiss neutrality has become a fixed feature in European diplomacy. It is well-accepted by the international community at large and, more importantly, by the major powers. It is a credible, stabilizing influence that is grounded in international law.

It would be difficult to translate the Swiss experience to the Baltic situation, however. Switzerland's location, terrain, economy, and population all work to its advantage. In contrast, the three Baltic states do not have a long history of neutrality, and they occupy desirable

territory that lies directly on the traditional invasion route between Europe and the Soviet Union. Further, their flat topography makes self-defense extremely difficult, and it is doubtful that they have the funds, population, or inclination to sustain large militaries. Therefore, Switzerland is considered an ideal type, but an inappropriate model for the Baltic states.

b. Sweden

Sweden is also a self-ascribed, armed neutral, but it has no international guarantee. The country has avoided war since 1814, and has claimed a policy of neutrality for over 100 years.\textsuperscript{115} Like other Scandinavian countries, it is extremely sensitive to maintaining the Nordic Balance described earlier, and is considered by many to be its fulcrum—Finland on one side and Norway–Denmark on the other.\textsuperscript{116} Accordingly, its government strives to follow an even-handed foreign policy and works to prevent any regional instabilities which might invite action or interference by outside powers.

There exists, within Sweden, a broad public consensus for a non-provocative, yet total (military, civil,


economic, and psychological) defense, which is similar in many regards to that in Switzerland. Its defense-industrial complex is largely self-sufficient. Further, Sweden sees its military as being important not only for domestic security, but also as playing a strategic role in preserving the Nordic Balance—it provides a very credible defense capability, that guards against any perception of a power vacuum. Sweden's status as a neutral is enhanced somewhat by its location, positioned as it is below Norway's north cape and away from a line between the Soviet Union and Europe.

Sweden's lack of an international guarantee, its emphasis on military prowess and defensive self-sufficiency, and its geographic location off the main threat axis all suggest that it, too, is inapplicable as a model for the Baltic states. Further, its size and population characteristics are much more favorable for maintaining neutrality than is true in the Baltic case. Sweden is nearly triple the combined area of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and its homogeneous population is 8.4 million strong. The Baltic states must add their populations together to come up with a total of 8 million, and the results are far from homogeneous. To begin, the three states are ethnically different. Beyond that, matters have been made even worse by

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the Soviet policies discussed earlier. Those Russification programs have left each republic with large numbers of other ethnic groups in their midst: non-natives make up 20 percent of Lithuania's population, 39 percent of Estonia's, and an overwhelming 48 percent of Latvia's. Because some of these minorities are quite hostile to the idea of secession, the Baltic house stands divided and, therefore, loses the potential deterrence value which a strongly homogeneous state enjoys.

The feature of the Swedish model which is most applicable to the Baltic case is the aspect of a Nordic community of interest. This could apply directly to the Baltic situation, for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania identify strongly with the Norden. A neutral status for the Balts would mesh well with the principles of the Nordic Balance.

2. "Restricted" Neutrals

a. Austria

Switzerland's neighbor, Austria, is a relative newcomer to the ranks of neutral countries. Its status is a product of the East-West confrontation of the Cold War, even

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The term "restricted" is used here only to distinguish Austria and Finland, whose military capabilities are limited by international agreement, from the unrestricted, heavily-armed neutrality of Switzerland and Sweden.
though accomplished by a unilateral legislative act. Austria's neutrality is not guaranteed by outside signatory powers, but it is recognized and has proved quite stable since 1955. This has happened, in large part, because it has been in the interest of the opposing bipolar blocs. Neutrality was seen by both the East and West as way of denying each other control over Austria after the war, and that perception has continued through the present.

Austria does not practice ideological, economic or political "neutralism" (as Switzerland often does), but it does intend to remain nonpartisan in any future military conflicts. Domestically, it employs a strategic concept of area defense, which is designed to deter outside aggression by making incursions too costly to be worthwhile. However, restrictions on its military that were written into the 1955 treaty reduce Austria's deterrence credibility, compared to that of Switzerland or Sweden.

