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NORWEGIAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
IN THE NEW EUROPE

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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This paper asserts that Norwegian national security policy should integrate into the new, emerging European security order and focuses on the immediate and long-term challenges to Norwegian national security, the establishment of Norwegian security options within a unified Europe, and the development of military alternatives for Northern regional stability.

Existing policies of reassurance to maintain low tension in the Northern region and deterrence through a reinforcement link to NATO are reviewed, in addition to Norway's Base Policy and commitment to the Nordic Balance.

An assessment of Norway's security strategy and available military forces in the Northern region is conducted. Coupled with an examination of Norwegian geographic, economic and social constraints, the assessment reals that Norway cannot meet her security challenges alone and is dependent upon expected NATO reinforcements in crises.

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This paper concludes that Norway should not pursue WEU membership but integrate into an emerging European security order based upon the three pillars of the Atlantic Alliance, the EC and the CSCE. By maintaining collective defense through a revised NATO security framework, developing multilateral political cooperation within a European structure for crisis prevention and management through a resurgent CSCE, and promoting dialogue through membership and economic cooperation in the EC, Norway can integrate into the New Europe.
Abstract of
Norwegian National Security Policy in the New Europe

This paper asserts that Norwegian national security policy should integrate into the new, emerging European security order and focuses on the immediate and long-term challenges to Norwegian national security, the establishment of Norwegian security options within a unified Europe, and the development of military alternatives for Northern regional stability.

Existing Norwegian policies of reassurance to maintain low tension in the Northern region and deterrence through a reinforcement link to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are reviewed, in addition to Norway's Base Policy and commitment to the Nordic Balance.

Immediate security challenges, the need to shield Norway from crisis and instability in the Soviet Union/Russian Republic and the need to maintain links to an increasingly integrated Europe, are examined. Long-term security challenges, the need to maintain a transatlantic military link to the United States and develop a Eurostrategic perspective in Nordic security matters, are also discussed.

An assessment of Norway's security strategy and available military forces in the Northern region is conducted. Coupled with an examination of Norwegian geographic, economic and social constraints, the assessment reveals that Norway cannot meet her security challenges alone and is dependent upon expected NATO reinforcements in crises.

Norwegian security options in the New Europe, the revitalized use of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE), European Community (EC) and European Economic Area (EEA), and Western European Union (WEU), are analyzed.

Military alternatives to promote regional stability in the North, including the use of a revised NATO strategy, multinational ground forces and multinational naval forces are identified. The use of NATO Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) and Multinational Maritime Forces (MMF), coupled with Norwegian political support, military commitment and logistic support for reinforcements, is recommended.

This paper concludes that Norway should not pursue WEU membership but integrate into an emerging European security order based upon three pillars - the Atlantic Alliance, the EC and the CSCE. By maintaining collective defense through a revised NATO security framework, developing multilateral political cooperation within a European structure for crisis prevention and management through a resurgent CSCE, and promoting dialogue through membership and economic cooperation in the EC, Norway can integrate into the New Europe.
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NORWEGIAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
IN THE NEW EUROPE

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In the uncertain international climate which now prevails in Europe after the end of the Cold War, Norway is in a singular position. Far from the central area, it faces a series of Soviet bases and military concentrations across a common border. Although not threatened by an immediate attack, Norway remains vulnerable. Its policies will have to deal with a large gamut of possible factors and uncertainties.¹

Johan Jorgen Holst
Norwegian Minister of Defense

The ongoing disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dynamic transformation of Europe have a major impact on Norwegian national security, with both immediate and long-term consequences. In the immediate future, the new security environment in the Nordic region and instability in the Soviet Union increase the danger of regional crisis. Since "the defense of Norway must be viewed in a European context and the strategic position of the country in an Atlantic and increasingly Arctic perspective,"² Norway’s need to adapt to the increasing integration of Western Europe creates changes and tensions in the existing regional security pattern among Nordic states. These changes have immediate consequences...
on established Norwegian security policies. The long-term challenges for Norway in the new emerging security order of Europe consist of problems inherent to the return of a multipolar and dynamic European political system with new unpredictable states, including Germany as a resurrected superpower and the Soviet Union as an unstable force in Eastern Europe and on the northern flank. With the need to maintain a continued transatlantic link to the United States and a Eurostrategic perspective, Norwegian national security policy is inextricably linked with the variable geometry of European military competition and cooperation.

Today the major determinant of Norwegian national security policy does not come from the Soviet Union/Russian Republic threat directly. That threat is gone and unlikely to return in the same form. Today Europe "conceives of risks rather than threats...[and these risks] are best described as instabilities because most stem from internal disorder rather than calculated decisions to commit aggression." Risks to the Nordic region are significant because the future of the U.S.S.R is uncertain. If or when the U.S.S.R. fragments into a looser conglomeration of separate entities, Russia will remain a large state with the same military interests in the North and most of the Soviet Union’s formidable assets. Risks to European peace could "come from a revanchist or disintegrating Soviet Union, from ethnic conflict or transition problems in central or southeastern Europe, from escalating third world conflicts... or from a short-warning conventional threat on NATO’s flank."

The Nordic security environment is a function of five basic factors. Two are regional
factors over which Norway exerts a degree of influence:

* relations among the Nordic states and

* relations between Norway and the Soviet Union/Russian Republic.

The other three factors extend beyond Norway's control but involve national security considerations, political concerns and military forces which have a decisive impact on the Northern region and include:

* unstable developments within the Soviet Union/Russian Republic,

* integration developments in Europe, and

* developments in the United States and Soviet strategic/military relationship.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of Europe alters two of the three external parameters of the post-Cold War Norwegian security system and necessitates establishment of a new, functional regional security system within the context of a unified Europe. This paper asserts that Norwegian national security should integrate into the new, emerging European security order and focuses on the immediate and long-term challenges to Norwegian national security, the establishment of new Norwegian security policy options within a unified Europe, and the development of military alternatives for regional stability.

Chapter II reviews existing Norwegian security patterns while Chapter III analyzes immediate challenges to Norwegian security by examining the need to shield Norway from crisis and instability in the Soviet Union/Russian Republic. Scenarios which generate immediate problems and risks to Norwegian security caused by growing Soviet military
capabilities and redirected Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) assets in the North, force structure changes and construction programs in the Soviet Northern Fleet, changing Soviet operational patterns in the Northern region, and the residual Soviet military presence on the Kola Peninsula are discussed. Security related political ramifications stemming from the need to maintain links to an increasingly integrated Western Europe are also examined. Chapter IV analyzes long-term Norwegian security challenges including the need to maintain military links to the United States, the need to review United States and Soviet strategic/military relationships, and the need to maintain an Eurostrategic perspective in Nordic security matters. Chapter V provides an assessment of Norwegian military strategy and available military forces in the Northern region. Norwegian security options in the emerging European security order are discussed in Chapter VI including adjustments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and revitalized use of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), European Community (EC) and European Economic Area (EEA), and Western European Union (WEU) as alternatives to NATO. The need to Europeanize European defense and provide NATO support for a transition to a New Europe are emphasized. Chapter VII identifies military alternatives for promoting regional stability in the North including the use of a revised NATO strategy, multinational ground forces, and multinational naval forces. Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF), NATO Multinational Maritime Forces (NMMF), Multinational Naval Cooperation Options (MNCO), and Norway's role in the reception of Allied reinforcements are discussed. Chapter VIII concludes Norwegian national security policy should not pursue membership in the WEU but integrate into an emerging European security order based upon three pillars - the Atlantic Alliance, the EC,
and the CSCE. By endorsing NATO's transformed strategy, using her CSCE membership to promote political dialogue, and seeking EC membership as an instrument of economic cooperation, Norway can integrate into the New Europe.
CHAPTER II
EXISTING NORWEGIAN SECURITY PATTERNS

The Nordic area does not provide a sufficient framework for regional security.⁷

Johan Jorgen Holst
Norwegian Minister of Defense

The existing Norwegian security environment is based upon a balance between security and reassurance. The Norwegian Ministry of Defense Proposition No. 1 for the Budget Period 1991 has recognized the Soviet presence in the North and underscored the continued need to link Norway closely with the existing European and Atlantic security system through NATO membership. The Ministry has maintained that security in the North cannot be regionalized with only Norwegian assets and that the "military imbalance could only be counterweighed through Norway's connection to Western cooperation through NATO."⁸ As accentuated by Minister Holst, "the U.S. is the primary underwriter of Norwegian security."⁹ Norway's dependence on NATO reinforcement for deterrence of possible aggression and defense if deterrence fails is counterbalanced with reassurance not to destabilize the Northern region with increased military forces. Reassurance consists of a series of confidence building measures designed to communicate peaceful measures and intentions and to avoid challenging the vital security interests of Norwegian neighbors.
Norway's policy of reassurance is founded in the Base Policy which states:

Norway will never take part in a policy with aggressive aims. She will never allow Norwegian territory to be used in the service of such a policy. The Norwegian government will not enter in any agreement with other states involving obligations to open bases for the military forces of foreign powers on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not exposed to threats of attack.\textsuperscript{10}

Norway has extended the policy to include a prohibition on nuclear weapons and has added the following restrictions:

* no Allied aircraft may operate east of 24 degrees East (approximately 100nm from Soviet territory at the closet point);

* no Allied naval vessels may operate in Norwegian territorial waters east of 24 degrees East;

* no Allied exercises are permitted in the northernmost county of Finnmark, which borders on the Soviet Union; and

* the number of Allied air and naval forces allowed simultaneously in various parts of Norway are limited, and must be approved by the Norwegian government’s Security Committee, as are the weapons they can carry.\textsuperscript{11}

Norwegian security policy on nuclear weapons is aimed at diminishing expectations that nuclear weapons would be used in crisis or war in the Northern region. Specifically,
Norwegian policy implies:

* nuclear weapons will not be produced, tested, stored nor stationed in Norway;

* Norwegian forces will not enter into cooperative agreements for transfer of nuclear weapons in an emergency;

* special munition sites for nuclear weapons will not be built in Norway; and

* Norwegian weapon systems will not be certified for nuclear munitions.

The Base Policy garners much political support in Norway and is Norway's "most important element in the posture of restraint." These restrictions are designed to limit Norway's NATO membership and to maintain a state of low tension by prohibiting the peacetime establishment of foreign troops and bases, prohibiting the deployment of nuclear weapons, and restricting full-scale Allied exercise participation. According to Minister Holst, it has been "a central goal of Norwegian security policy to maintain that low state of tension, not as an end in itself but as a means to an end; to prevent the outbreak of war; to safeguard our sovereignty, freedom, and right to determine how to develop our own society; and to prevent developments in a sensitive region from jeopardizing East-West stability." It is important to note that Norway's Base Policy is political in nature. Self-restraint is self-imposed, not based upon agreements with other states, and conditional since it applies only as long as Norway is not subject to crisis or threats of attack.