Like the two models just examined, it appears that Austrian neutrality would not lend itself well to the Baltic situation. Austria became neutral as part of an East-West

119 Its neutrality was not embodied in the May 1955 State Treaty, as is sometimes assumed. Rather, it was set forth in an October 1955 law as a quid pro quo for Soviet acceptance of the treaty. See: Richard A. Bitzinger, Neutrality for Eastern Europe? An Examination of Possible Western Models (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1990), 7-10.

zero-sum game—it was a way of avoiding a strategic gain or loss by either side. The Baltic states already are "members" of one side. Additionally, Austria has been able to maintain its status without a guarantee, largely because of special bipolar circumstances and an ability to establish itself as a bridge between East and West. History has demonstrated that the Baltic states cannot survive without an international guarantee (sometimes, even with one) or the backing of a major power. Unfortunately, the country in the best position to offer moral and physical support—the Soviet Union—is the very one that is oppressing them. One feature that may apply to the Baltic states is that of having military restrictions (e.g., a ban on weapons over a certain range) placed upon them. Such conditions might alleviate any Soviet worries that the Baltic states would pose a military threat.

b. Finland

Finland, like Austria, became a neutral state relatively recently. It attempted to neutralize itself in 1939, but that effort was smashed when the Soviet army invaded during the Winter War of 1939-40. After World War II ended, Finland ensured its survival and Soviet predominance by quietly relinquishing most of Karelia, as well as other

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121 These conditions are now disappearing, and many Europeans are pressing for a "common European house" concept. Such circumstances will test Austria's self-imposed commitment to neutrality.
territory along the Finnish-Soviet border.\textsuperscript{122} By the Finnish Peace Treaty signed in Paris in 1947, the government agreed not to allow any local organizations to engage in hostile anti-Soviet propaganda.\textsuperscript{123} Further, the treaty placed limits on the size and types of Finnish armed forces and military hardware.

Finland also signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviets in 1948, pledging to "fight aggression against the Soviet Union on Finnish territory [emphasis added] with all her military forces if the Soviet Union is attacked by Germany or any other country allied with Germany."\textsuperscript{124} While this may seem a violation of the principles of neutrality, Finns claim that it is not necessarily so. This treaty applies only to aggression on Finnish soil. Finland is not obligated to come to the aid of the Soviet Union if the threat comes from some other direction. In effect, the Finns are saying they will defend their own territory against outside aggression. Further, Moscow recognized Finland's right to a neutral status in the preamble and Article One of the treaty, and it did not

\textsuperscript{122}A total of 13 percent of Finland's territory was surrendered to the USSR. See: Bitzinger, 10-14.


\textsuperscript{124}Ruehl, 117-118.
prevent the Finns from joining the United Nations and Nordic Council in 1955.\textsuperscript{125}

As result of the war and the 1947 and 1948 agreements, Moscow achieved practically everything it wanted. It refrained from making further demands, so as to avoid pushing Sweden into NATO. Therefore, the Kremlin has been generally supportive of Finland's "neutrality" within the bounds of their established agreements.

Though Finland is classified as neutral, its liberal interpretation of rights and responsibilities clearly make it a special, very flexible form of neutrality.\textsuperscript{126} For example, it is common for Finnish leaders to consult with the Kremlin on important foreign policy matters.\textsuperscript{127} Additionally, provisions of the 1947 and 1948 treaties allow the Kremlin to exert a degree of legal power over Finland. It might be argued that, by extension, this gives the Kremlin a measure of leverage over the Nordic Council and a way of influencing the Nordic Balance.

\textsuperscript{125}Bo Petersson points out that, while the legal basis of Finnish neutrality is contained in the 1948 Treaty, most analysts view the 1955 return of the Porkkala naval base by the Soviets as the real beginning of Finland's neutrality. See: "From Avoiding the Subject to Outright Criticism," Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies 4, no. 1 (1987): 50.

\textsuperscript{126}As Bitzinger (p. 11) has noted, this flexibility stems from Finnish President Paasikivi's realpolitik assertion during the 1940s--and supported by most other Finns--that "the beginning of all wisdom is the recognition of facts."

\textsuperscript{127}Gilberg, 38.
There are many features of the Finland model that do not apply well to the Baltic case. Finland's size (twice as large as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia combined), rugged terrain, and location beside a significant regional power—Sweden—all work to its advantage. Additionally, Helsinki fields a military which, though restricted by international agreement, has earned the respect of the Soviets and enhances its neutral status.

Nonetheless, Finland's brand of flexible neutrality may well provide the best example for independent Baltic countries. Like Finland, the Baltic states suffer from geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, and so also face certain "realities." Unless they can solicit strong, credible guarantees from other major powers, their situation dictates that they refrain from actions or policies which might unduly antagonize the Soviet Union. Thus, a neutral status biased in favor of the USSR might meet Baltic needs, yet also give Moscow an acceptable level of security, in the event that it feels compelled to grant them independence.

3. The Baltic States, Moscow, and Neutrality

Given their need to remain flexible while negotiating for independence, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been understandably vague with regard to their ultimate security status. They sometimes have acknowledged a willingness to offer defense concessions to the Soviets but, on other
occasions, have stated a firm intention to become neutral and free of nuclear weapons.¹²⁸

Neutrality failed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940 for several reasons. Clearly, arrangements among great powers was the major cause. They faced two very aggressive, expansionist countries, who were determined to annex them. Other great powers simply looked away, which sealed the Baltic countries' fate.

But there were other reasons, too. All three Baltic countries fell short in areas which enhance the chances of sustaining neutrality, such as size, population, scale of economy, resources, and technical sophistication. They proved incapable of individually generating an effective self-defense, and found little support in the international community-at-large or in the impotent League of Nations. Still, their ability to survive would have been greatly enhanced had they overcome personal jealousies and petty ambitions and cooperated effectively as a regional group. In Edgar Anderson's words, they "wasted twenty valuable years without establishing themselves as a respectable buffer zone, 

as was expected of them.\textsuperscript{129} The three could not even agree on which country presented the greatest threat--Estonia was most apprehensive about the Soviet Union, while Latvia and Lithuania feared aggression from Poland and Germany. Efforts to strengthen the Entente and work together seriously were undertaken too late.

By reviving the 1934 Entente in 1990 and coordinating closely on a wide range of issues, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania may finally be engaging in the type of collaboration that Anderson found so lacking and which would contribute to their survivability as neutrals.\textsuperscript{130} If they combine effective inter-state cooperation with the realistic flexibility of the Finns--and if Moscow maintains positive intentions--neutrality could be a more viable option for the future.

Might the Kremlin support neutrality for independent Baltic countries? According to Peter Vigor, Soviet leaders of the 1920-30s were suspicious of the mere idea of neutrality, because it did not mesh with Marxist dialectics.\textsuperscript{131} However, they slowly came to acknowledge that a country could be "perpetually neutral" if it does not participate in wars or military alliances, does not allow foreign troops to store

\textsuperscript{129}Anderson, 135.

\textsuperscript{130}For a good overview of recent cooperative efforts, see: Nils Muiznieks, "The Evolution of Baltic Cooperation," \textit{Report on the USSR} 2, no. 27 (06 July 1990): 18-20.

equipment or be based on its territory, and does not equip its forces with nuclear weapons. Beginning in the late 1950s, the Kremlin actually began to advocate neutrality to small West European countries as a way of strengthening the world peace zone.\textsuperscript{132}

In short, the Soviet position on neutrality has "matured" over the years and has become more tolerant. Because of the many overwhelming problems currently facing the Soviet Union, and because the Baltic states appear bent on seceding, neutrality may be more palatable than ever before. If Moscow decides its interests are best served by backing neutrality for independent Baltic countries, it is easy to predict which model it would prefer. Whenever the Kremlin has commented positively on the subject of neutrality through the years, it has been most supportive of the Finnish example.\textsuperscript{133} Soviet leaders have recommended it to Norway on many occasions, and claim it is particularly suited to the Nordic region.\textsuperscript{134}

Moscow's approbation should come as no surprise, for at least two reasons. First, Finland's system has allowed

\textsuperscript{132}Hakovirta, 205.

\textsuperscript{133}Soviet leaders have frequently hailed Finland as a model neighbor, a theme reiterated by Gorbachev when he visited Helsinki in October 1989. See: Bill Keller, "Gorbachev, in Finland, Disavows Any Right of Regional Intervention," \textit{New York Times}, 26 October 1989, Al.

\textsuperscript{134}Gilberg, 41.
Moscow an influential voice in its foreign and domestic policies. Secondly, as a result of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty and prudent thinking, Finland has developed a military that is adequate for defense, but not so strong as to present the Kremlin with a worrisome threat. These "concessions" to win Soviet acceptance have helped ensure Finland's survival as a neutral country, and Baltic governments and the architects of a new European security paradigm would do well to examine carefully the key features of this model.

4. Cordon Sanitaire

Related to the idea of Baltic neutrality is the notion of a cordon sanitaire—a corridor of neutral states stretching through Europe from north to south. Originally intended as a way of halting the estward spread of Bolshevism, the concept gradually came to mean a buffer system designed to separate potentially aggressive powers. Many variations were advanced during the inter-war years, in the hopes of establishing a strategic cushion between Germany and the Soviet Union. One version, proposed several times by French Foreign Minister Briand, involved Finland, the three Baltic countries, and Poland.\textsuperscript{135} For several reasons, however, nothing came of his or similar proposals. First, the Polish-

Lithuanian dispute continued to sour relations between all three Baltic governments and Warsaw. Secondly, there was a general reluctance on the part of Nordic countries to get involved in any military alliance system. Finally, neither France nor the Great Britain were prepared or equipped to guarantee such an arrangement.