Norway's national security policy is linked with the concept of the Nordic Balance, coined by Arne Olar Bruntland of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Although
Nordic countries chose different roads to security as illustrated by Figure 1, over time the
chosen policies have "crystallized into a coherent pattern of mutual consideration and
restraint." Key elements of the Nordic Balance concept include:

* Finnish pledges by treaty to repel attacks on herself or on the Soviets through
Finnish territory and to consult with the Soviets if threatened by Germany;

* Swedish reaffirmation of non-alignment in peace-time and armed neutrality in war;

* Icelandic membership in NATO but lack of her own military forces and reliance
on the American Icelandic Defense Force;

* Norwegian and Danish support as founding NATO members but self-denial policies
prohibiting stationing of foreign troops or nuclear weapons on their territory in
peacetime; and

* Soviet potential to dominate the region militarily but lack of coercive force to
date.\textsuperscript{15}

The Nordic Balance is not a true balance among the Nordic states since they are not
poised against one another but does apply to military engagement in the Nordic region by
outside powers. Norway’s role in the Nordic Balance reinforces the concept of self-restraint
and encourages the Norwegian national security policy of reassurance. Norwegian leaders
believe this concept contributes to stability and a low degree of tension in all of Nordic
Europe. Future Norwegian national security policies will seek to maintain the effect these
policies have achieved: a high degree of harmony among the Nordic states, a reinforcement
link with the United States for deterrence, and a mutually acceptable regional security
relationship with the Soviet Union.
CHAPTER III

IMMEDIATE NORWEGIAN SECURITY CHALLENGES

The net assessment of trends and changes in the North differ significantly from those in the center of Europe. Throughout the period of the Cold War the major tension field was concentrated in Central Europe while the Northern areas remained by and large a region of low tension. In the post-Cold War era the roles may be reversed.\textsuperscript{16}

Johan Jorgen Holst
Norwegian Minister of Defense

Short term challenges to Norwegian security involve two different security problems. The first problem is the need to shield Norway from the deepening crisis in the Soviet Union/Russian Republic and the instability in Eastern Europe. Paradoxically, the second problem is almost opposite in nature, and stems from the need to maintain links to an increasingly integrated Western Europe.

The growing Soviet internal crisis and its potential to overflow into the Nordic region are the most serious immediate security challenges facing Norway\textsuperscript{17}. With a 2,642 km straight-line coastline (28,000 km counting fjords) on the Norwegian and Barents Seas, a 176 km border with the Soviet Union/Russian Republic, and a 716 km border with Finland, Figure 2, Norway's 4.2 million population occupy an enormous territory of great strategic value that they cannot defend alone.\textsuperscript{18} The risk that the Soviet internal crisis will
expand is significant. With the irreversible economic decline fueling political and social instabilities, the possibility of internal disintegration and conflict is increasing.

Within the context of this first security challenge, three potential scenarios generate immediate Norwegian security problems. The least hazardous scenario is a large population flow from economically poor parts of Eastern Europe to economically richer parts of Western Europe. Witnessed in central Europe after the Warsaw frontiers were opened in 1989, this spill-over could occur in the North if the Soviet Union/Russian Republic opens its frontiers, and if prolonged economic hardships and civil unrest prevail internally. For Norwegian leaders, the "general dangers that must be observed...are the elements of unpredictability, propensity for erratic behavior, and potential for spill-over associated with Soviet decline and explosive centrifugal pressures." Although this potential exodus does not pose a military threat, the influx would require increased military and border capabilities, more police protection to handle anticipated increases in crime, new administrative controls to provide humanitarian assistance, a vigorous coast guard or naval capability to seal borders if necessary, and new legislative controls to deal with increased instability.

Large-scale conflicts in the Northwestern parts of the Soviet Union or the outbreak of a civil war drive a second scenario hazardous to Norwegian security. This scenario is created by internal Soviet violence which generates military threats or combat between conflicting factions which overflows into adjacent Nordic territory. This scenario requires Norway to prevent violation of her territorial integrity and to increase and sustain military
readiness at an appropriate level for as long as necessary to combat regional instabilities.

Third, the riskiest scenario develops if Soviet leadership reverts to a hard-line policy, including domestic repression, a hostile attitude to the world outside the Soviet Union/Russian Republic, and the use of military force in Europe. Under this scenario, an adjacent and relatively isolated Norway becomes extremely vulnerable. This contingency requires maintaining and sustaining a classic defense capability against deliberate military pressure or aggression and has a serious impact on Norwegian national security.  

As highlighted by these scenarios, Norway's immediate security challenges continue to shape Norwegian security policy by the need to weigh peace-time demands for stability against crisis demands for military effectiveness.

Although these scenarios do not fit the classical type of security threat for which Norway has traditionally prepared, they do involve complicated and potentially dangerous situations which are becoming more possible in the New Europe. According to Minister Holst, "the main problem in the Norwegian security policy is not a clear and present danger of military attack, but rather the need to constrain and block attack options in the future under different and unpredictable political conditions. It is a matter of guarding against unspecified dangers in an uncertain world rather than building against a specific threat."  

Accordingly, the major hazards associated with these scenarios reveal that the
Norwegian security environment is placed at risk by four threat related factors from the Soviet Union/Russian Republic.

* Soviet capabilities in the North are actually growing with redirected Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) assets;
* the Soviet Northern Fleet has been strengthened by force structure changes and construction programs;
* the residual military presence on the Kola Peninsula remains formidable; and
* the Soviet operational patterns in the North to demonstrate increased economic and military interest in the Northern region.

The first factor that places the Norwegian security environment at risk is the post-CFE build-up of Soviet forces in the Northern region. The steady transfer of Soviet ground and air assets from Central Europe to the Far North threatens Nordic regional stability. Norwegian allegations that the Soviets are storing equipment for 1.5 infantry brigades on the Kola Peninsula also increase the level of tension. Specifically, frontal aviation units are being transferred from Central Europe to the Leningrad (St. Petersburg) Military District (LMD) and assigned to the Navy’s Coastal Defense Command (CDC), established in 1988. The Soviets claim the ground and air units transferred to the CDC are exempt from CFE treaty limitations. Existing ground units in the North at a low readiness level are redesignated as coastal defense forces and augmented with modern treaty-limited equipment (TLE). New ground units are under the CDC and stocked with TLE’s. The equipment involved, Tables I and II, includes some of the most modern in the Soviet arsenal. The
Northern Fleet’s force now has 100 theater bombers, 70 tactical aircraft, 431 tanks, and 224 artillery pieces. If this destabilizing trend continues, the Northern Fleet will operate one of Northern Europe’s largest ground forces.22

Second, Soviet naval developments in strategic nuclear forces, naval ships and amphibious forces provide another threat related factor that places the Norwegian security environment at risk. Although the Soviets have initiated significant changes throughout their armed forces recently, the Soviet naval force structure and construction program remain relatively unaffected by the reforms taking place elsewhere. Despite the fact that Soviet naval exercises have decreased since SPRINGEX 1985 and some obsolescent ships have been scrapped, the Northern Fleet has received 32 new large combatants over the same period. "The Soviet military retreat [in Europe] and the growing internal weakness of the U.S.S.R...leaves the strategic nuclear forces as one of the few - if not only - remaining assets giving the Soviets a claim to great power status."23

Table III outlines the development of the Soviet SSBN force in the Northern Fleet and illustrates that the SSBN force has actually increased over the last four years from 3,173 warheads in 1987 to 3,636 warheads in 1990 - with 100% of this increase in the Northern Fleet’s TYPHOON and DELTA IV submarines. As a result, Northern Fleet submarines carry 72% of all Soviet SLBM warheads which stimulates Soviet and United States strategic interest in the Northern region and Arctic operating areas. Even with a significant cut in SLBM’s due to implementation of the START treaty, the majority of Soviet SSBN’s will
probably be based in the Northern Fleet. Since Kola bases provide the only good access to the Arctic Ocean, for which the TYPHOON and DELTA IV were specifically designed, the strategic importance of Norwegian waters is likely to increase.\textsuperscript{24}

The Northern Fleet lost 29 old units (16 submarines and 13 surface ships) and received 27 new units (18 submarines and 9 surface ships) in the last four years. While the size remained relative constant, the quality and combat capability of the Soviet Northern Fleet improved considerably. In fact, two new classes of large aircraft carriers are indicative of an expanded shipbuilding program and are causes for security concerns among Norwegian leaders.

Northern Fleet amphibious forces contribute to the increase in Soviet conventional forces in the North. With the addition of the IVAN ROGOV class, the full amphibious force can now lift one naval infantry brigade with its heavy equipment in one lift configured for assault landing under battle conditions. Additionally, sufficient roll-on/roll-off capability is available to lift a second brigade and one full motorized infantry division. The Northern Fleet has infantry increased from one brigade in 1987 to two brigades. Dedicated air support has also increased with the addition of 40 MIG-27 FLOGGER fighter/ground attack aircraft to the Kola in 1990, and six regiments with 90 SU-24 FENCER long-range bombers and 90 SU-17 FITTERs to the Baltic Military District in 1989.\textsuperscript{25}

Finally, Soviet operational patterns in the North demonstrate increased economic and
military interest in the Northern region, particularly in the Arctic. Traditionally, three conditions have contributed to Soviet interest in the Arctic:

* the East-West conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Republic;
* new developments in military technology which produced long-range strategic weapons and delivery platforms; and
* strategic geographic conditions which made the Arctic a suitable deployment area for nuclear weapons systems.26

The process of detente, evident in Central Europe, has not yet disrupted these conditions significantly. The withdrawal of the Northern Fleet’s strategic forces to Arctic waters and the Soviets rear deployment strategy have led the United States to counter with a maritime strategy that also projects strategic forces into the Arctic Ocean and the Norwegian Sea. In many respects, the Arctic has been transformed from a military vacuum to a military flank to a military front. The Soviets continue to elevate the status of the Northern Fleet in relation to other Soviet military forces and to use the Arctic waters as a northern patrol option/deployment area for SSBN’s, as represented in Figure 3. Regional militarization is evidenced by the current under-ice deployment of TYPHOON and DELTA IV class submarines equipped with SS-18/20 capabilities. Because two of the most available Arctic transit routes on a year-round basis, based upon sufficient depth and ice-free geography, are between Bear Island and Northern Norway, and between Franz Joseph Land and Novaya Zemlya, Figure 4,27 Norwegian security is placed at risk by Soviet deployments.
The development of the Arctic also strengthens Soviet interest in the Svalbard archipelago. Because of the increased use of the Arctic Ocean by the Northern Fleet and Svalbard's position directly in the sea lane leading into the central Arctic Basin between open and ice-covered waters, Svalbard retains its long-term military and economic interest to the Soviets. Although the Svalbard Treaty guarantees demilitarization of the archipelago, the Soviets continue to violate the spirit of Article 9 with military and economic incursions, including oil explorations into the "Gray Area" near Svalbard. As instability in the Soviet Union/Russian Republic increases, "Norway's strategic calculus is influenced directly and tangibly by the operational deployments of naval forces and submarine-based strategic forces in the Northern region and ...below the polar ice-cap."²⁸

The problem of residual military presence in the Kola Peninsula from Soviet air and naval bases, Figure 5, is formidable. The development of the Northern Fleet has continued, Soviet forces next to the Nordic region have been pushed over the CFE limits, the number of air and ground combat units in the North has increased, and the power projection capabilities of the unstable Soviet Union/Russian Republic into the Norwegian Sea and the Arctic Ocean have increased. These threat related factors which place the Norwegian security environment at risk, coupled with the scenarios developed earlier, indicate that one of the immediate concerns of Norwegian national security policy is to shield Norway from crisis and instability in the Soviet Union/Russian Republic.