In 1990, two plans for a future European framework have resurrected the idea of a cordon sanitaire. Michael Howard proposes a corridor "politically independent and free of all foreign military forces" extending from Finland through the Baltics, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria and Yugoslavia.\(^\text{136}\) He believes this arrangement would satisfy the security requirements of both the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance. Two other military analysts recommend a "defensive military zone" composed of Finland, the Baltics, Poland, a unified Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria.\(^\text{137}\) They contend such an arrangement would enhance European security and allow NATO and the Warsaw Pact to exist with reduced offensive forces.

These plans (both proposed prior to the unification of East and West Germany) have merit, first, because they contribute to the debate on a new security order for Europe,


and second, because they relate to resolution of the Baltic security question. However, they also have some notable weaknesses. First, they perpetuate the Cold War paradigm of a hostile East-West rivalry, rather than seeking to integrate the two sides. Secondly, both plans would force countries which are eager to join a new European order on an equal, unencumbered basis to fit, instead, into a restrictive category. Finally, these proposals look good on a map, but do not necessarily take individual countries and cultures into consideration. For example, Poland, which historically has maintained large armies and sought security through alliances and bilateral treaties, probably would decline to participate in such an arrangement. Instead, its leaders are promoting the idea of maintaining NATO and the Warsaw Pact until an all-European security structure can become a reality.\(^{138}\)

**D. ALIGNED STATUS**

The third broad alternative for independent Baltic states is alignment with another country or group of countries. It would be an understatement to say there is little chance that Moscow would permit the Baltic states to join NATO. The only way that might occur would be if Moscow also joined the alliance, or if the Soviet Union totally disintegrated.

However, unless NATO is transformed into an all-European system, it appears that the organization is not prepared to accept new members in the near term. Other existing organizations, such as the Western European Union, also show no signs of a readiness to expand their membership.

However, three other alignment options should be considered. The first is military alliance with the Soviet Union, or its former republics, in the event that the Union fractures. The other two would be the establishment of a Nordic alliance or an alliance with Poland.

1. Alignment with the USSR or Former Republics

Moscow's first choice is to keep the Baltic republics in the Union and, as previously observed, it appears that the current strategy is to delay secessionists until a new, attractive federation can be created. However, if political or economic exigencies make it necessary to grant independence to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, it is reasonable to expect that the Kremlin's fall-back position will be to extract concessions designed to guarantee Soviet national security.

139 Communique from North Atlantic Council meetings in June and July 1990 invited former East Bloc nations to establish regular diplomatic liaisons with NATO, and discussed the need to redefine NATO's role and goals, but they did not suggest expanding its membership. Instead, NATO leaders reiterated their desire to maintain the organization as a defensive alliance and called for CSCE to become more prominent in Europe's future. See: "London Declaration," and "NAC Final Communiqué," NATO's Sixteen Nations 35, no. 4 (July/August 1990): 66-70.
Moscow's most likely negotiated demand would be Baltic membership in the Warsaw Pact, or a bilateral military alignment with the Soviet Union. Accepting this demand is within the realm of possibility, because the Baltic states do not object to Soviet defense or protection per se. Their main complaint is their lack of sovereign free choice, though they do chafe over certain Soviet military policies, such as extraterritorial stationing and hazing of conscripts. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania want independence, dignity, and the freedom to set their own national agendas. Future political, economic, or military associations with their former "oppressor" would pose no inconsistency, as long as they are entered into voluntarily. Already, President Landsbergis has raised publicly the possibility of a sovereign Lithuania joining the Warsaw Pact. Such an alignment certainly would not be the Baltic states' first choice, and there is some question as to how effective such an alliance would be, given broken treaties of the past and currently inflamed nationalist tensions. However, President Landsbergis has stated that Balts have no desire for revenge and believes past differences can be overcome. In any case, the Baltic

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141 Landsbergis contends that Soviet peoples were all victims of a cruel system, which now is being destroyed. See: "Small States May Recognize Lithuania First, President Says," Reuter Library Report, 24 August 1990.
governments might opt for even an imperfect solution, if it means gaining their independence.

Failing a formal military alignment between the Baltic states and Moscow, Soviet negotiators could be expected to press for Baltic treaties similar to the 1948 pact with Finland. Additionally, they probably would seek to obtain special arrangements permitting some level of Soviet troop presence, access to airfields and naval facilities, and perhaps retention of key radar installations and electronics surveillance posts. These types of demands also might be acceptable to Baltic leaders. Algis Cekuolis, a Landsbergis spokesman, has stated openly that Lithuania might "recognize Soviet 'interests'--but not 'rights'--in the Baltic states, maybe including a military presence, together with access to the city of Kaliningrad...and use of the Baltic ports."142

What about political, economic, or military alliances with former Soviet republics, if disintegration occurs as has been predicted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Z," and others?143 Certainly, some types of arrangements are possible (if not probable), for it is in the Baltic states' interest to have close, friendly links with as many neighbors as they can. The connections that Baltic leaders have cultivated with

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nationalist groups in the Ukraine (Rukh), Belorussia (Popular Front), and Moldavia, and their increasing political and economic ties with Russian President Boris Yeltsin demonstrate that they are sensitive to the need for close relations with nearby states.\textsuperscript{144}

However, it should be pointed out, again, that the three Baltic states want most of all to integrate into the Euro-Nordic community. Therefore, one can expect that Baltic leaders will avoid entering into any agreements--particularly military pacts--which could jeopardize that goal. There is potentially one major complication. Russia, traditionally the driving force behind the Soviet Union, could force changes to that strategy. Of all the Union republics, Russia is the most likely to attempt to step into the superpower vacancy created by a disintegrated Soviet Union. If it believed large-scale access to the Baltic Sea would contribute to that end, Russia could be a persistent suitor or even a threat. Currently, there are no indications this will occur, but if it did, the Baltic states might feel compelled to draw closer to Moscow than they otherwise would have preferred.

\textsuperscript{144} "Perhaps the single-most significant reason why Moscow terminated its economic boycott of Lithuania was that Yeltsin refused to uphold it. A bilateral trade agreement for 1991 was concluded between the Russian republic and Lithuania in August 1990. See: "Bilateral Trade Agreements Signed Between Republics," \textit{Report on the USSR} 2, no. 34 (24 August 1990): 32."
2. Nordic Alliance

The discussion in Chapter IV demonstrated that a good deal of Western Europe's reaction to events in the Baltics has been less than encouraging for the secessionists. While publics there have been largely supportive, their governments have been vague and cautious. French, German, and British officials have followed the American response of expressing sympathy, urging talks, and stating that recognition will come only after Baltic governments have effective control over their territory.

Norden, on the other hand, has been very supportive, and the five countries feel historical cultural, economic, and political connection with the Balts. In the recent years, contacts between Nordic countries and the Baltic states have increased markedly, and Scandinavian diplomats have suggested to Phillip Peterson (an official in the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense) that the Nordic Council would be willing to accept the three Baltic states as members.

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145 The Nordic countries feel the strongest affinity toward Estonia and Latvia. They sometimes view Lithuania as foreign, because of its Polish tradition and Catholic religion. Still, there is an attraction, and Nordic states appear more interested than other European nations in finding a niche for Lithuania. Further, it is on those countries that Lithuanian delegations have concentrated much of their attention and diplomatic efforts in 1990. See Alain Debove, "Querelles de Voisinage," Le Monde, 05 January 1990, 5, for a discussion of the views of Scandinavians toward Lithuania.

Peterson has formulated a vision of Europe in the year 2000 which features three groupings of nations—a West European confederation, a middle European group, and a Nordic group. In the latter, he includes the three Baltic states. Although his plan is based on a premise that the Soviet Union will disintegrate, his inclusion of the Baltic states in a Nordic grouping is an idea that could hold promise even if the Soviet Union remains essentially intact. Along similar lines, Former British Foreign Secretary David Owen has proposed that the three Baltic republics be freed and then join with Finland, Sweden, and Norway to form a six-nation Baltic group linked to the European Community. Owen believes this would help the Baltic states make an easier transition to a Western-style economy and political structure.

The type of federated alliance suggested above is based primarily upon economic, political, and cultural interests, and conceivably could help balance the anticipated economic and political power of a reunited Germany. It would also help to stabilize economic conditions in the region, and offer Moscow a bridge to Scandinavian markets and assistance. All this would contribute to regional stability and, in turn, coordinate Scandinavian economic and cultural interests. Finland joined two years later.


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would be beneficial to all parties concerned with European security.

This Nordic model of alliance also could have long-range security implications. As Peterson has observed, in the future, "international security will increasingly depend upon economic relationships."\textsuperscript{148} It is not unrealistic, therefore, to imagine that the Nordic Council could increasingly come to address defense issues, particularly depending on the outcome of a new, all-European security plan. In the meantime, though, it is conceivable that the Baltic states could follow one track for military security (e.g., alignment with Moscow, or guaranteed neutrality), and a Nordic track for political, economic, and cultural matters.