The need to maintain economic and military links to an integrated Western Europe

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presents Norway with a second immediate security challenge. Although Norway is not a member of the Economic Community, she is dependent upon trade access with Western Europe and needs to safeguard those economic links. Table IV indicates that 78% of import trade and 82% of Nordic export trade is with the EEC, European Free Trade Association (EFTA) of which Norway is a member, Canada and United States. Risks to that important European trade link have important security related ramifications. From a security perspective, increased European integration raises regional tensions if the Soviet Union/Russian Republic leadership perceives that Norway joined a potentially hostile alliance, particularly if the Nordic region were consequently involved in any conflict between that alliance and the U.S.S.R./Russia. For example, Soviet perception that a future Nordic role in the EC compromises Swedish neutrality, Finnish neutrality, and Norwegian reassurance increases regional tensions. Additionally, integration implicates Norway in any future conflict between European economic or military organizations and the U.S.S.R./Russian Republic. European integration, most importantly economic as evidenced in Table V which indicates the value of intra-Nordic trade, might disrupt intra-Nordic relations. If some Nordic states opt for EC membership while others do not, the Nordic Balance may be strained, specifically if the EC develops a framework for a new and different emphasis on collective security. Potential security challenges arise if Norway fosters closer ties with an integrated Europe which incorporates Eastern Europe into a Western security structure. Rapid integration invites renewed Soviet political interference while a slow response produces a power vacuum that invites regional military clashes.

As Minister Holst concludes, "unequal power has a tendency to result in unequal
arrangements when great and small states deal with security issues.\textsuperscript{31} Norwegians need to anchor all cooperative European security arrangements with caution to meet their immediate security challenges, and "seek to preserve the cohesion and coherence of the all-European framework and prevent their scission by regionalization."\textsuperscript{32}
CHAPTER IV
LONG-TERM NORWEGIAN SECURITY CHALLENGES

The maritime competition in Northern waters will influence the shape and form of the security situation in Northwestern Europe in the years ahead. The Norwegian perspective will be one of restraint and confidence measures against the ripple effects of intensified competition in Northern waters.33

Johan Jorgen Holst
Norwegian Minister of Defense

Long-term security problems for Norway in the new Europe consist of the continued presence of the unstable Soviet Union/Russian Republic as a conventional and nuclear force in the North, and the return to a multipolar European political system. These concerns generate three long-term Norwegian security needs:

* the need to review the U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic relationship;

* the need to maintain a military link to the U.S.; and

* the need to maintain a Eurostrategic perspective.

Although the U.S. and Soviet nuclear relationship may undergo a fundamental change as a result of internal developments within the Soviet Union, the relationship plays an important role in Nordic security. As stated by Minister Holst, "Norway’s security predicament is shaped by conditions beyond Norway’s reach. It is shaped primarily by developments within the central balance of nuclear deterrence and by the global competition.
of the two principal military powers of the world. Because the Soviets view Nordic Europe as a vital strategic area, Figure 6, base offensive strategic forces on the Kola Peninsula, and continue the Arctic under-ice orientation of their SSBN forces, nuclear interest in the Nordic area remains intense and could increase. Since the only Soviet bases with access to Arctic are on the Kola Peninsula, all TYPHOONs and DELTA IVs have been Kola based. Proposed START reductions will not alleviate this situation as most Soviet SSBNs remaining after cuts will probably be based on the Kola Peninsula.

To balance Soviet SSBN capabilities, the U.S. emphasizes strategic ASW in the North which makes Norwegian waters valuable to the U.S. START counting rules, long-range bomber production, and ALCM developments make Northern airspace more important, particularly Norwegian airspace which provides an optimum strategic location for U.S. ALCM's directed against the Soviet Union. Thus, Norway's link to the U.S. increases the strategic nuclear importance of Norwegian waters and airspace despite changes in the European security environment. As summarized by Minister Holst, Norwegians cannot forget that in their security calculus "the nation which wields command of the sea is able to come to the assistance of the littoral states or to threaten them."

Norway's long-term security need is to maintain United States presence in Northern waters to prevent subjugation of these waters to Soviet territorialization through Soviet presence and Western absence. A common U.S. and Norwegian interest exists and is served by continued American presence. The challenge to Norwegian security policy comes from
the need to prevent adjacent sea areas from becoming an arena of intensive U.S. and Soviet Union/Russian Republic rivalry and competition.

The importance of the Nordic region also increases from a Eurostrategic perspective. Because of Soviet withdrawal from Central Europe, the retraction from the Soviet military barrier form the West Germany - East Germany border, the loss of the East European states as Soviet buffer zones, and the instabilities of the Soviet republics with regard to the central union; Norway recognizes that the Baltic and Nordic borders now represent front-line borders of vital importance to Russia’s defense and European security. According to Minister Holst, "the danger to be avoided by a peripheral state in the process of transformation and reconstruction in Europe is that of regionalization or decoupling from the general security order of Europe."37
CHAPTER V

ASSESSMENT OF NORWEIGAN SECURITY STRATEGY

AND MILITARY FORCES

Norway is engaged inextricably in the broad process of transformation in Europe and most particularly in the travails of a major power which is also a neighboring power. The future is wrapped in uncertainty. Defense planning is focused, therefore, on how to deal with uncertainty and its implications.\textsuperscript{38}

Johan Jorgen Holst
Norwegian Minister of Defense

While the Soviet Union today is no longer in the position to wage a multi-threat, all European war, the four developed threat related factors indicate that the Soviet Union does retain the military capability to wage a regional war in a single theater, particularly in the North. The three scenarios highlighted earlier indicate that Norway requires timely and dedicated security preparations focused on crisis management. Greater demands will be placed on the speed and flexibility of Norwegian readiness. Strong political leadership will have to be integrated with military contingency planning. New crisis management roles will have to emerge for the military, police, frontier guards and emergency environmental protection units. To determine if Norway can meet these new crisis management roles, focused on unstable regional threats, and the requirements for timely and dedicated security preparations, focused on classic military defense capabilities, an assessment of Norwegian
security strategy and available military forces in the Far North is required.

Rear Admiral Rolf Pedersen, Inspector General of the Royal Norwegian Navy, states that Norwegian strategy consists of three stages to sustain balance between security and reassurance:

* maintain adequate forces in north Norway at a high level of training and readiness;
* ensure adequate holding time to enable reinforcements from southern Norway to mobilize and reinforce northern Norway; and
* endure until NATO's reinforcements arrive.\(^3\)

According to Admiral Pedersen this strategy "maintains low tension in north Norway and, at the same time, safeguards her sovereignty and freedom of action;" recognizes that "Norway must rely on timely reinforcements when we ask for them in a critical situation" to achieve these strategic goals; and requires that "the Norwegian military must be able to hold out until NATO reinforcements reach Northern theaters."\(^4\) Minister Holst adds that, in general terms, Norwegian strategy has been:

* maintain membership in an Alliance which will deter an enemy attack through a credible balance of power;
* maintain balanced national military forces which will be a part of deterrence;
* hold Norwegian territory in crisis until reinforcements arrive and then defeat the enemy; and
* keep the level of tension in the Northern region as low as possible through
constraints and confidence-building measures.  

To understand this strategy, several geographic and social constraints which strongly influence all Norwegian security decisions must be considered:

* Long, rugged terrain. Mountainous with a fjord-edged coastline, Norway is between 250 and 4 mi wide over her 1250 mi length.

* Limited transportation infrastructure. Norway is roughly divided into three zones: the southern, south of Trondheim, is home to 90% of the population and is served by many roads and several railroads, despite rugged terrain; the northern, north of Bodo, has no rail lines and is served by limited roads dependent on ferries in places; and the narrow middle, which depends primarily on one main road and one rail line. Strategically, all significant military transportation north of Trondheim is difficult.

* Maritime domination. Norway's long coastline is dotted by more 50,000 islands. Additionally, Norway has the island territories of Jan Mayen in the Norwegian Sea, and Bear Island together with the Svalbard (Spitzbergen) archipelago in the Arctic Ocean. Norway's maritime nature, combined with her narrow width, necessitates an emphasis on maritime surveillance and defense from amphibious assault.

* Arctic climate. Several major Norwegian air bases lie north of the Arctic Circle and are subject routinely to harsh climatic conditions.

* Sparse population in the North. Less than 500,000 people live in the three counties that populate the northern half of Norway. The northernmost county of Finnmark has a population of less than 75,000.
Physical isolation from NATO and a common border with the Soviet Union. Norway shares no borders with other NATO states, with a 65 mi transit across the Danish straits as the shortest distance to an Alliance partner. Although the Norwegian-Soviet border is short, approximately 70 mi, Norway and the Soviet Union are separated by less than 120 mi along more than a 100 mi front. Major air and naval bases in North Norway, Figure 7, are particularly isolated.

Socially, Norway’s small population (4,226,000 in 1989) and almost zero population growth coupled with certain social policies and traditions, particularly a strong commitment to the social welfare system, constrain defense capabilities. The cost of Norway’s social system and the high priority given to it limit military budgets. As part of her commitment to social welfare, Norway extends the coverage of national work laws to members of the military, including officers through the rank of Major, by limiting working hours and controlling working conditions. Furthermore, members of the military may join unions to ensure compliance with these laws and to press grievances, although strikes are not allowed. Norway attempts to maintain military compensation at comparable civilian levels. These factors raise personnel costs, lower readiness and training levels, and place great burdens on overworked staffs. (Military compensation alone normally accounts for more than 40% of annual defense budgets). Limiting working hours, restricting night and weekend assignments to avoid paying overtime rates, and curtailing budgets to prevent extra costs cause Norwegian military forces to place greater emphasis on efficient use of their time, training opportunities and operational missions. Norway’s role in certain Allied
exercises is also reduced.\textsuperscript{42}

* Reduced defense spending. As noted by Major General Gullow Gjeseth of the Norwegian Defense Commission, "in spite of the great uncertainty about developments in the Soviet Union, the next defense budget does not foreshadow any changes on Norway’s part...and the government [as confirmed by Prime Minister Gro Harlem Bruntland publicly on 19 August 1991] will continue its line of making cuts and reducing the size of the armed forces."\textsuperscript{43} As seen in Table VI, Norway has averaged only 3.3\% of her Gross Domestic Product on defense since 1960 and spent 3.4\% in 1989. Norwegian Defense Chief, Admiral Torolf Rein, warns that "unless the defense budget is increased we must reduce our peace-time forces considerably, if we are not to totally destroy our defense forces." With a peace-time force of 40,000 of whom 26,000 are conscripts and 12,000 are enlisted Admiral Rein adds that a reduction of 5,000 could close down several garrisons, stations and bases during the 1990’s. The Admiral concludes "if there are problems reducing the peace-time armed forces, this will have a serious effect on the forces in time of crisis or war...In the worst case we will not find out how much is required to protect our security until it is too late."\textsuperscript{44}

In spite of these constraints, Norwegian military forces have two primary functions to support their security strategy. In the North, they must maintain readiness and prepare for NATO reinforcement capabilities to prevent a regional power from launching an isolated attack or pressuring northern Norway in a crisis situation. In the South, they must reinforce and support northern Norway. The available forces to meet these functions are: the Royal
Norwegian Navy (RNoN), Royal Norwegian Army (RNoA), Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF), Total Defense Concept additions, and NATO reinforcements.

Norwegian naval defense forces, Table VII, consist of three branches:
* Coastal artillery with coastal batteries, torpedo batteries and controllable minefields;
* Navy with submarines, frigates, motor torpedo boats (MTB), minelayers, minesweepers, and auxiliary ships; and
* Coast Guard which functions as part of the RNoN.

These forces have as their main mission the protection of Norwegian territory from maritime risk, threats or attacks. This mission is divided into three main portions:
* surveillance to assess and implement necessary measures in response to irregularities in coastal and ocean areas including environmental pollution;
* anti-invasion to delay or divert a crisis from invasion;
* protection of SLOC's to safeguard ports and sea lanes.

Surveillance is accomplished by submarines, maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), coast guard vessels, coastal artillery units, coastal radar stations and an alert coastal population to provide an outer line of defense along Norway's 28,000 km coastline. The maritime triad of the anti-invasion concept centers around delays and channelization; survivability and perseverance; and mobility and concentration of forces. The delay and channelization effect is designed to win time for Norway to concentrate her forces, Table VII, or channel naval
invasion to areas less vulnerable or easier to defend. This effect is accomplished by coastal artillery installations located to protect the entrances to crucial resource centers; 20 seafront batteries; defensive minefields; and new ULA (S-300) and updated KOBKEN (S-318) submarines. 38 MTB’s and 61 F-16 fighters provide mobility and concentration of forces to inflict losses on enemy amphibious and troop transport ships before an invasion force comes ashore. Protection of SLOC’s is important because ground/rail transportation between northern and southern Norway is extremely limited. To protect important approaches to key facilities (supply bases north of Ofotfjord, the Navy’s main base at Haakonsvern, and vital SLOC’s between Trondelag and Vestfjord); Norwegian frigates, corvettes, Coast Guard vessels and requisitioned vessels with sonar and mines are used. MPA and MTB’s are used for interdiction while OSLO class F-300’s, SEA SPARROWS, RNoAF HAWK missiles, and coastal artillery missiles provide air defense.45

The RNoA is truly a mobilization army with a peacetime strength of 22,000 and a mobilization strength of 165,000. The majority of the standing land forces are stationed in North Norway in the Finnmark and Troms Land Districts. After mobilization, the Army can field 13 independent brigades, six of which would be stationed in North Norway. Table VIII provides the ground forces likely to be committed to North Norway in crisis and the estimated time after mobilization it will take for these forces to be available in place. The Home Guard forms an important adjunct to Norway’s regular forces and plays a key role in the mobilization process required for crisis stability. Home Guard members keep their weapons at home, report to their mobilization point within three hours, and conduct LOC
protection, local roadblocks and sabotage.  

"The primary task of the RNoAF, both nationally and in the NATO context, is defensive air defense of key areas and air bases to secure Norwegian and NATO air, land and naval operations." The major effort is to establish air superiority over key defense areas. The RNoAF has three air defense regions: North Norway, from Bodo northward; Central Norway, between Trondheim and Bodo; and South Norway, the country south of Trondheim. North Norway is the principal theater of anticipated conflict and the location of the most important air bases. Potential hazards to NATO ground forces and air bases dominate defense concerns. Central Norway is the critical link between conflict in the North and the logistics base of the South. With only one major road and rail line connecting the two regions, the possibility of interdiction monopolizes concerns in this central region since these lines must move several brigades and most supplies in crisis. With few military transport aircraft and potential for crowded runway conditions in Northern air bases, protection of this central zone is a critical element for the defense of Norway. South Norway serves as the logistic base for the defense of Norway and provides most of Norway’s reserves and Allied ground reinforcements in crisis. 

This operational concept requires a defense-in-depth with F-16 fighters providing forward defense and area Norwegian Adapted HAWK (NOAH) surface-air missiles (SAM) deployed to defend the six main air bases in north and central Norway. SHORAD systems supply the second and third layers of defense. (Available RNoAF assets are summarized in
Table IX and the most significant Norwegian air bases are identified in Figure 8. Consistent with Norwegian strategy, it is important to note that "the main purpose of the initial air defense is to secure air bases and harbors for the reception of Allied reinforcements." Although the strength of available Norwegian forces should not be underestimated, they will be no match for the Soviet Union/Russian Republic forces in a regional crisis or most hazardous scenario and will depend upon NATO reinforcements.

Norwegian political culture and desire to maintain low tension in the Northern region have a major impact on Norway's security posture. "Since Norwegian political authorities do not want to depend on deployment of NATO reinforcements before hostilities begin, they have stressed the need to defend Norway long enough for reinforcements to arrive." According to Minister Holst, "Norway has not structured her defense strictly in accordance with the principles of forward defense, having chosen instead to concentrate her force deployments in the county of Troms in order to exploit the configuration of terrain to maximum benefit and deny the would be attacker the strategic benefit of access and control over the SLOC's... Finnmark will have only a trip-wire made up of two battalion groups." Troms not Finnmark contains the heaviest concentration of ground forces for defense and Kirkenes will not be one of six major bases defended by the NOAH system. The Nordkalott Area, Figure 9, accounts for 31% of the total area of the three countries involved in the Far North (the counties of Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark in Norway; the county of Norbotten in Sweden; and the county of Lapland in Finland) but the area's 925,000 inhabitants represent only 5% of their population. Norway does not intend to meet her security
challenges in the Far North with a large amount of indigenous military forces, mobilization assets, or regional assistance from other Nordic countries, but intends to depend upon NATO reinforcements in crisis.

Norway's security calculus is founded upon the available NATO reinforcements Norway will expect in crisis and the length of time required for those reinforcements to reach Norway. Within NATO, Figure 10, Norwegian forces fall within the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) chain of command under the command of Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), headquartered at Kolsas, which is divided into the three subordinate commands of North Norway (NON), South Norway (SONOR), and Baltic Approaches (BALTAP). In peacetime, AFNORTH's forces in Norway consist entirely of Norwegian units in accordance with Norway's Base Policy. In crisis, Norway expects, Table IX, to be reinforced with the following ground forces:

* Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (three multinational brigades and four multinational fighter squadrons);
* 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) (one large, USMC MEB to be stationed near Trondelag with POMCUS in central Norway); and
* 3rd Commando Brigade (Dutch and United Kingdom Royal Marines trained in Nordic operations form SACLANT, Table VIII.

North Norway will expect reinforcement at eight Co-located Operating Bases (COB), each capable of receiving one USAF squadron and limited NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) support, Table X. External reinforcements, not including NATO Carrier Battle
Groups (CVBG) which remain at sea or NATO MPA assets which staging from Iceland, comprise more than half of the ground forces and 200-300 aircraft to be deployed into North Norway in a major crisis.\textsuperscript{52}

This dependence on NATO reinforcements becomes particularly hazardous if Norwegian political delays in requesting these forces are exploited. In the most critical scenario, if NATO reinforcements have not arrived before the conflict begins, the RNoAF alone provides the air defense of North Norway. Air commanders would face the difficult decision of how to use the limited number of aircraft available. The fighter-interceptor attack role of the Norwegian F-16’s does not include ground support missions, but is limited to air defense and a special interdictions mission (interdicting amphibious ships in fjords). Failure to defend arriving ground reinforcements in crisis means fewer ground forces are available and higher rates of attrition occur. Failure to interdict amphibious threats means losing the opportunity to attack when opposing flanks are more exposed and vulnerable. Failure to conduct air defense and intercept missions in a major crisis allows the enemy to gain air superiority and prevents the arrival of ground reinforcements by attacks on airfields and ports. Air power, therefore, plays a critical role in determining success on the ground in North Norway during a crisis. Reinforcement delays could allow opposing forces to outflank Norwegian and NATO defenses in the Northern region.

Despite recent pre-positioning programs, air reinforcements are still needed to bring extensive amounts of material and personnel to Norway in a crisis. For example, the 4th
MEB is estimated to need 250-350 strategic airlift sorties, two Norwegian brigades 50-100 small civilian aircraft sorties, and the UK/Dutch Commandos 100-150 strategic airlift sorties. The entire effort to reinforce Norway with ground and air forces in a hazardous scenario requires 600-800 sorties. Table XI estimates the airlift capability of Norwegian bases assuming good weather, no counter-air, and an unrestricted number of airlift aircraft. (Banak and Kirkenes are probably not be usable in a major crisis since they are not protected by M/SAM and closer to Soviet air bases than other Norwegian air bases.) By comparing the distances from Soviet to Norwegian air bases, Table XII, it is estimated that Andoya, Bardufoss and Evenes are within SU-17 and MIG-27 range while Bodo, Orland and Trondheim are within SU-24 and TU-16 range. Each of these Norwegian air bases is susceptible to runway cratering operations by fighter-bomber missions. While closing all northern Norwegian air bases to tactical aviation would require a large number of enemy attack aircraft and a willingness to accept losses, Allied reinforcement would be complicated by denying base access to strategic airlift.

Tonne Huitfeldt, a former AFNORTH Commander, has reiterated that the effects of reinforcement delay would be greatly magnified by enemy air attacks in North Norway. If reinforcements are delayed politically and cannot arrive until after the bases have been closed or captured, the remaining bases could be overwhelmed quickly. Once reinforcements did arrive, the bases that remained open would be overcrowded and vulnerable. Arriving strategic airlift, Norwegian and NATO defense squadrons, Norwegian and NATO extended MPA missions, MEB and AMF aircraft, and bingo aircraft from NATO carriers operating
in the Norwegian Sea would compete for limited runway space.

In summarizing Norway's security challenges, Admiral Pedersen recently made the following overall assessment:

* Border incursions resulting from regional instabilities should be deterred by the harsh geography of Northern Norway, Northern garrisons, and naval defense forces until reinforcements arrive.
* Soviet modernization programs, redirected CFE assets, and construction efforts increase not decrease the risks on the Northern flank and reconfirm the need for Allied reinforcements in crisis.
* Norway's political culture, her agrarian economy and desire to maintain substantial social welfare systems, reduce Norwegian military budgets and weaken Norwegian defense. Consequently, Norway must resist pressures to make unwanted concessions and surrender freedom of action.55

Four major conclusions, then, can be identified when assessing the ability of Norwegian military forces to cope with her immediate and long-term security challenges and risks. First, Norway's political culture will not allow Norway's security calculus to be dominated by aggressive military options or actions. Reassurance, low tension, self-restraint and prudence, and limited defense budgets will remain key ingredients in all future security considerations. Second, Norway's geographical and social constraints will complicate Norwegian security objectives. Third, Norwegian surveillance forces, active brigades,
locally mobilized brigades, fighters, and MPA should be able to monitor and defend Norway against border incursions and spill-overs in the Northern region. New crisis management roles for local police and frontier guards are needed but not identified in Norway's security framework. They are, however, adaptable from mobilization responsibilities in the Total Defense Concept. Fourth, Norway "can't do it alone." Norway's strategic security objectives are linked to an Alliance, specifically to the U.S. through NATO. In any escalated crisis, Norway must count upon NATO reinforcements. Norwegian naval forces, cannot prevent Soviet territorialization of Northern waters. Norwegian forces are not be able to provide adequate defense alone and Norwegian strategic objectives in crisis will not be realized, if reinforcement has not arrived before conflict commences. Air defense, critical during initial mobilization to keep airfields and ports open as forces move from south to north, and to meet pre-positioned equipment, is also be limited. Political delays in preventing forces from mobilizing or reinforcement forces from deploying, place strategic airlift and critical cargo at risk. Future Norwegian security considerations, even if calculated from a Eurostrategic perspective, will depend upon an extraordinary amount of lift for reinforcement in crisis and be vulnerable to efforts to damage runways and air bases in Norway.