Moscow's current position on the concept of an augmented Nordic community--particularly one with potential defense responsibilities--is uncertain. In the 1930s, the Kremlin welcomed Nordic cooperation and stability, but did not want it to develop into a military defense alliance or become a coordinated neutral bloc.\textsuperscript{149} It took the same position in 1948, when Sweden proposed the establishment of a neutral Scandinavian defense alliance to offset the advances that the

\textsuperscript{148}\textsuperscript{Peterson, 18.}

Kremlin was making toward Finland and that the West was making toward Norway and Denmark.\textsuperscript{150}

At present, Moscow's emphasis appears to favor creation of an all-European security system, preferably based on the CSCE process. However, if it feels compelled to grant Baltic independence and sees no sign of a CSCE solution, it might view a Nordic alliance as the next best alternative. This would be particularly tempting if it helped to further neutralize already conditional (some would say lukewarm) Norwegian and Danish support for NATO, and if it led in the direction of Moscow's long-standing desire for a "permanent peace zone."\textsuperscript{151} Even without that occurring, however, Moscow understands that its "special" relationship with Finland--combined with the delicate nature of the Nordic Balance--would allow it to exert some degree of leverage over the group.\textsuperscript{152} Further, the Nordic states have proven themselves to be a very peaceful, steady group, bound by a strong community of interests. Melding the Baltic states safely into the Nordic fraternity would bring stability to the Soviet Union's

\textsuperscript{150} Lindahl, 20.


\textsuperscript{152} It should be noted, however, that many Finnish scholars and politicians believe the 1948 treaty has outlived its usefulness and should be reexamined and possibly discarded. See: Tony Austin, "Finland Cautiously Reexamines its Soviet Policy," \textit{Reuter Library Report}, 26 May 1990.
western border, and allow the Kremlin to concentrate on instabilities in other parts of the Union.

3. Polish Alliance

A third possibility—political or military alignment with Poland—merits consideration. Poland feels an historical kinship with Lithuania and, as previously discussed, its support in 1990 for Lithuanian secession has been strong. However, President Landsbergis and his government have not attempted to expand this relationship significantly. Instead, Lithuania seems determined to coordinate its efforts with Estonia and Latvia, and those republics feel closest to Norden. For their part, the five Nordic countries have never felt a sense of community with Poland, nor have they considered it to be part of the Nordic Balance.

The idea of a Baltic alliance with Poland, then, appears to apply almost solely to Lithuania. As a result, it should be viewed primarily as a final card to be played in the event that Lithuania becomes the only Baltic republic to break free and is unable to work its way into the Nordic community.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate that the reappearance of the Baltic Question has definite implications for European security—implications that demand attention as the rigid, bipolar Cold War order evolves into a new security arrangement. In order to explain the problem properly and determine the effects of various alternatives for the future, this thesis considered both historical precedent and contemporary constraints. As a result of that process, several conclusions may be drawn.

A. BALTIC STATES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

First, it should be evident that the Baltic nations have affected Europe's security, both as independent states and as captive nations. Estonia and Latvia have been fought over repeatedly and, being unable to conduct an effective self-defense, have spent most of their histories under the domination of other states. Lithuania stood as a great power and occasional aggressor for centuries, but it too eventually fell prey to an imperialistic neighbor. These developments were disruptive for obvious reasons. They frustrated the Balts, who wanted to rule themselves, yet were forced to adjust to a succession of rulers. They contributed to instability in Europe, because each gain or loss of the three
states affected the relative balance among the contending great powers. Additionally, these events soured the overall European security environment in much the same way that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has affected the mood in the Middle East. In recent years, the Baltic states' status as captive to the Soviet Union has been relatively stable, in that there have been no internal rebellions or attempts by other nations to wrest control of the region away from the Soviets. However, even this has been a threatening situation, because Western Europeans have viewed the area apprehensively as the springboard for a potential Warsaw Pact invasion.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania also affected European security as independent countries. Most recently, the three attempted in the 1920-30s to establish themselves as responsible, sovereign members of the international community, initially with positive results. However, the reality was that they were surrounded by nations who had designs on their territory and, in the end, Moscow prevailed over all contenders. The Baltic countries clearly had been victimized but, in a sense, they also had contributed to the region's instability. Their inability to defend their neutrality or to overcome regional jealousies and develop an effective alliance system made them an inviting target to the Soviet Union, Germany and, to a lesser degree, also to Poland.

A second conclusion is that the fate and defense of the Baltic states typically have depended more on arrangements
among the great powers than on the efforts of their own
governments. Furthermore, it is quite possible that this
pattern will continue into the future—for the Baltic states
to survive as sovereign states, it is imperative that they
obtain the support or unfailing acceptance of the major
powers, particularly that of the Soviet Union.