In the final analysis, Norway, as categorized by General Vigliek Eide, Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, is a small (40,000 active forces), tenacious adversary with extremely professional, competent military forces and the strongest commitment to mobilization (full mobilization includes 320,000 of 870,000 available manpower in the Total
Defense Concept) and defense of her sovereignty of any nation in the Atlantic Alliance.⁵⁶
CHAPTER VI

NORWEGIAN SECURITY OPTIONS IN AN EMERGING EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER

The end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of military deployments in Central Europe have created prospects for a new security based upon cooperation rather than confrontation.⁵⁷

Johan Jorgen Holst
Norwegian Minister of Defense

One of Norway's biggest security challenges is to determine how to integrate into the emerging European security order. European security organizations, Figure 11, have undergone fundamental changes recently and are "either dying (Warsaw Pact), evolving (CSCE), undergoing revitalization (WEU), restructuring to adjust to new security needs (NATO), or searching for new missions."⁵⁸ As noted earlier, however, risks to Norway and an emerging European security order might come from instability caused by a revanchist or disintegrating Soviet Union and ethnic conflict or transition problems in Europe. Western Europe, including Norway, may have exchanged the predictability of the Iron Curtain for a belt of instability.

Norway's role in NATO needs to be maintained at the present time because no other institution can adequately perform NATO's basic security functions. Until the structure of a new security framework becomes clear, NATO's near-term utility is to maintain peace and
order in Europe. Militarily, NATO is still necessary to counter the military potential of the Soviet Union/Russian Republic. Politically, NATO provides an institutionalized security structure where security issues are discussed in an open manner. NATO also gives assurance, during a period of European upheaval and transition, that the United States will remain committed to European peace and security, thereby inhibiting the prospect of new destabilizing alignments. Since a short-warning conventional military risk still exists on the Northern flank, this NATO link to timely U.S. reinforcements is particularly important to Norway.

Traditionally, the main pillars upon which Norwegian security policy have rested are a strong national defense and Alliance cooperation. As affirmed by Minister Holst, in an address on the future tasks of the Atlantic Alliance, "NATO has been the cornerstone of Norway's security" and supplies a viable framework for Norwegian security policy because:

* It provides protection against external threats. Norway cannot solve her defense problems by national efforts alone. The strategic significance of the country and area to be defended are too large for Norwegian resources to be adequate. NATO enables Norway to borrow military power and thus to ensure the essential equilibrium which remains a necessary condition for the preservation of peace.

* It contributes to positioning Norway in the pattern of international relations and thus avoids speculation concerning Norway's international course. NATO constitutes a defense community based on common values and political principles and its members share the interest of protecting those values and principles.
NATO provides a link between Norway and the broader security order in Europe reducing the vulnerability of a peripheral location. The multilateral cooperation NATO provides is a counterweight to the pressures of strategic competition in an area of high strategic stakes and interests and equalizes Norway's essential link with the U.S. to ensure common security in the North.

The Alliance ensures access for Norway to the major political deliberations of Europe and reduces the dangers of isolation and illusion.59

During the Cold War, NATO's mission was described by using the dictum that "the purpose of NATO was to keep the Soviets out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. The new purpose of NATO within the context of European security might be described as pulling the East up, bringing Europe together, and keeping the Americans in."60 As NATO adjusts to the needs of a new emerging European order in the post-Cold War environment, this new purpose is translated into the following goals:

* deter any residual Soviet threat;

* provide some collaborative structure for Western security ties with the Soviet Union;

* encourage democratization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe;

* extend a degree of stability to Eastern Europe through assistance, conflict resolution, and if necessary peacekeeping;

* keep Germany as an integral part of the Alliance and the European Market;

* maintain strong U.S. ties with and influence on European defense efforts; and
* organize Western responses to crises.\textsuperscript{61}

The challenge for NATO members, including Norway, is to adjust to the new emerging European order and to accomplish these goals with less military emphasis, but not at the expense of spending the political capital necessary to hold the Alliance together.

Norway has endorsed the broad outlines of NATO's transformation which were developed in the London Declaration of July 1990:

* the Warsaw Pact would no longer be considered an adversary;

* conventional forces would be smaller, highly mobile, more versatile, increasingly multinational, and more reliant on reserves and force reconstitution; and

* nuclear forces would be truly weapons of last resort.

Ongoing adjustments to implement the London Declaration will be discussed at the November 1991 NATO summit in Rome, which is expected to put the new NATO policies into final form. As part of this transformation

"the Strategic Review Group, chaired by Great Britain's Michael Legge, is considering alternatives to existing NATO doctrine. Forward defense will be discarded in favor of a doctrine that allows for mobility and some forward positioning. Flexible response will be recast to make it consistent with reduced tactical nuclear force deployments...In general, Legge's review will recommend a broader approach to security issues in which military force is not dominant and crisis management is a more important tool."\textsuperscript{62}

Although Norway's security is linked traditionally to NATO, "NATO could be an
impediment to European stability and to amicable transatlantic relations if its presence were to foster an illusion of well-being that precluded the creation of alternative security structures to deal with the qualitatively different challenges of the new Europe." This long-term NATO disutility could manifest itself in three ways.

First, normalization of Soviet relations with the West and the reunification of Germany may aggravate conflicting threat perceptions among NATO partners. Progressive relaxation of military tensions in Central Europe might cause NATO to discount the threat to the Northern flank posed by Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula - at Norway’s expense. Polarization of political and military interests within NATO increases security risks for Norway.

Second, redefining the threat may create tensions between the United States and European Allies. The United States desires to keep the focus on the U.S.S.R. ensure solidarity in NATO and maintain U.S. influence in Europe. Secretary of Defense Cheney emphasized recently that the United States "understands the desire of our European Allies to address the security dimension as they come to grips with the very important issues of economic and political integration" but reiterated that "Washington still believes 'very deeply' that NATO should remain the foundation of Western Europe’s security...NATO is the mechanism by which the U.S. has been involved and will stay involved in the questions of European security." European Allies, on the other hand, are investing their energy in the politics of Europeanization and in development of a new European security plan. This
investment may hazard the important transatlantic link needed to underwrite Norwegian security since the United States intends to preserve an influential security role in Europe while guiding the European community towards policies that will not restrict the export of U.S. goods and capital.

Third, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe may request NATO membership which necessitates a change in NATO's framework. Although Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich-Genscher have recently called for creation of a new group, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, to link NATO closer to the nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, this option remains limited unless addressed by the entire NATO summit in November 1991.

"Until recently, many European officials believed that the new security order should be built on the foundations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a Soviet inspired forum that ironically became a catalyst for detente during the Cold War." The CSCE has many advantages. The CSCE contains all the European nations except Albania. Since it includes the Soviet Union, the prospect of European integration is enhanced. The CSCE is committed to progress on political, security, economic, and human rights activities which makes its vision compatible with a new Europe. With the membership of the United States and Canada, the CSCE can pursue European goals without sacrificing the stabilizing presence of the North American pillar. The establishment by the CSCE of an Executive Secretariat, a Conflict Prevention Center, and a mechanism to monitor national
elections is also a positive move toward European unity.

Although the CSCE may provide a positive framework for change, currently it has no way of enforcing security policies without the threat of military sanctions and is hampered by the inability of its 34 member nations to agree to a common security program. The cumbersome CSCE may to ease regional tensions between member states but it is incapable of preventing armed conflicts among revisionist states, particularly among nationalistic Eastern Europe, "unless it is prepared to use military force to enforce its collective decision-making authority."67 Certain observers also believe that a CSCE framework "is not likely to sustain an active commitment...since the CSCE architecture for post-Cold War Europe may accelerate the process of U.S. military retrenchment at the expense of continental stability."68

From a Norwegian perspective, the CSCE use for development of a system of confidence-building measures to include notification of independent naval exercises, combined air/land/sea exercises, and exercises by amphibious forces is needed. CSCE stabilization measures, including notification of rapid transfers of combat aircraft on the Kola Peninsula; separation of personnel and certain equipment (ACV's in air-land divisions); prohibition of major ground force deployments and exercises closer to national frontier areas than a fixed amount known in advance; and limitation of the numbers of tanks, ACV's, and artillery in motorized divisions are also desirable. As a CSCE member, Norway believes the CSCE enhances Norwegian security by "contributing to an infrastructure of a pattern of
mutual restraint and confidence-building behavior which would maintain and protect the condition of low tension in the Northern areas." Norwegian fears that Northern areas are not included in the processes of detente and arms regulation, like the remainder of Europe, can be reduced. Additionally, Norwegian leaders believe that an increased role for the CSCE constructively influences the Soviet Union, and encourage the CSCE to reduce security challenges in the Northern region. Within the context of a broader cooperative undertaking in Europe and a reinforced CSCE, Norway supports a CSCE security framework because the "CSCE could reduce the significance of borders and emphasize common responses to common challenges." In summary, the CSCE cannot meet Norway's security challenges because the "CSCE's security program is still at a rudimentary stage...and the CSCE is not an instrument of direct cooperation." The CSCE, however, can be a framework for indirect cooperation "for the formulation of political directives aimed at stimulating or developing cooperation organized within external agencies." 

The European Community (EC) provides another alternative to NATO for an emerging European security order. "Although West Europeans continue to believe that NATO and the U.S. military presence are necessary for their near-term security, a majority of them would prefer to see the Community form a defense organization to protect their interests in the future," according to a recent EC poll. Similarly, a U.S. Information Agency (USIA) opinion survey, conducted in June 1990, found that a majority of Europeans sampled favored a security structure that revolved around the EC. Since the EC constitutes the principal vehicle for change in the political reconstruction of Europe and is
presently engaged in a process of consolidation, Europeans are hopeful that the considerable progress the EC has made toward economic integration might eventually extend to political and security matters.

The decision taken by the European Council in Dublin in June 1990 to convene an Inter-Governmental Conference on European Political Union (EPU); the push for a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) by the European Council in Rome in December 1990; the draft CFSP treaty presented in April 1991; the agreement to merge the EC and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) into a European Economic Area (EEA) in October 1991; and the security agenda included in the upcoming EC summit in Maastricht in December 1991 indicate that, in the long-term, Europeans desire security policy to be a part of political reconstruction. Most significantly, with the agreement to create the EEA, Europeans took a decisive step toward building a unified Europe and demonstrated the growing influence of the EC. By merging the 12 nation EC with the seven member EFTA, Europe will create the world's largest trading bloc embracing 380 million Western Europeans. Paving the way for membership in the EC, which is rapidly moving toward social and political integration, as well as economic integration, the EEA has the clout to be considered as a potential security organization.75

Many Norwegian leaders now believe that the key to a peaceful, secure Europe is through economic integration. According to Thorvald Soltenberg, Norwegian Foreign Minister, "there seems to be a broad agreement in the country that our foreign and security
policy interests, including our policy to promote peace, will be able in the future to be best promoted through membership in the EC... As long as Norway stands outside the Community, which is the backbone of European politics, we will have less influence on questions which are of vital importance to Norwegian interest." With Sweden’s commitment to join the EC and Finland’s anticipated request for membership in December 1991, 75% of the Nordic population could be inside the Community. Minister Soltenberg expresses concern that Norway may enter a situation where EC membership is required to be a part of the Nordic area. He advocates EC membership to maintain the "close Nordic cooperation that will be important... to pursue our visions of peace and security for own and other peoples, and for our values such as fair distribution of wealth, the strengthening of local communities, and the development of our distinct character." 

From a Nordic perspective, one example of economic integration with security implications is found in the critically strategic Nordkalott area, Figure 7. The Nordic Council of Ministers has called European integration one of the most important challenges faced by the Nordkalott area in the 1990's. Nordkalott policies aimed at unemployment, emigration problems, and economic development in addition to border security concerns have been started by Norway, Sweden and Finland and more European support has been solicited.

Norwegian politicians realize that a united Nordic area within the EC would carry considerable weight. For example, the Nordic region, with its 20 million inhabitants, would have as many votes on the EC's Council of Ministers as Germany with its 80 million
population. In addition to Defense Minister Holst, Fisheries Minister Oddrun Pettersen, Education Minister Gudmund Hernes, and Environmental Affairs Minister Thorbjorn Berntsen support EC membership. Support is, however, not unanimous. Social Affairs Minister Tove Veierod believes that an EEA agreement is sufficient; Labor Minister Tove Strand Gerhardsen, Consumer and Family Affairs Minister Matz Sandmann, and Socialist Left Party leader Erik Solheim oppose membership; and Finance Minister Sigbjorn Johnsen, Development Aid Minister Grete Faremo, and Culture Minister Ase Kleveland are undecided. Prime Minister Gro Harlem Bruntland has not endorsed EC membership formally, but she and her Labor Party have recognized that the "EC is the driving force in the New Europe." She is expected to take the lead in identifying Norway's role in that New Europe and to push for EC membership before the next Labor Party Congress in November 1992.

Although many Norwegians have been paralyzed by the 1972 plebiscite which denied Norway EC membership, several recent opinion polls indicate a majority now favor EC membership - something no poll did in 1971-1972. Norwegians in favor of the EC do not believe that EC or EEA membership will automatically solve Norwegian economic or security problems but they do believe that the alternatives are to close the borders, sink to lower economic and increased welfare levels, and isolate Norway from an increasingly integrated Europe.

At the present the EC alone is ill-suited to assume the security responsibilities for a
New Europe, and is not capable of providing a viable security alternative. Without a common foreign and security policy, the EC does not have a workable security framework to meet the challenges established earlier for Norwegian security policy. "To divert the EC from its single-minded pursuit of economic integration by burdening it with a security function that it is unprepared to accommodate might retard and possibly undermine European unity."83

If neither the EC nor the CSCE is capable of providing a security framework, what might be needed to promote integration and reduce instability in the post-Cold War era is "a new security framework built on the Western European Union (WEU)... that would ultimately form the basis of a Europeanized collective defense organization."84 The WEU is the only European institution whose members have pledged to defend one another. Given its explicit commitment to European integration, it is the security equivalent of the EC and the CSCE in their respective economic and political domains. Established in 1955 to monitor German rearmament, the WEU's security functions were preempted by NATO after West Germany joined NATO and have served mainly as a "souvenir of security cooperation immediately after the war [WWII], a sort of monument to good intentions."85 Since the end of 1987 as Soviet changes became more defined, the WEU has grown in importance, particularly when it adopted a "Platform on Security Interests." This platform has solicited more active cooperation among its members, in support of rather than in opposition to NATO, in European security areas. Free of charter restraints on its activities outside Europe like NATO, the WEU authorized European participation in the 1987 reflagging of Kuwaiti
tankers and in the Gulf War against Iraq.

Support for the WEU, is growing as evidenced by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mitterand's December 1990 letter to the heads of the European Council expressing hope that the WEU would become the centerpiece of European security. In October 1991, Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterand reconfirmed their hope that the "WEU would become the pillar of joint European security and defense policy" and called for "the creation of a corps-strength Western European army as a step toward giving the region an independent defense capability."86 Although European officials have stated that the French-German proposal, coupled with a September 1991 British-Italian proposal for creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force, would establish regional military groups that remain subservient to NATO, it is evident that a new order is emerging. A mandate exists for leading Western Europe toward greater economic and political union that includes establishing a common foreign and defense policy. "The new WEU would complement NATO. It would not become a rival of the Alliance, but the identity of a European security system is being created. It is a fact. It exists."87

Minister Holst has identified the WEU" as an organization in search of a mission and a framework"88 and has not endorsed Norwegian participation in the WEU.

"If the WEU were to establish special rapid reaction forces for out-of-area intervention, the problems could multiply as nations would scramble to hold their fingers on the safety-catches as well as the triggers. It could raise difficult problems concerning reactions with NATO, and it could detract from

51
the ability of the WEU countries to respond collectively or to participate in peace-keeping or enforcement missions...It has the disadvantage of neither comprising all the members of the EC nor all the European members of NATO [Norway is not a member of the WEU]. It could play a useful role...in facilitating cooperation in Europe, provided it does not detract from the unity."
CHAPTER VII
NORWEGIAN ALTERNATIVES FOR REGIONAL STABILITY
IN THE NORTH

The first major point of NATO's new strategy is that it is based on the concept of cooperative security. Secondly, it focuses on precautions against crises, crisis control, and solutions to crisis, and no longer on defense and deterrence. The third main point is that NATO adopt new instruments in order to cope with risks that come from all possible directions, not only from one direction as before. Then NATO will stress the multinational character of our units far more, become more mobile, and change the structure of its armed forces with a view to more flexibility and mobility.\textsuperscript{90}

Manfred Woerner
NATO Secretary General

Norway needs NATO for collective defense because it is the only working organization currently capable of guaranteeing security in the New Europe. NATO is not an end in itself, but is needed militarily and politically. Militarily, NATO does not need a threat to justify its existence and is no longer needed to ward off an immediate threat but as a precaution against immediate and long-term risks. Politically, NATO is the only forum where North America and Europe can come together, take precautions against crises, and conduct crisis management when necessary. NATO, however, needs to make changes and develop alternatives for regional stability. Although the U.S. will be needed to provide stability and reassurance through NATO, a reunited Europe must eventually accept
responsibility for its defense and cannot expect the U.S. to maintain an indefinite military presence in Europe. As Henry Kissinger has noted, nations have permanent interests, not permanent friends.\textsuperscript{91}

Consistent with Secretary Woerner’s adjusted strategy for NATO, four approaches for meeting Norway’s security challenges and promoting regional stability in the North will be developed. The first of these is creation of a NATO Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) with a Base Force and an Augmentation Force as supplements. A Rapid Reaction Force is a viable approach because it circumvents certain constraints imposed by existing Norwegian security patterns but yet meets short-term Norwegian security needs for a shield from crisis and stability and a link to an integrated Europe, and long-term needs for a link to the U.S. while maintaining a European perspective.

For political reasons, Norway has certain self-imposed restrictions on foreign bases and troops on its soil. There are no indications that these restrictions will be reconsidered in order to make a more permanent Allied presence in this region possible. A solution to defense of Norway will, therefore, have to be found within the framework of these restrictions.\textsuperscript{92}

Major General Arne Solli
Inspector General
Royal Norwegian Army

Since Norwegian national security policy will always stem from a desire for crisis stability and reassurance, one of the best alternatives for regional stability is to find
politically acceptable alternatives and reinforcements early in a crisis. Because "the
reduction of forward deployed forces in Germany...means that NATO's future strategy will
rely even more on rapid reinforcement in time or crisis," General Vigleik Eide, NATO's
Military Committee Chairman, recently endorsed the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force as
large as a corps with lead elements able to deploy within one week. Specifically, on May
28, 1991, NATO announced a revamped concept that includes:

* A mobile immediate reaction force numbering 5,000 capable of responding to crisis
in 72 hours.

* A Rapid Reaction Corps of 50,000-70,000 designed to respond in less than one
week. The Corps would be commanded by the British and include two British
divisions, two multinational divisions, and U.S. ground, air, and transport units.

* A Base Force of seven multinational corps designed to defend Western Europe.

Included would be:

- three German corps,
- one Dutch corps,
- one Belgian corps,
- one mixed German and Danish corps, and
- one U.S. corps with a U.S. division serving in the German corps and vice versa.

* An Augmentation Force, made of primarily U.S. units, designed to reinforce
NATO's Base Force.  

General Sir Patrick Palmer, AFNORTH, also states that NATO "can provide the sort
of rapid reaction capability which is necessary not only for war but for crisis management" in the North. He strongly advocates a Rapid Reaction Force that would be multinational in nature, coordinate with the AMF, provide at least two viable light and two heavy divisions, deploy within 24 hour notification, have U.S. strategic and sealift support, and maintain strong regional reinforcement. This recommendation has many advantages: politically, its multinational nature is less provocative than an alternative that depends heavily on U.S. forces; its success strengthens the cohesion of the NATO alliance and of the European security order; it ties U.S. to Europe for lift support; and it identifies requirements before a crisis occurs. General Solli also endorses the RRF concept since the alternative "that seems to have the best chance of success would be to provide Norway with certain tactical capabilities, thus reducing certain deficiencies in its defense. Such capabilities could be fire support, long-range armor systems, and mobility." 

According to General Gjeseth, land forces commander for South Norway and Defense Commission member, Norway is willing to participate in future NATO Rapid Reaction Forces. This participation is not because Norwegian military forces would be decisive, but because they would be a symbol of NATO solidarity and because NATO continues to provide an essential framework for U.S. engagement in the management of security in Europe. Norway is concerned over the nature of continued American military presence in Europe and supports integration of U.S. troops in the multinational formations at the corps level over an independent American corps structure. From a Norwegian perspective, integration by the U.S. is required to maintain a credible capacity for reconstitution; pre-
positioning of ammunition, fuel and equipment; rapid reinforcement; lift capabilities; and periodic exercises. Because this alternative presents one of the most feasible approaches to overcoming Norwegian hesitation in preparing for crisis and accepting Allied reinforcements, it is one of the most effective options.

The second approach for meeting Norway’s security challenges involves adjusting NATO’s maritime concept of operations to reflect a multinational, rapid response approach with on-call forces in reserve if needed. With a shift from forward defense to forward presence, crisis response, protection of SLOC’s and control of shipping, NATO needs to respond to the risks posed by the internally unstable political and economic environment in the Soviet Union/Russian Republic, while retaining the potential to combat residual Soviet military capabilities.

Since the U.S. Atlantic Fleet is one of the most important sources of reinforcement to Norway, Norway requires U.S. and NATO maritime forces to deter horizontal escalation should the Soviet Union/Russian Republic attempt to exploit the comparative Soviet advantages in the Northern region. Because Norway is still interested in preserving stability and low tension in the North, Norway needs an Allied capacity for forward defense at sea that contributes to stability in support of Norway’s policy of reassurance and a capacity for credible defense that contributes to deterrence. Therefore, Norway would support and benefit from multinational forces having graduated capabilities to meet a variety of crisis response tasks associated with NATO security requirements.
One approach for NATO forces proposed by Admiral Leon Edney, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), would be particularly advantageous in meeting Norway’s security needs. These forces are categorized as Standing Naval Forces and On-Call NATO Task Groups, Task Forces and Expanded Task Forces.