The events of 1940 illustrate this point. Neither the
Soviet Union nor Germany respected the sovereignty of the
Baltic states, and neither could restrain its own urge to
expand. At the same time, other major powers—most notably
Great Britain and France—opted not to extend a guarantee of
safety, and the three nations soon lost their independence.
It was not that these other powers bore the Baltic states any
ill will. They simply had wider interests and different
priorities, and were unwilling to jeopardize their broader
agendas to protect Baltic independence. They wanted the
Baltic states to be sovereign and a part of the European
order, but they also wanted the region to be secure and
preferred that security flow from a regional alliance with
Poland or the Scandinavian countries. That is to say, the
other major powers hoped for a regional solution to a problem
which had much wider balance of power implications.
Understandably, however, Baltic leaders felt that by its
inaction, the West had sold them out.

In her study of power and small states, Annette Baker Fox
explores this type of dilemma, noting that "while the great
power might be almost the whole concern of the small state, the latter was only a small part of the concern of the great power."

Sometimes great power attention (or lack of it) works in favor of the small power, sometimes it works against it. Unfortunately for the Balts, their survival depended upon the Great Powers, and those countries elected not to intervene. This was true in 1940, and it clearly is happening in 1990 as well--no country has stepped forward to confront Moscow on the issue, for fear of jeopardizing other "big-picture" issues.

In short, the Baltic states are an important component in the European security equation--they act on the system, and it acts upon them--but historically, they have been relegated to a position of secondary importance. Nonetheless, they are an important factor, and it would be wise to resolve the Baltic Question now, while other European security issues are being settled. For Europe to be stable and secure, all of its parts must feel relatively secure. In the case of the Baltic states, this will just require extra cooperation and guarantees from the international community.

B. BALTIC STATES AND SOVIET SECURITY

As just noted, all nations must feel relatively secure, but this is especially important when considering a major,

153 Fox, 181.
nuclear power such as the Soviet Union. The international community is well aware of this fact, as evidenced by the generally cautious stand most governments adopted following Lithuania's 11 March 1990 declaration of independence.

The Russian empire and Soviet Union have had a long history of being invaded through the Baltic region. Coupled with their own expansionist tendencies, that concern has made Soviet-Russian advances toward the Baltic states the most persistent and aggressive ones through the centuries. Therefore, it would not be overstating the case to say that the Kremlin holds the key to the Baltic future. The past provides good reason to believe that if Moscow threw its unqualified support to independent Baltic states, they could survive. Conversely, it suggests that the future does not look as bright if the Soviet Union begrudges their independence and the Baltic governments continue to press their case.

This study demonstrated that, after violating the letter and spirit of numerous commitments and treaties, Moscow carefully integrated Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into its national security plan. The Baltic republics now contain an extensive network of military bases, airfields, listening posts, as well as stockpiles of military equipment, artillery, bridging equipment, oil, and nuclear weapons.

However, it is also the position of this paper that from a security standpoint, the loss of the Baltic republics is
manageable. It would be expensive, and the High Command would be very unhappy, but Soviet defense strategists could adapt, particularly given Moscow's well-publicized shift to a strictly defensive doctrine. Kaliningrad and Leningrad would continue to provide access to the Baltic Sea, and there are indications that the Baltic states are willing to offer concessions to help safeguard Soviet security and ease anxieties. It might even be argued that Baltic independence would be a good opportunity for the Soviet Union finally to acquire a protective layer of "Finlandized" buffer states, such as it initially sought to create after World War II.

In the end, the Kremlin must make its decision by weighing security gains and losses against many complex political, economic, and cultural factors at not only the regional level, but the national and international levels as well. This process must include a careful assessment of the value of keeping in the Union what Moscow undoubtedly sees as increasingly troublesome and unreliable Balts—that is, a calculation of the point at which they represent more of a liability than an asset. Moscow must also consider the precedent this would set for other restive republics, as well as what effect loss of the Baltic states would have on the overall correlation of forces. As secessionist and anti-military sentiments rise inside the Soviet Union, and as former allies turn in other directions, Soviet feelings of insecurity also will rise. It is worth repeating once again,
then, that since it is in Europe's best interest for the USSR to feel reasonably secure, any attempt to resolve the Baltic Question must be designed to enhance Moscow's confidence in its ability to protect itself.

C. ALTERNATIVES

Forecasting the future is always risky business, and it is especially chancy now, in view of the dramatic rate and scope of change during 1989-90. The fact that governments and academia are offering practically no public debate over future roles for the Baltic states only adds to the problem.

Rather than argue a specific vision for the future, this thesis explored four broad ways that the Baltic Question might be resolved, and considered the effects of each. It discounted non-alignment, but found three others—remaining in the Soviet Union, neutrality, and alignment—to be realistic alternatives. The first option could occur either as the result of a crack-down or by a change of heart on the part of Baltic leaders. A brutal repression would leave smoldering resentment and possibly increasing resistance in the area, and thus would be undesirable from the point of view of Balts, Soviets, and Europeans alike. A voluntary decision to remain in the Union would stabilize the region and would essentially settle the Baltic Question, which are

\[\text{\footnote{It also could push East Europeans closer to NATO, which probably would be viewed with discomfort in the Kremlin.}}\]
important points in its favor. However, it also would leave
the Soviets in their forward-leaning position, which would be
detrimental to European security if Moscow chose to reverse
its currently accommodating foreign policy and return to its
previously aggressive ways.

The second category, that of neutral, independent
countries, could also occur, but only under the proper
conditions. As was shown, the Baltic states are lacking in
many attributes (e.g., size, population, economy, resources,
and technology) that improve a neutral's survivability. They
also lie along the traditional invasion route between Europe
and Moscow.

However, all three Baltic states have expressed an
interest in resuming a neutral status, and it can be argued
that these problems could be overcome if Moscow (historically
the Baltic states' greatest antagonist) would be supportive.
There is good reason to believe that a Finnish-style
neutrality--flexible and militarily restricted--could meet the
needs and desires of both sides. Again, though, the only way
neutrality will work is if Moscow is supportive, or if one or
more other major powers agree to guarantee the Baltic states.
Even a fully-functioning neutral bloc of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania would probably require major power backing in order
to be credible. It is possible that such a guarantee could
be provided by a new, all-European security system, if one
ever evolves. Ultimately, however, it is best if the Balts work out their differences with Moscow.

The third alternative future which was investigated is alignment, either with the Soviet Union, Norden, or Poland. Baltic leaders already have hinted that joining the Warsaw Pact (as well as offering basing concessions for Soviet forces) is a possibility, because their drive for secession is not so much anti-Soviet as it is pro-independence and pro-equality. If this occurred, the Soviet Union would retain some ability to lean forward toward Europe. However, this would be less of a problem for European security than in the past, for at least two reasons. First, the Baltic states could be expected to demand an overall smaller military presence on their territories, and they would want this presence to be composed primarily of indigenous forces. Secondly, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania see their future as lying with the West, so they undoubtedly would temper any attempt by the Soviets to make Baltic territory threatening to Europe.

In the event that the Soviet Union totally disintegrated, it is possible that Russia might seek out world recognition as the successor superpower. While the Baltic states prefer to look westward for their place in the international order, they might feel forced, in these circumstances, to consider some form of alignment with Russia in recognition of the fact that it would pose the greatest potential threat to their
sovereignty. If this occurred, the effect on European
security would be similar to a Baltic alliance with the Soviet
Union. If Russia did not pose a threat, some types of
political, economic, or military arrangements might be entered
into between the Baltic states and other former republics, but
the ultimate Baltic goal would be connections with Europe.

Alignment with Nordic countries has many attractive
features. Norden possesses a strong community of interests
and an inherent balancing mechanism which ensures that the
actions of one member do not unduly jeopardize the needs of
another. The group is economically and politically stable,
and it is increasingly committed to peace. What is especially
noteworthy, is that the group considers the Baltic states a
part of this regional identity. They have provided possibly
the greatest moral and physical support in recent years, and
have indicated their willingness to allow independent Baltic
states to join the ranks of the Nordic Council.

Such a Nordic arrangement (at least initially with an
economic, political, and cultural emphasis) should be
perceived as positive by all parties concerned with European
security. It would be a stabilizing and balancing (with
respect to Germany) influence, and would reduce the chances
of a power vacuum by locking the three Baltic states into a
peaceful position of its liking. This would contribute to
overall European stability. Historical precedent and current
reactions suggest that the major Western powers will never
perceive the Baltics as a keystone of their foreign policies, and will always prefer to see a regional alliance or a common European security arrangement. A Nordic alliance, augmented by a military alignment or a guaranteed neutrality, could make that a reality.

D. CLOSING COMMENTS

Europe is undergoing a fundamental restructuring, and this naturally carries a potential for generating military instability. While adding resolution of the Baltic Question to this situation might contribute to that potential, it should be viewed, nevertheless, as an opportunity rather than a problem. As has been shown, the Baltic states' neighbors are supportive, and alternative security arrangements agreeable to all parties are available if diplomats—particularly Soviet ones—are willing to be bold, imaginative and decisive. This is a chance finally to end World War II, and allow the Baltic states to become a bridge between East and West.
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