* Standing Naval Forces (SNF) would closely resemble current structures (Standing Naval Force Atlantic with U.S., U.K., Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Belgium and Norway as participants; Standing Naval Force Channel; and Naval On-Call Forces Mediterranean) and comprise the baseline peace-time presence. A crisis or risk factor that NATO determines to be serious enough to warrant a surveillance and presence effort could be assigned to an augmented SNF.

* On-Call NATO Task Groups, comprised of additional cruisers and destroyers, would be a Task Group of 8-10 ships with AAW, ASW, ASUW, EW, AEGIS, cruise missile and NGFS capabilities. A crisis requiring surveillance and presence that had the potential to involve limited conflict could be assigned to this Task Group, with units tailored to the evaluated risk.

* On-Call Task Forces would consist of the elements of the NATO Task Group with one CV/CVS to provide additional sea control, air control and power projection capabilities. An amphibious assault group (Dutch and United Kingdom Royal Marines) could be assigned.

* On-Call NATO Expanded Task Forces would include multiple CV’s, a full amphibious landing force, and a full complement of multi-mission capable escorts designated to represent NATO’s most capable maritime force, available for use in a
major crisis.

These On-Call Forces would be available to operate anywhere essential to Alliance interests and flexibly assigned to the Major NATO Commander best suited to exercise command. On-Call Force structures would be identified in advance, trained to fight, and maintained in required readiness and availability categories to provide the rapid, effective response needed. Failure to control any crisis with these graduated response forces would be expected to lead to full mobilization.100

In light of Norwegian budgeting constraints and a revision to the traditional Soviet threat, the third Norwegian security option is to hedge against possible crises through participation in a multinational naval force arrangement. This participation comes through a NATO Multinational Maritime Force (NMMF) option, similar to the SACLANT proposal, bilateral Multinational Naval Cooperative Options (MNCO) with the U.S., or regional MNCO's with other European Allies.

Although deterrence on the Northern flank traditionally implies the use of Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG) as force multipliers to overcome Soviet advantages in stationed aircraft, airfields and residual capabilities;101 Norway's security equation would be enhanced by MNCO’s with CVBG capabilities and by MNCO’s with with maritime elements other than carriers. During peace-time, these MNCO’s (or NMMF’s) "guarantee security, support political unity and enhance stability."102 For example, MNCO’s consisting of maritime patrol aircraft elements using Norwegian P-3’s from Andoya; small combatant
elements using Norwegian frigates or MTB's from Olavsen or Haakonsvern; submarine elements using Norwegian KOBBEN or ULA class submarines; and amphibious elements are available. Norway's immediate security concerns with population spill-overs from the East or problems associated with Soviet instabilities can be counterbalanced by MNCO's "involvement in non-military missions, e.g. humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and border controls." If conditions worsened, MNCO's have the capability to escalate into a NATO assigned CVBG sized force with expeditionary ARG's to conduct crisis prevention and management, conflict avoidance through forward presence, and power projection if necessary. With only 12 U.S. carriers scheduled to remain active (six in the U.S. Atlantic Fleet) and reductions in Norway's defense budgets, multinational naval forces, including the two light and four ASW carriers in NATO, provide a legitimate vehicle for maintaining naval presence in area of mutual interest in the Northern region and relieving Norway's security burdens. MNCO's are advantageous to Norway because they enhance collective defense by promoting closer relations with Allies; improve stability by developing a commitment to security in the Nordic area without isolating Norway; reduce risk by complimenting on-station force levels during a period of force drawdowns; develop a framework for burden-sharing; and provide a rapid, positive response that is often less provocative than ground forces in crises.

In peace-time Norway will not have adequate forces in place to overcome unexpected emergencies or crises without reinforcement. The final approach for meeting Norway's security challenges centers on actions Norway should take for reception of Allied
reinforcements. Although the military forces, e.g. RRF’s, NMMF’s, MNCO’s, 4th MEB, UK/Dutch Royal Marines, and COB assets, earmarked for reinforcement of Norway belong to NATO, they are dependent upon Norway for host nation support to sustain their combat capability. "Before a nation or an Alliance decides to move military forces into an area, three principles are operative; political timing, collective cohesion, and logistics support."\textsuperscript{105}

Political timing may be the ultimate determinant of a successful reinforcement. Reinforcement becomes more difficult if Norwegian leaders delay in calling for reinforcement in crises. If Norway wishes to control crises in the strategic Northern region and avoid the adverse effects of delayed reinforcement, she needs to make the political and military decision to act before being significantly challenged. Because "political timing can set or regain the initiative,"\textsuperscript{106} Norway requires a streamlined decision-making process to convince her Allies she has the political will to act in crisis.

Since coalitions are strong when they function in concert with each nation assuming a credible part in the reinforcement effort, Norway needs a competent defense force to promote collective cohesion. Norway’s military strategy demonstrates collective security goals. To convince Allies to remain committed to Norway’s defense, Norway needs to remain committed to her Allies with a force structure that supports the safe reception of Allied reinforcements. Norway cannot reduce her military forces to levels where they are unable to support reinforcements effectively, or those reinforcements may not commit to
Norway's defense.

Reinforcement requires logistic support to deploy and employ substantial combat forces. Norway’s commitment to people, fuel, munitions, spares and facilities is solidified by a Total Defense Concept that ranks Norway first in the active/plus reserve defense manpower/population ratios among all Western Allies.\textsuperscript{107} This support is necessary to maintain a strong reinforcement posture. Constrained by geography and limited by exceptional lift requirements during mobilization, coalition logistic support is vital to crisis management in the Northern region.

In summary, these approaches provide a solid framework for Norwegian national security policy. They are consistent with Norway's existing security patterns, can be developed within her social and political constraints, and meet her immediate and long-term security challenges. Because these alternatives call for smaller, restructured, highly mobile and flexible active forces; rely on multinational corps and naval options with links to an integrated Europe and transatlantic ties to the U.S.; reduce readiness, training and cost requirements for active units; but also encourage Norway to help herself by developing the political will, collective cohesion and military commitment to support expected reinforcements; they provide viable options for regional stability in the Northern region.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

An unregulated situation in the North could easily result in a decoupling of Norway from the new, cooperative regimes of Europe. Norway could be thrown into a tension field, reducing her freedom of action. Hence, it is in our national interest...that cooperative negotiations with Europe continue.108

Johan Jorgen Holst
Norwegian Minister of Defense

For Norwegians, a clear and present danger has been replaced by contingent future risks, residual threats and unspecified hazards. Norway can no longer count on a predictable Soviet threat. Norwegian national security policy must meet challenges which go beyond the traditional use of military force. The security structures that Norway uses to cope with these challenges must avoid rigidity and incorporate adaptation and innovation. "Stability is likely to replace readiness as the key criteria for Norwegian security, smaller forces will succeed larger forces...Political organization and commitments, coupled with economic integration, could supplant military deployments and demonstrations as the basic currency of security management in the future."109 Regardless of these new developments, however, two things remain clear. "For Norway the Russian Republic will always be Norway’s neighbor and will be the largest single military power in Europe...This means that Norway has to have the closest possible ties with the rest of Europe, so that Norway’s
position as Russia's neighbor does not become an isolated affair, but part of Russia's relations with the rest of Europe.\textsuperscript{110}

Norway's interests are best served in an integrated approach that maintains close ties to Europe and includes, at the multinational level, a United States led Atlantic Alliance. As a structure for a new security system that eventually develops into a European collective defense system, NATO can support the evolving process of political integration in the CSCE, economic integration in the EC and EEA, and security integration under a revised NATO framework. As the New Europe assumes more responsibility for the common defense of Europe, Norwegian national security policy should integrate into this emerging European security order and actively support three pillars - the revised Atlantic Alliance, resurgent CSCE and invigorated EC.

In its political role, the CSCE security program benefits Norway in three important areas: confidence-building measures, arms reduction and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The CSCE "provides a compliment not a supplement to NATO."\textsuperscript{111} Since the CSCE encompasses all the members of NATO, the EC, and the ex-Warsaw Pact and possesses key political features important to the emerging New Europe, Norway should use her CSCE membership as an instrument of political cooperation and integration. Most importantly, Norway needs to use the CSCE, which is growing in prominence, for a more united political dialogue in the New Europe.

To exploit the EC's security potential and participate in the economic integration of the New Europe, Norway should seek EC membership. Because the EC, and now the new
EEA, provide the most publicly accepted and economically powerful framework for managing the process of Europe's growing together, the EC will emerge as an important part of the overall security architecture for post-Cold War Europe. Since the EC will encompass most of the members of NATO and the EEA, and posses key economic features important to the New Europe, Norway should seek EC membership as an instrument of economic cooperation and integration in the New Europe. For Norway, the EC also provides a compliment not a substitute for NATO. The Nordic area and Europe are in the process of coming together. Norway's choices are to join or be left behind in the integration of Europe.

The biggest drawback for Norwegian commitment to a WEU framework for Europeanizing Western defense is fear of precipitating U.S. withdrawal from European security arrangements vital to the defense of the Northern flank. If Europe commits to Europeanizing Europe's security framework through the WEU, United States influence will inevitably decline. Norway would not benefit from an increased WEU role that coped with the contingencies in Europe but operated outside the NATO region, particularly with a strong and independent role by a non-NATO France, and weakened NATO; integrated Eastern Europe but ignored the stability provided by NATO to the Northern flank; and pacified the U.S.S.R./Russian Republic but ignored the risks to Norway from internal Soviet strife and residual Soviet military forces. For these reasons, Norway should not accept the risks associated with WEU membership. Since Norway cannot jeopardize her NATO transatlantic link with the U.S. and can maintain a European link with membership in the CSCE, and as
recommended in the EC, she should not pursue membership in the WEU.

What does Norway want or need from any future European security organization? According to Minister Hoist, any new security framework must maintain coherence by linking transitional considerations to long-term assessments and future force postures to possible contingencies. The overall political concept should encompass basic principles, values and interests which unite Allies rather than attempt to depict a rapidly changing political landscape. The strategic concept should focus on the provision of generic capabilities rather than on tailored capabilities predicated on the existence of identifiable threats. The military strategy must emphasize flexibility and mobility, capabilities for immediate and rapid reinforcement, multinational formations, and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The framework should provide a manifest capacity for reconstitution in the event preparations for forward pressure or possible attack would emerge from the unstable East. The security organization needs an integrated command structure with command arrangements restructured to accommodate German unification. In order to preserve the cohesion of the security order in Europe, the command arrangements should continue the defense of the peripheries to defense of the core areas.\textsuperscript{113} These objectives reflect Norway’s immediate security challenges to shield Norway from crises and instability, and to maintain links to an integrated Europe; show concern for Norway’s long-term challenges to maintain a military link to the U.S., monitor the U.S./Soviet strategic relationship, and maintain a Eurostrategic perspective; and assess that Norwegian military forces cannot meet their security needs alone. They imply that the collective defense
provided by NATO still constitutes the best basis for stability, balance and security for Norway.

Although committed to NATO, Norway is not unwilling to explore other European security options. Even Minister Holst realizes that Norway must join the new European security order. "Constraining future attack options may be pursued by a combination of residual capability to block such options through collective defense arrangements in NATO and the pursuit of other tacit and explicit cooperative European defense measures in the North...Norway will seek to anchor cooperative security arrangements in a broader multilateral security construction in Europe at large."114 Minister Holst's observations highlight Norway's three key security options for the future. One, Norway needs to maintain collective defense through a revised NATO security framework. Two, Norway needs to develop multilateral cooperation within a European political structure for crisis prevention and crisis management through the resurgent CSCE. Three, Norway needs to promote dialogue with an increasingly integrated Europe, particularly through economic cooperation in the EC.

These security options are also consistent with the vision that NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner holds for a revised NATO that adjusts to a New Europe. According to Secretary Woerner, "a new European state of peace where many organizations cooperate and no one has a monopoly is the supreme objective of our Alliance. This Europe will be mainly based on three pillars - the Atlantic Alliance, the EC, and the CSCE. "115
**TABLE I**

SOVIET POST-CFE BUILD-UP ON THE NORTHERN FLANK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>FORCE</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CMD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theater bombers</td>
<td>3 Bomber regts</td>
<td>100 SU-24</td>
<td>Baltic</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontal aviation</td>
<td>1 FGA regt</td>
<td>40 MIG-27</td>
<td>Kola</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 recce sqdn</td>
<td>12-18 SU-17</td>
<td>Kola</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 CAS sqdn</td>
<td>10 SU-25</td>
<td>Kola</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 FGA regts</td>
<td>90 SU-17</td>
<td>Baltic</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack helos</td>
<td>1 AH sqdn</td>
<td>10-12 MI-24</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>VPVO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne divisions</td>
<td>76 Ground ABD</td>
<td>ABD</td>
<td>Pskov</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>KGB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground forces</td>
<td>77 MRD MRD</td>
<td>MRD</td>
<td>Archangelsk</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Tank Batt DTB</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Ground MRD MRD</td>
<td>Klaipeda</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 ARTY BDE HAB</td>
<td>HAB</td>
<td>Viborg</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Navy</td>
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AD=Division
MRD=Motorized Rifle Division
DTB=Detached Tank Battalion
HAB=Heavy Artillery Brigade
NIB=Naval Infantry Brigade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>MBT</th>
<th>ACV</th>
<th>ARTY</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petsamo</td>
<td>61 NIB</td>
<td>40 MBT</td>
<td>26 PT-76</td>
<td>18 2S1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petsamo</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>40 MBT</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>18 N/A</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serebrianski</td>
<td>175 NIB</td>
<td>40 MTB</td>
<td>26 PT-76</td>
<td>18 2S1</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serebrianski</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>40 MTB</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>18 N/A</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkhangelsk</td>
<td>77 CDC</td>
<td>220 T-80 MTB</td>
<td>30 ACV</td>
<td>152 ARTY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petsamo</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>51 T-80 MTB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>431 MBT</strong></td>
<td><strong>82+ACV</strong></td>
<td><strong>224 ARTY</strong></td>
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TABLE III

SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESIGNATION</th>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>IN SVC</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1991</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>DELTA IV</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>TYPHOON</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>DELTA III</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>YANKEE II</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>DELTA II</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>DELTA I</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>YANKEE I</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSB</td>
<td>HOTEL III</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSB</td>
<td>GOLF III/II</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Number units in the Northern Fleet
** Northern Fleet units as % of all units of that class in Soviet Navy

TABLE IV

NORDIC COUNTRIES' TRADE BY REGIONS, 1989

**Imports** 125 243 mill. US dollars

Rest of the world 21 778
Eastern Europe 6 612
USA, Canada 10 574

**Exports** 131 388 mill. US dollars

Rest of the world 17 351
Eastern Europe 5 992
USA, Canada 11 809

**TABLE V**

INTRA-NORDIC TRADE: VALUE OF EXPORTS, 1989 (MILLION US $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value (Million US $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>127.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5,294.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>11,374.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3,335.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5,768.3</td>
</tr>
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</table>


72
### TABLE VI
**NORWEGIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

% of GDP (NORDIC COUNTRIES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE VII

ROYAL NORWEGIAN NAVAL FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Units</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ula (S-300)</td>
<td>Submarines (including 3 being built)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kobben (S-318)</td>
<td>Submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>Missile Frigates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sleiper</td>
<td>ASW Corvettes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hawk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Snogg</td>
<td>Missile FAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Storm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Vidar</td>
<td>Minelayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MSC-60</td>
<td>Coastal Minewsweepers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 coastal artillery installations
(15 in north Norway with majority near Troms, Lygenfjord, Vest Fjorden, Ofotfjord).

Personnel
8000 includes 2000 in Coastal Artillery
includes 5000 conscripts
33000 mobilized forces

Major Naval Bases
Haakonsvern (Bergen)
Ramsund
Olavsvern (Tromso)
Horten

**TABLE VIII**

NATO GROUND FORCES LIKELY TO BE COMMITTED TO NORTH NORWAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Available (days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finmark Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Norwegian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade North</td>
<td>Local/Semi-active</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade 14</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>0-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade 15</td>
<td>Locally mobilized</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade 5</td>
<td>Locally mobilized</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade 6</td>
<td>Mobilized/airlifted</td>
<td>2-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMF/NATO Composite Force</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK/Dutch Royal Marines</td>
<td>Airlift/Sealift</td>
<td>2-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 MEB</td>
<td>Airlift/Sealift</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 MEB</td>
<td>Deployed by ship from U.S.</td>
<td>8-12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Norwegian Personnel

- 22000 including 15000 conscripts
- 165000 mobilized forces

Norwegian Organization

- 13 Brigades (3 armored, 4 mechanized, 6 infantry)
- 28 Independent Infantry Battalions
- 7 Independent Artillery Battalions
- 50-60 Independent Infantry Companies

Total Defense Concept

- 4000 Active Forces including 26000 conscripts
- 500 Home Guard in peace
- 80000 Home Guard mobilized within 2-6 hours
- 870000 Available manpower
- 320000 Full mobilization including 115,000 in Civil Defense

### TABLE IX

**ROYAL NORWEGIAN AIR FORCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Aircraft</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Squadron Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>F-16 A/B</td>
<td>332 at Rygge (south)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>338 at Orland (central)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>301 at Bodo (north)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>334 at Bodo (north)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>F-5 A/B</td>
<td>Operational Conversion Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>P-3 C</td>
<td>333 at Andoya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>P-3 N</td>
<td>Coast Guard use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>C-130 H</td>
<td>Composite Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Falcon-20 C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DHC-6 Twin Otter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Personnel**

- **9500** including 4800 conscripts
- **37000** mobilized forces

**Major Air Bases**

- Andoya
- Bardufoss
- Bodo
- Stavanger

**Other**

- **6 NOAH** located at 6 air bases in central and north
- **5 Air Force Stations**
### TABLE X

**NATO AIR FORCES LIKELY TO BE COMMITTED TO NORTH NORWAY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Squadrons/Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Norway</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNoAf</td>
<td>2 F-16</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Fighter interceptor attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>3 F-16</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Fighter bomber attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>1 F-15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>All weather air defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>1 RF-4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Recon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMF (US)</td>
<td>1 F-16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Fighter bomber attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMF (RMN)</td>
<td>1 F-16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Fighter bomber attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMF (UK)</td>
<td>1 Jaquar</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Fighter bomber attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>2 F-18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Fighter bomber attack (all weather)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 AV-8B</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Ground support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 RF-4B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Recon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 EA-6B</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>EW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 KC-13D</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tanker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Central Norway** |                |        |                                           |
| RNoAF            | 1 F-16         | 16     | Fighter interceptor attack                |
| USAF             | 1 F-16         | 24     | Fighter bomber attack                     |

TABLE XI

ESTIMATED AIRLIFT CAPABILITY AT NORWEGIAN AIR BASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Estimated Daily Airlift Sortie Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bardufoss</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andoya</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evenes</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodo</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orland</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trondheim</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# TABLE XII

**DISTANCES FROM SOVIET TO NORWEGIAN AIR BASES (NM)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norwegian Air Base</th>
<th>Soviet Air Base&lt;sup&gt;a,b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Pechanga</th>
<th>Murmansk</th>
<th>Alakurti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bardufoss</td>
<td></td>
<td>266</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evenes</td>
<td></td>
<td>316</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andoya</td>
<td></td>
<td>316</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodo</td>
<td></td>
<td>403</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orland</td>
<td></td>
<td>645</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trondheim</td>
<td></td>
<td>639</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>671</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>distsances assume overflight of Finnish territory

<sup>b</sup>distsances assume Swedish airspace is not violated
FIGURE 1
THE NORDIC BALANCE

FIGURE 3

SOVIET SUBMARINE MOVEMENTS AND POTENTIAL BASTIONS

FIGURE 4

SOVIET SUBMARINE TRANSIT ROUTES IN THE BARENTS SEA

FIGURE 5
SOVIET AIR AND NAVAL BASES ON THE KOLA PENINSULA

FIGURE 6

THE NORDIC BARRIER; NORDIC EUROPE AS SEEN FROM THE U.S.S.R.

FIGURE 7

MAJOR NORTH NORWAY AIR AND NAVAL BASES


86
FIGURE 8
NORWEGIAN AIR BASES
FIGURE 9

THE NORDKALOTT AREA
NORDKalotten

Norwegian Sea

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

LAPPLANDS LÄN

NORSKLANDFYLKE

U.S.S.R.

NORRBOTTENS LÄN

VÄSTERBOTTENS LÄN

POTENTIAL EUROPEAN SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

- EEA
  - Denmark
  - Greece

- EC
  - Ireland
  - Belgium/Lux
  - France
  - Spain/Portugal
  - Netherlands
  - Italy
  - U.K./Germany

- NATO
  - U.S.
  - Canada
  - Turkey

- CSCE
  - U.S.S.R.
  - Bulgaria
  - Hungary
  - Poland
  - Yugoslavia
  - Romania
  - Cyprus
  - Malta
  - Holy See
  - Monaco
  - San Marino
  - Liechtenstein
  - Czechoslovakia

- NL
  - Switzerland
  - Austria
  - Norway
  - Iceland
NOTES

Chapter I


2. Ibid.


5. Ibid.


Chapter II


15. Lund, Don't Rock the Boat, pp.16-17.

Chapter III


24. Ibid., p.804.

25. Ibid., p.808.


32. Ibid.

Chapter IV


Chapter V


40. Ibid. p.42-43.


45. Pederson, pp.43-47.

46. Lund, Don't Rock the Boat, p.58.

48. Ibid.

49. Lund, Don't Rock the Boat, p.41.


52. Lund, p.66.


Chapter VI


60. Ibid., p.71.

61. Ibid., p.71.

62. Ibid., p.72.

63. De Santis, p.53.


67. De Santis, pp.55-56.


72. Ibid.


77. Ibid.


79. Malmo, p.27.


83. De Santis, p.56.

84. Ibid., p.51.

85. Ibid., p.57.


87. Ibid.


89. Ibid., pp.10-12.

Chapter VII


96. Solli, p.43.


103. Ibid.


106. Ibid.


Chapter VIII


112. Ibid., p.12.

113. Ibid., p.7.


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Wetterquist, Fredrik. "Scandinavia’s Coming Winter." Defense and Foreign Affairs,